G.R. No. 10028 December 16, 1916 JOSE VALES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMEON A. VILLA, FELIPE S.

SILVESTRE, and MARIA GUIA GARCIA, defendants-appellants. MORELAND, J.: This is an action to set aside certain transfers of real estate from the plaintiff to one of the defendants and to require that defendant to recover by good and sufficient conveyance the title to such properties; to refund to the plaintiff a certain sum paid by plaintiff for the recovery of certain other real estate; and for an accounting by the defendants of the rents, issues and profits of certain real estate during a certain period; and for P25,000 damages. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows: Requiring the defendant Maria Guia Garcia to elect within fifteenth days from date hereof, whether she will pay the plaintiff the sum of P7,274 with interest on P6,500 thereof at 6 per cent per annum from September 5, 1911, and on P752 thereof at 6 per cent per annum from the 4th day of April, 1913, and retain the property; or deed the property described as follows (description of property) and the property sold to her on the 4th day of April, 1913, to the plaintiff upon plaintiff's paying her the sum of P7,500, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the 5th day of September, 1911, and of deeding to plaintiff without compensation the parcel of land deeded by plaintiff to her on the 4th day of April, 1913. And requiring the defendant, Simeon A. Villa, to elect within 15 days from date thereof whether he will pay the plaintiff the sum of P8,910.41 and retain the property sold to him by the plaintiff, and described as follows (description of property) together with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day of October, 1911, or deed the property to the plaintiff upon the payment by the plaintiff to him of the sum of P8,089.59, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from October 17, 1911. And, upon the failure of either of said defendants to elect, as stated, the right of election as to performance shall be in the plaintiff, who may immediately enforce his election by execution, compelling the defendants to execution the deeds as indicated, upon the payment of the sum required of him, or to pay the amounts required by them to be paid, in case of retention of the property, and in favor of the plaintiff. And against the defendant Maria Guia Garcia for the sum of P3,600, together with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the 24th day of October, 1913, and, for the costs of the action. This appeal was taken from that judgment. It appears that the defendant Felipa Silvestre is a widow, 70 years of age, and is the aunt of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia, wife of the defendant Simeon A. Villa. In 1904 plaintiff was the owner of the following properties, to wit: (a) Two houses of strong materials, known and designated as Nos. 37 to 47 (now 105-113) Calle Nebraska, district of Ermita, together with the lots whereon said buildings are erected, said houses and lots having an assessed valuation of P23,644 Philippine currency; (b) one house of strong materials, known and designated as No. 49 (now 303-311) Calle Mercado, district of Ermita, together with the lot whereon the same is erected; (c) one house of strong materials, known and designated as No. 45 (now 221-225) Calle Mercado, district of Ermita, consisting of 11 doors or posesiones, together with the lots wherein the same is erected; (d) two houses of strong materials situated upon the private street known and designated as Callejon Maria Paz, and numbered 47a, 47b, and 11, 13, 15 and 17, respectively, together with the lots wherein the same are erected. At that time he was in debt to the defendant Felipa Silvestre in the sum of P20,000. In that year he executed to her a conveyance of the properties above described in consideration of the debt, the conveyance containing a clause giving to the vendor the right to repurchase the premises within one year from the date of the conveyance by a payment to the vendee of the consideration stated in the conveyance. Plaintiff did not repurchase, and in March 22, 1909, having become indebted to Felipa Silvestre in an additional sum of P5,000, he, on that day, conveyed the premises to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia, at the request of Felipa Silvestre, she being an elderly woman and Maria Guia Garcia being considered by her the heir to all her property. The consideration for the transfer was the debt of P20,000, the purchase price named in the conveyance of 1904, and P5,000, the additional debt which had been created during the time intervening between the two conveyances. The deed was absolute on its face and, so far as appears, conveys the property in fee simple; but the plaintiff contends that there was a parol agreement between him and the defendants entered into at the time the conveyance was executed and delivered, giving him the right to repurchase the premises so conveyed at any time on paying the vendee the P25,000 named as the consideration for the transfer. The defendants deny the existence of such a parol agreement and the controversy thus raised is the origin of all the difference between the parties to this action. Shortly after the conveyance of March 22, 1909, on parcel of the property described in that conveyance was sold to Judge Jocson, and still later a second parcel, the defendant Maria Guia Garcia appearing in both conveyance as the vendor of the properties. Still later another parcel of the property described in said conveyance was sold to one Garchitorena, Maria Guia Garcia being the vendor in that conveyance. In 1911, the plaintiff conveyed to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia for P7,580 certain property, also the subject of this action, but not a part of the property described in the conveyance of the 22d of March, 1909, located on Calle Salsipuedes; and in 1913 a parcel of land adjoining the Salsipuedes property for P752. In 1911, plaintiff also conveyed to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia a house and lot located on Padre Faura Street for P8,000. On the 4th day of April, 1913, the defendant Maria Guia Garcia conveyed to plaintiff the properties described in the conveyance of March 22, 1909, remaining unsold, for the consideration of P6,800, plaintiff thereby receiving on payment that which he claims he was entitled to receive for nothing under the alleged verbal agreement, he claiming that he had paid long before the full sum of P25,000 which entitled him to the reconveyance without further consideration. This action was commenced on the 25th of October, 1915.lawphi1.net It is claimed by the plaintiff that, in spite of the conveyance of the 22d of March, 1909, he continued in possession of the properties described therein as virtual owner thereof, and that all he paid for such possession was the interest on the P25,000, the consideration for the conveyance, at the rate of 9 per cent per annum, or P2,250, a year. He also claims that he rented those portions of the properties described in the conveyance which he himself did not personally occupy and that he had the benefits of such rents, collecting them and using them for his own personal purposes. The defendants, on the other hand, deny that the plaintiff, after the conveyance of the 22d of March, 1909, occupied the premises as owner, but assert that he occupied them as tenant of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia and that he paid rent to her continuously while in the occupancy thereof, the amount of the rent being reduced as portions of the property were sold; and that in December, 1911, and this plaintiff admits, defendants canceled plaintiff's lease and thereafter collected the rents themselves from all occupants, including the plaintiff. Defendants also say that, while it is admitted that the plaintiff rented portions of the properties to other tenants, he acted in so doing as a tenant of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia and under a permission to sublet. Plaintiff also claims that the consideration received for the conveyance to Judge Jocson was received by him as the real owner of the property and that P10,000 thereof was paid to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia as a part payment of the P25,000 which formed the consideration for the conveyance of the 22d of March, 1909, and was paid in pursuance of the alleged verbal agreement to reconvey the premises on the payment of the P25,000 in full. He makes the same claim with regard to the purchase price of the property sold to Garchitorena, asserting that he received the whole of that purchase price as the owner of the property and that he paid therefrom to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia the sum of P15,000, said sum, together with the sum of P10,000 paid from the Jocson sale, constituting the full amount due to defendant under the verbal agreement to reconvey attached to the conveyance of the 22d of March, 1909; and he asserts that, upon the payment of that sum, he was entitled to receive a reconveyance from the defendant Maria Guia Garcia of the properties described in the conveyance of the 22d of March, 1909, remaining unsold. It is admitted that, in the sale to Judge Jocson and to Garchitorena, the plaintiff personally conducted the negotiations. Defendants, however, deny that he acted in such negotiations as owner, but allege that he acted as their agent. They also deny that he received the

purchase price of said properties and that he paid them P10,000 and P15,000 or any sum whatever. They assert, on the contrary, that the defendant Maria Guia Garcia received the full purchase price in each case, and that the only sum that plaintiff received was that paid him by the defendant for his services as agent in selling the property. With regard to the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties the plaintiff claims that they were obtained from him and that he was induced to execute conveyances therefor in favor of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia under the threat that, if he did not do so, the defendants would not reconvey to him the properties described in the conveyance of the 22d of March 1909; that is, that they would repudiate the verbal agreement which plaintiff alleges was attached to that conveyance. He asserts that the consideration paid by the defendant for these properties was grossly inadequate and that, as stated, he was induced to accept such considerations and to make the conveyances by reason of the threat aforesaid. The defendants deny, as we have seen, that such verbal agreement existed and also specifically deny that such threat or any threat was made or that the conveyances of the property referred to were obtained by virtue thereof. The history of the transactions between the plaintiff and the defendant as given by counsel for the parties is not essentially different. While there is, of course, a wide difference in the claims of the parties to the action, that difference consists largely in the reasons which underlie the facts thus stated and the forces and motives which moved the plaintiff to the performance of the acts referred to and from the effects of which he asks to be relieved. Counsel for the plaintiff claim that the conveyance subsequent to that of the 22d of March, 1909, which is the origin of all the controversies between the parties, and his appearance as a witness for the defendants in the various proceedings in the Court of Land Registration concerning certain of the parcels of land in litigation and all other acts against his own interests, were induced either by the fraud of the defendants or by the force and undue influence which they were able to and did exercise over him by virtue of the advantages they possessed by reason of the fact that the conveyance of March 22d, 1909 was absolute in form. Counsel further assert that one of the elements of the alleged fraud and undue influence was that there was no consideration for the transfers to defendants or if there was a consideration, it was grossly inadequate. Plaintiff's position with regard to the various transfers and the other acts of plaintiff is best shown by statements of counsel in their brief in this court. With respect to the conveyance of March 22, 1909, counsel say: On March 22, 1909, under guise of covering the additional P5,000 and to place the property beyond the reach of an impecunious brother-in-law, the plaintiff was induced to execute a writing, in the form of an absolute deed (Exhibit 1) in favor of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia, niece of Felipa Silvestre, and wife of Dr. Simeon A. Villa. This deed was made upon the express understanding (not contained in