Feminists, Islamists, and Political Change in Turkey Author(s): Yeim Arat Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 19, No.

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Political Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1998

Feminists, Islamists, and Political Change in Turkey

Ye?im Arat
Department of Political Science and International Relations Bo6azifi University, Istanbul, Turkey

Thispaper examineshow somefeminist and Islamist women in Turkeyhelped bring about change in political values during the past decade. The traditionalpolitical cultureupheld statist,corporatist(as opposed to liberal, individualist)norms.Thestate controlledreligion in the name of secularism and limited democracy within the confines offormal equality. Bothfeminists and Islamistscontestedtraditionalpolitical values by insistingon their own definition of their interests, as opposed to those that were state-enforced.Thefeminists questionedthejustice offormal equalityas theysoughtsubstantiveequality;Islamistwomen challenged the secular concept of equality as they insisted on the justice of male-female Both groups engaged in active politics and expandedthe parametersof complementarity. democraticparticipationas theysoughtsubstantiveequalitybeyondformalequality.Yetthe patriarchal heritage of Islam defined the limits of Islamist women's searchfor liberation within the confines of religion.
KEY WORDS: feminists;Islamists;Turkey;political change;women in Turkey

In this essay, I would like to examine how women helpedbringaboutpolitical I change since the mid-1980s in Turkey.1 focus on two groupsof women:feminists who organizedagainstdomestic violence and Islamistwomen. These two groups are worth our attentionbecause, althoughthey are composed of activists whose worldviews are radically opposed to one another,both groups have successfully raised their voice to make a difference in politics. Feminists insist on women's Islamists,even when they do make unequivocalrightto choose theirpredicament; for women's rights,are boundwithin the constraintsof sacredlaw. Yet both pleas groupshave left their imprinton political discoursewith their demandsfor rights as they themselves define them.

1An earlier version of this article was presentedat the International Society of Political Psychology conference, 21-24 July 1997, Krakow,Poland. 117
0162-895X ? 1998 International Society of Political Psychology Publishedby Blackwell Publishers,350 Main Street,Maiden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF,UK.

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If power involves "settingthe agendaof public debate"and "shapingthe way people define their concerns" (Katzenstein, 1995), then these women, whose activitiestook place beyondthe scope of traditional generated politicalinstitutions, power to advocate change in political values and consciousness. Demands for of political change came as women resistedprevailingstructures power-those of the state as well society-and in turn were resisted by these loci of power. individuPrevailingnormsadvocatedby the stateandadoptedby society regarding alism as opposed to solidarism were questioned. Concepts of democracy and secularism were challenged. As women redefined their identities in search of politicalgains, the stateandsociety againstwhichthose identitieswere formedalso changed.I now discusshow these two differentgroupsof womenencroachedupon the entrenchedlimits of women's traditional political activism to initiatechange. Context of Turkish Politics With the adventof the TurkishRepublicin 1923, the foundingfathershad to respond to the challenge of creating new political identities in a new political initiatedby the stateelites was prompted culture.The projectof modernization by for the West on one hand, and shaped by the local practices of aspirations solidarismon the otherhand(Bozdogan & Kasaba, 1997). To the communitarian extent thatthe projectof modernitywas "atotalproject,embracingandinternalizing all the culturaldimensionsthatmade Europemodern"(Keyder, 1997, p. 37), religious laws and norms of the polity were obstacles to progress. Ideals of liberalismand individualismassociated with Westernculturecould not be practiced in such a way as to underminethese established institutions,which were and deemed to oppose Westernization the West. Engaged in the enormous task of modernizingthe state and the polity, the measures to implement their leaders of the Republic resorted to authoritarian reforms(Tun9ay,1981). A solidaristcollectivist ethic served as the tool of modcouldnot be effective ernizingreforms(Parla,1992) whenappealsto individualism as a means to achieve the task at hand.Populism,which was to meangovernment by the people, came to representgovernmentby the people for the people, which at times verged on being despite the people (Parla, 1992, p. 219; Shaw & Shaw, 1977, pp. 378-384). The governingelite knew the best interestsof the people and thus could justify the single-partyregime of the Republicuntil 1945. Interestsof the communityand the nation would come before the interestsof the individual (Heper, 1985). It was in this context that the Islamic law was abolished, to be replacedby secularcodes. The new civic code grantedwomenrightsequalto those and of men in, for example,inheritance divorceby 1926. In the same spirit,women were given suffragein 1934. The foundingfatherspromotedwomen's publicroles benevolence. and changingstatuswith patriarchal Westerncivilization However, liberalismas the heart of the much-admired was implicitly recognized. To the extent that Westernizationwas the goal of

