The Army Lessons Learned Centre

VOL 13 NO 1 July 2007

Lessons Learned for Soldiers

CONVOY AND VIP ESCORT

National Dfense Defence nationale

HOW TO CONTACT
The Army Lessons Learned Centre CFB Kingston (613) 541-5010 Extension xxxx CSN 271-xxxx
Director LCol R Matheson4909 Assistant Director Maj W.B. Pond3291 SO Plans Maj E.J.A. Lefrancois4816 SO Operations Maj E. Morin5440 SO Reserve Maj SR Rankin5117 SO Coordination Capt CI Clark4813 Deputy Coordinator MWO J.W. Hooyer2890 Matheson LCol RH@LFDTS HQ@Kingston Matheson.rh@forces.gc.ca Pond Maj WB@LFDTS HQ@Kingston Pond.WB@forces.gc.ca Lefrancois Maj EJA@LFDTS HQ@Kingston Lefrancois.EJA@forces.gc.ca Morin Maj JGCE@LFDTS HQ@Kingston Morin.JGCE@forces.gc.ca Rankin Maj SR1@LFDTS HQ@Kingston Rankin.SR1@forces.gc.ca Clark Capt CI1@LFDTS HQ@Kingston Clark.CI1@forces.gc.ca Hooyer MWO JW@LFDTS HQ@Kingston HooyerJW@forces.gc.ca

DIRECTOR'S NOTE
In November 1994, the Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC) produced a Dispatches publication entitled "Convoy Operations." Now, twelve years later, the issues of convoy operations and very important person (VIP) escort have resurfaced in light of the challenging counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. It is interesting to note that military themes remain constant, but must be reviewed due to the ever-changing contemporary operating environment (COE). This "Convoy and VIP Escort" edition of Dispatches is a result of the work of numerous officers and non-commissioned members of the Combat Training Centre (CTC) who have contributed to the study of convoy and VIP escort "best practices." The ALLC is pleased to assist in promulgating this important document. The ALLC wishes to thank Colonel M.P. Jorgensen and his dedicated CTC staff for their comprehensive work and commitment to training excellence. R.H. Matheson Lieutenant-Colonel Director Army Lessons Learned Centre

FOREWORD
Canada has participated in the campaign in Afghanistn since 2002. Throughout our involvement in this campaign, convoys have increasingly become the targets of choice for belligerents and insurgents. The contents of this edition serve to provide a framework of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for the conduct of convoy and VIP escort. The material contained herein has been compiled from existing publications and TTP, as well as from recent operational and training experiences of the field force. The Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC) has representation in theatre and provides periodic lessons summaries in the form of Lesson Synopsis Reports and Consolidated Lessons Reports. These reports are distributed Army-wide and constitute an invaluable source of information on emerging insurgent tactics and threats, while providing observations, findings and relevant recommendations. It was decided at a recent Army Individual Training Authority Strategic Planning Session that the field force would benefit by publishing these TTP. Accordingly, this edition is the first in a series of Dispatches covering the TTP that are pertinent to the contemporary operating environment (COE). Future topics will include cordon and search, room clearing, and checkpoints, all of which will be published later this year. As TTP for convoy and VIP escort will continually change to counter a fluid threat, I welcome your comments and suggestions for improvement. Your observations should be forwarded through approved communication channels to the applicable centre of excellence-the Armour School-at the Combat Training Centre in Gagetown. M.P. Jorgensen Colonel Commander CTC / AITA

DISPATCHES 1

REFERENCES
A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. B-GL-394-005/FT-000 Convoy and VIP Escort TTP B-GL-005-000/FP 001 Convoy Operations TTP B-GJ-005-316/FP-004 CF Counter-IED TTP Handbook B-GL-394-001/FP-002 Reconnaissance in Battle B-GL-392-009/FP-000 Military Training Volume 1 Fieldcraft B-GL-361-021/FP-001 Mobility Support: Route and Area Clearance Mounted Reconnaissance TTP (Draft) May 2005 Combined Arms Team TTP (Draft) Jan 2005 ALLC Dispatches Vol. 1 No. 1 Convoy Operations Nov 1994 US Army FM 17-98 Scout Platoon US Army Convoy Leader Training Handbook, Kuwait Oct 2003 US Army Lessons Learned, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 2003

