Defining A Human Security Framework in The Philippine Context

HUMAN SECURITY
FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT
Defining the
Proceedings of the Third World Studies Center Policy Dialogue Series 2006
DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT
Third World Studies Center (TWSC) Policy Dialogue Series 2006 Towards a Human Security Framework This policy dialogue series was made possible with the support of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-Philippines. Published by the Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines-Diliman in partnership with the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) with funding support from the Government of the Philippines (GOP)-UNDP Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Programme and the United Nations Development Programme-Philippines.
ISBN 1234-5678 2007 United Nations Development Programme-Philippines Reproduction of this document is permitted, provided due acknowledgement is given to the publisher and the authors. The opinions expressed herein are those of the writers and policy dialogue participants and do not necesssarily reflect the views of the OPAPP, UNDP, or TWSC. Edited by Zuraida Mae D. Cabilo, Sharon M. Quinsaat, and Trina Joyce M. Sajo Book and cover design by Joel F. Ariate Jr. Cover photograph by Sharon M. Quinsaat Published 2007
Third World Studies Center College of Social Sciences and Philosophy Basement Palma Hall P.O. Box 210 University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City Phone: +63 2 981 8500 ext. 2442 Telefax: +63 2 920 5428 Mobile: +63 926 710 2926 E-mal: uptwsc@gmail.com URL: http://www.upd.edu.ph/~twsc
CONTENTS
Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem
THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUES SERIES 2006 01
Human Security and Development 10 Human Security and Governance 39 Human Security and Culture 61 Human Security in Violent Conflict Situations 79 Defining the Human Security Framework in the Philippine Context 93
TOWARDS A HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINES 117
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006
Zuraida Mae D. Cabilo and Sharon M. Quinsaat

POLICY BRIEFS 124 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 143
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INTRODUCTION
THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUES SERIES 2006

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem
Director Third World Studies Center College of Social Sciences and Philosophy University of the Philippines-Diliman
INTRODUCTION The Third World Studies Center (TWSC) of the University of the Philippines (UP) is an academic research institute based in the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) committed to analyze and develop alternative perspectives on Philippine, regional, and global issues. Since its inception, the Policy Dialogue Series has pooled together various representatives from the state, civil society and social movements, private sector, and members of the academe. This began after the People Power Revolution in 1986 when the democratic space was established for government officials, the academe, and civil society to engage each other. This was also a venue by which academe and civil society saw a way to intervene in policymaking. Themes of previous dialogue series include Academe Meets the Government (1988 and 2004), Academe Meets the People (1989-1990), Academe Meets Political Parties (1991), and Academe Meets PartyList Representatives (2004). In 2005, the policy dialogues were organized in five installments. The first three focused on World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements: Agreement on Agriculture, General Agreement on Trade in Services, and Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights. The fourth policy dialogue tackled the negotiating strategies of the Philippines prior to the Hong Kong ministerial meeting, while the fifth centered on policy implications of the results of the ministerial conference. Each forum sought to assess and define the future directions of the Philippines tenyear membership in the WTO. Through the years, the Policy Dialogue
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Series has contributed to meaningful dialogues about the search for alternative and viable policy options. RATIONALE FOR THE POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES ON HUMAN SECURITY The TWSC Policy Dialogues Series (PDS) 2006, which ran from June to December, puts under critical lenses the existing development and national security frameworks vis--vis the human security model in pursuing national development and peace-building goals. The prominence gained by human security has been matched with attempts to put the concept in practice. At the international level, Japan, for instance, has integrated human security in its foreign policy. The Japanese government has adopted an advocacy to further develop human security through the creation of the Commission on Human Security, and the establishment of the Trust Fund for Human Security to fund grassroots human security projects (Diplomatic Bluebook 2004). Other developed countries such as Canada and Norway established the Human Security Network to undertake practical responses to human security threats such as campaigns to ban landmines, protection of children, the establishment of the international criminal court, among others (Alkire 2002). In the Philippines, however, the protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation-state remains the guiding principle of the security sector. This is reflected in the governments foreign policy directions, as well as in its defense and economic strategies. The concept of human security was brought to the fore in the Philippines by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) but the Philippine state and society in general are yet to acknowledge the inadequacies of the national security framework and agree to a precise and contextual definition of an elusive concept, such as human security, which supposedly offers an alternative to the prevailing ideology. But, even states and experts recognize that human security does not supplant, but rather complements, national security. In this context, the TWSC PDS 2006 specifically aimed to: 1.Review the existing development and national security frameworks, from which stem the countrys policy responses to peace building and conflict resolution; 2.Provide a comprehensive overview of a human security framework as an alternative framework in policymaking and implementation of initiatives on peace building, conflict prevention, and development; and, 3.Develop mechanisms in adopting human security as a policy framework. With the main question, How can we promote and protect human security?, the three dialogues focused on three key themes:
INTRODUCTION
1. An overview of the frameworks on national security and human security; 2. Focus on the various dimensions of human security as defined in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 1994; and 3. Integration of key outputs of each dialogue to enable the adoption of a human security framework towards peace building, conflict resolution, and development. DIALOGUE THEMES For the PDS on Human Security, discussions placed emphasis on the different dimensions of human security, as well as the players/actors and processes involved in crafting policies utilizing a human security framework. The five topics, and their respective schedules and venues, are shown below:
Policy Dialogue Policy Dialogue 1 Title Human Security and Development: The Case of the Philippine Mining Policy Human Security and Governance: Access to Participation of Marginalized Sectors under the Local Government Code Human Security and Culture: Our Vulnerable Culture: Towards Strengthening Cultural Integrity and Diversity Human Security in Conflict and Emergency Situations: The Case of Bondoc Peninsula Redefining the National Interest under a Human Security Framework: A Synoptic Presentation of An Emerging Human Security Framework and Mechanisms Date, Time and Venue 27 June 2006 1:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m. Balay Kalinaw, UP Diliman 25 July 2006 1:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m. Balay Kalinaw, UP Diliman 29 August 2006 1:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m. Balay Kalinaw, UP Diliman 3 October 2006 1:00 p.m.-4:00 p.m. Balay Kalinaw, UP Diliman December 5, 2006 9:00 a.m.12 noon Balay Kalinaw, UP Diliman
Policy Dialogue 2
Policy Dialogue 3
Policy Dialogue 4
Policy Dialogue 5
Human Security and Development
Philippine Mining Policy: Whose Development Counts? The first of the dialogue series, which focused on human security and development, was entitled Philippine Mining Policy: Whose Development Counts? Development is viewed as a universal right that assures people of leading a life that engenders freedom from wantone of the freedoms constituting human security. The road to development, however, is a thorny path particularly on issues where one dimension of human security runs contrary to another. Development initiatives in the mining industry illustrate such a case. On one end, mining advocates iterate that it will bring
about economic security; on another front, communities decry the threat that mining-related activities pose to their environmental security. Government has time and again articulated its intent to maximize the industrys potential contribution in terms of revenue generated from local and foreign investments (but primarily from the latter), as well as providing solution to the problem of unemployment in the country. In her 2004 State of the Nation address, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo emphasized that economic growth can be achieved through the creation of a favorable investment climate for local entrepreneurs and foreign capitalists, particularly in the mining industry. The revival of the Philippine mining industry is a fundamental strategy in the governments pursuit of economic development. However, local communities, environmental groups, and other development stakeholders belie the promise of extracting the countrys mineral resources. They have been asserting the right to communitydirected development and the preservation of the integrity of communities resource rights. The battle was initially won in January 2004 when the Supreme Court declared the Mining Act of 1995 unconstitutional based on its clause on foreign ownership of natural resources. The decision was, disappointingly, reversed a year later. Some claim that the highest tribunals December 2005 decision was in consideration of the fiscal crisis declared by none other than the President herself. In this context, one is compelled to ask, Whose development counts? While the answer may be obvious, it is imperative upon development actors (state and nonstate alike) to locate human security in the development blueprint of the state. The case of the Philippine mining policy illustrates divergent views on how development goals should be pursued. The first installment of the TWSC PDS 2006 therefore sought to bring to fore development issues vis--vis the pursuit of human security. Specifically, it sought to: review the Philippine Mining Act of 1995; assess the law in terms of how it has affected the different development stakeholders; identify the values, processes, and actors that constitute development and human security; and look into how these factors come into play in the development-human security nexus. The discussion sought to answer the following questions: 1. What are the salient points of the Mining Act of 1995? 2. How has implementation of the Mining Act affected the different sectors in the development process? 3. What has the Act achieved in so far as promoting human security in communities where mining activities are undertaken? 4. What values are promoted through the development-human security nexus? 5. What processes are undertaken in the development process using a human security framework? 6. Who are the actors involved and what roles do they play?
INTRODUCTION
7. Is human security possible in mining as a development track? 8. How can a human security framework be integrated in the prevailing development framework of government, particularly in the case of the Mining Act of 1995? The resources persons who came to this session were the following: 1. Leo Jasareno, Regional Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources 2. Gerardo Sicat, Professor Emeritus, School of Economics, University of the Philippines-Diliman and former Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority 3. Carlos Primo David, Associate Professor, National Institute of Geological Sciences, University of the Philippines-Diliman 4. Marvic M.V. Leonen, Associate Professor, College of Law, University of the Philippines-Diliman
Human Security and Governance
Access to Participation of Marginalized Sectors under the Local Government Code of 1991 For the theme on Human Security and Governance, the policy dialogue tackled issues of participation among marginalized sectors. In this regard, participation is conceptualized in the context of decentralization as a framework of governance, and is intended to further strengthen the capacities of government and nongovernment actors in directing local development. Stakeholders, particularly marginalized sectors, are enabled to play vital roles in processes that may include local development planning and implementation, setting up conflict resolution strategies, and resource management. This establishes collective ownership of the development process. In the human security discourse, stakeholder participation in decision-making processes creates an enabling environment where marginal groups can have a voice and conflicts are resolved peaceably among various interest groups. In the Philippines, the Local Government Code of 1991 enshrines the governance framework of decentralization to strengthen the role of local governments in contributing to the goal of national development. Section 28 of the Code specifically mandates the representation of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in decision-making processes in the provincial, municipal, and city structures. More than a decade since the implementation of the decentralization experiment, recognition has been given to local governments where significant positive changes in their localities have taken place. Case studies have been written about best practices in good governance; various good governance models are documented for possible replication. Participation of marginalized sectorswomen, children, elderly, and
differently abled, among othershas also been highlighted as one of the major breakthroughs with the implementation of the Code. The policy dialogue focused on the governance dimension of human security. It sought to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and experience on how best practices in local governance promote and protect human security, particularly of marginalized sectors. Moreover, it aimed to elucidate issues of the human security-governance nexus under the Local Government Code. In doing so, it attempted to answer the following questions: 1. What are the salient provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991? 2. What can be learned from the Codes potentials and limitations in relation to human security? 3. How can existing structures and processes be constituted or further strengthened to ensure meaningful participation, especially of marginalized sectors in local governance? 4. How can a human security framework be integrated in the existing local governance framework to further promote the participation of marginalized sectors? 5. How can various governance actors be involved in the process of integrating human security in the governance framework? 6. How should human security be positioned, especially in the current proposal to change the Charter? The resource persons for this dialogue were the following: 1.Wilfredo B. Prilles Jr., Co-Team Leader of the i-Governance Program, City Government of Naga 2.Francisco A. Magno, Associate Professor of Political Science and Development Studies, De La Salle University-Manila 3.Edna Maguigad, Coordinator, Local Governance Program, Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panligal
Human Security and Culture
Strengthening Cultural Integrity and Diversity Culture, generally, is the collective expression of values, beliefs, and practices reproduced as concrete, lived experiences of particular groups of people. Institutionally and symbolically, culture ensures individual identity and membership in a community. Culture is also a resource that members of a community draw from in order to achieve their full human potential, thus guaranteeing a sense of community security. Being integral to lives and communities, culturein particular, indigenous cultureshould be preserved, developed, promoted, and protected. The passage of Republic Act 8371, known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, is a landmark event in history, the fruit of the
INTRODUCTION
long-worn struggle of Filipino indigenous peoples (IPs) towards full recognition and sovereignty. IPRA seeks to protect lives, livelihoods, and communities, as it enshrines the fundamental rights of IPs, in particular: 1) right to ancestral domains and lands; 2) right to self governance and empowerment; 3) social justice and human rights; and 4) right to cultural integrity (CIPRAD 1999, 4). IPRA is the supposed institutional mechanism that would collectively engage indigenous peoples as active members of the state. But the passage of this legislation is only an initial thrust to its complete and sustained fulfillment. Already, IPRA is wrought with problems, from the creation of an institutional body, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, that would implement, uphold and protect the IPRA, to the implementation process itself, and the conflicting responses from stakeholders. Studies assessing its implementation question how far the law can address the needs and protect the culture, livelihood, rights, and integrity of IPs.1 Problems in the issuance of ancestral domain titles, for instance, prevent them from owning, utilizing and managing the most important resource, as mandated by the IPRA. This problem is further compounded by the intrusion of corporate interests. For IPs, this is not a simple issue over territory and ownership. Land is integral to everyday life; it extends to all other social, economic and political spheres. The interface of the discourse on indigenous peoples rights and welfare and human security has gained profound emphasis. In the Philippines, the urgent call for the adoption of a human security paradigm for IP programs and initiatives is a response to increasing threats, regionally and internationally, to the long-term security and stability of the country. A reexamination of the law towards a better understanding of the human security framework is also propelled by the gnawing, unbridled poverty experienced by local IPs, especially in areas where armed insurgency is prevalent. The third installment of the PDS 2006 intended to create a venue for intersectoral dialogue on human security, particularly on the promotion and protection of cultural integrity and diversity as a dimension of human security. In relation to this, it sought to answer three key questions:
An early assessment of the law is found in Florence Umaming-Manzano, An Analysis of the Current Status of the IPRA Implementation, In Coalition for Indigenous Peoples Rights and Ancestral Domains. Guide to R.A. 8371. Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). (Quezon City: CIPRAD, 1999), 65-8. For a more detailed assessment covering a longer period, see Nestor T. Castro, Three Years of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act: Its Impact on Indigenous Communities, Kasarinlan 15 (2): 35-54.
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1. How is human security defined? 2. Does the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), as the law crafted to protect the cultural integrity and diversity of indigenous peoples (IPs), promote and protect human security? 3. What policies and mechanisms should be crafted to promote and protect the human security, cultural integrity and diversity of IPs? The main speakers of the forum were: 1. Nestor T. Castro, Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, University of the Philippines-Diliman 2. Zenaida Brigida Pawid, Convenor, Cordillera Peoples Forum
Human Security in Violent Conflict Situations
The Case of Bondoc Peninsula
Previous policy dialogues have evinced that insecurity stems from the incursion of development activities into communities and the failure to exercise inclusive governance. This uncertainty then creates a situation where inadequacy in entitlements leads to conflict over ownership and control of resources. The case of Bondoc peninsula in the province of Quezon exemplifies the complex nature of securing human security in the context of conflict and emergency situations. A former stronghold of the New Peoples Army (NPA), ownership and access to land is a crucial issue that defined the lives of the people for many years now. In the perilous pursuit for land, farmers have organized themselves to avail of the governments agrarian reform program when the agrarian revolution promised by the communist party and its armed component faltered. During the watch of then-Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary Horacio Morales, some lands have been awarded to farmer beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. This, however, is only the beginning of yet another struggle. Landlords goons harassed farmer beneficiaries with trumped up charges of theft and other petty crimes, while the NPA exacted revolutionary taxes from both landlords and farmers. Collusion between landowners and local government officials, and allegedly between landowners and the NPA, which led to gross violation of human rights, has been recorded extensively by the media, NGOs, and solidarity groups working in the area. These circumstances bring about the intensification of violent conflict over control of the area, leaving peasants in the middle of the crossfire and their struggle for land unsettled. The interplay among various interests that of landlords, peasants, civil society organizations, and state and non-state armed groupsin the peninsula exacted the high price of local peasant leaders lives and livelihoods of thousands of farming households, creating a multidimensional insecurity in the area.
INTRODUCTION
The fourth installment of the PDS 2006 sought to understand the nature, processes, and mechanics of promoting human security in the context of violent conflict situations. The dialogue posed the following questions: 1. How is human security defined in situations where escalation of violent conflict persists? 2. What role can state and non-state actors play in such contexts? 3. What processes are necessary to ensure that human security is protected in such instances? 4. What policies and mechanisms should be crafted to promote and protect human security in circumstances where violent conflict intensifies? The following experts and practitioners provided their insights to facilitate the discussion: 1. Herman Joseph Kraft, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, College of Social Science and Philosophy, University of the Philippines-Diliman 2. Danny Carranza, Land Tenure Improvement Program Coordinator, Philippine Ecumenical Action for Community Empowerment (PEACE) Foundation 3. Alejandro Cruz, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, Quezon Province The findings of these four policy dialogues in the pursuit of defining the human security framework in the Philippines are discussed in the synoptic chapter. This highlights the culmination of the effort of the TWSC, with the assistance of the UNDP-Philippines under its Conflict Prevention and Peace Building programme, to contribute in its small way to define human security based on the experiences of people both at the national and local levels. More importantly, it also sees this as part of the various initiatives to mainstream human security, in the pursuit of a common language that will define popular forms of intervention for national development and peace building. REFERENCES Alkire, Sabina. 2002. A conceptual framework for human security. Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) Working Paper No. 2. United Kingdom: Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. Castro, Nestor T. 2000. Three years of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act: Its impact on indigenous communities. Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 15 (2): 35-54.
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HUMAN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