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modernization,the values of liberalism surfaced in both economic and cultural discourse.MustafaKemal, the founderof the Republic,gave his personalsupport class. Even though,to this for the cultivationof a liberalcapitalistentrepreneurial have not liberatedthemselvesfromthispaternalistic day, the Turkishentrepreneurs relationshipto the state (Bugra, 1994; Keyder, 1987), aspirationsfor liberalism remain. In the culturaldomain, liberalism as an ethic of individualismwas not altogether ignored. The importantideologue of the day-Ahmet Agaoglu, a Russian emigre who had studied in France-defended the values of liberal indicollectivist practicesof the state. vidualismagainstthe authoritarian, The battlebetweenliberalismandcollectivist statismcontinuesto characterize the political life of the countryto this day. Whatliberalismmeans, its relationship to individualism, and meanings of statism are still contested. It is within the parametersof this debate that women's political activism in the contemporary periodcan be best understood. Feminist Women The tension among individualism,collective social norms,and statismcharacterized the period of women's political activism that began in the mid-1980s. This period was characterizedby a political vacuum where the militantleft and right were suppressed(Tekeli, 1986). Women who had been engaged in leftist political activism and whose boyfriends or husbands were imprisoned had an opportunityto contemplatetheir predicament.In the context of a global feminist upheaval, feminist ideas inevitably had their appeal for Turkishwomen as well. The vanguardof feminist activism in Turkeywere educated,mostly professional middle-class women who had personallinks to feminists abroador were exposed to feminist literaturethroughfriends or connections. Works of Mary Wollstonecraft, Simone de Beauvoir, Betty Friedan,Kate Millet, and SchulamithFirestone circulatedamong women who first came together allegedly with the purpose of publishing a series on women for a publishingcompany and later identified this In activism as consciousness-raising. the shadowof militarysupervision,feminist rhetoricreasonablyseemed innocuousenoughto have its own space (Arat,1994a). Even thoughthe formandcontentof feminismin the 1980s wouldbe very different, therewas the heritageof a statefeminismthatthe foundingfathersof the Republic hadinitiatedandlegitimized,which also helpedfeminismto flourishin a politically circumscribedcontext. By the mid-1980s the vanguardhad branchedout, and women who began calling themselves feminists organized not merely in small groups,but in publicprotestsin IstanbulandAnkara.Even thoughdifferentgroups that identifiedthemselves as radicalor leftist feminists emergedduringthe 1980s, these groups were united by the issue of domestic violence. Where abortionhad ignited feminist hearts in many Western countries, domestic violence activated feminists of differentpersuasionsin Turkey.Turkishwomen, despite shortcomings, did have abortionrights.

