Communication Theory Brant B.

Bur l e son Sally Planalp Ten: Two Producing Emotion(a1) Messages Pages 221-250 Emotion is often a major part of the content of messages and is an important influence on message production, but connections between emotion and message-production processes have not received systematic attention until quite recently. This article explores 3 ways in which emotion and message production are connected: (a) Emotions and moods are important influences on cognitive processes underlying message production; ( b ) emotion is expressed as the content of messages; and ( c ) emotion knowledge is used t o manage the emotional states of others. Exploring how people communicate about emotion, under the influence of emotion, and in efforts to manage emotion brings us face to face with the mysteries and challenges of both communication and emotion research. We must grapple with problems tha t long have plagued communication research: H o w can intentional and unintentional expressions of emotion be reconciled? H o w d o emotional states influence communicative behavior? H o w does communicative behavior influence emotional states? We also have to wrestle with persistent problems in emotion research: What constitutes a n emotion? What causes emotional reactions

of certain types? H o w does emotion interact with cognition? It is interesting terrain. In this paper we address issues related to emotion and the production of messages (for reviews of research examining emotion and message reception, see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991). We will be concerned primarily with three major ways that emotion and message-production processes are connected.' First, affective states (both emotions and moods) influence how people produce messages (wha t we might call emotional messages). Second, emotion can be expressed as the content of message-production processes (wha t we might call messages of emotion. Third, one person's emotions are often the targets of messages produced by others, such a s when people try to comfort, inspire, o r intimidate each other (wha t we might call emotion-focused messages). Given the space available t o us, o u r survey of these issues will necessarily produce more of a sketch than a comprehensive map. Copyright 0 2000 International Communication Association 221 Communication Theory Our hope is that this initial guide will prompt much more detailed explorations in the future. Emotion as an Influence on Message-Production Processes Our first question is this: How does affect influence message-production processes? Tha t is, how d o affective states (e.g., anxiety, anger, happiness) influence various cognitive operations that are commonly believed

to figure in message production? Models of Message Production and Affective Experience Affect and message production are complex, multifaceted phenomena. Hence, exploring how affect influences message production requires detailed models of both the nature of affect and the cognitive processes underlying message production, as well a s an appreciation that different aspects of affect may influence distinct elements of message production. The Message-Production Process. Quite sophisticated cognitive models of message production have been developed in recent years (see Burleson, 1995; Greene, 1997b; Hewes, 1995; along with the articles in this issue of Communication Theory). Although the models presented by particular theorists differ in important ways, most of them propose similar outlines of the processes assumed t o figure in message production. Abstracting across these models, it appears that message production involves the processes of ( a ) interpretation (e.g., defining the situation; making attributions about the causes of others actions; inferring others internal states; noting relevant aspects of the setting; determining situationally relevant roles and rules), which gives rise t o ( b ) goal generation (forming intentions pertaining to primary and secondary instrumental objectives; forming intentions pertaining to relational and identity objectives), which serves as the impetus to (c) planning or action assembly (building behavioral programs or cognitive representations of action lines), which eventuates in ( d ) enactment (executing behavioral plans or output representations), which is followed by (e) moni-

toring (observing and evaluating the outcomes of ones behavior-a directed form of interpretation), the results of which may lead to ( f ) reencoding (recycling processes b through e i n light of monitored outcomes). Emotion and Mood. Models of affect frequently begin by distinguishing between two primary forms of affective experience, mood and emotion (see Batson, Shaw, & Oleson, 1992; Frijda, 1993). As forms of affect, both emotion and mood are feelings that have some valence (typically on a good-bad or positive-negative continuum) and some level of 222 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages intensity (mild to strong). There are, however, important differences in these two forms of affect. Emotions typically have some definite or specific object (they are provoked by some particular circumstance), exhibit a relatively brief duration (in most cases lasting only a few moments), and are comparatively intense. Moods, in contrast, are more global and diffuse in character, tend to be less intense states than emotions, are comparatively enduring (often lasting for many minutes, even hours), and usually are not tied to any particular provoking incident. Thus, moods tend to be background states of which people may be only vaguely aware. Moods generally have few direct motivational consequences and typically influence behavior (when they do) through subtle effects on perception, memory, information integration, and other forms of information processing (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995a). In contrast, a central element of an emotion is the arousal of distinct motivational and behavioral orientations. These orientations are most

widely referred to as action tendencies; the concept of action tendency figures prominently in the analysis of emotions offered by a diverse array of theorists (e.g., Averill, 1980; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Parkinson, 1995). Action tendencies are biologically based behavioral responses that have the function of helping people cope adaptively with emotion-arousing events. Associated with each action tendency is a distinctive set of cognitive appraisals or interpretations, a characteristic subjective feeling state (affect), and a pattern of physiological arousal or activity. For example, the action tendency for anger is to attack the offending party; for fear, the action tendency is avoidance or escape (see Lazarus, 1991; C. Smith & Pope, 1992). Action tendencies are not hardwired reflexes or automatically executed programs; these tendencies may be (and often are) suppressed, ignored, or transformed. But regardless of whether they are exhibited or suppressed, action tendencies provide a behavioral orientation toward the emotion-arousing event. Emotion and Message Production Effects of Emotion on Communicative Goals. One way in which emotional experiences may influence message production is through the goal generation process. Message-production researchers have given increased attention to goal generation in recent years, but even sophisticated models of this process have not explicated the potential influence of emotions on interaction goals (see Wilson, 1997). We believe the concept of action tendency provides a vehicle for linking emotion and the generation of communicative goals. The action tendencies associated with particular emotions provide

only abstract behavioral orientations to emotion-arousing situations. Thus, these emotion-based tendencies must exert behavioral consequences through their influence on specific, contextually relevant goals. In gen2 2 3 Communication Theory eral, then, (a) interpretation or appraisal of a situation generates a certain emotional state, along with, of course, a variety of cognitions, (b) the emotional state carries with it an action tendency or abstract behavioral goal that, in turn, (c) informs, in conjunction with other factors, the generation of specific communicative goals relevant to that particular situation. A general scheme like this has been developed by Weiner (1985,1995) in his attribution-emotion-action model of behavior. Consistent with appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Lazarus, 1991), Weiner and his colleagues argue that ( a ) information in a situation leads a perceiver to attribute a targets conduct (e.g., missing class) to certain causes (e.g., misfortune vs. laziness), ( b ) these attributions arouse complementary emotional states (e.g., sympathy vs. irritation) that, in turn, ( c ) modulate the likelihood of specific behavioral reactions (e.g., loaning vs. withholding ones class notes). Weiner and his colleagues (see Weiner, 1 9 9 5 ) report considerable empirical support for this model in predicting general behavioral orientations (e.g., the self-reported likelihood of helping or not helping in certain situations). Bradbury and Fincham (1992) applied a similar model to the context of marital interaction. These researchers found, consistent with Weiners framework, tha t distinct attributions for the causes of a spouses behavior were associated with spe-