June 27, 2006 (Tuesday); 1:00 to 4:00 pm Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City Moderator MARIA ELA ATIENZA Associate Professor Department of Political Science College of Social Sciences and Philosophy University of the Philippines-Diliman CARLOS PRIMO DAVID (A SSOCIATE PROFESSOR, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF GEOLOGICAL SCIENCES, COLLEGE OF SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES [UP]-DILIMAN): Mining as an industry is composed of the downstream and upstream industries. The upstream industry is based on the world metal prices. Since 2001, metal prices mostly of heavy metals and base metals were going up. The price of gold in 2004 has reached a value of around USD 450. Currently, the value of an ounce or 31 grams of gold is at USD 660. The second base metal is copper, which has also increased in its world price since the year 2000, followed by nickel. All these three metals are available in the Philippinesthat is why we are a mineral exploration hub.
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Fig. 1. World metal prices (US Geological Survey)
You can also see in the second graph that exploration for these metals have also increased in proportion to world metal prices. In 2004 alone, gold, for example, was explored in 1,800 sites all over the world. For the base metal, copper, there were 390 new active copper exploration sites. It is a misconception that mining activities are confined to the Philippines or other Third World countries. As the next graph shows, exploration sites are distributed around the world. Most of these sites are located in Latin America, Canada, and the United States (US). In fact, the contribution of explorations and succeeding mines in the Asia Pacific region such as the Philippines only accounts for less than 10 percent. In most years, it is only 5 percent. The figures have changed along with the world metal prices. In the graphs above, we can see the increasing trend of global prices of gold, copper, and nickel, which the Philippines have an abundance. Secondly, as mentioned, the development of mineral resources is not
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Fig. 2. Exploration sites (US Geological Survey)
Fig. 3. Distribution of exploration sites around the world (US Geological Survey)
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confined in Third World countries but also in First World nations. The US is the leading producer of coal. Canada produces a lot of gold, and South Africa produces most of our chrome. The economic benefits of all these operations come with the downside of mining. Everyone knows that in any natural resource-based industry, mining takes a toll on the environment. While we see the need for mining as an economic platform, there is also a need to protect the environment. We have to do a very delicate balancing act.
The Downside of Mining
Mine tailings are the waste materials coming from mining operations. In 1993 and 1996, the Marcopper Mining Corporation in Marinduque Island was the source of major mine-tailing spills in the Mogpog River and in the Boac River, respectively. The two spills resulted in the degradation of riverwater quality, which consequently led to the loss of livelihood. The Mogpog River remains idle until today because of the contamination. The Boac River, on the other hand, has been partially recovered because of the natural healing process of the river. Other consequences of the mine-tailing spills are the contamination of aquatic habitats, and various skin diseases contracted by residents of the area. Last year, we also saw two spills in the mine operated by Lafayette Philippines Incorporated in Rapu-Rapu Island, Albay. Unlike the case of Marcopper in Marinduque, Lafayette saw two spills after only a few weeks in operation. The mine spill caused cyanide leakage and fishkills in Rapu Rapu. As mentioned earlier, it is a very delicate balancing act. We need mining and we have the resources to do that. What I want to see is the sustainable development of our mineral resources without compromising the environment. This can be attained by the implementation of our existing laws and provisions. We have so many environmental laws; the main problem is we are not implementing them. Responsible mining means the use of best practices in the mining industry. These methods should start from the extraction of minerals to its processing, and even to the disposal of the waste materials. In addition, existing technologies that do not compromise the environment should be employed. The balancing act for mining can be attained if there is participation of all stakeholders. All stakeholders should have a significant role to play, from the development of the mine to the monitoring of its operations. Lastly, the technical people, or our scientists, also need to be updated on innovations and latest technologies in the field, so we can also contribute to the development of our local communities.
The Comprehensive Monitoring Plan
Let us now look into the Comprehensive Monitoring Plan (CMP) proposal. The first and most salient point of the CMP is that it streamlines most of the regulatory provisions on mining activities. In the current system, when
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a mining company operates or submits a proposal to operate, most of the environmental regulations are provided for in our Environmental Impact Statement system. Mining companies are subject to this system and the resulting document is the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), which permits the mining company to operate. The environmental impact assessment is simply an estimate, an educated guess, of the damage it can cause. The problem is that such an assessment only happens prior to the actual conduct of the mining activity. The CMP proposes to actively involve stakeholders through a multibillion monitoring program. We should not put all the responsibility in monitoring the operations of mining or any industry to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The local government, private citizens, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) should be at the forefront of monitoring all these operations. In the CMP it is also suggested that more stringent penalties be made for violations of existing environmental laws. For example, the company involved in the mine-tailing spill that happened last year was charged with a PHP 10.7 million fine. That does not even cover half of the damage. The case of the Marcopper mine spill is worse: there were no penalties imposed against Marcopper Mining Corporation. If there were, PHP 100,000 is an insufficient fine, if not unjust. The mining company can easily recover that kind of amount from profits. The CMP proposes the use of conventional monitoring protocols and other measures to detect any pollution or contamination in the environment. To date, we have not adapted any standards for sediments quality, or standards for assessing aquatic habitats. The current procedure makes use of water quality assessment. Water quality assessment is inadequate, because there are cases when the river is clean and passes water quality standards but the sediments are actually dirty. Usually, when water in an area that is devoid of any aquatic life passes quality assessment procedure, the evaluators quickly conclude that the water is clean. A possible cause for this problem is metal that tends to settle in sediments and not in the water. Pollution is therefore not detected. Contaminated sediments affect, if not destroy, the entire habitat since all aquatic organisms, including those living in the water, feed on organisms living in the sediments. Our existing laws do not qualify contaminated sediments as basis for imposing fines or even closing down mines. Another method to assess contaminated water habitats is biomonitoring. More than looking at the water content, we in the environmental science and geology disciplines actually look at the organisms themselves. If one of the organisms is not present, something must be wrong. If only one species is present, something is wrong. The quality of the aquatic habitat is monitored by looking at the conditions of the inhabitant life forms. We have submitted the CMP to the former and present secretaries of the DENR: Elisea Gozun, Michael Defensor and now, Angelo Reyes. Hopefully, we will see the importance of having regulations during and after the life of our mines through the passage of the Comprehensive Monitoring Plan.
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LEO JASARENO (MINING TENEMENT DIVISION, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF E NVIRONMENT AND N ATURAL R ESOURCES [DENR]): The Mining Act was approved in 1995 by former President Fidel V. Ramos. It superceded Executive Order 279, the transitory mining law at that time. The Mining Act was originally equipped with Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) under Administrative Order 95-33. This was eventually superceded by Department Administrative Order (DAO) 96-40. The moment that the Mining Act had the basic IRR, DAO 96-40 was amended. The Mining Act requires the state to promote (the mines) rational exploration, development, utilization, and conservation (Philippine Mining Act of 1995 Declaration of Policy). This will be undertaken through the combined efforts of government and the private sector in order to enhance national growth in a way that effectively safeguards the environment and protect the rights of affected communities (Philippine Mining Act of 1995 Declaration of Policy). The development of mineral resources will be done within the guiding principles of sustainable development. One of the more important provisions of the Mining Act is to identify the agencies of government that will be given authority to manage mineral resources development. The DENR, which is the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and use of mineral resources, is one of those agencies. The DENR is supported by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), which is in charge of the administration and disposition of mineral lands. I wish to raise a point of clarification that the Mining Act covers nonfuel minerals. Fuel minerals, on the other hand, are under jurisdiction of the Department of Energy. In granting mining rights, the Mining Act follows the framework that emphasizes active engagement of the state in the development of our resources. Mining rights may also be awarded to a private party. When the state exercises the right to mine, the DENR can enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with Qualified Persons. In the executive branch, the issuing authority is shared by two agencies the national government and the local government. The national government issues mining tenements, which are bigger in scale compared to small mining tenements issued by the provincial governor and the city mayor. One example of a mining tenement issued by the national government is the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA), while a mining tenement issued by the local government is the Small-Scale Mining Permit in Mineral Reservations.
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The right to mine expressed under a mining permit or a mining contract can be issued only to a Qualified Person. A Qualified Person can be a citizen of the Philippines or a corporation, partnership, association, or cooperative, which has to be duly organized for the purpose of engaging in mining, and has to have the technical and financial capability to engage in mining. More importantly, it has to be a Filipino corporation, which means that the ownership of foreigners must not exceed the limit of 40 percent. There is an exception when the mining tenement involved is an Exploration Permit, a Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA), or a Mineral Processing Permit where foreign ownership can be allowed up to 100 percent. Mining tenements granted by the national government can be divided into major and minor types. Major types of mining tenements include Exploration Permit, which gives the right to explore to a Qualified Person; MPSA, which gives the right to explore, develop, utilize, and market the minerals; and, lastly, the FTAA for bigger scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which may be given to foreigners. Minor mining tenements, on the other hand, include the Temporary Exploration Permit, Special Mines Permit, Mineral Processing Permit, Industrial Sand and Gravel Permit, Special Mineral Extraction Permit, Government Seabed Quarry Permit (GSQP), Government Dredging Permit, Special Exploration Permit (which can be given to a GSQP Applicant), Small-Scale Mining Permit in Mineral Reservations, Ore Transport Permit/Delivery Receipt, and Treasure Hunting Permit. In all, we have fourteen types of major mining tenements issued by the national government. As to the mining tenements issued by the provincial government, there are nine: Quarry Permit, Sand and Gravel Permits, Gratuitous Permit, Guano Permit, Gemstone Gathering Permit, Pebble Picking Permit, Small-Scale Mining Permit outside Mineral Reservations, and Ore Transport Permit. The Mining Act also specifies areas that are closed to mining. These are grouped into six. First, there are government reservations like military reservations, civil reservations, and forest reservations, except when the agency concerned gives a prior written clearance to allow a mining application. The second area closed to mining is near or under built-up areas, archaeological or historical sites, infrastructures, and plantations of valuable crops except when the agency concerned will give a prior consent to allow a mining application. The third are areas already covered by an approved mining tenement. In such cases, no other mining application will be accepted. The fourth are areas prohibited by law. There are laws that explicitly prohibit mining in certain areas; for instance, laws that ban the extraction of minerals along the beach. Small-scale miners areas are also closed to mining application unless the small-scale miners give their consent to the mining applicant. Finally, all old growth virgin forests, proclaimed watersheds, wilderness areas, mossy forests, provincial and municipal forests, greenbelts, and all protected areas under the National Integrated Protected Areas System law. The Mining Act also lists several environmental protection measures, but we focus on two major programsthe Environmental Protection and
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Enhancement Program (EPEP) and the Final Mine Rehabilitation and/or Decommissioning Plan (FMR/DP). The EPEP is a program that embodies all the progressive mine rehabilitation work that the mining contractor is supposed to undertake during the life of the mine. It contains such mitigating measures to address the impact of mining. Its major requirements include at least 10 percent of initial capital for environment-related infrastructures during development/pre-operation stage; an allocation of at least 3 to 5 percent of direct mining and milling cost for environmental protection; the establishment of the Mine Rehabilitation Fund to ensure availability of funds for mine rehabilitation; and, the creation of a Multipartite Monitoring Team, which is a multisectoral team. It is the monitoring arm of a committee that takes charge of the implementation of the EPEP. The second document is the FMR/DP, which provides for a comprehensive approach in planning for mine closure where environmental, social, and economic considerations associated with a mining project are integrated into every stage of the mining operation. This is required from the mining operator at least five years before the mine closes operation. One of the features of this plan is the front loaning of at least 20 percent of the budget for mine closure at the beginning of the mining operation. This makes available at least 20 percent of the amount needed to close the mine and bring back another land use fund, which we call the Final Mine Rehabilitation and Decommissioning Fund. This is a new amendment of the IRR passed by former DENR Secretary Defensor. The Mining Act also requires the mining operator to put up a Social Development and Management Program (SDMP). The document embodies the obligation of the mining contractor for community development. It requires the allocation of at least 1 percent of the direct mining and milling cost for the implementation of the program. It also requires the designation of a community relations officer. It gives preference to local workers and employment in the mine and, in the case of ancestral domain or ancestral lands, it requires the allocation of at least 1 percent of the annual gross output to indigenous peoples (IP) communities. In summary, SDMP takes charge of the social responsibilities of the mining companies, while the EPEP and the FMR/DP take charge of the environmental responsibilities of the same mining company. In terms of the fiscal provisions, the Mining Act provides for the payment of taxes and fees to the government from the contractor. These taxes start with the payment of an excise tax and other direct taxes, including royalties to IPs in the case of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, and royalties to the government in case the area is inside a mineral reservation. The IRR of the Mining Act also clarifies the role of local government units with respect to the management of mineral lands. This includes the issuance of small-scale mining permits or small-mining permits. Another provision of the Mining Act is the protection of the rights of IPs, which can be summarized in two major provisions. If the concerned IP or indigenous cultural community refuses, then government cannot
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issue the mining rights or the mining tenements. We call that the prior, informed consent under the Mining Act, which later on was modified by the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) to become free and prior informed consent. The DENR has been strictly implementing this provision of the Mining Act and the IPRA. Second, in case where there is an indigenous cultural community, the Mining Act mandates that there has to be an agreement with the IPs concerned. Without the agreement, the mining rights or the mining tenements cannot be issued by the government. In the case of small-scale mining development, the Mining Act provides that small-scale mining shall continue to be governed by the existing small-scale mining laws, namely Republic Act 7076 and Presidential Decree 1899. The Mining Act also contains what we call the social acceptability provision. It is consistent with provisions on the issuance of the ECC, as well as provisions of the Local Government Code, particularly sections 26 and 27 which require, among others, the endorsement of the Sanggunian (local council) for the approval of a mining project. The DENR cannot issue or cannot allow mining projects without the endorsement of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (provincial council), the Sanggunian Bayan (city or municipal council), and the Sangguniang Barangay. To settle mining conflicts, the Mining Act has created two quasijudicial bodies: the panel of arbitrators in every region of the DENR, and the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). The panel of arbitrators and the MGB have the exclusive and original jurisdiction to decide on mining disputes. In case of appeals, the decision of the panel of arbitrators may be appealed through the MAB. There is only one board holding office in the DENR central office. Lastly, the Mining Act provides for a set of penalties in case of violations of the Mining Act and the terms and conditions of the mining tenements. To quote, [t]he mining act has set a new regime of mineral resources development following the principle of responsible mining and it is government policy to promote the use of minerals under the terms of responsible mining. GERARDO SICAT (PROFESSOR EMERITUS, SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, UP-DILIMAN): The main issue, in my view, is to determine how best we can harness the natural resources for the benefit of the nationthe Filipino people. It is not for the benefit of small groups; it is not for the benefit of communities where the mines are because these communities are part of the nation. It is in that context that they have to be sharers of the bounty but natural resources are the bounty given to us as a nation. This,
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I think, was the essence of the Constitutional framework that the patrimony for natural resources belongs to the nation and not to any particular group of people in the country. Whose development counts? It is the nations development; not the development of little communities or small portions of the country but the development of the nation. Policy, then, should define who should benefit from the countrys mining resources. Mining resources are part of the nations natural resources. How are we going to look at the benefits that we should derive from natural resources for the benefit of our country and its people? We should determine how we can earn dollars and generate other sources of income for the good of the nation rather than for special groups. Second, the income generated from rents, and the taxes that we collect from natural resources, belong to the nation. Of course, those who are helping to extract these resources to generate income deserve a minimum share. The problem, however, is that people think that when some participants try to extract resources, they have vested interests. But rents and taxes go to the state, and the states revenues oftentimes go back to the local communities. If we have resources that are exploited and taxed, we must see to it that the proper rents are derived. The rents from the resources that we can extract after production cost and all other costs are the net incomes derived by operators. The maximization of our mineral resources would generate income and employment for the labor force. People get employed and earn, which allows them to support their families. Indirect incomes are also very important. The indirect incomes are the incomes derived by bystanders to the process of miningnearby communities and the people who make business out of those earning from the mines. This is where the whole economy gets in. How does this strengthen the economy? How does it raise export earnings? How does it prop up the capacity of the nation to incur other obligations involving foreign monies? There are revenues from rents arising from exploitation of natural resources. What do we get from them? We get increases in government revenues from taxes, the provision of additional resources to support national programs for development, and the strengthening of the fiscal position of the government. It is very easy to see that the first impact of operationswhether mining, forestry, fishery, or any operation that involves large-scale activitieswould be on local communities. In some cases, however, these activities cause conflicts, and thus are not beneficial to the community. However, we have to look at the total net effect. The net benefits are greater than the cost that you receive. Can we correct the cost incurred so that we can minimize them and then we maximize the benefits that we can see? These are the problems that people should think about. I have said the countrys natural resources are for all Filipinos and the Constitution of our country says this. That is a very sound principle. What went wrong? Our leaders who framed the 1935 Constitution made the mistake of making rules that are rigid and impractical for a young nation
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lacking in capital. Perhaps theyRecto and Quezonhad good intentions, but failed in the process of implementation. Unfortunately, we had to pay for the outcomes of their action. To define how the beneficiaries of the nation will get the appropriate results from our natural resources, we ought to have Congress debate over the issue and pass the proper laws. Later on, Congress could amend it if needed. If they are wrong from the very start though, how could we expect them to amend the Constitution? I call this the iron laws of Quezon and Recto in the Constitution. If you look at the section on Patrimony, it says that the citizenship of corporations that can engage in natural resource development should be 60 percent Filipino. What they did was to write specific laws in the Constitution, rather than write the principle and let Congress decide on doing it. In our country, legislations covering this issue have to comply with the iron laws that I talked about, with the specific requirements that are found in the Constitution. Every law that we pass regarding this issue have to go into a circumlocuted situation trying to refer to this basic statements of our Constitution and then adjusting our laws. If we know they made a mistake and we cannot do anything about it, we try to work out the second best solution. This is what we have done for the last 70 years, from the first fifteen years up to the Commonwealth period. But if you examine what the other countries do on this very same issue, they have no such rules in their constitution. They have laws that are passed by the parliament, which the parliament can amend if needed. Our hands are tied on issues dealing with very important development aspects. The first few years [of the republic] were not so bad because capital was available. It was capital that we were driving out. During those years up to 1973, American capital was treated as if it were Filipino capital. Although all of us hated the Parity Amendment, there was capital available to help our mining industry. That is why between the independence and the 1970s, the mining industry was one of the leading sectors of Philippine development. It was after 1975, especially after the mid-1980s, when the mining industry became very weak. Our public utilities are very bad because we prevented foreign capital from entering. We encourage local individuals to become the owners of these utilities. There is nothing wrong with that except we gave it to them on a silver platter. They did not have money but they had the power, so they were able to charge a higher cost for public utilities. They withdrew the expansion of their business because they had no capital and they found it difficult to borrow funds from abroad. How did our forests become denuded? Since only Filipinos can manage and control the forests, our leaders allocated our resources to friends for exploitation and profit. Many parts of our land were divided into logging concessions. We could not impose the reforestation policy on them because they had padrinos (patrons) in government. The padrinos protect them so all they do was to cut up the forest. In some countries, people have forest power because government protects them on certain rules and because government can control people who have forestry concessions.
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Today Filipinos go abroad seeking higher wages. There is a lot of capital accumulation in other countries and because of that, a carpenter can have a very productive enterprise, while the carpenter here remains poor because the only tool he has is the hammer. In 1935, our ideology was framed along the iron laws of the economic restrictions on foreign capital by those who thought they were serving the nation well. Over the years, our development policy focused on how to restrict capital and competition from coming in. We try to exclude production that would jolt our industries to become more competitive because we want our industries to profit. With this rationale for the liberalization of the economy, I believe we will keep lagging behind our neighbor countries. MARVIC MV LEONEN (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, COLLEGE OF LAW, UP-DILIMAN): My standpoint comes from the perspective of the communities that have been affected by mining corporations. True, they are not the entire Filipino people, but they are Filipinos. I agree that development should benefit everyone, not only a single group, but the people coming from the communities are very significant stakeholders in this process. There is something wrong with the allocation of our rights. It still comes from the general colonial idea that the state owns everything. The Regalian doctrine is a historical farce, a legal fiction that began in 1935 for two reasons: At that time, the Regalian doctrine only applies to the conquered but unoccupied land. Second, Magellan came here not to conquer but to search for the Spice Islands. As pointed out by Dr. Sicat, it was in 1935 when the Constitutional Convention introduced the idea of the Regalian doctrine, which they called by a Spanish name. The United States Supreme Court said that, The Regalian doctrine applies perhaps to the Spanish sovereign. But to the American sovereign when we came in 1900s, in the case of Cario vs. Insular government, it does not apply. Today, we still follow that doctrine. The idea is: command and control. The persons that are supposed to have, by principle, the best knowledge of how resources are to be allocated is just a single individual who has an office in the DENR office. The Secretary of the DENR decides who will get a permit. There are laws but in the ultimate analysis, the system is still first-come-first-served to a Qualified Person. Allow me to correct the impression on the exemption of foreigners from operating and managing our local mines. That is the general rule today, as in the case of La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association vs. Western Mining Corporation, which was decided in December 2004. In spite of the provisions
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stated in Article 12, section 2, paragraph 4 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court said that Foreign corporations may only participate via financial or technical assistance. On the other hand, the Constitution states either financial or technical, and then it included the word assistance. The 1973 Constitution states, A service contractor may participate by operating, managing, providing financial, technical and other arrangements. The 1987 Constitution was more restrictive, yet the Supreme Court in La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association vs. Western Mining Corporation declares that the foreign-owned corporation may not only provide financial assistance or technical assistance. It may, like Western Mining Corporation in Mindanao, operate and manage mining activities. It cannot also be the exception because a maximum of 1,000 meridional blocks can be awarded to them, which, if I am not mistaken, is 81,000 hectares. With a stroke of a pen, they can be awarded that much land and an MPSA holder can be awarded much less. People within the community are affected by it. Western Mining Corporation started with 95,000 hectares. Yearly, they should be able to release 4,000 hectares each, but to start with 95,000 hectares is really quite a big amount of land. I am not sure if my math is correct, but a surveyor told me that when you stand on a plain, you might be able to see 400 to 500 hectares of land as far as the eye can see on a clear day. The Dole plantation spans 8,000 hectares. The awarded area of Climax Arimco in Region 2 under an FTAA and Western Mining Corporation is close to 95,000 hectares in 1995. It was awarded before the Philippine Mining Act was enacted. My point, again, is that someone decides over this and, in the final analysis, it is really the Secretary of the DENR that recommends to the President, and the President signing that particular contract. It is still a form of command and control. Does the local government have a choice? Yes, according to the Local Government Code. They have veto power but then, that veto power is being contested, especially if all three Sangguniansat the barangay, municipality and provincial levelare involved. The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) say two-thirds of the vote is needed. Some members of the community, the politicians in the area, say the consent of all Sanggunians is needed. These people who are taking issue are not the owners of the land. These are not the people who made the land productive for years, whose lives are truly embedded in their lifeways revolving around the land. This practice can be stopped, but then it will be government again telling the people what they should do. Let us suppose the land is privately owned. In the case of Didipio vs. DENR, the Supreme Court has already given the imprimatur of saying that any mining activity of a corporation is already public use and, therefore, the government may expropriate the land and pay just compensation. The legal definition of just compensation conflicts with the general idea that it is the people who decide on how to utilize mining areas in their communities.
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The law says that there are areas closed to mining. But there is a collatilla unless the government agency accedes. Now, an FTAA of a foreign corporation is signed by the President. Every department of government, including the Department of National Defense (DND) is the alter ego of the President of the Republic of the Philippines. Therefore, when the President says, I want to sign this land over to a mining company, do you think that the government agency can say no? Protected areas are also restricted and absolutely do not have qualifications in the law. In practice, the protected-areas boundaries are realigned. It is possible to have a protected area with a large gaping hole in the middle. Mount Apos protected area is shaped like a huge hole in the middle in order to allow geothermal activity and commercial activity to occur. That is our concept of a protected area. A protected areas boundaries are not made final until it is legislated. Prior to that, the DENR through the President can reformulate the boundaries of a protected area. In effect, the law gives the executive branch the discretion to decide on which land to get. There are other loopholes in the law. There are also Qualified Persons to be dealt with. Qualified, which is supposedly the exception, is now the general rule. Let me refer to La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association vs. DENR. Why would a foreign company still get only 40 percent of an enterprise if, based on the court decision, they can already get a 100percent share? We do not need to amend the Constitution then; it has been amended by interpretation. The guaranteed share of government is not 60 percent of the net profit. That was the misconception before of many lawyers, including people from DENR. Sixty percent of net profit in foreign FTAAs should go to the government. The Supreme Court said that there is nothing in the Constitution that says that the government should get a minimum of 60 percent; it can be 30 or 20 percent. Justice Panganibans 246-page decision proved that it is better economically or business wise to actually choose an FTAA rather than go for an MPSA. The share of government in an MPSA is only the excise tax, according to RA 7942, but the regulation says that it is the tax plus something else, but then regulations originate from the law. A good mining companys lawyer can challenge that regulation and say that it is invalid and illegal. My point is that the law operates in a first come, first served basis. The people in government decides, not the people in the community. When we were arguing for La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) gave statistics to the Supreme Court without giving us copies. The Supreme Court, in their final opinion, came out with their final decision using the statistics. NEDA says that the total value of mineral wealth naturally occurring in organic material, as the law defines it, is PHP 4.73 trillion. We do not know how they computed that amount, since metal prices fluctuate, so that might not be the total value. The more staggering statistic that NEDA gave was what government will take out of the PHP 4.73 trillion,
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based on the regulation: PHP 157 billion. That means 3 percent of PHP 4.73 trillion will go to government. What about the 97 percent? It will go to the private enterprise that comes in as their share of the listed capital. Financial capital is valuable, but are not natural resources also a form of capital? Are not the peoples contributions to the land a form capital? Is not voluntary removal of the people from their land a form of capital? People are at risk; when they transfer from one area to the other, they will suffer from dislocation. Is that computed in terms of business, for purposes of determining the incentives you give to a mining corporation? I dont think so. I believe it is computed only as pre-operating cost. If you review the costs of relocation, the salary of social workers is not included in determining whether a mining company will be profitable for themselves and for the entire community in general. The PHP 157-billion share of government is miniscule, which impelled four justices in the Supreme Court were prepared to declare that the law was inequitable and therefore unconstitutional. Where did the money go? Most likely, it went to tax collection and not to the community. It went to counterinsurgency programs. Later, we will find that PHP 1 billion is unaccounted forlost to corruption probably. Let me tell a horror story. A foreign corporation committed 1 percent of its gross revenue to the Blaan community. We looked at the corporate papers. The corporation created a Blaan foundation, which will receive the said amount. The directorship was divided into three seats: one for MGB, one for the corporation, and a third for the Blaans. I do not know why MGB and the corporation have to be represented, or even why the board of directors cannot reach a quorum in a meeting unless a corporate representative is present. Certainly, the full amount will not go to the Blaan community as promised by the corporation. The tripartite leadership will limit the shares of the Blaans. These are the machinations happening on the ground. We have raised these problems several times since the term of former DENR Secretary Antonio Cerilles. My third point is on corporate liability. Can you imagine how difficult it is to sue a powerful person? Can you imagine how difficult it would be to go through a Regional Trial Court and sue a foreign corporation? Can you imagine how difficult it would be if the foreign corporation did submit all the plans to DENR but then in the end repatriates? Because of the bilateral investment treaty, foreign companies from Australia, Canada, France, and Germany are guaranteed repatriation. If government stops repatriation in any form, it will be sued under the international commercial arbitration, as in the case of the Philippine International Air Terminals Company Incorporated (PIATCO) scandal. Our government will have to answer to international arbitration and because it is a signatory, the treat is enforced here in the Philippines. What is stopping a foreign corporation from just packing up? It contributes to a contingent liability rehabilitation fund, but that is just a percentage of their future liability. The point here is that it is difficult to sue foreign corporations in the Philippines, like the corporate hard shell Marcopper.
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We encounter a lot of corporate layering in the Philippine mining industry. Let me give you a very concrete example. A PHP 16-million company buys all the shares of a foreign corporation to the tune of PHP 560 million. How can that be? Later, these foreign companies are presented to the Supreme Court as Filipino. How did these buy PHP 560 million worth of shares? The Deed of Sale, approved by the DENR secretary, states the mode of payment: [T]he small corporation will pay the large transnational corporation only when the mining company becomes an ongoing concern and 24 months thereafter. How can a good transnational company sell all its shares and pretend that it is a Filipino corporation? At the very start, the small corporation already had a PHP 560-million liability. The small corporation re-registers as a new corporation, so that the liabilities will not be reflected in its books. It registers under a new name. How can you make these corporations liable now, given that the Philippine law on limited liability is very much the same as that of a developed country? Fourth: On national economy. There are three journal articles by Jeffrey Sachs and he, along with another economist, tried all sorts of correlation and concluded that there is a natural resource curse in resource economics. If my economics serves me correctly, the natural resource curse says that whenever an economy depends on its natural resources, the more the economy is dependent in extracting natural resource, the slower its growth. The Chair of the University of Montanas Department of Environment was commissioned to do a study on the localities that are dependent on mining in the United States with one hundred counties, which was a very representative sample. His conclusions were simple. First, he found that the more that the county becomes dependent on mining, its growth becomes slower. Second, he found the phenomenon of high wage and high unemployment in these counties. Mining companies offer higher minimum wage, which will entice people in outlying low-wage areas to migrate. It does not matter whether the high wage is permanent, or whether work is seasonal. In an actual mining company operating in Region 2, the phenomenon of high wage and high unemployment exists. Unemployment figures are high especially on lowskilled jobs. If we rush to open our country for mineral exploitation, the question is: Will our economy really grow as expected? We have to look at the economics, then wonder at what point will our economy slow down because we are too dependent on these industries. The law does not say what the limit is. Our law and our government promote mining. There seems to be no understanding of the scientific phenomenon that I just mentioned. My next point is on incentives. Government gives incentives to mining companies. I hope that government would also consider these incentives from the point of view of the communities. Government seems to be only providing incentives to companies that do not have a track record of community responsibility or involvement. What kind of employment can
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be generated? Will these incentives allow companies offer regular, seasonal, or contractual, permanent or non-permanent jobs? How much do the people know about the employment? There is a world of difference between a farmer who gains dignity because he can pass on his knowledge on farming, and a person that carries rocks and is told by a foreman to carry a rock from one place to another. The summary differential is not enough. How would we measure the dignity of one who earns minimum wagethe one carrying the rocks, compared to the farmer who only earns half? That is a question that is fundamental to the security of the people within the community. When one does not feel secure, he may be vulnerable to others who are not from the area, who might be there only to mine but care nothing about the environment. Mining can cause divisiveness in communities. One community has a pro-mining and an anti-mining basketball club. The same community has a pro-mining and an anti-mining youth organization. The division is no longer between rich and poor, but between pro- and anti-mining groups. Mining separates families. Do we have to sacrifice the community for the greater goodwhich is to get PHP 157 billion into the coffers of the Republic to modernize our army? Government requires the EP, the EPEP all kinds of plans. A plan is a good starting point, yet it seems that if one plan is not enough the EPEP is requested for, then an Annual Environmental Protection and Enhancement Program (AEPEP), and later, social and post-rehabilitation plans. How do we monitor the mining corporations? What are the expenses of monitoring? Who actually monitors? Is it the DENR, or the MGB that promotes the program? Is our environmental protection agency separate from the DENR, or is it subsumed under the office of the DENR secretary, includes in principle in the DENRs major platforms that encourages mining? My final point is on the bilateral investment treaty. When a transnational corporation is taken over, or a victim of something akin to expropriation (but not expropriation such as canceling the mining permit) that transnational corporation can bypass the entire legal system in the Philippines and sue the Philippine government under the International Commercial Arbitration or under the International Criminal Court (ICC). Can a community sue a transnational corporation at the international level, on the basis of this treaty? The answer is no. Bilateral investment treaties are signed for the protection of the investor. In Rapu-Rapu, what did the government do? They wanted to throw away the recommendation of the Rapu-Rapu Fact-Finding Commission, rather than having the legal staff of the DOJ to help the people file the case in order to get compensation. It did ask for PHP 10 million, but that is the fine that goes to government. Does money go to farmers in that area? We should be able to litigate on a transnational level. If more foreign corporations come in, then we should be able to sue them in their own countries and litigate on a transnational level. Where do we get the resources? There seems to be no resources to help us assert our rights as a country. Meanwhile, government provides support to mining companies.
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The MGB goes around members of the Philippine Chamber of Mines promoting programs in their favor.
OPEN FORUM
PABLO ABUYEN (COMMUNITY ORGANIZER, COMMUNITY VOLUNTEERS MISSIONER, BENGUET): Our experience in the mining community in Benguet is the same with other mining communities having been displaced and the environment polluted. The experience we had is the same as what was explained a while ago, although it was different for IPs. IPs rely on land as well as their communities. Mining activities tend to bring about division. On the sixth year of mining operations in Sibungan, the community was divided into the promining and the anti-mining camps. People from lowland areas such as Pangasinan, who were hired as permanent workers, displaced the local people, particularly the women. It took longer to transport the products made by our women to the market because the route they used to take is now part of the companys heavily guarded premises, which they are not allowed to enter. As consequence, farmers had to get out of the mining territory. Our personal lives and traditions were affected. Families were divided. In terms of tradition, we had to transfer our buried ancestors and spend for religious rituals that are part of the process.
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Our communities are important to us. When the law was explained to us by the DENR, it seemed really good. We hope that it will be implemented as they had explained it. ADONIS BRINGAS (CONCERNED CITIZENS OF ABRA FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE): There are three points I would like to share. When the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) does not agree with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) on which instruments to use to survey the land, as well as the policy on mining, who decides over these activities? Is it the policy of the SB or the SP or the owners of the land that is followed? There are instances when decisions are overturned because of under-the-table discussions and arrangements with companies. We also have instruments for protected areas but there are people within protected areas who also have to be protected. Protection is not only for the area but for the community as well. My second comment is on the concept that land is life. Filipinos have been commercialized or made to think that land may be bought or sold. However, the real connection with land is still alive in IP communities. Families have an inherent obligation to care for the land and to pass it on to children and grandchildren. Land is more than property; it is life itself. Land is connected to the clan and to life. Unfortunately, the mining issue has since divided our community. The third is the issue of rehabilitation. When you go to Baguio City, you will see that rehabilitation is still under way in the area the Philex Mining Corporation operated. However, the mountains are barren because of the operations of the mine. RICARDO SATURAY (SAMAHAN NG MGA NAGTATAGUYOD NG AGHAM AT TEKNOLOHIYA SA PILIPINAS [ADVOCATES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR THE PEOPLE, AGHAM]): The demise of the mining industry in the late 1970s and the 1980s was admittedly due to the decline in the price of metals in the international market, and not because of restrictive laws. Back then, foreign corporations were able to circumvent the so-called restrictive laws and profit from it. We are not preventing capital from coming in. However, the liberalization policy allowed foreign companies to suck out capital from us. This capital is what we needed to build our own downstream industries, which would have fully integrated mining into our national economy. As for the Philippine Mining Act, its most salient point, in my opinion, is to institutionalize the liberalization of Philippine mining. NINA GALANG (ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES INSTITUTE, MIRIAM COLLEGE): First, I would like to ask the regional director from MGB. With regards remediation, is the company responsible only at the end of the contract or at the end of the exploration? I ask this because in the recent Lafayette spill, DENR Secretary Reyes said Filipino taxpayers will have to pay for the damages if they shut down the mine. What does that mean? We are left
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holding the bag when the government keeps assuring us that these miners will be responsible. Where is government responsibility? The next question is for Dr. Sicat. You asked whether we should look at the general good versus the good of only small communities. I think we should look at it in another way. I believe that mining will benefit only a small group and these are the companies and probably their employees. But the greater majority will suffer because they lose the mountain, the forest and the rivers. The rivers are silted and polluted. It is really the majority that will suffer and only a few will benefitthe mining companies. The general population, including the IPs, will be at a disadvantage. There is a general notion of economy versus environment. Some say mining activities are good for the economy, although we have to sacrifice the environment a little bit. I would like to point out that economically, corporate mining is not good at all. A research on some of our natural parks shows that mining will bring in about PHP 23 billion. We stand to gain PHP 50 billion without mining, so economically, it has no advantage. I think we have to look for developmental modes that will be both good for the environment and the economy. ARZE GLIPO (MEMBER, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF SORSOGON AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION): My concern is regarding the recent decision of the secretary of the DENR to allow the test running of the Rapu-Rapu mining facility. The position of the SP of Sorsogon against the operation of the Rapu-Rapu mining facility has been consistent as early as 2003. The SP asked why the DENR gave out this permit, despite the opposition of different sectors. Recently, we came up with a resolution denouncing the recent decision of Secretary Reyes to allow this test run. What is the role of communities, municipalities or provinces that are adjacent to a mining facility but also affected by, for example, the spillage of mining wastes? Sorsogon fisherfolks were the ones expressing the destruction and the negative impact of the spill on their livelihoods. For the past two to three months, about 4,000 fisherfolks in our province do not have income anymore from fishing. What is the role of local government units (LGUs) of other communities and provinces who are also affected by this spillage? What is the role of peoples organizations and NGOs? It seems to me that despite the resolutions that the LGU passed, they do not affect the decision of the national government. I think it is the voice of the corporate-driven mining industry that is being heard. What should be the participation of units, or coordinating bodies, that represent areas or communities affected by mining? LEO JASARENO: I would like to comment on remediation after the closing of a mining operation. During the mining operation, we implement the progressive
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mine rehabilitation process. Every area, every parcel of land within the mining area that is adversely affected physically or chemically by the mining operation, has to be addressed by the mining company in terms of any acceptable measure of mine rehabilitation. Once the mine is closed down, we then base a tax scheme to introduce a mechanism where the mined out area can be rehabilitated and used to maximize productivity. Another existing policy regarding responsibilities of mining companies is that the mining contractor is mainly responsible in with the closure of mines. What the DENR Secretary was saying regarding the Lafayette case is that when the company leaves, no one will take care of the mine; government will still take care of it. The Secretary must be thinking that MGB has not front-loaded the fund for mine closure. It is true that in the old mining law, once a mining company leaves, we are left with an empty bag because no funds are available for rehabilitation. Hence, we instituted the Final Mine Rehabilitation Fund. Last year, former DENR Secretary Defensor issued an amendment to the IRR, which requires all operating mines to front-load at least 20 percent of the budget for mine closure at the start of the mining project. We are now starting to implement the new policy. We are calling the attention of all mining projects operating in the Philippines to comply with this requirement. We have just called the attention of Lafayette Mining, the company behind the Rapu-Rapu mining project, to submit the Mine Decommissioning and Rehabilitation Plan, which will include the companys budget. We will require them to frontload by depositing the money in a government depository bank. Whether the company really has money should not be a problem because under the existing policy it must have money. If the mining project fails to deposit at least 20 percent of the required budget for mine closure, then the DENR will have to close the mine. It is part of our regulation and, in fact, it is one of the more important measures in meeting the requirements of environmental protection. That is a policy gap that the existing mining law seeks to address in reference to the old regime, which did not contain a provision for a ready fund for any incident or accidents. The contingent liability rehabilitation fund, worth PHP 5 million, is not for the mine closure. This is just for the day-to-day requirement of mine rehabilitation of the mining operation. On the point raised by Ms. Glipo, we have to understand that when the ECC was issued for the Rapu-Rapu mining project, only the primary impact area was defined. Unfortunately, Sorsogon is not included even in the secondary impact area. All the impact areas were determined within the province of Albay. This is one policy gap. All measures and conditionalities imposed by the ECC were directed only to those impact areas. If we want Sorsogon to be part of the impact areas, we have to manifest to the DENR that the Environmental Management Bureau can amend the existing ECC of Lafayette. In this way, the province of Sorsogon, or even Camarines Sur and nearby islands, can be part of the impact area.
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My advice to Sorsogueos is to file a complaint with the DENR and file a claim for compensation for damages, which may be paid after due investigation of the DENR. In the existing regulations, we have funds and assessment guidelines purposely formulated to address these kinds of issues. The DENR issued a report based on the Rapu-Rapu Fact-Finding Commissions report. The DENR also had other bases for its report, such as independent reports, and all others made by government agencies. DENR used scientific investigation and political decision was employed in coming up with an integrated report. GERARDO SICAT: All things have benefits and costs. We need to make a full account of the costs as well as the benefits. Mining should be a useful economic activity only if, in the end, we see that the benefits are large compared to the cost. It has been said that some types of activities will lead to the depletion of the resources. The replacement of mineral resources will take billions of years. While resources are available, there should be proper management of the resources, so that we can derive additional benefits or value for the nation. Our country had not really been able to take advantage of the enormous resources we have. When the Americans were running our country, the two most important units of the colonial administration were the Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Mines because there was strong interest in our mineral resources. An abundant amount of resources have been discovered. The Americans discovered enormous mineral wealth that were wasted over time. One of the reasons our countrymen wanted to exclude foreigners was that they wanted to have control over the mining areas. More mining plains are being filed in the geological services than there are explorations. The ones taking hold of the mining plains are essentially those who are looking for opportunities for themselves. They are creating claims on the land without the capital to do so and they turn around once they have the claims. With all the restrictions we have on capital and on participation, we can only turn to some mining companies. Our mineral companies are, basically, lacking in money. They are not the big players. None of the foreign mining companies are relocating and working in the Philippines because they have been excluded from exploration activities. They have not been able to discover resources. Why do we have limited gas resources in the country? Exploration by foreign companies is limited by constitutional provisions. In other countries, foreign companies are asked by the states to locate and find resources. Once found, the companies can decide how these can be divided between the state and the ones who discovered. In other countries, you have exploration companies discovering large petroleum resources. As resources are depletable, other renewable resources are also sought
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for. Renewable resources can be expanded for maximum value, but because of our restrictions, we are not able to do so. Let me give, as an example, a renewable resource such as forestry. In the Subic Export Processing Zone, there is a Japanese company processing forest products from a New Zealand concession. This agreement runs on a thirty-year period. Every year, they harvest a large portion of the land area, which is used for construction. Our country will not be able to work along these kinds of agreements because the constitution does not allow it yet. This is why I feel that we should liberalize a lot of industries, mining being one of them. The issue here is how we use these resources. Liberalization will open opportunities to increase the resources of the nation. This will benefit other industries that are connected with mining, and even enable other industries to emerge. It is very unfortunate that in the 1950s to the 1960s, the Philippines was basically ran by the agricultural sector, led by the coconut industry, and the mineral sector. We were setting up other industries that were stocking up the foreign exchange earnings of the mineral, coconut, and sugar industries, instead of creating industries that were potentially competitive. We practically wasted some of the resources by pouring funds for protected industries. Many of these protected industries could not really run themselves once they face competition. We really should avoid that kind of management from now on. I do not think that mining is bad. For one, it brings employment. There must be other opportunities, other kinds of industries that we should develop, but that depends on how we use our resources. MARVIC LEONEN: Two-thirds of the provisions of the Constitution are on mining. That showed the interest of the Americans. However, we need to look at the organic factors. We should not just focus on extraction. We should look at where the raw materials come from and, where they are actually processed. This is called the downstream side effect. If I were the corporation that owns the Rapu-Rapu mining project, I will tell my company that Australia and the Philippines entered into a bilateral investment treaty, which ensures that the Philippines cannot expropriate the investment. Second, the Philippines cannot do anything tantamount to indirect expropriation. Hence, the Philippine government cannot cancel the mining permit. The Philippine government can sue us. If they do, we can go to the International Commercial Arbitrary Tribunal and we will be paid in full for all investments on the mining area. In the case of PIATCO, the Supreme Court declared that the contract was null and void. Under domestic law, everyone suffers their losses. It is a loss for the French and the German investors, but because they had the bilateral investment treaty on their side they sued the Philippine government. The investors are gone because the Supreme Court declared that corruption was incurred. Now they are asking for USD 400 million in compensation for their investments. The DENR can cancel the mining
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permits, but the foreign corporation can sue the agency under international law and under the bilateral investment treaty. President Ramos signed it before he signed the FTAA with Western Mining Corporation. Before government closes down a foreign investment due to environmental reasons, the company turns around and sues the government in commercial arbitration instead of an environmental arbitration. Since the treaty requires that 60 percent of the company should be Filipinoowned, the usual strategy of the mining company is to name their Filipino lawyers as the stockholders. Another strategy is to enter into a trust agreement with them, as reflected in the confidentiality clause in Republic Act 7942. The Filipino lawyer now cannot disclose the agreement to anyone, even the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is compelled to uphold the trust agreement as well. If I were the mining company, I will come in as a fully foreign corporation, but register as a 100 percent subsidiary in the Philippines. I will put all Philippine assets under that name. If there is any threat of closure, I will pull out my stocks and investments. The Philippine government can go against the subsidiary and sequester whatever they can get from the office but that is all they can get. The government cannot go against the mining company. The Philippine government, with lawyers coming from a regional trial court, cannot go to Canada and Australia and serve the subpoena. On the other hand, what will be our loss if we pack up and go? The mining company did not make any deposit from the beginning. Before they can deposit 20 percent of the budget, they have to submit the Mine Decommissioning and Rehabilitation Plan to the DENR. Of course, 20 percent will not be enough; the company will reflect a very limited budget on the plan. As we can see, the entire government is under the control of the company. I do not fear foreign capital. I fear the way we treat them under our lawslimited liability, layering of corporations, nominal parties, etc. First of all, fisherfolks can sue Rapu-Rapu but how much will be spent for the lawyer? Pro bono. What about for the expert that will prove that there is a dispute? None. But even if it were free, the time spent by the expert is an opportunity cost. This means you have to get them on a fulltime basis to be able to get quality results. Where do you get the money to fund that? Our laws on liability are made such that it is the plaintiff that proves every causation, every negligence of the corporation. Do they have access to the corporate records in the first place? No. The law guarantees confidentiality. You cannot even sue the DENR to get it. If they do, the company can sue them back. Where does justice stand under that setup? There is an adjudication board that oversees mining cases in the country, which is based in the DENRs head office. The chair is the DENR secretary. The MGB director is another member. The third one heads operations, if I am not mistaken. No Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) representative sits in that board. The board is supposed to be an independent investigative body. The problem now is: how can you file a complaint or a case against a mining company, when DENR
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technically allowed them to do the alleged violations? These cases should be settled in a trial court where the judge can be partial. That is one of the pitfalls of the law. The Mining Act is progressive, in that compared to the law prior to the 1987 Constitution, the current Mining Act recognizes free, prior, and informed consent. But try to press charges under this law and you understand the frustration of lawyers. Many lawyers offering their services pro bono cannot win a case under this particular law. Even if we do not do it pro bono, pursuing the case is very tedious. If we go to the Regional Trial Court, will the judge listen to a farmer? To the mayor? Or will he listen to the president of the Republic of the Philippines who has endorsed a particular project? Or the DENR secretary, who happens to be very close to the administration? This is the reality that we are facing. Those are the conditions under which you are interpreting the law. We can talk about economics and about principles, but what about the realities on the ground? The odds are skewed under our own justice system, but it is hard to litigate here in our country. Litigation should be done in the international or transnational level. Are the policy gaps due to the individuals who occupy positions in the DENR? I believe the problem is in the structure of policy, which includes the law, and its governing and implementing agencies. LUNA EULOGIO MANRIQUE (MUNICIPAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, MUNICIPALITY OF BOAC, MARINDUQUE): In reference to the Boac River case, I would like to emphasize the responsibility and accountability of mining companies, and even the national government. When disasters happen, LGUs are bearing the brunt of the problems. We deal with the violations of the mining companies. Until 1993, before the industrial accident took place, the mining company pays PHP 16,000.00 per year to the local government. SHIRLEY BOLAOS (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COASTAL CORE, SORSOGON, SORSOGON): I would like to share the findings of our study on the economic benefits of mining in Rapu-Rapu. The economic benefits, which the government claims, far outweigh the social costs; in particular, the impact on health and environment. Also, based on the study conducted by Risk Asia Consulting Incorporated, the income generated by the municipal government of RapuRapu has not improved. If this is the case, where are the economic benefits of the local government? Some related issues are also involved here, such as the accreditation for tax holiday given to mining companies. My next question concerns chemical use in our mines. In a lot of mine sites, toxic chemicals are used to process ores. What are the specific outcomes of this, especially on our water aquatic systems? What is its impact on the soil? I hope that when we say we are looking for policy recommendations, we should include policy dealing with the use of chemicals.
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A final issue I would like to raise is the full accountability of companies especially when they leave the mining site. How do they rehabilitate the areas? Do they just plant trees and vegetation? Are these activities sufficient to recover the ecosystems that were destroyed by the mining operation? In the end, the fisherfolks and the farmers, not the companies are paying the price of such destruction. UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT 1: This is basically a security issue that affects a lot of IPs and communities where mining operations take place. The role of MGB is to implement programs based on the existing policy. Its role is to respond to issues of human security. I have been hearing a lot about compensation and rehabilitation, but is there any room at all to address issues as consequence of these programs? My next question is for Professor Marvic Leonen. The trajectory of litigation seems to move upward, but in terms of policy advocacy in the Philippines and in terms of addressing human security concerns, what advice can you possibly give to policy advocates in the country so that we may also learn from you? UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT 2: What can policy advocates do? Policy advocates should go to the communities where intrusions are being fended off. The law itself provides the implementation of rules. Many NGOs engage the DENR or Congress, but someone from those institutions should be working in the communities. You have to change how you look at mining in terms of our law. To do so is not simple, although I believe the Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center-Kasama sa Kalikasan (LRC-KsK [Friends of the Earth]) have already done that. They made a proposal that can be deliberated in Congress and the Senate, but we have to be able to change the government first. Government should be made accountable in light of these issues. Government has to rethink the Constitution and reexamine the commandand-control system in natural resources. Ours is the only Constitution in the world that actually constitutionalizes the control of resources at the level of the chief executive and DENR secretary based on Regalian Doctrine. There are many little things that can be done; for instance, restructuring the DENR. We should also debate on the Constitutional provisions over natural resources. All these will involve a rethinking of the Constitution. LEO JASARENO: Is there a room for human security or other policy recommendations? The answer is yes. The program of the DENR on policy development and policy studies are expanding. We want to engage stakeholders in order to learn more from them. From there, we can translate these learning points into
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policy and regulations. We are not against mining in general, but irresponsible mining. The key is to use the correct mining instruments. Correct mining instruments of our resources means economically, legally, and scientifically sound operations that will benefit everyone. GERARDO SICAT: All stakeholders have many responsibilities. I think that is the major point that has to be addressed. It is the responsibility of government to protect the rights of local communities, especially those that are adversely affected. However, I believe government should also balance the interest of the larger community since mining of resources takes place in localities. Responsibilities are similar to accountabilities, and accountabilities are things that can be expected of mining companies that are in operation. The government should be able to implement the minimum necessary guidance for this. I suspect that this is the reason for the mining law. The problem is the institution itself. We know how the politics of the system affects the way we operate. There are inequities and injustices that happen in any kind of transaction, including mining operations. It is up to the legal system and the local community to work out how inequities and injustices can be minimized. Certainly, stopping mining activities is not the solution. We know some of these inequities are part of the whole development process. Let us relate the processing and creating of downstream industries to our Constitution. One of the problems in this context is that we choose locals to take part in the mining industry. We could have chosen the big players. We should also look at the long-term benefits if they set up large operations in the country. The mining industry in the country has fallen from the peaks. What we need is a strong mining industry. The government, because of the largeness of the industry, can impose sanctions but when we do not allow major players to come in, we cannot profit. MARIA ELA ATIENZA (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UP-DILIMAN): Clearly, we see the connection between mining and human security because we have linked some important human security issues such as livelihood, health, and healthy and safe environment in much of the discussion. Human dignity is expressed by the ability of people to decide, especially those affected by mining policies. The issue of unity and the possible division of the community has been discussed in relation to the mining issue. Much of the exchange focused on some very important human security issues related to the mining issue. Several actors are very important if we want to include the human security framework in the development policy. In the case of the mining policy, actors include the government, specifically the DENR and its support agencies; the academe, particularly in providing
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important policy studies and assessment; and NGOs and peoples organizations. The Filipino people, and in particular, specific communities affected by mining operations like IP communities, are also important actors. We also have to take into consideration the role of the private firms coming in, whether local or foreign. One of the most important points mentioned was that there are enough laws and provisions that promote sustainable development. The problem, however, lies in implementation. Thus, we should focus on the side of implementation. The DENR talks about responsible mining, so there is a need to focus on what responsible mining means. There is a need to properly manage our natural resources. The key is not to stop various activities, but to properly manage the resources available for the country. An example would be the imposition of proper rents and taxes, especially when extraction of resources is involved. In relation to the proper management of resources, there should be a review of the economic provisions in the Constitution. Indeed, as Professor Leonen mentioned, structural issues, such as in our laws have to be addressed. An important point was raised regarding the rethinking of the development model that are safe both for the environment and the people. Such rethinking would be made effective with active participation of the people. Thus, it was suggested that participation of all stakeholders in the whole policy cycle should be maximized, from policy formulation, to policy implementation, as well as monitoring. Finally, one of the most important themes that came out of this forum is to focus on the responsibility and accountability of all actors. There is an appeal from the different communities that have been affected by mining for the DENR to strictly implement various provisions of the Mining Act, particularly regarding social responsibility and the protection of the rights of the indigenous peoples.
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HUMAN SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

