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E X C E L L E N C E

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The Seven Fai l ure Modes
FMEA Ti ps and Tri cks
Maki ng FMEAs Smar t er
The Forgotten FMEA Manual
In this issue
ASQ Automotive Division
www.asq.org/auto
SUMMER 2008
The Seven Failure Modes
John Lindland
FMEA Tips & Tricks
Ron Atkinson
How Can We Make Our FMEAs Smarter?
John Casey
The Forgotten FMEA Manual
Steven C. Leggett
The American Society for Quality Automotive Division held its annual Awards
Event on June 17, 2008 at the Henry Ford Fairlane Estate, Dearborn, MI.
Bennie Fowler, Vice President of Quality, Ford Motor Company delivered the
keynote address followed by the awards ceremony.
ASQ Automotive Division Awards for 2008
Quality Leader of the Year Marybeth Cunningham, Global Director,
Excellence, Lean & Operations, Delphi Packard Electric/Electronic Architecture
Quality Professional of the Year Dr. Rajinder Kapur, Supplier Development
Engineer for Ford Motor Company
Koth Award Winner Lou Ann Lathrop, Design Release Engineer, Engine
Sensors
Cecil B. Craig Awards for Superior Papers published in the last year 2
awards
John J. Casey for his paper 3L5Y Explained and
Dan Reid for his paper Developing the Voluntary Healthcare Standard
Published by Mirus Graphic Solutions and ASQ Automotive Division
Editor-in-Chief: Amy Lichonczak
Publication Comittee: Janie Topp
Publisher: Mirus Graphic Solutions
Direct all editorial submissions or advertising information to:
Amy Lichonczak @ alichonczak@comcast.net
When reordering request document number B0624
NOTE: Please forward all change of address requests to ASQ headquarters at www.asq.org
Automotive Excellence (ISSN) is published by Mirus Graphic Solutions, for ASQ Automotive
Division. All editorial submissions should be directed to Amy Lichonczak, Editor-in-Chief, or
Mirus Graphic Solutions, Publisher at 25531 Dequindre Rd., Madison Hts, Michigan 48071.
Advertising inquiries should be directed to alichonczak@comcast.net Copyright 2008, ASQ
Automotive Division. No information may be copied without the express written permission
of the Editor-in-Chief, ASQ, Automotive Division. Neither the ASQ, ASQ Automotive Division,
nor the Publishers ofce is responsible for the accuracy of information in editorial articles or
advertising in this publication. Readers should independently evaluate the accuracy of any
statements in the editorial or advertising of this publication which are important to them and
rely on their own independent evaluation.
Chairperson (Voting Ofcer)
JACKIE PARKHURST
Tel: 313/220-0204
E-Mail: jackie.parkhurst@aam.com
Past Chair (Voting Ofcer)
CHERYL FRANKS DENMAN
Tel: 313/919-3294
Chair Elect (2008-2009) (Voting Ofcer)
JOHN CASEY
Tel: 248/202-8494
E-Mail: jcasey@whitehallgroupllc.com
Treasurer (Voting Ofcer)
FRANK BYKAYLO
Tel: 248/836-6045
E-Mail: fbykaylo@rdagroup.com
Secretary (Voting Ofcer)
DENISE TISO
Tel: 248/431-9852
E-Mail: denise.tiso@gm.com
07-08 AE Editor
AMY LICHONCZAK
Tel: 586/214-4131
E-Mail: alichonczak@comcast.net
Historian/MQC Liaison/AIAG Liaison/
QFD Liaison (Voting Ofcer)
LLOYD D. BRUMFIELD
Tel: 248/364-0196 Ext: 170
E-Mail: ldbrumeld@earthlink.net
Health Care Liaison
DAN REID
Tel: 248/857-1166
E-Mail: dan.1.reid@gm.com
Standards (Voting Ofcer)
DOUGLAS BERG
Tel: 248/348-2765
E-Mail: dougberg@earthlink.net
Examining Chair Publications Team
(Voting Ofcer)
JERRY BOWEN
Tel: 810/694-1586
E-Mail: ronaldjbow@msn.com
Regional Councilor, WCQI/Annual
Boat Cruise
FRANCIS W. CURTISS
Tel: 763/425-3724
E-Mail: francur@comcast.net
Membership Chair/Professional
Development Detroit Section
CLEM GOEBEL (Voting Member)
Tel: 810/599-6188
E-Mail: cjgoebel@cac.net
ASQ BOD President
RON ATKINSON
Tel: 248/821-4806
E-Mail: ronalakeo@aol.com
Qualkity Professional of the Year
KUSH SHAH
Tel: 248/830-8525
E-Mail: kush.shah@gm.com
Exhibits Chair
DENNIS C. SEEGER
Tel: 313/235-9601
E-Mail: seegerdc@dteenergy.com
Quality Leader Award Chair
CAROLE MALONE
E-Mail: malonec@macomb.edu
Craig Award Chair
LARRY R. SMITH
Tel: 313/623-7724
E-Mail: lrsmith@peoplepc.com
Koth Award Chair
ALLY HAMOOD
Tel: 586/575-2838
E-Mail: ally.hamood@gm.com
Awards Chair (Voting Member)
JAYNIE L. VIZE
Tel: 248/371-2413
E-Mail: jlvize@wowway.com
Ann Arbor Liaison
ERIC ZINK
Tel: 734/741-5399
E-Mail: ericmzink@eaton.com
Detroit Liaison/Coordinator Team India
ABHIJIT SENGUPTA
Tel: 313/595-5310
E-Mail: senguptaa@hotmail.com
Northeastern Illinois Section 1212
FRANCES BLOSSER
E-Mail: fab8850@aol.com
Scholarships
HIRA FOTEDAR
Tel: 440/933-3626
E-Mail: hirafotedar@yahoo.com
Assistant Scholarships/Saginaw
Liaison
KEN ZIMMER
Tel: 989/868-4811
E-Mail: zimmerken@aol.com
Vice Chair Programs
NARAYAN DAS
Tel: 586/492-4671
E-Mail: narayan.das@gm.com
Chair-Paper Symposium
ERIC HAYLER
Tel: 864/989-5577
E-Mail: eric.hayler@bmwmc.com
Coordinator Team India Project
Team Thailand Leader
MARIA STOLETOVA
E-Mail: m_stoletova@hotmail.com
ASQ Headquarters Administrator
SHIRL FURGER
Tel: 800/248-1946
E-Mail: sfurger@asq.org
ASQ AUTOMOTIVE DIVISION
VISION: To be the worldwide automotive industrys leader on issues related to quality
MISSION: To facilitate continuous iuproveuent and custouer satisfaction by identifying, couuunicating and prouoting. 0uality knowledge Manageuent's leadership role lndustry
Cooperation Frofessional developuent Fecognition 0pportunities to network
CUSTOMERS: PRIMARY Autouotive division ueubers Autouotive suppliers - all tiers AS0 sections ivision sustaining ueubers Fotential Autouotive ivision ueubers
SECONDARY Autouotive original equipuent uanufacturers (0EMs) 0ther AS0 divisions Strategic alliances - SAE, AlA0, SME, ES, ASl, organited labor Couuunity colleges/
universities AS0 headquarters/oard of irectors/0eneral Technical Council
TERTIARY 0uality award initiatives (federal/state/local) Standards activities Autouotive dealerships lnternational global uarkets Afteruarkets/ service parts Third party registrars
Fecruiters/ consultants
Features
2
8
10
12
Upcoming Events
2007-2008 DIVISION COUNCIL ROSTER
Fall Quality Symposium September 2009
Macomb Community College - University Center
Updates and information can be found at www.asq.org/auto/
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
1
from the home ofce