cific emotional reactions, and these emotions, in turn, were associated with particular behaviors toward the spouse. Although interesting, this research did not examine just how attributions and emotions resulted in characteristic forms of behavior and, in particular, did not examine the connection between emotional states and interaction goals. MacGeorge ( 1999b) recently elaborated and extended Weiners framework to examine explicitly the likelihood of pursuing varied communicative goals in situations where the provision of social support was contextually relevant. Specifically, MacGeorge found that when situational information led participants to feel sympathetic rather than irritated toward a target experiencing emotional distress (manipulated by making the target appear more or less responsible for a problematic event), they indicated a greater likelihood of pursuing communicative goals such as making the target feel better, feel understood, and feel sympathized with. When participants were led to feel more irritated toward the target, they indicated a greater likelihood of pursuing critical and recriminative goals such as getting the target t o recognize his or her responsibility for the situation, getting the target to see tha t he or she needed t o behave more responsibly in the future, and getting the target to realize that his or her behavior had negative consequences. Importantly, MacGeorge was able t o show (through path-analytic procedures) that perceiver attributions affected communicative goals largely through the mediation of emotional reactions. 224 Producing Ernotion(a1) Messages Although MacGeorges (1999b) results provide support for the no-

tion tha t attributions influence interaction goals through emotions, they leave unresolved many important questions about the precise ways in which emotions combine with other elements of a communicative situation in the generation of interaction goals. As just one example, the intimacy level between interactants has been found to influence a wide range of cognitions and behaviors. In particular, research suggests tha t information indicating a target is responsible for his or her distressed state is more likely to reduce help extended to low intimates (e.g., acquaintances) than high intimates (e.g., friends; see Weiner, 1995). Though not terribly surprising, this finding raises several interesting questions about how people generate interaction goals and the role of emotion in this process. For example, does intimacy affect interaction goals in support contexts by biasing attributions, and thereby influencing emotions (e.g., is the friend seen as less responsible than the acquaintance, with this attribution generating more sympathy and less irritation)? Does intimacy affect interaction goals not so much through biasing attributions but by influencing emotional reactions (e.g., does ones affection for intimates lead to more benign and sympathetic feelings for a friend than for an acquaintance, regardless of the attributions made ) ? Does intimacy affect interaction goals primarily through relational rules that, for example, dictate supportive behavior toward friends when they are in need, n o matter what one may think or feel about the causes of this n e e d ? The s e que s t ions , whi ch a r e cur r ent ly being addr e s s ed by MacGeorge (1999a), illustrate some of the complex factors tha t may both influence emotion and be influenced by emotion, in the process of

generating interaction goals. Although some research indicates that features of social situations may arouse emotions tha t influence communicative goals, other research suggests that personality traits may influence how situations are interpreted, the extent to which emotions are aroused by these interpretations, and the goals pursued in these situations. For example, people differ in their empathic orientation, here viewed as the dispositional tendency t o feel sympathetic concern on the part of distressed others. Research has found what appear to be causal linkages between emotional empathy ( t h e dispositional tendency to experience sympathetic concern for distressed othe r s ) a n d generation of supportive communication goals in samples of both children (e.g., Fabes, Eisenberg, Karbon, Troyer, & Switzer, 1 9 9 4 ) a n d adul t s (e.g., Tamborini, Salomonson, & Bahk, 1993; Trobst, Collins, & Embree, 1 9 9 4 ) . These findings suggest t h a t othe r personality t r a i t s may be associated wi th distinct emotional experiences (see Frijda, 1 9 9 3 ) tha t , in turn, generate characteristic goals. 225 Communication Theory Viewing personality traits as influencing communicative goals through the emotions these traits characteristically arouse addresses some of the objections that have been raised to personality-based explanations of message behavior (e.g., Hewes & Planalp, 1987). However, it remains unclear whether personality traits affect interaction goals through their influence on the interpretive process, the emotions aroused by particular

interpretations, the goals activated by particular emotions, or some combination of these. Moreover, it is quite possible that different traits affect interaction goals through different mechanisms. More broadly, there is much that we do not understand yet about how emotions influence communicative goals; several specific issues merit detailed investigation. First, just how does a global action tendency get instantiated in context-specific communicative intentions? What are the various processes through which the emotions manifest themselves in communicative intentions? Do emotions make memories of particular communicative goals especially salient, o r d o they exert their effects on specific intentions through other mechanisms? Second, to what extent are communicative goals determined by emotions and their accompanying action tendencies? Many other features of the person and situation also influence interaction goals (e.g., role considerations, politeness norms, relational rules, other situational demands, and priorities). H o w are all of these elements-in conjunction with aroused emotional states-synthesized in the goal formation process? Third, emotional states influence communicative goals in some situations more than others. People sometimes swallow their feelings, other times give their feelings play, and still other times get carried away by their feelings. How are these facts t o be explained? What are the processes that inhibit, allow, and magnify the motivational potentials associated with a n emotions action tendency in the process of forming communicative goals? Concepts like display rule account for conformity to social norms in the expression of emotion (see below), but d o

not directly address the differential effect that emotions have on communicative goals in different situations. Clearly, additional research is needed on a great many issues concerning the influence of emotions on communicative goals. Effects of Emotion on Message Planning and Enactment. The goal generation process is certainly not the only component of message production influenced by emotional experiences. There is considerable evidence tha t both the planning (action assembly) process and enactment (execution) process are influenced by emotions, sometimes strongly so. Although there are suggestions tha t emotions may facilitate these processes (perhaps through focusing attention and other cognitive resources o n the task a t hand; see Sarason, Sarason, & Pierce, 1991), the 226 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages overwhelming research focus has been o n how emotions-specially anxie t y - c a n disrupt the planning and generation of messages. Most of the research examining stage fright, social anxiety, communication apprehension, and related phenomena (see reviews by McCroskey & Beatty, 1998; Patterson & Ritts, 1997) has focused on the causes of social-communication anxiety, its personal and social consequences, and its alleviation. Recently, however, increased attention has turned t o the effects of anxiety o n the message-production process. People experience anxiety in communication situations for several reasons, including uncertainty about how to behave in a situation, the belief that they cannot meet the demands of the situation, and anticipation of negative reactions from others due t o their inadequate performances (see Greene &

Sparks, 1983; Patterson & Ritts, 1997). Regardless of its source, once aroused, anxiety tends t o have a variety of debilitating effects o n message production, especially if the experience of anxiety in social situations is chronic. Anxious communicators are less fluent and less organized; they are more likely to stutter, exit interactions when given the opportunity, exhibit a quivering voice, engage in less eye contact, repeat themselves, pause more frequently, loose track of ideas and the topical flow of interactions, speak more softly, and avoid many interactions when given the choice (Beatty & McCroskey, 1998; Patterson & Ritts, 1997). We wish to propose several distinct mechanisms through which anxiety may have these and related debilitating effects on message production (for a somewhat different set of mechanisms, see Leary, 1983). First, anxiety may distract the attentional capacities of the individual from the communicative task a t hand. At its core, anxiety reflects a concern with an uncertain threat (Lazarus, 1991). Given this core theme, it has been suggested tha t the action tendency associated with anxiety involves scanning for potential sources of danger (Leary, 1991; Mathews, 1990). Although such scanning (of both the perceptual field and memory) may be functional when the potential of danger is real, most social situations are not very dangerous, so this scanning devotes important attentional resources to little useful purpose. Hence, anxiety may distract attentional focus and concentration from where it would be more usefully placed-n relevant features of the ongoing communicative situation. Research needs to examine the extent to which anxious communicators exhibit a disrupted attentional focus during the message-planning process.