the instrument) that the plaintiff was to pay interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum upon his indebtedness of P25,000 and was to have a reconveyance of his property upon the repayment of said indebtedness. The deed expressly recites that by an escritura dated September 23, 1904, the land with the improvements thereon had been conveyed to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia under pacto de retro for P20,000, that since that time the plaintiff had received form time to time an additional P5,000, all of which had been employed in the construction of improvements on the land. This additional P5,000, none of which was retained by the plaintiff, was the so-called consideration upon which the conveyance under pacto de retro was converted into an apparently absolute conveyance. After the execution of this deed to Maria Guia Garcia, the plaintiff, Vales, continued in the absolute possession of the properties (test., p. 9) and administered the same for his own use and benefit, free from any control on the part of the defendants. The revenue from the property amounting to the sum of P600 per month was wholly received by the plaintiff, until he sold a part of the property, and until he was later ousted from the remainder as hereinafter stated. With regard to the transaction with Judge Jocson, counsel say: In October, 1909, the plaintiff found a purchaser for one of his houses in the person of Judge Jocson, who paid P14,000 for the premises at No. 49 Calle Mercado. Of this sum P2,000 was employed in building a stable and fences, P10,000 was paid by plaintiff on account of his indebtedness and the remainder of P2,000 was retained by plaintiff for his own uses. In thus reducing his debt from P25,000 to P15,000 the plaintiff was required to increase his interest payments from 9 per cent to 10 per cent, and the monthly payments of P187.50 were thereafter continued at the rate of P125.00. The sale to Judge Jocson was the occasion of the first intimation to plaintiff that he had committed a folly in executing a deed to property worth P78,500 to secure a debt of only P25,000 without expressing therein its real object. All of the negotiations with Judge Jocson, extending over several months, were carried on with the plaintiff exclusively, the price for the sale was fixed by the plaintiff after the latter had abandoned his efforts to secure a higher price, and the money was paid to plaintiff by Judge Jocson in the presence of the defendants, who were present, of course, for the purpose of signing the formal deed. This is shown not only by the testimony of plaintiff but also by that of Judge Jocson, who states that he was informed by Vales that although he was the owner of the property he had allowed the title to stand in the name of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia as security for an obligation. The judge testifies that he explained to Vales that although he, Vales, might have absolute confidence in the good faith of the defendants, there would be trouble in the event of the death of said Guia Garcia, and that in view of said explanation Vales requested the judge to prepare a suitable document which would show the real equity of Vales in the property. The judge identified the surveying sheets of the rough draft of the document so prepared by him (deposition, Exhibit B, p. 77-8). When this document was presented to defendant Villa and his wife, Guia Garcia, upon one pretext or another they failed to execute the same. This attitude of theirs aroused the suspicion of plaintiff and he forthwith determined to sacrifice a part of his property in order to obtain the money with which to discharge the remaining balance of his indebtedness. He accordingly engaged the service of brokers to find a buyer for the house and lots at Nos. 105-113 Calle Nebraska, included in the deed to Guia Garcia. The result of this activity was the sale to Garchitorena of these properties for the sum of P20,000, although this was far below their real value, as shown by the testimony of Goyena, a competent and disinterested witness, who appraises the said properties at over P36,000. The broker who made the sale testifies positively that the defendant Felipa Silvestre informed him that the property in question belonged to Vales, the plaintiff; that he received all his instructions regarding the sale from the latter; and that from him he received his commission for his services in effecting the sale. The testimony of this witness also corroborates absolutely that of the plaintiff to the effect that when the P20,000 were received from Garchitorena for the sale of the property in question P5,000 of it was turned over to Vales. He also testifies that at the time Vales requested the defendants, all of whom were there present, to reconvey to him the rest of the mortgaged property and that the defendant Villa, in the presence of the other defendants, said that that would be done after Holy Week (sten. notes, page 39). The details of what transpired on this occasion were also given by the plaintiff in his testimony (sten. notes, page 14). This occurred on the night of April 11, 1911. The situation, therefore, after April 11, 1911, was that the plaintiff had returned to the defendants the whole amount of his indebtedness to them, but the titles to the remaining properties, which had stood as security for the debt, still stood in the name of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia. The value of these properties, as established by the undisputed testimony of the witness Goyena, was P24,437. Counsel have this to say with regard to the transaction involving the house on Calle Salsipuedes: On April 14, 1911, plaintiff requested defendants to reconvey to him the rest of his property, but was informed that this would not be done until he had sold them for P7,500 a house and lot of his on Calle Salsipuedes, the value of which, as fixed by the witness Goyena, was over P15,000. The details of the discussion which this outrageous demand provoked are found on page 17, stenographic notes of plaintiff's testimony. The final upshot was that the defendants told plaintiff that if he would finish the house as they wanted it and sell it to them for P7,500, that they would then reconvey to him the rest of his property, but that if he did not do so, they would keep it, availing themselves of the fact that the record title was in the name of the defendant Maria Guia Garcia. Fearing that he would be deprived of his property, and yielding to the threat of the defendants, the plaintiff completed the house and conveyed it to the defendant Maria Guia Garcia for P7,500.

This house was completed about August 1, 1911, and on September 5, was deeded by plaintiff to defendant Maria Guia Garcia. He then again preferred his request for the restoration of his Ermita properties, but the rapacity of the defendants was not satisfied. The plaintiff had purchased a building lot on Calle Padre Faura, and had planned and commenced a building thereon to cost about P17,000. This property had apparently excited the avarice and cupidity of defendants, and under the guise of punishing him for his ingratitude in telling the true history of his woes to Judge Ostrand of the Land Court and thus delaying the title to the Salsipuedes house, they demanded of plaintiff the Padre Faura house, finished and completed to the taste and requirements of Dr. Villa for the meager sum of P8,000. The mere fact that the plaintiff had meekly been haled before Judge Ostrand by Dr. Villa and frightened into retracting his statements and consenting to the issue of title unto Maria Guia Garcia, after a two days' delay, seemed to make no difference. The temerity of plaintiff in even mentioning his rights was deemed worthy of chastisement, especially such as would redound to the profit and gain of defendants. And so the Padre Faura property went the way of the house on Calle Salsipuedes and settled into the maw of the defendants. Its actual cost of building (some P14,800) was advanced by Dr. Villa, and so, when finished the poor plaintiff was owing to defendants the sum of P6,800 or the excess of cost over the purchase price of P8,000. Finally in December, 1911, the defendants having discovered that plaintiff was the owner of a strip of land adjoining the house and lot already wrested from him and having made unsuccessful demands upon him for the transfer of that strip to them, put the screws upon his thumbs a little tighter. In addition to informing him that they would indefinitely retain his Ermita properties, they ousted him form the administration thereof, collected the rentals thereof and even compelled the plaintiff to pay them rental for that part occupied by himself and family. Succumbing to this pressure, and piling Pelion on Ossa, the plaintiff made conveyance of this additional tribute. With the demand of P6,800 above stated the plaintiff was unable to comply for the some time. Finally, in April 1913, he succeeded in borrowing this sum from one Rafael Alonso, and with this sum (P6,800) as a nominal consideration, he succeeded in securing the refund of the balance of his Ermita possessions (worth about P24,500). Why the defendants did not complete their undertaking, but left the plaintiff with an equity of about P18,000 is surprising. Doubtless the delay in procuring for their demands the ultimate P6,800, or the threatened fulfillment of the adage that even a worm will turn, advised them that they were at the end of their rope. It is thus clear that the real difference between the parties in their relation of the facts in the main lies in the coloring given them by the disclosure by the plaintiff of what he alleges to have been the motives and forces which drove him to the transactions which he now wishes to have annulled. There appears to be some confusion as to the precise nature of this action. Counsel for appellants say in their brief in this case: This is an action to annul a series of real estate transactions between plaintiff and defendants on the ground of duress. This statement is sharply challenged by counsel for appellee in their brief. They say: The action has been erroneously described in appellant's brief as one to annul a series of real estate transactions on the ground of duress. More correctly this is an action to compel the defendants to account unto the plaintiff for the proceeds of a series of frauds practiced upon said plaintiff. Later in their brief, however, and constituting the very first sentence of that portion marked "Argument," counsel for plaintiff have this to say respecting the real issue in the action: With no dispute or denial of the shameful charges laid at the door of Villa and his wife by this plaintiff, counsel for appellant seeks strenuously to avoid the issue of duress. Counsel then continue: From this premise he (speaking of counsel for appellant) argues that as there was no legal obligation to reconvey, manifestly their refusal to do so could not have coerced plaintiff's volition. Our law would be indeed a travesty on justice if, upon the facts disclosed by this record, no relief could be afforded to the plaintiff. Still later counsel say with respect to the sale of the properties in question for P5,000 when the undisputed evidence shows they were worth P78,515: It is repugnant to common sense to think for one moment that any sane man would be willing to sell property of this value for less than a third of its actual worth. Moreover, the brief of counsel for plaintiff is divided into four parts, each part headed by a word or phrase in bold face type descriptive of its contents. They are "Argument," "Duress," "Ratification, "Res judicata." There is no division of the brief which is devoted to fraud or deceit and no direct discussion of either element. Under the heading "Argument" there is a discussion of the claim that the conveyance of March 22, 1909, was for security and not an absolute conveyance. This is followed by the part marked "Duress" where counsel say: The evidence also shows, however, that instead of performing this duty, the defendants, conspiring together, and taking advantage of the fact that the conveyance by way of mortgage was in the form of an absolute deed, played upon the fears of plaintiff and extorted from him the money and property described in the complaint. It is our contention that the consent thus wrung from the plaintiff was vitiated by the duress to which he was subjected by the defendants, and that they are bound to make restitution to him of every dollar which they have extorted from him by their threats and intimidation. Under the heading "Res judicata" we find this: But the plaintiff does contend that the defendants must undo their fraud, and must elect to make up the deficiencies, etc. It would seem from the foregoing, taken