July 25, 2006 (Tuesday); 1:00 to 4:00 p.m. Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City Moderator JORGE TIGNO Associate Professor Department of Political Science College of Social Sciences and Philosophy University of the Philippines-Diliman WILFREDO PRILLES JR. (CO-TEAM LEADER, i-GOVERNANCE PROJECT, CITY GOVERNMENT OF NAGA): Participatory local governance in Naga came at a time when the Local Government Code (LGC) was not yet passed. There was no mandate for local government units to engage with nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and peoples organizations (POs). During this time, the euphoria behind the People Power revolution was high. Various groups were trying to build and capitalize on the euphoria to push the agenda forwardthat is, to institutionalize the concept of people power more concretely in the bureaucracy. The story of the local government of Naga is an evolving journey in good urban governance. Eighty years ago, we are just one of the small and
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faceless urban centers south of Manila. Over the last 18 years, we were able to build a niche of our own through five essential steps. One, which took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is to engage with civil society. I think it was one of the most critical decisions made during the first term of Mayor Jesse Robredo. Then, we institutionalized the participation of civil society in governance processes. The experience enabled us to come to our own homegrown governance model. The first three steps essentially focus on organized groups. At present, we are trying to develop alternative means of engaging with individual citizens, knowing that there are citizens who do not want to get involved in organized groups or associations. Finally, we are trying to institutionalize participation in the local planning machinery of the city, which led me to be re-assigned to the Local Planning Office. Prior to the now popular Naga City Peoples Council (NCPC), we created a council made up of a loose coalition of NGOs and POs. The council sought to work with the City Hall in maximizing the potential of the local government council. The effort to bring in organized sectors in Naga was not ours but of local civil society groups. Active NGOs in the area like the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas played an important role in these initiatives. The groups effort established the citys engagement with local NGOs and POs, facilitated by what we call an open city hall. The NCPC was given impetus by a civil society organization that was ready and a city government that was also willing to listen. The engagement and discussion concretely led to the formation of Kaantabay sa Kauswagan (Partner in Progress) Program that addressed the needs of the urban poor. The urban poor, who comprised 25 percent of our residents, was a growing concern at that time. As the program progressed, nine associations developed, with the facilitation of Community Organizers of the Philippines Enterprises (COPE). At that time, we realized that community organization was not the core competency of the city government. Furthermore, people, especially in the low-income communities, did not trust the government. Thus, we allowed COPE to assume the organizing work. Having been organized, the urban poor became empowered. The urban poor had a voice. Kaantabay sa Kauswagan was essentially a social housing program, anchored on the goal of securing tenural rights for the urban poor. Tenural right was accomplished by acquiring occupied land holdings. As much as possible, we veered away from relocation, although over time it became an inevitable solution. We did on-site acquisitions through various innovative schemesland sharing, land swap, among others. These strategies have long been institutionalized. Former President Ferdinand Marcos came out with a series of issuances on how this can be carried out, but these remained in paper. In our case, the strategies became reality. The housing program is designed such that, when negotiations are completed, beneficiaries could amortize home lots under affordable terms through community mortgage. Community mortgage makes the
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amortization cost of home lots very affordable. If a household has paid but the entire community has not done so, the transfer of title to the beneficiary would be withheld. Once the land holdings are fully paid, property right to the home lot is transferred to the beneficiary. There is a mother title, which is subdivided into individual households. At the very start, we already implemented participatory strategies. We were not really into theories of participation then. We just approached the situation through gut feel and trial-and-error efforts. We pursued the things that worked and abandoned those that did not. One of the things that worked was community organizing. From nine organizations in 1989, there were about 80 urban poor associations in 1995. We recognized that these associations have a role to play in the development of the city. Involvement of the urban poor is part of the concept of tripartism. This mechanism enabled the involved parties cities and national government agencies, urban poor association aided by NGOs and POs, as well as the private landownersto try to reason together, come into the bargaining table, and try to do something about the collective decision. Urban poor organizations were represented in the Urban Development Housing Board, the policymaking entity for housing and urban development, as well as in the NCPC. The NCPC appoints NGO representatives, while the City Hall can only appoint ministerially upon the recommendation of NCPC. NCPC representatives can both observe and participate up to the committee level. They can propose legislation and act as the peoples representative in the exercise to right to information. This led to the People Empowerment ordinancea menu of the mechanisms through which people, individually and collectively, can participate. It took the form of multilevel consultation mechanisms, consultations in the barangay (village), and referendum on development issues, showing that it can work at such size and scope. It eventually led to the birth of the Empowerment Ordinance, which concretized the NCPC. Over a seven-year period, we were able to develop a governance approach built on participation, partnership, and the progressive perspective. Participation includes mechanisms that ensure the long-term sustainability of local undertakings. In terms of function, partnerships enable us to do more with less. The progressive perspective is the approach of management to seek prosperity but to temper it with an enlightened perception of the poor. This model was utilized in all government programs that were initiated since then. Ideally, planning is the first step in undertaking a program or project. But we took the opposite course and we are now trying to fix the planning process. We are currently updating our plans within a nine-year timetable; we are fully cognizant that we should attain some targets in line with the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Our challenge is to revisit outputs, refine the target sets, and align these plans towards 2015 to attain these targets. Our approach is to tap existing mandated councils to come up with sectoral components of the local plans.
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There is already more than adequate government and civil society representation in this approach. This enables us to establish baseline data, assess needs, craft programs, projects and activities that will respond to these targets, cost this out and lay out a 9- to 10-year plan that we can use to monitor and evaluate performance. The City Development Council is used as framework for the planning process, but the approach involves consultation by subsectorschildren, women, senior citizens, among others, are consulted and involved in making the plans. The approach has advantages in terms of participation and generating higher data quality because stakeholders have the opportunity to validate and reconcile official and unofficial data. There is shared ownership and responsibility over output plans. What are the factors behind Naga Citys success? Undoubtedly, Mayor Robredo played a key role as a progressive local chief executive who guided us for 15 years. However, we should not overlook the efforts of the active civil society organizations (CSOs) in Naga. Without the people and the CSOs in the city, Mayor Robredo would not be able to do it. What is very important in Naga Citys success is leadership continuity along with the same management team. We have a competent bureaucracy and outstanding mid-level management. But our willingness and readiness to push the envelope of local autonomy is the most important factor. For instance, we adopted the perspective that what the law did not explicitly prohibit, it allows, which enabled us to do something with the school board. Since the LGC does not prohibit participative budgeting, we used the budget, and in so doing gained wonderful outcomes. There are very good opportunities for mainstreaming participation. We have the policy environment and Supreme Court rulings affirming local autonomy, as well as support systems that can reinforce good practices in participation. But there are continuing challenges insofar as Philippine decentralization is concerned. To our mind, decentralization transformed governments structure from a vertical, top-down orientation, towards a broad-based approach. We do not have solid data to back up this claim but this is our gut feel: decentralization contributes to the tremendous resilience of the Filipinos. True, we were met with crisis after crisis, but some self-reliant communities also emerged. Innovation is limited to a few it seems, so we are compelled to come up with various ways of developing more self-reliant communities and not only depend on the internal revenue allotment. In a way, the national government contributes to the slow progress of decentralization. There is lack of focus and weak policy support at the national level. National government competes with local government units (LGUs) in service delivery, which should not be the case. In the principle of subsidiarity, we are closest to the clients we serve; therefore, we should be given the opportunity to do so. National agencies, on the other hand, should focus on quality assurance, but they should also be complemented with an effort towards best practice-driven policymaking.
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FRANCISCO MAGNO (A S S O C I A T E PROFESSOR, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITYMANILA): The concept of human security addresses non-traditional threats to peoples security. This is precisely why we are talking of security issues in local governance. There is a very thin line dividing human security and human development precisely because of poor governance. As consequence, there is a real threat to the livelihood of people. The security of individuals is no longer defined exclusively within the realm of the nation-state. Thus, efforts should really be done on the local level. The origins of todays security are diverse and can be found in social, economic, and environmental factors. Security is also increasingly transcending state borders, as can be found in local areas. Nonetheless, the repercussions are global in scale. Human security threats often impact the marginalized and vulnerable sectors including women, children, and indigenous peoples. Concretizing the concept of human security on the ground requires the participation of multiple stakeholders. Civil society can help address human security threats by promoting responsiveness, transparency, and accountability in governance. Local politics is often viewed in terms of factionalism, bossism, and patronage. In reality, local politics develops through simultaneous developments. Participation exists alongside patronage politics. But we are more interested in moving forward, and installing reforms and participatory processes at the local level. That is why we recognize the changing landscape in many local areas. The example of Naga City is well known in terms of the good practices developed over a long period of time. The transformation of local politics through participatory tools and active civil society participation since 1987 led to a new legislationthe LGCand a multistakeholder processes, which provided the window for local participation. The LGC was enacted in 1991 but it took some time before local practices were developed. The democratization process in the Philippines since 1986 has been characterized by the increased participation of NGOs in promoting good governance. In the past, NGOs usually referred to an oppositional brand of politics. But opportunities for engagement at the local level emerged, so that the concept of NGOs gradually changed. NGOs and POs claim to represent the marginalized sectors in civil society. The demands for further accountability and transparency in local governance served as impetus for civil society participation and the LGC facilitated these mechanisms for civil society participation in governance. Minimum conditions for civil society to flourish include the existence of democratic space and citizens vigilance in resisting exclusionary
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processes. The demand for decentralization and participation is also fuelled by efforts to apply the principles of efficiency and subsidiarity. We know that local mechanisms for participation include local initiative, referendum, and civil society participation in local development councils and bodies. The latter includes the local health board, local school boards, local peace and order councils, local pre-qualification, awards committees and other special bodies. Participatory governance through barangay governance is provided for under the law. The consent of the barangay is required before any development project in the local area is undertaken. Public participation extends to all stages, from project planning to implementation to project monitoring and evaluation. But we are not limited to the LGC because participatory governance mechanisms are embodied in other laws, such as the 1992 National Integrated Protected Areas Act, providing for the Protected Area Management Boards; the 1997 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, providing for Ancestral Domain Management Board; and the 1998 Agricultural and Fisheries Modernization Act, providing for Fisheries, Farming, and Aquatic Resources Management Board. Let me go to the rationale for participatory local governance in addressing human security. Responsive good governance is required in ensuring human security. As such, human security issues can be contextualized at the local level. Addressing human security threats requires participation from various social domains. The most vulnerable and marginalized sectors are women, children, indigenous peoples, disabled, agricultural workers, and others. Local governance mechanisms can facilitate their participation in addressing such cross-cutting issues as health, environment, social justice, and poverty, which pose threats to lives and livelihoods. One of the key efforts of civil society to engage in governance at level of the barangay is called the Barangay Training and Management or BATMAN. The program enables both civil society and local officials to understand and actually introduce participatory processes in local development planning. This kind of project increases the residents familiarity of formal and informal governance processes. It is a capacitybuilding effort that is very much integrated in the planning process. Under this project, a barangay training manual was developed as a tool for participatory local governance interventions and the conduct of a basic orientation on barangay governance. The people are involved in the making of the Barangay Development Plan. The Barangay Development Plan is made to go through a participatory planning process. The plan then goes up to the municipal or city level. The key idea is to develop capacity at the lowest level for the people to participate in prioritization of development projects including budgeting. Under the local development planning process, 20 percent of the budget has to go through the process of participation. Peoples perception of the importance of transparency in barangay governance is very important. Participatory local governance can encourage public participation through increased levels of awareness and acceptance
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of the roles and responsibilities of local officials. It places more pressure on officials to perform better and deliver outputs, and helps in identifying clear goals for programs and projects to be undertaken. It increases the capacity of the barangay to source out funds to support projects and enhance consultation to ensure sustainability through the sharing of resources. One of the key concepts integrated into the planning process is the idea of leveragingmaking claims, for instance, to the pork barrel, which in many situations are allotted to projects that are identified by the legislators staff. But because of the participatory planning process, the people themselves at the barangay, municipal or city level are able to identify the types of projects they want. In this regard, one of the changes we have seen is the integration of peoples priorities in municipal or city level plans. Instead of the multitudes of basketball courts and waiting sheds being constructed, the list of priorities of the people are now being addressed, depending on the type of barangay. To cite a case: in one barangay in Claveria, Misamis Occidental, the concerns of the people are integrated into the local development planning process. By activating participatory processes in the local development council, CSOs actually practice a form of sectoral representation: they organize people and mobilize them to be part of the project development process. Such efforts, however, still fall short of formal local sectoral representation since we still have no enabling law for that. There are existing mechanisms like local development councils through which civil society can participate, but more skills and capacity-building efforts have to be employed. Commitment is not enough to help the marginalized sectors. It is important to build their capacities, empower and enable them to identify priorities for their development. EDNA MAGUIGAD (COORDINATOR, LOCAL GOVERNANCE UNIT, SENTRO NG ALTERNATIBONG LINGAP PANLIGAL [SALIGAN]): One of the more innovative provisions of the LGC is the provision calling for local sectoral representation (LSR). LSR is a mechanism or system in local governance where representatives from local sectoral groups are elected to sit as members of the local sanggunian (council) in the municipal, city, or provincial level. The principle of LSR is not new in the Philippines; the ratification of the 1987 Constitution elevated it into constitutional mandate. Back in 1987, representatives from the urban poor, women, and persons with disability were appointed by the President to sit as sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives. Eventually, the party-list system came into effect in 1995.
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As we know, sectoral representation is not only limited to the national level. Article 10, Section 9 of the Constitution provides that local legislative bodies shall have sectoral representation as may be provided by law. Section 9 also implements two other provisions of the 1987 Constitution, strengthening the role of peoples participation in local governance. Article 1, Section 41 (c) of the LGC also provides that there should be, in addition to the regular members of the sanggunian, at least three sectoral representativesone from the women sector, one from the workers and one from the sector to be determined by the sanggunian. Local sectoral representation is an essential democratic principle under the LGC. It feeds into local governance reforms and fulfils the good governance requirement, which specifies that marginalized and underrepresented sectors should be represented and enabled to participate in local legislative processes. Thus, LSR is expected to enhance local legislation. In pushing for political-electoral reforms, issues brought to fore by sectoral representatives can now be integrated in the local legislative agenda. LSR likewise departs from the personality-based brand of Philippine politics. Why, then, is LSR not yet practiced at the local level? The absence of an enabling law to implement it can be traced to sheer technicality and objections. One of the objections to LSR is the additional funding required to implement it. However, this should not be an issue with the LSR as having constitutional mandate. We have an accommodation clause to address the issue of financing the election of additional members of the sanggunian. The inclusion of local sectoral representatives for fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-class municipalities shall not increase the number of seats in the sanggunian as presently provided by law, unless an LGU passes a resolution stating that they have available funds for the election of such additional seats.
Salient Features of the Local Sectoral Representation Bill
Article 1, Section 41 (c) of the LGC mandates the appropriation of three seats for marginalized sectors in the sanggunianone from the women, one from the workers, and one from any of the following marginalized sectors (hereinafter referred to as the third sector): indigenous peoples, differently abled persons, senior citizens, victims of calamities and natural disasters, children, urban poor, and any other sectors as may be determined by the sanggunian. Under the proposed LSR bill, organizations and coalitionsnot individualscan run as candidates to veer away from personality politics. The organization or coalition must submit three nominees following a set of qualifications. An elected sectoral representative who changes his/her organizational affiliation during the course of his/her term forfeits his/ her seat. The first election is proposed to be simultaneously held with the May 2007 local elections. Sectoral representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries, emoluments, rights and benefits as other sanggunian members
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as they serve as representatives of the people. It will be unconstitutional if they are not afforded the same because of the equal protection clause.
Local Sectoral Representation: The Unfulfilled Mandate
The LSR remains to be an unfulfilled mandate mainly because there is no enabling law. While the LGC identifies the sectors, there is no provision on how the representative will be elected, the manner of election, how the sectoral organization will be registered, and when the election should be held. Section 41 (c) of the LGC states that the Commission on Elections (Comelec) shall issue the guidelines for the election of sectoral representative. In the 1990s, however, two Comelec circulars pertaining to local sectoral representation was not put into effect because of opposition from the Philippine Councilors League and the League of Municipalities. In 1998, the LSR election was suspended. While Republic Act 7887 amending the synchronized law of 1991 provided that the issuance of said guidelines must be in accordance with an enabling law, the Comelec could not issue the guidelines because Congress is yet to pass the enabling law. Another issue is that some LGUs do not have additional resources to implement the LSR. This, however, is disputed by a 2000 study conducted by the Task Force LSR with the help of the Evelio Javier Foundation. The study asserts that there really is no budget deficit in all levels of the LGU. In fact, there was a PHP 6.8 billion budget surplus. All it takes is PHP 1 billion for local sectoral representatives to be elected in all levels of the sanggunian in the city, municipal, and provincial levels. We should look at it as an investment rather than as an expenditure because LSR can curb local-level corruption and can be a means to shorten the process of consultation. At present, we have three bills pending in the Senate and the House of Representatives introduced by Senators Francis Pangilinan, Miriam Defensor-Santiago, and Jinggoy Estrada in the Senate, and representatives from the Lower House. But almost a year after these were called out in the Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws and Codes, another committee hearing is yet to be called to discuss the bill. Another challenge would be the charter change. In both the House and Consultative Commission versions that was issued December 2005, the local sectoral representative provision was cropped out of the 1987 constitution.
Campaigning for the LSR Bill
Our campaign initiatives include urging LGUs to pass a resolution in support of the LSR bill. We also continuously lobby and network with key legislators and government officials, conduct information and education campaign in local communities, and focus our campaign on enacting a local sectoral representative ordinance in the LGUs. Right now, the local government of Naga is in the process of enacting an ordinance implementing Section 457 (B) of the LGC, which is the election of sectoral representatives.
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The third sectoral representative in Naga will be coming from the agricultural sector. Other similar initiatives are being undertaken in Mindanao like in Cotabato and Agusan to replicate the Naga experience of passing their own versions of the People Empowerment Ordinance.
OPEN FORUM
DINA DELIAS (TEACHING FELLOW, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY [CSSP], UP-DILIMAN): How exactly do you model and encourage individual participation? What are the alternatives in instances when municipalities do not have people who have the necessary skills to be part of local special bodies; for instance, the lack of accountants in the area?
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WILFREDO PRILLES JR.: We realized that services are the interface between individual households and citizens, and their government. We tried to make public service delivery more transparent. We came up and published what we call the Naga City Citizens Charter, which is updated every three years as the law requires. The charter spells out the procedures in the provision of services, identifies those responsible for the delivery of the service, and the time required for the delivery of services. This should ideally be circulated among the 26,000 households. So far, the city government has produced only 5,000 copies. We have realized that it is better to publish it in the local language and broken down into useful forms. You must give a whole range of options to the citizens of the city. We are also trying to push for the development of information and communications technology (ICT) to help us make service delivery more efficient. We have developed our own program that can do modular applications using the ICT resources of the city. Information will be directly routed to service providers so they will be able to respond better. This is in addition to the website that has the digital equivalence of the charter and all other information about Naga. In choosing sectoral representatives, we rely on the wisdom of the NCPC. The city mayors duty to appoint representatives selected by the NCPC is only ministerial. It is entirely within the province of NCPC to determine who their representatives will be. This is how local civil society can check government and curb the excesses of the state. EDNA MAGUIGAD: SALIGAN and the Alternative Law Group conduct legal education in the form of paralegal formation. Through paralegal formation, representatives from different sectors with paralegal training are able to advocate their sectoral concerns. Trainees also undergo legal education, including basic training on local governance, skills training, and thematic training. One of the trainings they undergo is on Peoples Participation in Local Governance. Through this, they are expected to have the capacity to check on transparency and accountability at the barangay level. Most of the paralegals we have trained have evolved into barangay and municipal officials. FRANCISCO MAGNO: Regarding the absence of qualified professionals in local special bodies, let me cite the case of Concerned Citizens of Abra on Good Governance (CCAGG). The local bidding and awards committee is an important area of engagement for civil society organizations. Much as they want to participate in this form of engagement, CCAGG members have little knowledge of auditing procedures. To address this problem, CCAGG leveraged the fact that they are organized to gain financial support from the Commission on Audit and the United Nations Development Programme for in-house
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participatory audit trainings. For its accomplishments, CCAGG has been recognized as an accredited NGO participant in this type of local governance activity. Participatory audit is like bringing activism in the boardroom. Still, skills are necessary to work in the boardroom. One cannot do sloganeering in a procurement meeting. I believe it is necessary to have a local governance network of civil society organizations that are able to engage in participatory auditing. In so doing, best practices can be shared and replicated. GILBERT LOZADA (PROFESSOR, ATENEO SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY): What are the likely implications of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos supraregionalization to the development activities of Naga City? If at all, how are you going to localize it? WILFREDO PRILLES JR.: For so long we have operated on the principle to really allow local governments to flourish. The benefits of the supraregion can or cannot happen, but we will endeavor to do our obligation to Naga and build a livable and sustainable urban community. FRANCIS CUPANG (COMMUNITY ORGANIZING COORDINATOR, COALITION OF SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY): If the process of participation can be done in Naga City, why did it not happen in other places? How do we change our politicians appreciation of participation? FRANCISCO MAGNO: According to an assessment, only 25 percent of all LGUs in the Philippines are actually having quality civil society participation in local governance. Perhaps we need to distinguish between the replication of best practices and mainstreaming them. We have to elevate the discourse from best practices to mainstreaming because we already have a lot of best and good practices. The question now should be: How do we mainstream these practices? First, we have to consider the enabling factors. Perhaps, by looking at these factors, we can venture into broader areas like electoral reform. Second, it is very important to look at the quality of elected local leadership as well as the quality of civil society in that area. If that type of synergy is absent then it becomes a confrontational type of engagement. However, if the local government is not open to engagement, civil society should not simply stop. Civil societys role is to adapt to situations like this and continue their efforts.
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NICOLAS TORRE III (CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, QUEZON CITY POLICE DISTRICT): Is there a common definition of security? During the time of former President Fidel Ramos, there was this concept of national security with seven elements. Are we still adopting this concept? FRANCISCO MAGNO: When we talk of human security, we are perhaps considering the term conflict prevention and management, which is the role of local governance. We might be thinking of community policing type of activities, like the local peace and order council. The council involves the local government, the civilian population, and the community. There is an established set of norms regarding how conflict is managed. Another example of human security is disaster management. It requires the participation of the police force and the military but it has to be under the leadership of maybe the mayor or the governor. Human security requires good governance because a lot of threats take place due to poor governance. Addressing human security with local governance as a mechanism may adopt good environmental governance in disaster-prone areas as a response. EDNA MAGUIGAD: SALIGANs definition of security is to have a Philippine society where man can live fully, a society without discrimination, and without poverty. Being lawyers seeking alternatives, we use the law creatively and our legal resources to advocate for particular issues. An example would be the expansion of the role of barangay captains because of laws that were recently passed by Congress. With the passage of the law on Violence against Women and Children in March 2004, barangay captains now have the power to issue a barangay protection order. We embarked on a nationwide information dissemination campaign to teach barangay officals and other paralegals on how to draft a barangay protection order. Other laws that expanded the roles of barangay authorities include the Anti-Trafficking against Women and Children Law, the Juvenile Justice Law, among others. For purposes of public information and assistance, we began offering our legal services. We are also train paralegals to do the work at the barangay level. NICOLAS TORRE III: Having worked with the local government and its officials in the area of peace and order, the problem with decentralization is that the broad strokes is not felt on the ground. Local government officials are supposedly the implementors, and policymakers at the same time. But do they understand the broad strokes of decentralization? What are the measures for barangay captains, for instance, to understand that what they are doing is part of the bigger picture?
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WILFREDO PRILLES JR.: About the lingering lack of participation in some areas, I think the key lies in the people themselves. At the end of the day, it is the people who elect these leaders. Often, we hear of big words such as human security and national security. When you go to the local level, you do not see statistics, but people suffering and facing their own challenges. I think it helps that from time to time, you keep abreast with developments in the intellectual field. These fresh ideas help us when we continue doing our job in our hometowns. At the end of the day, human security will be measured by how you will uplift the last individual citizen that is marginalized in your community. Participation is a two-way process. People choose the ones to lead them, while these leaders see how individual citizens are coping and how the community collectively propose solutions to overcome local problems. For local officials to understand the broad strokes of decentralization, the long-term responsibility that we are trying to do is to educate them on matters of participation. Education is the key to secure Nagas future. EDNA MAGUIGAD: The key to Nagas success is the 100 percent support of the sanggunian for initiatives such as the Naga People Empowerment Ordinance. DANTE ANG II (PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE MANILA TIMES): Mr. Prilles said that part of the success of Naga City is creativity in the enforcement of laws. If you ever encountered problems with the laws, how were the programs in Naga run? How were you able to delineate the responsibilities of the barangay vis--vis the local government, and viceversa? IWAN SOETJAJHA (PRESIDENT, HEALTH ALL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION [HADI]): We in HADI feel that if we want to solve our current problems, we have to look at human security in a very broad way. Hence, we view security in terms of health because it is the one sector that covers or relates to all other sectors. We believe that we have to exert influence at the level of policy and regulation. We have adopted the approach of encouraging people to change the economic system to a more human-oriented, well-being related system. This way, our policies will be geared towards improving human development. In the beginning, we thought about human happiness but since we have no mechanism for developing happiness, we have found, in our opinion, that focusing on health allows a holistic way of addressing issues
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concerning physical, mental, and social well-being. We know that to change a system is not easy because it involves changing the people themselves. We have many sectors, all of which have to function. If we use health development as the overarching system, that means we have to change the health paradigm. The economic sector claims to solve our problems through equity in economy. Equity in economy can never happen, but equity in health can because the conditions for being healthy are the same. First, we need to re-evaluate the policies and regulations of the government to make sure that we are going in the right directionthat these improve our conditions. Then, we have to have the right activities through the local government. We do not propose to create new organizations, but work with existing ones in the villages with the help of the local government. DIVINA LUZ LOPEZ (CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS ADVISER, PHILIPPINES-CANADA LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT PROGRAM): I was struck by the point made by Dr. Magno about mainstreaming applicable good practices. The goal is to create opportunities where advocacies for human security are really mainstreamed in government policies and programs, especially at the local level. It is true that you will see participation at its most optimal at the barangay level because it is where people are really organized. But we should not also neglect the fact that there are parallel processes, for example, development plans that also occur at the municipal and provincial levels. Since the time we started innovations in governance at the barangay level, how much have we achieved? It is good that tools are being developed to help us expand peoples participation, not only in terms of budget processes at the local level, but most of all in terms of making sure that projects and programs are really human security-oriented or compliant, at the very least. We need to go a step further. We may be very good at convincing barangays and LGUs to allocate their legal resources for projects; we were able to influence them to prioritize. However, it would also be better if these programs and projects that were funded from the barangay to the municipal and provincial level are responsive to the needs and concerns of indigenous peoples, the urban poor, women and childen, among other sectors. It is not enough that we are able to integrate good practices in the local governments investment program, the Annual Investment Plan. We have to make sure that money has been allocated to projects that have been implemented well. Participation can take place in this process through monitoring bodies for project and program innovation. It would be a lot better if we can enrich the tools of development and participation beyond influencing budget priorities and plans. With regards supraregionalization, which the national government is promoting, it does not happen at the barangay level or the municipal level.
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This takes place in the level of regions. I think the most strategic level for peoples participation, in terms of intervention in government plans, for example, is at the provincial level. The challenge is how we get to that level by influencing or, at the very least, providing inputs to local government decision making at the provincial level. How effective the LGC is in terms of participation in governance depends on how it made an impact on human security. I think it is also very important to try to explore avenues that go beyond policy, which should involve the issue of what mechanisms should be adopted at the lower level. In our experience working with various NGO and PO networks, our assessment showed that in areas where there is strong NGO and PO participation, executive legislative agenda (ELA) were crafted partly because of the inputs that have been shared by CSOs. In 2007, the Department of Interior and Local Government will be releasing a policy circular that will oblige LGUs to develop their ELA for 2007-2010. It will be a very good opportunity for NGOs to be involved in that process. We should bear in mind the factors needed to make this happen. It was mentioned that an open and a developmental mindset of local government officials, with the aid and participation of the community, make for a good process or a good output in the ELA. WILFREDO PRILLES JR.: Earlier, it was pointed out that health should be the crucial sector of society. I would like to argue that it is not only health, but essentially education, that we need to advocate here. In operationalizing the concept of what the law does not explicitly prohibit, it allows, let me cite the example of the Naga City school board. The board consists of eight members: the mayor, the school superintendent, the chair of Sangguniang Panlungsod (City Council) Committee on Education, parents, and teachers. Despite opposition to our proposal to implement innovation in the performance incentive system for teachers, we used the budget as the authorizing document for us to proceed with the plan. The plan allowed the allocation of a portion of the budget for the new performance-based incentive system. It also gave the superintendent the authority to disburse the amount. Further, mechanisms to measure the teachers performance were also installed. This created opportunities for us to be involved in the process. Since the money is coming from the local government, we make sure that the hiring is transparent. Hiring, which is now based on ranking, involves not only the superintendent but also a representative from the city government. There has been an agreement that the ranking of applicants will be respected, regardless of who they supported in the last elections. We also expanded the Local School Board to include high school principals of private universities and business sector representatives, who are able to fully articulate issues to the Department of Education (DepEd).
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Our perception of how we interpret the law is supported by a publication issued by the Office of Senator Francis Pangilinan, which stated that LGUs have residual powers in the same manner that the President of the Philippines as an executive has residual powers; that, although not provided for in the Code, we [LGUs] can also pursue things, if we are willing or brave enough. We are happy to know that the DepEd has adopted some of these innovations. They form part to the Basic Educational Sector Reform Agenda, which we hope the DepEd Secretary will adopt. We agree that mainstreaming is a challenge. It will be different from one locality to another. However, fifteen years should have been enough to come up with certain benchmarks or minimum performance standards. These standards should exact accountability from our elected leaders which brings me to my final point. We should exact accountability on the candidates, on how they are performing with regard to policy implementation and management. That is the only way we can change the discourse from personality-based to issue-based governance in the local level. DANTE ANG II: It was also discussed that the definition of security also has something to do with conflict resolution. It is very difficult for me to imagine, for example, LGUs negotiating with the New Peoples Army or other rebel groups when some who are allegedly responsible for killings of journalists, for instance, are those from the LGUs. EDNA MAGUIGAD: There are various mechanisms through which communities can participate in conflict prevention. Let me share the experience of SALIGAN Mindanao, which has been an active member of the Mindanao Peace Weavers. They monitor the peace situation and the peace process on the ground. If there is a violation in the ceasefire agreement, SALIGAN lawyers in Mindanao assume representation in the peace process between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front or with the Organization of Islamic Conference. They also train Bangsamoro (homeland of the Moro) groups on human rights and how to document these cases, and most importantly, on accessing available venues where they can have their claim. The Local Governance Unit of SALIGAN in Manila has a two-year project, which seeks to build peace through sustainable community disputeresolution system in partnership with the municipality of Culion, Palawan. Culion became a municipality only in 1995. As such, they do not have the concepts of autonomy and barangay. In the course of implementing the project, they find it difficult to implement a new governance system. They were used to the dole-out set up, which they had under the Department of Health. The program helped lay the foundation of good democratic governance in the first barangay of Culion.
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With the changing politico-administrative system in Culion, there was a growing clamor for private ownership of land. With no judicial system in place, we promote alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and train the people to maximize the Katarungang Pambarangay (Justice in the Barangay) system to prevent conflict from arising due to scarcity of resources such as land and water. FRANCISCO MAGNO: Regarding the issue about local vis--vis national conflicts, we have to identify the types of conflicts especially when it comes to development projects. I think it becomes standard that local ownership should be made part of the process. We should be reminded that conflict in the 1970s was because of lack of local participation. This contributed in the spiraling of violence. This resulted not only in the loss of lives, but also in the withdrawal of the World Bank from funding development projects. This is the reason many development projects, especially in support of local communities, need prior informed consent. These are examples of local jurisdiction and processes in conflict prevention. Another example is the creation of local peace zones, which in some areas were created even before the LGC. Beyond the traditional types of conflicts where you see people bearing arms and fighting each other, there are a lot of conflicts that actually emerge because of development disputes and resource conflicts. Governance boards have been created in some areas to respond to these conflicts. Deaths caused by resource conflicts impel human security to present a broader view of protecting human lives. Conflicts such as solid waste management and community forestry take place in the local level. More people are dying because of disasters, compared to people who are dying because of firefights between the rebels and the police and military forces. On replication of best practices versus mainstreaming, I think these processes are operating simultaneously. Replication is a process that is being undertaken because of innovations. The latest I heard in Naga City, for example, is a proposed LSR, which the local government will be implementing before it gets recognized at the national level. I think that is how policy should be made, but the national government is more conservative compared to innovations by governance practitioners at the local level. In the case of mainstreaming local practices, perhaps one practical suggestion is to seriously look at the qualification requirements for mayors or elected public officials. Maybe they should undergo training before they become mayors, councilors, and barangay officials. Normally, what happens is that first-term mayors or governors enroll in public administration classes during their first year in office. On the second year, they start preparing for their re-election. The third year is spent campaigning. It is only during their second term that they actually practice
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governance. Will it not be better if they become local administrators first before they become mayor? In this manner, they learn the processes. I think it is very important to mainstream good governance; that there are people to implement and abide by these minimum standards. The real challenges, I think, are the lack of capacity to comply with minimum standards and the lack of commitment among local officials. Consideration should also be given to politics, which requires engagement. You can create all these tools, but if you do not have people with the capacity to do this, good governance will not prosper. Development should integrate participation as well. We are not downplaying the fact that supraregions is the way of the future, but the processes subsumed herein require engaging and building the capacity of civil societies. Since participation is the key point in our discussion, the tools that have been developed and the practices that have been exercised in the municipal or provincial level should be elevated to a higher level of governance. These are challenges that we have to be sensitive to. Governance operates at different levels. Thus, networking should also operate at all levels. DANTE ANG II: It is important for innovation to be mainstreamed, and for innovation to be honed by the agency you are trying to influence. It is important for national government agencies such as the DepEd to own these innovations so that they would be motivated to implement this throughout the country. But that is only one part of the story. The other part of the story is for us to develop a constituency at the community level who will look at how the local divisions are doing it. It is important for the people on the ground to see how these things are implemented. No matter how good your policies are in government, no matter how sound they are, how ideal they are, if the people are not really vigilant, the bureaucrats will always get their way. LU VICTELLES (DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT): I was thinking of education beyond what was indicated as education of major stakeholders in local governance. I am curious as to how colleges, universities, and academics are involved in Naga Citys internationally renowned example of participatory governance. Universities can offer financial resources that come from tuition, user fees, and from the national governmentin the case of state colleges and universities. They can also offer human resources to engage in the education of the different stakeholders. In the many places that we have observed, however, the universitys typical role is primarily on an advisory level in poverty reduction and in so-called participatory-development projects. There has been no systematic integration of what is being learned, for example, from communities, from civil society, from local governments into the curriculum. Real-world
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problems do not respect interdisciplinary boundaries that we have in universities, which can actually become a laboratory for exchange. This issue should be looked into. JOHN EUGENIO (BALAOD MINDANAO): Are there any concrete policy programs or reforms especially at the local level that address the increasing trend in killing activists and paralegal leaders, the impact of which is not only physical but extends to the emotional, social, and economic well-being of children of these slain activists and leaders? ALELI BAWAGAN (ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, COLLEGE OF SOCIAL WORK AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, UP-DILIMAN): No matter what we say about local autonomy and local governance, it seems that local governments do not have any power when it comes to military operations, which take place in the villages. The LGC made it possible for marginalized sectors to participate and express their views. But I am more interested in asking for real, direct, and palpable gains. What have been the gains in terms of addressing the development agenda of the people? Have they been able to access a higher budget for health, for instance? If this is the best practice, how can marginalized sectors address their very basic, living issues of health and education to local government? Have the local government responded to this? At the same time, we should also expect some kind of culture change from the local government. I think it would also be a direct gain for peoples organization if local governments change their culture, in terms of listening to the people in expressing their agenda. Have local governments been listening to them and getting their participation? What percentage of the policies come from the marginalized sectors? What have local officials been doing in terms of putting NGOs and POs in development councils? Do NGOs and POs and their participation in the development councils approximate what is being expected of the people in the local sectoral representatives? Do representatives of NGOs and POs in the local development councils approximate the role of the people being elected in the LSR? RYAN BARCELO (CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI): Based on experience, convincing the policymakers to implement sectoral membership in the local council is not a one-night success. Is it not strategic that participation in different sectors should be acted in the different special bodies under different local governments? After all, the actual work happens in these special bodies, not in offices of the elected officials or council members of the local government. Perhaps we can adopt this approach when we become active at the bottom where we advocate at the top.
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EDWIN CHAVEZ (CENTER FOR POPULAR EMPOWERMENT): In advocating for participatory processes, is it really just mainstreaming or just implementing the provisions of the Code? It is clearly stated in the LGC that each LGU should have a comprehensive, medium- and long-term local government plans. We notice that almost all of the barangays are preparing recycled annual improvement plans. The Barangay Development Council is a mechanism that makes it possible for the POs, NGOs, and marginalized sectors to participate. I am not sure if any study has been conducted on the participation of NGOs and POs in barangay development councils. How many barangay development councils do we have in the Philippines? How many of these are functional since the LGC was passed in 1991? Participation of marginalized sectors in governance is directly related to the prevailing electoral and political culture. Based on our experience and observation, you cannot promote participatory governance to local chief executives and the members of local councils if they are not convinced with the concept. If there are have NGOs in the barangays who are committed to implement participatory barangay development planning, but the local chief executive is not supportive of this undertaking, it is difficult to integrate the barangay development plans in the municipal level. If the local chief executive is already convinced with the process, but the Sangguniang Bayan is not supportive, the budget to support the priority barangay development plans will not be there. The political exercise will make the difference in this context. ED BALDORIA (SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF QUEZON CITY): There is a big difference in the approach of the national and local levels of government. In order to reach the people, we have to go through the local level. Political dynamics is a reality that we have to contend with, even if at times it impedes the growth of participatory democracy. NICOLAS TORRE III: We can never have security if we do not have moral and spiritual consensus. I am recalling an element of national security that was included in the medium-term development goals of former President Ramos, which up to now is still being adopted. Some decisions that were made do not support our moral and spiritual concerns, one of which is environmental protection. Our concept of national security is still in relation to the police and the military, and still focused on territorial integrity.
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JOSEPHINE DIONISIO (DEPUTY DIRECTOR, THIRD WORLD STUDIES CENTER [TWSC], CSSP AND PROJECT LEADER, TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006): From this afternoons discussion, I gather that one way of defining human security is that it is the promotion and preservation of human life. One important dimension towards that goal is the expansion and deepening of democracy. One way of operationalizing democracy is to promote, protect, and enhance participation, not only of an informed local government but also of an informed NGO, of civil society and all other stakeholders. If increased participation is defined in this way, this should exemplify human security in the experience, for example, of the local government of Naga and the local government units that Atty. Maguigad has been exposed to.
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HUMAN SECURITY AND CULTURE