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The feminists who organized the campaign against domestic violence in Istanbul begantheirprotestindividuallyby contestingthe state'sjurisdiction(Arat, 1994b; Ann, 1996). When a feminist activist read in a barjournal a court ruling that gave explicit legitimacy to domestic violence, the feminist protest against domestic violence was triggered.The judge had refused to grant a divorce to a woman, motherof three childrenand pregnantwith a fourth,who was regularly beatenby her husband; expoundedhis decision with the saying that"oneshould he not leave a woman's back without a stick, her womb withouta donkey."At first, a small group of women sent protestletters to the judge and attempted,without success, to take him to courtwith the claim thathe had insultedthem as women. The next stage was the collective decision taken to initiate the campaign against domestic violence. A rally was organizedin May 1987 that protestedthe pervasive practiceof domestic violence as well as the state's lack of attentionto the issue. The enthusiastic turnout the mediafocus on thecampaignencouraged and the participants organize a 1-day festival in Octoberof the same year, to draw to furtherattentionto the issue and raise funds to publish the personalaccounts of women who hadbeen exposed to domesticviolence. Collectiveeffortsas feminists were now geared toward increasing public awarenessratherthan seeking state action on the problem.The process increasedwomen's self-confidence and their faith thatthey could make a differenceby themselves.In April 1990, 14 feminists establisheda foundationwith the purposeof opening a shelterfor women exposed to domestic violence. PurpleRoof Women's ShelterFoundationwas the accomplishmentof individualfeminists who had discoveredtheirown collective power againstthe state.The foundationwas the firstof its kindin its goals andthe feminist modes of achievingthose goals. The women of the PurpleRoof waged a battle againstthe institutionsof the state to remain autonomousand to have the discretionarypower-as feminists ratherthan as social service providers-to accommodatebatteredwomen. They refusedto allow the state to subvertthe feminist meaningof theirendeavor.They challenged the traditionalrhetoricof the women-friendlystate that had granted suffrageto women-a challenge thatled to the establishmentof the PurpleRoof. Ironically,the feministswho had theirindividualandindividualisticrevolt against statistand solidaristsocietal normshad to act in solidarityto reachtheirgoals. For the sake of feminist solidarity,individualfeministshad to curbindividualfeminist demands. to Collective feminist determination have an autonomousfoundationled the membersof the PurpleRoof to decline the supportmunicipalitiescould provide with certain conditions. The founders of the Purple Roof sought help from the Social Democratic Populist Party mayor of Istanbulat the time, without much result.The mayorexpected to have the ultimatedecision-makingpower regarding from the operationof the shelter.Whenthe feministsinsistedon theirindependence the the municipality, buildinghe was planningto designatefor the use of the Purple Roof was given to the municipalityof Sisli to be used as a shelter (Ann, 1996,

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fromthe pp. 148-149). A similarstoryfollowed when the feminists soughtsupport of Bakirkoy. In due course, the Bakirkoy municipality opened its own mayor shelter.Two districtmunicipalitiesopening sheltersfor the first time in Turkeyin response to feminist initiation was a significant outcome in itself. However, the feministsresolutelyinsistedon theirautonomyandforesawthatsheltersshouldnot be left to the vicissitudesof partisan Whenthey politics or patriarchal management. realized they could not get the kind of help they needed from the municipalities, they rented a small flat, provided consulting services to women exposed to violence, and workedto raise the money needed for the shelter. Overtime, the relationship betweenthese feministsandthe statechanged.The feminists initiateda successfulcollaboration, with the local but with the federal not thatthe statecould be an importantsource of support government.They accepted for them, and the relevantinstitutionsof the state acceptedthat the feminists had to retaintheir autonomy.In 1993, The PurpleRoof Women's ShelterFoundation acquired a house to be used as a shelter with the help of the State Ministry of Women, Family and Social Services. The ministryprovideda substantialamount of funds towardthe purchaseof the building,which the foundationwould have the authorityto operate as a shelter.Feminist membersof the PurpleRoof who had institutionsin the midindividuallyprotestedagainst the state and its patriarchal 1980s had gained the self-confidenceto approach stateandtame its patriarchal the proclivities. They were able to convince the state of the importanceof the project to be able to get the money they did, at the same time as they ensuredtheir own independence. In turn, the state-at least, the state ministry responsible for women-had the confidence to recognize the feminists and resist co-opting them with its traditional"the state knows the best interestsof its people, including its women, better than they themselves do" attitude.This collaborationchanged the patronizingpolitical relationshipthat had long characterizedthe interactionbetween women and the state. The trickle-down results were noteworthy. There might have been other factors at work-such as the global context, the international treatiesthatTurkey had signed, and international thatTurkeyworkedwith-but neverorganizations theless the feminist goal to make the invisible problem of pervasive domestic violence visible was reached. The second and third periodic reports of Turkey in of prepared 1996 underarticle18 of the Conventionon theElimination All Forms of Discrimination Womencites 15 researchprojectsundertaken since 1989 Against thatshedlight on differentaspectsof domesticviolence in Turkey(CEDAWreport, 1996). Among these, some are carried out in universities, others by the State Ministry of Women, Family and Social Services, the Prime Ministry Family ResearchInstitution,or the PrimeMinistryDirectorateGeneralon the Statusand Problems of Women. Thus, institutions of the state were involved in studying domestic violence and focusing attentionon the issue. These projects and other researchcarriedout by privatesurveygroupshadrepercussions throughthe media, both the populardailies and television.