This edition contains articles on Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This valuable tool still has its imple-
mentation challenges for many companies, but has enormous potential for improving effectiveness. The intent
of these articles is to make implementation easier and the tool more user-friendly. It is our way of welcoming in
the Fourth edition of the FMEA Manual being printed as you read this newsletter.
Fall will be here very soon; the Edition is already underway. With the new council year, it is my pleasure to
introduce you to the new Chair Elect 2008-09 year: John Casey. John has long served as volunteer for the ASQ
Automotive Council and various ASQ events. John has also been a regular author for Automotive Excellence.
It is difcult to believe that my time as Vice-Chair Publications of the ASQ Automotive Division, Automotive
Excellence newsletter has ended. It was an honor to have served the last couple of years in bringing members articles and information on
important industry topics.
Many challenges are ahead for the automotive industry, but no doubt it is here to stay and is evolving in our global market.
est wishes to all, and l look forward to seeing you in the future at AS0 events.
Sincerely,
Amy Lichonczak
Vice- Chair Publications 2007-08
ALichonczak@comcast.net
Dear ASQ Automotive Division,
The constant force of change is upon us, the world will never be the same, now more than
ever we need to lead. It is obvious that the competitive offerings and the constant push for savings is
causing our industry to challenge everything in order to survive. We continuously push the organiza-
tion to become more lean, we push for faster product introductions, all in order to get a market place
advantage. Our greatest contribution as quality professionals is to show how the quality methods
have the greatest leverage for our companies.
When you truly improve quality, you achieve it through improving rst time yield. This simultaneously
improves productivity, it directly improves cost, it improves employee morale and it improves customer condence making your
products worthy of a premium price. Strategic deployment of quality techniques is the only discipline that has a multiplier across
all dimensions of business. The massive pressure for nancial gains that is on our industry often causes our decision makers to
forget this uultiplier effect and they uake sub-optiual decisions due to the pressure. asically, they forget.
WE NEED TO LEAD. The tools and skills that you possess are the ones the auto industry needs more than ever. If you see a prob-
lem, solve it using disciplined methods and teach your peers the techniques you know. Make them problem solvers, just like you.
Thats what leaders do, they show people a better way and enable them to duplicate the success. This leadership in quality can
create geometric multipliers when hundreds of people follow your lead.
My objective over the next year is to nd ways to invigorate deployment of the quality tools in our industry. We need an environ-
ment to let you show off your skills and demonstrate the multiplying value that a quality professional like you can bring to your
company. How can the ASQ Automotive Division serve you and your company making the constant changes that we face have
quality in the heart and soul? I am looking for your ideas, and thoughts.
est wishes as you lead the way to the future.
John J. Casey
Chair Elect 2008-09
jcasey@whitehallgroupllc.com
SUMMER 2008
Which dimensions or material properties are
required to make the product work?
Which dimensions, material properties, energy
source, resistance/restriction will change over
time?
Nottle Length. The early part affects
laminar ow. For a given pressure, overall
length affects ow resistance.
Nottle ase. Flatness provides the ability to
achieve a seal
Nottle 0pening iaueter. For a given
pressure, affects ow resistance
www.asq.org/auto
2
DFMEA: Selecting the Correct Level of Detail
AXIOM: ENERGY CONSUMES ALL MATTER OVER
TIME. PARTS LAST LONGER WHEN THEY ARE
STRONGER, TOUGHER (RESIST DAMAGE), OR
THE STRESS IS LOWERED. UNDERSTAND AND
STUDY THE ENERGY STRESS RELATIONSHIPS.
Within the mission time, the important character-
istics cannot degrade outside of design intent for
t, form function, appearance, or safety.
GD&T and Material characteristics will ensure
that the design works for a short period of time.
How well the design and material parameters
handle energy will determine how the design will
perform over the mission time.
When identifying design detail to analyze,
consider any detail which:
Stores or releases high/low teuperature,
radiation, energy or other type of stress
Slides against any other surface
Feceives stress frou cheuical attack
Secures or holds a part under stress
has failed in the past
(similar designs/applications)
Frotects a surface frou any type of stress
Any design detail which uight lead to a ht,
form, function, appearance, safety, or
government failure.
Primary Focusing Questions
Which diuensions are required to satisfy
stated requirements for t, form, function,
appearance, or safety?
Which of these diuensions will change as a
result of time and energy?
What uaterials will change as a result of tiue
and energy (strength, brittleness, resistance
to energy transfer/ow, etc.)?
Which uoving (translational/rotational) inter-
faces will change as a result of changing
resistance (increasing or decreasing
resistance)?
Which energy sources will change with tiue7
Selecting Detail
0btain held failure data.
0ather all available detail which describes
the product design: Assembly drawings, bills
of material, schematics, specications, etc.
use a yellow highlighter and uark the
selected detail, those which make the
product work and those which will change
over time (energy, resistance, restriction,
strength, etc.).
ldentify the lteus to study and state the
item in terms of the function verb-noun.
The Seven
Failure Modes
Workshop: Design Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis
John Lindland
SeVEN FAILURE MODES
THE FMEA Process
Structure of the Workshops
Identify Special
Characteristics.
Controls
to Prevent
Cause(s)
Controls
to Detect
Failure
Mode(s)
Identify Item Details
and Functions
Brainstorm
Potential Failure
Mode(s)
List the Effect(s) of
Failure Mode(s)
Brainstorm
Cause(s) of Failure