Second, the onset of social anxiety, especially for chronic sufferers, may generate a self-amplifying feedback loop wherein the anxious state is maintained and intensified. Those experiencing social anxiety regularly report having a host of negative, self-deprecatory thoughts, including not knowing what to d o in the situation, feeling they are sure t o fail, believing they will perform poorly in comparison t o others, expecting 227 Communication Theory they will look foolish o r incompetent in the eyes of others, anticipating they will be rejected by others, and so forth (Sarason et al., 1991) . These intrusive, self-preoccupied thoughts not only detract from attention to the ongoing situation (see above), they tend t o be quite unmotivating and are reported to be associated with reduced effort o n tasks (MacLeod, 1996) . Mor e serious, the prediction of failure and, especially, focus on the unpleasant or harmful consequences of failure, tend t o maintain the anxious state and may even intensify it over time. Two empirical implications of this account include that ( a ) the anxiety level of chronically anxious communicators should increase over the course of a communicative encounter while ( b ) the motivation to communicate should decrease. Future research should evaluate these predictions. Third, the intrusive, self-deprecatory thoughts tha t accompany the anxious state may interfere with the process of message planning or assembly. Mos t current views of message production assume that human beings are limited capacity information processors who must develop lines of behavior by retrieving relevant instructions from memory,

integrating these modular instructions into a coherent behavioral representation or program, and then physically executing the program. These processes all make demands on cognitive resources, especially working memory, where retrieved memories must be temporarily stored, integrated, and held until executed (for detailed presentations of this general scheme, see Berger, 1997, and Greene, 1995, 1997a ) . Anxiety may interfere with these cognitive processes by filling valuable working memory with task-irrelevant thoughts about the self. A recent study examining the message preparation process by low- and high-anxious individuals nicely illustrates the effects of such cognitive interference (Daly, Vangelisti, & Weber, 1995) . This study utilized a talk aloud protocol methodology to access the thoughts of participants during a 20-minute period in which they prepared a speech. Compared to low-anxious participants, those with high levels of communication anxiety reported more thoughts expressing nervousness about speaking and doubt about their personal capabilities; these subjects also reported fewer thoughts exhibiting focus on audience concerns, constraints in the speaking situation, tools available for the speech, and ideas they intended to include in the speech. The disruption in planning caused by irrelevant, intrusive thoughts may increase the need for editing and revision, processes that consume even more of scarce cognitive resources. Consistent with this, Daly et al. (1995) found that highly anxious participants evaluated the completeness of their thoughts more than less anxious participants; engaged in more and longer searches for words, phrases, and concepts; and exhibited more backtracking in the course of message preparation. Another

recent study (Greene, Rucker, Zauss, & Harris, 1998) indicates that the 228 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages cognitive interference associated with anxiety not only disrupts message planning, i t undermines the acquisition of message-production skills. There are, then, several mechanisms through which anxiety may negatively impact the message-production process. Future study should examine the extent to which these mechanisms jointly influence the message-planning process; we suspect tha t they represent complementary rather than competing accounts for the effects of anxiety on message production. For some, the anxiety associated with performance in social situations occasionally intensifies into fear-for example, stage fright in the context of public presentations. A strong emotion like fear, with its intense physiological accompaniments, not only may significantly disturb message planning, but also thoroughly disrupt the execution of a message plan. Powerful emotions like fear, with their high levels of physiological arousal, have the potential t o hijack bodily and cognitive systems in the service of their action tendencies (which, in the case of fear, is escape; see Lazarus, 1991). The physical trembling, tightened respiration, chattering teeth, and related physical manifestations of intense fear may make i t virtually impossible for the frightened individual to enact whatever message plan has been developed; indeed, these physical expressions of fear may only deepen if the desire t o escape the provoking situation is resisted. Extreme embarrassment has also been observed t o seriously disrupt communicative performances; the acutely flus-

tered individual appears momentarily incapable of enacting any message plan (e.g., Miller, 1996). Although the effects of intense fear and embarrassment o n speech are well documented, we know little about how intense emotional states disrupt communicative performances. For example, how does emotional hijacking occur and what can be done to combat i t ? Anxiety, fear, and embarrassment are not the only emotional states found t o have debilitating effects on communication behavior. There is ample evidence tha t communicative performances can be degraded by emotions such as anger (see the review by Canary, Spitzberg, & Semic, 1998) and depression (see the review by Segrin, 1998). Recent research suggests tha t anger and depression may negatively influence information processing through some of the same mechanisms as anxiety, notably cognitive interference (e.g., Ellis, Moore, Varner, Ottaway, & Becker, 1997; Zillman, 1993). Do emotions such as anger and depression degrade communicative performance by upsetting message-planning a n d enactment processes? If so, are these degrading effects primarily due t o cognitive interference o r t o some other mechanism? Do other emotions (e.g., j o y ) have facilitative effects on communicative performance? If so, by what mechanisms d o these emotions enhance message planning and 229 Communication Theory enactment? Clearly, there is a rich agenda for research on how emotions influence message planning and related processes. Moods and Message Production

Compared to emotions, moods are milder states that typically last much longer and have no particular object or focus; as Parkinson (1995, p. 9 ) puts it, moods are tonic rather than phasic, and generally d o not have discernible causes to the individuals experiencing them. As mild, prolonged states, moods d o not manifest the action tendencies associated with emotions. So, how d o these relatively mild, lingering affective states influence the situationally bound, goal-focused activity of message production? We examine here some well-documented mood effects on two aspects of message production: planning and interpretation. Moods and Message Planning. Most cognitive models of message planning represent this process as occurring through two phases: an activation process where relevant procedural memories (records about how to d o things) are retrieved from long-term storage, and a n assembly process where these memories are fit together into a coherent output representation or plan for the current situation. Greenes (1995, 1997a) action assembly theory provides a particularly detailed discussion of these yoked processes, so we employ concepts from this theory in what follows. According t o Greene, in any communicative situation, relevant elements of procedural memory ( w h a t Greene terms proc edur a l records) are activated above some resting level by ( a ) the individuals interaction goals and ( b ) relevant contextual factors. Procedural records are conceptualized as nodes in an interlinked system; hence, when activated above threshold, a given procedural record may spread activation to other procedural records with which it is associatively linked. Activated procedural records are subsequently edited and assembled (integrated) into