in conjunction with the allegations of the complaint, that the theory of the action is duress. We might say, however, inasmuch as fraud and deceit are so prominently mentioned, that we find no fraud in this case. Most if not all of the elements of fraud are absent. In none of the transactions was there a misrepresentation of an existing or past fact; and plaintiff went into each one of them knowing all of the facts as well as the defendants. There was no deception. This is a necessary deduction not only form the fact that there was no misrepresentation but also from the fact that plaintiff knew precisely what he was doing was fully acquainted with the facts; and, knowing them, again and again accepted the verbal promises of the defendants to reconvey. Under his own statement and according to his own theory the defendants did no more than break their verbal contract with him with respect to all subsequent transactions as they had with respect to the first. That was not fraud, although it was done again and again, unless the mere failure to fulfill the various verbal contracts can be said to constitute fraud or deceit. It is well recognized however, that a mere failure to live up to a contract is not fraudulent or deceitful. The furthest the authorities have gone along this line, and not all have gone that far, is to declare that if, at the time a contract is made, one of the parties has present in his mind the purpose and intent to break it, after getting all he can out of the other party, and that purpose and intent enter into a the contract as the main element or consideration thereof on his part, there is fraud and deceit, the authorities holding that the state of mind of the party is a fact entering into the consideration of the contract without which it would not have been made; and that, by virtue of that state of mind, the other party was deprived of property. That fact however must be alleged and proved and relied upon before it can be utilized by the person asserting its existence. It was not alleged or proved in this case and plaintiff does not rely upon it in his brief in this court. His consent was not obtained by deceit in any of the transactions. There did not exist in any one of the transactions complained of a condition where "by words and insidious machinations on the part of one of the contracting parties the other is (was) induced to execute a contract which, without them, he would not have made." Reduced to the lowest terms this action constitutes an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to extricate himself from a series of foolish transactions, if we may accept his allegations respecting them. As we have said, the sales were all made by the plaintiff with full knowledge of the facts and there appears nothing in the record which warrants a rescission of them from the standpoint of fraud. The ultimate purpose of the action is the recovery of the properties described in the deed of March 22, 1909, remaining unsold. But, as appears from the evidence, the plaintiff has already recovered those properties, having purchased them from the defendants on April l4, 1913, for P6,800. Before this action was begun, therefore, plaintiff had obtained the very thing which he had been seeking to recover all through thus dealings with defendants and to obtain which he claims he had suffered so much. Having secured before this action was

begun precisely what defendants had promised him and the very thing he sought, there remains nothing further to be said or done in that connection. Certainly the repurchase of the properties which he so much desired was not procured by fraud or deceit; and it was a complete termination of the relations existing between the parties arising out of the properties which he claimed were sold with a right to repurchase. After having obtained the very thing he desired and having done so in a manner which he deemed best and most suitable under the circumstances, did he not thereby terminate all relations between himself and defendants with respect to, or growing out of those properties, and can he nor repudiate not only the transaction by which he recovered them but also every other transaction which he claims related thereto? It is incomprehensible, from a legal point of view, that plaintiff, having been deprived of property by fraud and deceit, may recover that property through a voluntary agreement between him and those who deceived and defrauded him, and then repudiate not only the transaction in which he was defrauded of that property but also the very transaction by which he recovered it. Dealing with the case from the standpoint of intimidation, it should be noted of March 22, 1909, was obtained in that form by force or thereat. The validity of that conveyance is admitted; as is also the fact that the verbal agreement to reconvey was omitted from the conveyance knowingly. The claim is simply that there was a verbal agreement to reconvey on the repayment of the consideration named in the instrument and that defendants made use of the fact that the agreement was verbal and, therefore, difficult to prove, as clever by which they forced him to convey to them additional properties before they would comply with the verbal agreement. According to plaintiff's contention, then, each one of the conveyances between him and defendants subsequent to the original conveyance was an extortion, using that word in its popular and not in its legal sense, the defendants, in order to intimidate him and thereby obtain the conveyance, threatening him with a refusal to comply with the verbal agreement to reconvey and the consequent loss of his properties. At each conveyance the defendants agreed, always verbally, as a consideration therefor, to reconvey to him the properties remaining, but each time refused to do so and proceeded, after each such conveyance, to a fresh extortion. It is contended that plaintiff, by not incorporating the verbal agreement to reconvey in the instrument itself, placed himself in a disadvantageous position; and that he executed and delivered the subsequent conveyances for the purpose of extricating himself from the unfortunate situation so produced. The ultimate extortion, the payment of P6,800 to recover the remaining properties, was the last penalty which he paid for his mistake in not incorporating the verbal agreement in the conveyance itself. All men are presumed to be sane and normal and subject to be moved by substantially the same motives. When of age and sane, they must take care of themselves. In their relation with others in the business of life, wits, sense, intelligence, training, ability and judgment meet and clash and contest, sometimes with gain and advantage to all, sometimes to a few only, with loss and injury to others. In these contests men must depend upon themselves upon their own abilities, talents, training, sense, acument, judgment. The fact that one may be worsted by another, of itself, furnishes no cause of complaint. One man cannot complain because another is more able, or better trained, or has better sense of judgment than he has; and when the two meet on a fair field the inferior cannot murmur if the battle goes against him. The law furnishes no protection to the inferior simply because he is inferior, any more than it protects the strong because he is strong. The law furnishes protection to both alike to one or more or less than to the other. It makes no distinction between the wise and the foolish, the great and the small, the strong and the weak. The foolish may lose all they have to the wise; but that does not mean that the law will give it back to them again. Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute themselves guardians of persons who are not legally incompetent. Courts operate not because one person has been defeated or overcome by another, but because he has been defeated or overcomeillegally. Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by them indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. Furthermore, even if an actionable wrong be committed in such manner as to authorize the courts to intervene, the person injured may renounce his right to take the matter to the courts and may compromise with the wrong-doer. Or, having been placed in a very disadvantageous position by the wrong committed against him, he may be offered by his adversary one or more avenues of escape. He may be required to lose more property to his enemy or go to the courts for redress. In such case the payment of an additional sum as a means of escape is not necessarily a payment voidable for duress. The act was preceeded by an exercise of judgment. This much was plain to him: he had either to let the matter stand as it was with the loss already sustained, or go to the courts to be relieved. His judgment, operating upon this condition, told him to pay the additional sum rather than to suffer the inconvenience and expense of an action in court. A payment made under such conditions is not voidable. It is the voluntary act of a sane and mature man performed upon reflection. Not only this; it is a compromise of the original wrong and a ratification of the relation which the wrongful act was intended to establish between the parties. The same may be said with greater force of a case where a person's own voluntary act, uninfluenced by another, has put him in a disadvantageous position a position which another may unjustly make use of to his injury. The failure to reduce a contract to writing, or to have witnesses present when a verbal agreement is made, or to record an instrument, or to exclude from the operation of its terms things verbally agreed to be excluded, etc., may place a person in a disadvantageous position with respect to another; and the demand that he pay to secure his extrication is not illegal, and a payment made pursuant to such demand is not necessarily voidable. He pays for his lack of foresight. While the demand may be reprehensible morally, it is not illegal' and of itself is not ground for relief. There must, then, be a distinction to be made between a case where a person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executes a contract or performs an act against his will under a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law. But when his sense, judgment, and his will rebel and he refuses absolutely to act as requested, but is nevertheless overcome by force or intimidation to such an extent that he becomes a mere automation and actsmechanically only, a new element enters, namely, a disappearance of the personality of the actor. He ceases to exist as an independent entity with faculties and judgment, and in his place is substituted another the one exercising the force or making use of intimidation. While his hand signs, the will which moves it is another's. While a contract is made, it has, in reality and in law, only one party to it; and, there being only one party, the one using the force or the intimidation, it is unenforceable for lack of a second party. From these considerations it is clear that every case of alleged intimidation must be examined to determine within which class it falls. If it is within the first class it is not duress in law, if it falls in the second, it is. But into whichever class it falls the party coerced may, as we have seen, waive his right to annul the contract and to recover damages. He may do this expressly or impliedly. He may expressly accept the agreement as it stands, or in a modified from, and live up to it as thus accepted. Or, he may compromise by paying something to be relieved from its effects or to have its terms changed. Or, he may accept benefits under the contract. In any one of which cases, and there are others not now necessary to mention, he renounces and waives his defense of intimidation and thereby eliminates that element as one having any influence on the case thereafter. Article 1265 of the Civil Code tells us when duress exists: "Consent given by error, under violence, by intimidation, or deceit shall be void." Article 1267 provides that "violence exists when, in order to exact consent, irresistible force is used;" and the "intimidation exists when one of the contracting parties is inspired with a reasonable and well-grounded fear of suffering an imminent and serious injury to his person or property. . . ." Article 1268 declares the effect of violence and intimidation on the contract. It provides: Violence or intimidation shall annul the obligation, even if it should have been employed by a third person who did not take part in the contract. There is no question of error or violence in this case; and we have already disposed of that of deceit. Intimidation resulting from the fear of losing his property, if he did not comply with defendants' demands, is the element relied on.