Mode(s)
List Current
Design or Process
Controls
Assess Severity (S)
of the Effect(s)
Assess Occurrence
(O) of the Cause(s)
Assess Detection
(D) of the Failure
Mode (D-Type)
Calculate Criticality
Crit = S X O
Calculate RPN
RPN = S X O X D
Identify Failure
modes with S > 8
Create Pareto Charts of
Criticalities and RPNs
Prioritize
Recommended Actions
Hold FMEA Reviews
and Implement
Recommended Actions
Scope Risks
Risk Reduction
RPN: Risk Priority Number
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
3
SUMMER 2008
Understanding Failure Mode Relations
Every problem is preceded by the failure mode
and the source of the failure mode, the cause.
The cause is that which produces a poor quality
function/response (failure mode).
All problems that relate to customer injury must be
given high priority regardless of the RPN that are found
during the analysis.
All problems have three components:
1. Frequency of occurrence of the cause.
2. The ability to detect (the failure mode or
effect).
3. Severity (how the effect impacts the
customer).
Mission Time and Action Response
The mission time is the length of time that the
product/system must run without failure at its stated
level of reliability.
Stated reliability is such that when requested to
perform, the response (action) will meet all stated
requirements.
A basic incandescent light bulb. 1000 hours
Milk in a carton. 11 days
hot water heater. 10 years
Manufacturing equipuent. days at 21 hours
Autouobile. 5 years or 100,000 uiles
New houe. 100 years
Consider the warranty period
Consider the recouuended uaintenance period
Mission Time and Action Response
The mission time is the length of time that the
product/system must run without failure at its stated
level of reliability.
Stated reliability is such that when requested to
perform, the response (action) will meet all stated
requirements.
A basic incandescent light bulb. 1000 hours
Milk in a carton. 11 days
hot water heater. 10 years
Manufacturing equipuent. days at 21 hours
Autouobile. 5 years or 100,000 uiles
New houe. 100 years
Consider the warranty period
Consider the recouuended uaintenance period
System, Sub-system, Part/Component Design Detail(s) Detail Function(s) Functional Requirement
Item to be Studied: Fuel Nozzle Sub-categories of Item Verb-Noun Specification (if applicable)
Nozzle Length Length Surface Resist Erosion New
Flow Length Resists Flow 1.00 Basic Dimension
Nozzle Opening Diameter Cross Sectional Area Resist Flow 0.150.01
Nozzle Opening Resist Buildup New
Nozzle Base Flatness Achieve Seal 0.03 Max
Engine:
Model Year:
FMEA Number:
FMEA Scope:
Effect
Failure Mode
(Flawed Action/
Response)
Source of
the Failure
Mode
(Cause)
(S)
Severity
(O)
Frequency
(D)
Ability to Detect
(failure mode and problem)
Reduce Frequency
through Design
Changes (Error
Proofing)
Manage the failure mode
through Mistake-Proofing
and equipment controls.
During the Mission Time,
the Action/Response
becomes flawed.
Manage Problems through the
Process Control Plan for:
Verification, Validation, Process
Control, in partnership with
Inspection and Testing and Control
of Nonconforming Product
Reduce Severity
through Design
Changes
Absorb energy Dampen noise Inject air Provide Identification Remove chemicals
Absorb heat Develop finish Inject fuel Provide information Remove element
Absorb impact Develop heat Inject liquid Provide light Remove heat
Absorb moisture Develop pressure Isolate electrical current Provide reference Remove particles
Absorb radiation Develop seal Isolate materials Provide seal Remove seal
Absorb vibration Develop strain Isolate x Provide signal Remove x
Absorb x Develop x Limit movement Provide spark Resist chemicals
Accept bolt/screw Direct flow Maintain force Provide stiffness Resist damage
Accept gas/air Direct light Maintain seal Provide structure Resist deformation
Accept liquid End cycle Meter flow Provide tension Resist fatigue
Accept part Engage part Modulate brakes Provide x Resist movement
Achieve hardness Guide electrical-current Open circuit Read signal Resist radiation
Adjust speed Guide energy Open x Reduce backlash Resist Strain
Amplify signal Guide fluid Orient part Reduce chattering Resist wear
Change chemicals Guide force Oxidize material Reduce chemical Resist x
Change state Guide heat Position electrode Reduce force Secure part
Clip signal Guide light Position part Reduce friction Start cycle
Close circuit Guide movement Protect material Reduce heat Support part
Control crack Guide pressure Protect microstructure Reduce leak Transfer electrical-current
Control direction Guide sound Protect part Reduce heat-loss Transfer electricity
Control feedback Guide vibration Protect surface Reduce noise Transfer force
Control force Handle current Protect x Reduce pressure Transfer heat
Control location Hold liquid Provide clearance Reduce shock Transfer liquid
Control position Hold oil Provide color Reduce signal-noise Transfer pressure
Control pressure Hold paint Provide continuity Reduce vibration Transfer x
Control shock Hold part Provide feedback Reduce wear Turn fan
Control speed Hold plating Provide force Reduce x Turn shaft
Control speed Hold pressure Provide form Reflect heat Withstand fatigue
Control temperature Hold x Provide friction Reflect light Withstand force
Control x Increase force Provide fuel Reflect particles Withstand heat
Create vacuum Increase pressure Provide heat Reflect x Withstand x
Examples of Design Functions
The surface of the nottle uight erode over
time
The nottle opening uight develop a
material buildup over time
The nottle base will not change with tiue
The nottle length will not change with tiue
Product: Documenting the Level of Detail
Select the lteus [systeu, subsysteu, part/
component(s)] for the study
ocuuent the esign etail(s) for each
Item
ocuuent the lteu Function(s) for each
Design Detail in the Verb-Noun format
Flow Nozzle
.03
90
0
.150.01
1.000
-A-
F0uFTh ElTl0N
FMEA MANuAL
Available from
www.aiag.org
www.asq.org/auto
4
7 failure modes
Example: Failure Mode Brainstorming
Worksheets
Causes, Failure Modes, and Effects
Item: Fuel Injection
Detail Name: Nozzle
Detail Function (Verb-Noun): Atomize Fuel
1. Failure Mode (Omission): Does not Atomize
Fuel
2. Failure Mode (Excessive Action):
Excessively Atomized Fuel
3. Failure Mode (Incomplete