a coherent output representation (plan) that is then executed behaviorally. Following Bower (1981) , Greene and other theorists (e.g., Forgas, 1995a; Motley & Camden, 1985) suggest that a n individuals prevailing mood state may be one of the relevant contextual elements that spread activation t o nodes with which it is associated. Tha t is, mood states may themselves serve as aroused nodes in the procedural-memory network tha t activate other nodes with which they are associatively and contextually linked. Further, a given mood state may be associatively linked to particular message forms or message elements. This suggests that, for example, when pursuing the communicative goal of making a request, persons in happy moods may use request forms characteristic of happiness, whereas persons in sad or depressed moods may use request forms tha t reflect that state. Research (see the review by Forgas, 1995a) indicates tha t happy persons typically are more confident, ambitious, and helpful; set themselves higher goals; overestimate the likeli230 Producing Ernotion(a1) Messages hood of success; and are more likely to take moderate risks. In contrast, people in sad moods tend t o produce more negative assessments of the self; show reduced self-confidence and self-efficacy; make more self-deprecating attributions; and display more cautious and risk-avoidant judgments and behaviors. Based on these properties of happy and sad moods, Forgas (1999a) suggested that: People in a happy mood should form more positive and more confident inferences due to the selective priming and greater accessibility of positive memories and experiences about similar situations in the past and [thus should] use more confident, direct, and

risky request forms. In contrast, sad people might selectively recall incidents when they suffered a loss of face due to overly direct requests and [thus] should employ a more cautious, indirect, and polite requesting strategy. (p. 852) Similar predictions have been made with respect to the use of cooperative, competitive, and avoidant negotiation strategies (Forgas, 1998 b). Moreover, Forgas (1995a) argues that the effects of mood states are most likely to infuse operations, such as the assembly of request forms and negotiation tactics, when messages are produced in response to relatively demanding or challenging situations. Such situations require more extensive and detailed processing (activation and assembly) than do comparatively simple, routine situations, and thus permit a greater infusion of mood. An elegant set of experiments provides strong support for these predictions, in particular, demonstrating that mood has its greatest effect in communicative situations calling for more elaborate and substantive cognitive processing (Forgas, 199813, 1999a, 1999b); similar effects were also found for responses to varied request forms (Forgas, 1998a). Mood has also been shown to have several other effects on the message-construction process. For example, several researchers have found that induced mood states lead to the use of mood-congruent lexical items when generating both oral and written messages (e.g., Lindsey, 1996; Motley & Camden, 1985). Mood has also been found to influence the amount and intimacy of communication in self-disclosure contexts (e.g., Cunningham, 1988), as well as the production of more persuasive arguments when engaged in counterattitudinal advocacy (e.g., Bohner & Schwarz, 1993). In all these instances, mood has been theorized t o influ-

ence behavior through its impact on the message-planning process, and specifically through priming (activating) procedural memories congruent with the prevailing mood state. Mood and Interpretation. Just as mood states have been found to influence the operation of procedural memory through the activation of mood-congruent records, so mood states have been found to influence the operation of the declarative memory system (used in interpretive processes) through the activation of mood-congruent interpretive 231 Communication Theory schemes. For example, mood states have been shown to influence the character of the causal attributions people make about their own and others behaviors (Forgas, l 9 9 4 , 1 9 9 8 c ) , judgments about the quality of close personal relationships (e.g., Forgas, Levinger, & Moylan, 1994), and evaluations made a bout both prototypical and atypical people and relationships (Forgas, 1992, 1995b). In addition, mood states have been found to influence the capacity to organize and integrate information in the impression-formation process (e.g., Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Rosenbach, Crockett, & Wapner, 1973). These effects may be due more to attentional narrowing than memory priming; however, more research is needed to determine the exact mechanisms through which moods exert such effects on interpretive processes. In any event, it is clear that mood states can have a substantial effect on a variety of interpretive processes tha t underlie the judgments people make about social situations, other persons, and in-

terpersonal relationships. Definitions of situations, attributions about the causes of others behaviors, and evaluations of personal relationships obviously have relevance to communicative goals; hence, mood effects o n these social judgments have important implications for message production. Mood and Message Production: Unanswered Questions. Although the effects of mood have been documented on several facets of message production, there is considerable room for additional specification about the nature of mood states and how these states have their observed effects. One issue concerns the effects of different mood states on message-production processes. Most research has distinguished conceptually between positive and negative moods, b u t has operationalized this distinction in terms of the specific mood states of happiness and sadness. Yet, it is clear tha t happiness does not exhaust the class of positive moods, just as sadness does not exhaust the class of negative moods (e.g., negative moods can include irritation and anxiety as well as sadness). Different mood states within the broad classes of positive and negative should have distinct effects o n message production, given that different moods should prime distinct sets of procedural memories. Consistent with this, there is some evidence that different negative moods have distinct effects on message reception (e.g., Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994) . Future research should explore how different moods affect production processes and identify the ways in which specific moods are likely to influence features of messages in different functional contexts (e.g., persuasion, support).

Second, because moods dont prime all affectively congruent memories, but only those that are relevant to the current situation (see Forgas, 1995a, p. 45) , the question remains as to just how mood primes rel2 3 2 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages evant memories. What makes a mood-congruent memory relevant t o the ongoing situation? There appear t o be many different ways in which this question could be answered-features of the setting, the primary communicative goal, the participants, the speakers role, etc., could all be viewed as relevant aspects of the situation. Are all mood-congruent memories associated with diverse aspects of the communicative situation activated? If so, how does such a nebulous influence come t o affect the content of messages produced? Third, it is not clear when moods will affect message construction and when they wont. Forgass (1 995a ) affect infusion model (AIM) suggests that moods are most likely t o influence message production when systematic, rather than heuristic, information processing is required. Forgas further argues that mood effects are minimized when persons approach tasks with either direct access or motivated processing strategies (for a discussion of these information-processing modes, see Forgas, 1995a). Although Forgas has reported some support for these predictions, the lines separating the circumstances provoking heuristic, systematic, and motivated processing remain fuzzy. To attain stronger predictive power, researchers will need to specify more clearly the particular features of situations tha t permit mood t o infuse message-production operations.

Fourth, accounts about how moods influence message construction remain frustratingly underdeveloped. For example, Forgass impressive research program clearly shows tha t moods can influence aspects of requests and negotiation strategies, but doesnt show exactly how moods exert their effects. In part, this is because Forgass work lacks an explicit theory of message production, and the implicit model informing this work closely resembles the outmoded strategy repertoire view of message production-the notion that people store abstract representations of message strategies in memory and then instantiate these abstract structures with contextually relevant content. This view of message production suffers from numerous problems and has been abandoned by most contemporary message-production theorists (see D. OKeefe, 1994; Wilson, 1997). Thus, one objective for future theorizing lies in integrating detailed models of mood effects with more contemporary views of message production. In sum, affective states-both moods and emotions-have a variety of effects on message production. Exploring these effects and detailing them empirically depend critically on highly specific models of both affect and message production. As more detailed models of these phenomena are developed, we may look forward to more precise understandings of how affect influences the cognitive processes implicated in the production of messages. 233 Communication Theory Emotion as the Content of Messages