August 29, 2006 (Tuesday); 1:00 to 4:00 p.m. Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City Moderator RUTH LUSTERIO RICO Associate Professor Department of Political Science College of Social Sciences and Philosophy University of the Philippines-Diliman NESTOR CASTRO (ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY, COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY [CSSP], UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES [UP]-DILIMAN): Let me start by citing some existing published ethnographies on the concerns of indigenous peoples that may be connected to human security. The first one is from the perspective of a Manobo, Datu Dinawat Ogil, circa 1967, as interviewed by a Filipino anthropologist, Bishop Francisco Claver. He talks about the concept of free childhood. My childhood was as free and happy as any Manobo childs can be. I went hunting in the jungles round about, hunting the wild boar, the
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chattering monkey, and the fast-running deer, and I went fishing in the rivers. Many were the joyful hours by the riverbanks, now along the Tigwa, now along the Namnam or the Balacayo, as I and my companions made dams and traps to catch the slithery fish. In the next quotation, Datu Dinawat Ogil compares a life prior to the coming of the Japanese, when people had the freedom to go hunting. When the war broke out, such activities were no longer possible. He also shares how life was after the war. I was probably 13 or 14, still unable to carry a mans load, when the Japanese came. We fled to the mountains. Those were hard times, indeed. One day, I could not bear living out in the jungles any longer. I went to the Japanese camp and worked for the soldiers there. At first, the soldiers wanted to kill me Soon, tall white men, the Americans, and their PC [Philippine Constabulary] companions came up the river, too, and Namnam became a place of death and slaughter. But it all came to an end, and all those strange men moved out with their instruments of death more horrible than the sharp doldog. Namnam was ours once again. The second perspective comes from a Tiduray from Upi, Maguindanao. He refers to the conflict in Mindanao when Ilonggos, Ilocanos, and Cebuanos came and displaced the indigenous people in the area. Their first reaction was to flee, but later they realized that they have nowhere else to go. They had no choice but to assert what was theirs. Years ago, our ancestors inhabited the land called AwangSettlers came, waving in front of them a piece of paper called land title. They did not understand itBut they did not want trouble and the mountains were still vast and unoccupied. And so, they fled to the mountains, bringing their families along and leaving precious and sacred roots behind. We have nowhere else to go now. The time has come for us to stop running and assert our right to the legacy of our ancestors. Speaking of the Chico Dam issue, this is from a Kalinga named Suplay Alunday in 1984: When the soldiers had not yet come to Kalinga, there was no trouble. Our bodong maintained peace and order. Then the soldiers came and recruited some of our people to PANAMIN [Presidential Assistant on National Minorities] and CHDF [Civilian Home Defense Forces], to use against us. This caused the breaking up of many peace pacts and the worsening of tribal wars. For those who are not familiar with the situation, the Chico River Basin Development Project in the 1980s was supposed to establish four
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hydroelectric dams along the Chico river. This would have displaced approximately 100,000 Kalingas and Bontocs. Bodong is the traditional peace pact system of the Kalingas as well as other ethnolinguistic groups in that area. It is also called by different names: pachen, budon, puchon, buchong. There is this notion that the traditional institutions of the bodong provided security for the people but this was eroded with the coming of new institutions introduced by the Philippine government, most notably the PANAMIN and the paramilitary unit, CHDF, now known as the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units. The Kalinga perspective: government vis--vis the Kalingas. However, in this statement from an Ifugao woman in 1992, warfare is a state in which the Ifugaos are caught in the middle: It is good when military (troops) are here, and there are no NPA [New Peoples Army] groups. If NPA groups are here, they will fight (the military troops). Its better if neither will come here so that it is peacefulAnd it is dangerous for the children at school because the military lives thereOnce, they (military and the NPAs) were fighting here and I was so sick of nervousnessI thought I might die. This ambahan, the poetic expression of the Hanunoo Mangyan, reflects the attitude of the people towards conflict: Kawo no mangambungan Dag ambon yami day-an Pangambon yami adngan Halaw nakan magduyan Halaw palyo yi maan Libayan talayiban Baras lawod anuhan. If you are angry with me Dont be mad behind my back! Face me and we can agree. You know why I tell you this? That I can go home in peace To Libangan with the reeds, Where the Anuhan flood meets.
Peace here is not based on warfare but on internal peace and contentment. We can go on and on with different ethnographies, peoples stories about and their own concepts relating to human security. For the purpose of this dialogue, however, we could look at Tagalog concepts related to seguridad. Of course, seguridad is a borrowed word from the Spanish language. But its meaning has been changed. The concept of siguro and sigurado are different in the Philippine setting. In Spanish, seguro means to be sure but in Filipino it is not being sure. Indeed, some of our native Filipino words have no exact equivalent in Spanish or even in English. I shall mention some indigenous Tagalog terms related to human security as examples. You may also think about your own native terms. The closest term in relation to human security would probably be ligtas and kaligtasan, and their opposites, di balisa, di nababagabag, hindi ligalig, malaya sa kapahamakan, malayo sa panganib, mapayapa, may katiwasayan, panatag ang kalooban, walang pag-aalinlangan, walang pag-aatubili, and walang
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pangamba. Certain terms would also be applicable to other concepts. Ligtas or kaligtasan can also mean to be saved. Di balisa may be true for individual or collective situations. The different statements and linguistic terms may be the starting point of our dialogue. I did not start with the definition of human security based on existing literature. Rather, I would like to go into what people are telling us about how they feel. Basically they are talking about freedom from fear, freedom from uncertainty, freedom from interference, freedom from oppression and discrimination, and freedom from violent conflicts. Conflicts may persist, but some can be resolved internally by the community using their customary practices and certain preferences for amicable settlement. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) was enacted in 1997. It was supposed to be a magna carta of IPs rights in the Philippines. It includes stipulations on human rights including the right to ancestral domain, the right to self-governance and empowerment, the right to social justice, and the right to cultural integrity. Human security cuts across these various rights. I use the term territorial domain rights instead of the one used in IPRA. Right to ancestral domain is used in local literature but is not a universal concept. Some ethnolinguistic groups in the country have a concept of ancestral domain, such as the Cordillera peoples. Others, however, have a more fluid concept of territorial boundaries. Hence, IPRAs definition of ancestral domain should be understood in terms of collective and intergenerational ownership. When we refer to an ancestral domain title, ownership of land is by an entire group and not just by one individual or family. The territorial domain rights of IPRA also include the right to develop lands and natural resources within their ancestral domains. Protective measures are therefore guaranteed. For example, the consent of IPs is needed in cases of development projects in the area. Unlike the earlier practice, in which government and business undertakings were imposed on various ethnic groups, development planners have to secure the permit or the consent of the indigenous communities. This is best illustrated by the Chico River Basin Development Project. The right to regulate entry of migrants is a response to the displacement of IPs. Many of them have become minorities in their own land. For example, South Cotabato, home to the Blaan and Tboli, currently has a predominantly Ilonggo population. In Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato, there are more Ilocanos than Manobos. With regards to self-governance and self-determination, IPRA talks about indigenous peoples (IPs) right to use their own justice systems, conflict resolution mechanisms and institutions, and peace-building processes. Indigenous peoples have a right to resolve land conflicts within ancestral domains according to customary laws. But what are these instruments? How can IPRAs provision on self-governance be applied in situations of armed conflict? Unfortunately, many people do not know
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what they are, including the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). There are also the rights to maintain and develop their own political structureswhether this refers to the bodong, the Council of Elders, datuships, among othersand to determine and decide priorities for development. The issue of free and prior and informed consent is relevant to the latter. Regarding social justice and human rights, IPRA accords state protection of IPs against discrimination. For instance, in employment policies, the government must ensure that nobody is discriminated based on his or her ethnolinguistic group. IPRA recognizes state protection of indigenous cultures, traditions, and institutions. It recognizes the right to control and establish all educational systems. So far, there are no implementing rules and regulations on how this can be done. IPRA also talks about funds that should be given to IPs so they can manage their own heritage and archeological sites. In addition, IPRA guarantees the protection of cultural and intellectual property rights such as indigenous knowledge and technologies. These include genetic resources, literature, traditional arts and designs. We know that many of these are being pirated and patented by transnational corporations. The intellectual property rights of the scent of ilang-ilang belong to Yves Saint-Laurent. The Bangsamoro people are excluded from IPRA. This is a problem because they are the ones who are in dire need of human security because of armed conflicts in their areas. IPRA specifies that IPs are those who have not been influenced by non-indigenous religions such as Christianity and Islam. But many Christian groups are included in the NCIPs classification, such as the Ibanag, Isinais, Itawis, Gadang, and Ivatan. Ancestral domain is the last and final point of argument in the negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Of course, the Bangsamoro groups and nonChirstian or non-Muslim IPs would have their views on what constitutes their ancestral domains. A second problem is the conflict between IPRA and other laws such as the National Integrated Protected Area Systems (NIPAS) Act, the Mining Act, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Local Government Code (LGC), forestry laws, etc. The third issue concerns IP territories which are not yet fully identified and delineated by the NCIP. Only a very small percentage has been accomplished. Most of NCIPs issuances are certifications of preconditions stating that there are no IPs in the area. The fourth issue is on the codification of customary laws. Many ancestral domains are no longer homogeneously occupied by IPs; rather, they are populated by migrants who are unaware of these unwritten statutes. However, there are some groups in the Cordillera that refuse to have their laws codified, fearing that outsiders will use and manipulate these laws against them. Given that IPRA is a generic law, there is a need for culturallysensitive and -specific guidelines in its implementation. One cannot assume that the situation in an IP community is the same for all the
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others. For all these issues, capacity enhancement of the NCIP is a huge necessity. Our main concern is the dominance of the national security paradigm in addressing the issues confronting IPs. It seems that the governments concept of national security refers only to the interest of the state. The state is the sole authority enacting security policies. This approach does not adequately fit the broader concept of human security. Human security should be approached as a collaborative undertaking whereby the state and the people work to provide security. ZENAIDA BRIGIDA PAWID (CONVENOR, CORDILLERA PEOPLE'S FORUM): My experience with IPs began at birth. I am an indigene. My mother is Bontoc and my father is Ibaloi. The first time I realized I was indigene was when I stepped into the halls of the University of the Philippines and I was told that I was not an Igorot. I looked into the mirror and said, What does an Igorot looked like? How come nobody believes that I am an Igorot? The purpose of culture is to enhance ones vision of that synthesis of truth and beauty, which is the highest and deepest reality. Culture is something that everybody carries from the day he or she is born. It is passed on from one generation to another. It is not static; it changes everyday. It is influenced by the circumstances of ones birth or upbringing. Dr. Castro has shown us the difference between national and human security. Policy is supposed to strengthen cultural integrity and diversity. Government speaks of policy with a view from the top. I would rather talk about policy from the ground up. We should let the IP communities speak the harsh realities based on their experiences, if we truly wish to strengthen the integrity of their culture, and for diversity to flourish. IPRA, the national policy that governs IPs, is neither known nor understood as policy by the indigenous peoples. What they are aware of are administrative and executive orders; implementing rules and guidelines, free, prior, informed consent, among others. Hardly do they undersand what these statutes and legalese mean. The track record of IPRA speaks for itself. The first Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) awarded by NCIP is in Bakon, Benguet in the Cordillera. The Bakon people rejected the CADT. Five out of the eight communities returned the CADTs. But only a handful of communities are knowledgeable or enthusiastic about the CADT process. Dr. Castro said that it is in the Cordillera where you have a clear notion of what ancestral domain is compared to the rest of the IPs nationwide. In the Cordillera, there is a narrow strip that hems us in, and therefore we are very sure of what we own and where is it located. We
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know that the ancestral domain of the Blaans encompasses four provinces, thereby transcending political boundaries. But the problem is not so much on the concept of ancestral domain. Why was the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) excluded in the IPRA when it was created? This is because Muslims were busy contending with their notions of autonomy. Those of us fighting for IPRA completely forgot about our brothers and sisters who are indigenous peoples within the ARMM. The champions of IP rights are mostly located in New York, London, Amsterdam, or Metro Manila. They are not in provinces where they are needed most. Abject poverty, as defined by the National Anti-Poverty Commission, is the picture of most IP communities. However, if asked whether they are poor, an IP would say, No, I am not poor but we would like something else. There are no basic social services in IP communities. Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan program does not reach remote barrios where they are most needed. The children cannot go to school. Development projects to alleviate their impoverishment remain promises. IP communities are simply plotted on the maps of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau as green or red areas. IPs remain the subjects of studies by the academe, and objects of development by the government and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Rhetoric and advocacies for IPs are cheap. They are embedded and highlighted in policies and scholarly works. But without the budget, the personnel and the political will to empower the IPs, these are just documents. Curiously, the twin national security threats of insurgency and separatism, when plotted on the Philippine politico-administrative map, are located in IP areas. This is something to think about. We do not use the term self-determination because it is equated with separatism and this is not the case for all IPs. Empowerment, on the other hand, remains at the level of the individual. It does exist on the communal plane. The reality is that many IPs are trying to navigate three or four boats through one tumultuous river. There are too many national policies on every issue that concerns the IPs, but since they are outcomes of the majority-minority power structure of the elite, they seldom benefit the people. There are two major issues that the NCIP must confront regarding the implementation of the IPRA. First, the diversity of IPs is huge. There are 110 IP communities or ethnolinguistic groups, or 11 to 12 million people. Secondly, the IPRA has become a gamut of implementing rules and guidelines. What is IPRA as a policy then? If it is intended to improve and strengthen the cultural integrity of IPs in the Philippines, what is it supposed to mean in context? First, land is life, but unless you are an IP, you will never really understand what this means. If you take us out of our land, we are deadlife means nothing. This is supposed to be the core or essence of IPRA. Second, every IP community is different and that difference should be respected and honored. One cannot replicate the
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peace pact of Kalinga to the Maranaos. The customary laws of the Ifugaos cannot be applied to the Ibalois. This is what cultural integrity means. Completing the cornerstones of a good policy on IPs is the principle of self-determination. Land, cultural integrity, and selfdeterminationthese elements are not to be taken apart; they have to be understood altogether. Before we advocate or craft policies, maybe we should first ask ourselves the following questions. First, can there be a Philippine society that accommodates different cultures? Would that be possible? Or are we to look like we were all made out of one cookie cutter? Can Filipinos accept differences? If the answer is yes, the next question is: Can there be a Philippine government that recognizes inclusivity rather than exclusivity of people, where the majority is accountable, not oppressive, and the minority serves as fiscalizer, not the vanquished? The notion of unity in diversity tends to assume that all IPs are the same and they should be joining the majority of Filipinos. This should not be the case. Lastly, as far as policy goes, can process supplant substance? Can key result areas become the heart of the law? The answer remains with all of us.
OPEN FORUM
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SALVADOR RAMO (TEBTEBBA FOUNDATION): There is a need for the communities to empower themselves. During the first session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Declaration on IP Rights was discussed and subjected to a vote. This was a result of more than two decades of international unity and struggle for recognition of rights. When discussing policies for IPs, we must also situate it at the international level where there are instruments that could be invoked. Unfortunately, during the votation, the Philippines, which boasts of a law that recognizes IP rights, abstained. DELBERT RICE (DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, KALAHAN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION): Let me first correct the impression that there is no school which was established by and for cultural minorities. There is at least one. In 1971, the Ikalahans took the initiative and established their own high school. Some of those who graduated became elementary teachers, training children from kindergarten through high school in their own culture, language, and customs. The result has been very good. I do not use the term cultural integrity very much. It assumes that culture is static, but it is not. It keeps moving all the time. Thus, I call it cultural continuity. In public presentations, I have stated that any person who rejects his or her own culture is psychotic. As stated by Ms. Pawid, as far as your culture is concerned, you are formed even before you are born. The Tagalogs and the Americans have a problem with the concept of peace and security. Almost every word that is used is a negative wordno war, walang labanan. Ikalahan and Hebrew are the only two I know that have a very clear and affirmative statementlitang and shalom denote fullness of life. Even St. Paul had a hard time translating to Greek the Hebrew concept of shalom. He was stuck to using the term peace, but peace does not adequately translate to shalom. The Philippine state will not be able to help the cultural minorities without respecting them first. They have their ways of doing things government could learn from them. Let me cite an example. A cow was stolen and the Ikalahans involved had to go to court. It took 11 years for the government court to decide that the man who stole the cow was guilty. If the case were in the hands of the tribal court, everything would have been finished in 30 days. Even cases of murder could be swiftly resolved in the tribal court. The recidivism rate in Ikalahan culture, according to statistics I have developed in the last 40 years, is about ten percent. In the Philippine justice and penal system, it is 98 percent. What I am saying is that the customs and traditions of IPs are rich and they can solve, on their own, threats to peace and security. It is unfortunate, however, that others fail to see these and insist on civilizing the IPs based on their own perspectives.
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MAILEENITA PEALBA (INSTRUCTOR, COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, UP BAGUIO): Human security, as explained earlier by Dr. Castro, seems to mean going back to the natives way of life where they can fish and hunt. On the other hand, Ms. Pawid mentioned that the IPs are left behind, and thus they should be given the kind of services that majority of the Filipinos are enjoying. But these will definitely make drastic changes to the lives of IPs. For instance, when IPs are given education, some of them leave their lands in pursuit of things that their communities cannot provide them. Also, there seems to be a big difference between the type of state intervention that the IPs really need, and the kind that is being defined by the government and others for them. How can we define human security, given such contradictions? How can we strike the balance among all these perspectives? ZENAIDA BRIGIDA PAWID: As I have said, culture is not static. Therefore, cultural integrity does not mean the noble savage. That no longer exists. We do want Adidas. We would like to go to SM malls as much as you do. Human security is the ability of a person to make decisions for himself or herself. The only difference with IPs is that their identities come from their respective communities. Identity as community-based plays a big part in decision making. When we talk of policy, we cannot exclude the state. It encompasses people and territory. Father Conrado Balweg coined the expression, Cordillera and nation in the making. It is how cultural integrity or unity in diversity should be. We are all heading towards a certain goal, but the pace is not the same for everyone. Some are left out. Even others disagree as to the direction we are taking. If there are 110 IP groups in the Philippines, it is possible that there are at least 110 nascent forms of government, people, and territory, as well as notions of sovereignty. In defining the Philippine state, these must all be taken into account. There must be flexibility and accommodation. IPRA was crafted by and for the IPs, but the IPs were lost in the process of implementation.Unfortunately, it took the course the implementors wanted. Majority of parliamentarians, politicians, and administrators seek homogenization and fail to recognize differences of culture. NESTOR CASTRO: In my presentation, I tried to look into commonalities but definitely, there are differences. Many IP communities have organizations that have different agendas. It is wrong to say that all IPs have a single vision. There are those who are nativists and long to go back to the past. There are others who would really want to modernize and are very critical of policies such as the
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NIPAS Act which states, IPs are only allowed to maintain their traditional practices. Their response is: Why would you want us to remain in the past, while the rest of the Filipinos are undergoing modernization? We should be aware of, and respect differences in opinions. Policies should be based on informed choices of the communities. There are a lot of cases wherein IPs decide based only on what is being fed to them. They are unaware of other options. The state and other actors, such as NGOs, must help in decision-making by laying out alternatives, rather than imposing their own positions. Ultimately, decisions should be made by the IPs themselves. JESSICA DATOR-BERCILLA (CHRISTIAN AID): It is true that every community has its own definition of what human security is but there are common themes that we can pursue in terms of policies. Ms. Pawid mentioned about the right to self-determination. Dr. Castro pointed out the importance of helping IPs make informed decisions. In terms of operationalizing human security on the ground, how do we, in the academe and in the development world, work towards securing development choices that the IPs have made or are going to make? ZENAIDA BRIGIDA PAWID: We have heard what the IPs want. They are in the logframe, in the problem tree, and in the SWOT [Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats] analysis. I am not demeaning the work of administrators, development workers and academics, but these efforts have limitations in terms of knowledge and information. If we talk of informed choices, you cannot do that overnight. You have to discuss these with the IPs and make sure that they understand them. More importantly, administrators, development workers and academics are not supposed to impose their own views. The problem is that you are talking to people who do not have the comprehension and skills that you have in making decisions. Administrators and politicians would come to the communities and say, Here is the list of priority pipeline projects. They make the IPs choose between A, B, and C. This is not only true for IPs but for everybody. The same is true with the NGOs. They will stay in the community to a point that they even become a native. But when it comes to helping IPs make choices, they would say, You know, the organization has funds available for this kind of project. What is that? It is an interventionist scheme. In the end, the IPs are never encouraged to look for funds on their own. They are told to become somebody else, without being appreciated for what they can actually do. The intervenors have their own agenda, dictated by their political parties, funders, personal interests, etc. Development works in small, self-contained communities, not in an entire province or region. If one has the perseverance to work at that scale, then it would work.
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LUNES TAOIL (SOCIAL ACTION CENTER BAGUIO-BENGUET): I live in the mountains of Abra and belong to the Mangyan tribe. I can hardly express myself in English or in Tagalog. I live in a community in the municipalities of Tubo and Luba, north of Mountain Province. In my tribe, I can say that we had security before. We did not have individual possessions. Everything was communal. We owned a piece of land. Actually, we saw ourselves as caretakers, who had the right to use and cultivate the land because we inherited it. The community owned the mountains and the valleysgods gifts. We helped one another. During harvest time, we did not calculate how many days each person has contributed. We reaped what everyone had sown. When I was in need of food, I could go to a neighbor and ask some. We gave and did not expect any payment. We all worked together. Security for us is feeling a sense of belonging, being part of the community. Nobody is threatened when he or she is in the community because everyone will take care of him or her. Incursion of other cultures is a threat to security. The introduction of a new belief system disturbed our spirit of belongingness. Outsiders come and teach us individual rights and make us disregard our way of life. We are taught to be greedy, suggesting that we can have our own lands and there is a right way of doing things. Everything can be measured; a piece of paper can tell you who owns what. The intrusion of big businesses became a problem as well. When a logging corporation came to Abra, they measured hundreds and thousands of hectares, and declared that the land belongs to the company. Hence, they had the right to harvest all the trees that was protected by the people of the community. With these examples, I hope everybody agrees that injustice and destruction of the peoples security is already at work. IPRA is not really a law that respects and recognizes our culture, our own concept of ownership. What is a land title? It means nothing. Whoever has exerted effort to protect and develop a piece of land has the right to use it. These lands would have never been what they are today without our care and protection. We have preserved them. Nobody has the right to own them. AWEX SANTOS (PHILIPPINE RURAL AND RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT): The coming of the Christian missions in IP communities has, in a way, damaged the already complete IP culture through the introduction of new worldviews. One is the imposition of the belief in the existence of God and the concept of salvation. Another would be the introduction of gender roles. My belief is that equal treatment between male and female is more valued based on the animistic beliefs of the IPs than in Christian tradition. I also agree with Mr. Taoils comment on the government, but would like to stress that the Christian colonial perspective has also damaged the cultural integrity of IPs.
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GREGORIO ANDOLANA (AUTHOR, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' RIGHTS ACT [IPRA]): Until now, the primary reason for passing the IPRA has not been achieved. Based on the 1987 Constitution, the policy of the state is to recognize and respect the rights of the IPs to their ancestral domain. In 1991, when we started debating the NIPAS law, we made sure that the recognition of the cultural communities is incorporated. This is also the case with the LGC. I was the one who proposed the provision that the local government units must ensure that the rights of the cultural communities are respected, and that the cultural communities are represented in the local government legislative body. To date, these provisions have not been implemented despite the state policy. Together with Representative Guimid Matalam, I was co-author of the Organic Act of Muslim Mindanao. We ensured that legislative bodies craft ordinances on ancestral domain at the local level. Yet, up to now, the regional legislative assembly has not enacted anything. This is the reason why the Tidurays in Upi, Maguindanao continue to suffer and still cannot have their 200,000 hectares of land. We must understand that the ancestral domain law does not grant titles. IPRA only ratifies the native title that IPs possess since time immemorial, even before the Republic of the Philippines was created. The concept of land titling, in this case, is wrong. CADT is just a formal recognition of the state that there exists an ancestral domain in the area. Ownership of the land cannot be conferred by government. The reason why there are problems and conflicts on these matters is that the Land Registration Authority still adopts the Regalian doctrine, which states that all untitled lands in the archipelago is under the control of the Spanish Crown or the state and it has the right to dispense it. I agree with our brother from the Cordillera that these lands belong to generations of IPs and the title is merely a formality. Moreover, the domain is not only about the land. It covers the comprehensive rights of the people over their territory. The community has sovereignty and the Philippine state must respect this. The law grants power to the NCIP, a quasi-judicial authority. However, probably due to the term of office or for political reasons and absence of political will, the NCIP has been inefficient. In the past, the plan was to make the NCIP an independent constitutional commission. Maybe that should be the policy directionto make the NCIP, or any agency that looks upon the sovereign rights of cultural communities, an independent constitutional body, so that it is not held hostage by politicians. To be secure is also about freedom and the right to self-governance. The right to enact an ordinance is very crucial in attaining human security. The law provides that there can be a tribal barangay regardless of the population and that there should be respect for customary laws. These provisions should be adopted by IPs in their own communities. IPRA says that (n)o disputes can be raised before the courts without first being passed upon the community in accordance with their customary laws, but this has not been observed.
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Only when a community decides on conflicts and these are resolved in accordance with their customary laws can security be achieved. The people in the community are secured from the hazards of court litigation, a long process that causes money, time, and effort. That is also justice. Human security covers security of tenure over ancestral domain, including the fruits or income gained from harvest of the land. How is this possible in mining and plantation areas? Cultural integrity is equally important. Secure the IPs in their ancestral domains and there shall be peace. Human security is also the right to self-determination and political empowerment. It is about respect for the judicial proceedings of the IPs. If the 1987 Constitution is to be amended, then maybe we can have a federal form of government where there could be states established and controlled by the IPs. BERNARDITA CHURCHILL (PRESIDENT, NATIONAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PHILIPPINE STUDIES ASSOCIATION): My concern is related to the history books that are being used by generations of Filipinos. It is almost exclusively the history of the Christian Filipinos and the majority of the population. That is not our history. I have a challenge to pose. We historians cannot presume to have the knowledge to write the history of the indigenous peoples. I can study the documents and the materials but I am not one of you. The history of the indigenous peoples has to come from the indigenous peoples themselves. The IPs must study their history and let us know what that history is. Before I step down as president of the Philippine National Historical Society (PNHS), I would like, with my colleagues, to put together all the materials on local history that we have gathered, starting from 1978. My challenge to you is: Help us write the history of IPs. ZENAIDA BRIGIDA PAWID: I hope that everybody here picks up this challenge. The first problem is that the history of indigenous peoples is passed on orally. We have long memories, and we rely on our old people to pass on our history. If they die, part of the history goes with them. We are not knowledgeable with technology, so we need your expertise. Secondly, our history has been written; you will not really be starting from scratch. Of course, there are many cracks in the parchment paper, to borrow the phrase from William Henry Scott. On behalf of the IPs, I also would like to challenge the PNHS. When IPRA was still under discussion, the IPs asked the National Textbook Commission to provide them copies of all textbooks that have funny representations of indigenous peoples so that they can have these materials expunged. The Commission does not even want to give us copies and that is why the biases and prejudices continue.
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BERNARDITA CHURCHILL: In documenting the history of IPs, we want not just the political but also the cultural aspect. The IPs have very rich oral literature. ARCHIE CASEY, SX (XAVERIAN MISSIONARIES): I am encouraged to take part in this exercise with the affirmation that we are all indigenous peoples. I come from Scotland and have spent most of my life outside my own country and culture. I have spent only four years learning about the diversity of culture in the Philippines. Looking at the population, which is about 85 million, 12 million of which are IPs, the figure will probably double in 25 years. Ms. Pawid expressed that, Land is life but land is worthless without the people. If land is life for these people, what will happen when multinational mining companies come? How would prior and informed consent be enacted? We have had discussions with ambassadors of countries where these corporations come from and it appears that that there is no clear, transparent process in acquiring consent from the IPs. This might be a reflection of the variety of cultural and ethnolinguistic groups. There seems to be a lot of confusion on this issue at the moment. Nevertheless, there must be continued dialogue. LETICIA GUTIERREZ-DURAN (OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET): I am an Ibaloi. I work as the Provincial Legal Officer of Benguet. For me, human security is very personal. As an IP, I feel secure when I am staying in my province. When I go out of Benguet, I feel apprehensive. I introduce myself as Igorot and people would say, Are you Igorot, you don't look like one? That makes me insecure. Non-IPs should also be educated. You must be aware of our culture and respect it. There must also be a law that mandates non-IPs to be informed about our customs and traditions. NESTOR CASTRO: I have gathered many relevant contributions from the floor and some concerns expressed by the participants. Definitely, religion plays a role in the erosion of indigenous culture. This is still happening. I am a member of the Pasig Diocesan Commission on the Cultural Heritage of the Church. In one of our parishes in the Municipality of Pateros, the parish priest banned the dancing around the patron saint. This is likely to happen in IP communities, where the culture is different from that of the parish. All cultures change, however, and some indigenous communities have opted to become Christians and incorporated Christianity into their cultures. It is a matter of choice. I do not have any problem with this, as long as religion is not imposed on them.
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With rergards the educational system, I fully agree with what was said, that non-IPs should be educated especially about cultural sensitivity. Being aware of different cultures should be part of the curriculum, from elementary to college. What seems to be happening now is that IPs are educated about IPRA, but non-IPs are not. I also agree that in the implementation of IPRA, the bureaucratic procedures are more emphasized than the intent of the law. I hope that discussions about IPRA be published and distributed, not only the technical matter but also its intents and objectives. I fully agree with the documentation of local histories. Local history is a very important contribution. It can be an opportunity to deal with one another and create a national consensus on who we are as a people. It will not be limited to certain individuals dictating what our culture or history is. The writing of local history will be based on mutual respect. Our problems with human insecurity, as shared earlier, can be addressed at the local or community level, since IPs have their own customary laws. The question really is, how do we go about it? We need to understand from below the existing judicial systems and procedures, and conflict resolution and peace-building processes. ZENAIDA BRIGIDA PAWID: I remember talking to some old people in the communities about religion. One of the older people said to the bishop, Before, you said it was pagan, so we were not allowed to do it. Now you say it is not pagan and we cannot do it in the church. Will you please make up your mind before you come here to deliver a sermon? Indigenous culture does not disappear because of the Catholic religion brought by the priests. It remains rooted in the communities. Prayer cannot put it out. Our culture may change, but our folkways will still remain in our midst. The discussion today suggests that policymaking and implementation do not exist in isolated little black boxes. Policy must be understood as a form of praxis, and that it occurs on several levels. We need Congressman Andolana, the professors, and the priests to discuss IPRA, with all its imperfections. Law, after all, is a compromise. However, an uninformed Tiduray or Ibaloi cannot be brought to Congress to talk about the law. We need advocates who understand the IPs and have knowledge of the government policies. The second level at which policy operates is the masa (masses). The masa does not understand the law. The law in the first place is in English a comma makes a lot of difference. Unless there is commitment and heartfelt advocacy of policy, so that substance rather than process is brought down to the people, the masa will never appreciate it. Furthermore, there is the absolute necessity to mainstream all things that sound strange, or "pagan," as the old Bontoc man said, into the formal educational system. The IPs need an educational system that does not divorce us from the culture that we grew up with. As Reverend
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Delbert Rice said, there are schools of living tradition all over the Philippines. Some schools of living tradition, however, only teach IPs how to dance, or how to weave their clothes in a certain wayas if they belong to the museum for people to stare at. That is not what schools of living tradition mean. In relation to the mining issue, when people identify a territory and apply for a CADT, they will be issued titles stipulated on free, prior, and informed consent. What many people do not know is that NCIP has no money. The distribution of CADTs is funded by the Toronto Ventures Incorporated (TVI). During a meeting with the IP community, TVI presented the mines as the future Garden of Eden of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Naturally, the people were enticed because TVI and government did not talk about destroying the whole concept of ancestral domain and its fruits. Rather, they asked, Do you not want to have a school? They know fully well that IPs yearn for a school. So it has been agreed that the corporation and government will bring in the electricity. Provision of electricity is nothing for TVI, but for the IPs, electricity is like god almighty; it somewhat uplifts their lives. The road gets paved, which facilitates transportation, and consequently trade. With a motorcycle, families can start a livelihood and make money. What the IPs do not know is that once the corporation pulls out, it takes everything with it. We need people who will go to the IPs and explain to them the value of what the corporation is taking from them compared to what it is giving. You have to give them options by telling them the specifics of the issue. It is not a simple asking for a yes or a no. Once you do that, you divide them right down the middle, and they start fighting. Ultimately, you destroy the community. The effects of divisiveness are apparent in their way of thinking. How IPs think today is far different from older generations. I grew up in an area where we had mines for 100 years. The staunchest anti-mine advocates, our grandfathers and uncles, got sick from cancer of the lungs and tuberculosis. They died fighting for their cause. You do not see people like them nowadays. You cannot go to the community and just tell the IPs to say no to mining. Before you can obtain consent, they will ask for some sort of exchange, such as a 51-percent share of the mining companys stocks, or a prominent position in a respresentative body for IPs. Apparently, the language of the IPs has been coopted by the language of the capitalists and bureaucrats. The security of the IP is in their community-ness. Once this is broken or destroyed, they become vulnerable to other powerful entities. Unity should be maintained and preserved. Policy advocacy should underscore this in formulating strategies for the empowerment of IPs. It would be nice to see a Philippine society as a rainbow or a kaleidoscope rather than one gray sky on a rainy day. What is happening is we are trying to make everybody look like each other. We cannot
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romanticize the noble savage. He is nowhere to be found. Tarzan was buried a long time ago, in the comics. I will close by borrowing Bishop Francisco Clavers perspective on human security. He says, You want the IPs to survive? Don't put them in the museum. Make them globally competitive but culturally rooted. RUTH LUSTERIO-RICO (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, CSSP, UP-DILIMAN): The preceding discussion highlighted the following points: Indigenous peoples have different perspectives on human security, but human security is mainly associated with freedom from situations that give rise to insecurities. These insecurities relate to livelihood, land, or even personal safety. It was stressed that the meaning of human security should come from the people themselves or the community itself. For example, one of the concepts associated with security is the empowerment of indigenous peoples. A very important idea that was shared to us is that human security is also related to the idea of culture. Culture should be seen as dynamic or changing. Human security is related to one's ability to make decisions for oneself, and taking into consideration the beliefs, views and intentions of his or her community. Another insight shared by one of our participants has to do with the relationship of human security to the feeling of belongingness in a community. For example, intrusions or certain changes introduced into traditional practices, especially land ownership, make IPs feel insecure. In addition, human security is felt at a very personal level. It may mean confidence about not being dispossessed of one's tradition and culture. A large part of our discussion centered on IPRA, its impact on indigenous peoples and whether or not it actually promotes human security. As Dr. Castro mentioned, the provisions of IPRA protect the human rights of IPs. However, there have been many problems in the implementation of this law. As there were a lot of opinions about NCIP, particularly regarding its lack of capability to implement IPRA, many proposals point to institutional changes that can be introduced. NCIP should be a constitutional body, independent and free from the intervention of politicians. Another suggestion was the codification of customary laws of different indigenous people's group and coming up with more culturespecific guidelines in the implementation of IPRA. At a general level, it was suggested that promoting a more inclusive society should be undertaken by all, especially government. As such, government ought to learn from IPs.
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HUMAN SECURITY IN VIOLENT CONFLICT SITUATIONS