Action):Incompletely Atomized Fuel
4. Failure Mode (Erratic Action): Erratically
Atomized Fuel
5. Failure Mode (Uneven Application of Action):
Unevenly Atomized Fuel
6. Failure Mode (Too Much Time): Atomized
Fuel too Slowly
7. Failure Mode (Too Little Time): Atomized
Fuel too Quickly
8. Failure Mode (Other): N/A
Cause
Failure
Mode
Effect
Resistance
Restriction
Technical Root
Cause
Behavioral Root
Cause
Human Tactile
Failure Mode
From Another
Part
Dimension
Dimension Changes
Surface
Interface
Material
Energy
Noise
Spray
Nozzle
Atomize
Fuel
Function
Verb-
Noun
Fuel not Atomized
Fuel Atomized Too
Much
Fuel not Atomized
Enough
Erratic Atomizing
of Fuel
Uneven Atomizing
of Fuel
Fuel Atomized too
Slowly
Fuel Atomized too
Quickly
[O]
[+]
[-]
[V]
[U]
[+T]
[-T]
Make sure that
the verb-noun is
included in the
failure mode
statement
Energy, Resistance, Action, and Results
This relationship is true for both people (transactions)
and equipment (technical).
Ferfect Energy and Fesistance. Ferfect
Action and Results
Zero Energy or lnhnite Fesistance.
No Action
Too Much Energy or Too Little Fesistance.
Too Much Action
Too Little Energy or Too Much Fesistance.
Too Little Action
Erratic Energy or Fesistance. Erratic Action
uneven Energy or Fesistance.
uneven Action
Energy Fate too Low or lncreased
Resistance: Action too Slow
Energy Fate too high or Feduced
Resistance: Action too Fast
For Product Design: Energy can be by design or a
component of Noise (heat, cold, vibration, chemical
reactions,...). Resistance can also be by design, or a
component of noise (dirt, changing load, corrosion,...)
Simple Example of Function and Failure Modes
Resistance Action Results Energy
KEEF Y0uF
MEMEFShlF
CuFFENT
Renew online at:
www.asq.org
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
5
SUMMER 2008
Technical Root Causes relate to specic product,
process, or energy faults that cause the action
to fail. Technical causes relate to too much/little
resistance or restrictions to an action or energy
transfer. Resistance relates to friction and
restrictions relate to a material to material
interference. Resistance and restrictions also
relate to employees working with each other. It is
interesting that in the mechanical world
resistance creates heat and that resistance
between workers creates anger/resentment.
In other words, resistance wears out processes
and/or breaks down relationships.
ehavioral Foot Causes are the specihc huuan
tactile (movement/ words) that directly creates
the failure mode. Example, the failure mode
might be low specied design margin while
the human tactile is engineer selected a design
margin that was too low.
A previous failure mode can be a
cause, but not a root cause as it has
its own causes.
Causes are the reason that we have a Nawed
action (failure mode). The failure mode (awed
action/response) occurs at the exact same
time that the correct action should occur, and
the resulting problems are preceded
immediately by the failure mode (awed
action/response).
The components which are missing from this
analysis are:
An understanding of the severity of the effects
The Controls for the failure mode (Detection)
and causes (Prevention)
The frequency of failure uode occurrence
Identify Current Controls
Current Controls are not what an organiza-
tion could be doing to detect failures. Current
controls are that which are actually being
performed. Controls are used to detect either the
failure mode or causes.
There are two primary types of controls Preven-
tive (P) and Detection (D). Detection is generally
considered to focus on the failure mode and
prevention addresses cause controls. Preventive
controls do not receive detection ratings (they
reduce the frequency of occurrence). Detection
controls receive ratings. The ratings will be
described later in the materials. Only describe
the actual controls that are currently being used.
Example: Determining Causes and Effects
Begins with Dening the Potential Failure Mode
Time
Failure
Mode
Time of
Function
Control
Factors
Time
Requirements
t
o
t
f
Mission
Local Effect (part)
Assembly Effect
System Effect
User Effect
Government Effect
Cause 1
Cause 2
Cause 3
Cause 4
Cause 5
Failure
Mode:
Incompletely
Atomized
Fuel
Causes
Effects
Interface Function
between Fuel and Pintle
Dimension: Nozzle
Angle too Small
Dimensional Change:
None
Surface: None
Interface: Fuel Viscosity
to High
Material: None
Energy: Fuel Pressure
too Low
Noise: Buildup on Pintle
Human Tactile: None
Resistance: None
Restriction: Buildup on
Pintle Changes Shape
Failure Mode from
Another Part: None
List All Important Effects
Local Effect (part): None
Assembly Effect: None
System Effect: Engine
Vibration
User Effect: Poor Cold
Starts, Poor Gas Mileage
Government Effect: High
Emissions
www.asq.org/auto
6
7 FAILURE MODES
Failure Mode Relationship to Causes,
Effects and Detections
Documenting Risks
Failure
Mode
Effect 1
Effect 2
Effect 3
Effect 4
Effect 5
Time
Failure
Mode
Detection
Prevention 1
Prevention 2
Prevention 3
Prevention 4
Prevention 5
Cause 1
Cause 2
Cause 3
Cause 4
Cause 5
Effect Based Failure Mode
Detection 1
Effect Based Failure Mode
Detention 2
Effect Based Failure Mode
Detention 3
Effect Based Failure Mode
Detention 4
Effect Based Failure Mode
Detention 5
List the current P-
type controls that
will prevent cause.
List the D-type controls to
detect the failure mode
through the effect. These
must be established/
performed prior to the
release of the design.
List the current
D-type controls
that will detect
the failure
mode.
Examples: Reliability
Testing, Validation
Testing, Sensor Based
Engine Controls, etc.
Example: Heat
thermography,
vibration and
sound sensing,
etc.
Examples: material
specifications,
design standards,
design reviews,
documented
procedures/
processes, etc.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Worksheet
Cause Occurrence #
O
Detail Function (Verb-Noun): Atomize Fuel
YC/YS Description:
QualSAT
3
5
6
D
YS
1
5
3
YC
FM (Effect) Detection 1:
Engineering Emission Test
FM (Effect) Detection 2: Cold
Room Start Test
FM (Effect) Detection 3:
Highway Road Validation Test
FM (Effect) Detection 4:
FM (Effect) Detection 5:
S
10
8
6
Effect 1: High Emissions
Effect 2: Poor Cold Starts
Effect 3: Poor Gas Mileage
Effect 4:
Effect 5:
D
3
F
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e