DISPATCHES 2

CONVOY AND VIP ESCORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
REFERENCES PART 1 PART 2 PART 3 PART 4 INTRODUCTION PLANNING FOR CONVOY ESCORT TASKS? INTRODUCTION TO "ACTION ON" DRILLS RECENT OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN CONCLUSION LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY 2 4 8 16 19

PART 5 ANNEX A

20 21

DISPATCHES 3

PART 1INTRODUCTION General

Historically, convoy escort and the mounted escort of VIPs was primarily the doctrinal domain of the armoured reconnaissance squadron as a function of rear area security (RAS). However, in the contemporary operating environment (COE) there are no rear areas, and mounted escort tasks are far more common and can be assigned to most field units. Recent operational experience in Afghanistan, coupled with the lessons being learned by the US Army in Iraq, illustrate the importance of updating and formalizing convoy escort doctrine and TTP for the Canadian Land Force. This edition of Dispatches provides a summary of the types of escorts, the key planning considerations, and select "Action On" drills. It is not intended to replace, but to introduce, reference A.

In the first three months of this mission, the 12 RBC Battle Group carried out more than 600 patrols, escorted 90 humanitarian aid convoys, which delivered 6000 tons of cargo and 100,000 litres of fuel. Interim Operations Report, OP CAVALIER ROTO 2

...all CSS activities are a deliberate combat operation. Theatre Lessons Report 06-032, TFA Roto 1 CSS Support, 01 August 06

DISPATCHES 4

Key Definitions
A clear understanding of the following definitions is important when planning for this task: Escort Commander. A military officer or non-commissioned officer (NCO) in charge of the military forces assigned to conduct the escort task. Escort. The combat force detailed to accompany and protect a column of vehicles from being scattered, destroyed or captured. Its commander is the escort commander. Vehicle Column. A vehicle or groups of vehicles to be escorted. These vehicles could carry personnel, arms, ammunition, petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL), supplies, or a very important person (VIP). Vehicle Column Commander. The senior military or civilian person in charge of the column to be escorted. Convoy Commander. The military officer or NCO overall responsible for the escort force and vehicle column once link-up is complete. For reasons of unity of command and control, the escort commander is normally appointed as the convoy commander. The convoy commander is, regardless of any other senior ranking personnel within the convoy, responsible for the conduct of the operation and the safe conduct of the column to its destination. Convoy. A group of two or more vehicles organized for the purpose of control and orderly movement. A convoy may be composed of a vehicle column or an escort, and it may also include both civilian and military vehicles. VIP. Consists of one or more persons of designated special status whose status or value requires special protection. Aim of Escorts. The aim of any escort is to provide protection to an assigned organization or individual. The two types of escorts most commonly employed are: Convoy Escort. The aim is to protect a convoy from being scattered, destroyed or captured. Such vehicles can range from military combat service support (CSS) or command and control (C2) vehicles, to civilian trucks or buses. VIP Escort. The mission is to protect the VIP from being killed or captured. For the purposes of this document, it is concerned with the mounted movement of the VIP and not their close protection.

Contemporary Operating Environment

Recent experience has shown that escort operations must be treated as carefully planned military operations rather than scheduled as routine military road traffic. This point is valid throughout full-spectrum of operations (FSO) and conflict in the

DISPATCHES 5

COE, and re-emphasizes force protection. More than ever, convoys and escort forces face an increased threat posed by asymmetric forces operating throughout the entire battlespace. Attacks against static and moving CSS elements will increase as the enemy chooses to attack perceived weaknesses rather than confront the superior firepower of the combat forces.

PART 2PLANNING FOR CONVOY ESCORT TASKS?

The crew commanders, air sentries, and co-drivers need to be particularly alert for people and vehicles approaching or following their convoy. On numerous occasions soldiers have spotted individuals (sometimes locals, sometimes foreigners), following, videotaping, or noting what convoys were doing. There has been a distinct correlation with regard to observation followed by a higher threat posture against ISAF [International Security Assistance Force], mainly at the start and end of rotations. Observation, OP ATHENA ROTO 2

Types and Tasks of Escorts

Mechanized forces are well suited to perform escort tasks during all phases of war due to their firepower and armour protection against direct fire, indirect fire, and mines / improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Additionally, escort forces are further optimized if they are reinforced with aviation or other aerial reconnaissance (recce) support such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). An escort task may be assigned at the squadron/company level. A troop/platoon should be considered the lowest tactical organization capable of effectively performing an escort task. The element assigned the escort task is dependent on what is being escorted, its importance, the distance to travel, and the threat level. This may include the coordination of multiple escorts on different routes.