October 3, 2006 (Tuesday); 1:00 to 5:30 p.m. Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City Moderator EDUARDO TADEM Associate Professor Asian Center University of the Philippines-Diliman
HERMAN JOSEPH KRAFT (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY [CSSP], UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES [UP]DILIMAN): Human security is a very popular term nowadays. It is one of the buzzwords domestically and internationally. If you really consider it though, human security is vague at best, and meaningless at worst. It means quite a lot of things to people in different contexts. As such, it is almost rendered empty. If it does not mean anything, then why discuss human security? It is because the concept still has value.
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I will start by tracing the development of the idea and then proceed to explaining why, inspite of its many meaningsand therefore the difficulty in understanding ithuman security still has value. Hence, we should consider it as a framework for security. It is actually being considered as the main alternative to traditional or mainstream conceptions of security. Finally, I will take a look at the concept of human security in terms of how it can be applied as a policy framework in a situation of escalating violence. We are not talking of human security in terms of preventive measures, but in terms of addressing conflict. How does the concept of security become applicable in this situation? Human security was publicly introduced with the release of the United Nations (UN) Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994. It defined human security as safety from chronic threatshunger, disease, repression, and sudden and hurtful disruptions to the everyday lives of people. Why was it introduced in the first place? I think almost all of us can actually relate to the early 1990s. During this period, the Cold War ended, causing a sudden change in the international arena. The Cold War was significant in that the international system was dominated by the conflict between the United States (US) and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) over the idea of nuclear balance. Hence, the discourse on security, and much of the security framework utilized was all about the military. Everybody was talking about the number of tanks the US had, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Pact, and so on. With the end of the Cold War, the discourse did not seem appropriate anymore. Why talk about nuclear balance when the rivalry was theoretically over? In fact, one of the things that people were discussing then was the idea of a peace dividend. Since there was no longer any conflict between the US and the USSR, the shifting of resources was deemed possiblefrom making weapons and arsenals to peacebuilding, from traditional guns to butter, among others. There was a decrease in spending for the military, and allocation of a bigger budget for growing needs of the people. This shifted the thinking from national security to human security. The human security discourse became dominant in the UN since 1994. Basically, it is the human aspect of security. For instance, the UN Independent Commission on Good Governance began talking about an aspect of good governance, which is the reduction of the human cost of conflict. This was in 1995, during the war in the Balkans and the massacre in Rwanda. These cases actually portrayed the human costs of violent conflicts. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, the lives of ordinary people were disrupted as they were caught in the middle of the fight between the Serbs and Croats. The death toll was high, as was the number of internally displaced people or refugees. We saw this in Rwanda, where the Hutus did not have any qualms killing hundreds of thousands of Tutsis. Human security shifts the object of security from the nation-state to the people. Whose security? Whose interests? Whose protection? Although the national security perspective already covers everyone, human security tries to be more specific. The human person could mean the individual, the group, the community, or even the nation-state.
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In 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan delivered a speech in which, taking off from the 1994 UN HDR, he basically reduced human security to three: freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom for future generations to sustain their lives in this planet. This is actually a very interesting way of presenting human security. He defines it in terms of being free from whatever might threaten a human being. Aside from UNs characterization of the concept, some governments, including those of Canada, Japan, and Norway, presented a sense of what human security means. Of course, when you talk to nongovernment organizations (NGOs) that are involved in human security issues, they also have their own understanding of the concept. But what is common to all of them is the idea that security should pertain to the human person. What can be included in human security? The UN HDR talked about security in seven areas: (1) economic, (2) environmental, (3) personal, (4) community, (5) political, (6) health, and (7) food. Annan introduced the concept of freedom into the discourse. What is the danger here? If you think about it, what we are talking about is a very expansive meaning of security. Some scholars say this is wrong. Social scientists like me, for instance, want to be precise about terms. When you have a term that refers to a broad range of concerns, you are basically saying that human security means everything, and therefore, means nothing. A lot of criticisms of human security actually come from this. If we think about it though, the issue is merely conceptual and concerns people from the academe like me. In reality, human security has no conceptual precision. Its value is in the idea that anything that concerns us can basically be considered a security issue. Human security could be treated as an organizing concept, which, because of its various meanings to different people, would allow us to mobilize support. Its importance, therefore, lies in its political implications. You can rally people around the notion of human security simply because it is easy for us to identify with the idea. It involves our own concerns as individuals. The third thing that might be important about human security is the psychological dimension, which also adds to its mobilizing capacity. This is what we refer to as securitization. We now consider issues we normally do not include within the ambit of security as security. For instance, when we talk of development, we usually associate it with the economy, or the peoples livelihood. In this regard, we consider a situation where livelihood is threatened a security issue, like when the farmlands are turned into a battlefield. Such threat has a psychological effect. Thus, when a security issue is identified, it is accorded with a certain amount of urgency; it becomes a priority. Other than the conceptual problem, practical issues also surface when we talk about such an expansive notion of security. The main issue here is the peoples understanding of security. The term is often associated with a particular institution in societythe military and the police. The question, therefore, is: If we are going to use human security as a policy framework, and its meaning includes so many things, are we saying that there is a need to expand the mandate of institutions, which are traditionally responsible
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for security, to cover all of these concerns? Do we want the military to be involved in health as a security issue? In the 1990s, after the Cold War, environment was one of the issues that became a security concern because of the greenhouse effect. One of the things the military did was to organize so-called green battalions that would be responsible for protecting forest areas, catching illegal loggers, among others. Do we want this done in other areas, such as food? Another way of putting it is to ask the question: Who is responsible for human security? If it is the state, which institutions are responsible? These are some policy implications when you talk about an allencompassing definition of security. What is interesting about human security is that it deals with prevention, to minimize vulnerabilities and to ensure that certain threats do not escalate. But the context of our discussion this afternoon is the existence of violent conflict, the intensification of which has already happened. How do we look at human security then? First, we have to assess the situation, particularly at what stage or phase of the conflict. What kind of insecurities are the people facing? The most obvious would be displacement. Who provides for the everyday necessitiesfood, shelter, medicinesof the refugees? Are they ever going back to their homes? What can de done? What should be the policy response? Consensus is built around peace as a desirable end. The people themselves undertake this because in most cases, neither side is willing to give in. Once consensus is formed, a coalition is created to organize support for it. If a conflict persists, the goal is to de-escalate violence and its human costs. Furthermore, human security emphasizes the notion of soft, instead of hard, powerpersuasion and dialogue, rather than the use of force. In sum, I would like to reiterate that human security is a very expansive concept and this has several policy implications. Who is responsible for it? Because of its breadth, no single institution can be considered as having the capacity to actually oversee its policy implementation. It is therefore the societys purview, not just the states. DANNY CARRANZA (L A N D T E N U R E IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM COORDINATOR, PEACE FOUNDATION, INC.): In our work at the Bondoc Peninsula, the framework that we use is agrarian justice. People are directly mobilized and organized around the issue of the right to own the lands that they till. I would like to narrow down the concept of human security by discussing the situation of farmers. First, I would like to give you a background of the
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conflict. The struggle for land ensued since the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) 19 years ago. Recently, it became violent. In the three biggest haciendas in the Bondoc Peninsula, the landlords and the tenants share the land based on a 60-40 arrangement. This is, of course, against the law, but the situation persists. Most of the 12,000 tenants live in abject poverty. Most of them could not even vote, and even if they could, the landowners would dictate upon them. Often, they are not given their share of the earnings. There is inadequate delivery of social services. Schools are far and health service providers hardly reach them. In the past, these tenants were not organized. Community organizing started in the mid-1990s. Part of the role that civil society organizations played was to inform these people about their human rights. An important actor in the conflict situation in the Bondoc Peninsula is the armed left movement, specifically, the New Peoples Army (NPA). The NPA claims to represent the interests of the oppressed, but in reality, the NPA has chosen to side with the landlords. We notice three important factors as to why this is the case. First, the NPA wants to ensure that it is able to exercise control over its territory. They want no other group to reign and that all of us within the territory adhere to their rules. Second, they want political and ideological dominance, using the concept of revolutionary agrarian reform. The NPA thinks that this should be implemented, rather than the CARP. Lastly, the NPA seeks to protect its economic base through the extortion of revolutionary tax. This is collected both from the landowners and the farmers. Since the farmers chose to be politically autonomous, the NPA treats them as enemies. Farmers make sure that the agrarian reform law is implemented to protect their source of livelihood and to save their lives from the NPA. The NPA cannot prevent the growth of farmers organizations that do not share its ideology. As such, it has resorted to harassment and violence. The group has issued death sentences to the leaders. Four farmers have been killed, three by private armies of landlords and one by the NPA. Families have been threatened; some were physically assaulted. Another thing that complicates the situation is the use of the legal system by the landowners. Farmers are fearful of landowners filing criminal cases against them. They hide from authorities even if there is no warrant of arrest yet. Just the thought of someone pressing charges against them is enough to make them disappear like fugitives. They also do not have money to pay for bail bonds. Since 1996, almost 300 tenants have been imprisoned. More than 200 criminal cases have been filed against more than 200 farmers. From 12 June 2006 to 8 September 2006, 93 families have been living like prisoners. About 68 families have been adopted by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to avoid imprisonment. These are some of the issues in the Bondoc Peninsula that cause human insecurity. How do we define human security then? For us, human security is inseparable with the struggle for land. For as long as farmers do not have access and control of these lands, they can be easily manipulated by the landowners and politicians. Also, when you refer to human security
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in the context of violence, it should be about keeping the people alive. How can you be secure if your life is threatened, or worse, if you are dead? What is the value of land if you are not alive? Second, human security should be about freedom for the farmers, in which they can act freely, go wherever they want, and organize themselves. Third is to ensure that they have livelihoods. How can they farm when they are harassed, extorted, and threatened? Human security means addressing threats to life, freedom, and livelihood. At the same time, human security should also recognize the pressing needs of the people in the most dismal situations. Refugees are in the most vulnerable state. They should not be harassed any further. They should no longer feel insecurity. It should be ensured that they are provided utmost protection in their temporary shelters. They should be kept alive in these evacuation centers. What are the roles of the different actors? Non-state actors (NSAs) can help by providing legal support. This is very important because landowners have continuously used the laws and the courts to oppress farmers. The conditions of the farmers will worsen if the landowners continue to do this. Also, NSAs should help mobilize support for the claims and demands of the farmers and make sure that these are heard by the public, the media, and government. Third, they should also guarantee that basic services are provided. Finally, they should address the issue of accountability. Of course, not all non-state actors are able to help. Some are sources of insecurities. The role of state actors is clear and obviousto provide physical protection and meet their basic needs. For example, a military detachment was set up in one of the communities in the Bondoc Peninsula. Who is responsible for the plight of the farmers? It is much easier to extract accountability from the government rather than the NPA. Perhaps, if the NPAs actions are made public and judged by Philippine society and the international community, its leaders can be made responsible. What are the proceses and mechanisms needed to promote human security? It is important to recognize and expose the threats to call the attention of the agency responsible. Available spaces should be maximized. The Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) between the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) should also be explored even though they do not function effectively. The functions of the JMC should be re-examined. There was an instance when, instead of investigating the filed complaint, JMC produced evidence linking the farmer to the military or the barangay (village) intelligence network. The farmers situation worsened. In relation to this, the NDFs concept of revolutionary justice should be looked into. The farmers of the Bondoc Peninsula were the first to file cases in the JMC. This triggered the group of Jose Maria Sison and Roger Rosal to create black propaganda against the farmers. Constructive engagement with the government is important. This should be undertaken in the monitoring of the conflict situation, filing of
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grievance and complaints, delivery of aid and relief, and access to decision makers at the capital. For example, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process created an inter-agency committee. In our case, the DAR established a Task Force on the Bondoc Peninsula. ALEJANDRO CRUZ (PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM-QUEZON): The DAR Provincial Office in Quezon covers 22 towns. Ten of those are in Lamon Bay and 12 are in the Bondoc Peninsula, from the town of Padre Burgos down to San Francisco and San Andres. Out of these 12 towns, only five are having serious problems with the implementation of CARP. These are Buenavista, San Narcisco, San Francisco, San Andres, and Mulanay, where the big haciendas are located. There is a total of 40,246 hectares of farmlands in the Bondoc Peninsula. As of September 2006, we have already distributed 31,911 hectares or 78 percent of the total land for distribution to 19,450 beneficiaries. In places where the CARP is peacefully implemented, DAR continues to give support services and ensure the sustainability of the distributed lands. We have projects with the World Bank such as the Agrarian Reform Community Development and Agrarian Reform Infrastructure Support to help the farmers settle in their respective areas. The problem lies with the remaining 22 percent. As expected, the landowners are claiming that their lands should not be part of CARP because these are pasture lands and are therefore not covered by the law. They say that because of the peace and order situation, they were forced to remove their cows, enabling the farmers to plant corn and coconut. Is it a criminal offense to cultivate idle lands? Unfortunately, the landowners hire the best lawyers and their cases have reached the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. They have even approached the Office of the President, hoping that it would intervene. Waiting for the pending complaints to be resolved stalls documentation and coverage. This impedes the program in the long run. The cases range from estafa to qualified theft. Even DAR officers have been charged with trespassing and malicious mischief. Luckily for the farmers, they have the Agrarian Justice Foundation to bail them out if they get arrested. But who will provide bail to DAR officials, or the police and military, when they are taken into custody due to charges related to their job of implementing CARP? In addition, there is another group that makes the realization of CARP even more complicated. It does not believe that CARP is a legitimate program and based on the initial investigation, it seems that it
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is on the side of the landowners. These are issues that we also need to consider. Political will already seems to be lost. You probably heard from the news that Bondoc Peninsula is a hotbed for insurgency. It is because of agrarian unrest. We try to properly implement CARP at the local level, but our decisions and actions are overturned by the national government due to the lobbying efforts of landowners at the capital. How can we distribute lands when there is harassment and conflict? If we dont do our job, what do we tell the farmersthat government units like us at the provincial level cannot do anything about the situation? What can the government do as a state actor? Government functionaries and institutions should get their acts together and perform their mandated tasks. They should also coordinate with each other. The role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) is to secure the area and to maintain peace and order while the DAR is concerned with land distribution, delivery of support services and agrarian justice, and legal assistance. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources classifies public lands. On the other hand, the Department of Agriculture provides for adaptive farming technology, while the Department of Trade and Industry is for agricultural enterprise development. Health and education as well as basic social services should also be included. There should be mechanisms for feedback and continued dialogue with residents as well. What can NSAs do? First, exert continuous pressure at the top level, particularly with the executive branch. Second, and in relation to the first, non-state actors should advocate policies and programs that are rooted in the communities and barangays. It is said that programs are already boxed in when the budget is planned and approved by the national government. Indeed, not all programs created at the top level of government are suitable to the needs of the communities. This leads us to the third point. Opportunities for increased participation of people in the creation of projects, such as consultations, should be created. This would enable government to know what kind of intervention should be prioritized or created, which, in effect, hastening implementation. Most of all, setting up mechanisms for participation is important to give farmers a sense of ownership over the land, and control over the fate of their families and communities.
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OPEN FORUM
DIOSCORO TIJNO (FARMER LEADER, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG BONDOC PENINSULA, SAN NARCISO, QUEZON): I want to attest to what our companion from the PEACE Foundation, Inc. shared with us regarding the harassment of goons and the NPA. I am currently under the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice. I am the first person to file a case in the JMC. I would like to appeal to the military to protect us. We are innocent farmers who simply benefited from the proper implementation of the CARP. These goons and the NPA do not want us to support the
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government, but we are not taking sides. They threatened us and killed some of our companions. I was supposed to be gunned down but fortunately I was able to escape. We cannot go back to our former lives and our farmlands anymore. Both the landowners and the NPA have seized our lands. The small farmers cannot fight these people. In truth, we really do not care about the conflict between the government and the NPA. We just want to get our lives back. Do we not have the right to live? LT. COL. RHODERICK PARAYNO (SOUTHERN LUZON COMMAND, AFP): Although Mr. Tijnos question is generally addressed to the government, it appears that he was actually referring to the AFP because the NPA was included. I know that he somehow feels that he has nowhere else to go and cannot depend on the government. I would like to address his concern, but first, I would like to ask Mr. Tijno: Have you informed the AFP representativein this case, the 74th Infantry Battalionabout your case? The problem is, it will be taken up as an individual case and, therefore, a police matter. It is difficult for the military to intervene in individual cases. If a case is reported to us, we will treat that initially as an information report. Then we will work with the PNP and try to establish the presence of the NPA in that area. These cases remain a concern of the police unless it is clear that the NPA is involved. Since they appear to be unarmed, we cannot assume that they are NPA members until they start firing. That is why we cannot respond to mere reports in a manner that you would want us to. But I can assure you that we will work with you. If you inform us about your problems, we can assign intelligence officers to establish the presence of NPAs and organize facts. We are also appealing for your assistance. If you are afraid or embarrassed to ask for help in that area, then you can go directly to the AFP General Headquarters. JOBOY REYES (QUEZON ADVOCATES ON AGRARIAN REFORM AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICE): My concern is on the security of women and children. When a farmer is charged and arrested, the wives and children are directly affected. They experience mental torture because they think that it is the police who would save them from the landlords goons and the NPA. The goons, together with their police allies, use different forms of harassment. Meanwhile, the NPA would go to the barrios, to areas where the children are playing. Now what if the military arrives? FRANCISCO VIBAL (SAN JOSE SANCTUARY FOR PEACE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT): The situation in the Bondoc Peninsula is somehow similar to ours in Tarlac. That is why we also opted to have a local peace process in our area.
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The idea of human security in situations of escalating violent conflict is actually a paradox. How can there be security for us? If we side with the left, we are going to be killed by the military. If we go with the military, we are going to be blacklisted by the NPA. We are in a quandary as to what we are going to do. Meanwhile, this ideological conflict is affecting the communities. I believe that no state could provide us with total security and I am challenging any political scientist who says otherwise. The processes that are necessary to ensure human security is actually based on the people. If we do not act, nothing will happen. In our case, we are aided by religious organizations and cultural workers. We also appeal to members of the military and the NPA to refrain from engaging in conflict in our area. We have more important things to take care of. For instance, there is one barangay that has problems with the environment and natural disasters. The situation needs our immediate attention. The policies and mechanisms to promote and protect human security should be context-specific. You can only define human security based on the situation on the ground. Every locality has it own threats and concerns. Although the case of Bondoc Peninsula may be the same as oursagrarian conflictthe same formula cannot be applied to other cases. Every case is unique. Maybe we need a different approach in crafting policies and mechanisms to address conflict. We are wondering why a few powerful groups reign in our town, given that the residents comprise majority of the population. We are around 30,000 in the community, while the NPA is less than 100 in number. The AFP does not even have a military detachment. What if we arm ourselves? My point is that, these groups, which are relatively small in number, should not determine the decisions and outcomes of our towns. ROSSELYNN JAE DE LA CRUZ (LAWYER, AKBAYAN/PEACE FOUNDATION, INC.): I would like to underscore another threat to human security that is less dramatic than the NPA and its form of revolutionary justice. For me, it is really the existence of a structure that allows players to commit such brazen oppression against the farmers and still not violate any law. The cases filed against the farmers are on qualified theft. Under the Revised Penal Code, it is higher than theft because there is a bigger penalty for stealing coconuts. It is really difficult to imagine a more controversial law than qualified theft. We receive counter-affidavits saying that the farmers violated the law for stealing coconuts from lands they do not own. But they planted these coconuts! What do you do in a system like this? It is not enough to have dialogues or implementing the laws. We have to rethink how the law is structured in the first place. PRUDENCIO MAXINO (MAYOR, MUNICIPALITY OF MULANAY): Conflict in the Bondoc Peninsula is intense. I have already voiced my idea that there should be an investigation without involving the police and the military. If they are part of the investigation, they have a tendency to
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assume that everybody is guilty. There is an analogy to this: when you discipline your child, do not spank him or her if you are still mad. If the military has just been in an encounter, its members will probably behave improperly. In our town, a lot of people are pressed with charges by the military. But it is not the militarys fault because the charges are based on reports made by several people. The courts eventually dismissed these cases after one or two months. By then, the people have already suffered immensely. The judicial process is not functioning effectively. Figuratively, there is only one and a half judge for twelve towns in the Bondoc Peninsula. There are actually two, but the other one is assigned to another area. This practice can be traced to the colonial times. Town judges were called juez de paz or judge of peace. They are not actually judges, but have found a way to perform judicial functions that cannot be done because of circumstances. For so many years, we have had committee hearings in order to have a regional trial court in Tanauan, but to no avail. The landowners also have grievances against the government. They cannot do anything about their lands due to the slow judicial process. In Mulanay, the municipal government assigned responsibilities to leftist groups within the Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan program. The landowners handle the finances and oversee transactions. They contribute to the communitys development. As such, they are very concerned about the situation. P/S SUPT. VICTORIO CARAGALL (QUEZON PPO): I would like to react to what was said earlier regarding instances when the police or the military appears to be mad. For the information of everyone, now, the police officers are smiling when they conduct investigations because of their training on police-community relations, human rights, and proper conduct toward women and children. We even have police officers with law degrees who are in the forefront of investigations. TERESA ENCARNACION TADEM: What is the role of the third parties in the case of the conflict in Bondoc Peninsula? DANNY CARRANZA: We tried having third parties as mediators of the conflict. Through the JMC, it is possible to engage the two parties in dialoguethe GRP and the NDF. But NDF released a form of propaganda on its website which ruined the reputation of the farmers that are not on their side. Worse, there appears to be no effort to investigate the validity of the complaints of these farmers. The JMC does not really function in this case. Rather, it has become a mechanism to spread propaganda. This is the reason the farmers have given up on the JMC.
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The problem is the attitude of these third party facilitators that we are supposed to engage. Party-List Representative Satur Ocampo mentioned that he can serve but we hardly hear him speak. He did go to the farmers. He wrote a letter that was burned by the NPA when they attacked the town. There is no more evidence to show that the farmers asked for the help of Satur Ocampo. We even expressed our concerns to the Parliament of the Netherlands. But there has been no positive outcome. The Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice can be a temporary security measure that can provide the farmers with food, shelter, and financial support. But the farmers would never be totally free from insecurities as long as they are advocating agrarian reform. How we look at human security varies since we also interpret our situations and the realities differently. The NPA and the farmers have different perspectives regarding solutions to poverty. As such, the NPA treats the farmers as enemies. ANA ELZY OFRENEO (DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS): The investigation of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is limited to monitoring. I would like to distinguish between investigation for prosecution and for monitoring purposes. The CHR has a watchdog function. It monitors the different institutions of the state to see if they are able to uphold their obligations based on agreements on human rights such as the International Convention on Human Rights. There are situations that were not included in the panel discussion. I think that the conflict is not just the problem. Natural disasters like typhoons are also a threat to peoples security. Human security, therefore, is the reduction of the sources of fear and the progressive provision of an environment that satisfies the needs and wants of human beings. Both state and non-state actors have roles to play in the promotion of human security. The question is how to make them work together towards a common goal. Safeguards have to be in place to prevent the further escalation of conflict. The UN has guiding principles for internally displaced persons. What policies and mechanisms should be crafted to promote and protect human security in circumstances when violent conflict intensifies? To address this issue, I would like to propose a mechanism of the Commission, which is the National Human Rights Volunteer Program. DANNY CARANZA: The security situation in the Bondoc Peninsula is complicated. We need to trace the root of this conflict. In my view, the problem emanates from the issue of who should control the resources. HERMAN KRAFT: The UN tried to make the broad concept of human security clearer. The Commission on Human Security concluded that human security is based on
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how people perceive their particular situations. However, we still have to identify who should bear the responsibility for human security. Earlier, our companion from Tarlac challenged social scientists who believe that the state can protect all aspects of the life of a human being. I will not argue with him because he is right. But what he said is also important. This means that we cannot just leave the issue of human security to one institution. The state can provide some protection; that is what we expect from it. But we also need all the sectors and the people themselves to secure our needs. How do we do that? The answers depend on the situation on the ground. EDUARDO TADEM (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, ASIAN CENTER, UP-DILIMAN): Professor Kraft started the dialogue by giving us a background on human security. Broadly defined, it is when an individual or a group of persons become the object that has to be protected. The UN Secretary General also gave his own definition which is freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom from future generations to sustain their lives. The various issues and concerns raised prove that there is still no agreement on the meaning of human security. For example, human security is defined as what is threatening for a person. As such, this concept appears to be very broad. The meaning seems to have been lost. Human security has political implications; the concept can be used to organize people and to mobilize their support. It also has psychological importance because if we associate an issue as part of human security, people in power will be obliged to respond immediately because it is deemed as having a sense of urgency. Human security need not have a precise or exact definition. What is important is what it means to the people.
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December 05, 2006 (Tuesday); 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City Moderator HERMAN JOSEPH KRAFT Assistant Professor Department of Political Science College of Social Sciences and Philosophy University of the Philippines-Diliman SERGIO CAO (CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES [UP]-DILIMAN): It is my pleasure to welcome you all to this forum entitled, Defining the Human Security Framework in the Philippine Context, organized by the Third World Studies Center (TWSC) of the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP), UPDiliman. This is the final installment in a series of policy dialogues on human security, which began in June this year. This event is also a gathering of colleagues and friends from the academe, government, and civil society, all committed to understanding, fostering and chartering a blueprint of human security in the Philippines at the local and national
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levels. It is my pleasure to welcome you to the UP-Diliman campus, a premiere state university that engages in education, research, and extension towards nation building. UP provides an environment conducive to an exciting and dynamic dialogue, discussion, and exchange of views. Considering the unabated spate of violence and conflict that has beset the nation, human security is no doubt an urgent issue that everyone has to confront. Despite this, the concept of human security is quite elusive. In the Philippines, a precise and contextual definition is yet to be constructed. Consequently, modes of interface between government and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) to achieve human security are yet to be in place. Through a succession of fora, the TWSC Policy Dialogue Series of 2006 seeks to address this gap while taking into account the existing national security framework that embodies the nations policy response to peace building, conflict resolution, and development. Todays fifth and final policy dialogue is an integration of the learnings and insights of the previous policy dialogues. This is not simply a culminating activity. It is actually the beginning of a work in progress, fuelled by enduring partnerships and a lucid vision of a just society that would be instrumental to the improvement of the nations human security agenda. We are fortunate to have very distinguished personalities in the realm of peace and human security who are involved in policymaking and advocacyour keynote speaker for today, Ms. Teresita Quintos-Deles, former presidential adviser on the peace process who has now returned to the fold of civil society. We also have with us Honorable Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, a leading peace advocate in the Philippine Congress. I wish to extend my gratitude to the two of you for gracing this occasion and taking time to lend your expertise, insights and experience. CRISTINA PANTOJA-HIDALGO (VICEPRESIDENT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, UP SYSTEM): Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for this opportunity to convey a short message on behalf of UP President Emerlinda Roman: These days we are daily confronted with dramatic television images of people in different parts of the world coping in different ways with problems having to do with human security. Even if we accept the fact that cable television has more than tripled our awareness of events in every corner of the world, and the fact that media tends to cover the bad news because bad news is more exciting and gets higher ratings, the number of conflicts all over the worldfrom struggles over ancestral holy lands to brutal genocideis staggering. The most recent images are coming from Lebanon, where the issues of civil war, prompted initially by sectarian conflict fought four decades ago, has not yet been
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resolved. My family and I spent a couple of years of our lives there, while my husband was an officer in the United Nations Childrens Fund. When the civil war was officially over, the fighting continued to rage all over the country and the capital city was literally divided into Christian East Beirut and Muslim West Beirut. So I am particularly moved by these imagesmoved by feelings of regret, compassion and fear. A fear, which was born many years ago in a rented flat in that city by the sea and that the same situation could take place in our country. I was also struck by the fact that some media covering the demonstrations taking place in Beirut today were referring to these demonstrations as people power. Even as the term has lost most of its impact here and has even acquired ironic connotations in the country where it was born, it lives on in the imagination and in the hopes of people all over the globe. In my gloomier moments, I am tempted to say that the Lebanese seemed no closer to solving the problems that tore them apart in the early seventies, problems which had their origins in medieval Europe. Just as we are no closer in solving the problems that led to the first People Power, simply because the human condition is what it is. In the celebrated movie classic, 2001: A Space Odyssey primitive mans first invention was a weapon. But this cannot be true. To accept it as true would be to give up hope. And surely, our presence here this morning is proof that we have refused to give up. Academe itself is premised on the idea that man can learn. And the United Nations Development Programme, your sponsoring organization, is born on one of mankinds tallest dreams, after one of mankinds most cruel conflicts, is based on the idea that men can help each other, and that peace and progress is possible. Your efforts to adopt a human security framework that takes into consideration all aspects of life and the needs of all the countries communities, which will hopefully lead to more enlightened policies at all levels, is immensely valuable. I can only describe it as an affirmation of faith. For this, I congratulate you warmly and assure you of my continued support and the University of which you are a part.
KEYNOTE SPEECH
TERESITA QUINTOS-DELES (P EACE ADVOCATE, FORMER PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER ON THE PEACE PROCESS [PAPP], AND MANAGING TRUSTEE, INCITE-GOV): Recent events that have touched our people to the core highlight the continuing critical importance of the issue of human security in our national agenda. In the last few months, newspaper headlines have gripped the attention and emotions of our people. Our forum today takes place less than a week after the mudslide in Albay in the Bicol region; a day after the ruling on the rape case of Nicole, a Filipina raped by a United States serviceman; and, the week in which the
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House of Representatives scheduled a plenary voting on the proposed changes in our Constitution, without passing through the established legislative process of the Constitutional Assembly resolution. It is a good time to ponder on the meaning of human security where there is so much to remind us on the way the lives of Filipinos are daily being put to risk. It is a challenging time to assert that the welfare, freedom and safety of ordinary people count above all else, and that human security should be the overarching framework of Philippine governance, determining the roles and rights of both citizens and state. In this light, we welcome this bold and what I can only surmise to have been a difficult endeavor by the TWSC, with the support of the Government of the Philippines (GOP)-United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (CPPB) Programme and the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), to expand the discourse towards defining the human security framework in the Philippine context. Todays forum brings to a close a six-month effort that has centered on a policy dialogue series that sought to draw out diverse perspectives of multiple stakeholders on issues of human security. Indeed, the selected topics are potent factors in the definition of human security. We are eager to see the results of different perspectives and issues being melded into a human security framework appropriate to the current Philippine context. In the past, the national government took the lead in taking the theme of human security to the center stage in Philippine governance discourse. Around the time that the 1994 Human Development Report first advanced the concept of human security, the Ramos administration convened the international conference entitled, The Gathering for Human and Ecological Security (HES) in 1995, under the auspices of the Department of Interior and Local Government, then headed by Secretary Rafael Alunan. The gathering was the culmination of the several months of multistakeholder consultations, which resulted in a covenant that embodied a national agenda to protect and sustain the security of people and the environment. This covenant combined with the Social Reform Agenda of the basic sectors1 to constitute the people-empowerment pillar of Philippines 2000. About a decade after the issuance of the HES covenant, however, we wonder how many programs it was able to launch and sustain. Let me share with you more recent efforts undertaken by government to incorporate and institutionalize human security thinking into public policy. It is not publicly known, but a small group composed of representatives from both the security and social clusters of government met and worked closely together as the National Task Force on
Section 3(a) of Republic Act 8425 (An Act Institutionalizing the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Program) provides that basic sectors refer to the disadvantaged sectors of Philippine society. Among these are farmers-peasants, fisherfolks, migrant workers and workers in the formal sector workers, informal sector workers, indigenous peoples and cultural communities, women, differently-abled persons, senior citizens, victims of calamities and disasters, youth and students, children, and urban poor.
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Convergence (NTFC) from mid-2004 to mid-2005. The PAPP served as the chair of the group in order to harmonize perspectives between the armed forces (referred to as the right hand) and the civilian agencies (referred to as the left hand) in defining and making operational a common framework for national security. The NTFC was convened as a result of the convergence effort through the Macapagal-Arroyo governments banner poverty reduction strategy known as Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (Linked Arms against Poverty). This brought the different agencies of government, including the uniformed personnel, to fast track the delivery of social services, livelihood, and infrastructure needs to poor and remote communities including conflict-affected barangays (villages). While the different agencies were learning how to work together and to complement each others mandate and resources on the ground, it became clear during the joint assessment and planning sessions that a divide continued to exist between military and civilian perspectives and paradigms. The language used was indicative; while civilian agencies peppered the reports with the language of winning back, enhancing and transforming, the reporters-in-uniform used the language of eliminating, defeating and annihilating. The NTFC was an attempt to provide a venue for mutual probing on the concepts and beliefs of the uniformed and civilian sectors to bridge and transform perspectives on security imperatives guiding the state. Readings were circulated, which interrogated national defense concepts and strategies and put forward constructions of human security, non-killing society, and even feminism. When the National Security Council (NSC) convened the national strategic planning process early last year, the product of the NTFC came to constitute a major input into the process, with members of the NTFC joining the working group. Unfortunately, we were not able to see the end of the process. An outline of an incipient human security approach to development and peace can be found in chapter on the peace process (Chapter 14) of the 2004-2010 Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP). Chapter 14 sets forth the seven tracks to terminate all armed conflicts and bring the peace process to a just closure. The tracks consist of: 1.Continuing and completing peace negotiations with different rebel groups; 2.Support for local efforts to immediately reduce violence on the ground; 3.Complete the implementation of all final peace agreements; 4.Strengthening and enhancement of programs for the reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants; 5.Rehabilitation and development of conflict-affected areas; 6.A catch-up plan for Muslim Mindanao and an affirmative action agenda for Muslim Filipinos; and, 7.Support for interfaith, tri-peoples dialogue, and communitybased healing and reconciliation.
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I submit that Chapter 14 of the MTPDP constitutes the core of a human security agenda in confronting armed conflict. Sometimes, though, when I reflect on what has been said and done in the past year regarding the targeted defeat of the communist insurgency, I am led to wonder if Chapter 14 has been revised, if not completely deleted, from the MTPDP. However, I cannot fail to mention two recent major initiatives involving international partnerships in the Philippines, which have greatly advanced the discourse on human security. The 2005 Philippine Human Development Report launched in October 2005 carried the theme, Peace, Human Security, and Human Development in the Philippines. In examining the causes and costs of the communist and Moro insurgencies, the report establishes some basic precepts in the understanding of human security. Quoting Arsenio Balisacan of the Human Development Network, the report proceeds from a human development frame that is an understanding that human security is not just freedom from feara defensive concept but also freedom from want and humiliation; that the insecurity of one is the insecurity of all and that, most important, human security is a right in itself. The report provides concrete indices and figures to measure costs and causes of armed conflict and, more importantly, distinguishes between human development and human security. As the report notes, while human development is the process that widens the range of peoples choices, human security means that people can make those choices safely and freely. In other words, human security is the external pre-condition for human development. The second initiative was the seminar workshop on human security as a framework for peace and development in Mindanao, sponsored by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) last September 2006 in conjunction with the visit to the Philippines of former United Nations Commissioner for Refugees and now JICA president, Ambassador Sadako Ogata. The seminar further clarified the concept by delineating the two pillars of human securitythe pillar of protection and the pillar of human empowerment. Professor Solita Monsod of the School of Economics, University of the Philippines, presented the application of a human empowerment index as a weighted average of three sub-indices: social empowerment index, human economic index, and the political empowerment index. The social empowerment index is computed as the average of available indices on education, health, information and communication, and school mobilization outlook. The human economic index, on the other hand, is the average of available indices on income, credit, electrification, and employment. The political empowerment index is the average of available indices on voter turn-out, social expenditures, and women in power. I have taken note of these latter initiatives to highlight the advancements which have been made and the possibilities in the discourse on human security. Human security is already moving beyond the formulation of basic principles and agenda, to designing operational constructions by which one can create, measure, and compare indices of human security, including its causes and costs. Without such operational
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tools, human security is bound to stay on the level of rhetoric and wish list. To make human security a reality, I think it is important to be able to correlate aspects, causes, costs, and benefits in concrete terms, so human security would truly matter in the policy debate as well as in the allocation and direction of public investments. The Policy Dialogue Series 2006, which the TWSC has organized, aims to contribute yet another different layer to the operational understanding of human security. It seeks to clarify and analyze the nexus between human security and development, governance, culture, and violent conflict respectively by looking at particular illustrative cases. We can project a sharpening of understanding on specific stakeholders, actors, processes, institutional arrangements, and mechanisms. Can these features in fact be subjected to concrete measurement and comparisons so that the quality and quantity of social effort can be correlated to the concrete outcomes that can be achieved? As concepts are clarified and operational frameworks defined, we need to draw up more detailed and concrete pictures of what it would be like under a regime of human security. We need to imagine and project the concrete benefits for the greatest number of a working human security policy. This is necessary to make us fully convinced that such an overarching governance framework is possible to achieve. It is also important to convince others that such a framework is possible, and that it is to their own personal best interests. Drawing up concrete pictures will not be all that easy. We still have to deal with the hard details such as: how do we grow the economy so that it could feed, nurture, school, and protect the population that is growing exponentially? How do we provide enough livelihoods that are meaningful, ecological, and profitable? What is the role of the military or the police? Can there be no military? What would be the policy on armed, non-state actors? What will be the meaningful ground among diverse ethnicities and contested identities? What if people continued to vote for the wrong candidates? What if they will not stand up for their rights? What is the policy on terrorism? What about state terrorism? Where does individual human security end and common good begin and vice versa? These are just a few random questions that I have drawn up around the issues that have been tackled by the Policy Dialogue Series. We Filipinos know a lot about our desired development outcomes; we can draw up and formulate the most perfect agenda. In spite of this, we have found a great difficulty in implementing our agenda and, worse, we cannot sustain reform even in the most modest times. Through time, we have learned a little about the relationship between good governance and development outcomes. Without good governance, development outcomes are stalled, resources are wasted, and reform is waylaid. But it seems this is not enough because governance does not exist in a vacuum. Governance can be waylaid by politics, as has been repeatedly the case in this country. Our lesson is that we need to connect the dots between democratic politics, governance, and development outcomes. The important question we need to answer and understand is: what is the politics of human
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security? Who will gain, who will lose? Who needs to act, and who has the power to act? What are the motivations of the people who need to act? Indeed, we need to ask: can the politics of survival engender, nourish, and sustain human security for the Filipino people? What pressures can be borne on those who need to act? How can we draw a consensus among the greatest number on our goal of human security and how to get there? We also need to seek answers to how we can engender democratic politics to enhance the practice of good governance to mobilize social effort at scale and duration to attain human security at the national level. To attain human security for Nicole, for those children who lost their parents in the rubble at the foot of Mount Mayon, for all political activists and media practitioners, to those who live out in the streets. That is the question we need to respond to. Knowing the development outcome, knowing our definition of human security is not going to be enough. To make it happen, we have to understand and analyze it. We have to have a handle on the politics of human security.
JOSEPHINE DIONISIO (DEPUTY DIRECTOR, TWSC, CSSP, UP-DILIMAN AND PROJECT LEADER, TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006): Human security is such an elusive term. We should first locate its context. The end of the Cold War is one important context wherein questions were raised regarding the continuing utility of the traditional conception of security, which revolved around national or territorial security. Proponents of the human security argued that security should be viewed in terms of people and framed in terms of security concerns, which they require in their daily lives. This concept of human security was first introduced publicly in 1994, through the UN Human Development Report. Currently, an on-going debate about the role of the nation-state in promoting human security is one of the key aspects in trying to define the concept of human security. Some argue that nation-states have a potentially limited, if not an impeding, role in some cases, in the promotion of human security. Others, on the other hand, would argue that a strong democratic state serves as the best guarantee for the promotion of human security. The UN Development Report in 1994 argued that the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. The publication Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder identifies three meanings of human security. One meaning revolves around the rights-based approach, which is anchored on the rule of law and, therefore, focused on treaty-based solutions to human security
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concerns. It seeks to strengthen the normative legal framework at the international, regional, and national levels. International institutions are viewed as central to developing new human-rights norms and for bringing about convergence in different national standards and practices. Another meaning of human security comes from the humanitarian conception. It focuses on safety of peoples as the paramount objective behind international interventions. It sees war as one of the principal threats to human security and draws an important moral distinction between the concepts of combatants and noncombatants. It is also of the view that people should be protected from violent threats and that the international community has an obligation to assist them, as in the practices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and other NGOs. It also sees the need beyond the provision of emergency and humanitarian relief in war-torn societies and conflict settings by addressing the underlying causes of conflict and violence. For instance, the United Nations, among many other international organizations, became involved in post-conflict peace-building efforts as a result of formal peace settlements. This perspective also sees the importance of adopting an integrated approach to human security that would simultaneously address the deeper causes of conflict such as economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression. The third meaning that could be associated with human security is derived from the view of sustainable human development that is largely associated with the 1994 Human Development Report where human security is defined in terms of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. This is what is referred to as the postCold War peace dividend. Real threats to human security resulting from diseases such as AIDS [acquired immunodeficiency syndrome], drug trafficking, terrorism, global poverty, and environmental problems are traced to fundamental problems of inequality and lack of social justice in international relations, also referred to as the freedom from want dimension of human security. From these many meanings, the book also identifies the main threats to human security, appropriate mechanisms and processes for dealing with these threats, and the international institutions and governance structures required to address them. In all of these, attention is primarily on the individual human person and their daily lives rather than the state or the abstract definition of national interest, which was inherent in the conventional definition of security as national security. In the Philippines, attempts have been made to define human security. During the Second Annual Conference on Alternative Security in the Asia-Pacific Region in July 1998, then-Senator Wigberto Taada, in his keynote address asserted that human security could not be achieved as long as economic and political sovereignty are curtailed and undermined. Speaking in the context of the economic crisis resulting from the 1998 Asian financial meltdown, Senator Taada contends that the economic sovereignty of the Philippines is undermined as a result of misguided liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. For him, the governments way out of the worsening economic crisis is to attract foreign investors by
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amending the constitution to allow foreign ownership of Philippine resources. In the end of the worsening crisis, only transnational corporations (TNCs) come out as winners. He argues that what is needed is an alternative development paradigm that places the interest of the people before the market requirements of a few TNCs and the prescriptions of a few international financial institutions. His framework of human security may be summed up in six points. First, development and security spring from an ideology of nationalism and not foreign subservience. Second, human security enhances rather than marginalizes life. Third, it treats gross national product growth as a means rather than as an end. Fourth, it encourages grassroots participation in crafting policies and responses that shape their lives. Fifth, human security is not simply freedom from war but based on the resolution of problems. Lastly, human security focuses not on weapons but on basic human dignity and the daily concerns of people. Another attempt to craft a human security framework was undertaken by former Ambassador Howard Dee together with Professor Ernesto Garilao, both of whom represent Tabang Mindanaw. This was prepared specifically as a reaction to the 2005 Philippine Human Development Report. Based on results of the 1992 nationwide consultations conducted by the National Unification Commission, which traces injustice against indigenous peoples2 as the main cause of armed conflict, Tabang Mindanaws human security framework is anchored on justice-based development approach. It is based on the principle that inequities persist due to unresponsive institutions and passive, indifferent, and unempowered citizenry. Therefore, to resolve these problems, there must be local and multisectoral ownership of causes and solutions, and local leaders must be equipped with skills to create new institutional arrangements. The basic principles of this human security framework are the achievement of justice and equity and placing people at the center of governance, which should focus on the removal of unjust structures and situations that foment conflict. Human security of indigenous peoples can be pursued through: (a) community empowerment to strengthen IP organizations and leaders for self-determination and self-governance; (b) development rights for the protection of ancestral domain and for integral human development for them to become self-nourishing; and (c) peace and security for the attainment of the freedoms that come with human security for them to be self-sustaining. In the context of Muslim Mindanao, the peace-building framework is the establishment of Sanctuaries for Peace. Key components would be (1) distributive justice that provides livelihood, water, health and education to reverse the injustices that have caused social marginalization, and (2) restorative justice, which is the
Injustice against indigenous peoples or the Lumads of Mindanao, according to Tabang Mindanaw, comes in three forms: injustice againstindigenous cultural integrity,injustice against their right to economic security,and the injustice of official neglect (A Reaction to the Philippine Human Development Report 2005 by Ambassador Howard Dee and Professor Ernesto Garilao, 25 October 2005, Grand Ballroom, Heritage Hotel, Pasay City).
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process of cultural and spiritual healing and peace education to remove deep-seated religious and cultural prejudices.
Human Security in the Philippine Context: Dimensions, Processes and Mechanisms, and Actors
Based on the four dialogues, human security in the Philippine context would have six interrelated and not mutually exclusive dimensions: 1.Sustainable, non-interventionist development for all based on justice, equity, and nationalism; 2.Meaningful participation of multiple stakeholders in responsive, transparent, and accountable governance; 3.Promotion and protection of cultural diversity, cultural integrity, and self-determination; 4.Promotion and protection of community based on inclusiveness, solidarity, and mutual accountability; 5.Unconditional respect for human rights and international humanitarian law and the commitment to continued demilitarization; and, 6.Commitment to serve the needs and to promote the interests of the most vulnerable and marginalized sectors and to effectively regulate elite interests, whether local or foreign. We would like to highlight that the explicit bias of the proposed human security framework is for the vulnerable. One important dimension of human security based on the dialogues is that human security is not only to provide individual security but, more importantly, community security. In the Philippine context, the concept of fellow being is an important element in how we understand our own personal, individual security. We were able to identify the processes and mechanisms that would allow us to come close to achieve human security. One is the promotion of a stakeholder-based development. In the dialogue on the Philippine mining policy, one of the more important points that were raised was the pursuit for a development that strives to balance economic, environmental, and social needs and recognizes vulnerable and marginalized sectors as major stakeholders in development. There was a debate on how to define national interest as an abstract concept. Although specific communities may not constitute the entire Filipino people, they should be recognized as major stakeholders. The debate also emphasized that we cannot just decide based on the expressed needs or interests of a single community because we need to think about the national interest. What was stressed in that session was the inclusion of the stakes of communities that are adversely affected by the misguided mining policy in the cost-benefit analysis. It is not a matter of putting mining companies in the same field as indigenous peoples, peasants, and laborers as stakeholders.
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The stakes of most vulnerable sectors are largenot because they are vulnerable. They are major stakeholders because you could quantify their stakes and the costs that development intervention entails in their lives. Stakes, costs, and benefits of development should be accounted for in all stages of the development process, with the specific bias for the most vulnerable and the distribution of profits to all stakeholders. More importantly, there should be stronger regulation of actors in the development process, specifically those who hold capital. Another mechanism would be the rule of law, which has two dimensions. One is upholding existing laws, but continuously reforming these laws towards greater justice and equity. We have many laws with good intentions. The problem, however, is that many of these are lost in the implementation process. They distribute or allocate rights in a lopsided manner, which allows too much discretion on the executive to decide on resource use. Another challenge is that many of these undermine the principles of human security. Ensuring the continuity of stakeholder-based leadership and capacity building at the barangay level for democratic and human security-based governance is another mechanism to achieve human security. Continuity of leadership does not refer to the leadership of the local chief executive. Rather, it is having an active citizenry and a conscientious local government bureaucracy, which is able to implement and pursue a plan for development for their local community. The problem is that programs change with the change in leadership. It was stressed that this mechanism is collective and stakeholder-based. To achieve human security, capability building should be done at the basic level of the barangay, as this mediates the individual, the household and the national level. In some cases in the Philippines, the most basic level of decision making may be the tribe or clan instead of the barangay, so this is the level where capacity building should take place. Another mechanism would be to reform the educational system to make way for continued learning for all and from all. All of us need to benefit from the reform of educational system that seeks to enhance solidarity and respect for diversities, specifically from indigenous knowledge and practices. What role would national government have in the promotion of human security? Specifically, the national governments role is to create the enabling conditions to mainstream best practices. There were instances when national efforts emanating from the national level not only conflicted, but also impeded efforts in the local level. National government should allow local autonomy and local self-reliance to flourish to support continued innovation at the level of the local government unit to promote human security-based good governance. Another mechanism would be to promote a culture of solidarity. Philippine society should be more flexible. It should resist homogenization, and instead accommodate different cultures. In such pursuit, the Philippine government should institutionalize the promotion of inclusion rather than exclusion, and the promotion of the idea that it is more important to have
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solidarity amidst differences. It was pointed out in the discussions that we do not need to be the same to be able to achieve unity. The more important thing would be to accept, celebrate, and recognize our differences and have the ability to support an effort even if you do not share the interest of a group. Integrating the perspective of indigenous peoples in policymaking is another mechanism to achieve human security. Policymaking is anchored on the principle that land is life. Thus, human security should cover security of tenure in the ancestral lands, the value of cultural integrity and cultural diversity, and the right to self-determination. These principles apply to all communities, whether of indigenous peoples or not. In violent conflict situations, constructive engagement, which is already being pursued, with de-escalation of violence and saving human lives as end goals, should be given focus. There should be respect for human rights and all humanitarian laws, aside from the provision of relief and other humanitarian services especially to women and children in conflictaffected areas. While the conflict-prevention and peace-building concept of human security in other countries is in the context of post-conflict situation, the Philippine case looks at the pursuit of human security in the context of on-going conflict. The next question would be: who should pursue and act in favor of human security? Again, we have recognized the important role of a responsive government. There should be clearer ways by which sharing of accountability and responsibility between local government units (LGUs) and national government agencies may be achieved to strengthen local autonomy and local self-reliance. National capability in providing policy support and quality assurance in social service delivery should also be strengthened to facilitate the mainstreaming or replication of good practices, as well as critical analysis of bad practices in human securitybased governance. The capacity especially of barangays should be strengthened to engender responsive, transparent, and accountable governance. Participation of vulnerable and marginalized sectors in local governance should be reinforced through the implementation of local sectoral representation, as provided by the Local Government Code (LGC). Second is the role of a vigilant civil society. NGOs, the church, and academic institutions should all be involved in the pursuit of human security by continuing their policy advocacy in different arenas and at different levels. Vigilance should be exercised to promote and protect existing democratic spaces and to create new ones. Academe and civil society organizations including the church should provide expert advice and share resources for all of us to learn from indigenous knowledge and practices and to provide assistance in mediation, documentation and relief services to conflict-affected areas and peoples. Another actor would be organized individuals as active citizens. We need to start voting for accountable governance and to continue, to be vigilant in resisting exclusionary practices. We cannot afford to abdicate our right and responsibility in policymaking and policy implementation.
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The major contribution, for instance, of academic institutions and the church is to harness active citizenship. Accountable governance is not limited to government alone. Accountability and liability from the corporate sector should be regulated and exacted to create conscientious businesses. We need to assert that they have to conduct business in the context of human security. We should also recognize transnational organizations and institutions as actors in our local-national pursuit of human security. Specifically, some of those mentioned would be effectively governing transnational capital, by forging solidarity with other countries and transnational organizations and institutions with similar advocacies. Forging solidarity at the transnational level is an important means to ensure our continued pursuit of human security.
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PROPOSED HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK
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OPEN FORUM
VERONICA VILLAVICENCIO (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PEACE AND EQUITY FOUNDATION): How does the framework respond to the basic definition of freedom from fear? Without some of the points raised, for instance, responding to conflict or mediation, the synthesis sounds like it is a governance framework. Second, where does the state figure in the framework? As Ms. Deles said, there has to be a link that we have to establish between democratic politics, governance, and human security. RAYMUND QUILOP (ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, CSSP, UP-DILIMAN): How does this framework relate to the national security definition of our NSC? It, since the time of President Fidel Ramos, has also defined national security in its broadest sense to include seven elements, which include political stability, economic prosperity, cultural harmony, and the environment, among others. Apart from this, we also have the National Internal Security Plan (NISP), which also talks of the holistic approachthe left-hand and the right-hand approach. This is actually where some of the
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confusion of the Armed Forces is coming from because they themselves are in a debate regarding their proper role to play. Should they just focus on dealing with the armed component of the insurgency, or should they perform the tasks that are supposed to be performed by civilian agencies of the government? How different is our human security framework from that of the national security framework of the government? How does this framework link with, or contradict, the national security framework of the government? DAVID CRUZ (OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF LAGUNA): When we speak about stakeholders or actors, why do we not include the military? Regarding the definition, how does the most ordinary citizen view human security? In terms of the components, social security and the impact of natural disasters were not mentioned. These are more a common experience rather than the conflict with the Left or with the Muslim secessionists. JOSEPHINE DIONISIO: Fear, as expressed in the different dialogues, is defined in different ways and has many sources. A lot of the inputs that we have presented today came from representatives from military, and police officials from the local level. We were not fortunate enough to have representatives from the national level. From their inputs, we strived to show the economic and cultural aspects of human security. We also looked into human security in the context of violent conflict situations. The main thesis that we have drawn from the various dialogues is that the quality of our livesour human securityis a function of the way we govern ourselves. Human security has to be created through the collective effort of the people, which translates to participatory governance. Having said that, how do we address natural disasters? According to Professor Randolph David of the Department of Sociology, natural disasters, from a sociological point of view, are not simply natural. Disasters have socioeconomic indicators. The intensity of natural disasters is again a function of the way we govern ourselves. The state has a lot to say about human security. The problem is how the state implements its security policy. While the state broadens the definition of national security to include all aspects of human security, journalists and activists are being killed and the Chief Executive has articulated to wage an all-out war against dissidents. In the proposed human security framework, an all-out war policy is not an option. The commitment is for continued demilitarization and to never resort to violent or military solutions to conflicts. What is the role of the military? Do we supplant or contradict national security? We believe that we complement national security but certainly there will be aspects that will contradict. With continued demilitarization, the military option is the last resort. The reality, however, is that there a
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holistic human security approach, the dominant frame remains to be violence and all-out war. ZENAIDA BRIGIDA PAWID (CONVENOR, CORDILLERA PEOPLES FORUM): From a perspective of an indigene, when we talk of policy we talk of something that mandates or governs everybody. When we talk of inclusivity, we mean all the stakeholders. But the truth is we are talking of one stake. My reaction to the framework is that it sums up the wish list of marginalized and small groups as what should be the framework of government. We have been saying the same things repeatedly but government is not listening. Unless there is an attempt to redefine the state and governance, the framework is a careless use of convenient words. When you say governance, you include civil society as if it is given that civil society is part of government. It is not and it never is. When you talk of policy, it is as if we are saying that it is the policy that everybody must follow and gives mandate and governs a certain state, but it does not. The policy is the national policy, particularly in the three forums that were held. The responsible government that is supposed to respond to what the basic sectors or the marginalized groups have been saying has never been in attendance. What we have here is a wish list, which we like hearing. How do you get that to the second phase, wherein we will be able to engage with government? Until we are able to re-draw the whole diagram so that you do not have neat circles pointing in the same direction, until we are able to show the reality of the matrix of the power positions and decisionmaking processes, I do not think we will ever go anywhere with that. The second comment is: Can we attempt to demystify the discourse? Instead of promoting concepts such as those in the human development index, can we use the terms that people use? Only when it is translated in the language of the people will we be able to react. Third, the intention of dividing the dialogues into four divisions development, culture, governance, and violent conflictis not to classify the major stakeholders but to make the dialogue more manageable. All of these themes are holistic by themselves. But when you put them in diagrams, it seems like there is an attempt to interrelate all of it and there is a danger of mixing them all up. IWAN SOETHJAHJA (PRESIDENT, HEALTH ALL DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION): The presentation gives us a view of human security in detail, but it is quite fragmented. One of its weak spots is the proposed indicators of those changes. It seems as if we expect that things will happen. We need to handle human security as a whole, and to examine its roots to develop a solution.
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Security is related to all sectors, in the same way that insecurity will be experienced by all sectors. The correction of insecurity and development should take place in all sectors. A holistic response is required and not just directed to one or just a couple of sectors. How do we ensure the security of all sectors? My opinion is to use a common appropriate goal where we can develop mechanisms to achieve it. How do we implement this goal? This positioning of a common goal as the center point of development will produce the proper policies and regulations of government, nationally and internationally. It would also provide direction to all sectors to develop the right living conditions and develop security for all. Which is the most appropriate sector that will push the system forward? After thorough analysis, health development as a system is much better compared to the current system we are using, which is the economic system. Why? Because equity in health is possible compared to equity in wealth, which is never possible. Health is the only sector that is holistic and balanced. Health is the most effective sector to provide guidance to all other sectors. How do we implement this? We are proposing to adopt a bottom-up approach wherein communities are involved in decision-making processes. In this manner, people can act, both to change the system, as well as develop the community to become more self-reliant for the long-term. RAYMUND QUILOP: The human security framework, as proposed, would complement the national security framework if we are looking at national security from a very narrow point of view, which is only composed of the military dimension. However, as I have pointed out earlier, this view of national security is no longer the case. They have the seven elements of national security, which practically includes almost everything that the proposed human security framework here addresses. How different is this proposed human security framework from the governments existing policy since the time of Presidents Ramos, Joseph Estrada up to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo? Again, if you look at the NISP, it is actually very good on paper. The roles of different sectors and actors of government, including civil society, are actually laid out in that plan. In fact, they have a very good specification of how specific agencies of the government, including civil society groups, should come into the picture. Maybe one of the reasons this plan failed to materialize, and as noted in the presentation a while ago, is the failure of implementation. One last point regarding the entire framework: We have laid down here the different actors and the roles we want them to play, and what they should do. However, we failed to lay down how these actors are going to do those things.
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ELOISA ROGADO (DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT [DSWD], REGION IV): Since the national government is a major actor in the human security framework, maybe the TWSC can disseminate this proposed framework to all government agencies as a reference. Then we can tie it up with the existing policy or framework of each government agency and check out areas of complementation in another series of forums. JOSEPHINE DIONISIO: As Ms. Deles mentioned earlier, the discussion should not stop in the level of principles or on the framework itself. I agree with Ms. Pawid that the ultimate test of validity or the workability of this framework is if and when it becomes real for the stakeholders. She is also correct to point out that it should be translated into as many languages as possible so that more people will be able to provide their inputs to make the framework appropriate to the Philippine context. With regard to the added value of the proposed framework, we intend to complement the existing national security framework. Its main contribution is its explicit bias, not only in favor of the marginalized and the vulnerable, but also against foreign intervention. Probably, that is where it would have a ticklish, sensitive relationship with the existing national security framework of government. TERESA ENCARNACION TADEM (DIRECTOR, TWSC, CSSP, UP-DILIMAN): I think the issue is not whether this model complements or duplicates the existing national security framework. The issue, as mentioned earlier, is on implementation. What is the problem? Is it in the definition? Is it in implementation? We had representatives from the police at the local level and from the military from the field who expressed their respective views on this. However, as we have mentioned, representatives from the national government were not able to attend our forums. The national government has different definitions, but is an agreement reached? How will their definition evolve? Did they include the stakeholders in formulating it? What is apparent in the course of the dialogue series is that human security concerns are felt more in the local level. ZENAIDA BRIGIDA PAWID: I would like to see this go to the next level wherein we look at the generated discourses among government and the basic sectors that are in discord. Government is very good in saying that they will consult the basic sectors, but they do not include them when they craft their policies or programs. With regard to the added value of this entire process, I see the University as being the most capable of facilitating a dialogue, for instance, between the marginalized sector or the basic sector or the people from the
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grassroots with the NSC. You cannot get them to dialogue. Since they use different languages, they do not understand each other. They will have different perspectives when they start talking of security. The mediator makes the dialogue possible. The dialogue should not be conducted as a large-scale consultation, but in a focused manner. My recommendation is for the TWSC to continue to bring this proposed framework to where it is most usefulin the grassroots. FLEURDELIZ TORRES (DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND CHILDHOPEASIA): In the beginning of this forum, we asked the usefulness of this proposed framework. Where do we go from here? It was mentioned that the NSC has already done something regarding this. In my view, a framework is really just a framework, unless it is inclined towards policy guidelines. We should not confuse framework with plan of action. We are talking about the framework here, as well as the possibilities of how to implement it. Implementing a plan of action will be the second part of what we are doing. There really is a need for consultation and participation of all the sectors concerned. The reason why the existing national security framework is not really known or acceptable to everyone is because there was really no consultation. JOSEPH LUMANOG (OFFICE OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTIAN SEERES, BUHAY PARTYLIST): In my opinion, it would be good to explicitly emphasize monitoring in the human security framework. In this regard, we can recommend some policies and look forward to implementing them. I think we should institutionalize feedback mechanisms so that we can monitor the actual implementation of these policies. From there, we project what to do in the future. Also, explicit emphasis on monitoring will be very useful in the processes and mechanisms of human security. In so doing, we can hold all stakeholders and actorsnot only the state but all of usaccountable and responsible for our actions. I would like to add a point on the medias involvement. In our very complicated world today, the media has a unique role in bringing into public consciousness the different issues. If we want to make this a dominant discourse not only among government and NGO circles, but also for the general public, we need to bring in the media. I believe the media can help in mainstreaming the human security framework. As a community, we want to be inclusive as far as NGOs, civil society organizations, and private institutions are concerned. Sometimes, as far as the language also indicates, the discourse tends to be esoteric. The common people cannot understand what the human security framework is. The goal must be to mainstream the human security framework so that
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the broader masses can understand and appreciate what we are talking about. REV. DELBERT RICE (KALAHAN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION): I would like to speak from the standpoint of the local community where I come from. People in the community do not expect our town mayor to administer the municipality well. Instead, they expect him to give out scholarships to the children. Meanwhile, civil society is not demanding the congressmen legislate properly. Instead, they are asking the legislators to build bridges, waiting sheds, and health centers without budget for health workers. This is the ultimate confusion and we cannot have security as long as we are so confused. In my opinion, it is civil societys job to demand that public officials fulfill their proper functions, whether in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Provincial Council) or Sangguniang Bayan (Municipal Council). We will never have a good government if civil society does not perform this function. FR. ANTONIO ANCHETA (SOCIAL ACTION CENTER-ILAGAN, ISABELA): I would like to comment on the role of academic institutions in promoting good governance and participation. We can encourage our students to participate in venues for participation that the Local Government Code provides. In doing so, we can gauge whether the academe is helping out in implementing participatory local governance. NERISSA NAVARRO-PIEMONTE (COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS): The framework somehow provides very general concepts and suggests very specific or limiting aspects. For example, one of the mechanisms proposed is the promotion of a culture of solidarity. Is it only solidarity that you would like to promote? Should we not be promoting a culture of human rights and peace? We are speaking here of removing biases and accepting difference. Perhaps we should look into the possibility of building a culture of human rights. Respect for human rights and respect for international humanitarian law should be carried out in the processes and mechanisms. I do not find these in the proposed model. In terms of actors, which actors are doing what? As a final comment, to provide more meaning to this exercise, we should also review or assess the gaps in the implementation of the national security framework. In this manner, we can propose to government that this is another framework. We have a lot of frameworks to digest and to mainstream in planning in government and civil society. Perhaps we can start by looking, first, at what has failed and what we can do to lessen or fill in the gaps. The valueadded of what we are doing is to show government the gaps in the existing frameworks, which contribute to the failure in implementation.
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SERGIO VILLENA (PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE, GOP-UNDP CPPB): Before we talk about implementation, monitoring, and the role of the media, one recommendation is to identify or at least point us to the direction of who will be the champions of this framework both from government and civil society. Will it be Assisi Development Foundation? Will it be the OPAPP or any other security sector agency? Will it be DSWD, or a consortium of government agencies actually involved in the components of human security? GEORGE FACSOY (UPLAND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE): What has been discussed is very ideal. However, human security involves different levels. I agree that we have to reach the grassroots when it comes to the framework. We, in the Cordilleras, are guided by the three principles of ili (home territory), bodong (traditional peace pact system), and paniyaw (indigenous notions of evil). These principles define our security. The problem arises when there are intrusions of policies and frameworks from outside the community. While some say that the LGC is a good starting point, this should be viewed in the context of indigenous peoples communities. This will enrich the framework when we look at it this way. People from government and the academe may understand this language, but people from the grassroots do not have any idea what you are talking about. I hope that you will be able to go to the grassroots, and from there develop a consolidated framework from both government and civil society. Our framework, which uses a top-to-bottom approach, may be good in paper, but eventually we are going to have problems in implementing it in the community level. Laws and policies crafted by the people from Congress are not understood by the people they are supposed to represent. JOSEPHINE DIONISIO: The framework that we presented today is a result not simply of a review of existing literature, but of a process whereby we attempted to involve sectors to incorporate various perspectives. True to our mission as academics, we facilitate sharing and growth of knowledge. We recognize that the proposed framework still needs to be refined further and translated into action. In as far as identifying the champion of this proposed framework, the TWSC as an academic institution can facilitate the dialogue for us to come up with the framework. We engage all of you here to at least consider this framework, and other existing frameworks on human security and national security. We have prepared a resolution for us to recognize the need for a human security framework and its eventual mainstreaming. This is one way of expressing our will to own up to the effort to mainstream the proposed human security framework. The TWSC commits to do its best to further modify the framework based on all the inputs you have raised.
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TOWARDS A HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK 117
TOWARDS A HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