M
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d
e

D
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c
t
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o
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:

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h
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e
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D
i
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i
t
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l

P
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t
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e
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a
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e

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:

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N
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A
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g
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66
5
5
4
Cause 1: Wrong Design
Angle
Cause 2: Pressure Too
High
Cause 3: Pressure Too
Low
Cause 4: Simulation Not
Performed
Cause 5:
(P) Control 1: Finite Element
Analysis
(P) Control 2: Parametric Design
of Experiments
(P) Control 3: Parametric Design
of Experiments
(P) Control 4: Internal Auditing
(P) Control 5:
RPN:
4
SO: S:
Item: Fuel Injector
Design Detail: Nozzle
2 3
D
1
2 3
3
Effect FM Det 1
Effect FM Det 2
Effect FM Det 3
Effect FM Det 4
Effect FM Det 5
S
Effect 1
Effect 2
Effect 3
Effect 4
Effect 5
D
Failure
Mode
O
Cause 1
Cause 2
Cause 3
Cause 4
Cause 5
Identify the
Detection #'s
Identify the
Occurrence #'s
Identify the
Severity #'s
Identify the
Detection #'s
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
7
SUMMER 2008
Workshop
Risk Probability of Failure R/100 Cpk
1 1 in 1,500,000 0.0000006667 0.00 1.67
2 1 in 150,000 0.0000066667 0.00 1.50
3 1 in 15,000 0.0000666667 0.01 1.33
4 1 in 2,000 0.0005000000 0.05 1.17
5 1 in 400 0.0025000000 0.25 1.00
6 1 in 80 0.0125000000 1.25 0.83
7 1 in 20 0.0500000000 5.00 0.67
8 1 in 8 0.1250000000 12.50 0.51
9 1 in 3 0.3333333333 33.33 0.33
10 1 in 2 or more 0.5000000000 >50.00 <0.33
Very High: Failure is
almost inevitable
Possible Failure Rates
Occurrence Evaluation Criteria
Remarks: The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking system
which is consistent, even if modified for individual product analysis.
Remote: Failure is
unlikely
Low: Relatively few
failures
Moderate: Occasional
failures
High: Repeated failures
Ranking Effect Severity of Effect
1 None No Effect
2 Very Minor Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform.
Defect noticed by discriminating customer.
3 Minor Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform.
Defect noticed by average customer.
4 Very Low Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform.
Defect noticed by most customers.
5 Low Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience
item(s) operable at reduced level of performance.
Customer experiences some dissatisfaction.
6 Moderate Vehicle/item operable, but Comfort/Convenience
item(s) inoperable. Customer experiences
discomfort.
7 High Vehicle/item operable, at reduced level of
performance. Customer Dissatisfied.
8 Very High Vehicle/item inoperable, with loss of primary
function.
9 Hazardous
With Warning
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure
hazardous- mode affects safe vehicle operation
and/or involves with warning noncompliance with
government regulation with warning.
10 Hazardous
Without
Warning
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure
hazardous- mode affects safe vehicle operation
and/or involves with warning noncompliance with
government regulation without warning.
Severity Evaluation Criteria
Remarks: The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking
system which is consistent, even if modified for individual product analysis.
www.asq.org/auto
8
7 Failure modes
FMEA Tips &
Tricks
Get the most out of your
process
Ron Atkinson
AS0 0 Fresident, 2007-08
Give initial FMEA training on an object that is
common to the students and not part of their
work processes. That way they can concentrate
on the concepts. Move on to actual work pro-
cesses when the concepts are understood.
The logical sequence is to do Design FMEA
training followed by Process FMEA training. It is
actually easier to grasp the concepts by doing
the Process FMEA rst and then transfer the
concepts to the Design FMEA.
Failure is the inability of the item or activity being
studied to perform its intended function. This
can happen even if the part or process does not
break.
FMEA is used to evaluate POTENTIAL failures.
A FMEA analysis does not mean that the failure
has occurred in the past or will occur in the
future, just that it potentially could occur.
The Cause of the Failure is often given as the Po-
tential Failure Mode. This creates a problem and
results in confusion when identifying the Cause.
Example: People see a tire without air and state
that the Failure Mode is a nail in the tire. The tire
losing air pressure slowly is the Potential Failure
Mode and a nail in the tire is the Cause.

etter dehnition of the requireuents of the
design or process make the rest of the FMEA
analysis easier.
tips
Summarizing the Results of the Brainstorming
on the DFMEA Form
The inforuation next to the nuubers relate
to the numbers on the DFMEA form on the
following page.
Ranking Risk Of Non-
Detection
Detection Likelihood of Detection By Current
Design Control
1 0% to 5% Almost
Certain
Current Control will almost certainly detect a
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent
failure mode.
2 5% to 15% Very High Very High chance the Current Control will
detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
3 15% to 25% High High chance the Current Control will detect a
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent
failure mode.
4 25% to 35% Moderately
High
Moderately high chance the Current Control
will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
5 35% to 45% Moderate Moderate chance the Current Control will
detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
6 45% to 55% Low Low chance the Current Control will detect a
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent
failure mode.
7 55% to 65% Very Low Very low chance the Current Control will
detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
8 65% to 75% Remote Remote chance the Current Control will
detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
9 75% to 85% Very
Remote
Very remote chance the Current Control will
detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
10 85% to 100% Absolute
Uncertainty
Current Control will not and/or cannot detect
a potential uncertainty cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode; or there is no
Current Control.
Detection Evaluation Criteria
Remarks: The team should agree on an evaluation criteria and ranking system
which is consistent, even if modified for individual product analysis.
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Worksheet
Cause Occurrence #
O
Detail Function (Verb-Noun): Atomize Fuel
YC/YS Description:
QualSAT
3
5
6
D
YS YC
FM (Effect) Detection 1:
Engineering Emission Test
FM (Effect) Detection 2: Cold
Room Start Test
FM (Effect) Detection 3:
Highway Road Validation Test
FM (Effect) Detection 4:
FM (Effect) Detection 5:
S
10
8
6
Effect 1: High Emissions
Effect 2: Poor Cold Starts
Effect 3: Poor Gas Mileage
Effect 4:
Effect 5:
D
3
F
a
i
l
u
r
e

M
o
d
e

D
e
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
:

H
i
g
h
S
p
e
e
d

D
i
g
i
t
a
l

P
i
c
t
u
r
e
s
F
a
i
l
u
r
e

M
o
d
e
:

F
u
e
l

N
o
t
A
t
o
m
i
z
e
d

E
n
o
u
g
h
66
5
5
4
Cause 1: Wrong Design
Angle
Cause 2: Pressure Too
High
Cause 3: Pressure Too
Low
Cause 4: Simulation Not
Performed
Cause 5:
(P) Control 1: Finite Element
Analysis
(P) Control 2: Parametric Design
of Experiments
(P) Control 3: Parametric Design
of Experiments
(P) Control 4: Internal Auditing
(P) Control 5:
RPN: SO: S:
Item: Fuel Injector
Design Detail: Nozzle
10
11
13
13
13
13
13
12
16
15
15
15
15
15
17
17
17
17
17
18
14 18
19
19
19
19 20
21
STAY INFORMED!
The Fall Edition
of
Automotive
Excellence
is Coming Soon
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
9
SUMMER 2008
ASQ Greater Detroit Section 2008 Schedule of Refresher Courses

All classes are held on Saturdays at Macomb Community College, South Campus, Building "T"
(located between 12 Mile Road & Martin Road, west of Hayes Road). Refresher course starting
dates are subject to change, student should verify.

Certification Refresher
Course #
Refresher
Course
Start
Date
Examination
Application
(Last) Date
Examination
Date
Fee
Certified Quality Engineer
(CQE) 12 Sessions
CQE 808
CQE 209
08-09-2008
02-07-2009
10-03-2008
04-03-2009
12-06-2008
06-06-2009
$450
Certified Quality Technician
(CQT) 10 Sessions
CQT 1108
CQT 709

07-12-2008
11-08-2008
08-15-2008
01-09-2009
10-18-2008
03-07-2009
$325
Certified Quality Inspector
(CMI) 10 Sessions
CQI 1108
CQI 709

07-12-2008
11-08-2008
08-15-2008
01-09-2009
10-18-2008
03-07-2009
$325
Certified Six Sigma Black Belt
(CSSBB) 10 Sessions
CSSBB 608
CSSBB1108

06-21-2008
11-08-2008
08-15-2008
01-09-2009
10-18-2008
03-07-2009
$1000
Certified Six Sigma Green Belt
(CSSGB) 10 Sessions
CSSGB908
CSSGB309