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Besides the PurpleRoof, a numberof otherofficial andvoluntaryassociations that provide counseling and shelter services for women opened. In 1991, a year afterthe PurpleRoof was foundedin Istanbul, Women's SolidarityFoundation was establishedin Ankarawith the initiativeof a feministgroupanda local municipality. Bornova,Kiiuqikekmece,Kayseri,andNazilli municipalities openedwomen's homes (althoughthe latter two have been closed after a devolution of political power). The DirectorateGeneralfor Child Protectionand Social Services established women's guest houses in many regions, including Izmir (1990), Ankara (1991), Bursa (1991), Antalya (1991), Eski?ehir (1993), Istanbul (1995), and Tekirdag(1996) (CEDAWreport,1996, pp. 33-35). In contrast, the women of the Purple Roof, with 60 volunteers, provided counseling to about 1,000 women between 1990 and 1995. With their limited means,they organizedpanels anddiscussionsto drawpublic attentionto the issue. In this context,feministsprovidedradicalcritiquesof the legal framework pertainto domestic violence (Ann, 1996, pp. 130-139). They argue that violence ing toward women's bodies should be treated under a separatesection as "sexual assaults"withinthe criminalcode. Thereshouldbe no toleranceof violence toward women, and judges should not be allowed to refer to extenuatingcircumstances such as traditionsand local customs. These crimes should not depend on formal to rather, complaint; everyoneshouldbe required reportcases of domesticviolence. In line with the spiritof the existing formalegalitarian laws but againsttheirformal for a substantiveequality by asking for laws to egalitariancontent, they argue provide special care and treatmentfor women exposed to violence (Ann, 1996, p. 138). Beyond all this effort is the attemptto make self-respectingindividuals of women who have been socialized to be sacrificing, selfless mothers and wives. Domestic violence is one importantarena where the battle between the liberal of individualismof the feminists and the solidaristcommunitarianism the state is fought with conviction. Ironically,feminists first had to wage an individualfight practices,thenjoin togetherin feminist against social norms and communitarian solidarityto underlinethe grievancesof women as a group.Theirgoal, nevertheless, was makingindividualsof women who were violently discriminated against as a group.CananAnn, one of the prominentfoundersof the PurpleRoof, ended her essay (1996) on the story of the institutionwith a revealingcommenton their goals or what it is that satisfies her in this challenging environmentof domestic violence: Workingin a place like the PurpleRoof is a very tiring,exhaustingtask, which at times fills one with feelings of hopelessness and despair.However, the biggest prize is seeing torn women who have completely lost confidencein themselves,shy andhesitantto talk,those who have lost all become, abouta year later, hope and who believe in their "nothingness" citizens and individualswho can laugh, and self-confident,independent

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makeincrediblyhealthydecisions andstandon theirtwo feet. It (theprize) is metamorphosingin solidarity,understanding one another'slanguage better.(p. 151) It is revealing that even though the self-confident, independentindividualis the prize, Ann immediately added the collective communal dimension of the goal. Women thus seek substantiveequality in political participationbeyond formal equality as equally endowed individuals. Islamist Women It was not merely the political acts and debatesof secularfeminists, but also those of Islamist women that shed light on how women may have contributedto political change in the country.By the term Islamist, I refer to the explicit use of Islam as a political ideology ratherthana privatereligiousbelief system. "Islamist women"is a loose phrasethatdenotesa heterogeneousgroupof women, including those who only seek the rightto cover theirheads in public as well as the militant activists of the IslamistWelfareParty.Within this wide spectrum,some are more active than others. Contextof Islamist Women As political actors, Islamist women were part of the Islamist movement of post-1980s Turkey. There have been various explanationsof this contemporary Islamistupsurge.Influentialwriters,both secularandIslamist,have arguedthatthe deficiencies of the Kemalist modernizationproject that was staged after the foundationof the Republic accountfor the appealof Islam. It has been suggested that the "superficialityand lack of organic linkages with society, of Kemalism" (Mardin,1989, p. 170) has led the Islamiststo fill the vacuumcreatedin the life of the people. Othershave pointed to the consequencesof migration(Toprak,1991) or to the crises of nationalidentity in the context of global modernity(Keyman, 1995) to explain the Islamistappeal.Many have pointedto the role of the state in controlling(Sunar& Toprak,1983) or accommodatingIslam (Cizre-Sakallioglu, 1996). It is in the contextof these sociopoliticalandeconomic forces thatthe appeal of Islam has increasedin Turkeyand women began covering theirheads. Wearingheadscarvesin public institutionsis not an innocuousact in Turkey. The secularismof the Republicanstatehas traditionally meantnot merely separation of religion and state but also state control over religion. Imbued with the conviction that the state representsthe best interests of the people despite the have aimedto confine religion to the privaterealm. people, the Kemalistreformers Even though these secularizingKemalist reformersnever prohibitedthe veil (as, for example, Rlza Shah of Iran did), dress codes of public institutions make it illegal to cover hairin public service. Headscarves,in the institutionalRepublican Turkish context, stand for and propagate a religious ideology perceived to be