Zuraida Mae D. Cabilo
University Research Associate and Project Coordinator, TWSC Policy Dialogue Series 2006 Third World Studies Center College of Social Sciences and Philosophy University of the Philippines-Diliman
Sharon M. Quinsaat
University Researcher Third World Studies Center College of Social Sciences and Philosophy University of the Philippines-Diliman
INTRODUCTION The changing global environment provided the impetus to re-examine the concept of security. With more emphasis given to the well-being of individuals and communities, the attention of nation-states is slowly being made to shift from national security to that of human security. This, then, necessitates the need to provide a framework for human security that should comprise not only a working definition of human security, but also an account of the process by which individual institutions or nations can adopt and operationalize the concept to a form that is relevant to their own institutional abilities and cultural contexts (Alkire 2002). In the Philippines, both state and society in general have yet to agree on a precise contextual definition of the elusive concept of human security. In the Philippines, the protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation-state remains the guiding principle of the security sector. This is reflected in the governments foreign policy directions, as well as in its defense and economic strategies. In the attempt to contribute to defining human security in the Philippine context, the past four sessions of the Policy Dialogue Series facilitated the discussion by looking at human security in its various dimensions development, governance, culture, and violent conflict situations. The sessions sought not only to come up with an understanding of human security but also determined the roles that state and nonstate actors play in promoting and protecting human security, identified the processes necessary to ensure human security, and put forward proposals to bring about a policy environment that is responsive to the promotion and protection of human security.
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118 DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN SECURITY IN THE PHILIPPINES In the attempt to distill the many meanings of human security in the dialogue series, four principles emerge as the linchpin of this elusive concept: 1) the interconnectedness of the various dimensions of human security, 2) the centrality of land ownership and stewardship as part of human security, 3) the emphasis placed on community security rather than the individual, and 4) the plurality of understanding human security based on local circumstances (see Table1). The results of the discussions affirm the interconnectedness of the various dimensionsphysical, physiological, ecological/environmental, social, economic, and political aspectsof human security. The interventionist perspective to bring about economic development, for instance, impinges not only on the land and territory but also on the local social and political dynamics, wherein traditional institutions such as family, clan, or leadership structures in the community are undermined. The uncertainty then creates a situation where inadequacy in entitlements leads to conflict over ownership and control of resources, which only aggravates the cycle of insecurity. The failure to exercise inclusive governance further exacerbates an already volatile situation. In a natural resource-dependent economy such as the Philippines, land ownership and stewardship is at the core of the sense of security. The value placed on land as a source of security is shared by peasants, indigenouspeoples and other ordinary communities all over the country; they all derive their sense of security from their land as well as their community. The centrality placed on land to define both individual and community security is likewise predicated on the cultural underpinnings of human security in the Philippine context. The indigenous peoples of the Cordilleras, for example, interpret human security as hinged on three conceptsili (home territory), paniyaw (notions of evil), and bodong (traditional peace pact system). For the peasant sector, on the other hand, their way of life as determined by land ownership constitutes the cultural value of land as an expression of human security. The three preceding principles points to the fourth principle of human security, which is also the major contribution of the Policy Dialogue Series 2006 to the human security discourse, which is the emphasis placed on community security. This focus on community rather than the individual was a resonant theme in all the four discussions. While Western constructs focus on the individual, the concept of collective security emerges as the thread that binds the concept of human security in the Philippine context. HUMAN SECURITY: THE PHILIPPINE WAY Across all discussion groups, human security is defined as the condition where peoples physical, physiological, psychosocial, and economic needs are guaranteed. The physical dimension of human security has been defined as the freedom from displacement as a result of development intervention, as well as the conflict that ensues. Others see it as safety from adverse
Economic - Traditional mean and sources of livelihood are not threatened or destroyed - Access and contr of land
The Plurality of Understanding Human Security in the Philippine Context Dimensions of Physical Physiological Psychosocial human security - Freedom from - Health of - Preservation of displacement individuals and community resulting from communities relationships (family, development neighborhood) intervention and/or conflict - Basic services such as education, health, - Safety from natural and housing are disasters available and accessible to - Freedom from vulnerable and Operational violent conflicts marginalized sectors definition in the Philippine context - De-escalation of - Freedom from violence fear - Freedom from uncertainty - Tolerance for diversity - Contentment and internal tranquility
impact of natural calamities, which makes disaster mitigation and management imperative. Other groups view it as the absence of armed strife, which necessitates de-escalation of violence, in conflict-affected areas. Some others define physical security as the condition where women and children no longer experience violence in the household level. This understanding of physical security is closely tied with its psychosocial aspectthe preservation of community relationships and its attendant psychological security characterized by freedom from fear and uncertainty. In multicultural communities, this dimension pertains to respect for differences as an expression of tolerance for diversity. Others characterize psychosocial security as a condition where the vulnerable and marginalized have the ability to access and avail of basic social services. It also encompasses ecological integrity to ensure that future generations are able to benefit from natures bounty that is connected to the physiological health of individuals. The capacity of people to participate in decisionmaking processes, whether as an individual or as a group, constitutes the political dimension of human security. This includes the capacity to preserve the traditional means and sources of livelihood, as well as having the access and control over land, which constitute the economic security of individuals and communities. In short, understanding human security varies depending on realities on the ground and requires different responses, especially in cases of nontraditional threats to human security. It may mean absence of armed or nonarmed conflict (community, household, or individual levels) and the response would be to institute community-based conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. It may mean disaster management and mitigation; it may mean provision of basic social services (education, health, sanitation, water, etc.) to enable citizens, as individuals and as a collective, to participate meaningfully in local development processes. In the case of indigenous cultural communities, it is respect for their customs and traditions without leaving them out in decision-making processes that concerns development of their territories. In this way, community institutions and relations are upheld, which feeds on the communitys sense of security. ACTORS The role of a responsive government, whether at the national and local levels, remains crucial in promoting and protecting human security. An important element of a human security-based governance is sharing accountability and responsibility between local government units and national government agencies, particularly in setting the direction of development as embodied in state policies. In this manner, local autonomy and self-reliance are strengthened while national capability in providing policy support and quality assurance in social service delivery is enhanced. Both levels of government also facilitate the mainstreaming and/or replication of good practices as well as the critical analysis of bad practices. Emphasis is also placed on the need to strengthen participatory processes in the local level by building the capacity especially of barangays and institutionalizing
participation of the vulnerable and marginalized in local governance through local sectoral representation, which is provided for in the Local Government Code. This places transparency and accountability as important elements of human security-based governance. Serving as the check-and-balance mechanism of government, civil society is a rich source of critical and alternative information on state policies, programs, and projects. In playing the role as articulators of the interests of communities, civil society organizations (CSOs) exercise a certain degree of influence in the policy-making process. On the main, CSOs play a critical role in continued policy advocacy at the executive, legislative, and judicial arenas, even at the community level. For instance, the academe is the key to a wealth of organized knowledge that serves as important inputs in the policy-making process while communities, the main stakeholders in the development process, are the primary custodian of resources and source of indigenous knowledge and technologies. Nongovernment organizations, on another front, provide assistance in mediation, documentation and providing relief services to conflict-affected areas and peoples. Transnational activist networks are emerging civil society actors that play an important role in invoking or advocating international norms and mechanisms, particularly on human rights and international humanitarian laws. Another influential actor is the private sector whose activities are widely criticized as impinging on local territories, structures, and institutions. Its role as a source of financial capital and employment for local communities, however, cannot be discounted. In an era where catchphrases such as conscientious business and corporate social responsibility are widespread, the private sector plays an important role as a driver of national and local economic development. PROCESSES AND MECHANISMS The centrality of the community therefore suggests that processes and mechanisms to ensure that human security is upheld should concentrate on the micro level. Given that human security has no conceptual precision, as experts have acknowledged, such that it encompasses a broad range of concerns, it is through the minimal, small-scale but targeted, approach that such expansive meaning of security would be operational. As Zenaida Brigida Pawid of the Cordillera Peoples Forum has asserted, Development works in small, self-contained communities, not the whole province or region. If one has the perseverance to work at that scale then it would work. Professor Herman Joseph Kraft also explained in the Policy Dialogue on Human Security in Violent Conflict Situations that human security has a psychological effect. When you securitize or identify a concern as a security issue, it is afforded with a certain level of urgency and it becomes a priority. This should be how human security is applied within the boundaries of the community.
Recognition and identification of threat
First and foremost, what does the community consider as a threat to its way of life? As long as threats are not recognized or actors fail to perceive these as such, no response would ever be founded on the principles of human security. The important thing to understand is that every community is unique. Situations, interests, lives, and values vary widely even among communities that have the same sociodemographic characteristics. What may be a threat to some may not be the same for others. On the other hand, it may be perceived as an opportunity. Each case is different and no policy based on human security should treat communities homogeneously because they have dissimilar economic, political, social and even cultural dynamics. For instance, although the indigenous peoples (IP) of Cordillera and the fisherfolks in Sorsogon point to the entry of transnational mining companies as a pressing concern, they differ with regard to their perception of its immediate attendant destructive ramifications; for the former, it is displacement and destruction of the integrity of the IP communities and for the latter, it is environmental degradation, pollution, and health problems. In contrast, the case of the peasants of Bondoc Peninsula is rather an aberration if compared to other agrarian reform communities because harassment is not limited to the landlords and their private armies; armed nonstate actors such as the New Peoples Army are also embroiled in the thorny agrarian reform equation. With what the community has identified as a threat, what should be given priority? When people are caught in complex and precarious situations, wherein the problems are multifarious with multiple actors involved, there is a tendency to strike in numerous fronts in the hope of addressing the various origins of the crisis. But the community can be empowered to determine the priorities for action. For instance, in the Bondoc Peninsula, threats can be addressed in the short-term (protection of lives and properties), medium-term (investigation and prosecution), and long-term (genuine agrarian reform). In cases of ensuing violent armed conflicts, the main concern should be to save the lives of the people. Determining what should be given priority is extremely important, especially when resources and time are limited.
Utilizing community-based approaches Deciding on the priority for action
What are the existing means of the community to resolve these issues? Instead of promoting concepts and tools that originate from the national government, at the level of the community, it is best to use terms and procedures that the people are accustomed to. The IPs, for example, have their own peace-building strategies based on cultural practices and traditions, which must be respected. A model based on the ideals of Western liberal democracy may not always work; neither it is superior to what the community
is familiar with. It is therefore best to first explore the different methods and systems that work for the community, before new approaches are imported. POLICY PROPOSALS Each dialogue generated a host of recommendations and policy proposals that collectively resemble a framework for good governance. These range from general propositions such as a review of the Philippine Constitution to more specific and narrow such as improving the capacity of the Joint Monitoring Committee to implement the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. Each underscores the explicit bias in favor of the marginalized and vulnerable. But what policy framework overtly states that it is not on the side of the poor? If the community-oriented conceptualization of human security is adopted, this can limit the scope of policy prescriptions. However, the Philippines already boasts of an abundant and robust body of law on strengthening the power of communities. The problem is with implementation. In addition, community empowerment is not merely legislated because even ironclad canons cannot guarantee this. Equally important is the nurturing of the faith in the communitythat it can protect its people from pervasive threats. A participant captures the core of human security in the Philippine context when he said, Security for us is feeling sense of belonging, being part of the community. Nobody is threatened when he or she is in the community because everyone will take care of you. Outsiders come and teach us individual rights and make us disregard this way of life. REFERENCE Alkire, Sabina. 2002. A conceptual framework for human security. Center for Research on Inequality Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) Working Paper No. 2. United Kingdom: Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.
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PHILIPPINE MINING POLICY: WHOSE DEVELOPMENT COUNTS?1