First, then, applying the principles already enunciated: Was there intimidation in this case under the facts as related by plaintiff himself, leaving out of account the conclusions drawn and stated in the brief of counsel? Summing up the whole case under these facts, it is clear that all that defendants did was to refuse to live up to their verbal agreement with the plaintiff unless he gave them an additional consideration therefor. Plaintiff had his choice. He could refuse to pay again for the right which he had paid for once, and go into court for relief, or he could pay the price asked. His judgment operated upon the situation thus presented and he concluded that, from his point of view, his interests would be best subserved by paying the additional consideration. But having paid it, he found himself in precisely the situation he was before. The verbal agreement to reconvey, which he claims he had twice paid for, was still verbal, and he was no better off than before. He took no receipt showing the purpose of the payment; he required no writing to protect himself from the very trap into which he had once fallen; but, instead, with the very persons who had refused to live up to their original agreement because it was verbal, he not only made another verbal agreement but also paid them, without a scrap of paper to show for it or specify its object, the sum of P10,000 on that agreement. Not only this, but he did the same thing a second time. The defendants having refused to fulfill the second verbal agreement and having refused to give him credit for the P10,000 paid, he entered into a third agreement under which he paid them P15,000. But still the agreement was verbal. Still there was no receipt, no writing, nothing but the naked word that had twice before been repudiated. Again, for the tried time, there was a refusal to fulfill and the plaintiff, to obtain the very thing which had been the subject-matter of these prior verbal contracts, paid a fourth consideration of P6,800. This time he succeeded. On the payment of the fourth consideration he secured in black and white the title to the property which had so eluded him. If we accept these as facts, and we do for the purposes of the present discussion, we see that there was no intimidation in law. There was a lack of sense and judgment; but there was no imminent and serious injury threatened to his person or property. There was a simply refusal to comply with the terms of a contract unless plaintiff did certain things; but there was no threat of imminent and serious injury to his person or property. If a threat to refuse to live up to a contract is equivalent to a threat of imminent and serious injury to the person or property of the other contracting party, words have lost their meaning and language its significance. It may be admitted that plaintiff was in an unfavorable position. That does not mean, however, that the efforts he made to extricate himself therefrom entailed no consequences; nor does it mean that he was not dealing at arm's length with the defendants. There was no relation of trust of confidence. They owed him nothing but the naked legal; duty to comply with their promise -- to reconvey the premises on the payment of the debt he owed them. He was free to resort to the courts at the first refusal of defendants, as he ultimately did; and his chances for obtaining the relief sought would have been far better than they are now. By his delay and his subsequent dealings with the defendants he has not only given them the opportunity to charge that his conduct casts grave doubts on the truthfulness of his allegations, but he also laid himself to open accusation of having compromised with his enemies, with having ratified and confirmed all that was done, and with having wailed and renounced his right of action based on intimidation, if one he ever had. Every person who makes a contract assumes the risk of a refusal to comply. Breaches of contract are the commonest cause of litigation; and settlements and readjustments between the parties after a breach of contract whereby the person injured by the breach pays an additional consideration to the person breaking it in order to obtain a fulfillment, are also common. We never have understood that such arrangements were voidable for intimidation. A threat to refuse to comply with the terms of a contract without an additional consideration is not, of itself, intimidation. It is an offer to make a new contract, to establish new relations, with a statement from the one making the offer that he will no longer abide by the old contract. Such an act does not put the other party in the power or under the control of the one making the threat. He is still free to act as he pleases. He can still exercise judgment and will; he has still a refuge from the evil threatened' he still remains free to secure the same redress which every other person can obtain who is injured by a breach of contract. There is nothing in this which can produce intimidation. There is nothing which can engender a well-grounded fear of imminent and serious injury to person or property which destroys volition and chains the will. But, even though it should be found that the execution of the conveyance of the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties and the payment of the consideration of P6,800 for the recovery of the properties described in the original conveyance remaining unsold, together with all the other acts of the plaintiff which militate against his interest, were obtained and procured by means of intimidation, still we believe that the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover on the record. His acts in general not only contradicted the most material portions of his testimony, but he must be held to have ratified the conveyances, payments, and acts referred to and to have renounce the right o interpose the defense which intimidation originally offered him. Before entering upon this branch of the case it is necessary to correct certain errors into which counsel for the plaintiff appears to have fallen in their brief. Under the heading "Statement of facts" counsel say: The facts upon which this action is based, astounding as they are, stand absolutely uncontroverted and undisputed. The recital of woeful abuse which constituted the plaintiff's complaint might stagger the credence were it the mere version of a litigant, disputed or contradicted by his opponents, or by a single witness or document offered in their behalf. Instead, it stands corroborated and undenied in spite of unusual opportunities afforded to the defendants of correcting it in any particular in which it may have been distorted, overdrawn or misrepresented by the plaintiff. Under the head of "Argument" counsel again say: With no dispute or denial of the shameful charges laid at the door of Villa and his wife by this plaintiff, counsel for appellant seeks strenuously to avoid the issues of duress. There are several other statement in the brief of similar character. We find in the record, however, the testimony of Felipa Silvestre, Maria Guia Garcia, and Simeon A. Villa, the three defendants. These witnesses, or some of them, deny the material allegations and testimony of the plaintiff, and some of them testified to facts demonstrating, if true, the unreliability of the testimony of the plaintiff. They deny the existence of the verbal agreement upon which plaintiff bases this case. They declare that the sale of the 22d of March, 1909, was an absolute sale and was intended as such by the parties thereto. They assert that plaintiff occupied the premises after such sale as a tenant, paying them a monthly rental therefor. They testify that the conveyance of the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties was voluntary on the part of the plaintiff and for a consideration regarded at the time as adequate in each cae. They deny that they threatened plaintiff in any way; or that they intimidated him; or that they influenced him one way or the other in any of the transactions of which he complains. They deny that he sold the properties to Judge Jocson and to Garchitorena as owner, but allege that he acted as their agent in doing so. They deny that he paid interest and assert that he paid rent, and, to support this denial, evidence the fact, admitted by the plaintiff, that they finally ousted him from the possession of the property and collected the rents themselves. As further corroboration, they point to the fact that the only receipt introduced in evidence by plaintiff to substantiate his claim that he was paying interest and not rent shows upon its face that it was a receipt of rent. They point to the record showing that, again and again, by word or by letter, they refused plaintiff's request to reconvey to him and denied that there was any agreement to reconvey. They deny that plaintiff received any of the purchase price of the properties sold to Judge Jocson and Garchitorena, but declare that the purchase price was paid to them with the exception of certain sums paid to the plaintiff on their behalf. Not only this, but defendants point to the absolute nature of the conveyance of the 22d of March 1909; to the fact that they obtained Torrent title thereto with the assistance of the plaintiff who testified to the absolute character of their title; to the conveyances of the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties for considerations expressed; to the fact that the plaintiff assisted them in obtaining Torrens title to those properties and that he did so after the defendants had repudiated his contention of the existence of a verbal agreement to reconvey; to his failure to act when he was ejected from the premises as a tenant; to his repurchase of the properties described in the original conveyance remaining unsold and his payment of the consideration of P6,800 therefor; to his acquiescence for a period of six months after such repurchase before the present action was commenced. They call attention to the inherent improbability of plaintiff's story; to his acts which contradict his words; to his acquiescence for a long period of time; to his acts in assisting defendants to procure the registration of their titles not only to the lands described in the original conveyance but also to those which plaintiff claims they obtained from him by threats and intimidation; and in this connection they again invite consideration of the fact that, after all of the alleged wrongful acts of the defendants, the plaintiff repurchased the remaining properties, paying a consideration of P6,800 therefor.