O u r second question is this: How are emotional states communicated to others? Tha t is, how are the emotional states that people experience (love, shame, depression) communicated as the essential content of the message, not just as a tone or relational message added onto other content? When someone puts his or her head down on the table, cries, and says, I cant take i t anymore, sadness is the essence of the message. Most of the early work on communicating emotion, such as Ekmans work o n facial expressions, tells us about the nature of emotional expressions, but much less about the processes by which these expressions are produced. Emotion Is (Ex)Pressed Out Darwin (1872/1965, pp. 28-65) posited three principles to explain how expressions came to be associated with emotional states. First, the principle of serviceable associated habits maintains tha t certain actions are associated with certain states of mind because they once served some function, but through habit come t o be associated with the feeling even when the action itself becomes useless. For example, when preparing to attack, our ancestors bared their canine teeth, but now we only curl up the corner of the mouth in a sneer of derision (pp. 247-252). Second, the principle of antithesis indicates that when one wants to suppress certain actions, opposing muscle groups are used to inhibit the action, and they become associated with opposing states of mind. For example, whereas clenched fists and tense arm muscles indicate the tendency to attack, shrugging the shoulders and showing the palms of the hands indicates just the opposite (pp. 263-272). Finally, the third principle

states that when nerve force is generated in excess, we recognize these effects a s expressive. Hands trembling, hyperventilating, and sweating with fear are examples. The three principles may explain how emotional expressions came t o take the form that they did for humans and other species, but they say little about the processes by which they are produced for individuals in specific situations. Presumably they are hardwired programs tha t are accessed automatically when needed. Nevertheless, Darwin was also quite aware that expressions are inhibited, exaggerated, changed, and even faked for strategic purposes. H e observed, for example, that weeping is rare in men because of its being thought weak and unmanly and cites reports that New Zealand women were able t o shed tears at will while mourning for the dead (pp. 153-155). Repeatedly, he notes that some muscular and other somatic changes are less easily controlled than others and so are more likely to reveal genuine emotional state (for a n impressive review of the huge range of cues t o emotion, see Bowers, Metts, & Duncanson, 1985). T h u s began the scholarly distinction between spontaneous and strate234 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages gic-symbolic expression of emotion (Buck, 1984) . It is clear tha t they are different. Posed facial expressions, for example, tend to be easier t o recognize than spontaneous ones (Motley & Camden, 1988). O n the other hand, it is equally clear tha t there is a gradient of controllability tha t is partially innate and partially practiced, a s Darwin also noted. H e even proposed a mechanism: Actions which were first voluntary, soon became habitual, and a t last hereditary, and then came to be performed

even in opposition to the will (Darwin 1872/1965, p. 356) . Yet it seems tha t what can be done can be undone, a t least in part. Some inherited emotional expressions (such as cries of distress) can be taken over by the will and adjusted or even faked for effect. Babies learn t o do this in their first year of life (Saarni, 1999, p. 18) , and they develop increasingly sophisticated ways to manage emotion well into adulthood (LabouvieVief, DeVoe, & Bulka, 1990) . The message-production processes by which expressions of emotion are controlled are not well understood. One might speculate that the ability t o modulate some expressions may be inherited because it appears so early in life, because it is so useful for survival, and because it is found in other species (Marler & Evans, 1997) . Sometimes the squeaky child gets the parent and sometimes the predator, so it pays t o be able to cont rol t h e squeaks. People w h o s tudy the neurology of emot ion (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996) have found tha t sensory input is routed first through the more primitive amygdala for a crude-but-quick screening for danger a split second before the neocortex gets the input to do a more detailed analysis and to exert more intentional control over emotional reactions. Goleman (1995, pp. 13-29) has popularized this sequence as a n emotional hijacking in which anger holds hostage more thoughtful emotional responses. In partial contrast, Zillman ( 1993) attributes loss of control during anger t o overexcitation, which leads to cognitive impairments that make it difficult to take a broader perspective and easy to fall back on well-practiced habits, such as violence. In complete contrast to Goleman, Averill (1993) points o u t tha t anger may

not be controlled because it serves as a convenient excuse for wrongdoing-My anger made me d o it, or better yet, I was emotionally hijacked! Frijda (1986, pp. 401-450) argues tha t emotional regulation is not something tha t comes after a n emotion has become fully manifested, but rather is an integral part of the emotion process, so that one could expect control or lack thereof to operate through any number of mechanisms. The relative merits of these different accounts clearly deserve research attention. The most controllable emotional expression is, of course, verbal expression. Expressing feelings verbally with precision and accuracy, however, can be quite difficult, even setting aside the case of disingenuous 235 Communication Theory expressions. For example, the ability to label emotions with single words starts early and usually increases in sophistication with age, though not always. Some adults have such difficulty in verbalizing their own emotional states that there is a special term for their impairment-alexithymia ( n o words for feelings; Sifneos, 1 9 9 6 ) . For example, Haviland and Goldston (1992, pp. 220-221) cite a college sophomore who used the term upset t o describe ( a ) how Hamlet felt over his fathers murder, ( b ) how his neighbors felt over their daughters school report, ( c ) how the Pope felt over drugs tha t induce abortion, and ( d ) how he himself felt over breakfast. Interestingly, these researchers also cite the example of a precocious 26-month-old child who said, Im sad I popped it (a balloon). There is some evidence that, in everyday interaction, people

rarely label their feelings, although they d o speak of them indirectly (Planalp et al., 1996; Shimanoff, 1985) . The process by which people choose a n appropriate verbalization of their feelings, either using emotion terms o r more complex descriptions, is an intriguing one tha t invites more research. One of the most intractable problems for scholars is t o understand the coordination of emotional cues, especially verbal and nonverbal cue combinations (Planalp & Knie, in press). Ordinary people, of course, seem to have more trouble isolating cues than coordinating them, as is apparent when watching the facial expressions and gestures of someone on the phone or when trying t o read an emotionally charged e-mail without imagining vocal inflections. Conversely, it may be much easier t o fake a smile than it is to fake joy in the face, voice, body, and in elaborate verbal messages all at the same time. Faking joy by smiling when encountering a n acquaintance is childs play (literally); faking the emotional devastation of being a holocaust victim takes a Meryl Streep (in Sophies Choi c e ) . In fact, many actors find it easier and more convincing to fake the emotion (Stanislavski acting) than to fake the expression. Moreover, the research tells us more about how t o manage feelings than it does about how to leave the feelings alone and manage only the expressions. Emotion Is Pulled Out Expressions are pushed out by emotional states, t o be sure, but they are also pulled out by social situations (Andersen & Guerrero, 1998, pp. 57-64; Scherer, 1994) . Plentiful evidence indicates tha t emotional expressions are adapted t o audiences, nearly always in the direction of

making them more socially appropriate than spontaneous expressions would be. For example, Bavelas and her colleagues (1988) found that sympathetic winces in response to others pain were more likely when the victim and observer had eye contact. Fernindez-Dols and Ruiz-Belda (1995) found that Olympic gold medal winners who were extremely happy tended not to smile when standing behind stage, did smile when 2 3 6 Producing Emotion( a l ) Messages on stage receiving their medals, and then stopped again when the national anthem was played. Even imagined audiences have an impact. Students who believed that a same-sex friend was in another room watching the same funny video that they were watching laughed more than they did when watching the video alone and as much as when the friend was watching in the same room (Fridlund, 1991). Societies train their members in the proper expression of emotions, and members internalize and use a variety of display rules that are exquisitely sensitive to social situations. Children learn in their families how frequently, intensely, and under what circumstances they should express their feelings (Halberstadt, 1986). Well-socialized members of U.S. culture learn that showing positive emotions is more acceptable than showing negative ones (Scheff, 1984; Sommers, 1984) and that it is more appropriate for women to express sadness by asking for support than it is for men (Guerrero & Reiter, 1998), more appropriate to express feelings to a friend than to a stranger (M. Clark & Taraban, 1991), and more appropriate to express sympathy to the deserving than to the undeserving (C. Clark, 1997), and much more. Of course, these rules, as