Are Laws and Terminologies Enough?
One of the more common definitions of human security states that it means protecting people from severe and pervasive threats, both natural and societal, and empowering individuals and communities to develop capabilities for making informed choices and acting on their own behalf.2 What remedy can the people afford for themselves, when their capabilities for making informed choices about their lives and livelihood are believed to be sacrificed by the state in the altars of capital? Should the safety of a community take precedence over the development of a country? Development ensures freedom from want, a component of human security. Yet there are instances, like in mining, when the pursuit of development endangers lives and communities. To solve this dilemma, scholars have come up with phrases like development-human security
1 The data and insights in this brief are based, in whole or in part, from the proceedings of the forum on Human Security and Development (Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman, 27 June 2006), the first installment in the Third World Studies Centers Policy Dialogue Series 2006: Towards a Human Security Framework. This brief was prepared by Joel F. Ariate Jr., University Research Associate, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines-Diliman with the assistance of Karen O. Domingo, Project Assistant of the Policy Dialogue Series 2006. 2 Sadako Ogata and Johan Cels, Human Security-Protecting and Empowering the People. Global Governance 9 (2003): 274.
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nexus, sustainable development, human development, responsible mining and the like. These seemingly erudite terms are uttered by development and human security advocates in the hope of managing the mining mess. Are there really viable ways that people affected by mining can use that would eventually make their lives less encumbered by fear and want? In the face of established national economic policies, laws, and jurisprudence that support large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of the countrys mineral resources as a means to attaining development, can Filipino communities adversely affected by mining still aspire for human security? Whose development counts? Whose human security matters?
The Philippine Mining Policy: Whose Development Counts?
During the Third World Studies Centers policy dialogue on human security and development focusing on the Philippine mining policy held last June 27, 2006, two views were put forward to answer the crucial question: whose development counts? Two speakers in the policy dialogue, Leo Jasareno of the Mining Tenement Division, Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Department of Natural Resources (DENR) and Gerardo Sicat, professor emeritus at the School of Economics, University of the Philippines-Diliman, argued for the promised bounty that a large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of the countrys mineral resources can give to the Filipino people as a whole. The National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) estimated that the Philippines can earn up to PHP 47 trillion (USD 840 billion) in tapping its mineral resources. Add to this is the supposed employment that mining operations can generate. Professor Sicat urged the participants in the dialogue to look at the total net effect that mining can bring to the country. In the forum, supposed safeguards as prescribed by Republic Act 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR) (hereafter the Mining Act), like the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Program, the Final Mine Rehabilitation and Decommissioning Plan, and the Social Development and Management Program were emphasized. The Mining Act is said to ensure fiscal viability of the areas where mining activities will be conducted. If ancestral lands and ancestral domains will be used for mining, royalties will be paid to indigenous peoples (IP). If the concerned IP or indigenous cultural community refuses, then government cannot issue the mining rights or the mining tenements to the interested party. The need for prior informed consent is prescribed in the Mining Act and was further strengthened in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) that provides for free and prior informed consent. It is also argued that the Mining Act also contains am adequate social acceptability clause that guarantees social participation in deciding whether an area can be subjected to mining operations. There are also mechanisms in place to settle mining
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conflicts. The DENR is said to be strictly implementing this provision of the Mining Act and the IPRA. If there is a problem with the current Philippine mining policy, observers say it is the policys restriction on foreign ownership of mines. Professor Sicat argues that for a greater influx of capital, the mining industry must be liberalized to the degree that will allow the free and unrestricted entry of foreign capital. He suggests doing away with the constitutional provision that limits foreign ownership of any business venture for up to 40 percent; the greater the capital, the greater the profit that the nation can gain from mining. The other view, mainly argued by Marvic Leonen, associate professor at the College of Law, University of the Philippines-Diliman, and also of the Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center-Kasama sa KalikasanFriends of the Earth, gives preferential treatment to the communities that are directly affected by mining activities. In arguing for human security, the main weaknesses and limitations of the current Philippine mining policy as embodied by the Mining Act and its IRR were examined, namely: 1. The current mining policy heavily favours foreign capital. Though the NEDA estimates PHP 47 trillion (USD 840 billion) in earnings, Professor Leonen, citing the December 2005 Supreme Court decision in La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc., et al. v. Ramos, et al., argues that only 2 percent of this projected earning will be realized by the Philippine government. This is a result of the Supreme Courts interpretation of the constitutional provision on Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA). Through an FTAA, foreign entities can own a mine for as much as 100 percent. The Supreme Court also ruled in the same case that foreigners that entered into an FTAA are not required to remit 60 percent of their net profit to the government. They are only required to pay the excise tax and royaltiesa mere pittance of what they will get from operating the mines. With this Supreme Court ruling, there is even no need to amend the Constitution just to entice foreign capital. 2. There is no guarantee that exploiting the countrys natural resources will result in economic growth. Empirical data shows that the more a country becomes dependent on mining, the slower its growththe natural resource curse. Slow growth is usually coupled with high wage and high unemployment. The employment generated by mining operations is on a short-term basis. As pointed out by Nina Galang of the Environmental Studies Institute, Miriam College, this argument belies the perception that in mining, the dichotomy is between the economy and the environment. In truth, both entities suffer. 3. What the affected communities think of mining hardly matters. In the end, it is the decision of the secretary of the DENR and that of Philippine president that counts. They even have the power to open up protected areas to mining activities. Local
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government units (LGUs) can interpose a veto, but a veto will have an effect only if the three councils, barangay (village), municipal, and provincial will pass similar resolutions against mining in the areaan act of remote possibility. A participant in the dialogue, Arze Glipo, Sorsogon provincial board member and executive director of Integrated Rural Development Foundation, pointed out another weakness of the current mining policy. The Sorsogon provincial board has been protesting against the mine operating in Rapu-Rapu, a town that belongs to Albay. When a mine spill occurred in the Rapu-Rapu mine, the livelihood of fisherfolks in several Sorsogon towns was severely affected. However, since the towns were not considered part of the primary impact area designated in the Environmental Compliance Certificate issued to the mine in Rapu-Rapu, these towns cannot even claim any compensation. During the dialogue, there was also a very telling example of how authorities can muffle the voices from affected communities. When the DENR representative was asked why the DENR set aside the Rapurapu Fact Finding Commissions report, he replied that there are political decisions to be made regarding the matter. A decision made alone by the DENR secretary. 4. Communities adversely affected by mining can barely seek redress. The Philippines had signed the Bilateral Investment Treaty with most countries whose nationals operate mines in the country. This treaty assures total repatriation of their investment. If an individual or a community sues and wins its case against a foreign mining company, the company can simply pack up and leave the country. With the companys assets safely repatriated, the individual or the community cannot claim any damages. Only by suing these companies in their home countries will it be possible to ask for actual compensation. Add to this the burden that Philippine laws on liability place on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove every instance of negligence of the corporation. Just how many individual and communities has the resources for this kind of protracted legal battle? With an arsenal of lawyer that can exploit many loopholes in Philippine corporate law, these foreign companies can safely come back again in the Philippines, sometimes in the guise of a new or even a Filipinoowned corporation. 5. The current mining policy has no deep regard for the lives disrupted by mining in local communities. To comply with the Social Development and Management Program requirement under the Mining Act, mining companies usually have community relations officers to swathe a veneer of acceptability over its operations. Their main task is to rally support for the mining company in the local community where it is located. Rallying support for the mining company usually results in a community divided between those for and those against the mining
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operations. The division sometimes run within families. Displacement is another crucial issue. For most IP communities their land is their life. Can royalties compensate for a way of life lost? The critical views expressed on the governments current mining policy suggest a number of opportunities for making it more responsive to the plight of the communities affected by mining activities.
Interventions for Human Security
From the dialogue, several courses of action were mentioned in order to address human security in the context of the governments vigorous effort to utilize the nations mineral resources to improve the economy: 1. Carlos Primo David, associate professor at the National Institute of Geological Sciences, University of the Philippines-Diliman calls for the implementation of a Comprehensive Monitoring Plan (CMP). Professor David explains: The first and most salient point of the CMP is that it puts most of the regulatory provisions during the life of the mine. The CMP also actively involves all stakeholders in monitoring through a multibillion monitoring program. In my mind, we should not put all the responsibilities in monitoring operations of mining or any industry to the DENR. The local government, private citizens, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs) should be at the forefront of monitoring all these operations . . . . Professor David pointed out some specific monitoring mechanisms CMP and how these can fill the gaps of our current laws: The CMP also does not only use conventional monitoring protocols but also other measures to detect any pollution or contamination in the environment. We have not adapted any standards for sediments quality and no standards for aquatic habitats assessment . . . . Our existing laws do not permit us to say that the sediments are so dirty and that it should be a basis for fining or closing down the mines . . . . Another measure of contamination that can be used is called biomonitoring . . . . We monitor water quality by looking at life forms it contains.
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Professor David sums up the value of the proposed plan thus: Hopefully, we see the importance of having regulations during and after the mine life through the proposal of the CMP. 2. The government should provide incentives to mining companies based on their records of accomplishment of how they deal with the communities affected by their mining operations. 3. Mining companies should be fully accountable not only during the mines operations, but even after. They should be made to undertake a full clean up and rehabilitation of the mining site. There should be stiffer fines for a mining companys violation of environmental laws. The following policy proposals were mentioned during the course of the discussion: 1. Prior and informed consent of communities is not enough. 2. The role of the national government in granting resource use rights should be re-defined (i.e. lesser role for the national/ executive level) while stakeholders at the local level (e.g. LGUs, communities) should be given greater roles in deciding on resource use. This can be done by mapping protected areas with inputs from the communities and implementing the CMP. 3. Stricter rules for private mining corporations should be implemented to prevent layering of corporations and the participation of nominal parties, and to extract accountability on private companies such as demanding transparency of corporate accounts. 4. Redefining just compensation. The letters of the law can provide human security. There is the trust that a government attuned to justice can give both development and security to its people.
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HUMAN SECURITY, PARTICIPATION, AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 19911 The post-EDSA democratization process is characterized by an increased participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in governance. This provided the impetus for the decentralization project, which seeks to enhance further the capacities of both government and nongovernment actors as participants in the local development process. In the Philippines, the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 enshrines the governance framework of decentralization to strengthen the role of local governments in contributing to the goal of national development. It institutionalizes state-civil society relations. Section 28 of the Code specifically mandates the representation of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in decisionmaking processes in the provincial, municipal, and city levels. The law likewise provides for mechanisms to facilitate participation. Levels of participation, particularly in the local level, vary from local initiatives, referendum, to representation of NGOs and peoples organizations (POs) in local development councils and bodies. The forum was attended by representatives from local government units (LGUs), CSOs, and the academe in an attempt to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and experience on how best practices in local governance promote and protect human security, particularly of marginalized sectors. Questions on the governance-human security nexus were addressed, focusing on the Local Government Code of 1991 to see how existing structures and processes can be strengthened further to ensure meaningful participation, especially of marginalized sectors in local governance.
The Local Government Code as a Tool to Ensure Human Security through Participation
Responsive and good governance as a means of ensuring human security entails not only the provision of basic social services to local constituencies. An equally important dimension is the opportunity for various development stakeholders, specifically the marginalized sectors, to play vital roles in local development processes. In a decentralized context where there is coresponsibility between governance institutions at the national and local levels (Work 2002 quoted in Mani 2005), enhancing the capabilities of both local government officials and civil society actors is given prime importance for two reasons. First, capability enhancement gives local officials and civil society participants the opportunity to understand and practice participatory processes in local development planning. Second, this enables CSOs to
The data and insights in this brief are based, in whole or in part, from the proceedings of the forum on Human Security and Governance (Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 25 July 2006), the second installment in the Third World Studies Centers Policy Dialogue Series 2006: Towards a Human Security Framework. This brief was prepared by Zuraida Mae D. Cabilo, University Research Associate, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines-Diliman and Project Coordinator of the TWSC Policy Dialogue Series 2006.
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participate in local development processes and exact transparency and accountability from local executives. The LGC goes further than mere participation in policymaking processes; the Code upholds representation especially of underprivileged groups to make possible claim-making. The existing policy environment is unambiguous in its bias for participation of various stakeholders, particularly of disadvantaged sectors, in decision-making processes that impact on local development. The National Integrated Protected Areas System law, Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, and the 1998 Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act are among many legislations that include participatory governance mechanisms. The LGC, however, contains the most innovative stipulation allowing for local sectoral representation. It facilitates and provides for mechanisms of civil society participation, particularly in the context of increased demands for transparency and accountability in local governance. One mechanism in the Code is the inclusion of NGO representatives in the Local Development Council (Section 107b), which is tasked to chart the comprehensive multisectoral development plan. This provision, along with many others (Sec. 35, 106) not only recognizes NGOs and POs as partners but more importantly opens the decision-making process to civil society representatives of marginalized sectors. Sectoral representation is a means of ensuring that perspectives of various sectors are taken in to account in local legislations. Apart from a constitutional mandate for local sectoral representation (Art. 10, Sec. 9; Art. 18, Sec. 15-16), the LGC authorizes specifically for at least three representatives from the women sector, workers sector, and a third sector, which may be determined by the local legislative council (sanggunian) (Sections 41c, 446, 457, and 467). While participation and representation is enshrined in the LGC, it remains unrealized in majority of LGUs. Concerns of marginalized sectors remain centered on human security threats. Local officials, who are primarily politicians instead of public servants, feed on the electorates desire for short-term solutions to community problems instead of investing in more sustainable and viable undertakings. The existing personalitybased political culture in the Philippines is identified as the culprit in the failure of local government to respond to the needs of their more disadvantaged constituencies. This results to a mismatch of programs implemented and the needs of the communities. Exacerbating this is the incoherence and conflict between national and local policies. These myriad of factors, when put together, aggravate the insecurity of marginalized sectors despite provisions for representation.
Policy Proposals
The LGC as a framework affords flexibilities for LGUs to function. It is actually a matter of creativity of the local government officials to provide a whole range of options to its citizens. The democratic space and the existence of a vibrant civil society present a ripe context for genuine participation and representation to flourish. In response to the challenges
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posed by the existing political and electoral milieu, the passage of the Local Sectoral Representation (LSR) bill is being advocated continually. According to SALIGAN, an NGO and a consistent advocate of LSR, LSR seeks to introduce local governance reforms, politico-electoral reforms, and social reforms. The bills salient features include: 1. Three seats reserved for marginalized sector in the local sanggunian, which is consistent with what the Philippine Constitution mandates. The proposed provision on the third sector, which may come from various sectors2, is that the inclusion of local sectoral representatives for 4th, 5th and 6th class municipalities shall not increase the number of seats in the sanggunian as presently provided for by law, unless an LGU passed a resolution stating that there are available funds for such additional seats. 2. Organizations or coalitions, not individuals, are candidates for the sectoral representative seat. 3. All registered voters are entitled to vote for each of the three positions reserved for the sectoral representatives. 4. The seat of the elected sectoral representative shall be forfeited if s/he changes his/her organization affiliations during his/her term of office. 5. The bill fills the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in case a permanent vacancy occurs. (SALIGAN 2006) At present, the LGC only identifies the sectors that may be elected to the seat in the council and not how representatives will be elected. The Commission on Elections, thus, must issue a guideline for the election of sectoral representatives. However, Republic Act 7887 (amending the Synchronized Elections Law of 1991) implies that the issuance of said guidelines must be in accordance with an enabling law, which is yet to be enacted by Congress. Another striking proposal is to align local and national government plans and programs. The conflict between the national and the local becomes more pronounced in cases where national government policies impinge on the territorial jurisdiction of local governments and adversely impact local communities. Section 3 (k) of the LGC stipulates that [t]he realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through improved coordination of national government policies and programs and extension of adequate technical and material assistance to less developed and deserving local government units. While this plan alignment may be prescribed by law, reality shows that in majority of LGUs, national policies exercise supremacy over local ordinances.
The following may be considered for the seat for the third sector: indigenous peoples and cultural communities, differently-abled persons, senior citizens, victims of calamities and disasters, children, and urban poor, or any other sector as may be determined by the local council concerned.
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In the few instances where local government has continuously asserted territorial, administrative, and management authority, it requires not only innovation and continuity but also the openness of local officials to recognize civil society actors as part of governance. Completing the devolution of services such as education facilitates the process for LGUs to be innovative. Citing the case of Naga City, Wilfredo Prilles Jr. related that the local government was able to respond to the needs of the education sector in the city through its local school board by working around with what the LGC provides, instead of waiting for the Department of Education in the national level to respond to their needs. Hiring and awarding of performance incentives were based on local mechanisms with its financial requirements drawn from the budget of the local government. Such practices and mechanisms are harnessed with the full delegation of authority at the local level. Greater decentralization and participatory governance require overhauling existing political culture and practices. This includes the promotion of voting based on track record, which is made possible through voters education, inclusion of a standard of quality of service for aspirants, and support for management training for LGUs especially at the barangay level. The role of civil society in instigating these changes becomes more emphasized. However, stress is placed on civil society to readily take the cudgels and incessantly exact accountability from local officials. A third proposition is to elevate the standards for those running for public office. This electoral reform complements the proposal to improve the track record of candidates.
References
Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act 7160). Mani, Devyani. 2005. Strengthening Decentralized Governance for Human Security. Paper presented in the UNDESA/UNCRD Workshop on Decentralization, Poverty Reduction, Empowerment and Participation, International Conference on Engaging Communities, 14-17 August, Brisbane, Australia. Accessed through http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/ documents/UN/UNPAN021098.pdf on 13 June 2006. SALIGAN. 2006. Local Sectoral Representation: Unfulfilled Mandate. Presented by Atty. Edna Maguigad during the Third World Studies Center Policy Dialogue Series 2006 on Human Security and Governance in 25 July 2006 at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City.
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A VERY LONG ENGAGEMENT: SECURING SOVEREIGNTY AND CULTURAL INTEGRITY FOR IPS1 To be secured means to have your territory. You must be sovereign in your territory. And by being a sovereign community in your territory, you have the right to enact ordinance or policy within your territory (which) the state must respect. Gregorio Andolana, author, Indigenous People Rights Act
Introduction
Almost a decade after the passage of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), the indigenous peoples continue to wage the struggle for the recognition and protection, not only of their rights but their identity and way of life. Abject poverty and the lack of basic structures and services are staple features of everyday life in these communities, manifestations of a system of governance that tends to cast a blind eye on the needs of the marginalized. Indigenous peoples (IPs) remain skeptical whether legislation really serves their interests, or wonder how far IPRAs hopeful promises can gradually deliver them from political exclusion, to representation and recognition. These concerns cluster around a broader problematique: Can there be a Philippine state that accommodates the diversity of indigenous peoples and cultures? Further unraveling the knot will show that, on one hand, indigenous peoples have their own culturally imbedded notions of human security and cultural integrity, which are intimately tied to the land and their territory in general, and which emphasize harmony and a sense of community. The entire notion of a state (with its corresponding systems and structures), let alone policy, seems quite remote from the indigenous worldview. How can policy then be reconciled with indigenous culture? On the other hand, the recognition of the IPs and their rights cannot happen in exclusivity. It is imperative that IPs participate in the system, despite the hegemonic politics of the elite, if they wish to have a stake in the formulation and implementation of policies that sustain and protect their culture.
IPRA and Human Security
The passage of R.A. 8371, also known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, was a pivotal event in Philippine legislation. IPRA
The data and insights in this brief are based, in whole or in part, from the proceedings of the forum on Human Security and Culture: Towards Strengthening Cultural Identity and Diversity (Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 29 August 2006), the third installment in the Third World Studies Centers Policy Dialogue Series 2006: Towards a Human Security Framework. This brief was prepared by Trina Joyce M. Sajo, University Research Associate, Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines-Diliman, Quezon City.
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seeks to protect lives, livelihoods, and communities, as it enshrines the fundamental rights of IPs, in particular: 1. Rights to ancestral domains and lands; 2. Rights to self governance and empowerment; 3. Social justice and human rights; and 4. Right to cultural integrity.2 These basic rights are implicated in the provision of security. And security, IPs believe, is tantamount to or at least a parallel to land security. For IPs, land is life. Yet, as expressed by Brigida Pawid, convenor of the Cordillera Peoples Forum, (N)obody really understands when we say, Land is life. (It) does not refer to a land title, either free patent, CADT, PCT, or OCT. It means that when IPs are taken out from the land, were dead. Have the land title without the people, it means nothing. Thatis supposedly the core or essence of IPRA. The passage of IPRA is only an initial thrust to its complete and sustained fulfillment. Almost ten years after its inception, IPs still experience the debilitating conditions that IPRA intends to alleviate or protect them from. This is brought on by the lapses in the national policy. IPs are saddled with recurring problems such as insurgency, securing of ancestral domain rights, or the intrusion of capitalist ventures in their communities, for national policy falls short of creating a policy environment that accommodates, complements and supports their beliefs, practices, and social dynamics. In the final analysis, IPRAs provision for security seems mere lip service.
From Substance to Implementation: Gaps in the Ancestral Domain Law
Gregorio Andolana, one of the authors of IPRA, pointed out the main problem in national policy: the original purpose of the law, which is to recognize and respect the rights of the IPs on their ancestral domains, did not materialize. Such underdevelopment has spilled over to other laws: In 1991, when we started debating the National Indigenous Peoples law, we made sure that recognition of cultural communities is incorporated. Yet, when it was implemented, it never recognized the right of cultural communities. Andolana also mentioned how RA 7660 in the Local Government Code only ensured in principle the representation of cultural communities in the legislative body. In addition, problems in implementation beset the Organic Act in Muslim Mindanao, which mandates an autonomous
Coalition for Indigenous Peoples Rights and Ancestral Domains. Guide to R.A. 8371. Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). (Quezon City: CIPRAD, 1999), p.4.
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legislative body to enact the ancestral domain law within its jurisdiction. Until now, the mandate remains on paper. The lapse in implementation stems from a more profound problem of substance. The certificate of ancestral domain titles (CADT), the core of IPRAs provisions, was supposedly the foremost representation of sovereignty and cultural integrity. Yet the nuances of definition have posed implications in policy. As Andolana explained: We must understand that the ancestral domain law does not grant title. It only ratifies the native title that the indigenous people own from time immemorial, even before the Republic of the Philippines was created. The CADT is just a ratification, a formal recognition of the state that there exists an ancestral domain. From the IPs perspective, CADTs are glossy words over a hard reality. The issuance of CADTs, and in general IPRA, fails to provide them genuine ownership of their land. Part of the problem is because the law is patterned after the ancient Regalian doctrine, which accords the state power over all lands within its jurisdiction. Implicitly, such power makes the state capable of ignoring or disregarding indigenous political systems that sustain the IPs and their culture. Thus, conflicts such as the patents issued by the Bureau of Lands ensue and are never completely resolved. Rather than a duty-bound proviso, sovereignty and cultural integrity for IPs are mere rhetorics of the state. In effect, they are denied the right to their territory, a strong concern that resonates among IPs.
Engaging the Power Structure
In principle, IPRA, as expressed by one IP leader, is supposed to strengthen sovereignty and cultural integrity. A re-evaluation of IPRA according to the knowledge and understanding of IPs is imperative. Yet, before IPs can even step into the arena of policymaking, enabling mechanisms in the policy environment should be installed. One important policy recommendation that emerged from the forum was to grant full autonomy to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as an independent constitutional commission that is not beholden to any form of partisan politics. The NCIP should be restructured such that it would function effectively, and look upon the cultural communities with a view to substantively address their needs and providing palliatives to poverty and other social problems. Engaging the power structure, particularly in the level of policymaking, could be highly contentious, given the competing interests of different actors involved. Thus, to complement the institutionalization of an authentic legislative body, a form of IP leadership with strong integrity should take a foothold in state policy. IP leaders in the state should have the unwavering commitment and sense of responsibility to their people, if they are to genuinely represent the interests of the IPs.
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Zenaida Brigida Pawid, Convenor of Cordillera Peoples Forum, lamented how struggle has become a reality for many IPs on the ground because the policies are the outcome of power structures in this country. Indeed, securing cultural integrity and sovereignty for and by the IPs is as arduous as propelling through the meandering waters of policymaking. By strengthening indigenous peoples participation from the ground up, the task promises to be a very long yet worthwhile engagement.
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REFORMING THE JOINT MONITORING COMMITTEE1 The Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) is the first of four substantive agenda on the peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF). The implementation of the agreement, signed in 1998, has been stalled for several reasons, the most pressing of which is the questionand recognition oftwo sovereignties in some of the Agreements provisions. This sensitive issue has been raised several times. The common argument is that by granting the CPP-NPA-NDF the right to prosecute human rights violators, the political authority of the Philippine government, enshrined in the Constitution, is undermined. Finally, in April 2004, both parties agreed to operationalize the CARHRIHL with the formation of the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC). As of August 2004, more than 100 complaints of human rights violations have already been filed against the GRP in the JMC, while five cases were lodged against the NDFP, particularly the NPA. However, the JMC being an interim body tasked only with receiving and investigating reports or complaints of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as initiating recommendations or requests for the implementation of the CARHRIHL, has no executory powers and operates on consensus, which could be debilitating. It should be clear that the JMC is a monitoring body, not an implementing one. While the setting up of the JMC is a welcome development, the full realization of CARHRIHL is still contingent upon the sincerity of both parties to the agreement. There are apprehensions that the CARHRIHL is still at the mercy of the peace process, such that new tensions or disagreements between the two parties in issues like the terrorist-listing of the CPP-NPA and Jose Ma. Sison or the next agenda of the peace negotiationssocial and economic reformswill hamper the agreements implementation. CARHRIHL is generally viewed as a peacebuilding tool or a measure of goodwill and confidence-building to create a favorable climate for peace negotiations in the language of the Hague Joint Declaration of 1992. As a result, the implementation is held hostage by the constant wrangling and realpolitik of the two parties leading to unremitting suspension of talks. The talk-and-fight mode of peace negotiations has at
1 The data and insights in this brief are based, in whole or in part, from the proceedings of the forum on Human Security in Violent Conflict Situations (Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 03 October 2006), the fourth installment in the Third World Studies Centers Policy Dialogue Series 2006: Toward s a Human Security Framework. This brief was prepared by Sharon M. Quinsaat, University Researcher, Third World Studies Center, University of the PhilippinesDiliman with the assistance of Benjie DC Zabala, Project Assistant of the Policy Dialogue Series 2006.
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least produced CARHRIHL, but can the modalities of the agreement be disengaged from the vagaries of conflict or the pursuit of peace? It seems that both parties are contented with the inking of CARHRIHL but the carrying out, just like the peace talks, remains a cul-de-sac. In their study Breaking ground on bloody ground: A legal inquiry into the CARHRIHL between the GRP and the NDF, Rosselynn Jaye dela Cruz, a lawyer for the Bondoc farmers, and Rachel Anne Sibugan suggested that if full benefit is to be derived from the CARHRIHL then it is imperative that it be viewed independent[ly] of the peace agenda (delaCruz and Sibugan in Garcia 2006). It must be, first and foremost, an instrument to seek and exact accountability from the Philippine government, particularly its armed forces, and the CPP-NPA-NDF on the application of the principles of human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law in the context of armed conflict. Besides, just like the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols thereafter, CARHRIHL was forged to humanize the conflict by mitigating the violence on the ground. The question to ask now is: how can the JMC respond to complex political emergencies such as the case of the Bondoc Peninsula if, in the first place, it has no teeth? All the JMC can do is deliberate on a filed complaint, try to reach a consensus, and then throw it to the party concerned for further investigation (Garcia 2006). If the rights of the farmers are abused by both the military and the rebels, how can we implement provisions of CARHRIHL, and not merely monitor violations? With all the inadequacies, flaws, and inefficiencies in the Philippine judicial system, at least it operates legally and openly. If the agencies are unresponsive, there are procedures to hold them accountable. What are the NDFPs implementing mechanisms of the CARHRIHL? These must be clarified. As human rights lawyer Soliman Santos Jr. argues, there should be at least some fair idea of NDFP implementing mechanisms without prejudicing its security. This need for a fair idea may be even greater when it comes to the NDFP side of investigation, prosecution and trial of persons liable for violations of HR and IHL. This means having a better idea of the judicial system (both its substantive and procedural aspects) of the NDFP or what it calls the peoples democratic government so that complainant victims of HR or IHL violations would know how to lodge, monitor and follow up their cases in that system, if they prefer. Since the NDFP binds itself through the CARHRIHL to be accountable for HR and IHL violations by its forces, the people or at least concerned people have the right to know the NDFPs accountability mechanisms beyond the JMC. (Santos 2004) There are structural limitations of the JMC. An Achilles heel is the principle of consensus, which is almost impossible to achieve when the two camps are antagonistic to each other. It is a formula for deadlock,
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especially if the parties are not cooperating to address the needs of the complainants, and instead protecting their respective interests. This was demonstrated by how both the Philippine government and the CPP-NPANDF used the JMC to disseminate their propaganda on the Bondoc case. Danny Carranza of the PEACE Foundation shares the experience of the farmers: there appears to be no effort to investigate the validity of the complaints the JMC did not function effectively as expected. Thats the reason farmers do not push through with their complaints because they think that nothing good will ever come of it. Instead, it would just contribute to increasing the propaganda of the Left against them. (TWSC and UNDP 2006) The two observers from human rights organizations for each party could partly remedy the impasse, but this is predicated on their independence, which may be questionable if they were handpicked and appointed by the GRP and CPP-NPA-NDF. The JMC is also drowned by complaints which are not connected, in any way, with the armed conflict between the GRP and the CPP-NPANDF. These include demolitions of urban poor communities, labor disputes, and validity of tax ordinance. Some are not even covered by the date of effectivity of the CARHRIHL since the incident happened before August 7, 1998. Both camps should attempt to further educate the public on CARHRIHL and the role of the JMC. The JMC is a big step as far as the peace negotiation between the GRP and CPP-NPA-NDF is concerned, but as the experience of the farmers of Bondoc Peninsula has shown, it is not enough. If the JMC is mired in the politics of the negotiation, then the pursuit of human rights will be as elusive as that of peace. If the JMC does not wield power and is confined to an investigative organization, then like the Commission on Human Rights, it will just be another bureaucratic agency. Finally, while working towards taking greater accountability from both the GRP and the CPP-NPA-NDF through the strengthening of the JMC, the government and its instrumentalities must provide for solutions to the impending needs of the people on the ground. The Task Force Bondoc Peninsula of the Bondoc Inter-Agency Committee (IAC), lodged at the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process should function as both governance, and relief and rehabilitation mechanism. This would entail, on the one hand, the constitution of the IAC beyond being an ad hoc body and on the other, delegating the necessary powers to muster resources for the concerns of the people in the Bondoc Peninsula.
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Garcia, Robert Francis. 2006. Perspectives: Will an agreement on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law forged between governments and nonstate actors promote human security?. Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 21(1): 189-195. Santos, Soliman Jr. 2004. Having a CARHRIHL and implementing it too. Available from http://www.justpeace.net.ph/index_files/page0020.htm. Accessed 8 December 2006. Third World Studies Center (TWSC) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 2006. Proceedings of the Policy Dialogue on Human Security in Violent Conflict Situations held on 3 October 2006 at the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City. Unpublished.
References
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
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THE PHILIPPINE MINING ACT: WHOSE DEVELOPMENT COUNTS?
Resource Persons
1. Leo L. Jasareno Regional Director Mines and GeosciencesBureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources Tel. 9209131 Marvic M.V. Leonen Vice President for Legal Affairs, University of the Philippines Associate Professor, UP College of Law Carlos Primo David Associate Professor National Institute of Geological Sciences, University of the Philippines-Diliman Tel. 9243077 Gerardo Sicat Professor Emeritus School of Economics, University of the PhilippinesDiliman
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Melody Asia Office of Rep. Riza HontiverosBaraquel Tel. 9315210 Email: mjasia9@yahoo.com Jessica Reyes Cantos Office of Rep. Lorenzo Taada III Tel. 9316478 Email: jeckcantos@gmail.com Carla Pingul Office of Sen. Jamby Madrigal Tel. 5526703 Email: Carla_122002@yahoo.com Nenita Quilenderino Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Tel. 6360701 Panelo Ambas Office of the Mayor Municipality of Mankayan, Benguet Mobile No.: (0918) 6226785 Luna Eulogio Manrique Municipal Planning and Development Office Municipality of Boac, Marinduque Mobile No.: (0917) 9947245 Meynardo Solomon Mayor Municipality of Boac, Marinduque
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Participants
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Government
1. Acmad Macarimban Office of Rep. Joel Virador Tel. 9316166 Email: kadumacar@yahoo.com
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Lakambini Magdamo Policy and Planning Development Office Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Tel. 6360701 to 06
17. Pio Escarcha SALMON (Sorsogon) Tel. (056) 3111274 18. Adonis Bringas Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance Mobile No.: (0917)8031405 Email: kwatogbutchog@yahoo.com 19. Pablo Abuyen Community Volunteer Missioner (Benguet) Mobile No.: (0906) 2770914 20. Greg Ratin Defend Patrimony (Negros Occidental) Mobile No.: (0910) 8844367 Email: pdg_ngo2006@yahoo.com 21. Marina Rate-Manuel Tanggol Kalikasan Mobile No.: (0922) 8045633 Email: arnierate@yahoo.com 22. Pablo Rosales Kilusan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya Mobile No.: (0927) 4033825 Email: pab_ros2002@yahoo.com 23. Maxine Tanya Hamada INCITE Gov Mobile No.: (0917) 8043983 Email: incitegov@yahoo.com 24. Paula Tanquieng Fair Trade Alliance Tel. 3723924 Email: paulatanquieng@yahoo.com 25. Jo Ocampo Kilusan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya Mobile No.: (0916) 4747605 Email: kpd@pldtdsl.net
10. Anna Pacete ODASU Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Tel. 6360701 Local 853 Email: annapacete@yahoo.com
Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)/Peoples Organizations/ International NGOs/Church