Counsel for defendants on this appeal challenge the truthfulness of plaintiff's testimony when confronted by the denial of the defendants and a history of his own acts; and in doing so our attention is drawn to the admission of counsel for the plaintiff in their brief where they say: "The recital of woeful abuse which constitutes the plaintiff's complaint might stagger the credence were it the mere version of a litigant, disputed or contradicted by his opponent, or by a single witness or document offered in their behalf; "and we necessarily recur to the fact that the defendants did contradict plaintiff not only in their oral testimony but by the documents and documentary evidence introduced by them. Not only do they in their oral declarations contradict the plaintiff's testimony but there is a grave question whether or not the plaintiff is not bound by their testimony. They were his witness, called by him by virtue of section 355 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and while their testimony was not introduced by the plaintiff, it was offered by the defendants and accepted as evidence by the court with the consent and agreement of counsel for the plainful. We do not find it necessary to decide this question at this time, but refer to it simply to call attention to the possibility that section 355 may have its penalties as well as its rewards. Returning to the question of ratification and renunciation, the Civil Code provides, article 1309, that "the action of nullity is extinguished from the moment the contract may have been validly confirmed;" and article 1311 declares that "the confirmation can be made either expressly or in an implied manner. It shall be understood that there is an implied confirmation when, being aware of the cause of the nullity and such cause having ceased to exist, the person who may have a right to invoke it should execute an act which necessarily implies his wish to renounce such a right;" while article 1313 provides that "confirmation purges the contract of all defects which it may have contained from the moment of its execution." The first rejection of plaintiff's claims of the existence of the parol agreement in connection with the conveyance of March 22, 1909, occurred in June or the last part of July of 1909 when the defendants refused to sign an instrument presented to them by the plaintiff putting in written form the alleged verbal agreement. That claim was again rejected in the same year when the Salsipuedes property was conveyed, and this time in writing. In spite of these rejections, however, plaintiff continued his dealings with the defendants, selling them the Salsipuedes and Padre Faura properties, apparently assenting to their right to eject him as tenant from the Ermita properties, and by paying them P6,800 for a conveyance of the properties described in the conveyance of March 22, 1909, remaining unsold. Not only this, but after such rejections, or at least one of them, the plaintiff assisted the defendants in obtaining Torrens title to the very properties which he claimed to own and which he now claims he had been deprived of by intimidation practiced by the defendants. It is impossible, as we view the law, for plaintiff, after having been deprived of property by intimidation, to recover that property through a voluntary agreement between him and those who intimidated him, and then repudiate not only the transactions in which he was deprived of that property, but also the very transaction by which he recovered it. By his repurchase of the remaining properties in April, 1913, he accepted everything as it stood at that time and elected to take from the defendants a conveyance of the remaining properties as a final termination of all their relations in connection therewith. Taking the case as a whole, we are therefore of the opinion that there was no intimidation and that, if there was, the plaintiff has placed himself in a position where he was not entitled to urge it as a defense. The judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed, without costs in this instance. So ordered. ----------------------------------------------

G.R. No. L-2832 November 24, 1906 REV. JORGE BARLIN, in his capacity as apostolic administrator of this vacant bishopric and legal representative of the general interests of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the diocese of Nueva Caceres, Plaintiff-Appellee , vs. P. VICENTE RAMIREZ, ex-rector of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Parochial Church of Lagonoy, AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF LAGONOY, Defendants-Appellants. WILLARD, J.: chanrobles virtual law library There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in the pueblo of Lagonoy, in the Province of Ambos Camarines, since 1839. On the 13th of January, 1869, the church and convent were burned. They were rebuilt between 1870 and 1873. There was evidence that this was done by the order of the provincial governor. The labor necessary for this reconstruction was performed by the people of the pueblo the direction of the cabeza de barangay. Under the law then in force, each man in the pueblo was required to work for the government, without compensation, for forty days every year. The time spent in the reconstruction of these buildings was counted as a part of the forty days. The material necessary was brought and paid for in part by the parish priest from the funds of the church and in part was donated by certain individuals of the pueblo. After the completion of the church it was always administered, until November 14, 1902, by a priest of a Roman Catholic Communion and all the people of the pueblo professed that faith and belonged to that church.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took possession of the church on the 5th of July, 1901. he administered it as such under the orders of his superiors until the 14th day of November, 1902. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this defendant for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other property of the church. The defendant, by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery. That document is as follows: At 7 o'clock last night I received through Father Agripino Pisino your respected order of the 12th instant, wherein I am advised of the appointment of Father Pisino as acting parish priest of this town, and directed to turn over to him this parish and to report to you at the vicarage. In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you that the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction with the parish priest thereof, has seen fit to sever connection with the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and join the Filipino Church, the head of which is at Manila. This resolution of the people was reduced to writing and triplicate copies made, of which I beg to inclose a copy herewith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library For this reason I regret to inform you that I am unable to obey your said order by delivering to Father Agripino Pisino the parish property of Lagonoy which, as I understand, is now outside of the control of the Pope and his representatives in these Islands. May God guard you many years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Lagonoy, November 14, 1902. (Signed) VICENTE RAMIREZ.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library RT. REV. VICAR OF THIS DISTRICT. The document, a copy of which is referred to in this letter, is as follows: LAGONOY, November, 9, 1902. chanrobles virtual law library The municipality of this town and some of its most prominent citizens having learned through the papers from the capital of these Islands of the constitution of the Filipino National Church, separate from the control of the Pope at Rome by reason of the fact that the latter has refused to either recognize or grant the rights to the Filipino clergy which have many times been urged, and it appearing to us that the reasons advanced why such offices should be given to the Filipino clergy are evidently well-founded, we have deemed it advisable to consult with the parish priest of this town as to whether it would be advantageous to join the said Filipino Church and to separate from the control of the Pope as long as he continues to ignore the rights of the said Filipino clergy, under the conditions that there will be no change in the articles of faith, and that the sacraments and other dogmas will be recognized and particularly that of the immaculate conception of the mother of our Lord. But the moment the Pope at Rome recognizes and grants the rights heretofore denied to the Filipino clergy we will return to his control. In view of this, and subject to this condition, the reverend parish priest, together with the people of the town, unanimously join in declaring that from this date they separate themselves from the obedience and control of the Pope and join the Filipino National Church. This assembly and the reverend parish priest have accordingly adopted this resolution written in triplicate, and resolved to send a copy thereof to the civil government of this province for its information, and do sign the same below. Vicente Ramirez, Francisco Israel, Ambrosio Bocon, Florentino Relloso, Macario P. Ledesma, Cecilio Obias, Balbino Imperial, Juan Preseada, Fernando Deudor, Mauricio Torres, Adriano Sabater. At the meeting at which the resolution spoken of in this document was adopted, there were present about 100 persons of the pueblo. There is testimony in the case that the population of the pueblo was at that time 9,000 and that all but 20 of the inhabitants were satisfied with the action there taken. Although it is of no importance in the case, we are inclined to think that the testimony to this effect merely means that about 100 of the principal men of the town were in favor of the resolution and about 20 of such principal men were opposed to it. After the 14th of November, the defendant, Ramirez, continued in the possession of the church and other property and administered the same under the directions of his superior, the Obispo Maximo of the Independent Filipino Church. The rites and ceremonies and the manner of worship were the same after the 14th day of November as they were before, but the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the defendant had been entirely severed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In January, 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, Ramirez, alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other property belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the defendant render an account of the property which he had received and which was retained by him, and for other relief.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to a general denial of the allegation of the complaint, admitted that he was in the possession and administration of the property described therein with the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of the inhabitants of the same, who were the lawful owners of the said property. After this answer had been presented, and on the 1st day of November, 1904, the municipality of Lagonoy filed a petition asking that it be allowed to intervene in the case and join with the defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant therein. This petition been granted, the municipality of the 1st day of December filed an answer in which it alleged that the defendant, Ramirez, was in possession of the property described in the complaint under the authority and with the consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and that such municipality was the owner thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Plaintiff answered this complaint, or answer in intervention, and the case was tried and final judgment in entered therein in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The defendants then brought the case here by a bill of exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library That the person in the actual possession of the church and other property described in the complaint is the defendant, Ramirez, is plainly established by the evidence. It does not appear that the municipality, as a corporate body, ever took any action in reference to this matter until they presented their petition for intervention in this case. In fact, the witnesses for the defense, when they speak of the ownership of the buildings, say that they are owned by the people of the pueblo, and one witness, the president, said that the municipality as a corporation had nothing whatever to do with the matter. That the resolution adopted on the 14th of November, and which has been quoted above, was not the action of the municipality, as such, is apparent from an inspection thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The witnesses for the defenses speak of a delivery of the church by the people of the pueblo to the defendant, Ramirez, but there is no evidence in the case of any such delivery. Their testimony in regard to the delivery always refers to the action taken on the 14th of November, a record of which appears that in the document above quoted. It is apparent that the action taken consisted simply in separating themselves from the Roman Catholic Church, and nothing is said therein in reference to the material property then in possession of the defendant, Ramirez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There are several grounds upon which this judgment must be affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (1) As to the defendant, Ramirez, it appears that he took possession of the property as the servant or agent of the plaintiff. The only right which he had to the