social conventions, vary across groups and cultures. African-Americans tend to be more expressive than European Americans, Utku Eskimos believe it is almost never appropriate for adults to express anger, and the Balinese consider laughing on hearing of the death of a loved one to be not only appropriate, but, in some cases, mandatory (see Planalp, 1999; Porter & Samovar, 1998). The processes by which emotional expressions are adapted to audiences are intriguing because clearly they are learned, but equally clearly audience adaptations become so automatic that they are largely unconscious and effortless. The key to those processes is likely to be found by studying childhood socialization of emotion (e.g., Saarni, 1999) or adults making transitions to social situations tha t have different emotional rules ( e . g . , in a different culture or a different workplace; see Conrad & Witte, 1994). Pressing and Pulling Emotion in aTug of War Mostly, we assume that the experience of emotion is involuntary and that the expression of emotion is tuned to social rules and norms. In addition, people may engage in quite purposeful or planned expressions of emotion for strategic or manipulative purposes. They take control over the push of felt emotions and the pull of expected emotions to shape emotional expressions for their own purposes. For example, they use feigned emotional states as reasons, causes, and justifications for action; they strategically manipulate others to respond as desired through emotion display; and they deceive others by masking or expressing emotions.

237 Communication Theory Deception is an interesting example. Liars must control the genuine feelings t h a t may accompany lying-anxiety a b o u t getting caught, arousal, even duping delight (Buller & Burgoon, 1 9 9 8 ) . At the same time, the liar often must fake an emotion that is expected-surprise at the missing records, anger toward the real murderer, righteous indignation a t being falsely accused. Often managing all of the emotional cues is too difficult and genuine emotion leaks out, especially through the body and tone of voice, giving away the lie (Buller & Burgoon, p. 3 9 8 ) . In other circumstances, genuine emotions need only be exaggerated for effect, such as letting irritation build into rage in order t o get your own way (Bailey, 1983), faking or exaggerating happiness to ingratiate yourself t o others, or milking sadness to elicit support (Clark, Pataki, & Carver, 1 9 9 6 ) . Children take a few years to learn emotional dissemblance. For example, Saarni ( 1 9 9 9 , p. 1 8 9 ) found that when children were expected to express positive feelings about a disappointing gift, the younger boys ( 6 year-olds) were unable t o d o it, the intermediate-aged children showed what the researchers called transitional behaviors reflecting social anxiety and tension about what t o do, and the 10- to 11-year-olds, especially girls, could show disingenuous joy. By the early teen years, girls reported feeling a need t o balance expressions of their genuine feelings with the requirements of the social situation (Saarni, 1999, pp. 289290). Saarni ( 1 9 9 9 ) provides a useful analysis of the complex knowl-

edge, muscular control, and motivation needed t o dissemble emotion successfully. Considerable work remains to be done in this area, however, especially on the integration of verbal and nonverbal production systems during the course of dissembling. Shaping Emotion in the Push and Pull W h a t happens t o the emotional s t a t e a s i t is pressed a n d pulled o u t into the open? Usually, we assume t h a t the experience of emotion precedes its expression, but to some degree emotions a r e created a n d shaped in expressing them. Various mechanisms have been posited, ranging from microscopic physiological processes to macroscopic social and cultural processes, t o explain how emotional expression shapes emotional experience. One of the most captivating and counterintuitive ideas is the facial feedback hypothesis (FFH), which posits that feedback from facial expressions of emotion influences emotional experience, not just the other way around, as is often presumed. The FFH has produced ingenious experiments designed t o get around the problem of experimenter demand by asking people t o hold a pen in their teeth (simulating a smile) or in their lips (simulating a frown; Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1 9 8 8 ) or by giving them pronunciation tasks that d o the same ( e vs. ii; Zajonc, 2 3 8 Producing Ernotion(a1) Messages Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989). In his extensive review, Cappella (1993, p. 27) finds tha t the FFH is a reliable effect tha t is small in magnitude, may o r may not be emotion specific, and can initiate as well a s modify subjective emotional states. At least three mechanisms have been posited to

explain this effect, and all three remain controversial. The first is the general cognitive-interpretive claim (Stepper & Strack, 1993) and its more specific versions (e.g., Laird, 1974), which suggest that feedback from a number of sources, including facial and other cues, along with appraisals of the environment, are integrated into the subjective experience of emotion. A second physiologically grounded claim is tha t temperature changes in blood flow t o the brain mediate subjective emotional experience (Adelmann & Zajonc, 1989). A third explanation links facial feedback with conversational partners mutual imitation of each others facial expressions (especially smiles) in generating a n account for emotional contagion (Cappella, 1993). Other mechanisms by which emotional expressions influence emotional experience take a decidedly cognitive-interpretive and linguistic turn. Talking through emotions with the goal of reframing and achieving insight is a staple of therapy (Kennedy-Moore, 1999, pp. 63-90; Pennebaker, 1997). Conversely, expression t o vent feelings appears to be useless, if not counterproductive (Kennedy-Moore, 1999, pp. 2562). Shared meanings for emotional experiences develop a s children get help in labeling their feelings (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996, p. 181) and as adults construct emotional experience interactively (Staske, 1994). Saying Im not angry, just very disappointed helps to foreground, legitimize, and perhaps shape the speakers feelings, and also works as a bid to frame the listeners response as Im ashamed, not angry. Flight attendants, bill collectors, medical students, and people in other occupations use trained imagination and forms of talk to shape their

emotions into what the job requires (Hochschild, 1983; Waldron, 1994). To summon patience, flight attendants conjure up images of passengers in distress and speak of uncontrolled passengers (Hochschild, 1983). To call up anger, bill collectors imagine irresponsible credit card users and talk about deadbeats (Sutton, 1991). To maintain emotional distance, medical students picture disempersoned bodies, a s opposed to disembodied persons, and talk about the gall bladder in Room 27 (Smith & Kleinman, 1989). Early work on emotional regulation a t work had a critical tone, emphasizing its exploitive nature, but later commentators have suggested that emotional labor may be helpful if it fosters positive feelings or effective emotion regulation (Conrad & Witte, 1994; Mann, 1997). Constructionist cultural models take the social shaping of emotion so far as t o say tha t people live dramatically different emotional lives, depending on the circumstances to which the culture has tuned its emo239 Communication Theory tions. If talk shapes, simplifies, selects and standardizes emotion and lack of talk leaves emotions preconscious and inchoate, as Levy (1984, p. 227) suggests, it is easy t o imagine why nearly all Chinese mothers reported tha t their 3-year-olds understood the nearest Chinese equivalent of ashamed, whereas only 10% of American mothers did (Shaver, Wu, & Schwartz, 1992, p. 1 9 9 ) . The sea of messages tha t is cultural life produces variations in emotional profiles through talk, and also through nonverbal expressions. In Bali, smiling and showing positive feeling nonverbally are highly valued, whereas expressing negative feelings, es-