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inimical to the secular foundationsof the Republic by the ruling elite. Because Kemalistreformshave been successful at one level, uncoveredhair has been the norm in public institutions.Until the 1990s, the public sector was predominantly occupied by people who were educated with this particularsecular Kemalist ideology, and with the exception of singularinstances,this custom had not been challenged. Activismof Islamist Women Under these circumstances,to wear headscarvesin a context where women did not cover theirheads requiredcourageand a faith in oneself. The women who did cover their heads might not have been alone; they were influenced by either friends or mentors and, as such, usually had a community they could refer to (Saktanber,1994). However, they were quite alone in classrooms and school groundswhere they were made most visible with theirheadscarves.Even though headscarves were worn to make women publicly less visible according to the dictatesof Islam,in the Turkish contextthe coveredwomenwere morediscernible. Unlike whatthey mighthave meantin a liberalnon-Muslimcontext,these women were perceivedas differentin, if not a threatto, the existing order.In a polity where been controlledby the state in the name of secularism, religion had traditionally of stood for a criticismof this secularorder.Independent what theirprivate, they individualreasonsfor covering the head might have been, they had to assume the situation.As such, even though responsibilityof whatthey meantin this particular have acted in solidaritywith membersof their religious community, they might they were engaged in an act of individuationand political resistance as they confrontedthe gaze of the uncoveredwomen who thoughtof them as different. The tendencyto considerwomen who cover theirheads as victims of Islamist was propaganda most acuteregardingmilitantswho workedfor the WelfareParty in mobilizing votes. These women were not merely individual victims of an otherwomen.Yet women,butproselytizerswho injured ideology thatsubordinates the WelfarePartymilitantswere not mere membersof a mobilizedcrowd.At least amongthe leadingcadres,radicalandindividualistwomen criticalof the partyand to determined fight for theirown fate loudly spoke. Sibel Eraslan,who calls herself of with faith,"is such an example.Eraslan,a graduate the IstanbulLaw a "feminist Women's Commissionfor manyyears. faculty,chairedthe IstanbulWelfareParty names in mobilizingthe women's vote for the She was one of the most important partyin the March1994 local elections, which broughtthe partyto power in major municipalitiesincludingAnkaraand Istanbul.She workedwith 18,000 women to mobilize otherwomen. In 1 month,they would meet with 200,000 women face to face (Pazartesi, 1995, pp. 2-5). After the electoralvictory, she was not given any and position within the newly elected WelfarePartyadministration was expected to go back home to look afterher kids. She is known to have accostedthe Welfare Partymayor Tayyip Erdoganof Istanbulregardinghis dismissal of women after