DISPATCHES 6

Escort Methods. There are two methods to perform escorting tasks: standard method; and tunnel method.

Standard Method
In the standard method of escort, all elements directly involved in the task are integral to the convoy or VIP under escort as illustrated in Figure 1. This method is more reactive in nature. It is used when the route is in good condition, passable to all vehicles, and the threat of enemy action is relatively low. An escorting force employing the standard method will, as a minimum, consist of three tactical groups: Advance Group. This group is the leading element of the escort. It moves tactically and proves the route, acting as early warning for the follow-on elements. Its task may also include the recce of detours and the establishment of pickets. Close Protection Group. This group consists of combat escort vehicles dispersed throughout the main body of the convoy. Its task is to provide the immediate close protection to the vehicle column. Reserve Group. This group provides a rear guard/reserve to react quickly to the convoy commander's direction and to assist the close protection group if a contact is encountered. It is also where the medical and recovery resources are located if attached.
a. Advance Group. This group is the leading element of the escort. It proves the safety of the route and provides early warning prior to the arrival of the vehicle column. As a minimum, it consists of two vehicles for mutual support.
LO ENGR

Two escort vehicles with additional assets (i.e. Liaison Officer, or Engineer Support Party with vehicle mounted blade or Surface Munitions Clearance Device [SMCD]). Distance depends on task and situation (e.g. 2 km / 5 min interval).

b. Close Protection Group. This group provides the immediate close protection of the vehicle column. The escort commander is located within this group.

c. Reserve Group. This element provides a rear guard/reserve and also medical and recovery resources of the convoy (if attached). Two armoured vehicles with medical and recovery assets.

Main body of the convoy including the close protection group, the escorted vehicles, and additional assets as required (e.g. Forward Observation officer [FOO]).

Distance depends on task and situation (e.g. 2 km / 5 min interval). Figure 1: Standard Method of Convoy Escort DISPATCHES 7

Tunnel Method
The tunnel method is similar to the standard method; however, additional resources are allocated to provide security, early warning, and reaction along the route, as illustrated in Figure 2. This method is more proactive. It is used to escort anything that warrants higher protection than what is provided through employment of the standard method. During the tunnel method, there are typically two tactical groups used to provide additional security, early warning, and reaction. They are: Security Group. This group creates the imaginary tunnel for the escort to travel through along the planned route as illustrated in Figure 2. It deploys prior to the escort's departure, and is tasked with observation over watch in order to report en route status, provide early warning, and protect the route through the use of precision direct or indirect fire. Rapid Reaction Group (RRG). This group is a dedicated reserve force whose mission is to provide immediate assistance. It is normally located in a static position (hide/waiting area); however, it may move independently from location to location depending on the length of the "tunnel" and threat level.

Figure 2: This is an example of tunnel method with tactical groups deployed along a convoy route. Once the "tunnel" is in place, the convoy and escort proceed down the "tunnel" using the same groupings and movement as in the standard method. Abbreviations: SPstart point; TCPtraffic control point; RRGrapid reaction group; UAVunmanned aerial vehicle; and RPrelease point.

The tunnel method may also require additional assets to effectively conduct the task, such as snipers, engineers, direct fire vehicles, UAVs, helicopters and/or military police (MP).

DISPATCHES 8

Tactical Movement
Regardless of whether an escorting force uses the standard or the tunnel method, the advance group normally moves tactically with mutual support. They will not normally conduct drills, however, they will investigate anomalies along the route that could affect the main body. Conversely, the close protection and reserve groups move at a constant speed and spacing to avoid bunching and straggling.

Stages of an Escort
The following are suggested stages for conducting an escort task: Stage 1Preparation and Planning. Stage 2Conduct of the Escort. Stage 3Redeployment, After Action Review (AAR) / Debrief of the Escort Force.