09-20-2008
03-14-2009
10-03-2008
04-03-2009
12-06-2008
06-06-2009
$500

REGISTRATION
FORM



Greater Detroit Section 1000
27350 Southfield Rd., Suite 102
Lathrup Village, MI 48076
www.asqdetroit.org
Name Last First Mid. Initial
Home Address Home Phone
Employer Work Phone
Employer Address
ASQ Member No Yes

Member Number

Payment: Make check payable to Greater Detroit Section, ASQ

Mail to: Greater Detroit Section 1000
27350 Southfield Rd., Suite 102
Lathrup Village, MI 48076

For more information call Rajinder Kapur at 248-703-7148 or e-mail rajinderkapur@yahoo.com


www.asq.org/auto
10
How can we
make our
FMEAs
Smarter?
John Casey
The u.S. auto industry has been pursuing qual-
ity with a passion to stop things that could go
wrongthat is, prevent issues and problems
from reaching customers. This truly is a smart
uove. unfortunately, it is being done in the
things gone wrong method of Failure Mode
Effects Analysis (FMEA), which was a great tool
that has now served its purpose.
The auto industry has wrung out the maximum
benet out of the approach and needs a new
driving force in order to achieve the next level.
The auto industry, in fact all industry, needs to
move the actions of the engineering and man-
agement community into a situation where you
can guarantee operator success. Let me illus-
trate. Quality of products is typically measured
in Farts Fer Million defective - or FFM for short.
Most suppliers in the auto industry perform at
100 PPM or better. This means their performance
is 99.99% good and only .01% defective (1 bad
product out of 10,000).
For a production operator, they followed an exact
and perfect set of steps almost all of the time but
once out of 10,000 tries, the operation was differ-
ent and made an unacceptable part. The problem
with FMEAs is right here. There are an innite
number of things that an operator can do wrong
and FMEAs are trying to address all of them.
Chasing innity is a very frustrating activity. Isnt
it smarter to focus on the steps that must go right
and only look for the deviations? Wouldnt it be
better to have the base philosophy drive our ef-
forts to Either do it right or we wont let you do it
at all? This seems simpler to me and I think we
would get greater yield on our engineering hours
if we had a method that could guide our thinking
in this way.
I believe we can document the exact steps of each
operator and have simple devices guide the
operators efforts to help him follow the exact
pattern with a guiding principal of If each part is
not made exactly right, we will stop the process
and start over. This is the heart of Success Every
Time or SET. SET is a cost effective methodology
to help companies move from 200 PPM down to
1 PPM or better and simultaneously maximize prots.
The Best Thing about FMEAs
Please recognize that I think FMEAs bring us a
terric aspect and that we should keep FMEAs
as a fundamental process in the quality disci-
pline. The things I like about FMEAs are:
FMEA's are logical - Look for issues at
operation then create a countermeasure
FMEA's Frioritite Work - Find the highest
risk and work to reduce it
FMEA's Categorite lupact - The focus on
Severity - etection and 0ccurrence
FMEA's Appeal to Engineers - There is a
logical easy to follow formula
This approach is so logical and direct, it is dif-
cult to argue with it. In fact, the greatest asset
of the FMEA is that it can be applied to various
levels of design and manufacturing. This tool
has been effective in bringing the industry a long
way in improving quality. The problem is, the
FMEA approach cannot cost effectively take the
industry to the next level.
What can we do instead?
The difference between the FMEA approach and the
SET Approach can best be illustrated described in a
Ying Yang Diagram as illustrated in Diagram 1.1. In the
world of manufacturing, every operation performs work
and can either be done right or done wrong. In the
FMEA approach, you focus on stopping activities in the
done wrong" side. ut as tiue goes on, we discover
new things we never thought of and nd new ways
to do it wrong. The list of possibilities grow and grow
and the time, effort, and expense to protect us from this
list grows in proportion.
This continued pursuit of innity may be a
solid explanation of why, after 25 years, the
auto industry still has trouble creating totally
comprehensive FMEAs to catch every problem.
Anyone facing an innite task like this will look
for shortcuts, take risks, or just go as far as time
and energy permits and stop, which is exactly
what has happened to the FMEA process. It has
passed the point of diminished returns. We need
something different now.
Success Every Time (SET) - as an Alternative
y concentrating on the eleuents that drive suc-
cess, you focus on a much smaller set of actions
than the innite listing of what can go wrong
(such as with FMEA). Instead, you need to dene
what must go right and set up assisting devices
on these actions to help operators do their work
exactly right. For line associates, it is just as
easy to make a part correctly as it is to make a
part improperly, so you generally wont get any
resistance from them regarding this idea of doing
it right. The problem, however, is that normal
actions within a day cause disruptions that dis-
tract people for a very short while. These
distractions could last a few seconds or a few
minutes, but as soon as you have a small mental
lapse and day dream, booma mistake is made.
Although this is normal and utterly human, it still
causes an error.
Success Every Time is investing in devices to
help operators remember what to do, and help
them do it right. One operator I worked with
described it most profoundly: Set the system
up so that the process is telling me everything I
need to know.
If you look quickly, you may be thinking that this
is just a different way of describing the Poke
Yoke processes used all over Japan. ut Suc-
cess Every Time is much larger. Heres why: the
typical concept of error-proong is looking at
the device level. It is looking for means to detect
defects, many of which are discovered one at a
time.
I dene error proong as a method that PRE-
VENTS an error from occurring. It has two key
pieces. The rst is some type of mechanism or
sensing device that for this operation everything
is exactly right. The second feature is a con-
trol element that will only allow the operation
to proceed based on the devices sensing that
every element is right. If they are not right the
potential defective operation is stopped before
the actual error is built in to the product before
the value adding step builds the part. In simple
terms, either the product is right or it is stopped.
Error Proong Prevents the defects from being
created.
Smarter fmeas
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
11
SUMMER 2008
The elements of the Success Every Time Process
I believe there are a very clear set of actions
done on every job that makes perfect parts to
standard. This set of actions is done every day,
hundreds of times by each operator as they
make the thousands of great parts every week.
The Set of perfect Actions by Operators
1. Select the correct part
2. 0rient the part (Fight side up - properly
rotated)
3. Place the part in the exact correct location
within the tooling (multiple parts go
return to step 1 and repeat the sequence)
4. Activate the value adding energy
What will be the result?
y focusing on what is ideal and only allowing
value add to proceed if the ideal is in place, we
have a much smaller task to drive quality and
productivity. All you need to do is monitor 9 spe-
cic elements and ask the question Is every-
thing right? If it is, allow the process to proceed.
If any one of the 9 elements are not right, STOP,
make a correction or dispose of the part. I think
this is a smarter way to approach FMEAs
because it is a nite set and we can stop chasing
innity.
John Casey is a Supply Chain improvement
expert at the Whitehall Group LLC in Troy,
Michigan.
jcasey@whitehallgroupllc.com
The operators need the correct tooling to do
each job correctly
5. The Correct Set of Tools (including gages)
6. Properly aligned to mating xtures and
equipment
The Parameters governing the value added
energy
7. Correct amount of energy
8. Correct dwell time or parameters on each