11. Nikki Delfin Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute Mobile No.: (0918) 2698802 Email: gzopeace@admu.edu.ph 12. Oscar Adiova PhilDHRAA Mobile No.: (0928) 7094564 Email: oradiova2000@yahoo.com 13. Ricardo Saturay AGHAM Mobile No.: (0927) 9556940 Email: rmsatural@agham.org 14. Shirley Bolaos Coastal Core (Sorsogon) Mobile No.: (0917) 558276 Email: corecoastal@yahoo.com 15. Mauricio Lagsit ALPAS (Sorsogon) Tel. (056) 2112340 16. Alex Jasarino ALPAS (Sorsogon) Tel. (056) 2112340 Email: ajasarino@yahoo.com
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26. Merlinda Calubaquib Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM)-Nueva Vizcaya Mobile No.: (0920) 9025403 Email: merlinacalubaquib@yahoo.com 27. Lito Aonuevo Action for Economic Reforms Tel. 9275932 Email: ctanonuevo@pldtdsl.com 28. Patrick Adams San Juan PRRM Tel. 3712107 Email: patricksanjuan@yahoo.com 29. Geiah Homeres Centro Saka Incorporated Tel. 9296211 Email: centrosaka@yahoo.com 30. Beau Baconguis Greenpeace Tel. 4347034 Email: beau.baconguis@ph.greenpeace.org 31. Jo Gamba Integrated Rural Development Foundation Tel. 4265518 Email: irdf@info.com.ph 32. Boy Nuera NGO Forum on ADB Tel. 9214412 Email: bnuera@forum-adb.org 33. Thanh NGO Forum on ADB Tel. 9214412 Email: thannto@gmail.com 34. Arze Glipo Integrated Rural Development Foundation Tel. 4365518
35. Joselito Gonzales PRRM-Marinduque Mobile No.: (0919) 4422948 36. Eileen Matute PRRM-Marinduque Mobile No.: (0918) 9385707 37. Ingrid Gorre Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center-Kasama sa Kalikasan (LRC-KsK) Mobile No.: (0920) 9281317 Email: i_gorre@yahoo.com 38. Paul Escober Mobile No.: (0906) 8689147 39. Sr. Eden Orlino Diocesan Social Action CenterBayombong, Nueva Vizcaya Mobile No.: (0917) 5680231 Email: edenorlino@yahoo.com 40. Hanneke Van Eldik Thieme 11.11.11-Belgium 41. Daphne Villanueva Christian Aid Tel. 4367615 Email: dvillanueva@christianaid.org 42. Jessica Bercilla Christian Aid Tel. 4367615 Email: jessicabercilla@gmail.com
Multilateral Institutions
43. Mohammed Nasimul Islam Asian Development Bank Tel. 6325864 Email: mnislam@adb.org
146
44. Serge Villena GOP-UNDP Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Project Management Office 45. Pio Fuentes GOP-UNDP Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Project Management Office
Academe (Students)
50. Allan Sobrepea Mobile No.: (0915) 9325730 Email: allan_grand@yahoo.com 51. Rita Pawestri Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI [Indonesian Institute of Sciences]-Jakarta, Indonesia) 52. Tri Sambodo Maxensius LIPI-Jakarta, Indonesia 53. Patagan, Geville Hope UP-Diliman 54. Marasigan, Lea UP-Diliman 55. San Juan, Judy UP-Diliman 56. Abulencio, Arthur UP-Diliman 57. Carasco, Arla UP-Diliman 58. Mendoza, Mary Jane UP-Diliman 59. Fulong, Paulo UP-Diliman 60. Lamug, Guiller Kristoffer L. UP-Diliman 61. Evangelista, Angelica UP-Diliman 62. Altez, Aaron UP-Diliman 63. Flores, Diana UP-Diliman
Media
46. Beverly Natividad BusinessWorld Tel. 5339910 Email: bevnatividad@yahoo.com
Academe (Faculty)
47. Ma. Ela Atienza (Moderator) Associate Professor Department of Political Science University of the PhilippinesDiliman 48. Alejandro Ciencia College of Social Sciences University of the PhilippinesBaguio Mobile No.: (0916) 4158800 Email: ali_ciencia@yahoo.com 49. Nina Galang Environmental Studies Institute, Miriam College Tel. 4364736
147
64. Acorda, Tricia UP-Diliman 65. Collado, Remedios M. UP-Diliman 66. Detera, Christine Joy C. UP-Diliman 67. Taedo, Maureen UP-Diliman 68. Santos, Maan UP-Diliman
99. Cruz, Anna Francesca L. 100. Requiso, Daryl Alvin T. 101. Tiarrizon, Jionel M.
Students of Philippine Contemporary Social Issues

69. Pelare, Phoebe Kristina 70. Vargas, Ma. Jemilee B. 71. Villarey, Mary Joy C. 72. Co, Jamie 73. Nuguid, Cyril Ney D. 74. Caraan, Melissa Nadine C. 75. Masallo, Phoebe Dawn S. 76. Palileo, Nyssa Elline M. 77. Navarrete, Anna May L. 78. Ramos, Nina R. 79. Gamboa, Cielo 80. Abling, Gretel 81. Wong, Harrell 82. Dalida, Monique 83. Del Valle, Francis 84. Espejo, Magerie Ann 85. Navarro, Irish Venerie 86. Elises, Jose Carlo 87. Tabil, Jeffrey 88. Agustin, Mark 89. Marquez, Mark 90. Guevarra, Veron 91. Tuazon, Joy Odessa 92. Ente, Jullien 93. Gabriel, Adrian E. 94. Santos, Patrick G 95. Concepcion, Dan 96. Atencio, Ma. Bernadette R 97. Moraa, Janna Grace M. 98. Baconguis, Josette Ann
148
HUMAN SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE: ACCESS TO PARTICIPATION OF MARGINALIZED SECTORS UNDER THE 1991 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
Resource Persons
1. Francisco Magno, PhD. Department of Political Science De La Salle University Manila Email: magnofra@gmail.com Atty. Edna Maguigad Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN) Email: ednamaguigad@yahoo.com Wilfredo Prilles Jr. Local Government of Naga City Email: wbprilles@gmail.com
5.
Robert Limbago Office of Representative Enrico Aumentado Tel. (02) 687 4048 Email: tqp_premier@yahoo.com Felipe Hernandez Office of Representative Renato Magtubo Email: phi_bmp@yahoo.com Pauline Cardenas Office of Representative Eulogio Magsaysay Email: ave_partylist@yahoo.com Ryan Barcelo Makati Social Welfare Department Email: pingbarcelo@yahoo.com Benyl Camposano Makati Social Welfare Department Email: lyneb_2004@yahoo.com
6.
2.
7.
3.
8.
Participants
Government
9. 1. Representative Emilio Macias House of Representatives Luth Myr Teoxas Committee Secretary Louie Maraa Philippine Legislators Action Committee for Children Email: placc_phils@yahoo.com Divina Luz Lopez Philippines-Canada Local Government Support Program Tel. (02) 637 3511 Email: jlopez@lgsp.org.ph
2. 3.
10. Councilor Joey Tamayo Dagupan City Email: joeytamayo@yahoo.com 11. Ed Baldoria Office of the Vice Mayor, Quezon City Email: chac878@yahoo.com 12. P/C Insp. Nicolas Torre III Quezon City Police District Email: nicktorre3@yahoo.com Tel. (02) 921 5267
4.
149
13. Agnes Lorenzo Bgy. A. Samson 2nd District, Quezon City Tels. (02) 413 2002, (02) 414 1515 14. Ruth Mia League of Municipalities of the Philippines Tel. (02) 913 5737 Email: rsmia@hotmail.com 15. Laertes Latorre Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Email: latorrenian_principle@yahoo.com 16. Lu Victelles DILG
22. Francis Cupang Coalition of Services for the Elderly 23. Emily Bederico Coalition of Services for the Elderly Email: emz0819@yahoo.com 24. Iwan Soetjahja Health All Development International (HADI) Foundation Email: hadif@info.com.ph 25. Roebl Ty AKAP BATA Email: akapbata@yahoo.com 26. Jude Esguerra Institute for Popular Democracy Email: judesaipd@yahoo.com
Non-Government Organizations
17. Vincent Lazatin Transparency and Accountability Network Email: vtlazatin@yahoo.com 18. Edwin Chavez Center for Popular Empowerment Email: edwin.chavez@gmail.com 19. Magandi Antonio Center for Popular Empowerment 20. Susana M. Villa AKAP-BATA Inc. 21. Atty. Jan Perry Eugenio BALAOD Mindanaw Email: janperryeugenio@yahoo.com
Embassies and Multilateral Institutions

27. Vicky Tan Asian Development Bank (ADB) Email: vctan@adb.org 28. Joven Balbosa ADB 29. Saya Kiba Japanese Embassy Email: saya_kiba@yahoo.co.jp
Media
30. Natasha Gamalinda UP Newsletter Email: ashpixied@yahoo.com upnewsletter@gmail.com
150
31. Dante Klink Ang The Manila Times Email: danteang2@manilatimes.net
Academe (Students)
39. Aoife Gormally 40. Janet Lunzaga 41. Jenevive Lontok 42. Dianne De Los Reyes 43. Francis Guiang 44. Mark Christian Luciano 45. Myraflor Espinosa 46. Josette Ann Bacoguis 47. Cyrille Ney Nuguid 48. Melissa Nadine Caraan 49. Anna Nay Navarrete 50. Adrian E. Gabriel 51. Gretel Abling
Academe (Faculty)
32. Dina Delias Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP), UPDiliman Email: dinadelias@yahoo.com 33. Yutaka Katayama Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies Kobe University Email: ykata@kobe.u.ac.jp 34. Ma. Corazon J. Veneracion Department of Social Work College of Social Work and Community Development (CSWCD), UP-Diliman Tel. (02) 929 2477 35. Aleli Bawagan Department of Community Development, CSWCD, UPDiliman Email: abb02ph@yahoo.com 36. Gilbert Lozada Ateneo School of Government 37. Ian Jayson Hecita La Salle Insitute of Governance Email: hecitai@dlsu.edu.ph 38. Jorge Tigno (Moderator) Department of Political Science CSSP, UP-Diliman Email: jtigno@up.edu.ph
151
HUMAN SECURITY AND CULTURE: STRENGTHENING CULTURAL INTEGRITY AND DIVERSITY
Resource Persons
1. Zenaida Brigida Pawid Convenor, Cordillera Peoples Forum Nestor Castro, Ph.D. Department of Anthropology College of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines (UP)-Diliman
Academe
5. Bernadita Churchill, Ph.D. Executive Director, Philippine Social Studies Association Email: mtachurchill@hotmail.com Maileenita Pealba College of Social Sciences UP- Baguio Email: maipenalba@yahoo.com Israel Cabanilla Sentro Anthro Museum, UPDiliman Carlos Tatel Jr. Department of Anthropology, UP-Diliman Mary Constancy Barrameda Department of Anthropology, UP-Diliman
2.
6.
7.
Participants
Government
1. 2. 3. Leticia Gutierrez Duran Provincial Legal Office, Benguet Noli Guiad Provincial Legal Office, Benguet Carla Pingul Office of Senator Jamby Madrigal Espi Ubasa Philippine Development Assistance Program Email: pdap@mydestiny.net
8.
9.
4.
10. Rosario Del Rosario, Ph.D. Department of Community Development, College of Social Work and Community Development (CSWCD), UPDiliman Email: sariodesantos@yahoo.com 11. Aleli Bawagan CSWCD, UP-Diliman Email: abb02ph@yahoo.com 12. Joseph Lalo Email: jrlalo2004@yahoo.com
152
13. Atty. Gregorio Andolana Author, IPRA Law Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao 14. Aoux Santos Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) 15. Aldrin Beta-a Igorota Foundation Inc. Email: igorota@skyinet.net 16. Salvador Ramo Tebtebba Foundation Inc. Email: tebtebba@tebtebba.org pinoyigoy@yahoo.com 17. Fr. Renato Amasi Social Action Center, Isabela DSAC, Bangued 18. Fr. Mario Tambic SAC Baguio-Benguet 19. Delbert Rice Director of Research Kalahan Educational Foundation 20. Renand Marasigan Mangyan Mission Email: renmarasigan@yahoo.com 21. Manuel Santos Little Brothers of Jesus 22. Fr. Lunes Taoil SAC-Baguio-Benguet 23. Erly Ocasiones PLAN Philippines 24. Genevere Dominguez PLAN Philippines Email: Genevere.dominguez@planinternational.org 25. Sr. Eden Orlino DSAC Bayombong Email: edenorlino@yahoo.com 26. Fr. Manuel Catral DSAC Tuguegarao Email: man915@yahoo.com 27. Cynthia Aguas GCAPRegional Email: cindybamero@yahoo.com 28. Bing Veloso Community Volunteer Missioner Email: bing2v@yahoo.com 29. Bryan Uy PSEnVi Email: bryan.uy@pacificspectrum.com 30. Maxine Tanya Hamada INCITEGov 31. Fr. Archie Casey Xaverian Missionaries Email: sxarchie@yahoo.co.uk 32. Japs Hatta Chistian Aid Email: jhatta@gmail.com 33. Jessica Dator-Bercilla Christian Aid Email: jessicabercilla@gmail.com 34. Jeffry Acaba PRRM Email: jeffryacaba@yahoo.com.ph
153
35. Asami Nago Kobe University Japan
Students (Political Science 170)

36. Mark Joseph Arisgado 37. Alexis Ian Dela Cruz 38. Dianne Margarette De Los Reyes 39. Janet Lunzaga 40. Jacqueline Libatigue 41. Jenevive Lontok 42. Aiz Marie Santiago 43. Eva Marie Gutierrrez 44. Marie Krisel Malabanan 45. Stephanie Marie Tan 46. Julianne Agpalo 47. Sheila May Soriano 48. Fiel Evidente 49. Sarah Lynn Chavez 50. Graciela Base 51. Rose Ann Alejandro 52. Francis Geliang 53. Lucky Esteban 54. Maria Teresa Pre 55. Kathleen Mae Villamin 56. Kevin Bonaobra 57. Jeremiah De Guzman 58. Harold Bautista 59. Mark Christian Luciano 60. Myraflor Espinosa 61. Rose Ann Gaspar
73. Mary Joy Villarey 74. Janna Grace Moraa 75. Ryssa Elline Patileo 76. Nina Rebecca Ramos 77. Jamie Lynn Tiu Co 78. Harelle Valdemar Wong 79. Daryl Alvin Reqiso 80. Ma. Bernadette Atencio 81. Alvin Tengociana 82. Josette Ann Baconguis 83. Marie Julienne Ente 84. Daniel Concepcion 85. Veron Guevarra 86. Mark Andrew Agustin 87. Miguel Paolo Daz 88. Jionel Tiamzon 89. Phoebe Dawn Masallo 90. Jeffrey Tabil 91. Gabriel Adrian 92. Gretel Abling 93. Cyrille Ney Nuguid 94. Francis del Valle 95. Jennifer Ann Cruz 96. Mark Anthony Marquez 97. Joy Odessa Tuazon 98. Mona Lisa Valle 99. Irish Veneire Navarro 100. Margerie Ann Espejo
Students (Sociology 11)

62. Melissa Nadine Caraan 63. Sharmaine Bitaa 64. Monique Dalida 65. Anna May Navarete 66. Ma. Del Cielo Gamboa 67. Phoebe Kristina Pelare 68. Mark Antolin Marfal 69. Joshua Lorraine Soriano 70. Melvin Bitas 71. Patrick Santos 72. Ma. Jemilee Vargas
154
HUMAN SECURITY IN VIOLENT CONFLICT SITUATIONS: THE CASE OF BONDOC PENINSULA
Resource Persons
1. Herman Joseph Kraft Department of Political Science University of the Philippines (UP)-Diliman Danny Carranza Coordinator, Land Tenure Improvement Program Philippine Ecumenical Action for Community Empowerment (PEACE) Foundation Alejandro Cruz Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)Quezon 3. Carmelita Abelita DAR-Region IV-A Tel. 747 2223 Ofelia Sta. Maria Deputy Administrator, Land Registration Authority (LRA) Tel. 921 1930 Marivin Abueg LRA Prudencio Maxino Mayor Municipality of Mulanay Rufo Lorenzo Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Police Senior Superintendent Nestor Pastoral RPCRD, PRO IV-A Lucia Almeda Department of Social Welfare and Development IV-A
4.
2.
5. 6.
3.
7.
Participants
Government
8. 1. Ana Elzy Ofreneo Director, Commission on Human Rights Mobile No. (0906) 497 1721 Email: aelzy.ofreneo@gmail.com Leah Tanodra Armamento Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice Tel. 524 9357
9.
2.
10. Scheree Herrera Office of Representative Josefina Joson
155
11. Clarinda Reyna Peace Institutions Development Office Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Tel. 634 6346 12. Giovanni Gamo DENR IV-A Tel. 405 0052 13. Shem Toledo Office of Representative Lorenzo Taada III Tel. 931 6478 14. Lieutenant Colonel Rhoderick Parayno Southern Luzon Command 15. Luis Fernando Land Management Officer DENR-Quezon 16. Police Superintendent Victorio Caragail Quezon Provincial Planning Office
21. Joboy Reyes Quezon Advocates on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development Service (QUARRDS) 22. Melchor Rosco Kilusan ng mga Magsasaka ng Bondoc Peninsula (KMBP)Quezon 23. Melchor Pacopia Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance 24. Reverend Allan Concepcion SJSPSD San Jose, Tarlac 25. Rolando Francisco SJSPSD San Jose, Tarlac 26. Atty. Rosselynn Jaye Dela Cruz Akbayan! Citizens Action Party/PEACE Foundation Mobile No. (0917) 887 5020 Email: jae@akbayan.org 27. Chito Generoso Interfaith Center for a Culture of Non-violence Mobile No. (0917) 831 5703 Email: iccn@pldtdsl.net 28. Joan Fernandez PEACE Foundation 29. Danny Bernal QUARRDS 30. Dioscoro Tijino KMBP-Quezon 31. Rolando Bernardino KMBP-Quezon
17. Teresita Quintos-Deles INCITEGov Tel. 634 1334 18. Kareen Cerdea INCITEGov 19. Inday Toling-Olayer Philippine Legislators Committee on Population and Development 20. Vladimir Hernandez Community and Family Services International Tel. 510 1046
156
32. Engr. Ramil De Vera SJSPSD San Jose, Tarlac 33. Fr. Tubibal SJSPSD San Jose, Tarlac
Academe(Faculty and Research Fellows)

34. Eduardo Tadem (Moderator) Asian Center University of the PhilippinesDiliman 35. Bernardita Churchill Philippine Studies Association Tel. 921 4575 36. Annabel Manalo Miriam College Mobile No. (0919) 504 1683 37. Jose Tabbada National College of Public Administration and Governance UP-Diliman 38. Masako Inagaki Visiting Research Fellow Third World Studies Center UP-Diliman
52. Noel Melvin Bitas 53. Anna Francesca Cruz 54. Jamie Lynn Tiu Co 55. Josette Ann Baconguis 56. Daryl Alvin Requisa 57. Jei Ente 58. Anna Navarrete 59. Cielo Gamboa 60. Adrian Gabriel 61. Melissa Nadine Caraan 62. Monique Dalida 63. Magerie Ann Espejo 64. Nyssa Elline Palileo 65. Ma. Bernadette Atenecio 66. Cyrille Ney Nuguid 67. Mark Anthony Marquez 68. Phoebe Kristina Pelare 69. Francis Julius Romeo del Valle 70. Veron Guevarra 71. Ma. Jemilee Vargas 72. Daniel Concepcion 73. Hawell Tan Wong 74. Mona Lisa Valle 75. Alvin Tengoncina
Academe (Students)
39. Mark Agustin 40. Jeffrey Tabil 41. Nina Ramos 42. Gretel Abling 43. Shamine Mae Bitana 44. Irish Veneire Navarro 45. Carlo Elises 46. Phoebe Dawn Masallo 47. Janna Grace Morana 48. Joy Odessa Tuazon 49. Jennifer Anne Cruz 50. Mark Antolin Marfal 51. Joshua Lorraine Soriano
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Keynote Speaker
1. Teresita Quintos Deles Managing Trustee, INCITEGov 7. 8. Karen Kaye Sta. Maria Philippine Councilors League Edgardo Binaohan House Committee on Mindanao Affairs Joseph Lumanog Office of Representative Christian Seeres BUHAY Party-list
Participants
Government
1. Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel Representative AKBAYAN Party-list Ma. Nerissa Piamonte Director, Stategic and Development Planning Office, Commission on Human Rights Herbert Bautista Vice Mayor Quezon City Fleurdeliz Torres Director Department of Education Ed Calbitaza Department of Agrarian Reform Lakambini Magdamo Policy and Program Development Office Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
9.
2.
10. Henry Afable Provincial Planning and Development Office Eastern Samar 11. Panelo Ambas Office of the Mayor Municipality of Mankayan, Benguet 12. David Cruz Office of the Governor Laguna 13. Eloisa Rogado Department of Social Welfare and DevelopmentRegion IVA
3.
4.
5.
6.
158
14. Zenaida Brigida Pawid Cordillera Peoples Forum 15. Veronica Villavicencio Peace and Equity Foundation 16. Danny Carranza PEACE Foundation/Bondoc Peace and Empowerment Network 17. Dr. Iwan Soetjahja Health All Development International Foundation 18. Celia Santos Community and Family Services International 19. Genevere Dominguez PLAN International 20. Richie Supan Task Force DetaineesPhilippines 21. Lito Amistad Task Force DetaineesPhilippines 22. Roger Birosel Earth Savers Movement 23. Fr. Delbert Rice Kalahan Educational Foundation 24. George Facsoy Upland Development Institute 25. Melanie Elevenson Upland Development Institute 26. Danny Bernal Quezon Advocates on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development Service (QUARRDS) 27. Richard Gadit Cordillera Peoples Alliance 28. Alex Ozoa Paghida-et sa Paghiliusa sa Negros 29. Maila Quiring Coastal Core Sorsogon
Academe
30. Cristina Pantoja-Hidalgo, Ph.D. Vice President for Public Affairs University of the Philippines (UP) System 31. Sergio Cao, Ph.D. Chancellor, UP-Diliman 32. Zosimo Lee, Ph.D. Dean, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP), UPDiliman 33. Nestor Castro, Ph.D. Department of Anthropology CSSP, UP-Diliman 34. Raymund Quilop Department of Political Science CSSP, UP-Diliman 35. Alejandro Ciencia College of Social Sciences, UPBaguio
159
Media
36. Bernice Barona UP Newsletter
Church
37. Fr. Antonio Ancheta Social Action Center Ilagan, Isabela
Multilateral Institutions
38. Steven Edminister United States Agency for International Development 39. Sergio Villena Project Management Office Conflict Prevention and Peace Building United Nations Development Programme
58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82.
Christian Rillera Ana Katrina Go Carrisa Julianne Abio Katrine Paula Suyat Jizelde Maay Repato Sheina Marie Onrubia Erika Mariz Esperas Michael Thomas Sta. Maria Nina Rica Gayeta Eljay Bernardo Jenny Rose Olfindo Vincent Bryan P. Layug Jenica Dela Cruz Ryan Aliva Jacqueline Joy Glumalid Mara Villegas Ma. Victoria Alegre Krizla Guingon Joseph Ralph Avedillo April Gale Uy Soller Astrid Shevette P. Ong Ronald Carlo Banares Ralph Andrew Ramos Leo Mario Vidal Kathryn Joyce Hong
Students
40. Mariel Madlangbayan 41. Jake Rupert Tadora 42. Mohammad Al-Amin Julkipli 43. Ma. Fleurdelis Tanyag 44. Danjun Lucas 45. Ronald Ruava 46. Glenn Nino Sartillo 47. Kim Fernando Uy 48. Ma. Karla Abigail Pangilinan 49. Jessa Austria 50. Alexis Patacsil 51. Jemimah Estelle Bartolome 52. Cesar Ryan Aquino 53. Oscar Carlo Cajucom 54. Aldan Avila 55. Danica Calauagan 56. Marnelli Sales 57. Rustiniel Bayaca

Defining A Human Security Framework in The Philippine Context

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HUMAN SECURITY

FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem

THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUES SERIES 2006 01

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

Zuraida Mae D. Cabilo and Sharon M. Quinsaat

THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUES SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

Human Security and Development

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

The Case of Bondoc Peninsula

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

HUMAN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

Fig. 1. World metal prices (US Geological Survey)

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

Fig. 2. Exploration sites (US Geological Survey)

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

HUMAN SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT

PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWSC POLICY DIALOGUE SERIES 2006

DEFINING THE HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN THE PHILIPPINE CONTEXT