Stage Preparation and Planning

General. Upon receipt of an escort task, the escort commander conducts normal battle procedure. The paragraphs contained in this section outline a few of the key deductions that are specific to this type of task. Detailed Time Appreciation. The detailed time appreciation must be conducted in conjunction with the detailed map recce. This will assist commanders in determining: when liaison with the vehicle column commander / VIP will be conducted; how much time is available to make a recce plan, conduct the recce, prepare and issue orders; and how much time is available for subordinate commanders to conduct their battle procedure. Detailed Map Reconnaissance. Conducting a detailed map recce will permit the escort commander to understand what effect and influence the terrain will have upon the execution of the mission. It includes primary and alternative routes, the enemy, and the terrain along the route(s). Specific attention must be paid to the start point, release point, and other points along a route where interference with movement may occur, or where timing is critical. Prepare a Reconnaissance Plan. The planning and recce of the probable route(s) that the escort will follow and any possible alternative or bypass routes are critical to the escort task. The route recce should be conducted covertly to avoid alerting the enemy of the possible operation and route(s) to be used. Aerial recce assets can be used to overfly the route(s). Engineer assets, if available, should be used to assist in the recce.

DISPATCHES 9

Timely, accurate intelligence is a two-way street, as the convoys both collects and benefits from the final product. As they are a daily presence on the road, transportation assets became an integral part of the intelligence collection process. Observation, OP ATHENA ROTO 2

Conduct the Reconnaissance. The recce is conducted to confirm the condition and suitability of the route(s), and to ensure that it is clear of obstacles and hostile threats. It also serves to confirm the information gathered from the detailed map appreciation and assist the escort commander in determining which escort method will be used, as well as the level of surveillance required. The requirement for a liaison officer or interpreter may be identified at this time to help with the passage of lines through other friendly units' areas of responsibility (AORs), deal with the affected local population, etc. It must be kept in mind that recce information acquired several days in advance may need to be updated immediately prior to the operation. Combat EstimateKey Factors. The key factors for consideration in the combat estimate are as follows: Enemy Type/size / order of battle (ORBAT). Locations (possible and confirmed). Equipment, vehicle and weapons. Intent, and recent actions. Capabilities and weaknesses. Standing operating procedures (SOP)/tactics for attacks/roadblocks, snipers, ambush, minefields, IEDs, etc. Confrontation lines on the route, location, and check points. Likelihood of direct or indirect fire attack. How they would react to friendly actions.

DISPATCHES 10

Ground (Route and Influencing Terrain) Terrain type (e.g. open, closed, urban, rural). Type of main route (e.g. paved, single/multi lane, conditions and classification). Defiles/canalizing ground. Obstacles (natural and man-made). Bridges (class and condition). Built-up areas (BUAs)size/location/bypasses. Alternative routes/detours / return route. Halt/resting areas. Emergency hides, friendly bases, possible landing zones (LZs). Dominating positions (e.g. hills, buildings, towers). Overpasses/ambush sites along the route. Communications dead zones? Location / radio rebroadcast (RRB) sites available? Operational or factional boundaries? Liaison required? Weather Effect on the road conditions, now/during. Effect on visibility/surveillance sensors and optics. Effect on aerial support.

DISPATCHES 11

Own Troops Escortresources available. troops/attachments required? Own rules of engagement (ROE). Deception planif so, what is it? Where/when? Do we have electronic warfare assets? Does the convoy have compatible radios or not? Is there a requirement for a LO(s) and/or translator(s)? What are the locations of other friendly forces that can assist if required? Convoy organization to include chain of command. Where is the controlling HQ? Number of vehicles to be escorted. Type of vehicles to be escorted (e.g. mobility, speed, armoured protection required?) Are they armed? National origin of the column and their ROE. Their national ROE. If civilian vehicles are being escorted, are they easily distinguished from regular civilian traffic? Vulnerability/importance of what is being escorted. Combat service support: casualty evacuation (CASEVAC)/medical arrangements en route; recovery requests/vehicle breakdown procedure; alternative communications procedures if radios do not work within the convoy; and replenishment of combat supplies if required. Time and Space Time of day the convoy will travel. Time by which column must arrive at its destination. Estimated travel time. Earliest time column can arrive at check points / destination. Requirements for halts en route. Allowance for delays or unforeseen circumstances. Are they sufficient or are additional