possession at the time he took it, was the right which was given to him by the plaintiff, and he took possession under the agreement to return that possession whenever it should be demanded of him. Under such circumstances he will not be allowed, when the return of such possession is demanded by him the plaintiff, to say that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property and is not entitled to have it delivered back to him. The principle of law that a tenant can not deny his landlord's title, which is found in section 333, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and also in the Spanish law, is applicable to a case of this kind. An answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in which he alleged that he himself was the owner of the property at the time he received it from the plaintiff, or in which he alleged that the pueblo was the owner of the property at that time, would constitute no defense. There is no claim made by him that since the delivery of the possession of the property to him by the plaintiff he has acquired the title thereto by other means, nor does he is own behalf make any claim whatever either to the property or to the possession thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (2) The municipality of Lagonoy, in its answer, claims as such, to be the owner of the property. As we have said before, the evidence shows that it never was in the physical possession of the property. But waiving this point and assuming that the possession of Ramirez, which he alleges in his answer is the possession of the municipality, gives the municipality the rights of a possessor, the question still arises, Who has the better right to the present possession of the property? The plaintiff, in 1902, had been in the lawful possession thereof for more than thirty years and during all that time its possession had never been questioned or disturbed. That possession has been taken away from it and it has the right now to recover the possession from the persons who have so deprived it of such possession, unless the latter can show that they have a better right thereto. This was the preposition which was discussed and settled 1 in the case of Bishop ofCebu vs. Mangaron, No. 1748, decided June 1, 1906. That decision holds that as against one who has been in possession for the length of the plaintiff has been in possession, and who had been deprived of his possession, and who can not produce any written evidence of title, the mere fact that the defendant is in possession does not entitle the defendant to retain that possession. In order that he may continue in possession, he must show a better right thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The evidence in this case does not show that the municipality has, as such, any right of whatever in the property in question. It has produced no evidence of ownership. Its claim of ownership is rested in its brief in this court upon the following propositions: That the property in question belonged prior to the treaty of Paris to the Spanish Government; that by the treaty of Paris the ownership thereof passed to the Government of the United States; that by section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, such property was transferred to the Government of the Philippine Islands, and that by the circular of that Government, dated November 11, 1902, the ownership and the right to the possession of this property passed to the municipality of Lagonoy. If, for the purposes of the argument, we should admit that the other propositions are true, there is no evidence whatever to support the last proposition, namely that the Government of the Philippine Islands has transferred the ownership of this church to the municipality of Lagonoy. We have found no circular of the date above referred to. The one of February 10, 1903, which is probably the one intended, contains nothing that indicates any such transfer. As to the municipality of Lagonoy, therefore, it is very clear that it has neither title, ownership, nor right of possession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (3) We have said that it would have no such title or ownership ever admitting that the Spanish Government was the owner of the property and it has passed by the treaty of Paris to the American Government. But this assumption is not true. As a matter of law, the Spanish Government at the time the treaty of peace was signed, was not the owner of this property, nor of any other property like it, situated in the Philippine Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest times the parish churches in the Philippine Islands were built by the Spanish Government. Law 2, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies is, in part, as follows: Having erected all the churches, cathedrals, and parish houses of the Spaniards and natives of our Indian possessions from their discovery at the cost and expense of our royal treasury, and applied for their service and maintenance the part of the tithes belonging to us by apostolic concession according to the division we have made. Law 3 of the same title to the construction of parochial churches such as the one in question. That law is as follows: The parish churches which was erected in Spanish towns shall be of durable and decent construction. Their costs shall be divided and paid in three parts: One by our royal treasury, another by the residents and Indian encomenderos of the place where such churches are constructed, and the other part by the Indians who abide there; and if within the limits of a city, village, or place there should be any Indians incorporated to our royal crown, we command that for our part there be contributed the same amount as the residents and encomenderos, respectively, contribute; and the residents who have no Indians shall also contribute for this purpose in accordance with their stations and wealth, and that which is so given shall be deducted from the share of the Indians should pay. Law 11 of the same title is as follows: We command that the part of the tithes which belongs to the fund for the erection of churches shall be given to their superintendents to be expended for those things necessary for these churches with the advice of the prelates and officials, and by their warrants, and not otherwise. And we request and charge the archbishops and bishops not to interfere in the collection and disbursement thereof, but to guard these structures. Law 4, title 3, book 6, is as follows: In all settlements, even though the Indians are few, there shall be erected a church where mass can be decently held, and it shall have a donor with a key, notwithstanding the fact that it be the subject to or separate from a parish. Not only were all the parish churches in the Philippines erected by the King and under his direction, but it was made unlawful to erect a church without the license of the King. This provision is contained in Law 2, title 6, book 1, which is as follows: Whereas it is our intention to erect, institute, found, and maintain all cathedrals, parish churches, monasteries, votive hospitals, churches, and religious and pious establishments where they are necessary for the teaching, propagation, and preaching of the doctrine of our sacred Roman Catholic faith, and to aid to this effect with out royal treasury whenever possible, and to receive information of such places where they should be founded and are necessary, and the ecclesiastical patronage of all our Indies belonging to us: chanrobles virtual law library We command that there shall not be erected, instituted, founded, or maintained any cathedral, parish church, monastery, hospital, or votive churches, or other pious or religious establishment without our express permission as is provided in Law 1, title 2, and Law 1, title 3, of this book, notwithstanding any permission heretofore given by our viceroy or other ministers, which in this respect we revoke and make null, void, and of no effect. By agreement at an early date between the Pope and the Crown of Spain, all tithes in the Indies were given by the former to the latter and the disposition made the King of the fund thus created is indicated by Law 1, title 16, book 1, which is as follows: Whereas the ecclesiastical tithes from the Indies belong to us by the apostolic concessions of the supreme pontiffs, we command the officials of our royal treasury of those provinces to collect and cause to be collected all tithes due and to become due from the crops and flocks of the residents in the manner in which it has been the custom to pay the same, and from these tithes the churches shall be provided with competent persons of good character to serve them and with all ornaments and things which may be necessary for divine worship, to the end that these churches may be well served and equipped, and we shall be informed of God, our Lord; this order shall be observed where the contrary has not already been directed by us in connection with the erection of churches. That the condition of things existing by virtue of the Laws of the Indies was continued to the present time is indicated by the royal order of the 31st of January, 1856, and by the royal order of the 13th of August, 1876, both relating to the construction and repair of churches, there being authority for saying that the latter order was in force in the Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This church, and other churches similarly situated in the Philippines, having been erected by the Spanish Government, and under its direction, the next question to be considered is, To whom did these churches belong? chanrobles virtual law library Title 28 of the third partida is devoted to the ownership of things and, after discussing what can be called public property and what can be called private property, speaks, in Law 12, of those things which are sacred, religious, or holy. That law is as follows: Law XII. - HOW SACRED OR RELIGIOUS THINGS CAN NOT BE OWNED BY ANY PERSON.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service of God, can be the subject of ownership by any man, nor can it be considered as included in his property holdings. Although the priests may have such things in their possession, yet they are not the owners thereof. They, hold them thus as guardians or servants, or because they have the care of the same and serve God in or without them. Hence they were allowed to take from the revenues of the church and lands what was reasonably necessary for their support; the balance, belonging to God, was to be devoted to pious purposes, such as the feeding and clothing of the poor, the support of orphans, the marrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming evil women because of their poverty, and for the redemption of captives and the repairing of the churches, and the buying of chalices, clothing, books, and others things which they might be in need of, and other similar charitable purposes. And then taking up for consideration the first of the classes in to which this law has divided these things, it defines in Law 13, title 28, third partida, consecrated things. That law is as follows: Sacred things, we say, are those which are consecrated by the bishops, such as churches, the altars therein, crosses, chalices, censers, vestments, books, and all other things which are in tended for the service of the church, and the title to these things can not be alienated except in certain specific cases as we have already shown in the first partida of this book by the laws dealing with this subject. We say further that even where a consecrated church is razed, the ground upon which it formerly stood shall always be consecrated ground. But if any consecrated church should fall into the hands of the enemies of our faith it shall there and then cease to be sacred as long as the enemy has it under control, although once recovered by the Christians, it will again become sacred, reverting to its condition before the enemy seized it and shall have all the right and privileges formerly belonging to it. That the principles of the partida in reference to churches still exist is indicated by Sanchez Roman, whose work on the Civil Law contains the following statement: First Group. Spiritual and corporeal or ecclesiastical. A. Spiritual. - From early times distinction has been made by authors and by law between things governed by divine law, called divine, and those governed by human law, called human, and although the former can not be the subject of civil juridical relations, their nature and species should be ascertained either to identify them and exclude them from such relations or because they furnish a complete explanation of the foregoing tabulated statement, or finally because the laws of the partida deal with them. Divine things are those which are either directly or indirectly established by God for his service and sanctification of men and which are governed by divine or canonical laws. This makes it necessary to divide them into spiritual things, which are those which have a direct influence on the religious redemption of man such as the sacrament, prayers, fasts, indulgences, etc., and corporeal or ecclesiastical, which are those means more or less direct for the proper religious salvation of man. 7. First Group. Divine things. B. Corporeal or ecclesiastical things (sacred, religious, holy, and temporal belonging to the church). Corporeal or ecclesiastical things are so divided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (a) Sacred things are those devoted to God, religion, and worship in general, such as temples, altars, ornaments, etc. These things can not be alienated except for some pious purpose and in such cases as are provided for in the laws, according to which their control pertains to the ecclesiastical authorities, and in so far as their use is concerned, to the believers and the clergy. (2 Derecho Civil Espaol, Sanchez Roman, p. 480; 8 Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, p. 636; 3 Alcubilla, Diccionario de la Administracion Espaola, p. 486.) The partidas defined minutely what things belonged to the public in general and what belonged to private persons. In the first group churches are not named. The present Civil Code declares in article 338 that property is of public or private ownership. Article 339, which defines public property, is as follows: Property of public ownership is - chanrobles virtual law library 1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of similar character.