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the elections (Benton, 1996, p. 114). In an interview she gave to the feminist monthlyPazartesi, she expressedhow she believes in women's rights,theirneed to work outside the house, and the public need to have women's shelters. She explainedthatthroughthe process of mobilizing women for the party,they had the made the woman who had the veil speak from underneath veil; this woman began going to the grocer and asking why the price of this egg shot up to 4,500. She began going to the teacherin school andprotecting her child's rights.... (They) had made the women who did not talk talk. (Pazartesi, 1995, p. 5) In response to a question on what they talked about and how they attractedthe women they approached, Eraslanexplainedas follows: In our private talks, before anythingelse we wanted them to recognize their own power. Everythinghad made the woman shy, had imprisoned her. For example, we call her to a meeting, she says "I have to ask my we husband"; explain to her thatshe has to decide for herself andthatshe has a separatepersonalitythanher husband.At times, they would ask us to elaborategeneral policies. For example, we would explain "la ilahe illallah":There is no deity over you but God. One enters into faith with denial, denial of all otherdeities; it is very interesting,we were tryingto explain this and [phonecalls] began coming from men... "Whatareyou doing? You are taking our wives from our hands, you have undermined our order"... And slowly women began both cursingtheirhusbandsand coming to the party. Women came with reactions, "my husband is deceiving me, my husbandis beatingme...." (Pazartesi, 1995, p. 5) Listeningto the storyof IslamistmobilizingthroughSibel Eraslan'slenses, one is remindedof the "secular" feminists'attemptsto makewomen "recognizetheirown radicaldifferencesbetween the feminists and Islamistsregarding power."Despite the ultimatesourceof authority over the individual,thereareoverlapsandapparent influences of the feminists over the Islamists. Not all women in the ranksof the Welfare Partymay have been like Eraslan or the women she helped to empower in the process of Islamic mobilization. Besides those who might have been mobilized like a herd, there were Islamist women who were disappointed with the WelfareParty.Ayse Dogu, who was such a dissenter,would have agreedwith Eraslanon the importance women's subject of status. When asked to remarkon the coalition formed with the True Path Party, which broughtthe WelfarePartyto power as the seniorpartner, Dogu said: The WelfareParty'sstruggleis to be in power;our,the coveredwomen's strugglehas developed as a strugglefor identity.... As a Muslim woman who does not approveof the worldviewand structure the WelfareParty of because it is shallow and insufficient, I believe in the individuals' con-

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sciousnesses, choices, and actions ratherthan institutions,organs, and parties to be ultimately transformative.What is to be feared is the reactionarymentalityrooted in either the secular or the Islamist ranks, which arean obstacleto the liberalization oursociety. (Pazartesi,1996, of P. 9) Whetherthey walked in universitylecturehalls one by one or demonstrated in the universitygardenswith their fellow male and female students,or became activists in the Welfare Party ranks, the Islamist women challenged prevailing notionsof secularism,democracy,andnationalidentityin the country.The Republican state, which controlled religion and attemptedto confine it to the private realm, had to confrontthe reality of women who disobeyed its laws. With their headscarvesthe women carriedreligion to the public realm.Theirpublic disobedience of law was ironically coupled with their appeal to the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. They relied on their constitutionalrights to practicereligion withoutobstructionas they soughtlegitimacy for the wearingof headscarvesin public institutions.Even thoughit is still illegal for them to cover theirheadsin publicemploymentanduniversities,they have succeededin creating a public opinion thatenables women to attenduniversitieswith theirheadscarves without the interferenceof the administration. The Republicanunderstanding of secularism,which involves state control over religion throughits variousinstitutions, has been contested with an alternativeunderstandingof secularism that rejects statecontrolover religion. The issue of a changingconceptionof secularismis intimatelytied up with the changing boundariesof democracy. If democracymeans self-rule and involves in participation politics to define one's future,women who covered theirheads in public spaces were making statementsabout the way political authoritiesshould define civic rights, and thus were using their democraticrights to participatein participation politics. The intensityandinvolvementof these women in democratic changed. Some chose to be militants for the party, which promised them more extensive rights of religious practice,and vested their interestin traditional party politics. Othersexercisedtheirdemocraticrightsby remainingcriticalof the party. Limitsto IslamistIndividualism, Secularism,and Democracy Even though Islamist women might have challenged the prevailingconceptions of secularismand democracyof the Republicanstateand exhibitedpromises of personalliberationwithin the confines of Islam, therewere limits to individual liberation.Many writershave commentedon the similaritiesbetweenthe Islamists the centeredaround WelfarePartyandthe Kemalists((inar, 1996, pp. 32-38; Insel, 1996, pp. 29-31). IslamistsarguethatKemalistshave alienatedthe polity from its authentic roots and adopted Western culture as a global framework, thereby allowing the culturalcolonizationof the country.Kemalists,on the otherhand,see dictates of the Republic, such the Islamists as a radicalthreatto the fundamental