DISPATCHES 12

First/last light. Time for subordinates to conduct battle procedure. Time for the escort to return to its parent unit location. Rehearsal time prior to conducting the operation. Time available air support can be on station and its duration. Other Considerations Civilian attitude? (e.g. friendly, neutral, hostile). Civilian traffic patterns? (e.g. vehicle spacing of the convoy, avoidance of rush hour traffic). Refugee issuesare there any; are they friendly; how to deal with them? Non-governmental organization (NGOs)is there a need for interaction? Mediaembedded, freelance? Local hospitals we could use in an emergency? Security plan if used? Local, national, or religious holidays? escalate issues? Could movement cause unrest or

Are any additional control measures required. VIP escort considerations: How to identify the VIP. Composition and actions of the VIP's personal close protection group.

DISPATCHES 13

Will the VIP travel in an armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) or a decoy vehicle? When does the escort commander become responsible for the VIP? Additional control measures required: assign nicknames to routes and waiting/safe areas; use of grid intersection points (GIP); and identify prominent locations or points along the route. Courses of Action. Any escort task has three possible courses of action: tunnel method; standard method; or a combination of both. Once all of the factors and key deductions have been considered, courses of action are then developed. ROE. As a normal activity, early discussion of ROE is a must and should be conducted as a routine activity / marrying-up drill even in training. Differences or limitations in regard ROE need not be an obstacle to effective operations if all parties clearly understand the differences CFLO USMC 14 Jul 05 Report TRUEX

Plan. Once the plan has been determined, "Action On" drills must be established or confirmed for all foreseeable eventualities (See Part Three). The escort commander will normally back-brief higher command on the escort plan, emphasizing any additional control measures or additional assets required. The escort commander will communicate this plan to the escort force using the standard orders format (See reference A for suggested orders format).

Stage 2Conduct of the Escort

The following list outlines the chronological steps taken to conduct an escort task: Orders are issued to the escorting force. The escort force moves to the link-up location. Based on the level of threat, all-round security is established.

DISPATCHES 14

The escort commander liaises with the senior person of the force to be escorted and establishes the chain of command. Marry-up drills are conducted to include: exchange frequencies and call signs; number of personnel and their primary language; number and type of vehicles including confirmation of the cargo; types of weapons carried and their nation's ROE; and any other pertinent information that may affect the plan. Convoy inspection (in the case of VIP escort, confirm the identity of the person(s) being escorted). Crew/driver briefings to include issuing of maps/route cards. Sample briefing format included in reference A. Convoy marshalling. Conduct of "Action On" rehearsals. Establishment of over watch and check points (tunnel method). Departure of the Advance Group. Departure of the Close-Protection Group. Departure of the Reserve Group. Conduct arrival drills and vehicle inspections at the destination. Tactical re-deployment of the Escort Force. During the conduct of an escort task, all members of the convoy must be alert and maintain situational awareness against possible threats. The escort force should notice any changes from previous recce, and the commander must be prepared to implement contingency plans for any changes to the tactical situation. However, all participants must be alert for the following: Suspicious movement near and on overpasses (as they provide excellent areas for IEDs and/or ambush sites). Abandoned vehicles along the route (possible vehicle-borne IED). Foreign objects en route (possible IED).

DISPATCHES 15

Sudden activity as the convoy approaches. Local population dispersing or disappearing. Fresh road repairs (possible IED/mines). Signs of tampering, exposed wires, or items attached to the backside of guard rails. Movement on rooftops and in windows of buildings. One of the most prominent methods of attacking convoys has been attacking from overpasses with small arms, RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] and IEDs. This allows an attacking force good observation and fields of fire, good cover and concealment (often), and quick escape routes. Maj Eric O. Estep, Support Ops Plans, 3rd COSCOM, LSA Anaconda, IRAQ on 16 Oct 03

Stage 3Redeployment and After Action Review / Debrief of the Escort Force
Once released from the escort task, the escort force may return to their point of origin via an alternative route if possible, or receive a subsequent task. If the security force is still in place securing the tunnel, this route should be used for the return trip. Once redeployed to a safe area, an after action review (AAR)/debrief of the mission should be conducted to analyze the task and capture lessons learned. A report should be submitted upon completion of the mission including information on the road conditions, enemy/belligerent disposition, conditions of the local populace, and other details. This is an important method in updating the intelligence situation and can assist in the planning and conduct of future operations.