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2. That belonging exclusively to the state without being for public use and which is destined to some public service, or to the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until their concession has been granted. The code also defines the property of provinces and of pueblos, and in defining what property is of public use, article 344 declares as follows: Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library All other property possessed by either is patrimonial, and shall be governed by the provisions of this code, unless otherwise prescribe in special laws. It will be noticed that in either one of these articles is any mention made of churches. When the Civil Code undertook to define those things in a pueblo which were for the common use of the inhabitants of the pueblo, or which belonged to the State, while it mentioned a great many other things, it did not mention churches.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It has been said that article 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law indicates that churches belong to the State and are public property. That article is as follows: There shall be excepted from the record required by article 2 of the law: chanrobles virtual law library First. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent domain of the State, and which is for the use of all, such as the shores of the sea, islands, rivers and their borders, wagon roads, and the roads of all kinds, with the exception of railroads; streets, parks, public promenades, and commons of towns, provided they are not lands of common profit to the inhabitants; walls of cities and parks, ports, and roadsteads, and any other analogous property during the time they are in common and general use, always reserving the servitudes established by law on the shores of the sea and borders of navigable rivers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith. A reading of this article shows that far from proving that churches belong to the State and to the eminent domain thereof, it proves the contrary, for, if they had belonged to the State, they would have been included in the first paragraph instead of being placed in a paragraph by themselves.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of the Philippines to the United States, churches and other consecrated objects were considered outside of the commerce of man. They were not public property, nor could they be subjects of private property in the sense that any private person could the owner thereof. They constituted a kind of property distinctive characteristic of which was that it was devoted to the worship of God.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library But, being material things was necessary that some one should have the care and custody of them and the administration thereof, and the question occurs, To whom, under the Spanish law, was intrusted that possession and administration? For the purposes of the Spanish law there was only one religion. That was the religion professed by the Roman Catholic Church. It was for the purposes of that religion and for the observance of its rites that this church and all other churches in the Philippines were erected. The possession of the churches, their care and custody, and the maintenance of religious worship therein were necessarily, therefore, intrusted to that body. It was, by virtue of the laws of Spain, the only body which could under any circumstances have possession of, or any control over, any

church dedicated to the worship of God. By virtue of those laws this possession and right of control were necessarily exclusive. It is not necessary or important to give any name to this right of possession and control exercised by the Roman Catholic Church in the church buildings of the Philippines prior to 1898. It is not necessary to show that the church as a juridical person was the owner of the buildings. It is sufficient to say that this right to the exclusive possession and control of the same, for the purposes of its creation, existed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The right of patronage, existing in the King of Spain with reference to the churches in the Philippines, did not give him any right to interfere with the material possession of these buildings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Title 6 of book 1 of the Compilation of the laws of the Indies treats Del Patronazgo Real de las Indias. There is nothing in any one of the fifty-one laws which compose this title which in any way indicates that the King of Spain was the owner of the churches in the Indies because he had constructed them. These laws relate to the right of presentation to ecclesiastical charges and offices. For example, Law 49 of the title commences as follows: Because the patronage and right of presentation of all archbishops, bishops, dignitaries, prevents, curates, and doctrines and all other beneficiaries and ecclesiastical offices whatsoever belong to us, no other person can obtain or possess the same without our presentation as provided in Law 1 and other laws of this title. Title 15 of the first partida treats of the right of patronage vesting in private persons, but there is nothing in any one of its fifteen laws which in any way indicates that the private patron is the owner of the church.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library When it is said that this church never belonged to the Crown of Spain, it is not intended to say that the Government and had no power over it. It may be that by virtue of that power of eminent domain which is necessarily resides in every government, it might have appropriated this church and other churches, and private property of individuals. But nothing of this kind was ever attempted in the Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic Church had by law the exclusive right to the possession of this church and it had the legal right to administer the same for the purposes for which the building was consecrated. It was then in the full and peaceful possession of the church with the rights aforesaid. That these rights were fully protected by the treaty of Paris is very clear. That treaty, in article 8, provides, among other things, as follows: And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, or provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, or whatsoever nationality such individuals may be. It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions of that treaty. Neither the Government of the United States, nor the Government of these Islands, has ever attempted in any way to interfere with the rights which the Roman Catholic Church had in this building when Spanish sovereignty ceased in the Philippines. Any interference that has resulted has been caused by private individuals, acting without any authority from the Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library No point is made in the brief of the appellant that any distinction should be made between the church and the convent. The convent undoubtedly was annexed to the church and, as to it, the provisions of Law 19, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies would apply. That law is as follows: We command that the Indians of each town or barrio shall construct such houses as may be deemed sufficient in which the priests of such towns or barrios may live comfortably adjoining the parish church of the place where that may be built for the benefit of the priests in charge of such churches and engaged in the education and conversion of their Indian parishioners, and they shall not be alienated or devoted to any other purpose. The evidence in this case makes no showing in regard to the cemetery. It is always mentioned in connection with the church and convent and no point is made by the possession of the church and convent, he is not also entitled to recover possession of the cemetery. So, without discussing the question as to whether the rules applicable to churches are all respects applicable to cemeteries, we hold for the purpose of this case that the plaintiff has the same right to the cemetery that he has to the church.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library (4) It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution which antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and which existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshiped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration. In the preamble to the budget relating to ecclesiastical obligations, presented by Montero Rios to the Cortes on the 1st of October 1871, speaking of the Roman Catholic Church, he says: Persecuted as an unlawful association since the early days of its existence up to the time of Galieno, who was the first of the Roman emperors to admit it among the juridicial entities protected by the laws of the Empire, it existed until then by the mercy and will of the faithful and depended for such existence upon pious gifts and offerings. Since the latter half of the third century, and more particularly since the year 313, when Constantine, by the edict of Milan, inaugurated an era of protection for the church, the latter gradually entered upon the exercise of such rights as were required for the acquisition, preservation, and transmission of property the same as any other juridical entity under the laws of the Empire. (3 Dictionary of Spanish Administration, Alcubilla, p. 211. See also the royal order of the 4th of December, 1890, 3 Alcubilla, 189.) The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter the record be remanded to the court below for execution. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Separate Opinions chanrobles virtual law library CARSON, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library I am in entire accord with the majority of the court as to the disposition of this case, but I can not adopt the reasoning by which some of the conclusions appear to have been obtained, nor accept without reserve all of the propositions laid down in the majority opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Profoundly as I respect the judgment of my associates, and distrustful as I ought to be of my own, the transcendant importance of the issues involved seems to impose upon me the duty of writing a separate opinion and stating therein as clearly as may be the precise grounds upon which I base my assent and the reasons which forbid my acceptance of the majority opinion in its entirety.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library I accept the argument and authority of the opinion of the court in so far as it finds: That the Roman Catholic Church is a juridical entity in the Philippine Islands; that the defendant, Ramirez, can not and should not be permitted in this action to deny the plaintiff's right to the possession of the property in question, because he can not be heard to set up title thereto in himself or a third person, at least until he has first formally surrendered it to the plaintiff who intrusted it to his care; that the municipality of Lagonoy has failed to show by evidence of record that it is or ever was in physical possession of the property in question; and that the possession of the defendant Ramirez, can not be relied upon as the possession of the municipality because the same reason which estops Ramirez from denying the right of possession in the plaintiff estops any other person claiming possession through him from denying that right. I agree, furthermore, with the finding that the defendant municipality failed to establish a better right to the possession than the plaintiff in this action, because, claiming to be the owner by virtue of a grant from the Philippine Government, it failed to establish the existence of such grant; and because, furthermore, it was shown that the plaintiff or his predecessors had been in possession and control of the property in question for a long period of years prior to the treaty of Paris by unlawful authority of the King of Spain, and that since the