job
9. Energy deployed to the correct location on
the part
What needs to go
RIGHT?
What can go
WRONG
Problem
Problem
P
r
o
b
le
m
P
ro
b
le
m
P
ro
b
le
m
P
r
o
b
l
e
m
FMEAS
Systematically
Reduce Risk
A Simplified Look at Manufacturing
The Other Side of the World
A Tough Question:
Whats our method to
SYSTEMATICALLY
focus on what needs
to go right?
Currently
We Have Nothing
That Aims at
This target
Potential Problems
can be infinite
FMEAs
Focus our
attention here.
www.asq.org/auto
12
The Forgotten
FMEA Manual
Steven C. Leggett
The Automotive Division requested authors submit
articles on technical subjects. What better subject
than FMEAs! This subject is always misunderstood,
and there are many interpretations about FMEAs
and how they are applied. It has been my experience
that most organizations and suppliers do an excel-
lent job, but there are times when Design/Process
FMEAs, have many errors or conicting information,
or the failure mode was never thought through or
incorporated into the original documents. The Poten-
tial Failure Modes are always added after the fact,
or after the failure occurred. Then the FMEA Team
scrambles to update the latest documents. On many
occasions, the Quality or Engineering Manager or
Quality Engineer is the FMEA Team, and completes
the required documentation just prior to the PPAP
submission deadlines.
People need to understand that all FMEA Teams
should be cross-functional, multidisciplinary teams,
and this is a real life scenario. Please review these
reference manuals to help you facilitate your PPAP
Requirements.
The Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) are an important tool for evaluation and pro-
cess analysis for nding and identifying any potential
irregularities and weaknesses in the production
and manufacturing processes. For the past three
decades, two groups have collaborated to develop
and improve these FMEA Reference Manuals.
The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) devel-
oped SAE J1739 with the coordination of the Chrysler
Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and General Mo-
tors Corporation FMEA Reference Manual for both
design and process analysis of failure modes. The
Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG) developed
Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (PFMEA)
Reference Manual with again, the coordination of
Chrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and
General Motors Corporation.
Throughout the years, the FMEA Manuals have
added key features and elements for the advance-
ments and improvements in an automotive FMEA
application. The reference guidelines have been
published to help ensure that any FMEA is interpret-
ed and developed with a consistent process.
The reference manuals and guidelines are help-
ful, but the interpretations are still broad and
objective. There is still a need to further improve
and develop this subject, especially in the areas
of prevention and detection rankings. The detec-
tion ranking is very hard to understand, very
subjective, and difcult to apply in a consistent
manner. The Risk Priority Number (RPN) will not
show the true value upon completion
of your analysis.
There are more revisions to the reference manu-
als that will be released soon; that will help guide
the FMEA Team.
The guidelines for detection and prevention have
been used in automotive applications to help
develop consistent Process FMEAs (PFMEA)
for manufacturing and production applications.
There are a number of factors to be considered
when using these guidelines, based on the cause
or mechanism of the detected failure. Look at the
type of inspection, whether manual (visual) or
automated, and how close the failure mode is to
the cause. This is just one of the questions that
need to be asked before you start the entire
Machinery FMEA (MFMEA) process. This Lesson
learned will provide a relationship between the
FMEA and the production and manufacturing en-
vironment; and it makes the FMEA process eas-
ier to understand, and easier to use, especially
for the novice. To ensure consistency throughout
the entire document is very important. This will
also ensure better quality processes and parts
for your customers.
Your main objective, before starting the process,
is to have all D/P/M FMEA Team members prop-
erly trained and knowledgably about the entire
FMEA process.
Have you ever heard of the Forgotten FMEA
Manual?
Some people will even ask, what is a FMEA?
How do you make a FMEA? What does FMEA
stand for and how does it apply to me? Others
will tell you that FMEA helps people in national
emergencies. That FMEA is FEMA - Federal
Emergency Management Agency. Please dont
get the two mixed up! The FMEA that this article
refers to is the Potential Failure Mode and Ef-
fects Analysis for Tooling & Equipment (Machin-
ery FMEA or MFMEA). This MFMEA is a Refer-
ence Manual and is the technical equivalent
of SAE J1739, Section 5. The Machinery FMEA
Manual should been used by all suppliers to
companies subscribing to the old QS-9000 Tool-
ing and Equipment Supplement, or an Equivalent
Document. Since there is no more QS-9000, all
organizations, and suppliers to customers sub-
scribing to ISO/TS 16949 should also be using the
Machinery FMEA Manual. You can obtain your
copy of this excellent and Forgotten Machin-
ery FMEA Manual from the Automotive Industry
Action Group (AIAG), Southeld, Michigan.
A little history behind the AIAG-MFMEA Manual,
First Edition: In 2000, the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) had just released their SAE
J1739 and it had Section 5 about the Tool-
ing & Equipment. Not all Suppliers make their
own tooling and equipment, and it would be a
non-functional part of the current AIAG-FMEA
Manual, Third Edition. So it was decided to
remove the tooling and equipment (Section 5),
out of the SAE J1739 Specication, and make this
AlA0 - MFMEA Feference Manual 1st Edition.
This manual is the technical equivalent of SAE
J1739, Section Five (5), Potential Failure Modes
and Effects Analysis for Machinery (MFMEA).
This reference manual is for the FMEA of Tooling
and Equipment Suppliers to Chrysler LLC, Ford
Motor Company, and General Motors Corpora-
tion and other Global OEMs is intended to clarify
questions regarding the technical development
of Machinery FMEAs.
The Supplier Quality Requirements Task Force
Charter is consistent to the standardization
of reference manuals, procedures, reporting
formats and the technical nomenclature used by
Organizations and their Suppliers. Accordingly,
the MFMEA has been written to provide guid-
ance for the Organization and their Suppliers.
The MFMEA reference manual does not dene
requirements; it does provide a baseline and
guides users to cover situations that would nor-
mally be used when preparing MFMEAs during
the machinery design phase. Also, the AIAG-MF-
MEA - First Edition and the MFMEA - Third Edi-
tion Reference Manuals should be used together,
to reduce the possibility of any failures used
during the design and process of any production
or manufacturing facility and its suppliers. The
Fourth Edition MFMEA Reference Manual should
be available later this summer. Once this new
edition has been released, it is recommended
for each Team Member to be retrained to the
new Fourth Edition MFMEA Reference Manual,
and then complete your MFMEA requirements.
The Potential Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
for Tooling & Equipment (MFMEA) concepts
should be applied to machinery to reduce the
likelihoods and the probability of possible or
potential failure modes related to machinery. The
MFMEA supports the machinery design process
from design development through the design
approval process. The MFMEA should be a thor-
ough review of each element, function or step,
in the overall operation of the machinery. The
MFMEA manual addresses the design concepts
used to develop an effective MFMEA.
During the development of the build and instal-
lation process MFMEA, covers concepts by
all Global OEMs, and therefore, the MFMEA
manual should be considered and followed. The
build and installation process FMEA should be
initiated prior to the creation of any machinery.
Machinery is considered any and all tooling and
equipment combined to process or manufacture,