PART 3INTRODUCTION TO "ACTION ON" DRILLS General

The paragraphs contained in this section outline four major "Action On" drills for sniper, ambush, IEDs, and halts. For a more complete list of "Action On" drills see reference A.

Action On Sniper
The following list provides the actions on for a sniper contact: The convoy should NOT stop. The escort commander must develop a course of action (COA), considering the
DISPATCHES 16

relevant factors as to what the sniper is trying to achieve: To harass the convoy/target a specific individual; or To force the convoy to: stop and deploy (possible baited ambush); continue at a greater speed (possible baited ambush); turn around; take alternative route; canalize into a kill zone; and commit its quick reaction force (QRF) / rapid reaction group (RRG). All personnel in armoured vehicles should go hatches down. The escort force may, on order, use direct fire to suppress the sniper, although time should not be wasted attempting to locate and isolate the threat.

Action On Ambush
Regardless of the ambush scenario, the convoy commander's response must include the following: Immediate offensive action within ROE. Arrangements for halting and protecting that part of the convoy not caught in the ambush. Action to extricate that part of the convoy caught in the ambush. Instructions for all vehicle column drivers to, if applicable, clear the road to permit the escort to manoeuvre.

Action On Improvised Explosive Devices

While the CF Counter-IED TTP Handbook at reference C should be consulted for details, the following key activities should be taken upon an IED detonation: Quick, lethal and aggressive response in accordance with ROE. Establish all-round security of disabled vehicles for treatment/evacuation of casualties. Mobile vehicles move out of the kill zone to establish a RV with all-round security. Report situation. Re-establish the order of march and continue the task.
DISPATCHES 17

If traveling in soft skin vehicles, one Soldier wears earplugs the entire time. Then, if an IED/RPG is detonated or fired, that Soldier can continue to communicate effectively on the radio. U.S. CALL SBCT Monthly Bulletin, Volume 22, December 2003

Action On Halts
If the halt is for any reason other than an obstacle, these actions should be taken: The convoy commander signals the halt and transmits the order by radio. He will also inform his higher commander of his action. Escort vehicles take up protective positions forward, to the rear, and to the flanks. They orient their weapon systems outward and may, dependent on the escort commander's plan and the mine threat, establish dismounted local security. Escorted vehicles with weapons systems must also cover arcs outwards around the halt area. Drivers should remain mounted and be prepared to move on immediate notice. When the order is given to move, escorted vehicles re-establish the column formation, leaving space for the escort vehicles. The escort vehicles then move into their positions, leaving local security dismounted. Once all elements are in column, local security personnel mount, and the convoy continues its movement.

Figure 4: Action on Halt (showing sample arcs of fire). When required, dismounted personnel should be interspersed among the escort vehicles to provide additional protection.

DISPATCHES 18

PART 4RECENT OPERATIONS IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN

Recent operational experience in southern Afghanistan since early 2006 has seen less traditional convoy escorts, yet innumerable "convoy operations." All convoys in theatre have integral combat power provided by a number of organizations. A typical convoy could consist of five to ten CSS vehicles and three or more several fighting vehicles such as Coyotes, light armoured vehicles (LAVs), RG-31 Nyala mine protected vehicles, and light utility vehicles wheeled command and recce (LUVW C&R) variants. These integrated CSS convoys usually move as a single entity without an advance group or reserve group. The fighting vehicles (escortsclose protection group) can come from the battle group (BG) or from the National Support Element (NSE) integral defence and security (D&S) platoon trained and configured to conduct convoy operations. Nevertheless, convoy escorts still occur in the current COE where a fighting echelon sub-sub unit or sub-unit is given the task of escorting a convoy from another organization. In addition, the TTP

DISPATCHES 19

Cbt Veh The convoy will usually have combat vehicles at the front, middle and rear of the convoy, with an RG-31, LAV or Coyote in the lead. CSS vehicles (vehs) may be BISON, heavy lift vehicle wheeled (HLVW), etc. The convoy escort concept without the Advance Group and the Reserve Group (due to resources in theatre). Cbt Veh The convoy may have additional vehs, such as combat vehs and CSS vehs according to the situation and re-supply tasks. Concept when attacked: Push through a threat and never leave anybody behind. If a veh is battledamaged and cannot move, the middle and rear FP vehs will stay behind to destroy the enemy. If not, it will bring all personnel to the next bound and deny any equipment prior leaving the enemy kill zone (KZ).