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as secularism, liberalism, and ultimately democracy. What is common in this mutual skepticism is each group's assumptionthat they and only they know the best interestsof the society. Both have a transcendental conceptionof society and the see themselves as responsiblefor transforming polity in the way they thinkthe ideal society should be. A unitarysolidaristconception of the polity prevails in both the Kemalist and the Islamist discourses. It was no coincidence that when Sibel Eraslantalked abouther work with the women her partywas recruitinginto its ranks, she argued that their local governments were trying to do what the people's houses had done before them(Pazartesi, 1995, p. 4). The people's houses were the networkof culturalclubs establishedby the foundingfathersin 1932 to propagatetheir ideologies and lifestyle so thatthey would create the right society (Oztiirkmen,1994, pp. 159-181). AynurIlyasoglu, who analyzes Islamistnovels, drew attentionto similarities between the heroines of novels writtenby Kemalist Westernizingauthorsof the early Republicanera and the Islamists (Ilyasoglu, 1994, pp. 69-75). Heroines of these two ideologically very different genres, she argued, are both missionaries who workto propagatethe ideology they happento believe in. Both in the Kemalist and the Islamistnovels, what the heroinesbelieve in is rightand othershave to be enlightened.Liberalindividualismis replacedby an ethos of militant solidarism and elitist transcendentalism. Personal salvation has other pitfalls within the confines of Islam. Even the Islamist novelists admit and depict the disappointmentof women who were promisedindividualliberationin theirIslamic lives. Marriagethwartsideals, and Muslimhusbandsend up being like any otherbourgeoismen. Muslim women who marriedMuslim men hoping to create an ideal Islamic way of life discover that marriageand society that is too corruptedby they are left alone in a patriarchal Westernvalues for them to change on theirown (Ilyasoglu, 1994, pp. 78-81). At this point, the promises of women's liberation sought by Islamist and Kemalistwomen diverge.Despite theircommonelitist transcendentalist discourse, the Kemalists, whatevertheir practice, do rely on a secular concept of universal rights and equalityratherthan sacredtruths.Feministscan have recourseto these secularrights and use them as legitimate tools of personalliberationin searchof substantive rights. The task of the Islamist women is more difficult. Seeking autonomy and substantiveequality within the confines of Islam is bound to be thwartedby patriarchal of of interpretations the concept of complementarity men and women that is enshrinedin the holy doctrine.However much Sibel Eraslan explainsto women thatthereis no power over themexcept thatof God,manyargue to the contrary,offering the most common interpretations the Quran,hadiths of Men have powerover (sayingsof the Prophet)andsunna(practicesof the Prophet): women. At least under the prevailing conditions, Eraslanis easily asked to step down. Those groups that happento have political authorityin the name of Islam have the legitimacyof divine authority, which they can (anddo) use to subordinate women. The appeal to secular universal human rights and equality can be an

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means to fight patriarchal subordination because it does not lend itself important to manipulationin the name of divine rule and faith. Islamist women fight not of merely againstthe secularinterpretations theirrights,but also againsta patriarwithinthe confines of Islam.In the latter chy thatis legitimizedby sacredauthority fight, they are deprivedof a recourse to the secular concept of universalrights, which secularfeminists have. Feminists and Islamists Secularfeminist and Islamistpremises are radicallyopposed to one another. Feminists have been concerned with problems women have because of their gender, and they have appealed to concepts of secular rights to redeem their Islamistshave been concernedwith realizingthe will of God. Their predicament. to alleviatethe predicament women as individualswere circumscribed of attempts the dictates of God, which political authoritieshappenedto define differently by in different,historicallyspecific points in time. Yet the two groups influenced one another. Not all feminist and Islamist women were readyto acknowledgeandaccommodate another.However,there one was solidaritybetween certainfactions. Within the Islamist ranks, someone like Sibel Eraslan,who called herself a feminist with faith, had been influenced by feminists.Others,like MuallaGtilnaz,who were criticalof the demandsfor sexual liberationthatradicalfeministsvoiced andwho arguedthatthese demandsmerely helpedturnwomen into sexual objects,neverthelessexpressedfeministsentiments (Gtilnaz,1996, pp. 66-69). Giilnaz'scriticismof the radicalfeminists was carried out in the very languagefeministsused: thatdemandsfor sexual liberationmerely values associatedwith sexuality thatwere seeped with a male view"reproduced point and merely helped the male dominantsociety" (Giilnaz, 1996, p. 67). In contrast,Gtilnazargued,accordingto the dictates of Islam, the division of labor between men and women was complementary withoutbeing hierarchical.In this context, women who lived by giving priorityto theirintuition,feelings, andvalues could act more courageously and forthrightly.This situation would topple the traditional characterizations genderand the traditional of that patriarchy restedon these values (Giilnaz, 1996, p. 68). Giilnaz,who challengedthe radicalfeminists, did so to be able to betterreach the aims they sharedof undermining patriarchy. male Even thoughshe was an Islamistwoman,she sharedthe goals of undermining hegemony with the radicalfeminists whose concernsfor sexual liberationshe did not share. Within the feminist ranks, the radical feminists who gathered around the to journalPazartesigave explicit support the effortsof Islamistwomenwho wanted to redefine their identities as women. The journaldid not merely carryessays on and interviewswith Islamistwomen, but also allowed Islamistwomen to write in its pages to express their views on head covering or the Welfare Party. On two different occasions, when some feminist readers of the journal reacted to the