pecially in public, is nearly a cultural taboo. A Balinese woman away from Bali reported that it is so much easier t o be happy in Bali, there are so many smiles (Wikan, 1990, p. 111) . Emotion as the Target of Messages: Emotion Knowledge and the Production of Messages Directed at Managing Others Emotions Our third question is this: How does what people know ( o r believe) about emotion influence their attempts to manage (create, increase, decrease, or otherwise modify) the emotional states of others? Others emotions are a common target of communicative efforts; indeed, influencing the feelings of others may be one of the most basic tasks in which people engage, either as a means to some end (e.g., frightening someone about risky conduct t o improve health behavior) or as an end in itself (e.g., celebrating a friends accomplishment). When producing messages in pursuit of such goals, people must dr aw on some store of knowledge about the emotions and how they operate. Emotion Knowledge Structures and Message Production People strive t o understand aspects of the world they encounter regularly, and they build up stocks of knowledge about these features so they can manage them effectively. An individuals stock of knowledge will, of course, be directly influenced by his or her personal experiences. Moreover, cultures ( and other social collectives) develop shared stocks of knowledge about facets of the world and then pass these stocks of knowledge on t o new members through primary and secondary socialization

processes. Thus, an individuals stock of knowledge reflects both personal and cultural influences (see Berger & Luckmann, 1967) . Emotion, that is, human feeling, is certainly one aspect of the world that all individuals and cultures experience and learn t o manage, both in themselves and in others. Recent research documents that people have quite elaborate stores of emotion knowledge, both about emotion in general (e.g., Plutchik, 1984; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & OConnor, 240 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages 1 9 8 7 ) and about many specific emotions (e.g., Fitness & Fletcher, 1 9 9 3 ) . Theorists use a variety of terms in referring to these stocks of emotion knowledge, including emotion concepts (e.g., Kovecses, 1 9 9 0 ) , emotion protot ype s (e.g., Fehr, 1 9 9 4 ) , emotion scripts (e.g., Fehr & Baldwin, 1 9 9 6 ) , emotion knowledge structures (e.g., Fitness, 1 9 9 6 ) , and implicit or lay theories of emotion (e.g., K . Smith, 1 9 9 5 ) . The varied terms reflect some important theoretical differences in assumptions regarding the content and structure of peoples emotion knowledge. However, all of these terms reflect a common concern with what people know about emotions and how they use that knowledge. What is in these stocks of knowledge? What is their content? H o w are they organized? How d o people access and apply the knowledge resident in their stocks? In what ways d o these stocks of knowledge differ across individuals within a culture? H o w d o these stocks of knowledge typically differ for members of different cultures? Research has only recently begun t o sketch answers t o these questions, and a great deal of work must be completed t o answer them in meaningful detail. To date,

most empirical work has focused on the knowledge of specific emotions held by adult members of Western cultures, especially as tha t knowledge is represented in emotion prototypes (e.g., Fehr, 1994; Fehr & Baldwin, 1 9 9 6 ) . This research has sought to describe the general features and functions of emotion prototypes; thus far, little attention has been given to individual differences in emotion knowledge structures. Moreover, there is a paucity of research examining differences in emotion knowledge structures associated with factors such as culture and gender (but see Fischer, 1995; Paez & Vergara, 1 9 9 5 ) . There is good reason for believing that emotion knowledge structures influence message production. For example, these knowledge structures have been found t o affect memory, judgment, and inference processes about other persons and social situations (Fehr & Baldwin, 1996; Fitness, 1 9 9 6 ) , which suggests tha t they should also influence various message-production processes. As yet, however, there appears to be n o research directly examining how emotion knowledge influences messages when people seek t o manage the emotions of others. Still, assessments of individual variations in emotion knowledge structures would appear to have the potential to illuminate why different people sometimes produce such diverse message forms when seeking t o manage the emotions of others. Consider the following efforts to comfort someone w h o is distressed about having been dropped by a dating partner: 1 . Im really sorry. Gee, I wish I knew what to say! I never know what to say in these situations. Uh, youll feel better if you keep in mind theres nothing wrong with you; the problem is with her.

24 1 Communication Theory 2. Go a h e a d a n d cry; I can tell you are upset. And its OK to scream o r yell, i f y o u want. You need t o let your feelings o u t . 3 . Wow, this has to have turned your world upside d own . W h a t happened? And h ow a r e you feeling a b o u t everything? Take your time a n d tell me a b o u t t h e whole thing. Each of these messages reflects a distinct set of beliefs about the nature, course, causes, and cures of emotional upset. The first appears t o be informed by what might be called a magic bullet model of emotional support (Burleson & Goldsmith, 1 9 9 8 ) ; the idea underlying such messages appears t o be that others emotional states can be influenced quite directly through the utterance of the right words. The second message reflects what might be termed a catharsis model of emotional support (Planalp, 1999); here, the operative assumption is that people need t o vent their emotions when upset. The third message exhibits what might be called a sense-making model of support (Pennebaker, 1 9 9 7 ) ; the assumption here is that distressing situations often undermine o u r representations of the world, and people need t o make sense of these situations discursively if they are to heal. T h e point here is each message reflects a different set of beliefs (or knowledge structures) about the course and cure of emotional distress. The differences manifest in these three approaches to comforting are not merely stylistic, they are functional. Messages flowing from the sensemaking model of support are generally a more effective means of providing support (in the sense of helping people work through their dis-

tressed emotions a n d eventually feel better) than are messages informed by either the magic bullet o r catharsis models of support (see Burleson & Goldsmith, 1 9 9 8 ) . Given this functional difference, it is important t o detail the differences in the emotional knowledge structures informing distinct message forms. Mo r e generally, it can be hypothesized that some implicit theories of emotion (of sadness, fear, anxiety, etc.) are better than others-better in the sense of being more differentiated, abstract, accurate, open t o modification, a n d correspondent with what professionals know about the nature and function of both emotion in general and particular affective states. A corollary t o this hypothesis is that some persons should generally be particularly good a t managing the emotional states of others, or at least at managing particular emotional states, whereas others will be less skillful. Obviously, these hypotheses should be tested. Unfortunately, consistent with the paucity of research on individual differences in emotion knowledge structures, there have been few theoretical efforts to delineate important dimensions of difference in emotion knowledge structures, and still fewer efforts to develop methods capable of capturing theoretically relevant differences. Without these conceptual a n d methodological tools, it is difficult t o test hypotheses 242 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages regarding the effects of individual differences in emotion knowledge structures o n the production of effective, emotion-focused messages. Hence, a n agenda for future research includes ( a ) identifying some of the dimensions along which different emotion knowledge structures can be arrayed, (b) developing methods that will permit the assessment of indi-

viduals knowledge structures in terms of the specified dimensions of difference, ( c ) detailing ways in which different types of emotion knowledge should influence message behavior, and (d) testing these predictions. Individual Differences in the Capacity to Acquire Emotion Knowledge and Message Production A rather different way of thinking about emotion knowledge is in terms of the individuals capacity t o acquire information about the nature, causes, and course of anothers emotions. Research o n this capacity has focused on abilities to recognize diverse emotional states (affect identification), comprehend the causes for these states (affect understanding), and correctly anticipate the course of these states (affect prediction). Special attention has been given t o affective perspective taking (the abili ty to make warranted inferences about others affective states), as well as to the development of complex systems of interpersonal constructs, which appear t o underlie the ability t o engage in affective perspective taking (Burleson, 1982). Substantial developmental and individual differences have been detected in all of these abilities (e.g., Burleson & Caplan, 1998; Eisenberg, Murphy, & Shephard, 1997) . Differences in the capacity t o infer, understand, and predict the course of anothers emotional state have important implications for social effectiveness and communication, a notion developed in several theoretical analyses of social competence (e.g., Spitzberg & Cupach, 1984; ZahnWaxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990) , and popularized in Golemans (1995) treatment of emotional intelligence. Indeed, there is quite substantial

research showing that, across the life span, the ability t o acquire emotional knowledge about others is associated with the use of effective and appropriate forms of social behavior, including more sophisticated message structures. For example, Burleson and his colleagues (e.g., Burleson, 1984; see the review by Burleson & Caplan, 1998) have found that both cognitive complexity and affective perspective-taking ability are associated with the use of comforting message forms that elaborate, legitimize, and contextualize the feelings and perspectives of distressed others-message forms tha t are widely regarded a s more sensitive and effective ways of providing comfort (e.g., Burleson & Samter, 1985) . Affective perspective-taking skill has also been found t o be associated with the use of sophisticated message forms when seeking to persuade and inform (e.g., Applegate, Burleson, & Delia, 1992) , as well a s when man243 Communi c a t ion Theory aging conflicts (e.g., Meeks, Hendrick, & Hendrick, 1998). Thus, skill in the capacity to acquire knowledge about the emotional states of others is reliably associated with the production of more effective message forms. Exactly how knowledge about others emotional states is used in message construction remains unclear and is a matter needing further research. There is some suggestion, however, tha t knowledge of others emotions acquired through social perception skills influences the generation of interaction goals (for a discussion of this account and alternatives, see Burleson & Caplan, 1998) . It seems likely that individual differences in the capacity t o acquire

information about others emotional states are connected in important ways to how people structure their emotional knowledge. Thus, other objectives for future research include exploring interrelations between emotion knowledge structures and skill a t acquiring emotion information about others, as well as determining how people integrate information retrieved from their knowledge structures with that supplied by o n line processes in the course of generating messages. Conclusion We have addressed three questions concerning the connection between emotion and message production. First, we showed that emotion (or, more broadly, affect) has numerous effects o n several of the cognitive processes associated with message production. Through their influence on these processes, moods and emotions can have quite substantial effects o n the content of the messages people generate in varied circumstances. Second, we detailed some of the many ways in which emotion serves as the content of the messages tha t people produce. People express feelings through their communicative conduct in incredibly rich and diverse ways; understanding the processes through which they d o so requires a n appreciation of the biology, psychology, and sociology of emotion. Third, we explored how what people know about emotion might influence properties of the messages they produce when seeking to manage the emotions of others. Little research has directly examined this topic, but i t represents an exciting area for future work. Author Brant R. Burleson (PhD, University of Illinois, Ur b a n a - C h amp a i g n , 1 9 8 2 ) is a professor in t h e

De p a r tme n t of C ommu n i c a t i o n , Purdue University. Sally Pl ana lp ( P hD, University of Wisconsin, Madi son, 1 9 8 3 ) is a prof e s sor in t h e De p a r tme n t of C ommu n i c a t i o n , University of Montana, Mi s soul a , a n d a n a d j u n c t prof e s sor a t t h e University of Wa ika to, Hami l t o n , N e w Z e a l a n d . An out l ine of thi s p a p e r wa s presented a t t h e pr e conf e r enc e o n message produc t ion, Int e rna t iona l Communi c a t ion Association convent ion, San Francisco, CA, M a y 1 9 9 9 . Cor r e spondenc e c o ncerning thi s p a p e r may be directed to Br ant Burleson a t br antb@purdue . edu or to Sally Pl ana lp at sallyp@selway.umt.edu. 2 4 4 Producing Emotion(a1) Messages Other scholars have developed typologies of emotional communication that overlap partially with the one used here. Scherer (1992) writes of vocal expressions of emotion as symptoms, symbols, and appeals, thus focusing on controllability and goal orientation. Gallois (1993) refers to three traditions of communication research that focus on ( a ) experience and expression, ( b ) encoding skills, decoding skills, and accuracy, and (c) rules, codes, and styles. Planalp and Knie (in press) borrow B. OKeefes (1988) message design logics: expressive, conventional, and rhetorical. Although their first type corresponds well to ours, their second and third types combine into o u r second, and none of these address messages directed a t influencing another persons emotional state as a separate type of emotional expression-communication. Perhaps closest to o u r typology is the set of distinctions proposed by Dillard (1993). Dillards emotion-motivated communication is quite similar to our emotional messages, but considers only the effects of emotion o n message goals, whereas our treatment includes the effects of both emotion and mood on a broad array of message-production processes. Dillards emotion-manifesting communication appears quite similar to our messages of emotion, though o u r category

may be somewhat less inclusive than his. Finally, Dillards emotion-inducing communication is rather narrower than o u r emotion-focused messages in that Dillards category focuses on messages that elicit affective responses in others, and o u r category encompasses messages that are directed a t managing the emotional states of others, which may include reducing or moderating affective responses, as well a s eliciting them. In the course of reviewing this article, John Greene suggested yet a fourth focus for research on emotion and message production: the impact of an individuals message behavior on his or her own emotional states (as when the inability to say everything one might want leads t o frustrationsomething we certainly felt as we wrote this article!). Although this phenomenon is touched on briefly in o u r discussion of messages of emotion, we acknowledge the need for the independent development of this concern. Bowing to the limits of time and space, we defer such development t o later efforts. Note Adelmann, P. K., & Zajonc, R . B. (1989). Facial efference and the experience of emotion. Annual Review of Psychology, 40, 249-280. Andersen, P. A., & Guerrero, L, K. (1998). Principles of communication and emotion in social interaction. In P. A. Andersen & L. K. Guerrero (Eds.), Handbook of communication and emotion (pp. 49-96). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Applegate, J. L., Burleson, B. R., & Delia, J. G. (1992). Reflection-enhancing parenting as antecedent to childrens social-cognitive and communicative development. In I. E. Sigel, A. V. McGillicuddy-Delisi, & J. J. Goodnow (Eds.), Parental belief systems: The psychological consequences for children (2nd ed., pp. 3-39). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Averill, J. R. (1980). The emotions. In E. Staub (Ed.), Personality: Basic aspects and current research (pp. 134-199). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Averill, J. R. (1993). Illusions of anger. In R. B. Felson & J. T. Tedeschi (Eds.), Aggression and

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