CSS Veh

CSS Veh

Cbt Veh

Figure 5. Example of a CSS Convoy during JTF-Afghanistan Roto 1 , Feb to August 2006 (variations occurred throughout the deployment, and this should be taken as a guide).

..Convoy TTP will continue to be followed and all vehicle movement "outside the wire" will be treated as a combat patrol. Incident Lessons Report 06-054, SVBIED Attack on 16 Oct 06, JTF Afg Roto 2 ,

PART 5CONCLUSION
Convoy escort TTP and amplifying doctrine are not meant to limit the response of escort commanders, but serve to outline the guiding principles and provide all personnel involved with the tools necessary to effectively plan for and respond to any threat. During operations, escort tasks will continue to play a vital role to ensure force protection in the COE as our lines of supply and communication are increasingly vulnerable to an asymmetric and evolving threat.

DISPATCHES 20

ANNEX ALESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY

There are no "rear areas," and no one in a convoy is just a passenger. Remain alert (watch for potential threats). If it looks out of place, IT PROBABLY IS! The AAR process should be used to establish sound convoy escort SOP. At the link-up, time should be allocated to ensure that "Action On" drills could be rehearsed with all involved. Clearly establish the convoy chain of command. When doing his inspection, the convoy commander should ensure that convoy loads are properly secured. Loads that shift or fall off of the truck create hazards and could possibly force the vehicles to stop creating an easy target. Avoid routines for standing escort tasks. Take the quickest lane, and if the road quality is equal, travel down the middle of the road, avoiding the vulnerable shoulders. External assets, in the forms of fire support, UAVs, helicopter recce, fast air and gunships, can be essential to mission success. Ensure that if these assets are designated to support a convoy escort that someone in the convoy is trained and capable of directing their effects. Build up as much protection on each vehicle as possible IAW theatre SOP. All convoy vehicles should be equipped with tow bars or tow straps for quick recovery. Every vehicle should have radio communications. methods should be considered. Breakdowns will occur; a plan must be in place. When the mine threat is high, road inspection and mine clearing should be performed daily. In these areas, drivers should drive in the tracks of preceding vehicles. Be alert for people (including local media) observing or videotaping convoy activities. If people appear to be counting the number of vehicles in your convoy, or seem overly interested, stay alert (especially if they are speaking on a cell phone)! They may be gathering info on TTP, or may be a scout or a recce asset for a potential ambush force farther down the road, and may signal your approach. There has been a direct correlation between observation and attacks. Watch for lights flashing or going on/off, or listen for horns honking. These could be signals for an ambush force nearby. Other signalling methods include nonaimed gunfire. Recognizing the signals can help you anticipate an attack and avoid an engagement altogether. In built-up areas, watch for the absence of children where there are normally many. If the locals avoid it, so should you. Be cautious when approaching overpasses or embankments. Redundant communication

DISPATCHES 21

Know your ROE! More importantly, ensure all members of the convoy are clear on the Open Fire Policy. Maintain convoy speed at all times. Do not stop for any longer than absolutely necessary. Smaller non-armoured vehicles should use evasive movement in ambushes. If you encounter human obstacles (civilian or protestor), it is not your job to meet their demands, and they may be linked to enemy activity. They want you to stop! One of the biggest keys to success in convoy escort tasks is live fire training. Include it whenever possible. Ensure that all soldiers involved in convoy escort operations are intimately familiar with friendly force recognition SOP.

Remember that the enemy is not the only threat to a convoy. Apart from enemy action, most accidents during convoys are due to driver fatigue. Speeding, and following too close are the second and third most common causes of convoy accidents. ObservationBritish Army Convoy Operations

DISPATCHES 22

DISPATCHES 23