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supportIslamist women got from the journal,the journalissued editorialson the natureof theirsolidaritywith Islamistwomen (Savran& Tura, 1996; Tura,1997). of It was argued that their understanding feminism was critical of the Kemalist discourse on women and involved solidaritywith women who shareda common subordination despite many differences(Savran& Tura, 1996). "Tofight political of Islam as women, they had to expose its sexism, contest the sexist undertakings the WelfarePartygovernmentwithoutconcession,explainhow the Shariat[Islamic women who covered their Law] was against women, ratherthan house-arresting heads"(Tura,1997, p. 7). The radicalfeministsof Pazartesiaimedto fight political Islam in dialogue with its female proponents. Conclusion The founding fathers of the Republic nurturedand advocated a unitary, transcendental concept of the common good for the polity. Accordingly,the state or the governingelite knew the best interestsof the people. It was assumedthatthe interestsof differentgroups,men and women as much as peasantsand industrialSocietal interestsprecededindividualinterists, were potentiallycomplementary. ests. The scope for democracywas limitedwithinthe constraints formalequality. of Secularismmeantstatecontrolover religion.This tradition, thoughit evolved over time, continuedinto the 1980s. Women of differentpersuasions,at times radically opposed to one another,such as the feminists and Islamists,helped challenge this understandingwith their activism. Both groups began by defining what they themselves perceived to be their interests.Then, both groups contested concepts of equalityenshrinedin the legal system and expandedthe domainof democracy as participants with "affectedinterests" (Dahl, 1970, p. 64). Women's will to shape theirpredicament to reshapethe prevalentconcept of the common good. helped The feminists questionedthe justice of formalequalitythat was constitutionally guaranteedand sought substantiveequality. Drawing attentionto domestic violence and the physical subordination they were exposed to because they were women, they sought special treatmentso thatthey could actuallybe equal to men. Withtheirinsistenceon theirspecialinterests,they questionedtherealityandutility of a unitarysolidaristconceptionof the common good, within which the Republican women's rights discourse was framed. They underlinedthe importanceof responsibleindividualismas opposed to communallydefined responsibilities. Islamistwomen, on the otherhand,challengedthe secularconcept of equality with their insistence on male-female complementarity roles and their equivaof lence in Islam. They sought equal status and individualismwithin these complementaryroles. Their searchfor a religiously defined identitycaused them to defy the secularcodes of the Republic. One important implicationof this defiance was their challenge of the prevailing concept of secularism, which was under the surveillanceof a paternaliststate.

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Islamistwomen activistsdid not represent orthodoxyamongthe Islamists. the Theirchallenge of the secularcodes of the Republicaccompaniedtheirchallenge of the patriarchaland solidarist heritage of Islam. However, the limits of this radicalismdid not seem far. The threatof subjugationwithin a religious community, where the good is sacredly, unitarily,and universalisticallydefined, hangs over the Islamist women who seek liberation within Islam, like the sword of Damocles. Whetherthey are ignored and dismissed by the orthodoxyor merely dominated,they have yet to resolve the issue of reconcilingindividualismwith a holy communitarianism. REFERENCES
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