fabricate, machine or assemble of all hardware.
This includes all tooling, xtures, conveyors,
equipment, components, details, electrical
motors and wiring, switches, or any possible
combination. Additional examples include:
gages, stamping presses, injection molding,
metal cutting tools, welding, painting, and
cleaning equipment, all of which contribute to
the manufacturing process, including the
necessary operational computer hardware and
software.
FORGOTTEN FMEA MANUAL
AUTOMOTIVE EXCELLENCE
13
SUMMER 2008
Also take into consideration:
a) the human element;
b) training related to the operational content of each
element and
c) the process step related to the process.
These three items also include documentation,
manuals, procedures, and employee training re-
cords. Remember 100% inspection is not an effective
way to catch all nonconformances.
The Design MFMEA should be used as a continuous
improvement process and should be used to evalu-
ate the reliability, availability, maintainability, and
durability of the tooling, equipment and machinery.
MFMEAs are living documents and should be
reviewed and updated at regular intervals and as
process changes occur. Dont forget the supporting
documents used during the machinery operations
and the development process.
When you start the MFMEA process, you should
have a cross-functional team lead by the machinery
responsible engineer and is expected to involve all
areas at the manufacturing site. The manufacturing
facility should include plant & product engineers,
safety, quality, maintenance, production, support
personnel and the customer. This also includes
supplier engineering and their MFMEA from the ma-
chinery system, subsystem and all components. The
customer of the MFMEA is the manufacturing facility
where the tooling and equipment will be installed for
the production process.
A starting point should be dened; and become a
catalyst to simulate and stimulate the interactive
and interchange of ideas between all parties. There
should be a team approach during the activities
and include all commercial components and their
responsible engineer from each supplier. Each com-
ponent should be reviewed in detail for their
MFMEA criteria. The responsible machinery
engineer should be experienced with FMEA to help
facilitate and to help assist the team.
The Potential Machinery FMEA (Process) should be
used by the responsible machinery engineer and the
team as an analytical tool to evaluate any possible
failures during the design, install, manufacture,
or operation on all tooling and equipment. These
techniques should take in consideration all potential
failure modes and their possible causes and/or
mechanisms of failure, related to the operation of
the machinery as a means to ensure that all failures
are considered and addressed. The MFMEA should
be used as an input to the manufacturing facilities
preventative maintenance program and should be
used to determine the machinery controls that may
be used during the operation, manufacturing and
production processes. There will also be a need
to review all outside suppliers operations with the
causes and effects of any possible failures. Other
considerations: I recommend having the customer
preventative maintenance and supplier eld service
represented on the MFMEA Team. Otherwise, it will
be impossible to develop an effective MFMEA.
The MFMEA Team should concentrate on
improving the reliability, availability, maintainabil-
ity, and durability of the tooling, equipment and
machinery while conducting the analysis. During
the deep dive process, the MFMEA Teams ques-
tions, thoughts, documentation, lessons learned,
and analysis of each line element, should be
based on items that could potentially fail by their
associated causes and/or mechanisms of fail-
ures related to the operation of the machinery.
This should also be considered on the basis on
their past experiences concerns regarding the
entire operating production environment and
performance of the machinery. The MFMEA
improves the reliability, availability, maintain-
ability, and durability of the machinery. It helps
in the evaluation and understanding of the line
elements and steps of the devices, it aids in the
objective evaluation and helps provide the nec-
essary information to aid in the planning of an
effective and efcient process for the supplier
preventative maintenance programs.
When the process of the MFMEA had been initi-
ated and implemented, the results are reduced
life cycle costs, improved machinery repair
and maintenance, and reduction in mean time
to repair. The MFMEA shows the probability of
their potential failure modes and all the effects
of the shop oor should be considered before
uanufacturing the tooling and equipuent. upon
completion of the process, the MFMEA Team has
a ranked list of the potential failure modes and
their potential causes and mechanisms. The list
will be ranked accordingly, and then establish a
priority system for preventative and corrective
actions.
Once the MFMEA Team has assembled and all
pertinent back up information prepared, the
machinery responsible engineer should lead
the group in the MFMEA development process.
The process begins with the preparation of all
documents and each member should have a full
understanding of what the entire process can
and will do, during the manufacturing and pro-
duction processes. Each Team member should
be trained prior to the start of the development of
the MFMEA process as to what the machinery is
expected to do or not do, in the production and
manufacturing environment, under the specied
conditions and for the required time period. (e.g.
hot, cold, humidity, oil, water, cutting uids, ma-
chining chips, etc..). This criteria is expected
from sources such as design requirements,
validation testing, preventative maintenance
programs, program and performance criteria,
reliability, maintainability, availability and durabil-
ity results, contract and engineering specica-
tions, production and ongoing testing, including
lot control testing, traceability requirements,
prevention, detection and corrective actions.
This would also include the lessons learned,
preventative maintenance historical records
of the same machines, and possible federal,
state and/or local regulatory laws.
efore the MFMEA starts the review and devel-
opment process, the MFMEA Team should have
access to the process ow diagram, sequence
of steps of the operation of the machinery and
detailed descriptions. The tooling and equipment
machinery brochures, with engineering draw-
ings, detail prints and machinery reliability data
and capability studies. The responsible machin-
ery engineer leads the Team, to help facilitate
all of the documented results and analysis of the
potential failure modes and cause mechanism
of failures, and their possible consequences and
recommended actions.
This is just the tip of the iceberg, and I could
write another 20 pages of this fantastic FMEA
material. It can be a very dry subject, but I
would like you to get excited about new AIAG
Fourth Edition FMEA Reference Manual, and
please dont forget about The Forgotten FMEA
Manual, about Machinery FMEAs.
Steven C. Leggett is a General Motors Corpora-
tion, Senior APQP Supplier Quality Engineer. In
his current position, Mr. Leggett is responsible
for Cradle to Grave APQP Functions and War-
ranty regarding Chassis Components. He has
been and is active in the development of quality
publications by the Automotive Industry Action
Group (AIAG). He is the co-author of the AIAG-
FMEA Manual-Third Edition and is Chair of the
AIAG-PPAP Manual-Fourth Edition, as well as a
Speaker at various local and national confer-
ences. Steve is also active within the Automotive
Division and Detroit Section of ASQ, he can be
reached at steve-leggett@sbcglobal.net.
Reference Information can be found on the links
below:
SAE J1739, AIAG-FMEA, MFMEA, PPAP, APQP,
MSA, SPC, ISO/TS 16949, and Jurans Quality
Control hand ook.
Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
www.sae.org
Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG)
www.aiag.org
American Society for Quality (ASQ)
www.asq.org
Published by Mirus Graphic Solutions and ASQ Automotive Division
www.asq.org
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