sovereignty of these Islands has been transferred to the United States the new sovereign has never at any time divested or attempted to divest the plaintiff of this possession and control.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Thus far I am able to accept the reasoning of the majority opinion, and these propositions, supported as they are by the law and the evidence in this case, completely dispose of the question before us and establish the right of the plaintiff to a judgment for possession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library I am not prepared, however, to give my assent to the proposition that prior to the Treaty of Paris "The King of Spain was not the owner of the property in question nor of any other property like it situated in the Philippine Islands," and inferentially that the United States is not now the owner thereof and has no property rights therein other than, perhaps, the mere right of eminent domain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library I decline to affirm this proposition, first, because it is not necessary in the decision of this case; and second, because I am of opinion that, in the unlimited and unrestricted sense in which it is stated in the majority opinion, it is inaccurate and misleading, if not wholly erroneous.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library That it is not necessary for the proper disposition of this case will be apparent if we consider the purpose for which it is introduced in the argument and the proposition which it is intended to controvert. As stated in the majority opinion, the claim of ownership of the defendant municipality It is rested upon the following propositions: That the property in question belonged, prior to the treaty of Paris, to the Spanish Government; that by the treaty of Paris the ownership of thereof passed to the Government of the United States; that by article 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, such property was transferred to the Government of the Philippine Islands, and that by a circular of that Government dated November 11, 1902, the ownership and the right to the possession of this property passed to the municipality of Lagonoy. It is evident that if any of these propositions is successfully controverted, the defendants' claim of ownership must fall to the ground. The majority opinion finds (and I am entire accord as to this finding) that neither the Government of the United States nor the Philippine Government had ever made, or attempted to make, such transfer, and in making its finding it completely, conclusively, and finally disposes of defendants' claim of ownership.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library All the acts of the Government of the United States and of the present Government of the Philippine Islands which can have any relation to the property in question are before us, and so short a period of years has elapsed since the transfer of the sovereignty of these Islands to the United States that it is possible to demonstrate with the utmost certainty that by no act of the United States or of the Government of the Philippine Islands has the ownership and possession of this property been conferred upon the defendant municipality; it is a very different undertaking, however, to review the legislation of Spain for the three centuries of her Philippine occupation for the purpose of deciding the much-vexed question of the respective property rights of the Spanish sovereign and the Roman Catholic Church in State-constructed and State-aided churches in these Islands; and if I am correct in my contention that a holding that the King of Spain was not." and, inferentially, that the Government of the United States is not, "the owner of this property or any other property like it is situated in the Philippine Islands" is not necessary for the full, final, and complete determination of the case at bar, then I think that this court should refrain from making so momentous a finding in a case wherein the United States is not a party and has never had an opportunity to be heard.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library But the mere fact that a finding that the King of Spain had no right of ownership in this property which could pass to the United States under the provisions of the treaty of Paris is not necessary in my opinion for the disposition of the case at bar, would not impose upon me the duty of writing a separate opinion if it were in fact and a law a correct holding. I am convinced, however, that when stated without limitations or restrictions, as it appears in the majority opinion, it is inaccurate and misleading, and it may not be improper, therefore, to indicate briefly my reasons for doubting it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library As stated in the majority opinion, "it does not admit of doubt that the parish churches in the Philippines were built by the Spanish Government," and it would seem therefore that prior to their dedication, the beneficial ownership, the legal title, the possession and control of all this property must be taken to have been vested in that Government. But it must be admitted that after this property was dedicated, the ownership, in contemplation of Spanish law, was said to have been in God, and there can be no doubt that the physical possession and control of these churches for the purposes for which they were dedicated was given to the Roman Catholic Church not, as I think, absolutely and conclusively, but limited by and subject to the royal patronage ( patronato real) which included the right to intervene in the appointment of the representatives of the church into whose hands the possession and control of the sacred editors were to be intrusted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The anomalous status thus created might well have given rise to doubts and uncertainties as to the legal title and beneficial ownership of this property had not the grantor and the lawgiver of Spain expressly and specifically provided that neither the Roman Catholic Church nor any other person was or could become the owner thereof, and that all these sacred edifices were to be regarded as beyond the commerce of men. No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service of God, can be the subject of ownership by any man, nor it can be considered as included in his property holdings. Although the priests may have such things in their possession, yet they are not the owners thereof. They hold them thus as guardians or servants, or because they have the care of the same and serve God in or with them. Hence they were allowed to take from the Revenues of the church and lands what was reasonably necessary for their support; the balance, belonging to God, was to be devoted to pious purposes, such as the feeding and clothing of the poor, the support of orphans, the marrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming evil women because of their poverty; and for the redemption of captivers and the repairing of the churches, and the buying of chalices, clothing, books, and other things which they might be in seed of, and other similar charitable purposes. (Law 12, title 28, partida 3.) It is difficult to determine, and still more difficult to state, the precise meaning and legal effect of this disposition of the ownership, possession, and control of the parish churches in the Philippines; but since it was not possible for God, in any usual or ordinary sense to take or hold, to enforce or to defend the legal title to this property, it would seem that a grant to Him by the King or the Government of Spain could not suffice to convey to Him the legal title of the property set out in the grant, and the truth would seem to be that the treatment of this property in contemplation of Spanish law as the property of God was a mere arbitrary convention, the purpose and object of which was crystallize the status of all such property in the peculiar and unusual mold in which it was cast at the time of its dedication.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library So long as church and state remained united and so long as the Roman Catholic Church continued to be the church of the State, this convention served its purpose well; indeed, its very indefiniteness seems to have aided in the accomplishment of the end for which it was adopted, and on a review of all the pertinent citations of Spanish law which have been brought to my attention, I am satisfied that the status created by the above-cited law 12 of the partidas continued without substantial modification to the date of the transfer of sovereignty from the King of Spain to the United States. But this transfer of sovereignty, and the absolute severance of church and state which resulted therefrom, render it necessary to ascertain as definitely as may be the true meaning and intent of this conventional treatment of the parish churches in the Philippines as the property of God, and it is evident that for this purpose we must look to the substance rather than the form and examine the intention of the grantor and the object he sought to attain, rather than the words and conventional terms whereby that intent was symbolically expressed. It is not necessary to go beyond the citations of the majority opinion to see that the objects which the grantor sought to attain were, first, and chiefly, to advance the cause of religion among the people of the Philippine Islands and to provide for their religious instruction and edification by furnishing them with parish churches suitable for the worship and glorification of God; second, to place those sacred edifices under the guardian care and custody of the church of the State; and, third, to deny to that church and to all others the right of ownership in the property thus dedicated; and since God could neither take nor hold the legal title to this property, the declaration of the King of Spain as set out in the above-cited law, that when dedicated these churches became in some peculiar and especial manner the property of God, was in effect no more than a solemn obligation imposed upon himself to hold them for the purposes for which they

were dedicated, and to exercise no right of property in them inconsistent therewith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library This declaration that these churches are the property of God and the provisions which accompanied it, appear to me to be precisely equivalent to a declaration of trust by the grantor that he would hold the property as trustee for the use for which it was dedicated - that is, for the religious edification and enjoyment of the people of the Philippine Islands - and that he would give to the Roman Catholic Church the physical possession and control thereof, including the disposition of any funds arising therefrom, under certain stipulated conditions and for the purposes expressly provided by law. In other words, the people of the Philippine Islands became the beneficial owners of all such property, and the grantor continued to hold the legal title, in trust nevertheless to hold the property for the purposes for which it was dedicated and on the further trust to give the custody and control thereof to the Roman Catholic Church. If this interpretation of the meaning and intent of the convention of Spanish law which treated God as the owner of the parish churches of the Philippine Islands be correct, a holding that the King of Spain had no right to ownership in this property which could pass to the United States by virtue of the treaty of Paris can not be maintained; and it is to withhold my assent from this proposition that I have been compelled to write this separate opinion. For the purposes of this opinion it is not necessary, nor would it be profitable, to do more than indicate the line of reasoning which has led me to my conclusions, nor to discuss at length the question of ownership of this property, because whether it be held to be in abeyance or in God or in the Roman Catholic Church or in the United States it has been shown without deciding this question of ownership that the right to the possession for the purpose for which it was dedicated is in the Roman Catholic Church, and while the complaint in this action alleges that the Roman Catholic Church is the owner of the property in question, the prayer of the complaint is for the possession of this property of which it is alleged that church has been unlawfully deprived; and because, furthermore, if I am correct in my contention that the legal title to the State-constructed churches in the Philippines passed to the United States the virtue of the treaty of Paris, it passed, nevertheless, subject to the trusts under which it was held prior thereto, and the United States can not at will repudiate the conditions of that trust and retain its place in the circle of civilized nations; and as long as the property continues to be used for the purposes for which it was dedicated, the Government of the United States has no lawful right to deprive the Roman Catholic Church of the possession and control thereof under the terms and conditions upon which that possession and control were originally granted. ________________________ CASE DIGEST ON BARLIN V. RAMIREZ [7 P 41] - F: The def., Ramirez, having been appointed by the pltff parish priest, took possession of the church on 7/5/01. He administered if as such under the orders of his superiors until 11/14/02. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this def. for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other prop. of the church. The def., by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery, stating that "the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction w/ the parish priest of thereof, has seen fit to sever connection w/ the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and to join the Filipino Church, the head of w/c is at Mla. In 1/4, the pltff. brought this action against def., alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church bldg, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other prop. belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the def. render an account of the prop. w/c he had received and w/c was retained by him, and for other relief. The CFI-Ambos Camarines ruled in favor of the pltff. HELD: It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution w/c antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and w/c existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshipped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration.