Klarsfeld Ed. - Holocaust & Neo-Nazi My Tho Mania

OTHER WORKS ON THE HOLOCAUST PUBLISHED
BY BEATE AND SERGE KLARSFELD

Le Memorial de la Deportation des Juifs de France
by Serge KLARSFELD
ts of all the Jews deported from France and history of each transport)
656 p., 1978.
La Solution Finale de la Question Juive;
ssai sur ses principes dans Ie Reich et en France sous I'Occupation,
208 p., 1978,
by Dr. Joseph BILLIG.
Die EndlOsung der Judenfrage in Frankreich,
Deutsche Dokumente (136), 244 p., 1978,
by Serge KLARSFELD.
Works edited by Serge Klarsfeld in 1978 and intended
for the Centers of Historical Research on the Holocaust:
election of two thousand documents from the German authorities
in France concerning the "Final Solution" in France (1940-1944).
Presented in chronological order with detailed index and tables.
ection of several hundred documents from the Service for Jewish Affairs,
the /1-112, of the Sichereitsdienst-SD (1937-1939).
Documentary files concerning the Nazi criminals
(Kurst Lischka, Herbert Hagen, Ernst Heinrichshon)
responsible for the deportation of the Jews from France.
They have been indicted and will be tried in 1979 in Cologne.
The autobiography of Beate Klarsfeld, Wherever They May Be.
Was published in 1975 by The Vanguard Press, New York (344 p.).
singer. A Documentation, by Beate Klarsfeld, was published in 1969
by Melzer Verlag, Darmstadt, with a foreword by Heinrich BOll.
II
THE HOLOCAUST
AND THE NEO-NAZI
MYTHOMANIA
The Launching of the "Final Solution"
by Dr. Joseph BILLIG
The Existence of Gas Chambers
The Number of Victims and the Korherr Report
by Georges WELLERS
Edited
by Serge KLARSFELD
Translated from the Original French
by Barbara Rucci
The BEATE KLARSFELD FOUNDATION - New York 1978
The Public Committee for the Support of BeateKlarsfeld, Jerusalem
Association pour Ie Jugement des Criminels Nazis qui ont opere en France, Paris
LIBRARy
OJt-
This book is dedicated to the memory of
HENRI MICMACHER
(June 29, 1925-August 24, 1978)
of
Founder and President-General Director of PRONUPTIA
He was a good, generous and creative Man,
who lost his mother, father and brother at Auschwitz.
e helped us to publish "The Memorial of the Depol1ation of the Jews from France."
He was killed in a tragic automobile accident,
which also took the lives of his son, Marc, and his daughter in law, Colette.

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Copyright 1978 by Klarsfeld
All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce
this book or portions thereof in any form.
FIRST PRINTING
IV
CONTENTS
Foreword ...................................... IX
Acknowledgments ............................... XV
Part I: The Jewish Question until 1941.
1. The Incubation Period of Hitler's Anti-Jewish Action,
1933-1938 ................................. .
2. Jewish Emigration during the Incubation Period of the
"Final Solution" ............................ .
3. The Nazi Anti-Jewish Action Isolated from
Mass Movements
4. The Jewish Question in the Gestapo and in the SD
before the War ............................. .
5. The Preparation of the "Final Solution": the SS
Destined to Inspire the Gestapo ............... .
6. The Service for Jewish Affairs within the SD, the
II-112, under the Sign of "Zionism" (1935-1938) ... .
7. The SD and the Zionist Emigration ............. .
8. The Anticipation of the "Final Solution":
Hagen and Eichmann in Vienna ................ .
9. The Efforts of Hagen to Force Jewish Emigration
in Various Countries ......................... .
10. The Men of the II-112 Confronted with the Jews ... .
11. The Passage to the "Final Solution" in the Reich
(1938-1939) ............................... .
12. The Integration of the Men of the II-112 into the
Reichssichereitshauptamt (September 1939) ....... .
13. Eichmann's Task from September 1939 to March 1941
V
1
3
4
8
12
17
19
22
24
26
30
30
.... , .... Itt;; VIU!;;/;} Jur lne --r Inat
1. The Order of the Fiihrer (Der Fiihrerbefehl) in General
2. Public Announcements of the "Final Solution" by the
Fiihrer and Chancellor of the Reich ............. .
3. The Announcements of the "Final Solution" by Hitler
before his Dining Companions at the Fiihrer's Head-
quarters .................................. .
4. The Orders of Hitler to Himmler ............... .
5. The "Final Solution" by a Jewish Colonial Reserve
(Summer 1940-Spring 1941) ................... .
6. The Order of the Fiihrer for the "Final Solution" in the
Occupied Soviet Regions (Spring 1941-Summer 1941)
The Principle of the "Final Solution" by Exterminatory
Deportation to the Occupied Regions ("East of the
East") (Autumn 1941) ....................... .
Hitler's Approval of the Generalized "Final Solution"
and the Conference of Wannsee (January 1942) ....
The "Final Solution" by Gas Chambers in the Concen-
trationary System (Summer 1942-0ctober 1944) ....
The "Final Solution", "Page of Glory" Which Will
Have Neither to be Written Nor to be Forgotten ... .
'bliography ................................... .
otes
by Georges WELLERS
The Gas Chambers at Auschwitz '" ............. .
l. A few Documents from Archives ............... .
Declarations of Members of the SS ............. .
I. Statements of Former Prisoners at Auschwitz ...... .
The Gas Chambers at Belzec and the Declarations
of Gerstein ................................ .
Kurt Gerstein and His Report .................. .
, "Proofs" that the Gerstein Testimony is a "Forgery" .
Irrefutable Documents ....................... .
f. The Gerstein Report at Nuremberg ............. .
;. Stockholm Confirms ......................... .
VI
35
39
41
44
45
47
50
57
59
61
74
109
111
113
116
120
120
122
124
126
127
6. The Gerstein Testimony and the Insincerity of its
Detractors ................................ ..
7. The Gas Chambers at Belzec ................... .
8. A Mysterious Visitor and His "Testimony" (?) ..... .
9. "Witness X" and the Legend of the Mad SS ....... .
by Georges WELLERS
1. Convergence of Diverse Estimates .............. .
2. Rassinier's Figures d His Methods ............. .
3. The Hungarian Chapter ....................... .
4. The Korherr Report (December 31, 1942) ....... .
5. The Korherr Report Completed (March 31, 1943) ..
6. Genocide in the U.S.S.R., in the Baltic Countries and
in Bessarabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Results of the Census by Nationality of the Population
of the U.S.S.R .............................. .
8. Number of Victims Recorded ................. .
9. Number of Dead and of Survivors ............. .
Bibliography
Appendices
The First Unabridged Publication of the two Korherr
Reports ................................... .
Appendix A: The First Korherr Report (December 31,
1942), the German Text ...................... .
Appendix B: The First Korherr Report (December 31,
1942), the English Translation ................. .
Appendix C: The Korherr Report Completed (March 31,
1943), the German Text ..................... .
Appendix D: The Korherr Report Completed (March 31,
1943), the English Translation ................. .
Appendix E: Korherr: His Past and Present Activities, His
Photograph in 1978 ......................... .
INDEX ...................................... .
The BEATE KLARSFELD FOUNDATION
VII
128
131
133
136
139
140
143
145
149
150
151
154
158
162
163
165
177
195
202
211
212
214
Foreword
We have taken the initiative not only for the conception of this book,
its edition and publication, but also for its distribution. Our objective is
to provide people of good faith with the precise facts which incontestably
refute the lies of the Neo-Nazi propaganda relevant to the Holocaust.
Those propagandists who seek to rehabilitate Nazism are perfectly
aware that what marks it indelibly is the infamous genocide of the Jewish
people. They take advantage of the credibility of the public and the
more or less unconscious desire of the latter that this nightmarish mass
murder had never take place. That is why the Neo-Nazis have during
recent years launched an offensive which has had a certain success. Their
principal themes are the following: that Hitler was not responsible for the
"final solution", that the gas chambers as a mean of exterminating the
Jews never existed, that the number of Jewish victims has been very
considerably exaggerated.
This propaganda is internationally co-ordinated, and the most virulent
of these Neo-Nazi publications appear in the major languages. In the
following pages, we shall give striking examples of this propaganda which
seeks to weaken the cause of the Jews in general as well as that of Israel.
At our own risk, we have been leading the combat throughout the world
and on the spot to challenge the impunity of the Nazi criminals and the
development of Neo-Nazism. We have also decided to make publicly
known the unequivocal refutations of this propaganda and to bridge certain
obvious gaps regarding the history of the Holocaust. In addition our
publications are distributed free of charges to research centers on the Holo-
caust and to sources of information every-where: major university and
public libraries, the mass media.
We may cite as an example our "Memorial de la Deportation des Juifs
de France", in which we reproduced official Nazi data (last names, first
names, places and dates of birth, nationalities) concerning the 80,000 Jews
who were victims of the "final solution" in France, as well as the description
of each convoy. This work has put an end to the propagande which
claimed that the Jews in France have been spared.
As for the collections of documents that we have published and our
documentary files, their importance as aids to research is evident. They
have also just permitted the indictment in Cologne of the former SS
Chiefs, Kurst Lischka and Herbert Hagen, who before operating in France
were in Berlin respectively Chief of the Anti-Jewish Service of the Gestapo
and Chief of the Anti-Jewish Service of the SD.
"The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania" is based on irrefutable
German documents. Of particular interest is the report drawn up for
Himmler by the Inspector of Statistics of the SS, Richard Korherr. The
latted added up with great precision the Jewish losses (as of December 31,
1942 and as of March 31, 1943). An appendix contains the totality of
the reports in German accompanied by an English translation. They are
publicly printed for the first time in an unabridged version. Moreover,
Y/e have succeeded in locating the infinitely valuable Korherr himself in
'Lower Saxony, where we were able to speak with him and take his
photograph. The Neo-Nazis will therefore be unable to claim that Korherr
IX
4 - _ 4UU UUU5"IaLlUU eUlU {nat tne documents in
question were falsified or even invented.
The notes contain the original text of the quotations concerning the
"final solution". The English translation can thus be easily compared to
the German by those who have any doubts.
We hope that our endeavours to provide documentation as well as our
direct action will receive effective support, and we launch an appeal to
our readers for help so that our foundation may continue to undertake
similar projects which are just as necessary.
Beate and Serge KLARSFELD.
Note: the classification numbers in parenthesis COnSIsting of a Roman numeral
)IIowed by an Arabic one are the numbers of documents conserved at the Center
f Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris; for example (XXXVII-l 22). The
assification numbers consisting of capital letters followed by an Arabic numeral
re those of documents from the Archives of the International Military Tribunal;
lr example (PS-446).
x
FOREWORD
The Neo-Nazi weekly, "National-Zeitung," circulation 110,000, propaganda organ
denying the Holocaust, circulates freely in the country where the genocide was
organized and perpetrated
.. g
Arg. 75,. p_, Auatr.,sot, Berg. 2OFN' DIn.3,!I !Cr. 1 FlnnL 2,-Fmk. J GrIoch.20 Dr. I HoD. ,,shll./lrak200OI./lllL UOL I KaR,,40SI Kuw.200nl.1 Ub.1.5P11 Port.15!M1./ SeudIlt.2,S RI/SDdatr.-,3CI R./TOr1t..8 t I US... ..,40 S IVar .,1.'
Israel billel wieder zur Kasse
Erpressung mit 6-Millionen-Liige
- .-
Israel once again demands money; blackmail with the lie of the 6 million
Klarsfeld-Ban,de contra Oberst Rudel
Dilrfen -Juden sich alles erlauben? I s. 2

Arg.1S,..P_' A... tt.-,SO I IBolg.20FnI Dan.3,51C 1f!nlll.2,-ftftk,/Gr,-cn.20D /HoIL1,5hll/lm .200fiIo/lTa!.350L/J[OI\..,4lI$/l(uw,:ZOO 11111 Ub. 1,5'1 fPorl. 15Esc,. I So<HIh".2,5 II I Stidqlr ,30 R. IflI.k.8fUSA.,AO.'V .... .14f.
Neuer Gaskammer-Schwindel aufgedeckt
New fraud on gas chambers discovered
XI

At;. 71,- "-I AuW..so,/s.lg.2G FAIl DIII.:s,s !Cr. I FInnl.2,.FtU./GMch.20Dr./ HoI!. 1,ShlLltnUot ... ' .... I5OL/ItM. ..... /ICuIr.ZOCI ... '1.h1,1F1/Pott.1$bc.' ....... 2,SRI/8IIda!r.-,3CIR./TGIt. a /USA-AO./V ..... 14.
Die LUgen g!gen Hitler
Neue Erpressungen
gegen Deutschland
S.il.S/Nr.8/18.hbrvarI9n
The lies against Hitler
Der Schwindel
des 20. Jahrhunderts
Das Ende der 6-Millionen-Liige
Von Prof. Dr, Arthur R. Bulz
UNBEYn(LTIGTE VEAGANGENHEIT
_ al. 'Qlge die ......
nuI!3crwo.lhnlld1cnVorMch,," .
Den Pro""""n von 11145 bb 19-19, die
OuuUdlland. durchfUhrten,
,., nkhl. Verglc!chbn,,,, gccenUoomJ.tcl.
Jen,lUIdder.,Ugeohat eo ZUvOtnudlnle
8oseb<:n. Dor Fall JcnnM d'Arc komml

"f !lure]ne ,,In..,1,,c PC'$OII. 1I1<h1 le.
d<>cl1clnen game" Sinai. CembB den ncue
.1,_nl'orodlung$ct scbnl .. .,"worEnc1.nd
lurdleOurmhlh.run8dl" ...... P'o ........ Ver-
onlworilich. E. ]01 doher nile . urn den
Db c,ne A.t Kolle,.", oder
H"xcrej Bclrellendcn
.cien!>"rch,vonvoml1erelngrund.nl%Il<:h
odluldlg und vcrdDmmcn.wcrt, - VCrur-
toll! gcmllll lfingol vo.hand.ner RegeJn IUr
)'..cul1"ndnvcm.hmen undVerf.hrcndurch
clncunpulell.cheundunlvcrsDleKlrchc.
.Ind. Ole NATIONAL_ZEITUNG hal dem_ KrleRC nn&cbllch fur .<=huldll! Ix:tundcn welle. Wenn dn .GclehrIN' test.lellt. dna Wie Meinung gemacht
wird
Ruluncn dn .. gJel<=hen R<'d!l. fur aUe In dcr lcl<=ht <ul:ongllthen .rcvl.lonlaU_ <=hem Grundo nu<=h Immor - .Ich m!t clnor In den USA. dcm 'Dtstichllchcn Vorrell
rest: Der amerikanische
The hoax of the 20th century; the end of the lie of the 6 million
6 Millionen vergaste Juden
als Schwindel entlarvt!
Neue Dokumentation aus Amerika IS. 5
-

"6 million Jews gassed" discovered a hoax
XII
l"'UKbWUKLJ
IPlIllB lfI8AZ
8. IPlfllB
fPWBlfJlPltBlPlfI
lfJlPfJIJa.Tf
by A.R.BUTZ
THIES CHRISTOPHERSEN
LE MENSONGE
D' AUSCHWITZ
Preface de Manfred Roeder
La pone du camp de concentration d'Auschwitz
The lie of Auschwitz
PLEASE
help us expose
THE
BIGGEST
JEWISH LIE!
PLEASE
help us spread
THE TRUTH!
Order copies of
THE HOAX ,OF THE
20th CENTlJR Y
at these prices:
1/$5.35-3/$13.50
10/$37.50-100/$310.
from:
.111<1 lilerE> art' ;1.999,999
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Reedy, W.Va. 25270
Did Six Million
REALLY DIE?
by Richard Harwood
5 copies for ............ $ 1. 00
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SO or more at .......... 15 each
XIII
Sons of Liberty
pO BOX 214
Metairie, La. 70004
Die Wahrheit iiber die Judenmorde
Wie lange noch Erpressung der Deutschen?
.
The truth on death of the Jews '
How much longer will the blackmail of Germans last?
Wer erfand den Schwindel von
6 Millionen vergasten Jude"? / s, 6

h;.75,.,_, Aull ..sa S I 8.1,.20 F,., Dii1l.3,5 Ie., 1 Finn!.2,.flllk. I G,i.ch.200 1 Hall 1.5 hR I r ....k 200 III, I 1'01. 3SO L I "gno_AI i 11(.... 20(1 All/lib. 1,5 Pi I 'orl. 15 .c.1 SaucIi"., 2,S III SOdaf,.,lO 1.1 Tan., 8 IUSA -.90S/Vo -.14.
So lust das Fernsehen
lie das deutsche Volk belrogen wird
Dos Unbehagen der Ilffenl-
an den Sendungen deT Rund S KI f ld
lunkundfernsehqnsI"l!enlnderBun- erge ars e
desrepubllkwlrdvonJllhrluJohrgrll
Ber. Es bell.hl slch sowohl oul dl. k' d' t 't re
un 19 weI e
las pOIlt/5th' Programm. Zwor haben Anschla"ge an
",he Gerlchl, mehrlach und mil Nach
lruck ousge,proehen, daB derRund-
unk und selnll Sendun- Reuter, Miinchen
Der franzQsische Rechtsanwalt Serge
thelen slth wenig darum, Ole Wltk- Klarsfeld hat weitere "Vorfalle" nach
dem Muster des auf
.lldjeRedeseln kann. Es bl$lehl line das Verlagshaus der In Munchen her-
qllllgbcrr. UnlerwDrllgkell gegenDber ausgegebenen rechtsextremen utJaro-
... Bei dem aut
lnen, uml IS bntehl ebenso .Int oft rarsieId VOn Juden verubten Attentat
:haml!)u lInkslasllgkelt der Pro- war Angaben der Polizei zufolge ein
timme, die .51th stlwohl In der Aus Sachschaden von 10000 bis 15000 Mark
entstanden. Die ein Kilo schwere Bom-
I be. war am Samstalt im des
Sonderrechte fOr
Bandenchef Klarsfeld
Who invented the hoax of the 6 million gassed Jews?
Special right for the head of the Klarsfeld gang
The T. V. lies in this way; how the German people are slandered
lie Wahrheit Hber Hitlers Kls
tne truth on Hitler's concentration camps, by Prof. Dr. Butz
XIV
Editor's acknowledgments
We should like to express our gratitude to the two authors of these
most valuable studies. Those or Mr. Wellers appeared in "Le Monde Juif"
(No. 86-1977 and 89-1978) and that of Dr. Billig in "La Solution Finale
de la Question Juive", a work which our Foundation published in 1978 .
JOSEPH BILLIG
Born in Saint-Petersbourg, Russia, in 1900, Joseph Billig received his
Ph. D. from the University of Berlin in 1929, In 1939, Dr. Billig enlisted
in the French Army, was wounded in combat and from 1940 to 1945 was
a prisoner of war in Germany. In Nuremberg, he participated in the
work of the American prosecution, particularly in the case of A. Rosenberg.
Until 1976, he was historian at the Center for Contemporary Jewish
Documentation in Paris.
Dr. Billig has published numerous articles as well as the following
works, the titles of which we translate here from the original French:
-Germany and Genocide (Nazi Plans and Realizations). Ed. du Centre,
Paris, 1950. .
-The General Commission for Jewish Affairs. Three volumes, Ed. du
Centre, Paris, 1955.
-Alfred Rosenberg in the Ideological, Political and Administrative
Operations of the Hitlerian Reich. Ed. du Centre, Paris, 1963.
-Hitlerism and the Concentrationary System. Presses Universitaires
de France, Paris, 1967.
-Kiesinger or a Subtle Fascism, Extra-Dienst Verlag, West-Berlin, 1969.
-The Concentration Camps in the Economy of the Third Reich.
Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1973.
-The Institute for Studies of Jewish Affairs. Ed. du Centre, Paris,
1975.
-The Final Solution of the Jewish Question. Ed. Klarsfeld, Paris,
1978.
GEORGES WELLERS
Born in Russia in 1905, Georges Wellers studied at the Faculty of
Sciences of the University of Moscow. From 1932 to 1975, he carried
on research in physiology in Paris, where he was named director of a
research laboratory at the Faculty of Medicine. From 1968 to 1974, he
was also an adviser to the Dean of the Faculty. Laureate of the Academy
of Science and of the National Academy of Medicine, he is the author of
more than 150 articles published by the scientific press in France and
abroad. He is a member of various learned societies and is Honorary
Research Lecturer at the National Center of Scientific Research.
Mr. Wellers holds the decorations of Chevalier of the Legion of Honour,
Chevalier of the National Order of Merit.
XV
~ _______ ~ ~ v V V U I U " 1 .lL-, i::f'ti, oy tne Gestapo and
deported to Auschwitz. He was liberated from Buchenwald by the
American Army on April 11, 1945.
Georges Weller is the author of numerous works relative to the Nazi
concentrationary system and the deportation of the Jews. From them we
may cite the following titles which we have translated for the English-
speaking reader: '
-From Draney to Auschwitz. Ed. du Centre, Paris, 1946.
-The Mass Arrests of December 12, 1941. "Le Monde Juif" , 1949,
No. 14-15.
-The French Population Confronted with the Persecution of the Jews.
"Le Monde Juif" , 1949, No. 16.
-The Raid of July 16 and 17, 1942, in the Paris Area. "Le Monde
Juif" , 1949, No. 21, 22, 23.
-Collective Resistance in the Camps and the Ghettos. "Le Monde
Juif" , 1949, No. 18.
-An Historical Account of the Uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto. "Le
Monde Juif" , 1957, No. 78.
-The Nazi Concentrationary System. Ed. de I'UNADIF, Paris, 1965
and 1978.
-The Hunt for the Jews. "Historia", Paris 1972, No. 26.
-The Yellow Star at the Time of Vichy. Ed. Fayard; Paris 1973.
-The Final Solution of the Jewish Question and the Neo-Nazi Mytho-
mania. "Le Monde Juif" , 1978, No. 86.
-Reply to the Falsification of Historical Facts. "Le Monde Juif" ,
1978, No. 89.
Georges Wellers is a member of the Executive Committee of the Center
of Contemporary Jewish Documentation and the editor of the review, "Le
Monde Juif". He was the only French witness at the Eichmann trial in
Jerusalem.
We should also like to thank Mr. Phillip Portugal of Quality Photo
Engraving, New York, and the Harbour Foundation, London, without
whose generous assistance the publication of this work would not have
been possible.
Serge Klarsfeld.
XVI
THE. LAUNCHING
OF THE
"FINAL SOLUTION"
OF THE
JEWISH Q!IESTION
XVII
Part I The Jewish Question
uotil1941
1. The Incubation Period of Hitler's Anti-Jewish Action
(1933-1938)
Hitler was as prudent in the launching of his anti-Jewish action as he
was in demonstrating that the Third Reich was destined, by expansion,
to become Great Germany.
In February and March 1933, anti-Jewish exactions took place in
several localities. (1) The terms "J udeo-Bolshevism" and "J udeo-
plutocracy" also continued to form part of the Nazi vocabulary, which
was henceforth endowed with the dignity of being a governmental one.
This alarming news arrived abroad and set off protests in the interna-
tional press. Hitler attributed these anti-Nazi reactions to Jewish
emigration from the Reich and retorted immediately by officially order-
ing, at the end of March, the boycott of Jewish businesses, doctors anG
lawyers. (2) This boycott lasted but one day, the first of April. Grebbels
noted on April third: "The propaganda of atrocities has diminished
very considerably. That is why the Cabinet has decided to not resume
the boycott for the moment." He added that this means of pres-
sure would be maintained as a menace without actually being applied.
Until November 1938, Hitler carefully endeavored to avoid all public
demonstrations against the Jews.
Until November 1938 (with the exception of Austria, annexed to the
Reich), the exclusion of Jews from the professions was effected with
caution and a certain hesitation. The first legislative act against the
social position of the Jews of Germany was taken some days after the
boycott. In the law of April 7, 1933, on the reform of the Civil Service,
the prohibition of Jews in public office was implied. A law of April 25
introduced a quota for Jews in the schools and universities. The law
of September 29, 1933, creat.ed the Chamber of Culture of the Reich,
to which writers, journalists and artists were obliged to be10ng. This
law excluded non-Aryans but allowed for exceptions. It was only in
January 1939 that Grebbels insistantly ordered the "dejudaiZing of the
Chambers." (3)
1
THE JEWISB QUESTION UNTIL 1941
To these measures were added ini tiatives which were more or less
local and occasionally private. Exclusions were decreed from various
occupations having to do with public service (for example, that of
doctor employed by the Social Security); certain employers laid off their
Jewish employees, (4) sometimes under pressure from the Party.
Jewish schoolchildren and students were prevented from sitting for cer-
tain examinations. As for Jews in the economy, no general rules
restrained their economic activity. But the anti-Jewish policy of the
regime created worry and uncertainty among the Jewish people, an
insecurity which s o m e t i m e ~ encouraged them to sell their belongings at
a loss. Certain non-Jews took advantage of this. (S)
Finally, the psychological climate of scornful hatred with regard to
the Jew was marked by vexing prohibitions (6) decreed locally to close
public places and prohibit use of public equipment "to Jews and dogs".
The Nazi authorities played down this point in anticipation of the Olym-
pic Games which were to be held in Berlin in the summer of 1936.
But his attenuation was temporary (CDXXXVII-4S).
Thus Hitler's regime humiliated the Jews, but (except for uncontro-
lable incidents) without violence. As Hitler proclaimed on March 27,
1933, on calling for the boycott: "Not one hair of the Jews will be
twisted." The Jewish population, transformed into a body foreign to
the nation, could still live by collaborating with it: the Jews were not
excluded from the economy and in addition even a man such as Greb-
bets tolerated a few of them in cultural affairs. A number of the most
distinguished professions remained open to them. The prohibition to
practice medicine dates from July 1938 and that to practice law from
September of the same year.
The most striking blow cast against the German Jews between 1933
and 1938 was the promulgation of the two laws adopted in Nuremberg
by the Reichstag meeting during the Congress of the Party in September
1935. It is a question of the legal and dishonoring alienation of the
German Jew from his non-Jewish fellow citizens. The law on citizen-
ship enacted on September IS, 1935, established the differenc.e be-
tween the German citizen, endowed with civil rights, and the dependent
of the Reich, who did not possess these rights. A second law of the
same date forbade marriage and sexual relations between a Jew and a
person of Germain or related blood. The law transformed the Jews
into a group of outcasts in the midst of the German people since it
was entitled "Defense of the German Blood and Honour."
Before November 1938, the Jews (aside from those of Austria annex-
ed to the Reich in March 1938) were not reduced by the regulations to
a miserable life of inactivity. Nevertheless, their condition of pariahs
little by little weakened the foundation of their existence and plunged
them progressively into misery and disarray. We may cite the report
presented in July 1938 by the Jewish communities of Vienna and of the
Reich at the Conference of Evian. This conference was attended by
reprensentatives of thirty-two states meeting to discuss the possibilities
2
The Incubation Period
of organizing the emigration of Jews from the Third Reich. The report
concluded that
"One uas the right to hope that the problem of emigration, which has
become a question of life or death for the German Jews, can be resolved.
We hope tllat the Conference of Evian will achieve its worthy goal at a
moment when a fourth of tIle Jewish population of Germany cannot assure
its means of existence and is dependent on public charity, when thousands
expect iastir'b unemployment, when tens of thousands of young people
wanting to work have l6st their jobs ... " (7)
It is thus that the Nazi authorities from 1933 to 1938 prepared the
ground for Hitler to launch his solution to the Jewish question, at the
time that the Third Reich was taking its first steps towards the creation
of Great Germany. This solution could consist in nothing other tha;,
the total elimination of the Jews from the German vital espace. Tht
decisive step was to be taken in winter 1938 by the dispossession of tnr
Jews: economic Aryanisation. Grering, as Chairman of the Four-Year
Plan, presided over the spoliation.
Towards the end of 1938, the detenoration of the quality of jewish
life was such that the Minister of the Economy announced on December
20, 1938, a decree (CXLV-SSO) especially conceived to combat ,un-
employment among the Jews. It instituted their obligatory hiring fm
manual work.
From January 1939 on, the situation was ripe for direct action in the
sense of Hitler's solution to the Jewish question, in the sense of the
liquidation of their presence from the Reich. It is at that time that
Grering was to be given the reponsibility for turning the Jewish question
over to the Gestapo. The first form of the solution was forced emigra-
tion, already applied in Austria since spring 1938. It was convulsively
inaugurated in the Reich in November 1938 by a brutal operation of
internment rapidly organized with the promise of liberation to those
who demonstrated their willingness to emigrate.
2. Jewish Emigration during the Incubdtion Period
of the" Final Solution"
The Nazi authorities as of 1933 were interested in the development
of the emigration of the Jews. They envisaged Palestine as the principal
destination, and it was therefore Zionist emigration which was favou-
rized. The principle was to keep the greater part of the emigrant's
possessions: a fraction of them was destined to finance the emigration of
Jews who were poor and the rest, while respecting the interests of the
Reich's policy on foreign currencies, was destined to assure the Jews
the means of settlement required of the immigrants by the countries
receiving them. In August 1933, the Ministry of the Economy of the
Reich concluded an agreement named Hahvara (which in Hebrew means
"transfer") with Zionist organizations. According to this agreement,
3
THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1941
the emigrant was to pay in marks the sum to be transferred; this was
to cover a part of the price of German exports to Palestine (the other
part was to be paid to the Germans in cash) whereas the emigrant upon
arrival was to receive in Palestinian money the equivalent of the sum
he had paid in marks. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then
Ribbentrop himself were opposed to this agreement. (8) A procedure
which favourized the birth of a Jewish state, and yet in Palestine, to
them seemed inacceptable. Rosenberg and his collaborators professed
the same point of view hostile to Zionist emigration. But Hitler and
with him Himmler and Heydrich, thus the Gestapo and the SD as well,
insisted until the end of 1939 on the emigration to Palestine: the Zionist
emigration was by its very nature the strongest current in the movement
of Jewish emigration.
It would manifestly be absurd to infer the existence of a sort of sym-
pathy between the Nazis and Zionism. This curious attitude of the
Hitlerian authorities may be compared to the attitude of Hitler himself
with regard to the Soviet Union at the time of the conclusion of the
non-aggression pact in September 1939. This agreement was favour-
able to the immediate interests of the Soviet Union, a sworn enemy in
the eyes of the Third Reich; but Hitler concluded it even so. He was
certain that at a given moment he would surprise the enemy by his
attack. The leaders of the Soviet Union were conscious of this as were
the representatives of the Zionist organizations in what concerned their
own case: they received at the same time immigrants and German
exports, whereas the Reich emptied its territory of the Jews and gained
currency for its exports to Palestine.
The Nazi authorities gave evidence of their primordial interest in the
emigration of Jews to Palestine, but they neglected no. possibility of
emigration to another destination, being always understood that the
greater part of the Jewish patrimony remain to profit the Reich and that
the regulations concerning. foreign currencies be respected. At the end
of the Conference of Evian, an international commission presided over
by the American Rublee was formed. It reached an agreement with
the Ministry of Finance and that of the Economy of the Reich and was
founded on the same principle as that of Hahvara and valid for diverse
countries of immigration. Only 25 % of the Jewish fortune could be
affected by the new agreement, the rest remained at the disposition of
the Reich. (9) The Rublee agreement was concluded in January 1939
on behalf of the Germans, thanks to the efforts of Schacht, opposed by
Ribbentrop, who wanted po collaboration of foreign states in resolving
the Jewish question in Germany. However, foreign countries opened
their borders but parcimoniously to the driven-out emigrants.
3. The Nazi Anti-Jewish Action Isolated
from M ass Movements
The propaganda directed by Grebbels, Rosenberg and Streicher accli-
matized the anti-Jewish spirit among the German masses. It was
4
The Nazi Anti-Jewish Action
necessary to obtain the consent or at least the toleration of the people
for what the central authority would do to the Jews. On the other
hand, all participation of the masses, except at two particular moments
(the boycott of 1933 and the "Kristallnacht" of November 1938) was
forbidden. The anti-Jewish movement was to be strictly hermetic, thus
centralized; but in spite of that it was to be known as one of the "great
actions" of the regime. The Party, a mass movement, occasionally
went beyond these principles. Severe instructions coming from the top
were then addressed to the diverse Nazi authorities. In March 1934,
the Nazi professional organization for commerce and artisanry mani-
fested its intention to provoke a boycott of Jewish stores. Rudolf Hess
sent it a severe warning (CXLV-519) condemning every anti-Jewish
action undertaken without an order from the FUhrer, given the reper-
cussions of such comportment abroad. In April 1935, Hess sent a
circular to all members of the Party to warn them that all personal
contact with a Jew and, on the other hand, all spontaneous anti-Jewish
activity would be sanctioned by exclusion from the Party. In August
of the same year, R. Ley, chief of organization of the Party, pronounced
in a circular the same prohibition to the Party and its ramifications (the
SA, the SS, etc.). At the same time, Himmler addressed the following
order to the members of the SS:
"1) I strictly forbid any individual action on the part of any member
whatsoever of the SS against the Jews; 2) The solution of the Jewish
question is a matter in the competence of the Fuhrer as it has been until
now for the solution of all questions, and not of no matter what individual;
3) Violations, even slight, will be penalized by exclusion from the SS." (10)
In February 1936, Frick, Minister of the Interior, and R. Hess
addressed a strictly confidential order (CXLV-531) to the civil and
police administrations and to the directors of Party districts forbidding
all anti-Jewish demonstrations at the time of the assassination of
Gustloff, chief of the Swiss Nazis, by a Jew.
In a circular of April 21, 1936 (CDXXXVII-46), the Ministry of the
Interior clearly emphasized to all regional administrations that in the
Jewish question, which was developing by stages, there was no reason
to go ahead of the government, whose activity had not yet exceeded the
regulation of citizenship and had not yet touched upon economic
questions.
This circular reveals that Hitler was still waiting for the moment when
he would inaugurate the solution of the Jewish question. But neither
during this waiting period nor during the future activity was the
German citizen to be excited. It 'was sufficient that he be comprehen-
sive about the rude measures that the FUhrer would take or approve
against the Jews. This detachment as to Jewish affairs is underscored
in a work which analyzes the reports edited by the SD on the internal
situation of the Reich: (11)
"In the echo that Hitler and his conception of the world provoked among
the German people, anti-Semitism scarcely played the central role which
it no doubt held in the ideology of Hitler."
5
--'---
It seems to us that it would be inaccurate to suppose that this indif-
ference covered a tacit opposition. The citizen participates in an event
as something inevitable because the one in whom he has confidence
energetically proclaims it necessary.
This state of mind characterizes, too, with slight differences, the per-
sonalities profoundly engaged in the Hitlerian movement. Speer,
Minister of the War Economy, and one of the principal figures of the
Third Reich, wrote in his memoirs:
"I have always been surprised by the slight trace which Hitler's anti-Semitic
remarks have left on me... The hatred which Hitler professed for the Jews
seemed so natural to me at the time that it did not make much of an
impression on me."
In another passage he wrote that he did not feel
"personally concerned by the hunt for Jews, Free-Masons, Social-Demo-
crats and Jehovah's Witnesses about whom I heard in my entourage."
He thought that it was sufficient for him "not to get mixed up in
that." (12)
Such an attitude explains that those who executed the Hitlerian action
against the Jews had not to feel marked by the horror of their task.
They were attached with the other artisans of the Third Reich to a
single and unique work, albeit strictly compartmentalized, a work which
the Reich created. An Eichmann would certainly not have succeeded
in the gigantic task of Speer. Speer would probably have been neither
able nor willing to support the vision of horror with which Eichmann's
activity was impregnated. But both of them knew that the person who
commanded the ensemble and in whom they had confidence saw the
necessity for the work of each of them. There was no passion for the
object of the mission, but only for its accomplishment. Speer expressed
this in his memoirs:
"I have the impression that this desperate race that I was running with
time, this look of a madman that I kept perpetually fixed on the figures of
production and on efficiency curves, had smothered all consideration and
all human sentiments in me... What bothers me much more is rather that
I did not see in the faces of the internees (in the concentration camps) the
reflection of the physionomy of the regime, whose existence I was striving
with the rage of a maniac to prolong during these weeks and these
months." (13)
In contrast to the case of Speer, master of Hitler's war economy, the
passion of zeal was in the case of the chiefs. of the "final solution"
inseparably from the direct and constant vision of this physionomy of
the regime, given that it was in themselves that the expression of the
atrocity of Hitlerism culminated.
6
In the Gestapo and the SD
4. The Jewish Question in the Gestapo and the SD
before the War
The Jewish question did not immediately occupy an important place
in the two police bureaus of Himmler and Heydrich, that is to say in
the SD for what concerns the SS and in the Gestapo for what concerns
the State.
Let us first sketch the situation in the Gestapo. Political police units
were developed in all the German countries immediately after Hitler's
rise to power. The two most important centers were those of Bavaria
and Prussia. In Bavaria the political police was presided over by
Himmler and directed by Heydrich. Gcering presided over that of
Prussia, which he baptized "Geheime Staatspolizei": Gestapo. Its
direction was confided to Diels. As of April 1933 its judicial section
was endowed with a service for matters concerning Jews, Free-Masons
and anti-Nazi emigration. This service was directed by Hasselbacher.
Between 1933 and 1934, Himmler managed progressively to obtain
the direction of the political police for all the regions of Germany. In
April 1934, he first of all received froin Gcering, as his assistant, res-
ponsibility for the Gestapo, the direction of which he entrusted to
Heydrich. Under Heydrich, the service of Hasselbacher was transferr-
ed from the judicial section to that of "Enemies", main section of the
Gestapo, which had already distinguished itself under Diels by the hunt
for Communists and other representatives of the left. But Hassel-
bacher's activity in the Jewish question remained rather unimportant.
However, Himmler and Heydrich rapidly transformed the Gestapo
(Prussia) into a central authority which surveyed the political police of
all the regions of Germany. We shall note that the Service for Jewish
Questions in the Gestapo was attributed the index IIB4.
Although directed by the Reichsfiihrer-SS and by his close collabo-
rator, Heydrich, the Gestapo was not confounded with the SD. When
Heydrich moved into the Gestapo in Berlin, he brought with him pro-
fessional policemen from Munich all while keeping on certain men,
such as Hasselbacher, who had worked for Diels. The men of the SS
were integrated into the Gestapo, but it was the profession-al policemen
who were to organize the work.
The section which contained Hasselbacher's office was at first directed
by Flesch, who in addition personally handled Jewish matters
(CDXXXVII-20). He was replaced in September 1937 for Jewish
matters by Freytag. The latter remained in this post until June 1938,
to be finally replaced by Kurt Lischka (CDXXXVII-23,2S). (14)
The SD, intelligence service of the SS, was created by Heydrich on
Himmler's orders in 1931. It developed a very considerable activity
before Hitler's rise to power (intelligence concerning political parties,
7
but also concerning the diverse tendencies which were being formed
within the Nazi Party itself. (15) It was, however, relatively inactive
between 1933 and 1937. Its chief, Heydrich, concentrated his efforts
on the Gestapo. The two principal sections of the SD were Section II,
"Internal Affairs" (Inland), and Section III, "'Foreign." In Section II
an "Adversaries" service was formed; it covered in particular "ideolo-
gical adversaries," which included the service concerning Free-Masons
(Ill). Within this service a SUb-section for Jewish affairs (figure II 112)
was to be created. The first chief of II 112 was von Mildynstein,
replaced (16) by Schroeder who kept the position until April 1937.
Beydrich had just ordered a more dynamic activity of II 1, and Schroe-
der was removed in favour of Wisliceny. But the real impetus was
;not to be given until the second half of 1937. Wisliceny was replaced
in November 1937 by Herbert Hagen (CXXXVII-18) (17) whereas all
of II 1 received for chief a young and brilliant professor, F.A. Six. The
latter, in addition to his activities in the SD, was at the same time to be
director of the' Foreign Policy Institute. He had already previously
worked with Hagen. The II 112 was divided into three parts: "Assi-
milated Jews," "Orthodox Jews "-a part which was to remain embryo-
nic-and "Zionism." The first subject was at the beginning treated by
Schroeder and as of March 1937 by Dannecker (CDXXXVII-18); the
third was confided to Eichmann.
Himmler destined the SD to become the intelligence service inspiring
the Gestapo, while at the same time remaining independent and retain-
ing its statute from the SS and not from the State. He required of the
SD a freedom of mind which the functionaries of the police lacked.
Those of the SD lent themselves to a careful study of the problems they
explored and reached objective points of view from which they drew
what were to them well-founded conclusions. The independence of the
SD did not always dispose the Gestapo to collaborate. But this colla-
boration was established on good terms in the Jewish question, at least
until 1937.
5. The Preparation of the "Final Solution": The SS Destined
to Inspire the Gestapo
Hitler waited for more than five years before undertaking the liquida-
tion of the Jewish presence from the German vital space. He did not,
however, leave the world ignorant of his intentions for so long a period.
It was known that the intended to proceed with this liquidation at a
certain time and to entrust this governmental action to the non-govern-
mental organization of the SS, the only one capable of executing this
solution in a radical manner. In September 1935, he presented to the
Reichstag meeting at Nuremberg the three laws of Hitlerism: that of the
flag of the Third Reich (flag with the swastika), that of citizenship in
the Reich, and finally that concerning the protection of the German
blood and honour.
8
-
The Preparation of the Final Solution
The Congress during which Hitler proclaimed the three laws was
called the Congress of Liberty to underscore that the Reich had re-
assumed its military sovereignty (March 1935) by proclaiming obligatory
,military service. On the other hand, the naval agreement with England
implied the expansion of its rearmament. As for the domestic situation,
the opposition forces were practically mastered by 1935. Far from
appeasing him, this situation incited Hitler at the Congress to parti-
cularly emphasize his resolution to strike out harshly at the slightest
sign of opposition. He declared ~ u r i n g the opening speech:
"This spirit of decision to stamp out certain aangers in all circumstances,
and even those still in the bud, will not hesitate either, should the situation
arise, to transfer functions which are not fitting to the State because they
are foreign to its very essence to organizations better adapted to the
execution of this task." (18)
Here Hitler denounced the weakness of the professional police, who
were still too influenced by considerations of a careful respect of legality
to act with full efficiency in a field such as that of the Jewish question.
Nevertheless, when the time for the anti-Jewish action arrived, it was
the Gestapo which detained the central responsibility. But Heydrich
had by that time integrated members of the SD with his executives. As
for the "organizations better adapted" evoked by Hitler to rigorously
apply a policy of repression, he gave at this same congress a further
detail, but a fundamental one, precisely on the subject of the anti-Jewish
policy.
We know that at this Congress of the Party he convoked the Reichstag
at Nuremberg in order to submit the laws already mentioned. In the
speech presenting them, Hitler let loose against the anti-Nazi influence
of Jews abroad, but also against the agitation which, according to him,
they maintained inside the Reich. He proclaimed:
"The third (law) is the attempt at a legislative regulation of a problem
which, in case of a new failure, must be entrusted to the National-Socialist
Party for the definitive solution. Behind the three laws stands the National
Socialist Party and with it and behind it the Nation. I ask that you accept
these laws." (19)
Hitler spoke in the opening discourse of adequate "organizations"
which would act in place of the State. Now he spoke of the Party.
But within the Party, among the organizations of repression, the SA
was already emasculated. What was left was the SS with its SD. As
for the Party as such, in 1938 it attempted to take in hand the economic
Aryanization in Austria. At a meeting on October 14, 1938, concern-
ing the Four-Year Plan, Grering denounced (PS-1301) the savage acts
of members of the Party designated administrators of temporary enter-
prises. He also rejected the thesis according to which Aryanization
was a Party affair, it being exclusively an affair of the State. It was
precisely during this period that the process of integration into the
Gestapo of specialists of the Jewish question of the SD began in Austria,
annexed to the Reich.
9
Heydrich in an article of 1936 (20) explained the task of the SO as
indispensable to the Gestapo:
"The prerequisite to the struggle of the police against the adversaries is the
"ideological struggle" against the principles of the adversary which can
only be led by the National-Socialist movement. That is why the Police
of the State must work in the closest liaison with the SD of the Reischs-
fUhrer -SS, to which the direction of the NSDAP has entrusted, in its
position as an organization of the SS as a whole, the intelligence work for
the investigation and surveillance of the adversaries on the level of ideas."
Much later (May 1944), Himmler defined the role of men trained in
the SO in the exterminatory deportations of Jews to the East. In a
speech pronounced during a course on political ideology (21) he said:
"Measures taken within the Reich could not be taken by a police composed
only of a civil servants. A corporation which would be bound only by the
oath of a civil servant would not have the necessary strength. These
measures could be adopted and applied only by an organization composed
of National-Socialists moved by a fanatic conviction. The SS is one and
affirms itself as apt and has taken the responsibility for this task."
These words of Himmler express retrospectively what Hitler indicated
at the congress of the Party in 1935: the vocation of the SS to execute
the solution of the Jewish question.
In 1944, Himmler spoke of the "final solution" in its definitive sense;
the direction of it could only be assumed by men trained in the spirit of
the SO. If he considered that these men in particular were prepared to
undertake such an action, it is not because he believed them to be
especially brutal. On the contrary, in this instance it was rather their
flexibility and their intellectual discipline that he judged to be a favour-
able condition. Having once established an absolute goal, a flexible
nature is necessary if one is to pursue it not blindly, but in adapting the
action to fluctuating circumstances. The goal was the total elimination
of the Jew from the German vital space. The intellectuals of the SO
worked first on planning the emigration, then on the "territorial solu-
tion" (attribution of a "reserve" to the Jews); and finally they agreed to
the process of extermination. The years of study of the Jewish condi-
tion in the world, years spent within the SO, made them proficient at
this task. They knew the structures of Judaism and were able to set up
a system of administrative collaboration with the Jewish organizations,
which in most countries facilitated the deportations.
We have quoted the words of Heydrich in an article dating from
January 1936 concerning the role of the SO. During the same month
and year, the principal Nazi daily, the "Voelkischer Beobachter,"
explained the SO to the general public:
"Given that the Secret Police of the State, taken up primarily by tasks of
the executive branch, is unable to fulfill that task of observation of enemies
10

The Preparation of the Final Solution '
of the State to the extent required, it is the security service of the Reichs-
fUhrer-SS, named by the deputy of the FUhrer, whis as a comple-
ment to it will assist it as the intelligence service of the Nazi mouvement
and will thus put a great part of the forces of the movement which it has
mobilized at the disposition of the security of the Reich." (22)
We insist upon these 'official explanations of what constituted the SO
because, considered by itself, its activities remained in the background
of those of the Gestapo, which represented the terrifying face of the
regime. However, the greater part of the men who accomplished the
most complex and most horrifying task of the "final solution" within
the Gestapo came from the SO.
In June 1936, Himmler obtained the creation of a unified police for
all of the Reich. As of that time his official title was: Reichsfiihrer-SS
and Chief of the German Police attached to the Ministry of the Interior
of the Reich. He thus disposed not only of the Gestapo but also of the
civil police and the criminal police. But the criminal police and the
Gestapo became a single office, that of the security police, where
H. MUller was Chief of the Gestapo and Nebe that of the criminal
police. Thus Heydrich presented himself henceforth as Chief of the
Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) on behalf of the State, and as Chief of the SO
on behalf of the SS.
The SO possessed within the Reich a whole network of regional and
local services which were to gather intelligence on the activities of the
opponents of Nazism. This information was then centralized in the
main bureau (Hauptamt) of the SO in Berlin.
Until the second half of 1935, that is to say before the "Nuremberg
Laws," the activity of the SO was insignificant, at least in what concern-
ed the service for Jewish affairs. Nor was the Gestapo at the center of
the anti-Jewish policy of the first period. Neither the exclusion of the
Jews from the public sector as a whole, nor from cultural activities nor
from certain professions necessitated by definition the intervention of
the Gestapo. It did intervene, however, in case of violation of the
regulations and was consulted by other authorities. The role of the
Gestapo began to become important for the Jews only in 1938. Adler,
historian of the "final solution" in the Reich, wrote (23):
"Already in 1938, the greater part of the important procedures and many
of the less important ones concerning the Jews were equally within the
jurisdiction of the Gestapo which was either working on the matter or kept
informed."
As for Jewish affairs in the SO, as early as the end of 1935, that is
to say, following the legislation proclaimed at Nuremberg in September
of the same year, Heydrich gave the order to develop the service of
Jewish affairs of the SO, which was still embryonic. Let us recall that
the service in question bore in the whole of the SO the index II-1l2.
11
6. The Service for Jewish Affairs within theSD, the /l-112,
under the Sign of "Zionism." (1935-1938)
We have indicated above that before 1935 the SD did not handle
Jewish affairs. Eichmann, posted in the SS to the SD in 1934, was em-
pioyed in the Free-Mason service, where he found the work fastidious.
At his trial in Jerusalem he described how he accepted with joy his trans-
fer to the sub-service" Judaism," which had just been created. (24)
"One fine day at the beginning of 1935... the SS-Untersturmflihrer von
Mildenstein came in... He told me that he had organized a new sub-ser-
vice (Referat) "Judentum" ... and asked me if I didn't feel like being
appointed to it. Happy to get rid of coins and seals, I answered: yes."
Eichmann was to take charge of Zionism whereas a certain Schroeder
was then working on matters concerning the assimilated Jews.
Eichmann added that von Mildenstein did not delay in giving him the
book by A. Boehm, "Judaism," which he was later to sum up in a
"Leitheft" (Notebook of Guidelines for Work). Eichmann indicated
the subjects of stUdy (25):
"Structure of world Zionist organization, the goals of Zionism; the sources
which assisted it and its difficulties, and also the possibilities of supporting
it (Foederung) given that it sought a political solution to the Jewish
question."
In brief, the first task of the II-112 consisted in studying and, by
means of" men of confidence" and informers, keeping aware of the
activities of Jewish organizations both Zionist and wassimilating."
Under examination, Eichmann gave the characteristics of the successive
chiefs of the II-112 and accorded the place of honour to Hagen. It is
interesting to compare these characteristics.
We are already familiar with the structure of the II-112. Let us now
consider it in its presentation by Eichmann. He very much appreciated
von Mildenstein who rejected the vulgar anti-Jewish propaganda
launched by Streicher and "sought unconditionally a political solution
in such a way that I considered Mr. von Mildenstein my master." But
Heydrich judged that von Mildenstein's anti-Jewish behaviour was too
clement," (26) and the latter was replaced at the beginning of 1936 (27)
by the very young Schroeder, his protege, whose name we have pre-
viously cited. According to Eichmann, Schroeder, whom he despised
for his lack of maturity and his arrogance, was to keep this post only
a few weeks. Nevertheless, the reports of the II-112 still bore his name
in April 1937. He was, however, only temporarily named chief of the
II-112 (CDXXXVII-16).
He was replaced on the first of April, 1937 (CDXXXVII-18), by
Wisliceny, who until that time had been the collaborator of one of the
people responsible for the "Free-Mason" service. "Wisliceny was a
12
The Service for Jewish Affairs, the II-112
benevolent chief. His obesity predisposed him to tranquillity. He was
well-read in history, one could converse admirably with him." After
the departure of Schroeder, the post "Assimilated Jews" remained
vacant. But the replacement was promptly appointed. It was Danne-
cker, transferred from one of the regional offices of the SD in the pro-
vinces where he also took care of Jewish affairs (CDXXXVII-18),
In the meantime, the' work intensified:
"Now things began slowly to move... That is what one calIed the daily
entries (Tageseinlauf). The reports of the sections (regional, local) of the
SD, the shipments of materials from the archives seized by the Gestapo
and 'ffom which reports were to be addressed to it, reports of Nazi organi-
zations and of the police services."
Towards the end of 1936, (28) all of the section II-1 received a new
head which was to give it all its impetus. This was F.A. Six, employed
until then as chief of the "Press" section, 1-3. It is Six who in Novem-
ber 1937 was to replace Wisliceny by Hagen, the former being trans-
ferred to Dantzig to direct the regional section of the SD, "Ideological
Adversaries." Eichmann related that Hagen "tried to set up the affair
otherwise and to animate it ... " Thus Six replaced the fiegmatic Wislice-
ny by Hagen, who was his protege and former collaborator in the
"Press" section. Eichmann testified:
"Hagen was an intelIigent and broad-minded person. He disposed of a
fine general culture and was highly capable of rapidly assimilating matters
of which he had previously no knowledge, of recognizing what was essen-
tial, of extracting it and immediately writing an article on it... And it is
thus that Dr. Six used him as the author of numerous articles in his
monthly, published at the time by the Institute of Foreign Policy under his
editorship ... " "At that time he had no idea of Jewish organizations, of
their aspirations, of their goals. The first thing he did on arriving was to
question me... He interrogated me, in fact, in such an exhaustive manner
and wanted to know everything with such precision that it was difficult for
me to come out with everything I knew: more exactly, he pumped out my
knowledge until there was nothing left, the organizations that I named.
And the astounding thing was that he retained alI that... I should add
that he was assisted in this by the tables that I have evoked previously,
those which were hung on the walls and which generally indicated at least
the names."
Hagen had in Eichmann a serious and extremely zealous collaborator.
Eichmann declared under examination:
"I must say that I procured the Jewish Encyclopedia and other works in
great quantity... At that time I read enormously in this field and, its goes
without saying, all of the Jewish papers."
He said that he studied the Jewish organizations first-hand and that
having no executive power and therefore being unable to convoke
Jewish personalities to interrogate them, he obtained these contacts by
means of convocations delivered by the Gestapo.
13
Judging from the cited characteristic of Hagen, the latter developed
his activities of chief on the basis of material assembled by Eichmann.
Eichmann declared in Jerusalem:
"As I have already told you, Hagen arrived after WisIiceny. And accord-
ing to the old saying, "New brooms sweep clean," one began here with a
renewed activity under the authority of Hagen's superior, Dr. Six... Since
the end of 1935, one had only dragged ... (Hagen) submitted to his chief a
new division of labor. In principle, it was a question of pulling the SD
out of the insignificance of its activity and pulling it up to the level of the
Gestapo, in direct contact with it, Gestapo-executive authority, SD-intel-
ligence authority. This intensification took place not only in the II-lI2
but in the whole of II... and had to result from an order of the chief of
the Sipo and the SD ... " (29)
In this passage, Eichmann answered questions concerning the report
submitted by Hagen to Six in December 1937 (CDXXXVII-21) on the
"reorganization of the section," thus from the time of Hagen's nomina-
tion as head of the II-112.
Hagen declared that the "real work on the adversary Judaism by the
section II-112 began roughly near the end of 1935," but that the awk-
ward tactic of the direction (of the II-112) prevented the establishment
that the II-112 did not bring out its initiative in the Gestapo and that,
of "all practical contact" with the Jews in Germany. Hagen deplored
when the latter took an interest in Jewish organizations and proceeded
to the interrogation of a personality repreCS'entative of these organizations,
"the questioning was conducted exclusively by officials of the Gestapo."
Hagen added that one did not exercise any "political orientation of
Jewish organizations ... according to the Gestapo's point of view," nor
the surveillance of" Jewish political officials." In contrast, we learn
that the representatives of the II-112 henceforth entered into direct
contact with the representatives of Jewish organizations convoked by the
Gestapo and that one spoke not only of Judaism in Germany but in the
world as a whole. "By means of regular convocations of officials direct-
ing Jewish organizations, we are trying to direct the policy in the Jewish
question in such a manner as to favourize and intensify the emigration
especially of indigent Jews." At the same time, visits to the headquar-
ters of Jewish organizations permitted the checking-up on them and the
correction of certains "faults" such as the employment of foreign Jews.
On the other hand, the II-112 established a liaison with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior" to obtain an immediate
influence upon the practical execution of the emigration. The final
objective is to centralize all of the Jewish question in Germany in the
SD and the Gestapo. A report to the Chief (Heydrich) on this subject
is being drawn up." (30)
Eichmann under examination (31) emphasized the contradiction be-
tween the firm resolution of the government to have the Jews emigrate
and the difficulties raised on this subject by the German administration.
The development of the Jewish affairs section of the SD, with the Ges-
tapo as executive authority, had the task of overcoming the difficulties
and taking charge of the solution of the Jewish question, which at that
time amounted to emigration.
14
The Service for Jewish Affairs, the II-112
The central role that the II-112 was destined to play for the Gestapo
was emphasized in the report quoted from Hagen which referred to a
decree of execution (Funktionsbefehl) promulgated by the Reichsfiihrer
on July 1, 1937. It stipulated that the SD was to be responsible "for
all general and fundamental questions" which did not include executive
measures and that it was to take its decisions "in strictest agreement
with the section II B4," the section of Jewish affairs of the Gestapo.
An examination of the trimestrial reports of the SD II-1l2 demons-
trates the role played by this section in the activities of the II B4 of the
Gestapo. The report edited in October 1937 (CDXXXVII-20) qualified
as "sufficiently good" the collaboration with Flesch in whose section
the II B4 was situated. It adds:
"Since September 15, 1937, Assessor Flesch has been transferred to the
Gestapo of Berlin. A personal contact has been made with his successor,
Assessor Freytag. Given that Assessor Freytag has not yet any familiarity
with the field of Judaism, he (Flesch) has asked to help him to a large
extent and especially to advise him also on executive measures." (32)
,.
In its semestrial report of July 1938 (CDXXXVII-23) it is under-
scored that the II-1l2 interrogated the leaders of Jewish organizations,
and it is explained that:
"The necessity to engage itself personally in this sort of manceuvres or
action stems from the fact that the civil servants in charge of external
affairs of the Gestapo are not qualified, due to their lack of knowledge in
this field, to find out from the Jews the information necessary to determine
the general tendency." (33)
This report nevertheless indicated a few
regional centers of the SD and the Gestapo.
March 1, 1939 (CDXXXVII-25) declared:
difficulties between the
The trimestrial report of
"The relations with the section corresponding to the Gestapo, the II B4
(Governmental Advisor Lischka and Governmental Advisor HUlf), are very
good. Collaboration: All questions relevant to Judaism are discussed to-
gether on the basis of the fundamental attitudes of the section II-1l2. All
of the correspondance is countersigned by the main office of the SD and
by the Gestapo when it is addressed to a third party ... " (34)
The semestrial report of January 1938 (CDXXXVI-22), from which
date the II-1l2 was directed by Hagen, brought out the good relations
with the Gestapo and added: "The initiative in the work belongs essen-
tially to the II-1l2." (35) As for the surveillance of Jewish organi-
zations, the reports specify that not only were Jewish leaders convoked
by the SD to be questioned by the Gestapo, but also that the SD
commonly made unannounced visits to these organizations and at the
same time searched their headquarters (CDXXXVII-22-23).
These quotations demonstrate that the development of the SD and of
the Gestapo exactly correspond to the views of Hitler and Himmler,
according to which the governmental authority of the Gestapo in hand-
15
ling the Jewish question needed the inspiration of the non-governmental
authority of the SS of which the SD was an emanation. In the trimes-
trial report of March 1, 1939, Hagen, writing of the" Action of Novem-
ber against Jewry (Judenschaft)" (a reference to the "Night of
Crystal": reprisals for the attack committed by Grinzpan in Paris against
the person of the German diplomat Von Rath), specified that "the prin-
cipal bureau (of the SD) and all its main and regional branches partici-
pated in part in the execution of the action and in part in the putting
under safe cover of the material of Jewish archives and libraries." (36)
At that time Eichmann was occupied in Vienna, and it was Hagen and
Dannecker who had to cope with all this activity directed by Lischka.
The last part of it saw the brutal internment of 30,000 Jews as a means
of pressure to stimulate the wiIIingness of the Jews to emigrate from the
Reich.
A few weeks after having received the responsibility for the II-112,
Hagen drew up the regulations for his section which were summed up
in a note of December 21, 1937 (37). The accent was put on the
necessity to study works devoted to Judaism, to make resumes of them
and to discuss them. These regulations formed a supplement to those
given by the II-I, that is to say by Six. They were thus due to Hagen
personally. It is true that on this subject the reports note that due to
lack of time, the cultural work never got off the ground. Let us re8all,
however, that Eichmann affirmed that he had read enormously on the
question. In addition, a thick report on French Judaism made by
Oannecker at the time of his activity in Paris (XXVI-I) shows that he
was very familiar with the structures of Jewish organizations in general.
It is certain that the education which Hagen, Eichmann and Dannecker
acquired by assiduous study made them competent specialists of the
Jewish question.
The work which was being accomplished in the II-112 carried the
obligation of letting at least a chosen public outside of the SO take
advantage of it. Hagen, Eichmann and Dannecker gave lectures on the
Jewish question for the preparatory courses of the SO but also for
classes organized by the Police, by the "People's Tribunals" and above
all by the Party. This teaching activity was very intense from January
to June 1938. During this period when, precisely, the solution to the
Jewish question was suddenly brought up . before public opinion as
having to be resolved without delay, the princi,?al activity was due above
all to Hagen and Dannecker and very little to Eichmann, who was
occupied in Vienna forcing the Austrian Jews to emigrate. One notes
in the report of October 1936 to February 1937 (COXXXVII-16) four
lectures; in that concerning July to December 1937 six lectures of which
there were delivered by Hagen, (CDXXXVII-22), two by Eichmann,
one by Dannecker. But from January to June 1938 twenty-nine lec-
tures were given, including eighteen by Hagen, four by Dannecker and
one by Eichmann. Afterwards, in the report covering July to December
1938 (CDXXXVII-23), one notes two lectures by Hagen, in August.
In the report of January to June 1938, Hagen wrote:
16
,...
The Service For Jewish Affair, the II-112
"Given that the involvement of the service 11-112 in the field of education
(Schuling) remains very intense, it appears necessary ... to name a scientific
assistant to prepare the documentation." (38)
But no follow-up was given. Let us note that in August 1938 Hagen
prepared two lectures for the Foreign Policy School of the Party, but
that the text was presented by Knochen in Hagen's absence. Knochen
was the assistant of Six. It is evident that the collaboration between
the sections of the II-I was close.
It is instructive to point out that the SO's manner of bringing up and
treating the Jewish problem was in clear and violent contrast to the
vulgar and pornographic anti-Jewish propaganda of Streicher and his
monthly, "Der StUrmer" ("the Assaillant"). The team which was
educating and cultivating itself to later assume a central role in the
"final solution" developed its capabilities by the imposition of a certain
scientific discipline. This divergence between Heydrich and Streicher
came to light in May 1938 concerning a foul anti-Jewish illustrated
which Streicher destined for young people: "Der Giftpilz" ("The Poi-
sonouS Mushroom") (CDXXXVII-8, 9, 10). Streicher gave Heimer,
the editor of the "stUrmer", the reponsibility of taking the necessary
steps to obtain a favourable report on the publication from the SD.
Hagen, Six and Heydrich decided that a favourable opinion on their
behalf was inadmissible. But they consented to receive Heimer to show
him the work that Eichmann was accomplishing within the Jewish
community in Vienna. In a letter which Hagen wrote to Eichmann on
June 28, 1938, he pointed out the ineptitudes of the editor of the
"Sturmer." Writing to his "Dear Adolph," Hagen laughed at the
horrified indignation of Heimer confronted with the revival of Jewish
religiOUS sentiment.
"When I hear such a thing, I hold onto my head: but what do they have
to do then! Perhaps the "Stlirmer" will contribute in bringing about the
radical solution of shortening them by a head to prevent their having the
joyful thought of recognizing themselves as Jews again." (39)
7. The SD and the Zionist Emigration
The Gestapo and the SD imagined that the best way to develop the
massive emigration of the Jews was to favourize Zionist emigration.
According to the statistics furnished in March 1943 to Himmler, only
15 % of the 353,000 emigrants from the Reich went to Palestine. But
it was anticipated that the Zionist movement would be able to encou-
rage the wave of emigration.
We may cite on this subject a characteristic note of the Gestapo.
This note dating from February 20, 1935 (CDXXXVII-5), informed all
branches of the Gestapo that the Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber, was
17
to be forbidden to speak in pUblic. It was formulated in the following
manner: "It is true that he is a Zionist. It has, however, been esta-
blished that he prefers the leftist movements of Judaism." (39a) This care
to maintain Zionist feeling among the Jews xas also shown by certain
details. For example, a note of April 4, 1936, from Heydrich to all of
the Gestapos (COXXXVII-3) announced that the use of Hebrew was
forbidden in public assemblies, but that it was authorized in meetings
the intention of which was the practice of that language to facilitate
emigration to Palestine.
Given this tendency, it is evident that the work of Eichmann, respon-
sible for Jewish affairs, was the most important in the anti-Jewish
section of the SO. With this in mind, he made in company of Hagen a
study trip to Palestine in 1937. He read Yiddish fluently, which allow-
ed him to study the Zionist press. He thus learned that a para-military
organization ("The Hagana") had been formed to prepare the creation
of the Jewish state. It was consequently necessary to make contact
with this organization to learn in what spirit and what manner the Jews
were acting to obtain the majority in Palestine by intensifying immigra-
tion. Eichmann succeeded in establishing contact with one of the
leaders of the "Hagana" who came to Berlin, entered into connivence
with him and invited him to come visit the Jewish colonies in Palestine.,?
Hagen on June 17, 1937 (COXXXVII-1), drew up a report signed by
Six and intended for Heydrich. Let us note that at that time the II-112
stilI had Wisliceny for chief. But apparently the nonchalance of the
person excluded him from dynamic actions. The report edited by
Hagen stated that Eichmann was the obvious man to follow up the
invitation, but that for greater security it was better that he be accom-
panied. Hagen commented:
"The Jewish work of colonization must be studied thoroughly. It is im-
portant to know these works in particular because after the proclamation
of a Jewish state or a Palestine administered by the Jews, Germany would
have a new adversary in foreign policy which could decisively influence the
political line in the Near East. In addition to that, the establishment of
a State will accentuate the question of a statute for the Jews, as a minority
residing in Germany." (40)
This argumentation, common among the Nazi doctrinarians, opposed
them to Zionism. But this was not the case for Hagen. In fact, in this
same report he proposed to offer the following compensation to Polkes
(representative of the Hagana):
"to put pressure on the committee representing Jews in Germany so that it
would oblige Jewish emigrants to go to Palestine exclusively and to no
other country. SUch a measure is clearly in the German interest and has
already been prepared by measures of the Gestapo. The plans of Polkes
to obtain the Jewish majority in Palestine will thus at the same time be
favourized." (41)
18
The SO and the Zionist Emigration
Hagen thus weighed the advantages and disadvantages of the Zionist
emigration and decided that the advantages were greater. The voyage
took place between September 26 and October 2, 1937. Eichmann
was accompanied by Hagen himself. At his trial he spoke of Hagen as
his superior here. This is not quite true because Hagen took over the
II-112 only in November 1937. He nevertheless occupied, directly next
to Six, a position superior to that of Eichmann, albeit in a different
service of the II-I. Although their position of emissaries of the SO
was camouflaged, the English authorities prevented Hagen and Eichmann
from entering Palestine from Egypt. The two envoys of the SO suc-
ceeded even so in meeting Polkes in Egypt and in informing themselves
of the situation there and in a Palestine. The report (COLXXX-8)
dated 4 and 27 November, 1937 (Hagen already being chief of the
II-112), was drawn up for the greater part by Hagen. Eichmann
related only his discussions with Polkes in Cairo. As for relations
between the Jews and the Arabs, Hagen judged that the Arabs had no
racial hatred towards the Jews, but that they were against them only if
their own interests were threatened by them. Counting on Zionism,
Hagen did not however neglect anti-Judaism. In conclusion he
proclaimed "the total incompetence of the Jews to direct the economy
of their country" and declared
"the habit the Jews have of deceiving each other is evidently not the most
minor reason for the economic chaos of Palestine, even more so because
the absence of Aryans does not allow the Jews to trade with them ... " (41a)
As for Eichmann, he declared himself opposed to Polkes's proposition!:)
(without having admitted this to him) which risked making Palestine too
powerful and were inspired by the Havara agreement to which, accord-
ing to Eichmann, the SO was opposed. He agreed with the point of
view of Wisliceny who in July 1937, in an "Orientation Notebook" which
he wrote for the SS Office on Race and Implantation, argued against
the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The reason advanced was
that this state would serve as a cover for all the Jewish minorities in the
countries that they would continue to exploit (point of view also defend-
ed by A. Rosenberg). The Nazi support of Zionism was evidently a
great paradox. The fact remains, however, that the SO acct;pted this
paradox. It was sufficient that the propensity to massive emigration
which was inherent to Zionism be able to immediately serve the liquida-
tion of the Jewish presence from the Reich.
8. The Anticipation of the Final Solution:
Hagen and Eichmann in Vienna
Until March 1938 the solution to the Jewish question was, so to speak,
in incubation in the Third Reich. The signal that brought it suddenly
to the foreground was the annexation of Austria. Beginning imme-
19
diately after the annexation, the action was still limited to Austrian
territory. The "solution" was not in evidence in all of the Reich until
November 1938.
The operation in Austria was both carefully and feverishly prepared
by the S.D. (42) An immense and technically perfected file was com-
piled to cover all persons whose activities classified them as opponents
of Nazism, obviously including the Jews. As of March 1938, the
Hitlerian power lashed out against the Austrian Jews. Expropriation
was immediately decreed and applied. The Jewish organizations as a
whole were forbidden, and personalities representative of Jewish commu-
nity life were arrested and interned. (43)
In the semestrial report on the activity of the II-112 between Janua-
ry 1 and June 30, 1938 (CDXXXVII-23), Hagen summed up the politi-
cal action in Austria which was the essential part of the activity of the
II-112 at the time:
"Results of the investigations: the accomplishment of the entire operation
against Jewish organizations in Austria, with the participation of civil
servants of the foreign section of the Gestapo: reconstitution of Jewish orga-
nizations for the country of Austria; discovery of internal processes
concerning the foundation of a Jewish State; financing of the Jewish emi-
gration form Austria to the extent that it is admissible from the point of
view of the situation of the Reich regarding foreign currencies." (44) '7
As for the direction of this action, the report states:
"The SS U'stuf Hagen was detached to Vienna from March 3 to April 11,
1938, to participate in the actions in Austria. SS U'stuf Eichmann was
on March 16, 1938, designated for the same mission and was later entrusted
with the direction of the II-112 of the Office there." (45)
At his trial Eichmann gave no account of the presence of Hagen in
Vienna. He related that he arrived alone in Vienna and that, having
no contact apart from the address of the Sipo-SD in that city, he under-
took the reorganization of Jewish life, subordinating it to the imperative
of emigration. He told of the liberation of Jewi<>h personalities, the
choice he made of an administrator of the Jewish community and the
intuition which led him to create a central office for Jewish emigration
(Zentralstelle fUr judische Auswanderung). He was quick to unite in
the same section representatives of all the government authorities on
whom the delivery of emigration permits depended. This centralization
did in fact remarkably accelerate the process of preparation for emigra-
tion. According to the testimony of Wisliceny (LXXXVII-67), Heydrich
engaged his authority for the creation of this office.
We have noted, however, that Eichmann soent the first three weeks
in Vienna with Hagen, entrusted with the same mission as the latter.
In addition, the idea of a Zentralstelle may be derived from Hagen's
report of December 7, 1937 (CDXXXVII-21), on the reorganization of
the II-Il2 involving it in practical work and not just theoretical. It is
in short a question of the principle of subordination of everything
concerning the Jewish question to the SD and the Gestapo. The Zen-
20
,...
Hagen and Eichmann in Vienna
tralstelle that Eichmann was to organize in Vienna was nothing other
than the instrument of this centralization recommended by Hagen as
soon as he was nominated to head the II-112. It was, as Hagen
expressed it on December 7, 1937, the instrument of the "establishment
of relations with the competent sections of the Ministry of the Interior
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." But Eichmann perfected this
principle by addressing himself to all the authoritie<; on whom the per-
mission to emigrate depended: the Prefecture of Police, Ministries of the
Economy and Finance, the Gestapo, etc. The representatives of all the
authorities were gathered together in one bureau, and the preparation
of all the documents necessary for emigration took place as on an
assembly line. (46) According to this testimony of Eichmann, the
Jewish personalities with whom he then worked in Vienna had also
asked him to centralize the procedures; for, as he recognized himself,
the diverse administrations sometimes created obstacles, which exaspe-
rated the Jewish emigrants.
In the impetus that the II-112 gave to the Jewi5h emigration from
Austria, it continued to give preference to Zionist organizations. The
semestrial report of Hagen for the period of July to December 1938
(CDXXXVII-25) informs us that after the closing up of all the Jewish
organizations in Vienna, immediately following the annexation to the
Reich, all of the Zionist organizations were Ie-opened (and religious
organizations as well, except for those exercising educational activities).
In contrast, the organizations of assimilated Jews remained prohibited.
On May 3, 1938, Eichmann (47) wrote to Hagen:
"Dear Herbert... the "Zionist Review" publishes its first issue next Friday.
I had the manuscripts sent to me and am currently in the midst of the
bothersome work of censoring. It goes without saying that the paper will
be sent to you. It will in a way become "my" paper ... I have required
that the cultural community and the Zionist union reach a figure of 20,000
indigent Jews emigrating between April 1, 1938 and May 1, 1938, which
they have accepted as having to be executed."
Eichmann in this letter summed up the situation as follows:
"Aryanization, Jews still in the economy to be treated according to the
decree of Gauleiter Burkel. By far the most difficult chapter, that of getting
the Jews to emigrate, is the task of the SD ... "
The Zentralstelle was a dependancy of the "Sipo-SD of the Danube."
Eichmann was named direc;tor of the Zentralstelle. But he still belonged
to the SD II-Il2, of which he directed the Austrian branch. At the
same time he exercised an executive function, for on the one hand he
organized the administrative work in view of emigration; and on the
other hand he led the Jews to emigrate by making their life in Austria
intolerable. Subordinate to Stahlecker, chief of the Sipo-SD for the
region of the "Danube", Eichmann was divided between the SD, to
which he still belonged, and the Gestapo. It nevertheless remains that
the SD II-Il2, in other words Hagen, finally arranged matters concern-
21
ing the emigration from Austria; and this is proven by Hagen's report
of October 31, 1938 (CDLXXX-18). He went to Vienna to organize
with representatives of the Ministry of the Economy the attribution of
currency which was to permit the emigration of the Jews first from
Austria and later also from the Reich. Hagen emphasized that he
strongly insisted that the Zentralstelle be the sole agent handling these
sums. This was to avoid the creation for this purpose of a Jewish
economic organization.
The Zentralstelle turned over to the II-lI2 the documentary material
confiscated from Jewish organizations. This material was immediately
and carefully studied, as prove the reports of the "Kommando" formed
for this purpose in the II-l12. The collaborators of the II-lI2 sought
among other things any traces of anti-Nazi activities on the part of the
functionaries of the Jewish organizations. One of the people assigned
to this work put in his report of June 17, 1938 (CDXXXVII-26), that
he had discovered in a letter of 1936 from a member of the "Union of
Austrian Jews" that the latter had been very active in the fight against
National-Socialism in Austria. The coI1aborator of the II-l12 added:
"The original of the letter and copies of it were immediately sent off to
U'Stuf. Hagen to see if the Krisshaber case was already known. If it was,
an investigation was to be conducted at once by the section "Austria" or
else an arrest was te be made." (48)
But the II-l12 was more and more involved in matters of,an executive
nature. It acted in company with agents of the Gestapo. Thus
Himmler gave an order which Heydrich apparently transferred to Six
and Six to Hagen. Hagen stated in a note of November 2, 1938
(CDLXXX-22), that Eichmann had established contact with the Gau-
leiter "Lower Danube," Globocnik (he who was later to direct the
extermination of the Polish Jews), concerning the execution of Himmler's
order to concentrate aU of the Austrian Jews in Vienna. It was under-
stood that these Jews (approximately 10,000 people) would be invited by
representatives of the SD, accompanied by members of the Gestapo,
either to emigrate before December 15, 1938, the ZentralsteI1e furnish-
ing them both papers and financial means, or to transfer before Octo-
ber 31 their residence to Vienna, where housing would be provided.
9. The Efforts of Hagen to Force Jewish Emigration
in Various Countries
Paranel to this activity of the II-l12 in the executive field, the intelli-
gence activity also continued. The local and regional headquarters of
the SD stiU had their confidence men and their informers and communi-
cated information to the main office of the II-l12. But Hagen personal-
ly took care of this work when it concerned confidence men and infor-
mers abroad. (49) He wrote in his report of December 7, 1937
(CDXXXVII-21):
22
'7
,..
Jewish Emigration in Various Countries
"Outside of this work, we have begun to study world Judaism in a system-
atic manner (partly by direct contacts) given that the decisions for the con-
tinuation of the solution to the Jewish question in Germany imply an exact
knowledge of the leading Jewish organizations on a universal scale." (SO)
He insisted in his semestrial report for "June to December 1939
(CDXXXVII-25) on the.importance of intensifying work abroad; for the
emigration of the Jews, which was taking place under constantly increas-
ing pressure, displaced the field of action of the Jews to foreign
countries.
Among the few confidence men and informers ,of whom he disposed
abroad, the central role was played by people in the Near East. In the
report for January to June, 1938 (CDXXXVII-23), Hagen indicated one
man in New York, another in Paris, one in Bucharest. But these names
were crossed out. There remain in a stable manner three or four
persons for the Near East and three persons through whom the II-l12
tried to organize clandestine transportation of Jewish emigrants or ways
to transfer money for the emigrants. These were the essential subjects
of Hagen's correspondence with his men of confidence or informers
(CCXXXIV). It happened that the SD and the Gestapo together
disposed of the same informer. Occasionally, Hagen's correspondants
also provided political information aside from the Jewish question.
Hagen welcomed it gladly but as less important complementary infor-
mation and transmitted it to the appropriate sections of the SD. All of
the activity of intelligence-gathering seems not to have amounted to
much. The II-l12 learned a great deal about the structures of Judaism
all over the world, but the documentation gives the impression that it
sought its knowledge primarily in non-secret sources.
The essential preoccupation of the II-1l2 was the intensification of
Jewish emigration. On June 20, 1938, (51) Hagen informed Eichmann
of the success of his talks with the Ministry of the Economy on
the use of funds coming from contributions granted to the Reich by
Jewish organizations abroad to aid emigration.
In a note of November 7, 1938, Hagen proposed to develop propa-
ganda which would incite England to grant additional possibilities for
this emigration. In the course of that year, Hagen emphasized several
times in his notes to Six the necessity of obtaining from foreign
countries greater possibilities for the Jewish emigration. The II-1l2
also involved itself in the organization of an illegal emigration.
On February 6, 1939, Hagen wrote to one of his confidence men,
director of an important travel agency, about the failure of the transport
of Jews that the latter had organized to Paraguay. He communicated
to him the rumours according to which the government of that country
would accept the illegal immigration on the condition that it be remu-
nerated at a certain rate per head. In May and June, 1939, the director
of the travel agency corresponded intensely with the II-l12 (Hagen put
him in contact with Eichmann and Dannecker) to execute the project
of buying old Greek boats for clandestine transportation of Jews, the
23
payment for which was to consist in the delivery of arms. Hagen
contacted the Ministry of the Economy on this subject (CDXXIV-8,
p. 16). In July he noticed that the Greeks were avoiding the issue,
probably following English intervention (May 19; June 2, 12, 17 and
29; July 5, 6, 8). This correspondance reveals that the Greek fleet
often participated in the clandestine transport of Jews.
In the course of 1939, the emigration became increasingly difficult.
Hagen noted on June 15, 1939 (52):
"Promote" emigration to the maximum possible. The emigrations are be-
coming more and more difficult... Promote all plans for emigration no
matter where."
In March 1939, Hagen gave Eichmann the responsibility (53) of
assembling a documentation for a report to Heydrich on a plan for the
installation of Jews in Madagascar. He presented it as having already
been debated between France and Poland. This report was to be
compiled in collaboration with the section for Jewish affairs of the
Gestapo (II B4), and it revealed that
"the Jewish question cannot be resolved on the basis admitted until present
(financial difficulties, etc.) and that it is necessary to put a foreign policy
solution on the agenda ... (Madagascar Plan)."
A reference to this non-dated note was made in another of March 24, 'i
1938 (CDXXXVII-28), from Dannecker, It was drafted in Vienna,
apparently in Eichmann's presence, to recall among other projects the
one in question.
10. The Men of the I/-112 Confronted with the Jews
In 1939 Six and Hagen, employing the pseudonym of "Dieter
Schwartz," put out (testimony of Wisliceny, LXXXVIII-67) a brochure
entitled "World Judaism," which appeared in the series of treatises
published by the SS. Beginning with the thesis of the Jewish will to
dominate the world, they analyzed the system of Jewish political, social,
financial, national and international organizations. They finished up
with Zionism which they considered incapable of bringing about a real
solution, given the number of Jews in the world and the small territory
of Palestine. "Dieter Schwartz" revealed in this context that the Jews
themselves desired a Jewish State only as the center of a Jewish govern-
ment power which would protect them in the activities that dispersed
they would continue to develop. "Dieter Schwartz" thus denounced
Zionism. The brochure concluded, nevertheless, by emphasizing that
the only thing that interested Germany was to remove the Jews from its
territory at any price. Thus the authors did not exclude, without how-
ever saying so explicitly (they did not bring up the question of anti-
Jewish measures), that if Palestine could not contain the entire popula-
tion of Jews in the world, it would suffice to absorb that of the Reich.
24
The Men of the II-112 and the Jews
It is known that in the report on his trip with Eichmann to the Near
East, Hagen represented the Jew in Palestine as a crook who, for lack
of activity in a non-Jewish milieu to rob it, took advantage of the Jews
with whom he was surrounded. Hagen formulated the classic anti-
Jewish image of the Jew moved by a depraved desire for world power.
In this brochure the condition of Jew is considered a racial characte-
ristic, indelible: the Jew remains Jewish no matter what his religious
beliefs nor his integration with another people. Hagen wrote on June
3.0, 1939, to a Czech editor to advise him on the anti-Jewish propaganda
to be developed in his paper, "Znova:"
"Given that the law concerning Jews has not yet appeared in the Protec-
torate-the reason for this is probably that the Germans do not agree with
the religious conception advanced by your Government-you thus have the
most favourable occasion to continue your propaganda activity of your
racial conception in the Jewish question." (54)
And Hagen gave much advice to his correspond ant.
In the anti-Jewish propaganda, Six, Hagen, Eichmann and Dannecker
condemned the hysterical outbursts of Streicher and his paper, "Der
Stiirmer" (" The Assaillant "). They limited themselves to a cold and
laconic refusal of the Jewish presence in their country. This refusal
was to be thus even more efficacious in its results.
Hagen was not obliged to enter into contact with those Jews for whose
removal he was working. We have no direct information permitting us
to imagine the attitude that he assumed if he happened to communicate
personally with them. But we do know how, according to the SD
II-112, a man of the SD was to approach the Jews. Hagen wrote in a
note of February 9, 1938 (CDLXXXIX-9) on the activity of the SD in
the region of Fulda-Werra, which counted a numerous Jewish population
(according to Hagen, 23,000 Jews resided in Francfort), that the man
assigned to the Jewish question in the SD of that region was unfit for the
job. His chief wrote that" although demonstrating both willingness and
zeal, he is not suited to fulfill his function given his age (twenty-two
years old) and his lack of tcughness." (55) Hagen thereby agreed
with the opinion of the chief of the branch of the SD.
An account on Eichmann and the atmosphere of the emigration
offices that he organized allows one to conceive the comportment of a
person of the II-112 when confronted with Jews. B. Loesener, Chief of
the Section on Racial Questions at the Ministry of the Interior, described
Eichmann as he appeared to the Jews in the offices of the Zentralstelle
and those of the Jewish community. (56)
"The corridors along which the emigrants had to pass were enormously
overcrowded with Jewish persons who had to or wanted to leave. I had
not the courage to speak to one of these people, for I felt that I was being
watched by Eichmann, although he was polite and even very attentive to me;
but one always sensed his glacial determination. In the corridors overflow-
ing with people, frightened women seized their children as soon as they saw
Eichmann, whereas he, without being troubled by this, advanced as if the
25
way were clear and pushed aside all that recalled human misery. I follow-
ed in his tracks ... Eichmann also took me into the office of the community
of the synagogue, in the Leopoldstrasse, where he had previously spoken of
me as reporting on racial questions to the Ministry of the Interior. Upon
my arrival there, I saw a certain number of Jews seated on chairs on which
they had obviously already been waiting for hours. When we arrived, they
immediately stood up; they were persons in charge of various questions in
the community of the synagogues of Vienna. In a curt manner, Eichmann
called them by their names, indicated to me just as briefly the subjects of
their reports, and they at once, like trained animals, delivered what they had
to say. On each face, one could read the expression of a mortal fear which
was well-founded ... "
Neither the letters exchanged by Hagen ("Dear Herbert") and
Eichmann ("Dear Adolf") nor their relations as chief and subordinate
reveal the slightest disagreement concerning their way of acting. One
may suppose that Eichmann's comportment was virtually approved by
Hagen.
11. The Passage to the "Final Solution" in the Reich
(1938-1939) .
The final solution had been launched in Austria as of spring 1938.,/
Geering, in charge of the Jewish question, declared at a meeting of the
Four-Year Plan (PS-l301) on October 14, 1938, that it was time to
exclude Jews from the economy. He meant by the same occasion that
the incubation period of the Jewish question was over. The action
precipitated in Austria was like an anticipation of what was to be done
everywhere in the Reich. But Geering at this meeting severely criti-
cized the manner in which confiscations had been effected in Austria.
The Gauleiter in charge of the operation considered that it should profit
Austria!). members of the Party who had suffered before the annexation
to the Reich. Because of this, Aryanization had taken place in scan-
dalous disorder and with abuses. Geering underscored that in the
entire territory of the Reich, the dispossession of the Jews was to be
strictly the affair of the State and not of the Party.
In April and in June 1938, the economic Aryanization in the Reich
was already noticeable in decrees ordering the Jews to register their
businesses and their fortunes. But on December 3, 1938, a decree
proclaimed the Aryanization of possessions. This decisive step in the
launching of the solution to the Jewish question was taken during the
storm raised by the attack committed by the Polish Jew Grynzspan at
the German Embassy in Paris. He killed, apparently by chance, the
German diplomat Von Rath in a protest against the brutal expulsion of
Polish Jews from German territory. Geebbels seemingly encouraged by
Hitler, incited troops of the SA and the Party to proceed with progroms
in the night .of November 9-10. This measure was severely disapproved
by nearly alI of the ranking Nazi dignitaries. The burning down of
synagogues and the wrecking of stores were accompanied by looting.
26
The Passage to the Final Solution
On November 10, 1938, Heydrich gave orders (PS-3S01) to the Sipo-SD
to not prevent the pogroms as long as the directives against exactions
were respected by the crowd. On the other hand, he ordered the arrest
of the greatest possible number of Jews and their internment in concen-
tration camps. In the report to Geering (PS-30S8) dated November 11,
Heydrich gave him very incomplete information on the enormous
amount of destruction' and looting and on the arrest of Jews to be
interned. The next day Geering, on Hitler's orders, met with the most
important leaders of nearly all branches of the Government (PS-1816)
to decide upon preparatory measures for the solution of the Jewish
question. He began as follows, speaking as the man responsible for the
Four-Year Plan (note that the essential work in the preparation of the
"final solution" was economic: the dispossession of the Jews, called
economic Aryanization):
"Gentlemen, today's session is of prime importance. I have received a
letter from Bormann, Chief of Staff of the Representative of the FUhrer,
in which he writes to me on behalf of the FUhrer that the Jewish question
must now be considered as a whole in order to be brought in one way or
another to its solution. Yesterday the FUhrer once again reminded me by
telephone to take all of the decisive measures in a centralized manner.
Given that the problem is principally a vast economic problem, that is
where one must apply the pressure ... " (57)
For hours Geering and the participants at this conference made an
effort to uncover and define the necessary measures to assure that in
the space of a few weeks, the Jews of the Reich would be separated
from their possessions. Their fortune was to be blocked by the State
which was to grant them a pension of 3 112 % of this fortune; their
businesses were to be sold or officially liquidated.
Heydrich intervened nearly at the end of the conference to give
another turn to the deliberations and one which went to the heart of the
question:
"Whatever may be the elimination of the Jews from economic activity, the
fundamental problem finally still remains that of the departure of the Jew
from Germany." (57)
He set forth the manner in which the Sipo-SD proceeded in Austria
by creating and using the Zentralstelle. He pointed out that in the
same period of time, only 19,000 Jews had left the Old Reich, but 50,000
had left Austria. He explained that the Jewish emigration would not cost
the Reich any foreign exchange and asked that Geering create an office
for the totality of the Reich similar to that of the Zentralstelle in Vienna.
Geering accepted this request. Heydrich sketched out the future: the
emigration of all the Jewish population was to take eight to ten years
during which a total segregation of the Jews was to be applied. Finally,
Geering evoked an even more shady aspect of the question:
27
"If the German Reich were to find itself involved in the foreseeable future
in an external conflict, it goes without saying that we, too, would think in
Germany in the first place to settle our account with the Jews. Aside from
that, the Fiihrer will finally undertake-beginning with the powers that have
put the Jewish problem on the agenda-a foreign policy action to thus
effectively attain the solution of the problem of Madagascar. That is what
he exposed to me on November 9 ... " (57)
Thus, on November 9, the news of the death of Von Rath having
reached the Chancellery, Hitler evoked as an immediate objective the
project of the Jewish reserve in Madagascar and, as a possibility in
the future, a "settlement of accounts" with the Jews in case of war.
In what concerns Madagascar, we know that in March 1939 Hagen had
reminded Eichmann of the necessity of a report on this subject to
Heydrich.
But what marks with an indelible stamp Grering's personal style of
treating the Jews at this time when he was in charge of the Jewish
question, is his exclamation to the famous conference of November 12,
in respect to the enormity of the sum that the insurance companies
would have to spend to cover damages caused by the progroms:
"I should have preferred that you slaughter two hundred Jews rather than
annihilate such worth."
The feverish activity of expropriation, first in Austria and afterwards 'i
in the totality of the Reich, was not in the competence of the II-112.
The economic administration of the country, at the head of which was
the Four-Year Plan, took care of it. The section of Eichmann in
Austria and, since spring 1939, also in the Protectorate, took care of
economic questions only in relation to the Jewish emigration.
The expropriation of the Austrian, German and Czech Jews was a wide-
sweeping action. It was also the preliminary action necessary to the
solution of the Jewish question. But the solution itself, or the liquida-
tion of the Jewish presence from the German vital space, was represented
at this time by emigration. And it was prepared by the SD, by its
studies and by the influence it held on Jewish organizations. It was the
SD which trained Eichmann, still acting in Vienna as editor for the
II-U2, although placed at the disposal of the Sipo-SD of Vienna. It
was Hagen in Berlin who could consider himself at the head of the
action which Eichmann had just launched in Vienna.
Honouring a promise made to Heydrich at the meeting of November
12, 1938, Grering ordered the creation of the "Reichzentralstelle flir
jiidische Auswanderung (The Central Office of the Reich for Jewish
Emigration)." He added in his decree of January 24, 1939, on this
subject (NG-2586A) that he subordinated this office to Heydrich as
Chief of the Sipo, that i,s of the Gestapo and the Criminal Police. By
the same occasion, the SD was in a way removed from the action.
Eichmann's precedent showed the path to be followed: the men trained
by the SD were put at the disposal of the Gestapo. Grering's decree
contained an important clause which clearly stemmed from the
doctrine of the SD cultivated by Hagen, Dannecker and Eichmann:
28
The Passage to the Final Solution
" ... Take all measures for the preparation of an intensified Jewish emigra-
tion: among others, create an appropriate Jewish organization to assure the
uniform preparation of requests to emigrate ... " (58)
We know with what care the II-112 inspected and developed its
contacts with Jewish institutions, work which Eichmann prolonged in
Austria by reanimating the activity of the Jewish community in Vienna,
which collaborated with the Zentralstelle to organize the emigration.
In Germany, the institution of this nature was to be the "Reichsver-
einigung der deutschen J uden" of which the creation was decided (on
the basis of a decree of Grering) in July 1939. But the Reichsvereinigung
was to be obliged to participate in administrative work, not for the
emigration but for the deportation of the Jews. Alder, a knowledgeable
historian of the deportation of the German Jews, and who himself lived
during this period in the Reich, pronounced in his work on the depor-
tation the following judgment:
"The connection between the SO and the Reichsvereinigung... worked
remarkably in anticipation, at the development of the process of deportation
without snags." (59)
The same thing took place in most of the occupied territories. The
Gestapo owed to the SD this fruitful doctrine of the utilization of Jewish
organizations. But it was the Gestapo which applied the method elabo-
rated by the SD.
The internment of 30,000 Jews during the "Crystal Night"
(Heydrich stipulated in his order (PS-3051) that it was necessary to
arrest wealthy Jews in particular), was also an operation of the Gestapo
to incite this mass to hasten its emigration. These internees were
quickly liberated on condition that they prove their willingness to emi-
grate. However, the SD collaborated in the action, as Hagen stated in
his semestrial report for July-December 1938. It nevertheless remains
that the essential part of the operation no longer belonged to the SD.
Hagen wrote in the semestrial report for July to December 1938
(CDXXXVII-25) (the report dates from March 1, 1939, thus after
Grering's decree):
"At the time of the preparation of the Reichszentralstelle fiir jiidische
Auswanderung und der Reichsvereinigung der luden Deutschlands, the SO
at first led the tal ks. The situation changed only after the Reichszentrale
fUr jiidische Auswanderung was subordinated to the Security Police." (60)
This by itself indicates that the essential work of the II-112, that with
the Jewish organizations, had passed in 1939 into the hands of the II-B4
of the Gestapo (section directed by Lischka). A note of Hagen
(CCXXXIV-18) of May 25, 1939, on the reception of two regional
chiefs of the SD to whom Hagen, aided by Dannecker, explained the
new situation, emphasized that because of "the giving of the direction of
the Reichszentrale flir Jiidische Auswanderung to an official of the
Gestapo", the SD had not to take the initiative for the creation of new
centers for emigration and that all questions of assistance to the Jews
were to be settled with the consent of the offices of the Gestapo.
29
He stressed several times that he had brought Lischka up to date.
Hagen added a general remark to his explanations:
"Given the intention of dropping as much as possible the treatment of
judaism inside Germany by the SD, a plan is being drawn up to involve
Judaism abroad in the work of the section II-112 to a greater extent than
presently. For this reason, the two (visitors) were invited as of now to
seek out all of the facts concerning Judaism in Poland." (61)
We may wonder if Hagen was getting ready in May 1939 to prepare
the materials for a future activity of the Gestapo in Poland. We ignore
if these new projects were in fact initiated.
12. The Integration of the Men of the l/-112 into
the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (September 1939)
The breaking out of the war very rapidly brought about a radical
transformation of the structure of the SD and of the Sipo. The Sipo
and the SD were both capped by a single unit, the "Reichssicherheits-
hauptamt (Principal Security Office of the Reich: RSHA)." The RSHA
was split into six and later seven departments. The former Depart-
ment II of the SD, where Six and Hagen were, became Department III,
that for intelligence activities for the interior of the Reich. But there(
was no longer an anti-Jewish section. On the other hand, Depart-
ment III of the SD, which became Department VI of the RHSA and
took care of foreign intelligence under the direction of Jost and later of
Schellenberg, had an anti-Jewish section. It was called "Judaism and
Anti-Semitism "and was directed by Hagen.
Hagen's section was a sub-section of that entitled "Ideological Enemies
Abroad," which was headed by Knochen. The latter had previously
been the assistant of Six in the press section, where he had held the
responsibility for the analysis of the press of emigrants from the Reich.
As for Six, under whose direction Knochen, Hagen, Wisliceny, Eichmann
and Dannecker had until then worked, he received a special responsibi-
lity in the RSHA: that of the direction of the scientific department,
"Ideological Studies and Applications." The Gestapo delivered to it
all of the material (archives, libraries) seized from "ideological enemies."
The Gestapo itself (as of March 1, 1941) was to be Department IV of
the RSHA. The section for Jewish affairs which under Lischka was the
II B4 became the IV B4. Subordinated to Eichmann, it had no longer
to be guided by the SD, as in the time of the II-l12.
13. Eichmann's Task from September 1939 to March 1941
The task of the IV B4 was at once considerable. It was to assure
that the harsh laws of exception conceived to totally uproot the
Jewish population bring about total segregation. For that purpose it
was to set up and control the Union of Jews in Germany. Because the
30
Eichmann's Task 1939-1941
possibilities of emigration had become infinitesimal, the IV B4 was
reduced to working by itself while waiting for a solution to be found.
In the Austrian and Czech territories, the two ZentralsteIlen, that of
Vienna created by Eichmann and that of Prague (for the Protectorate:
Bohemia, Moravia) created in 1939 also by Eichmann, continued to
function. During the early months of the war, Eichmann devoted
himself to these two bureaux. They were dependent on the Sipo-SD of
their region but in fact acted on their own initiative without interference
from Lischka, Chief of the IV B4.
During these first months, the IV B4 in a way remained outside of the
principal circuit of the anti-Jewish activity, which began to develop in a
new direction. The conquest of the vast Polish territories and the fall
of Polish Judaism into the hands of the Hitlerian power opened up new
perspectives for the manipulation of the Jewish populations in general.
The objective was to liquidate their presence from the German vital
space.
The division of Poland into a part annexed to the Reich (Wartegau,
Upper Silesia) and a region placed under the regime of the General
Government coincided with the intention to evacuate the Jews from the
first part and also from the Reich and the Protectorate into the General
Government, a region of the latter to be used as a temporary reserve for
Jews. That is what Heydrich on September 21, 1939, explained to the
mobile killing units (Einsatzgruppen) of the Sipo-SD in invaded
Poland (PS-3363) at a time when the General Government was not yet
proclaimed as such (62). Heydrich added that it was a question of the
"final goal" kept secret and which would be attained after a rather
long period by the "totality of the measures" (Gesamtmassnahmen).
He stated that these measures themselves were to be soon announced.
A certain zone in the region of Lublin seems to have been planned for
the concentration of the Jews, who were first brought by stages into
the cities of the General Government.
One wonders what Heydrich was thinking as he evoked "the final
goal" about which he refused to say anything whatever. It was certain-
ly not a question of the very principle of the creation of a Jewish reserve
in the General Government. This project was not in fact
hidden from public opinion nor was that of a Jewish reserve in Mada-
gascar. Thus a direct evocation of the Jewish reserve in the region of
Lublin and a rather allusive evocation of a reserve in Madagascar are
to be found in a short treatise which the publishing house of the NSDAP
put out in 1941 (63):
"For a certain period of time, a region of settlement in the districts of
Lublin was considered a sort of reStorve for the Jews ... But it was also
unthinkable that the Jewish reserve near Lublin be a definitive solution.
This solution can only be obtained on the basis of the recognition of the
principle that the Jew has not to be part of the world and territories where
white men are settled, but rather those of colour. It is therefore in the
region of the latter that the future territory for Jewish settlement must be
sought."
31
But the author ends his treatise with <l p;ognost;c Yihich lc:'::',C3 [2 C::lUDt
in the air as to the very principle of a Jewish reserve:
"In the meantime, the war imposes its own problems on us and the victory
will confront the German people with new tasks, still greater, most of which
will be more important than the problem of a Jewish reserve. The last word
has not yet been pronounced, but it will be at the appropriate time and by
an authoritative source in order to definitively liberate the people and the
Reich from the malediction of Europe: the Jew on the eastern border."
One has the impression that the author wanted to lead public
opinion to believe that the German people would have neither time nor
energy to lose in taking care of the settlement of the Jews and that
Hitler would know how to pronounce the word which would assure their
disappearance in the most radical of manners. Isn't this how we must
interpret the unutterable "final goal" that Heydrich announced on Sep-
tember 21, 1939? The following observation is in fact found in the
report on the inspection trip that Seyss Inquart, deputy of Governor
General Frank, made to the General Government in November 1940.
It concerns the eventuality of a Jewish reserve in the region of Lublin:
"This region, with its swampy character, could quite possibly, according to
the reflections of District Governor Schmidt, be used as a Jewish reserve, a
measure which would probably greatly decimate the Jews." (64).
Relating to this it is to be noted that Heydrich, in his memorandum
of September 21, 1939, to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen, insinuated
that the mysterious final goal would be attrained by the living conditions
that these measures would bring about for the Jews.
The plan for a Jewish reserve in the General Government was given
up as of 1940 (LXXXVIII-67).
Between summer 1940, after the brilliant victory in the West, and
autumn 1941, the ideas concerning "the final solution" to be given to
the Jewish question were not fixed. It was hoped that the power repre-
sented by the victorious Reich would oblige the other nations to grant
the Reich space for a Jewish reserve. The plan for a Jewish reserve in
Madagascar included Jews from Poland as well as from Western Europe.
That did not prevent the continued concentration of Jews in the
General Government until March 1941. Eichmann was able to tell of
an order from Hitler to evacuate 300,000 of them, a figure which was far
from being attained at the time. (65) As the deportations of Jews concern-
ed mainly the Austrian territories and the Protectorate, Eichmann with
his two Zentralstellen in these two countries was greatly involved in this
operation. In addition to the Jews, Poles were massively deported from
Poland annexed to the General Government. All of this movement of
populations provoked the furor of the Governor General, H. Frank.
To counter these reproaches against the chaotic action of the Sipo-SD,
Heydrich created within the Gestapo (the RSHA IV) a section IV D4 to
organize this action. He named Eichmann its chief. Dannecker was
32
'(
,...
Eichmann's Task 1939-1941
at Eichmann's side during an important conference which met on January
30, 1940: it concerned the transfer of populations in the regions i:J.
question (66). Thus Eichmann and Dannecker were integrated with the
RSHA-IV. In contrast, Hagen, as we have seen, remained in the SD,
in the RSHA-VI (SD for foreign intelligence), where he directed the
section "Judaism and Anti-Semitism."
It is not clear how the functions of Eichmann as Chief of the IV D4
and Chief of the IV B4, were combined. He was named head of the
latter in place of Kurt Lischka, who had been transferred in December
1939 (Postdam film 1174A2592 (603)) to Cologne to direct the Sipo-SD
there.
According to his own testimony, Eichmann in the spring of 1940
became Chief of the IV B4, the section for Jewish affairs, with Rolf
Gunther as his assistant. As for the functions of Eichmann in the
IV D4, they ended in March 1941 with the prohibition to transfer popu-
lations to the General Government. It is only after this date that the
documents designate Eichmann's section as IV B4 and no longer IV D4.
Eichmann related that upon taking possession of Lischka's former
section, the IV B4, he found there
"in addition to the furniture, the civil servants who until then had served
Lischka. They continued, as was normal, their work of secret police of the
State, an activity which was then foreign to myself and to Gunther. But
they were very well-trained civil servants, who were perfectly familiar with
their regulations, in which we then had to plunge ourselves and study
them." (67)
The situation is here in a way the reverse of that of the SD 11-112 in
1938 in relation to the II B4 of the Gestapo. At that time Hagen,
Dannecker and Eichmann impregnated, so to speak, the anti-Jewish
work of the Gestapo with their knowledge of the Jewish question acquir-
ed in the SD. Now Eichmann and his assistant, Gunther, applied them-
selves to combining their capabilities acquired in the SD with those
demanded by the executive work of the police.
This situation was soon to be also that of Hagen, Knochen and
Dannecker. Let us recall that Knochen and Hagen were in Depar-
ment VI of the RSHA, the foreign intelligence section of the SD, where
Knochen directed the section "Ideological Adversaries" and Hagen had
within this section the sub-section "Judaism and Anti-Semitism." As
for Dannecker, we know that at the beginning of 1940 he was with
Eichmann in the IV D4. In the second half of 1940, all three were to
be designated for Jewish affairs in the Sipo-SD in occupied France.
In the summer of 1940, Heydrich sent a small commando to Paris.
It was to form the branch of the Sipo-SD in occupied France.
The anti-Jewish movement in France apparently had a privileged
position in the solution of the Jewish question as a whole. Luther,
Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote in a memo-
randum of August 1942 (NG-2586): "The regulations in Paris served
33
as a model for the regulations in Holland and in Belgium." (68) The
elite of the anti-Judaism unit of the SD was transferred to Paris.
Knochen, specialist of the affairs of emigrants from the Third Reich,
was to direct the Sipo-SD in occupied France; Hagen was to direct it
in the Atlantic region of France;Dannecker, specialist of "assimilating"
Judaism, was to be entrusted under Knochen with the anti-Jewish
section of the Sipo-SD. Lischka, specialist of Jewish affairs in the'
pre-war Gestapo, was to join this group.
In the same way that Eichmann in the IV B4 depended on his spe-
cialized subordinates under Lischka for the real police work, Knochen
received an assistant for his work in France, the experienced Gestapo
man, Lischka. A post in Paris was a distinction which had to be
merited.
The men who inaugurated the Hitlerian anti-Jewish action under the
sign of the SS and the Gestapo were to continue it in France under the
occupation. But it was then to be already in the sense of the "final
solution" by extermination.
Eichmann declared under questioning (69): !(
"The final solution of the Jewish question as such, that is to say, relative
to that special mission received by Heydrich, for example, or to express it
for once without circumlocutions, murder, was not a law of the Reich but
an Order of the FUhrer... It was understood, according to the conception
of the law at that time, that "the words of the FUhrer" amounted to law ... "
It is thus that the judicial basis of the "final solution" was presented
in the Third Reich and in the countries fallen under its yoke. The
action in France under the occupation is the example the richest in
subtleties of the functioning of the "final solution" directed by the
Order of the Fuhrer in question.
We shall now try to realize what constituted an Order of the Fuhrer
in general and its functioning in the launching and the development of
the extermination of the Jews.
34
~
Part II The Orders for the
"Final Solution" of
the Jewish Question
1. The Order of the Fuhrer (der Fuhrerbefehl) in General
A mISSIOn announced as an Order of the Fuhrer imposed on those
to whom it was entrusted an unconditional fervour in its execution.
According to the testimony of Eichmann, it was as an "Order of the
Fuhrer" that Heydrich presented to him the task of the extermination
of the Jews, a task for which Heydrich gave him the responsibility.
The Order of the Fuhrer gave the force of law to the measure
ordered. Such was the foundation of the regime based on the "Fuhrer-
prinzip. " But this principle set up a complex system which was rami-
fied by a multitude of chiefs in a hierarchy engaging the personal
responsibility of each one in the accomplishment of his task. They
had to use their initiative not only with their subordinates but also with
their superiors to develop as well as possible the action under the sign
of the Order of the Fuhrer. In this hierarchy of responsibilities, the
highest level was that of Orders of the Fuhrer, by definition in confor-
mity with the doctrine and therefore right. Next came the level of
governmental orders, which applied the supreme orders in terms of
one of the spheres constituting the life of the people (Ministries, Party,
SS) and often acted in contradictory interdependence. Beneath the
governmental level was that of the administration, which arranged by
its orders the execution of those of a higher level. But, given the
Fuhrerprinzip, these less important acts were to be accomplished with
the same conviction as the governmental acts, the whole being animat-
ed by the conscience of the direct and total responsibility of each
member of the people to the Fuhrer.
It may be argued that the efficiency shown in the accomplishment of
the evil acts of the Hitlerian regime was not due to blind obedience
but rather to a very lucid zeal developed by subordinates who some-
times gave a stimulus to their superiors in the execution of the order that
the latter had received.
35
THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTION
In two fields, that of foreign policy and that of military affairs,
Hitler after consultation and reflection decided for himself. It is less
certain that he was as decisive in other fields, such as the maintenance
of order and "purge" operations.
High-ranking personalities of the Hitlerian regime have left accounts
in their memoirs of the way in which measures referring to an Order
of the Fuhrer were often taken.
Hans Frank, who from the time of the creation of the Party was
active at Hitler's side, and who was finally named Chief of the General
Government (Polish territories not annexed to the Reich), wrote in his
memoirs: (70)
"Himmler and Bormann transformed the remarks that the Fuhrer some-
times dropped at table into "great secret missions" or else obtained on
this occasion authorizations for their action. The history of the Third
Reich is in its later period full of such procurations of the Fuhrer. How-
ever, he was himself, in these cases, generally too weak to revoke (zuruck-
pfeifen) these exaggerations ... "
(1
Diels, Chief of the Gestapo under Geering until April 1934, gave the
same impression on the formation of decisions at Hitler's level: (71)
"All these initiators and executants acted as a medium by which the out-
growths (Ausartungen) of the Hitlerian vitality were intensified to the
maximum. In their milieu were born the grotesque ideas (skurille Ideen)
which transformed themselves in his head into totalitarian final solutions ...
Bormann with Himmler raised the inoffensive proposals (harmlose Aeusser-
ungen) of Hitler, as in a CUlt, to the level of "Orders of the Fuhrer"
endowed Wilh the strictest legal force. When the circle was closed, they
soon exceeded the wishes and even the dreams of the demi-god."
O. Dietrich, Press Chief of the Government, President of the Chamber
of the Press of the Reich, wrote: (72)
"Hitler almost never gave his orders in wntmg ... Sometimes, orders that
Hitler had given casually, during a discussion, had not been recognized as
such by his interlocutor and so had not been executed; whence conflicts
between different military offices and others. Rather often, people that
he received for reasons that had nothing to do with politics, simply because
it pleased him to see them, took advantage of the occasion to attain their
ends; Hitler then made them promises privately or approved what they
proposed; after, they acted as if what Hitler had told them was an "Order
of the Fuhrer" and that did not fail to produce great confusion, for there
already existed an "Order of the Fuhrer" diametrically opposed ... "
An attentive observer like H. Picker, at the time a young jurist attach-
ed from March to July 1942 by the Ministry of the Interior to the Head-
quarters of the Fuhrer, noted for M. Bormann the remarks that Hitler
made in the circle of his guests. Picker wrote in the foreword of the
published version of these notes: (73)
36
The Order of the Fuhrer
"The goal which attracted me was to clearly show this veritable Hitler in
his soundings of the future, in his hesitations before the uncertain and in
his inhibitions before "the ultimate consequences a la Stalin"."
The taking of ordinary decisions at Hitler's level was described by
B. v. Schirach, Fuhrer of the Young People of the Reich and, as of
1940, Gauleiter of Vienna: (74)
"Soon Bormann assured that stenographers registered each of Hitler's
words, even at table. Bormann piled up these notes in enormous armour-
ed closets, arranged according to subjects, names, dates... All letters, re-
quests, complaints addressed to Hitler finally landed on Bormann's desk.
Hitler saw but a small part of them. Bormann has himself brought from
these armoured closets the comments of Hitler concerning the subject
treated and afterwards edited the answers in the style and name of his
master. Hitler during the year had often expressed the most contradictory
opinions on the same subject: Bormann always chose the most extreme,
the most brutal. And Hitler always covered for Bormann."
This role of active intermediary that Martin Bormann played in the
development of the political and public life of the Third Reich did not
concern the special relations of Hitler with Himmler, Heydrich or
Kaltenbrunner, successor of Heydrich. But the way in which M. Bor-
mann established decisions in Hitler's name characterized the attitude of
Hitler in general: Hitler taught and his collaborators deduced the extreme
decisions to be taken, except in foreign policy and in the conduct of the
war where Hitler acted personally.
We may cite, too, F. Hossbach, liaison officer of the Wehrmacht with
Hitler, who observed Hitler's influencable character when confronted
with accomplished facts: (75)
"The'e is no doubt that following arbitrary initiatives, taken on their own
account by sections of the Party, things often followed an orientation
which, in the beginning, was not a agreement with Hitlers own intentions.
In these cases, he was more the party led than leading; and, when they were
over, he attributed to himself events which previously he had wanted other-
wise or had not wanted at all. However, he seized with passion many
accomplished facts with which he was confronted and assimilated them."
It is curious that it occurred to Hitler to personally and publicly make
known before the Reichstag his reputation of being indecisive. On July
. i3, 1934, in an important speech, he commented on the murderous action
of June 30 and the following days against the SA (Rahm) and against
the politicians that he associated with the tendencies of the latter. At a
given moment of his speech, he formulated the argument that the SA had
advanced to incite people to revolt against the established Hitlerian
regime: (76)
"The necessity of a separate intervention of the SA has been explained by
the evocation of my inability to take decisions, which would be overcome
only if faits accomplis occurred."
37
R. Olden, a militant anti-Nazi, explained in his work on Hitler, which
appeared in 1936, the brutal decision against the SA. (77)
"There is but a single explanation possible of the reason for which the deci-
sion was put off so long, to the point where it degenerated into a catas-
trophe because Hitler, the FUhrer, is very far from being able to be counted
among the strong ... H;s weakness led him to make simultaneous and incom-
patible prom;ses to Blomberg and to Roehm."
One cannot call into question the force of Hitler's personality as
Fuhrer of the Third Reich. He created by speech a spiritual force
which stirred the masses and engendered in the conscience of his colla-
borators conclusions which they drew as "Orders of the Fuhrer." To
treat a subject, Hitler had to present it in its derivation from all of his
political and ideological work which he exposed with this in mind. This
is how his speeches were constructed. The accounts that we have cited
indicate that face to face with a collaborator, Hitler explained to him the
complex development of his thinking on a subject, leaving him the care
to find a precise decision in it, to present it after to his Fuhrer and, ifr\
necessary, to convince him of the close agreement of this decision or
even the action already accomplished as a result of it, with the intentions
exposed by Hitler.
Gilbert, the American psychologist on special mission to the Interna-
tional Tribunal of Nuremberg for the purposes of psychological study of
the defendants at the Main Trial, related the reaction of Grering to the
hypothesis that he presented to the latter on the role of Hitler in the
taking of decisions concerning the" final solution":
"I shall suggest the following tableau: H.itler, obsessed by anti-Semitism and
incapable of tolerating opposition or advice advocating moderation, saying
finally to Himmler: "Get rid of them-it little matters how-I don't want to
hear about them anymore!" Grering reflected a moment, seeming to visualize
the scene; then he declared that it was probably like that that it happened."
. The essential for Hitler was acquired i'n advance: the measures pro-
voked by the development of his thinking were to be carried through by
the spirit of extreme harshness with which he impregnated the Party that
he created by gathering about him persons adequate for this spirit This
spirit was guaranteed by the training the Party gave to its members. It
was perhaps this dialectical manner of expressing his wiII by the explana-
tion starting from principles or origins which acquired for Hitler the
reputation that he evoked himself regarding the operation against Roehm.
A significant parallel was drawn by Himmler between this last action
and the "final solution." In fact, in his important speech of October
1943 at Posen to the high-ranking officials ot the SS, Himmler, before
exposing in brutal terms the extermination of the Jews as the goal of the
deportations (he said: "evacuation "), warned that he would speak of a
matter of which the men of the SS should be aware as of a necessity,
but with regard to which they were to observe the same discretion which
was the rule in respect to the recollection of the Roehm affair.
38
Public Announcements by the Fuhrer
2. Public Announcements of the "Final Solution" by
the Fuhrer and Chancellor of the Reich
January 30, 1939 was the last anniversary in peace-time of Hitler's
rise to power. In his speech before the Reichstag on domestic and
foreign policy, Hitler pronounced his famous "prophecy": (78)
"Today I want to be a prophet once again: if financial international Judaism
in Europe and beyond Europe were to succeed once again in pushing the
peoples into a world war, then the result of it would not be the Bolshevi-
zation of the earth, thus the victory of Judaism, but the destruction (Vern-
ichtung) of the Jewish race in Europe."
What was the meaning of this shattering declaration? As of the end
of 1938, the Jewish population of the Reich had been driven to the
alternative of misery or emigration, but there had been no question at
all of extermination.
The term "Vernichtung" (annihilation, destruction) marked the abso-
lutely negative will concerning the Jewish presence in the Reich. Since
it was absolute, this will announced itself as ready if necessary for all
extremities. The term in question did not mean that the stage of
extermination had already been reached, nor even the deliberate inten-
tion to do so.
A few days before the speech quoted, Hitler received the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia. He reproached his guest with the
lack of energy of the government of Prague in its efforts at entente with
the Reich and recommended, in particular, an energetic action against
the Jews. He declared, to show an example: "In our country, we des-
troy them (bei uns werden sie vernichtet)." One might conclude that
Hitler in the course of a diplomatic conversation recorded in the archives
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (79) confided the fact of a massacre
in the Third Reich, which, in addition, was not true at the time.
Two years later, January 30, 1941, Hitler recalled his "prophecy" of
1939. But this time he specified its meaning as follows: (80)
"and [ do not want to forget the indication that I have already given once
before the Reichstag, that is that if the rest of the world (andere Welt) is
cast into a war, Judaism will completely end its role in Europe ... "
In his conversation with the Czechoslovak minister, Hitler evoked
England and the United States as being able, according to him, to offer
regions for the installation of Jews. In January 1941, he indicated that
the role of the Jews in Europe was to be completely ended; and he added
that this prospect would be realized, for the other peoples would under-
stand the necessity of it in their own countries. At that time, there was
a belief in the creation of a Jewish reserve. But for Hitler it was admis
sible only outside of Europe.
We have just pointed out that on January 30, 1941, Hitler simply
announced the termination of the role of the Jews in Europe. Two
years earlier, the word "Vernichtung" had been pronounced. At that
time, the Nazi authorities proclaimed that the problem of the Jewish
39
question was being resolved by emigration. During the war, the solution
by emigration became practically impossible. One was reduced to
contenting oneself with vague projects (a Jewish reserve in Madagascar).
But in the second half of 1941 the extermination of Jews in the occupied
regions of the Soviet Union was begun. This method soon began to be
applied to the Jews of the Reich deported to the East and to the Jews of
the Polish territories. This "final solution" was not openly admitted.
Hitler considered it necessary even so to publicly' resume the use of the
word "Vernichtung" in this new situation where it was no longer ques-
tion neither of emigration nor of a Jewish reserve. He announced in
his speech of January 30, 1942, (81) that
"the war can end in but two ways, either by the extermination (ausgerottet)
of the Aryan peoples, or by the disappearance of Judaism from Europe."
Recalling his "prophecy" of 1939, he specified that it would not be
a question of the extermination of the European-Aryan peoples, but that
the result of this war would be "the destruction (Vernichtung) of ~
Judaism." He added: l ,
"The time will come when the most harmful universal enemy will have
finished its roie for a least a milknium."
Hitler thus afforded himself the satisfaction of proclaiming "the final
solution" to the world, but by using terms sufficiently confused that it
be perceived in the mysterious obscurity of an oracle.
The proclamation that he sent on February 24, 1942, from his head-
quarters to celebrate the foundation of the Party announced that
"the war will not exterminate Aryan humanity but the Jew." (82)
He recalled on September 30, 1942, in a major speech at the Sports
Palace in Berlin that
"not Aryan humanity will be exterminated (ausgerottet) but Judaism." (83)
On February 24, 1943, Hitler repeated in his proclamation similar to
that of a year before that the war would result in
"the extermination (Ausrottung) not of Aryan humanity, but of Judaism In
Europe" (84)
and added that the German people, having become aware of the role of
the Jews,
"has struggled with success against the Jewish domestic enemy and is now
about to definitely finish it off."
It is perhaps useful to point out a particularity of terminology in
these oracles of Hitler. On January 30, 1939, he foretold the extermi-
nation of the" Jewish race." After, he referred to this "prophecy;" but
40
Public Announcements by the Fuhrer
by presenting it sometimes as directed toward "Judaism." But
"J udaism" ordinarily means the spiritual and cultural entity of the Jews.
Such was not the sense of this word for Hitler. The series of his decla-
rations from 1939 to 1943 prove that by Judaism he meant the physical
reality of the Jewish population. This is brought out by his reference
to the first expression, that of 1939, where the Jews to be destroyed
were designated as "Jewish race." Hitler felt entity "Judaism" in
such a profoundly biological way that for him it was identified with the
"J ewish race" or "Jewish person." Hitler's terminology obviously was
followed. The accepted meaning given in Nazi circles to the word
"J udentum" is clearly revealed by the manner in which Six, chief of the
cultural section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, evoked in April 1944
(PS-3319) before German diplomatic representatives abroad, the exter-
mination of the Jews of the East: (85)
"The veritable source of energy in Europe and in America is the Judaism
of the East... The physical suppression of Judaism of the East withdraws
from Judaism its biological reserves."
3. The Announcements of the "Final Solution" by Hitler
before his Dining Companions in the
Fiihrer's Headquarters
Since January 1942, Hitler affirmed in his speeches that the "final solu-
tion," such as it was then being applied under Himmler, constituted
a cardinal point of the war of the Third Reich. He gave no further
details. He left public opinion free to not take literally the meaning of
his sinister declarations and to i n t ~ r p r e t them metaphorically as an
expression of the violent oratory which relieved his hatred and were
only intended to intimidate the adversary.
In the lengthy remarks that Hitler was used to making after meals to
his dining companions (a small group of about twenty people attached
to the Headquarters of the Fuhrer, plus a few guests invited to military
conferences), one sees how he presented the "final solution" to those
who, while belonging to his entourage, did not in the majority belong to
the circle of personalities initiated into the secrets of Himmler's activities.
Let us recall that these comments were gathered in part by H. Picker,
the jurist attached by the Ministry of the Interior to the Headquarters of
the Fuhrer from March 21 to July 29, 1942. He noted Hitler's remarks
for M. Bormann, chief of the Chancellery of the Party and Hitler's
secretary. The notes taken previously by Mr. Picker's predecessor, for
the period of july 21, 1941 to March 29, 1942, were put at Picker's
disposition. After the war he published the collection of notes.
H. Picker characterized Hitler's comments in the following manner: (86)
"Following a dispatch or no matter what remark pronounced during the
meal or else because of the interest that he attached to a problem, Hitler
began to expose his conceptions in order to fix his ideas for himself or to
speak to his guests or to influence them in a determined way."
41
THE ORDERS FOR THE FINAL SOLUTrON
In five of his conversations, from December 1941 to the end of July
1942, Hitler made declarations concerning the liquidation of the Jew-
ish presence in Europe. These were open remarks which were not
made as "State Secrets."
On December 1,1941, Hitler declared (86):
"There were many Jews who were not aware of the uestructive nature of
their existence. !:lut he who uestroys life exposes himself to death anu as
far ,'s they are concerned, that is all that is happening to them, too."
In November 1941, the Jews of the Reich were already being de-
ported for extermination into the occupied Soviet regions, and
Heydrich had obtained all of the approvals necessary from Hitler. At
that date he had, in addition, already sent out invitations to the Con-
ference of Wannsee. Hitler did not conceal from his guests that depor-
tation imperilled Jewish lives.
We shall see that in 1942 German public opinion was swarming
with news on the horror of the treatments to which the Jews deported
to the East were submitted. On May 15,1942, Hitler spoke at table of
these reactions (86). After having accused the German Jews of having
given Germany "a knife in the back" at the end of the First World
War, Hitler declared:
"What one calls the bOdrgeoisie lament" this same Jew, who was then res-
ponsible for the knifing, when he is deporteu to the East. What shoulu be
pointeu out in this respect is that at one time this same bourgeoisie was not
concerned by the fact that every year 250,000 to 300,000 Germans emigrated
from Germany anu that about 75 Ofo of the German refugees going to Aus-
tralia uieu uuring the voyage."
Thus Hitler called on the people to lament the "75%" mortality
rate (a whimsical figure) among certain groups of German emigrants
of former times rather than the current situation of the Jewish deportees.
This was despite the fact that he had already announced on December
I, 1941, that the Jews risked death.
Two weeks later, on May 29,1941, Hitler approached the Jewish
question in another manner. He left aside the extermination process
which was being carried on. The process was not reconsidered and
the guests were already informed of it. One might say that Hitler
brought up the subject as Heydrich did at the Conference of Wannsee,
when he declared that what was done during the war was only a
temporary measure which would allow the acquisition of the
experience necessary to execute the action, the final goal being the
liquidation of the Jewish presence in Europe. Hitler declared (86):
" .. .That is why within a certain time all of Western Europe must be totally
emptied of the lews... But one must not deport the lews to Siberia for,
given their capacity of adaptation to climates, they will become still much
more haruened ... It is much better (to deport them) to Africa to expose them
to a climate which harms any man having our force of resistance."
42
C'-
Informal Announcements by the Fuhrer
Two months afterward, on July 21,1942, Hitler took up (86) the
Jewish question again in its totality and from the point of view of the
Jew considered as bearer of Communism:
"When this war is finisheu, a lightened Europe will be able to catch its
breath. For, given that at the end of this war ([ shall have) thrown all of
the Jews, up to the very last one, out of Europe, the Communist uanger com-
ing from the East will be extirpated from top to bottom."
Some days after these remarks, Hitler broke out in fury at the
thought that the war ended, the Jewish presence would perhaps not
be eliminated from aU of the European cities. To this prospect he
opposed the action of the liquidation of the Jews already in progress.
On July 24,1942, he stated (86):
"Judaism is seeking out EUIOpe for its business. Europe should refuse it,
if only by sacro-sanct egoism, for J uuaism is racially tougher. When the
war is over, (l shall maintain) rigourously the following point of view: (1)
shall break up (zusammenschlagen) one city after the other if the dirty Jews
do not come out and emigrate to Madagascar or another lewish national
state. The removal of the Jews from Vienna is of prime urgency... Also,
from Munich ... (I am delighted) that Linz is already touay freed of the
Jewish presence. When they tell me that today Lithuania is freeu of the
Jewish presence (judenfrei), I find that significant... The lews who, as the
popular refrain put it, wanted to "hang their linen on the Siegfried line,"
will lose their impuuence after the war... For, secretly, the anti-Semitism
of the Anglo-Americans is essentially stronger than that of the German,
who, in spite of all the negative experiences, is unable in his sentimentality
to free himself of the expression concerning the "decent Jew."
A close examination of these words reveals that all while evoking
Madagascar or a Jewish reserve in general, Hitler joyously emphasized
that the Jews were disappearing in the East, being on the other hand
well-understood that the evacuations from the Reich were directed
precisely to the East, a fact which was publicly known. If Hitler evoked
the establishment of a Jewish reserve, it is because he was not yet certain
to manage the deportation of the Jews from all the European coun-
tries before the conclusion of the peace. In July 1942 the deportations
from these countries to the regions of the East had already brutally
started but were sti1I only at their beginning. It was impossible for
Hitler to know to what extent the Sipo-SD would succeed in emptying
these countries of their Jews. To parry against what was to him the
terrifying eventuality of finding after the victory a Europe not purified
of the Jewish presence, he played with the idea that with the conclusion
of the armistice the Jews who in one country or another had not been
reached by the action of Eichmann, would, under the pressure of
generalized anti-Semitism, be relegated to an unhealthful reserve in
Africa. Those in charge of the physical destruction of Judaism
realized that organized killing would not be possible in peacetime. That
is why Himmler demanded that the extermination be practised at
an accelerated pace (NO-20S). After the victory, it would be neces-
sary to proceed by conventions between States, all of which would have
become (according to Hitler's previsions) anti-Semitic, that is by the
concentration of the Jews in a reserve. That is what Hitler indicated
43
in his remarks at table. He let his imagination wander and chose his
expressions by chance. In fact, he spoke of a "National Jewish State".
But the propaganda of the Party, directed by Alfred Rosenberg and by
such units as the "World Section" (center of Nazi propaganda abroad),
totally rejected the idea of a Jewish State and admitted only a Jewish
reserve. Let us underscore once again that in evoking Siberia (territory
to which the Reich, extending to the Urals, intended to push Russia),
Africa, Madagascar, Hitler did not in his fantasy exclude the mention
of the "final solution" in progress. He informed his guest of it by declar-
ing that the Jews risked death and that in his action against them, they
were deported "far to the East" where one made them disappear, as for
example from Lithuania.
4. The Orders of Hitler to Himmler
High-ranking personalities of the Hitlerian regime have provided
us with indications of the confused manner in which what were afterwards
called Orders of the Fuhrer were formed. We may add to this tableau still
another nuance concerning the anti-Jewish action. It is found in a
memorandum from Grering on December 28,1938, to the Ministers of
the Reich (CXXXIX-28). The text contains a little used but expressive
term as to the role of Hitler's will in the taking of anti-Jewish measures.
Grering, in charge of the Jewish question as of July 1938, formulated a
series of special restrictive measures for the Jews. He ended his letter by
declaring (87):
.. I went to get the opinIOn of the lVill of the Flihrer (Willensmeinung) on
these matters so that henceforth they alone would be exclusively valid as
directives. "
Thus, in the Jewish question one asked the Fuhrer the "opinion of his
will. " This opinion placed a measure under the sign of the Order of
the Fuhrer.
How did Himmler receive the Orders of the Fuhrer? We may cite the
account of Schellenberg, Chief of the Department of "Foreign Intelli-
gence" in the RSHA. He wrote about Himmler coming back from
his audiences with Hitler (88):
"To certain whom he considered worthy 02 s ~ : c h an honour, he then com-
mented on the sacred words (sakrale Worte) that he had just gathered with
devotion in the monologues of his FUhrer going on for hours. One of the
rare persons to Whom he spoke of them was Reinhard Heydrich, who quickly
rid these messages of all fantasy and transformed them into the sober prac-
tice of the secret services."
One can imagine Hitler pouring out reasonings and Himmler gather-
ing from them what struck him and transforming it, in his conscience,
into an Order of the Fuhrer which, transmitted to Heydrich, became
a definitive decision, unless Heydrich did the same thing directly with
Hitler.
44
C"
The Orders of Hitler to Himmler
Eichmann gave the following suggestive description of the manner in
which orders were given by Himmler (89):
"One must not believe, however, that Himmler constantly and abundantly
took care of Jewish affairs. But the subject was by itself a burning one in
Party circles. A brief phrase pronounced by Himmler, an instruction given
to his aide de camp (R. Brandt), to his personal staff (K. Wolff), to C.d.S.
(Heydrich) to a Haherer SS-und Polizeiflihrer during a visit to his command
post or, in time of peace, to his office, sufficed; and this brief instruction,
this brief order then unleashed, on the part of the authorities concerned, a
flood of work, discussions, requests for declarations of approval from autho-
rities other than the Sipo-SD, but which had to be heard or consulted so
as to not feel neglected. That is what gave, for example, the most work to
the IV B4."
Let us try to indicate the succession of decisions which from 1940 to
1942 led to the" final solution of the Jewish question."
5. The "Final Solution" by a Jewish Colonial Reserve
(Summer 1940-Spring 1941)
From the very first stage of the war-the invasion of Poland - the Hit-
lerian regime had to decide the fate of the greater part of East European
Judaism. The meaning of this question was later (April 1944) summed
up by Six, who was at the time Chief of the Cultural Department at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At a meeting of German diplomatic re-
presentatives abroad, a meeting organized to brief them on the anti-
Jewish action (PS-3319), he explained that the
"physical elimination of Eastern Judaism deprives Judaism of its biological
reserves" .
On September 12,1939, deliberations took place in Hitler's train, in
Poland, among the chiefs of the Wehrmacht. Ribbentrop (91) attended
them with the military men. The question of the extermination of
diverse categories of the population in Poland was brought up in the
sense that Hitler wanted. Lahousen, present at these conversations,
testified before the Nuremberg Tribunal that the general directive was
to exterminate in Poland "the intellectuals, the nobility, the clergy and,
naturally, the Jews." This vague glimpse of Hitler's conceptions at
that moment was to be sufficient for Himmler and Heydrich to isolate
the most evident point which could be begun in its totality, that is,
the treatment of the Jews. Heydrich prepared a long-term plan of
action which he communicated on September 22,1939 (PS-3363), to
the chiefs of his mobile killing units in Polish territory. Let us
recall that he exposed to them a series of measures which were
in the long range to end in the accomplishment of a "final goal" which
he declared to be secret. Given that the plan for the creation of a
Jewish reserve in the General Government ("Nisko") was not kept se-
cret, it was a question of something else, something to be treated as
unacknowledgeable. The project of a transfer of the Polish Jewish popu-
lation to another continent was not kept secret, either. In these con-
ditions, the secret of the "final goal" appears in rather a macabre light.
45
But in March 1940 the "firal solution" was presented in a new sense,
marked by the euphoric consciousness of a victory which seemed immi-
nent. It was a question of creating a Jewish reserve outside of Europe,
where the Jews of the Reich and the countries under its domination'
would live in a system of self-administration strictly held in check by
the Sipo-SD.
Himmler drafted a note in May 1940 on the treatment of the indi-
genous populations of the East (that is, in the Polish territories). He
wrote in this note (92), regarding the Jews in the General Government
and in the Polish provinces annexed to the Reich:
"I hope that the conception "Jews" will be totally eradicated by the pos-
sibility of a great emigration of all the Jews to A.frica or to no matter what
other colony."
In a note of May 28,1940, Himmler announced that this memorandum
had been approved by Hitler. As far as the Jews were concerned,
Himmler limited himself to this brief indication. But we know that in
March 1939 Hagen and Eichmann had been concerned with the project
for a Jewish reserve in Madagascar. In summer 1940, France being
defeated, the project was treated as current by Heydrich and Eichmann
in collaboration with the section for Jewish affairs at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (NG-5764). The principle was established that in the
peace treaty the victorious Reich would demand a mandate over Mada-
gascar. This was the "territorial solution" of the Jewish question as
Heydrich designated it to Ribbentrop (93). It was to be applied to all
of the Jews under Hitlerian domination, including the Polish Jews.
At the end of June 1940, Abetz was about to leave for Paris to assume
the post of Ambassador of Germany. Hitler stated explicitly his will
to evacuate the totality of the Jews from Europe (NG-2586, memo-
randum of Luther). This declaration of intention was tantamount to an
Order of the Fuhrer for the Nazi occupation forces in Europe. According
to the testimony of Abetz (LXXXI-123), (94) Hitler did not mention
Madagascar, but he spoke only of the unpeopled areas of America. Let
us recall that in his speech of January 1941 Hitler evoked his prophecy as
to the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe in case of war, but this
time without employing the term "vernichtet". He declared only that
the Jews would have lost their role in Europe
The Jewish populations in France, Belgium and Holland were sub-
jected to a regime intended to bring about their segregation. This
would facilitate their deportation to a reserve. In March 1941, the
Military Commander in France declared to Vallat (95), who had just
been named Commissionner General for Jewish Affairs, that he, Vallat,
was invited to
"set up herewith the plan and the preliminary measures for the future evacua-
tion of the Iews."(XXIV-15a.)
It is highly probable that at that time one hoped that the victorious
Reich would manage to have itself granted a territory outside of Europe
in which to concentrate the Jews of the Reich and the territories under
its control.
46
The Final Solution by a Jewish Colonial Reserve
However, during this same period, in March 1941, the dream of
Madagascar evaporated (96). A. Rosenberg, chief ideologist of the Nazi
Party, in a speech broadcast on March 28,1941 (PS-2889,CXLVI-23),
spoke of the state of the anti-Jewish question in Europe. The text
appeared in the newspaper of the Party, "Der Volkische Beobachter."
Rosenberg spoke on the occasion of the inauguration of the Institute of
Studies of the Jewish Question, in Frankfurt. He had previously asked
Hitler in writing if in his speech he could speak of the project for the
Jewish reserve in Madagascar (CXLVI-210) (97). The answer was cer-
tainly negative. In his lengthy discourse, Rosenberg only proclaimed
(98):
"This dream" (here Rosenberg is speaking of the eventuality of a Zionist
state, which he does not accept)" is liquidated. It is we, on the contrary, who
have to reflect on where and how we are to place the Jews. As it has just
been said, this cannot be in a Iewish State, but will be done under a form
that [ want to call Jewish reserve."
Rosenberg left open the question of knowing where such a reserve
would be installed. But he set the unchangeable principle:
"For us, the Jewish question will be resolved only when the last Jew has
left the Great German space."
In his speech of March 26,1941, (99), at the opening of the inaugura-
tion (CXLVI-22, p.23), he declared as an argument in favour of the
Nazi solution of the Jewish question that the reproaches one could make
him were comparable to those one would make to a surgeon who "re-
moves by a surgical operation a mortal tumor."
But in the spring of 1941 another "definitive solution" to the Jewish
question, altough still limited in space, was to be conceived and elabo-
rated. A few months later, this solution was to take the place of the
"final solution of the Jewish question" in its over-all meaning.
6. The Order of the Fuhrer for the "Final Solution"
in the Occupied Soviet Regions (Spring - Summer 1941)
Neither an Order of the Fuhrer decreeing in writing the general ex-
termination of the Jews, nor the valid indication of the existence of
such a written order, have been found in the archives of the Third Reich.
But the absence of something does not, evidently, prove its non-existence;
and it is therefore impossible to pronounce an opinion with certainty on
this question. We have gathered together, systematized and analysed
the information found on the basic decisions for the launching of the
"final solution" by extermination; and we have contented ourselves
with drawing up some suggestions on this problem. The first act in
this sense aimed at the Jews in the occupied Soviet regions.
In March 1941, Hitler prepared the attack on the Soviet Union accor-
ding to the "Barbarossa Plan," which had been established in December
1940 (PS-446). A complementary text of March 13,1941 (PS-447),
formulated special directives, among which figured Hitler's decision
authorizing Himmler in the Soviet territories to act independently and on
47
his own responsibility in measures required for "the final and definitive
struggle between two opposed political systems." By Order of the
Fuhrer four mobile killing units (Einsatzgruppen) of the Sipo-SD were
created. These groups, progressing immediately behind the Wehrmacht,
were to break down all resistance in the Soviet population.
The agreement between the High Command of the Army (OKH) and the
Sipo-SD was concluded in March-April 1941 (100).
The order to exterminate all of the Jews in the occupied Soviet
regions is not explicitly mentioned in the officials texts defining the
missions of the Einsatzgruppen. In contrast, the reports on their action
carefully enumerate the quantities of Jews massacred and refer on this
subject to a superior order that they are carrying out (101). According
to the testimony of Blum, chief of a sub-group in one of the four Ein-
satzgruppen (NO-4145), the officers of these formations were convoked
to an information meeting in May 1941 under the presidency of Hey-
drich. It was explained to them that "according to the Fuhrer's opinion,
eastern Judaism was the intellectual reservoir of Bolshevism" (102) and
that because of this it had to be exterminated. Ohlendorf, Commander
of the Einsatzgruppe D, testified in the same way (NO-2890) (103).
The Wehrmacht engaged in the East was informed of the necessity of
drastic military actions against the Jews. The order of the day of
June 4,1941, of the General Staff of the Army (104) began its
"Directives for the behaviour of soldiers in Russia" as follows:
"Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of the National-Socialist German People.
It is against this corrosive ideology and those who bear it that Germany is
engaging the struggle. This struggle requires ruthless and energetic interven-
tion against Bolshevik instigators, partisans, saboteurs and the Jews; and the
total elimination of all resistance, active or passive (restlose Beseitigung
jedes passiven oder aktiven Widerstandes)."
The massacre of the Jews began in July 1941. The principal instru-
ments of it were the Einsatzgruppen of the Sipo-SD. But the men of
the Wehrmacht were witnesses of these massacres, and it happened that
they took part. In October 1941, the Generalfeldmarschall v. Reichenau,
Commander in Chief of the Sixth Army, addressed the following order
of the day to the soldiers, an appeal which one may consider as emana-
ting from Hitler, for the latter approved it warmly (D-411) (105):
"In the regions of the East, the soldier is not only a combattant in confor-
mity with the rules of the art of war, but also the bearer of the intransigent
populist idea (voelkische) and the avenger of all of the beastialities inflicted
on the German popular entity or on a related species. That is why the soldier
must have a full understanding of the necessity of a tough but just expiation
inflicted on the Jewish sub-humanity. Another goal is to nip in the bud
revolts behind the back of the Wehrmacht which, as experience proves,
are always fomented by Jews."
It was foreseeable that the Soviet power would engage in guerrilla
warfare against the Nazi invader. Hitler commented on the Soviet
decision in a conference of July 16,1941 (L-221), with Grering, Keitel,
Lammers and Rosenberg (106):
48
The Final Solution in the Occupied Soviet Regions
" .. .The Russians have given the order now for a guerrilla war behind our
front. This guerrilla warfare also presents an advantage for us: it gives us
the possibility to exterminate (auszurotten) what rises against us."
The next day the order was taken which made Himmler responsible
for security in the Soviet Union (PS-1922), in conformity with the
directive of March 13,1941. The fact that the guerrilla war in the
Soviet Union was part of the action of war of this state against the
Reich gave Hitler an appearance of justification for taking himself, as
Supreme Chief of the Wehrmacht, the decision of extermination the Jews
as part of the Soviet population declared as a whole to
be engaged in the guerrilla war. Bolshevism was proclaimed the male-
diction of humanity and the Jew its creator and bearer. In these
conditions, the order that every Jew present in the occupied Soviet
territories was to be Iiquitated was claimed to be militarily justifiable. It
was an act of war of the German State against the Soviet State.
A report made in December 1941 by an inspector of armaments in
the Ukraine, addressed to General Thomas, Chief of the Economic
Department of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (PS-3257), con-
tains the following description of the anti-Jewish action in this part of
the Soviet Union (107):
" ... This action ... took place absolutely publicly with the involvement of the
Ukrainian militia and unfortunately also with the benevolent participation
of members of the Wehrmacht. The manner in which the operations were
executed, directed at men, old people, women and children of all ages, was
frightful. By the quantity of executions, the operation is the most gigantic
of all the analogous measures taken in the Soviet Union ... "
One may also quote the report of January 25,1942, of the General
Commission for the region of Slonim (in Bielorussia) (CXLV a-8) (108):
"The operation accomplished by the SD on November 13 rid me of vora-
cious, useless mouths. During a certain time the Wehrmacht proceeded
generously to a clean-up (Saiibering) in the open country, unfortunately only
in localities of fewer than ten thousand inhabitants... Given that the Wehr-
macht no longer accepts undertaking operations in the open country, I shall
concentrate all of the Jews in two or three principal towns... The best
specialists among the Jews will have to communicate their art to intelligent
apprentices, so as to make the Jews useless in artisanry, too, and eliminate
(ausschalten) them."
An Order of the Fuhrer given personally by Hitler, Supreme Chief of
the Wehrmacht, must be the basis for the massacre of the Soviet Jews.
It was in fact a measure considered as belonging to the military opera-
tion. The orders of the military command bear witness to this. So
does the fact that the reports which the Einsatzgruppen established
regularly, with details on the quantity of Jews killed, were distributed to
a multitude of authorities of the Reich, ministries and offices of the
Party. Himmler himself presented the extermination of these Jewish
populations as a task entrusted to him by Hitler personally. He wrote
on July 28,1942, to Berger, Chief of the Principal Office of the Central
Direction of the SS and responsible for liaison with the Ministry of Regions
Occupied in the East (NO-626) (Himmler in this letter rejected certain
limitations in the definition of the Jew that this Ministry wanted to have
adopted) (109):
49
THE ORDERS FOR THI: FINAL SOLUTION
'The occupied regions in the East will be emptied of the Jews. The execu-
tion of this very painful order has been loaded on my shoulders by the
FUhrer. In any case, no one can relieve me of this responsibility. There-
fore, I forbid no matter whom any interference (Mitreden)."
We shall see that Heydrich was to otherwise present the Order of the
Fuhrer as to the "final solution" aiming at the totality of European
Judaism. He was then to speak of an agreement, an approval of the
Fuhrer.
7. The Principle of the" FinaL Solution" by Exterminatory
Deportation to the Occupied Regions (' East of the East")
(Autumn 1941)
The decision to massacre the Soviet Jews does not presuppose that
of the massacre of all the European Jews. As late as spring 1941,
Hitler could mean by "final solution" to come something otiter than
what he already foresaw for the occupied Soviet territories. It is from
this angle that a decree of the RSHA of May 20,1941 (NG-3104), which
it is sometimes tempting to interpret in the sense of the "final solution"
by massacre, must be considered. This decree forbade the emigration
of Jews from the occupied zones in France and in Belgium and twice
added that in this decision the "final solution which will not fail to
arrive" had been taken into account. At first sight, one may believe
that Heydrich thus gave the order to prevent the Jews from escaping the
"final solution" by emigration. The reason indicated is totally different:
one wanted all possibilities of' emigration to be reserved for the Jews
of the Reich. It was only on January 19,1942, that the prohibition of
Jewish emigration from the Reich, authorized until then (XXVb-5), was
pointed out in France. Heydrich was to proclaim it the next day at
the Conference of Wannsee. On the other hand, in May 1941, emigra-
tion was not yet excluded or one dreamt of some sort of "Jewish reserve"
which the Reich promised itself to obtain. .
It is the application of the "final solution" to the Soviet Jews which was
to open the way to the conception of the global extermination of the Jews
in the German vital space and to the total rejection of the solution by
emigration.
Since January 24,1939, Heydrich, on Hitler's order, had been entrusted
by Grering with the emigration of the Jews, emigration then considered
as the radical solution to the Jewish question. Two and one half years
later, the activity of the Einsatzgruppen was to familiarize the conscience
of Hitler, Himmler and Heydrich with the physical suppression of
the Jews. The predominance of a hostile attitude towards Hitlerism in
the public opinion of the principal world powers, the alliance between
Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and the policy of the United States,
acquired during the second half of 1941 from these allied powers,
multiplied Hitler's fury against the Jews whom he saw at the origin of
such a situation. He was to make up his mind to chastize Judaism by
destroying the part of it which had fallen into the hands of the Third
50
The Final Solution by Exterminatory Deportation
Reich. Hitler was to publicly follow up this resolution in his speech of
January 30, 1942. Public opinion was free to take his declarations
literally or to interpret them as exaggerations due to his oratory style.
As for the decision, it was, so to speak, already being tested as of autumn
1941.
On January 31, 1941, Heydrich on Hitler's order received a new
mission from Grering. It extended that of January 24, 1939, in two
ways (110):
"to obtain the best possible solution by emigration or evacuation, in confor-
mity with the situation at a given time" and this for "the global solution of
the Jewish question in all the regions under German influence in Europe ... "
(PS-71 0). The principle of emigration was still applicable and even
mentioned first of all, but "the situation at a given time" was to
eliminate it in practice in favour of only the "evacuation" which Hey-
drich intended to direct towards the occupied Soviet territories, where
the Jews deported would automatically fall under the Order of the
Fuhrer to suppress all Jews present in these regions.
In November 1941, Heydrich was ready to inform the representatives
of all the authorities of the Reich concerned by the anti-Jewish operation
of Hitler's agreement that the Jewish populations of the German vital
space be deported "far to the East," in order to there disappear from
the face of the earth. He was to make this announcement before these
high-ranking civil servants at the Conference of Wannsee planned for
December 7, 1941, but which had to be postponed until January 20,
1942.
We shall see that "far to the East" meant" occupied Soviet territories"
(officially designated as "territories occupied in the East") where the
Einsatzgruppen operated. Such was to be the official presentation of the
"final solution" by extermination. In reality the process imagined in
the summer of 1941 to arrive at it was double; and the variant which
was to be the most important as of the summer of 1942, the extermina-
tion by gassing in the internment camps in Polish territory, was not to
be that which Heydrich explicitly announced: deportation "far to the
East." Because of this, the massacre perfected by the means of gas
chambers has remained a foot-note of the consecration that Heydrich in
the name of the Fuhrer was to bring to the "final solution" by extermi-
nation.
Yet Hitler was kept perfectly informed of the means employed for
the liquidation of the Jews in the concentration camps. This fact
appears in the political testament that he drew up a few hours before
his suicide. He alluded to this means which he considered "more
humanitarian" than the death of civilians caused by the bombings (111).
At his trial, Eichmann testified concerning Heydrich's order (112):
" ... let us suppose that the war began in July; it was probably two or three
months later,. It was certainly towards the end of the summer ... when Hey-
drich called me in. I introduced myself, and he said to me: "The FUhrer
has ordered the physical extermination of the Jews. Eichmann, go there-
fore to see Globocnik in Lublin. The Reichsfiihrer has already given
51
Globocnik the corresponding instructions and go see how far he has gotten
in this task (Vorhaben). I believe he is using the anti-tank trenches of the
Russians to destroy Jews in them."
Globocnik, Gauleiter of Vienna until the beginning of the war, was
then named SS und Polizeifiihrer of the district of Lublin, region where
Eichmann was to imagine in 1939-40 the Jewish reserve of "Nisko".
Eichmann thus went to Globocnik's and remarked that not far from
Lublin a work crew was building and fitting out a shack destined for
the extermination of the Jews by gassing due to the exhaust fumes of
an engine. This installation was to become the extermination camp of
Belzec. It was to be operative only as of March 1942. Globocnik
was also to install the extermination camps of Sobibor and Treblinka.
He was to exterminate the Jewish population of Poland almost entirely
and thousands of Jews deported from various countries.
During the same period, Hoess, commander of the concentration
camp of Auschwitz, was to receive an order from Himmler similar to
that given to Globocnik and which Himmler was to present to him
also as a "decision of the FUhrer." According to the rather unclear
recollections of Hoess, the first extermination took place in the autumn
of 1941 or rather, as Hoess corrected himself, in January 1942 (113).
It concerned about a thousand Jews from Upper Silesia who were
killed by the gas Zyklon B. It is known that as of summer 1942 Ausc.:;h-
witz was principally used for the extermination of deported Jews from
the occupied countries of Central, Western and Southern Europe.
These two orders given by Himmler (exermination in the Polish
territories entrusted: 1) to Globocnik, in the General Government, and
2) to Hoess in Upper Silesia) diverged from the official language pre-
sented by Heydrich in January 1942. Let us now examine the relation
of all these orders to an Order of the FUhrer.
Eichmann at his trial was to reveal a curious fact. One might say,
according to his testimony, that Globocnik wanted to have a validation
of the order which Himmler had, however, given him in the name of
Hitler in the summer of 1941 and which he had been applying since
March 1942. Eichmann declared (114) that in the summer or at the
end of the summer of 1942 (by that date Globocnik had, according to
Eichmann, already killed a very great number of Jews), Globocnik asked
him for a written confirmation of the order to kill, a confirmation to be
formulated in such a way as to justify the executions to come as well
as those already practised. Given that it was Eichmann who was charg-
ed with personally bringing him the document, it is evident that Globoc-
nik considered necessary a confirmation by the Sipo-SD. We know, in
addition, that it was the Chief of the Sipo-SD, Heydrich, who was on
Hitler's order entrusted by Geering with finding and applying the adequate
method for the "final solution of the Jewish question." Eichmann
roughly quoted the text of the authorization: "I authorize you to deliver
up another 150,000 (or 250,000) Jews to the final solution (Endloesung)."
52
Eichmann at his trial hesitated between these two figures. Under
questioning, he believed that it was Heydrich who had signed the docu-
ment. But having explicitly stated that it was a question of the summer
or even the end of the summer of 1942, he rectified his testimony at
the hearing. He admitted that Heydrich not being alive at that time,
Himmler (who then personally directed the Sipo-SD) had been the signa-
tory. Eichmann related that the Chief of the Gestapo MUlIer remarked
that Globocnik was the only one to make a request of this nature.
In fact, Hoes had contented himself with the verbal order from
Himmler. The task which the latter entrusted to him was, however,
gigantic. But by his functions and by his rank, he was a minor SS
official., The word of the Reichsfiihrer was sufficient for him. Let us
note that there was still another center of extermination, outside of
the field of action of Globocnik and that of Hoess. This was in the
province of Lodz (Polish territory annexed to the Reich), where the
extermination camp of Chelmno had been in operation since December
1941. Greiser, the Gauleiter of that region, in July 1941 addressed
a letter to Himmler wherein he asked the latter's agreement for the
extermination of the Jews unfit to work who encumbered the ghetto of
Lodz. The consent was given, following which the camp of Chelmno
was created. Its equipment for extermination by gassing (mobile gas
chambers) began to function in December 1941. Greiser was satisfied
with the written consent given by Himmler, without raising the question
of an Order of the FUhrer. Until 1943 hundreds of thousands of Polish
Jews were exterminated there. But, as far as Globocnik is concerned,
it must be taken into account that it was he who was by far the principal
exterminator of about two million Polish Jews. In addition, his
operation took place in the region under the authority, all the more
sensitive as it was tottering, of the Governor General Frank. This
situation may explain the care he took to have an entirely sufficient
justification for his mission. But at the same time his attitude under-
scored his uncertainty concerning the instructions of Himmler given in
the name of Hitler, but not confirmed by Heydrich, who in Hitler's name
was responsible for the "final solution."
The other aspect of the "final solution," the deportation "far to the
East" in the "zones of operation" of the Einsatzgruppen, also knew a
period of uncertainty as to it ratification by an Order of the FUhrer.
The deportation of the Jews of the Reich was certainly proposed by
Heydrich to Hitler in August 1941, but it was not to be fully accepted
by the latter. The question was brought up on August 15, 1941, in the
course of an important conference convoked at the Ministry of Propa-
ganda. Loesener, chairman for racial questions at the Ministry of the
Interior, was present at the conference and drew up a report on the
debates for the Secretary of State of his ministry. (115) Let us point
out the following passage:
53
"So far as the evacuation of the Jews from the Old Reich (Altreich) is
concerned, the SturmbannfUhrer Eichmann made known that in answer to
a request made in this direction by the Obergruppenfiihrer Heydrich, the
FUhrer has forbidden the evacuations during the war; following which (Hey-
drich) had a proposition drawn up which has partial evacuations from big
cities as its goal."
Loesener did not specify that it was a question of deportation to the
occupied Soviet regions.
Himmler wrote to Greiser (116) on September 18, 1941, to ask
that he temporarily lodge (in the ghetto of Lodz) the Jews of the Reich,
before sending them farther on:
"The FUhrer desires that the Old Reich and the Protectorate be emptied
and freed of the Jews, progressing from the West to the East. I am there-
fore making the effort first of all to transfer the Jews of the Old Reich, as
a first step, into the regions which have been annexed to the Reich for two
years to send them farther east next spring."
The operation took place in October 1941: some twenty thousand
Jews were deported from the big German cities, as well as from Vienna
and Prague, to the ghetto of Lodz. It has been stated above that
the extermination camp of Chelmno had begun to operate in December
1941. The contingent of German Jews remained intact until May 1942.
The intention to send it"farther east" was then abandoned, and 50%
of this group of deportees were exterminated on the spot at Chelmno.
Those able to work were temporarily kept alive. (117)
But one month after Himmler's letter to Greiser, Heydrich even so
obtained the possibility and thus, evidently, the consent of Hitler, to
deport the Jews from the cities of the Reich and from the Protectorate
directly into the "zones of operation" of the Einsatzgruppen. On Oc-
tober 24, 1941, a memorandum (PS-3921) of the Security Police ordered
is bureaux in sixteen cities (including Vienna and Prague) to accompany
the transports of Jews that the Sipo-SD was to form for the destination
of the regions of Riga and Minsk and to hand them over on their
arrival to the representatives of the Sipo-SD there.
The operation extended from November 1 to December 4 and con-
cerned 50,000 Jews. The contact with the Einsatzgruppen had already
been established. At a meeting over which Heydrich presided on October
19, 1941(118), Eichmann announced that the commanders of two of the
four Einsatzgruppen (Nebe and Rasch) operating in these regions had
confirmed that the Jewish deportees "can be interned in the zones of
operation with the Communist internees." At Eichmann's trial, the
judge asked him the meaning of the term "zone of operation" (119):
"Is that where the Einsatzgruppen operated?" and received the answer:
"Certainly, that is how it must be understood, it is natural." Note
that with time the Einsatzgruppen, which were mobile units, were relieved
by the local services of the Sipo-SD. (120)
54
Witnesses returning to Germany from the "zones of operation" told
what they had seen. Loesener reported: (121)
"Just before Christmas, the Government Adviser Feldscher came to see me
in my office and related to me what had been told him the evening before
by a person worthy of confidence, an eye witness, on the massacre near
Riga of German Jews, primarily Berliners. It was so frightful that I shall
omit the details here. It is the first time that I learnt that my worst fears
concerning the fate of the deportees had been confirmed or, more exactly,
exceeded... I reported to Stuckart (Secretary of State at the Ministry of the
Interior) what I had learnt... Stuckart began by retorting: "Don't you know
that these things are done by supreme order?"
There were convoys which were immediately liquidated in their enti-
rety. For others, the deportees were in part packed into ghettos whose
populations were sporadically subjected to liquidation operations. The
number of Jews of the Reich and the Protectorate who survived this
regime was minimal.
The uncertainty which until October 1941 characterized the orders
of Hitler for the" final solution" suggests that Himmler and Heydrich,
announcing the Order of the Fuhrer to Globocnik, Eichmann and Hoess
in the summer of 1941, went beyond the explicit determination of
Hitler's will (it was still only the order to prepare, not to already execute
the operation). In his diatribes against the Jews, Hitler made known
that he wished to give them over to extermination. He did this in
public as well as in private or during work sessions. Himmler and
Heydrich drew their own conclusions and prepared measures which
they considered justified on the basis of what they heard from "their
Fuhrer. " Before proceeding with the operation, they had Hitler adopt
the measures envisaged. He expressed his agreement and stood by it.
It has been stated above that according to Globocnik, his special
mission (extermination of the Polish Jews) required a written authoriza-
tion from Heydrich or, if not from the latter, from Himmler or Miiller,
several months after the beginning of the extermination. The operation
concerning the euthanasia of the incurably ill, which was ordered in
September 1939, was something else again. A written order of Septem-
ber 1, 1939, signed by Hitler (PS-630) gave Bouhler of the Party Chan-
cellery, and Doctor Brandt, the responsibility of organizing and directing
this action. Nothing of this nature appears in the "final solution."
However, a consideration of the mission of Globocnik in the execution
of the latter reveals that the Chancellery of the Party did indeed colla-
borate ,with him in this mission: it provided him with the specialists in
gas chambers trained during the operation "Euthanasia." Brack, to
whom Bouhler had entrusted the gassing of the incurables (operation
stopped in August 1941), wrote on June 23, 1942 (NO-205), to Himmler:
(122)
"Following the order of the Reichsleiter Bouhler, I have already, since
some time ago, put my men at the disposition of the Brigadefiihrer Globoc-
nik for the accomplishment of his special mission. Following a new
request from him, I have given him still more personnel..."
There was thus an agreement of principle granted by Hitler.
55
But whereas for the "Euthanasia" Hitler had given the responsibility
in writing to Bouhler and Doctor Brandt for a precisely defined operation,
for the "final solution" Hitler entrusted Grering with giving Heydrich
the responsibility in writing for finding the "solution" according to
the changing situation and for executing it. The operation to be ac-
complished by Globocnik, Hoess and Eichmann was confided to the
zealous creator of the Nazi administration. Its correct functioning
was assured by the initiatives of diverse sections of the administrative
apparatus of the Reich grouped for the "final solution" around the
Sipo-SD.
The deportation of the Jews ,from the Reich and from the Protecto-
rate to the "zones of operation" in the East was the first form of
the "final solution" by extermination aside from the Jews of the Soviet
regions. At the same time and in conformity with the order of
Himmler, the method by gassing being prepared by Globocnik and
Hoess was taking form. But the Governor General Frank appears not
to have been informed of Globocnik's mission in the General Govern-
ment and considered himself called upon to promote, in the territories
under his jurisdiction, measures whirh were to resolve the Jewish ques-
tion. He nevertheless knew that Heydrich, responsible for the Jewish
question as a' whole, had laid down the principle of deportation
"farther east" for the Jews of the General Government as well. This
meant, at least for the General Government, deportation to the occupied
Soviet territories. But Frank considered it necessary to complete this
measure by murderous local operations on his own authority. He made
the following declaration on December 16, 1941, at the session of his
Government (PS-2233) (123):
"They (the Jews) must be put out. With this goal in mind, [ have begun
talks for their deportation to the East. In January, an important conference,
to which I shall delegate the Secretary of State Bouhler, will take place in
Berlin", But what is to happen with the Jews? Do you believe that they
are going to be lodged in the Ostland (Baltic countries and White Russia)
in settlement villages? We, too, can undertake nothing with them in the
Ostland or the Commission of the Reich. Liquidate them yourselves,"
And Frank declared that it would be necessary to
"proceed to interventions which, in one way or another, will assure that
the destruction succeeds (Vernichtungserfolg)."
Eichmann's bureau, the l\1 B4 of the RSHA, noted on December 1,
1941 (124), that the Hoehere SS und Polizeiflihrer Kuger, the repre-
sentative of Himmler in the General Government, had been complain-
ning for a long time about Frank's efforts to personally treat the Jewish
question. The note added that to prevent these attempts, Frank and
his Secretary of State, Buhler, would both be invited to the conference
which was to gather together all the authorities of the Reich concerned
by the Jewish question. It has been seen that Frank clearly remarked
the invitation. But according to his declarations it appears that he
ignored or wanted to ignore the mission entrusted to Globocnik and
that the latter was not to be able to put into practice before March 1942.
56
The Generalized Final Solution
8. Hitler's Approval of the Generalized "Final Solution"
and the Conference of Wannsee (January 1942)
At the important conference commonly known as the Conference of
Wannsee (from the name of the suburb of Berlin where it was held),
Heydrich presented all of the "final solution" as deportation still farther
east. The Gauleiter Meyer, representing the "Ministry of the Territories
Occupied in the East" (where, according to this program, the massacre
of about two million Jews of the General Government should have taken
place), and Buhler, Secretary of State in the General Government, recom-
mended, on the subject of this deportation to the East from the General
Government, that "certain preparatory work in the process of the "final
solution" should be done on the spot, but whilst taking care not to
disquiet the population." (125) The allusion to the uncamouflaged
killings which were taking place in the "zones of operation" of the
Einsatzgruppen, and which should have been avoided, is clear. It does
not at all appear in the protocol that Heydrich had revealed the mission
that Globocnik was preparing. However, Buhler expressly recognized at
this conference that the operation was in the competence of the Sipo-SD,
provided that this work be accomplished as rapidly as possible.
The Conference of Wannsee by presenting the "final solution" to all
of the authorities of the Reich who were to collaborate in it consecrated
its acceptance by Hitler. The connection between the orders, beginning
with that of January 24, 1939, to which that of July 31, 1941, referred,
was scrupulously brought to light and confirmed that the operation
was highly official. In fact, Heydrich referred to Grering's decree
of July 31, 1941 which entrusted him with organizing "the final
solution of the Jewish question by emigration or by evacuation." He
added:
"In the meantime, the Reichsflihrer-SS and Chief of the German Police has
forbidden the emigration of the Jews because of the dangers of emigration
in war-time, and taking into consideration the possibilities offered by the
East. [n place of emigration has now come, after the FUhrer's preliminary
acceptance to this effect, the evacuation of Jews to the East, as a new pos-
sibility of a solution,"
The "solution" by the deportation of Jews from the Reich and from
the Protectorate to the "zones of operation" in the East had already
been practiced since the autumn of 1941, but had not yet the firm
consent of Hitler. Now Heydrich could announce this consent. He
spoke of it as relating to the deportation directed to the East even from
the General Government, as proven by the positions taken by Buhler
and Meyer that we have cited. Luther, Under-Secretary of State at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was present at the conference and
specified in his report of August 1942 to Ribbentrop (NG-2586, Memo-
randum, p. 12) (126):
"The transport to the General Government is a temporary measure. The
Jews will be transported farther, to the occupied,zones in the East, as soon
as the technical conditions allow it."
57
THE ORDERS FOR THE F1NAL SOLUTION
This manner of speaking was but a convention of language, as nearly
all of the extermination was being carried on from this time in the areas
under the jurisdiction of Globocnik and Hoess.
Heydrich in his expose envisaged the application of the "final solu-
tion" to eleven million (according to his statistics) European Jews. He
added, however, that the
"solution adopted was only a temporary solution (Ausweichmoeglichkeit),
but in the course of which would already be gathered practical experience
of great imporlance in view of the final solution of the Jewish questiol '.
Whatever the means, the goal indicated by Heydrich, despite its
nebulous presentation, already remained fixed: physical suppression of
the existence of the Jews. Heydrich resumed the itinerary of the
deportation as follows:
"The Jews evacuated will be first of all transported without interruption
(Zug urn Zug) into what one calls transit ghettos, to be transported from
there farther east."
He had first indicate<;i that the Jews fit to work (the fate ot those un-
suited is not evoked) were to be be led into the regions of the East, with
separation of the sexes, and working at the building of roads, a process
during which most them would be eliminated "by natural diminution."
As for those who remained, they would constitute the dangerous part as'
the most biologically resistant and who, liberated, would constitute the
embryo of a Jewish renaissance. It would therefore be necessary to
"treat them in an appropriate manner."
Two stages were imagined: first, deportation to the regions of the
East close to the Reich, displacement accompanied by work ("construc-
tion of roads"); after, for the survivors, suppression "farther east" in
the "zones of operation.".
Heydrich at the Conference of Wannsee treated at length the question
of persons of mixed Jewish blood or those involved in mixed marriages.
He specified that the Chief of the Chancellery of the Reich (Lammers)
had written to him in respect to this subject. In the measures to be
applied to this category of Jews (Germans), the effect that these
measures would produce on the German kinship of the parties to the
mixed marriage would have to be taken into account.
Heydrich added that the beginning of the great evacuations would
depend on the "military evolution" (militaerische Entwicklung). The
Secretary of State for the Four-Year Plan (Neumann) declared that it
was not possible to evacuate from the Reich the Jews employed in
enterprises important for war production. Heydrich had to respect this
directive coming from the Four-Year Plan. It is possible that the
restriction thus imposed by Neumann on the deportation from the
Reich of Jews fit to work stimulated Himmler in the summer of 1942 to
undertake, without excessive delay, the deportation to the East of Jews
from the countries subjugated in the West. The deportation of the Jews
was to serve for the "final solution" and for their exploitation as labour.
58
The Generalized Final Solution
Heydrich had indeed said in his vague description of the deportation
that the latter was "for use at work" (zum arbeitseinsatz). But to
him this element of the operation appeared completely secondary. He
contented himself with evoking the employment for the building of
roads during the march towards the East ("transit ghettos"). Himmler
drew up a completely different plan. He conceived the system of
internment camps which officially bore the denomination "concentra-
tion camps." The only camps classed in this category were those subor-
dinated to the Principal Office of Economic Administration of the SS
and where Gliicks was chief of the department "Concentration Camps."
Himmler was preparing to offer all of his concentrationary labour to the
important weapons industry. He intended to integrate the Jews into
it and to keep them there as long as the German economy needed them
during the war. That was his conception of the phase Heydrich
described as the "building of roads."
9. The "Final Solution" by Gas Chambers in the
Concentrationary System (Summer 1942-0ctober 1944)
January 25, 1942, four days after the Conference of Wannsee over
which Heydrich presided, Himmler telegraphed the Inspector of the Con-
centration Camps, Gliicks (NO-500) (127):
"I shall send to the camps a great number of Jews and lewesses who are
going to be evacuated from Germany... Important orders and economic
tasks will be given out in the coming weeks to the concentration camps ... "
This message from Himmler to Gliicks does not resemble Heydrich's
expose at the Conference of Wannsee. Whereas Himmler saw the
Jewish labor force at the center of his economic projects based on the
concentration camps, Heydrich appreciated the high mortality rate
among the deportees in the first halting-places in the East. A flagrant
contradiction may be seen in the fact that the decision to exploit the
Jewish labour force did not prevent Himmler from being as attached
as Heydrich to the imperative of the extermination of the Jews. Hoess,
who was commander of the camp at Auschwitz, indeed declared that
as of the summer of 1941 Himmler had given him the responsibility
of preparing the camp for extermination on a very large scale. Ausch-
witz was the destination of the deportations of Jews for concentrationary
work. But Himmler, in contrast to Heydrich, attached great importance
to the productive phase of the detention of deportees fit to work.
A fraction of the mass of Jewish deportees was to be conserved as labor
and was in fact employed in the essential branches of the production of
armaments.
At the end of March 1942, Himmler effected the first deportation of
Jews for the war economy. He was to draw his contingents not from
the Reich, but from friendly countries or occupied ones. To begin
with, it was a question of Slovakia, but also of a convoy from France
59
in March 1942. It was on June 11 that Eichmann met in Berlin with
his representatives in France (Dannecker), in Belgium and in Holland
to inform them (XXVI-29) that Himmler had given the order to deport
for the work at Auschwitz important quantities of Jews from these three
countries (128). This operation was curiously explained by the impos-
sibility for military reasons of deporting the Jews of the Reich to the
"zones of operation" during the summer. One would say that it was
necessary to justify the decision to begin the deportation from the
countries occupied in the West, while the deportation of the Jews from
the Reich and from the Protectorate was not yet ended. Let us add
that in spite of Eichmann's explanation, the deportation from the Reich
continued during the summer and the autumn of 1942, more precisely to
the regions of Riga and Minsk.
In the instructions given by Eichmann on June 11, 1942, on the
deportations from the western countries, the rigour with which the age
limits for deportable Jews were set-sixteen to forty-five-seems astonish-
hing. It was in addition rather rapidly annulled. This limitation which
Eichmann designated as essential underscored that the deportation was
to be undertaken for the strictly economic reasons of labour. One
would say that Eichmann in the RSHA had received the order from
Principal Office of Economic Administration of the SS, to which the
Inspection of the Concentration Camps belonged, and which was
primarily interested in the economic exploitation of the internees.
Eichmann apparently transmitted the order such as he had received it.
But the age limits were soon extended again, even before the series of
deportations from the countries in question had really begun. In parti-
cular, the deportation of children of all ages was accepted by the RSHA,
this in response to steps taken by Dannecker from his post in Paris.
Eichmann had indicated at the meeting held on June 11, 1942, in
Berlin that 10% of persons unfit for work could be accepted in the
transports of deportees. When the convoys began to reach Auschwitz,
the people arriving were in their very large majority considered as unfit
for work; and they were killed in the gas chambers that Hoess had
prepared in conformity with the order received from Himmler in 1941.
At Auschwitz an average of 80% of the Jewish deportees were thus
immediately liquidated. The rest represented the Jewish concentra-
tionary labour strongly desired by Himmler; it largely disappeared, more
or less rapidly by the mortality due to the living and working conditions
in the camps and the work commandos. The employment of this rest
was nevertheless an important factor in the economic plans of the SS,
the realization of which was being pursued by Himmler with Pohl,
Chief of the Principal Office of the Economic Administration of the
SS. But the weight of the 80% immediately liquidated showed that
the deportation of the Jews was being effected primarily for their
extermination.
60
The Final Solution by Gas Chambers
In his important public speeches, Hitler announced and, from 1942
to 1943, co.nfirmed the destruction (Vernichtung, Ausrottung) of the
Jews. But the expose of Heydrich at the Conference of Wannsee indi-
cated that the launching of the massacre came in practice from Himmler
or Heydrich. In fact, Heydrich did not speak of an initiative, but of the
agreement given by Hitler for "the deportations to the East." Let us
repeat once again what seems to us to be the position of Hitler. He
expressed publicly and with violence the will that the role of the Jews
in European society be radically liquidated. Himmler and Hey-
drich gave the orders which fulfilled Hitler's will, no matter what the
atrocity of the conditions necessary to the rapid accomplishment of
this resolution. The operation being accomplished, Hitler adopted it
in all its atrocity.
Himmler in the autumn of 1942 referred to the will of Hitler to
accomplish to the very limit the liquidation of the Jews in Poland.
It was a question of the skilled labour temporarily conserved while wait-
ing for a valid Polish labour force to be formed to replace the J ewsih.
Himmler ended as follows his note of October 9, 1942 on the subject
(NO-1611), a note addressed to Pohl, Chief of the Administrative and
Economic Department of the SS, to Kruger, representing the power of
Himmler in the General Government, to Globocnik, responsible for
the "final solution" there, to the RSHA and to Wolff, chief of the
personal staff of the Reichsfiihrer-SS (129):
"We shall have to force ourselves to replace this Jewish labour by the Poles
and to englobe the greater part of these Jewish concentrationary enterprises in
the East of the General Government. However, in the latter, too, the Jews
must one day disappear in conformity with the will of the FUhrer (ent-
sprechend dem Wunsche des FUhrers)."
Thus Himmler did not fail to found his instructions on the will of
the Fuhrer. But he took care to evoke the Order of the Fuhrer under
the form of a "will."
10. The "Final Solution," "Page of Glory" which will have
neither to be Written nor to be Forgotten
Himmler noted on June 19, 1943, after having made his "report to
the Fuhrer at the Obersalzberg": (130) "Following my report on the
Jewish question, the Fuhrer declared that the evacuation of the Jews
must be executed in a radical manner and conducted to the very
limit (durchgestanden) in spite of the unrest (Unruhe) that it will
provoke for another three or four months." This meant that Hitler
approved the propositions of Himmler. Here is how Himmler presented
the "final solution" in his speech of October 6, 1943, at Poznan, before
the Reichsleiter and the Gauleiter of the Party (131):
"I ask you only to listen to what I say in this circle, but really not to speak
of it. The question was raised to us: What is to be done with the women
and children? I took the decision to find in this case, too, a perfectly clear
solution. That is that I did not consider myself authorized to exterminate
61
(ausrotten), that is to say, assassinate (umbrigen) or to have assassinated the
men and let their children grow up, avengers in face of our sons and our
grandsons. It was necessary to take the difficult decision to make this
people disappear from the face of the earth."
Himmler concluded:
"You are now informed and you will keep it to yourselves. Perhaps, much,
much later, one will reflect on whether there is a reason to say a little more
to the German people. I believe that it is preferable that we all bear it for
our people and take the responsibility upon ourselves ... and that we carry
the secret to the grave."
Nevertheless, Himmler did not wish the secret to be tightly guarded.
Two days previously, he delivered a speech (PS-1919) before ranking
dignitaries of the SS in which he told analagous secrets.
He concluded with the exclamation: "It is a page of glory, but which
never will be written." It was thus even so a page of glory. The fact
of the liquidation of the Jewish presence in the German vital space had
not to be forgotten. Only one had not to take pleasure in trying to
find out how this performance had been realized. The memory of it
was to be perpetuated but in the haze of consciences only.
One might say that in this speech of October 4, 1943, addressed to
the high-ranking officers of the SS together in Poznan, Himm-
ler evoked the exterminations of the Jews as something obvious in the
eyes of each member of the Party. (132) He presented in the follow-
ing manner the radical interpretation that the latter had to give, accor-
ding to him, to the anti-Jewish paragraph, still so mild, of the program
of the Nazi Party established twenty years before and conserved
intact like a relic in conformity with the wish of Hitler. All while
deploring the tendency of each German who, condemning globally the
Jews, asked that an exception be made for his "good Jew" who was not
like the others, Himmler declared in respect to members of the Party:
"The Jewish people will be exterminated (ausgerottet)," says each member
of the Party, it is clearly indicated in our program, we are proceeding with
the elimination (A usc halt un g) of the Jews, with the extermination (Aus-
rottung) " ... Among all those who speak in this manner, no one has been
a spectator of it, no one has seen it. Most of you must know very well
what a hundred corpses laid out together is or when five hundred or a
thousand are. To have endured it and to have remained decent, aside from
some exceptions of human weakness, is what has toughened us ... " (PS-1919)
Himmler had no doubts that the physical liquidation of the Jews
which was in progress was known by every German conscious of what .
Nazism was. But no one was to seek information about the process of
this liquidation. Himmler added that it was a natural question of tact
to not speak of the horrors one was committing because they were
necessary for the good of the Nazi Reich.
Three other speeches on the same subject were found in the Chancel-
lery of the Reichsfiihrer-SS. Himmler gave himself up to the same
confidences on December 16, 1943, in Weimar before an audience of
naval commanders and on May 5 and 24, 1944, when he addressed the
generals of the Wehrmacht in Sonthofen. In exactly the same way as in
62
The Final Solution, "Page of Glory"
the speech of October 6 in Poznan, he insisted upon explaining the
extermination of Jewish women and children. These texts lead one
to think that the extermination of Jewish men was supposed to be
already known and did not 'necessitate any justification; and that it
was a question at the time of Himmler's providing a "justification"
only of the ordered murder of the mass of Jewish women and children
The memoirs of von Schirach contain the following quotation from a
speech that Himmler allegedly made on May 29, 1944, in Poznan at the
City Hall "before the national and. regional leaders" :
"I ask that you listen to what I am going to tell you in this circle and to
keep it strictly to yourselves... The annihilation of the Jews is a harsh and
painful task. We found ourselves faced with the following question: What
was to be done with the wonien and children? There, too, I endeavoured
to find a radical solution. I did not in fact have the right to exterminate
men-I mean to kill (them) or have (them) killed-and to afterwards allow
the proliferation of their breed, which would take vengeance on our sons
and grandsons... It was thus necessary to take the decision fraught with
consequences to act in such a way that this people disappear from the sur-
face of the earth... We are carrying out this task without-at least I believe
I may say it - our men's suffering in their minds and souls ... "
Himmler insisted on this last affirmation. We have cited it in his ora-
tion of October 4, 1943, in Poznan; and we have also found it in that of
May 5, 1944, before the generals.
Two documents inform us of the manner in which the" final solution"
was to appear to public opinion. One of them was intended at that
moment for an ultra-secret use. The other, on the contrary, regulated
the information to be given to the public, preoccupied by the turn
taken by the anti-Jewish movement.
The Inspector of Statistics Korherr in March-April 1943 (NO-5193-
5198) drew up for Himmler a detailed 'report and an abridged report
(the latter destined to be presented to Hitler) on the "Final Solution of
the Jewish Question." Himmler wrote on April 9, 1943 (NO-5197), to
the Chief of the Sipo-SD (Kaltenbrunner) (133):
"I have received from the Inspector of Statistics the statistical report on the
final solution of the Jewish question. I consider this report as very good
as eventual documentation for future times, that is, for the purpose of
camouflage. Presently it must neither be published nor communicated.
The most important thing for me, now as previously, is that this time one
transport as many Jews as humanly possible to the East. I want to be
informed in the brief monthly reports only of how many of them have been
sent each month and how many Jews still remain at the given time."
It was during a period of great military upheaval that Himmler had
Korherr draw up this statistical balance sheet of the "final solution."
At the beginning of 1943, Hitler was caught up in the whirlwind of
the defeats of the Wehrmacht. His proclamation of February 24, 1943,
on the celebration of the foundation of the Party, was a manifestation
of his will to compensate himself and his followers for the military
disasters by the certainty that the Reich was in the process of liquida-
ting, and would succeed in liquidating, the adversary par excellence, the
63
THE ORDERS FOR THE FJNAL SOLUTION
Jew, to a great extent fallen into his hands. We have already indicated
that this proclamation was overloaded with imprecations against the
Judeo-Anglo-Saxons and the Judeo-Bolsheviks, culminating in the
announcement that the Jews within the interior of the Reich were about
to be definitively finished off.
lt is thus apparently to reply to an intense interest on the part of
Hitler that Himmler ordered the report from Korherr. It remains never-
theless that Himmler took on his own conscience the responsibility of
the massacre of the deported Jewish masses, except in what concerned
the Soviet Jews, whose extermination was spontaneously ordered by
Hitler under the pretext of an essential measure of military security.
On reading the report of Korherr, Himmler thought that it could
eventually serve as evidence of the liquidation of the Jewish presence, all
while leaving the means employed to achieve this objective in the shadows.
These shadows, such as were cast by the report over its own details,
were not, however, opaque. They were just sufficient to warn the
future historian that if the work of purification of the German vital
space had been pitiless and radical, there would be no reason to ask
how one had gone about it.
Let us recall the hypothesis that the American psychologist Gilbert
presented to the defendant Grering in the prison of Nuremberg and with
which the latter agreed. It concerned the attitude of Hitler himself,
namely that Hitler desired the disappearance of the Jews by no matter
what means and that he did not want to hear about them any more.
In a first draft of the report, Korherr employed the expression "spe-
cial treatment" (Sonderbehandlung). He used it in regard to the
1,449,692 Jews who "were sent through" the extermination camps of
the General Government (operation of Globocnik) and of Wartegau
(the extermination camp of Chelmno). The expression "special treat-
ment" was not accepted by Himmler. His aide de camp communicated
to Korherr that Himmler wanted this term to be replaced by that of
"transportation" (Transportierung). "Transportation" is a variant of
"evacuation. "
The entire" final solution" was presented in the report (p. 15) as the
result of four factors: the emigration, the ex cedent of deaths over births
and, finally, the evacuation. These factors evoked nothing macabre.
But the future historian studying the reports of Korherr might decide
even so to raise the question as to the meaning of the evacuations. The
"final solution of the Jewish question" consisted in the disappearance of
the Jews from the German vital space. This principle was loudly
proclaimed. Besides, Korherr specified that he counted the evacuations
as "departures" (Abgange). Given that the destination of these evacua-
tions did not go beyond the German vital space (all while being beyond
the limits of the Reich proper), and that in conformity with the principle
no Jewish reserve was evoked in that space, the" departures" in question
could only be departures from earthly life.
64
The report stopped at December 31, 1942. The evacuations with
the "transportations" were composed of nearly a million and a half
people for the latter and of 330,000 persons evacuated to the East from
the Reich and from the countries of Western and Central Europe. A
curious detail figured in the chapter on the" Jews in the Concentration
Camps (p. 11)". Korherr wrote that the Jews "lodged during the course
of the evacuation in the concentration camps of Auschwitz and Lublin"
were not included in these figures. Therefore, the camps of Auschwitz and
Lublin were considered as transit stops where the Jews were only "lodged"
and where there was no need to count them. The sketch-plan established
by Heydrich at the Conference of Wannsee may here be recognized:
deportation to the East (here it is a question of Auschwitz and Maj-
danek-Lublin) and then continuation "farther east" where the rest
were to disappear. "Farther east" meant, in reality, the gas chambers
on the spot.
The condensed report drawn up for Hitler ended with a significant
conclusion: since 1933, European Judaism had lost nearly half of its
effectives; and half of this lost half had been transplanted (zugeflossen)
to other continents. One may conclude from this that the other half
of the half lost by European Judaism had been deported without leaving
Europe on arrival. In conformity with the objective of the elimination
of the Jews from the German vital space, it thus evaporated form the face
of the earth.
The Korherr Report was an ultra-secret document. It was only for
future times that Himmler imagined its eventual use as documentation
on the work of "purification" accomplished by the Third Reich. But
another document reveals that the information on the "final solution"
that the Chancellery of he Party intended to communicate without delay
to the "compatriots" (Volksgenossen) fundamentally expressed the same
thing, although in a manner even more vague. ,
lt is an ordinance of October 9, 1942, of the Party Chancellery and
found in the collection "Ordinances, Decrees, Opinions," which was
published by the Chancellery in 1943 as a confidential work. We may
note that another ordinance reproduced in this volume (on the obliga-
tion for the Jews to wear a distinctive sign) specifies that it was intended
only for ranking dignitaries (Hoheitstraeger) of the Party and "their
closest collaborators." We may conclude from this fact that the
volume in question was accessible to a restricted circle of Nazi leaders.
But the text which interests us bears no restriction as to its communica-
tion. It would have failed in its objective were it not communicated
to all those reponsible for the propaganda of the Party. It made known
what was to be explained to no matter what German among those who
were troubled by the rumours about the treatment inflicted on the Jews
deported to the East.
Here are the essential passages of the ordinance (134):
''In relation to the development of projects for the final solution of the
Jewish question, the population of diverse regions of the territory of the
Reich has of late been engaging in discussions on "the very severe mea-
sures" taken against the Jews, particularly in the regions of the East. It
was established that such exposes-deformed and exaggerated in most
65
cases-came from those home on leave from diverse units engaged in the
East and who had themselves had the occasion to observe such measures.
In order to be able to combat all formation of rumours on this subject,
rumours which often assume a tendentious nature, the following commenta-
ries are given for information on the present situation ... "
After having recalled the anti-Jewish movement between 1933 and
1939 (1. "Exclusion of the Jews from diverse sectors of the life of the
German people... 2. The effort to totally expulse the adversary from
the territories of the Reich "), the ordinance brings out that on the one
hand the war had blocked emigration and on the other that the vital
space, and thus the economic space, of the German people contained at
that time such a quantity of Jews that their expulsion by emigration
was no longer possible. Finally, the ordinance declares, before formu-
lating what was the current "final solution:"
"The problem as a whole must be resolved by the present generation, given
that even the following generation will no longer feel the question so keenly
and on the basis of personal experiences, and that once launched, the affair
urgently requires its resolution."
By this last detail the ordinance apparently means that the measures of
segregation applied to the Jews by the present generation would end
up by distracting the attention of the following generation from the
actions of the Jews in segregation. This would create a dangerous
situation because taking advantage of the careless somnolence of their
Aryan entourage, the Jews would finally succeed in infiltrating non-
Jewish life again. In brief, the operation 'begun had to be accelerated,
having as objective the disappearance of this human group; for other-
wise the regeneration of the dissolving power of the Jew would be
fatally repeated.
The" final solution" is exposed as follows:
"That is why the total driving out (Verdraengung), respectively the elimina-
tion of millions of Jews established in the European economic space, is an
imperative in the struggle that the German people are leading to assure
their existence. Beginning with the territories of the Reich and then going
on to other European countries implicated in the final solution, the Jews
are commonly transported to the East to large camps, in part still to be
built, where they are either set to work or brought still farthcr east. Old
Jews, as well as the Jews bearing important military decorations ... are com-
monly transplanted (umgesiedelt) in the city of Theresienstadt, in the Pro-
tectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. It is in the nature of things that these
problems, which are in part very different, can only be resolved in the inte-
rest of the definitive security (Sicherung) of our people by an unmitigated
harshness. "
We know today in detail of what the "final solution" consisted,
and it is thus easy to interpret this text in its mUltiple shades of
meaning. Many things which it touched upon by getting around them
were probably to go unnoticed by an ordinary member of the Party
who became aware of the ordinance. But to that member of the
Party who wanted to have an idea of the solution that the Hitlerian
power had finally found to one of the cardinal problems of its ideology,
the following traits should normally have been evident: the "final
66
solution" was to be rapidly and brutally led to the very end, the Jewish
masses transported to special camps in the East were, according to
criteria which remained inexpressed, either kept in these regions to work
or transported farther east to be submitted to a treatment the nature of
which was not at all mentioned. A close examination of the text reveals
that an alternative defining the fate of the deported Jews had already
been presented in a preceding paragraph: the Jews were either to be put
out (Verdraengung) or eliminated (Ausscheidung). In addition, the
principle had already been established in the ordinance that the exclusion
of the Jews from the new "economic space" of the German people, that
is to say, the "European economic space," was to be total (voellige
Verdraengung). In these conditions, the deportation "still farther east"
for a purpose apparently inexpressable, but which was to be attained
by means of an "unmitigated harshness," could only appear in the sense
of the disappearance of that part of the deportees brought "still farther
east." The "unmitigated harshness" was applicable for this part as
well as for the other, kept only for work; and to both was applied the
imperative of the elimination of the Jews from the "European economic
space. "
The plan of the "final solution" exposed by Heydrich at the Confe-
rence of Wannsee was faithfully reproduced in these directives. There
were the two stations of deportation: first of all, "in the East" for
work, after "farther east." On January 20, 1942, Heydrich evoked
"transit ghettos" for the first station; the ordinance spoke of "big
camps. " As for the final liquidation intimated by Heydrich, there is no
evocation of it but only an enigmatic silence as to the fate of those
deported "far to the East." Thus the ordinance proposed nothing to
combat the sordid news spread by those on leave from the East who
told what they had seen. It added, however, that a part of the deportees
were kept for work. But the German who wondered alJout those
brought farther away was to learn nothing directly. He reflected,
however, on the "unmitigated harshness" of the treatment of the Jews
and the racial purification of the "European economic space" that
the ordinance forbade to evoke. These indications were disquieting
for the Jews who, despite their deportation "far to the East," remained
in this space and concerning whose fate the ordinance was silent. But
a person who was not informed must have probably hesitated to draw
the conclusion that these Jews were eliminated by their physical liqui-
dation. But in this case it was not a question of people not informed.
The ordinance spoke of the information to be given to people already
troubled by the stories of what had been seen in the East. The infor-
mation given to them by members of the Party could only confirm
their suspicions of a collective massacre. The ordinance of October
9, 1942, indicated that the conviction was spreading in Germany that
the deportation of the Jews to the East had the "final solution" by
extermination for its objective. But it was not said for as much that
the technique of this operation was known by many people.
67
Let us point out another subtlety of expression in the text of the
ordinance. Just as in the expose of Heydrich, one finds there the
evocation of Theresienstadt intended for the old people and the privi-
leged ones (which, incidentally, did not at all prevent the deportation
of these Jews to Auschwitz where at first they were settled to be after-
wards exterminated). But in principle the camp of Theresienstadt was
not designated for the extermination. To stress the exceptional position
of Theresienstadt, it was a question not simply of the transportation of
the Jews, but of their "transplantation."
Aside from that, there was no longer any question of any sort of
Jewish reserve. If the Jews were to be treated in such a way as to
have them disappear from the "European economic space," it was
necessary in those conditions to make them disappear from the face of
the earth.
The ordinance of October 9, 1942, was faithful to the conventional
vocabulary introduced by Heydrich at the Conference of Wannsee: the
stage of work "in the East" and the stage of disappearance "farther
east." The fiction which replaced the transport to the gas chambers by
the transport into "zones of operation" farther east was respected.
This terminology was respected by the heads of the regime even among
themselves. On March 27, 1942, Grebbels wrote in his personal
diary (135):
"[n the General Government, the Jews, beginnin6 with those of Lublin, are
going to be evacuated to the East. To accomplish this, one is employing
rather barbaric methods, on which no further explanation is necessary; not
much is left of the Jews. Generally speaking, one may say that sixty per-
cent of them must be liquidated, whereas only forty percent can be put to
work. The former Gauleiter of Vienna, who is directing this operation, is
accomplishing it with sufficient discretion, and by employing procedures
which do not attract the attention too much... No other government and
no other regime would have enough strength to resolve this question once
and for all. Here again, the FLihrer is the determined champion of a radical
solution which the circumstances require and which thus seems inevitable.
The ghettos which become free in the cities of the General Government will
be filled with Jews evacuated from the Reich; then the operation will be
renewed from time to time ... "
Thus Grebbels, even in his diary, observed the convention of calling
"evacuation to the East" what he at once explained as extermination
on the spot by "procedures which do not attract the attention too much,"
that is to say, by gas chambers. Another fiction was observed: in the
secrets to be revealed concerning the "final solution," there was no
question of Auschwitz. Grebbels spoke of the General Government
and of the operation of Globocnik. In the autumn of 1942, General
Oberg, Himmler's representative in occupied France, indicated to Laval
that to questions on the deportation of the Jews it was necessary to an-
swer that they were transported to the General Government to work.
However, the Sipo-SD in Paris sent one convoy after the other not to the
General Government, but to Auschwitz, located in Upper Silesia.
68
The ordinance of October 9, 1942, vividly revealed the frame of mind
in which a German citizen, were he to think about what the HitIerian
regime was doing with the Jews, could see the "final solution." The
German citizen had to reflect not on the deportation to a Jewish reserve,
be it in Africa, Madagascar or Siberia, but rather on the meaning of
the immediate or imminent deportation very far east, in the German vital
space, from which at the same time all the Jews were to disappear. The
direction of the Party had not the intention of making the German citizen
believe that it was simply a transfer of a labour force. The ordinance of
October 9, 1942, stated precisely that it was necessary to specify that only
a part of the deported Jews remained for the work, that is in the
first stages of its deportation; whereas another part was transported "far-
ther east." Nothing was said of the objective for this other part, were it not
the general objective of the disappearance of the Jews.
The question may be raised as to whether the officials of the Sipo-SD
in the Reich and in its branches abroad could reasonably claim to have
had less information on the "final solution" than that contained in the
ordinance conceived with the worried German citizens in mind. The
same question must be asked to the German diplomats who worked
closely with the Sipo-SD. The only reasonable supposition is that,
given their functions, the extent of their knowledge of this matter large-
ly exceeded the minimum of information contained in the ordinance
of October 9, 1942.
It is to be noted that the ordinance of October 9, 1942, of the Chancel-
lery of the Party contented itself with defining what was to be revealed to
those troubled by news of the killing of Jews in the occupied Soviet
regions. But the Hitlerian propaganda also manifested its intention of
going ahead of the curiosity of the citizens. This intention is found in
the directives given by O. Dietrich, Pressechef of the Reich and of the
Party. He worked directly with Hitler, all while belonging to the
Ministry of Propaganda of Grebbels as a Secretary of State.
In the beginning of 1943, O. Dietrich gave instructions to the daily
press and to the periodicals for the intensification of their anti-Jewish
propaganda. A directive of February 5, 1943, stated (136):
"The anti-Jewish propaganda is on the same level as the anti-Bolshevik
propaganda. The treatment of this theme is part of the campaign lately
designated as necessary to provoke feelings of hatred... The accent must
be put on the work for which the "German Weekly Service" gives ample
suggestions and proposals of themes, that in contrast with what goes on
among other peoples, there are in Judaism not just some isolated crimes;
Judaism entirely stems from a criminal root and it is criminal in its pre-
disposition (Anlage)... The extermination (Vernichtung) of Judaism is not
a loss for humanity, it is useful for the peoples of the earth in the same
way as the death penalty or the detention for security (Sicherheitsverwahr-
ung) is for the criminal delinquant (kriminelle Verbrecher)."
This directive indicated that it was necessary to make public opinion
understand that Judaism was delivered over to the death penalty or
to internment, the death penalty occupying the first place in this perspec-
tive.
69
The word "Vernichtung" was employed in another directive to desig-
nate that time what the Jews were planning against all nations. One
may quote the judgment pronounced at Nuremberg against O. Dietrich:
"The Information Service" observed on April 22, 1943, that the Jews
were responsible for the mass massacre of the Polish officers at Katyn;
"the Jews would have the intention of assassinating the peoples of Eu-
rope ... " Other directives designated by the word "Vernichtung" the
goal pursued by the Jews with regard to the non-Jews. In the general
directive, one reads:
one can refer to the word of the FUhrer, that is, that at the end of this
war, there will only be survivors and those exterminated (Vernichtete). By
pointing out the firm intention of Judaism to exterminate (Vernichtung) all
the Germans, one will fortify the will to self-affirmation."
Thus, the anti-Jewish propaganda had to suggest that the "Vernich-
tung" of the Jews by the Germans was the answer to give to the
"Vernichtung" that the Jews were preparing to apply to the non-Jewish
peoples; and the meaning of this "Vernichtung" was extermination.
Let us finally point out in regard to "Vernichtung" the propositions
advanced by Ribbentrop and Hitler during their conversation of April
17,1943, with Horthy, Regent of Hungary (D-736) (137):
"In answer to the question asked in retort by Horthy to know what he was
to do with the Jews after he had deprived them of practically all means of
existence-he could not even so finish them off-the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Reich depiored that the Jews had to b:: either exterminated
(Vernichtet) or interned in concentration camps... There are no other solu-
tions ... Continuing on, the FUhrer came to speak of the city of Nuremberg ...
It is a fact that the Jews are parasites. In Poland, this situation has been
entirely liquidated. There, if the Jews do not want to work, they are shot.
If they are unable to work, they must perish... It is not cruel. It suffices
to consider that even the innocent creatures of nature, such as hares or
goats, are killed to prevent their harmfulness. Why should it be necessary
to spare brutes who wanted to bring us Bolshevism?"
The process of the extermination of the Jews was nevertheless one of
the most important State Secrets. Neither Hitler nor the competent
authorities intended to officially make known that on the average about
80% of the Jewish deportees were done away with by gas upon arrival
at their destination. This State Secret forbade any revelation which
allowed people to imagine the procedure of the killing off of millions of
Jewish persons. But at the summit of the Third Reich (Hitler,
Himmler, Grebbels, Bormann), one was thinking of the necessity of
preparing public opinion for knowledge of the fact that these millions
of people had disappeared. It was necessary that public opinion have
a sort of premonition that by means which would never have. to be
detailed, the Jews were disappearing from the face of the earth. The
thing was not entirely said, it was even expected that the violent terms
in the anti-Jewish propaganda would provoke the impression of exagger-
ation; but it was known that the word "Vernichtung" would provoke
an uneasy foreboding of horror.
70
It is certain that the ordinance of the Party of October 9, 1942, and
the directives of O. Dietrich intended to present the "final solution" to
the public in a sinister and macabre light.
In the winter of 1943, anyone at all had only to buy the November 4,
1943, edition of the weekly "Der StUrmer", published by Streicher,
Gauleiter of Franconia, to be informed of the real meaning of the
"final solution." "Der StUrmer" was scorned by the very great majority
of Germans. We have already seen that before the war, the SS (Hagen
and Eichmann) severely criticized this obscene and outrageously vulgar
organ of anti-Jewish propaganda. Hitler nevertheless insisted that it
continue to appear, and the "StUrmer" was ostentatiously exposed in
the streets of all the cities of the Reich.
But far from limiting itself to the propaganda calling for the murder
of the Jews, it gave the information that this murder was being
accomplished.
Streicher, who was judged in Nuremberg at the trial of the major Nazi
war criminals, explained the working habits of the editor of the "StUr-
mer. " He emphasized the important role played by the analysis of
the paper "The Jewish Weekly," published by the Swiss Jewish commu-
nity, in the preparation of the issues. This paper contained news on
the extermination of the Jews of the East or of those deported to the
East. The November 4, 1943, issue of the "StUrmer" (PS-1965) con-
tains an article entitled "The New Jewish Order. What the Jews
Demand for Themselves." (138) Therein is found this quotation from
the Swiss weekly:
"The Jews have, so to speak, disappeared from Europe, except with respect
to England and also the small Jewish communities in the few neutral
countries. The Jewish reservoir in the East, which was capable of equi-
librating the phenomena of assimilation in the West, no longer exists."
The "StUrmer" made the following comment on this quotation:
"It is not a question of a Jewish fraud (Judenschwindel). It is in fact true
that the Jews have "so to speak" disappeared from Europe and that "the
Jewish reservoir in the East," from which the Jewish epidemic (1udenseuche)
had spread for hundreds of years onto the European peoples, has ceased to
exist. If the Jewish publication wants to claim that the Jews did not envi-
sage such a development when they thrust the peoples into the Second
World War, they are not to be believed. But the FUhrer of the German
people, from the very beginning of the war, foretold what has now hap-
pened. He said that the Second World War would swallow up those who
had wanted it... One thus annihilates the cause, the Jew; and the world is
freed of the Jewish animosity. One understands that the Jews do not wish
such a solution. They demand rather the extermination of all the non-
Jews, who necessarily become enemies of the Jews, because,'(jf the presence
of the Jews." .
Thus the editorial staff of the" StUrmer" declared itself to be informed
of the event reported by the Swiss publication. Given that Streicher,
a scandalous personality, had already for several years been put aside
from the real political life of the country, his news did not have the cre-
dibility of being official. Nevertheless, the very fact that it was publish-
ed and that this paper was especially exposed in the stands, took on
71
the meaning of a confirmation of the rumours which circulated in the
public opinion. It is to be noted in addition that in this article Strei-
cher faithfully followed O. Dietrich's directives.
It is often tempting to think that since the time that the decision was
taken to obtain the "final solution" of the Jewish question by the exter-
mination of the Jews, the Hitlerian power intended to distract public
opinion from this unsupportable aspect of the operation. This point of
view is erroneous. The anti-Jewish propaganda of the Nazis, beginning
with that of Hitler in his major public speeches, addressed itself to the
German people in the intention of obtaining its grateful acceptance of
the operation which, by measures not to be elaborated except perhaps
in a distant future, were making the Jews disappear from the German
vital space, that means from the Urals to the Atlantic. In the given
circumstances, this meant their physical disappearance. These macabre
visions were combined with assurances that the "final solution" consisted
first of all in segregation with confiscation (Aryanization), then in depor-
tation to the East for the exploitation of Jewish manpower in the war
economy. One may recall that the deportations to the East did in fact
take place as work "assignments" (Arbeitseinsatz); this was in practice
translated by the extermination of about 80% of the deportees, pro-
claimed "unfit for work," and by the temporary conservation of the
rest, a labour force exposed to the excessively harsh regime of life in a
concentration camp. Both aspects, the disappearance of the Jewish
masses deported to the East to vanish there and this same deportation as
a furnisher of labour appear in the propaganda as valid. But when
faced with the slightest curiosity concerning the process by which this
disappearance was obtained, the initiates and their multiple agents did
their utmost to assure that it was a matter of nothing other than econo-
mic exploitation in the war industry which lacked workers. These in-
dignant denegations of the "lies of the Jewish terror propaganda" (ju-
dische Greuelpropaganda) were proferred without the slightest care
of coherence with the revelations that Hitler repeated publicly. Eich-
mann was questioned in Jerusalem on the answers he gave to the cu-
rious and the anguished in regard to the "final solution." He answered
(139): "The directives were so numerous, and to such a degree diverse,
that at that time already one had to choose them oneself. " He also declared
(140) that as for the extermination of the Jews, "the birds were singing
it on the roof-tops" since the end of 1943.
It is natural that these macabre and unclear indications were not
easily assimilated by public opinion. One might advance that a German
citizen who did not revolt against his Government at the news of the
extermination of the Jews thus became an accomplice of the Nazi
power. It was preferable not to believe in the possibility of the
horror which this power boasted of perpetrating.
But this rejection became impossible for the categories of Germans
who, at diverse levels of the hierarchy, assured the functioning of the
72
apparatus of the "final solution." Such was clearly the case of the
Gestapo and the SD, but also of a large number of German diplomats,
particularly those who had to deal with the questions of the deportations
of the Jews of the Reich and of the countries yoke. The
activity of all these agents of, the Hitlerian power pointed uniquely
towards the goal that the propaganda mysteriously desig-
nated by proclaiming the disappearance of the Jewish masses from the
German vital space. This nebulous vision forced the attention of these
agents. At the very most, they could endeavour to distract themselves
with it, to the extent that their functions did not directly confront
them with the procedure of extermination. But no matter how great was
their effort to not think of it, they must always have had in mind that
their task aimed at making all of the Jews, German or foreign, disappear
from the German vital space before the end of the war.
73
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74
NOT E S
PART ONE
I. THE JEWISH QUESTION UNTIL 1942
7. The I,!uubatioiZ FeY'iod of HitleY"s Anti-Jew-ish Action (19.';:5-1968)
I. Krausnick, pp. 311-312
2. Hitler's appeal of March 28,1933, to all of the organizations
of the NSDAP for the boycotting of Jewish firms:
"Die Aktionskomitees sind dafUr verantwortlich, dall sich dieser gesamte
Kampf in vollster Ruhe und grollter Disziplin vollzieht. KrUmmt auch
weiterhin keinem Juden auch nur ein Haar!"
3. Krausnick, p.317
4. Krausnick, p.311
5. Adler, p. 658
6. Krausnick, p. 321
7. Adler, p. 10, Memorandum of the delegations of the Jewish communities
of Berlin and Vienna at the conference of Evian:
"In dem Augenblick, da ein Viertel der jUdischen Bevolkerung Deutsch-
lands sich nicht mehr seIber erhalten kann und durch offentliche Wohl-
titigkeit unterstUtzt wird, da Tausende einer dauernden Arbeitslosigkeit
entgegenblicken, ja Zehntausende Junger und arbeitswilliger Menschen
ihre Stelle eingebUllt haben und mit ihrer Auswanderung die Moglichkeit
zum Aufbau einer neuen Existenz ... suchen, erfUllt uns die Hoffnung, dall
die KONFERENZ IN EVIAN ihr hohes Ziel erreichen und die GrUndung einer
neuen Existenz fUr jene Menschen ermaglichen wird, denen die Geschichte
die Auswanderung als ihre Sendung zubestimmt hat."
? Jewish Em-igY'ation dUY'ing the Ineubation Per'iod of the "Vinal Solution"
8. Krausnick, pp. 343-344
9. Adler, p. 8
:5. The Nazi Anti-Jewish Aetion Isolated fY'om Mass MOvements
10. Buchheim I,pp. 318-319, Order of Himmler to the SS on August 16,1935:
"I) Ich verbiete aufs schirfste jede Einzelaktion irgend eines SS-Ange-
harigen gegen Juden. 2) Die Lasung der Judenfrage ist, wie auch bisher
die Lasung aller Fragen, eine Sorge des FUhrers und nicht eine Sorge von
Einzelnen. 3) Zuwiderhandlungen, auch in der leisesten Form, werden mit
Ausstollung aus der SS bestraft".
II. Steinbert, p. 263
12. Speer, pp. 126, 45
"Es hat mich immer wieder Uberrascht, dall mir antisemitische Bemerkungen
Hitlers kaum haften geblieben sind ... - der Judenhall Hitlers schien mir
damals so selbstverstindlich, dall er mich nicht beeindruckte ...
Dagegen mull ich die Empfindung gehabt haben, dall es mich persanlich
75
Notes pp. 6-7
nichts angehe, wenn ich harte, wie Juden, Freimaurer, Sozialdemokraten
oder Zeugen Jehovas von meinex Umgebung wie Freiwild: beurteilt wurden.
Ich meinte, es genUge, wenn ich selber mich daran nicht beteiligte".
13. Speer, pp. 384-385 :
"So kommt es mir vor, als habe der verzweifelte Wettlauf mit der Zeit,
dieses besessene Starren auf Produktions- und AusstoBzahlen, alle Er-
wagungen und GefUhle der Menschlichkeit zugedeckt ..... Mich beunruhigt
vielmehr, daB ich in den Gesichtern der Haftlinge nicht die Physiognomie
des Regimes gespiegelt sah, des sen Existenz ich in diesen Wochen und
~ l o n a t e n so manisch zu verlangern trachtete".
4. The Jewish Question in the Gestapo and in the SD before the War
14. LISCHKA, Kurt Werner Paul
Born August 16, 1909, in Breslau. Law studies in Breslau and Berlin.
SS NO 195590, June I, 1933. In April 1935 Lischka became a judge in
training; and on September 2, 1935, he entered the Gestapo of Berlin.
He joined the Nazi Party on May I, 1937 (NO 4583185).
SS-UntersturmfUhrer January 30, 1938.
SS-ObersturmfUhrer April 20, 1938.
SS-SturmbannfUhrer in April 1942.
Lischka was also rapidly promoted in his functions of civil
administrator:
Gerichtsassessor September 2, 1935.
Regierungsassessor in July 1936.
Regierungsrat in April 1938.
Oberregierungsrat in September 1941.
Chief of the service of Jewish affairs of the Ge.stapo for the
entire Reich, Lischka directed the first mass arrest of the German Jews
on June 13, 1938. In November 1938 Lischka led the operation of the
arrest of the Jews which immediately followed the pogrom of the
"Crystal Night". In 1939 Lischka was chief of the head office of the
Reich for Jewish emigration, an emanation of the Gestapo. From January
to November 1940, Lischka was chief of the Gestapo of Cologne.
From November 1940 to November 1943, Lischka was active in France,
where he occupied the following posts of the highest responsibility in
the political police:
I) Permanent substitute for the head of the security services
(Knochen) and of the criminal investigation department of the Nazi
police, the Sipo-SD, in occupied France;
2) Kommandeur, which means chief, of the Nazi police, the Sipo-SD,
of all the Paris area with antennae in Melun and Versailles;
3) Chief of Department II of the Sipo-SD on the national level,
in charge of the internment camps, the execution of hostages, the
surveillance of the French police;
4) Given the responsibility quite especially to cap the Gestapo
and the Kripo, because of his experience in the police, (Knochen was
by training an intelligence man).
76
Notes pp. 7-8
Declaration of Knochen:"Sections IV (Gestapo) and V (Kripo)
were placed under the direct authority of my assistant who was always
a member of the Amt IV (Gestapo)"; " At the request of General MUller,
the executive questions of my services were known only by my assis-
tants, Lischka then Henschke. I did not meddle in their business".
"Lischka was my permanent representative for Sections IV and V, by
virtue of the detective force and the criminel investigation department".
"Lischka handled the matters of Sections IV and V referring himself
to General Oberg. Although the fact may appear strange, it is my re-
presentative Lischka who particularly took charge of matters concerning
Section IV (Gestapo)."
From November 1943 to May 1945 Lischka, back in Berlin at the
Headquarters of the Principal Office of Security of the Reich, which
had been placed after the death of Heydrich under the direction of
Kaltenbrunner , became one of the closest collaborators of the Chief of
the Gestapo of the Reich, Heinrich MUller. Lischka directed Depart-
ment IV B of the Gestapo of the Reich, the IV A being directed by
MUller himself. Under Lischka's orders, there were civil servants of
a higher rank than his.
After the attack against Hitler of July 20, 1944, Lischka be-
longed to the special commission in charge of investigating those
officers suspected. MUller, Chief of the Gestapo, directed the
commission which was composed of fifteen members. Lischka investigated
the following cases: Generaloberst Hopner, who was hanged at the end of
the inquiry, Oberstleutnant Sadroczinski (hanged), Hauptmann Klausing,
Oberst Jager (hanged), Heusinger, Oberst Hahn (hanged), Oberst Hassel,
Generalleutnant Thiele (hanged), Generalstabrichter Sack (hanged).
Lischka was tried by the Permanent Tribunal of the Armed Forces
in Paris. On September 18, 1950, he was sentenced in absentia to
perpetual hard labour.
He lives in Cologne at 554 Bergisch Gladbacher Str. Lischka
officially retired in 1975 as agent (Prokurist) of the import-export
company "Krlicken".
Lischka still remains unpunished. He held the prime responsibili-
ty for the deportations of the Jews from France. In 1971 Beate and
Serge Klarsfeld attempted to kidnap him and bring him back to France.
In 1974 the trial of Beate Klarsfeld which excited world-wide interest
brought to light the scandal of this impunity. In 1975 the Bundestag
was obliged to ratify the Franco-German judiciary agreement, and
Lischka is to be tried.
15. Hohne, p. 195
16. Aronson, p. 293
77
Note p. 8
17. HAGEN, Herbert-Martin
Born September 20, 1913, in Neumlinster(Holstein)
SS NO 123273, October I, 1933. NSDAP NO 4583139
Hagen worked in the SS from May 25, 1934, onwards. He became
SS-Hauptsturmflihrer in 1939, SS-Sturmbannflihrer in 1941, SS-Obersturm-
bannflihrer in 1945.
In May 1934 Hagen entered the SD of the SS-Reichsflihrer in Munich.
In September 1934 he was named to the SD-Hauptamt in Berlin.
A graduate of the Auslandwissenschaftliche Institut, where he
attended the lectures of Professor F.A.Six, who directed the 11-1 of
the SD, Hagen became the collaborator of Six in the SD and head of the
section 11-112 in charge of Jewish affairs. Hagen, chief of the 11-112,
struck up a friendship with his collaborator Adolf Eichmann; and the
two men went to Egypt and PalestiOne together in October 1937. Hagen
also travelled a great deal in Central Europe in order to intensify
anti-Semitism and to watch over the strict application of the anti-
Jewish measures in Germany.
On June 22, 1940, Hagen belonged to the first commando of the
SD in France. He became Kommandeur of the Sipo-SD of Bordeaux and from
there controlled all of the Atlantic coast as far as Brittany. He
arrested the Jews of the region and selected the fifty hostages shot in
Bordeaux on October 24, 1941.
In May 1942 Hagen became the political adviser (Politischer
Referent) and the sole direct collaborator of General Oberg, Chief of
the SS and of the German Police in France, for whom he did the real
brain-work. He was also chief of Department VI of the Sipo-SD.
Very active against the Jews in France, Hagen also played an
important role in all of the reprisals by executions from 1942 to 1944.
On July 9, 1943, Hagen married the secretary of the anti-Jewish
section of the Gestapo in Paris.
burg.
March
In 1945 the SS-Obersturmbannflihrer directed the Sipo-SD of
He was to be imprisoned in the British zone. In France on
18, 1955, Hagen was sentenced in absentia to perpetuel hard
Salz-
labour.
Herbert Hagen resides at WilhelmstraBe 34, Warstein (Rhineland-
Westphalia) .
He is commercial manager of an important industriel enterprise:
the "Industrie- und Apparatebau".
Hagen has still not been punished. He was the second most im-
portant of the Nazi criminals who deported the Jews from France. In
1972 Beate and Serge Klarsfeld demonstrated against him in Warstein.
78
Notes pp. 8-11
5. The Preparation of the "Final Solution"
Inspire the Gestapo
the SS Destined to
18. Hitler, p. 17, Proclamation of Hitler for the opening of the Congress
of the Party, September II, 1935 in Nuremberg:
"Diese Entschlossenheit, bestimmte Gefahren unter allen Umstanden und
schon im Keime zu ersticken, wird, wenn es einmal natig sein sollte,
auch davor nicht zurlickscheuen, Funktionen flir die ersichtlich der Staat
- weil seinem innersten Wesen fremd - nicht geeignet ist, auf dem Wege
der Gesetzgebung den Einrichtungen zu libertragen, die flir odie Lasung
einer solchen Aufgabe besser geeignet erscheinen."
19. Domarus, p. 537 or Hitler p. 65, Speech of Hitler of September 15,1935
before the Reichstag convoked in Nuremberg(proclamation of the
racial laws) :
"(Das dritte) Gesetz ist der Versuch einer gesetzlichen Regelung eines
Problems, das im FaIle des abermaligen Scheiterns dann durch Gesetz zur
endgliltigen Lasung der nationalsozialistischen Partei libertragen werden
mliBte. Hinter allen drei Gesetzen steht die nationalsozialistische Partei
und mit ihr und hinter ihr die Deutsche Nation".
20. Article of Heydrich, "Die Bekampfung der Staatsfeinde" in the
periodical "Deutsches Recht", 1936 (summarized by M.Broszat in
"Anatomie des SS-Staates" pp. 51-52) :
"Voraussetzung der polizeilichen Gegnerbekampfung sei"der weltan-
schauliche Ideenkampf gegen die Grundlagen des Gegeners", der "nur
durch die nationalsozialistische Bewegung geflihrt werden" kanne. Deshalb
mlisse die "Staatspolizei in engster Flihrung mit dem Sicherheitsdienst
des Reichsflihrers-SS" arbeiten, dem als "Zweig der Gesamt-SS von der
Reichsleitung der NSDAP die nachrichtenmaBige Erforschung und Uber-
wachung der ideenmaBigen Gegner des Nationalsozialismus libertragen ist".
21. Buchheim, p. 339, Lecture of Himmler in Sonthofen, May 26, 1944,
during a course on political ideology:
"Nun werden Sie eines begreifen. Diese MaBnahmen im Innern des Reiches
kannen nicht von einer Polizei, die nur aus Beamten besteht, durchge-
flihrt werden. Dazu hatte ein Korps, das nur seinen Beamteneid geleistet
hat, nicht die Kraft. Diese MaGnahmen konnten nur getragen und durchge-
flihrt werden von einer in sich bis zum auBersten gefestigten Organisat-
ion, von fanatischen und zutiefst liberzeugten Nationalsozialisten. Die
SS rechnet sich dazu und behauptet von sich, daflir geeignet zu sein und
hat die Aufgabe libernommen."
22. Zipfel, p. 6, "Valki.scher Beobachter", Janvier 1936 :
"Da die geheime Staatspolizei neb en den ihr in erster Linie obliegenden
Vollzugsaufgaben diese Beobachtung der Staatsfeinde nicht in dem not-
wendigen MaBe durchflihren kann, tritt ihr erganzend der Sicherheits-
dienst des Reichsflihrers-SS, der vom Stellvertreter des Flihrers als der
politische Nachrichtendienst der Bewegung eingesetzt wurde, zur Seite
und stellt damit einen groBen Teil der von ihm mobilisierten Krafte
der Bewegung in den Dienst der Staatssicherheit".
79
Notes PP. 11-13
6. The Service for Jewish Affairs within the SD, the II-112 under the
Sl:gn of "Zionism". U935-1938)
23. H.G. Adler, "Der verwaltete Mensch", p. 662 :
"Schon im Jahre 1938 waren die meisten wichtigen und viele minder
belangvolle amtliche Vorgange, die einen Juden betrafen, auBerdem auch
Angelegenheiten der Gestapo, die jederzeit eingeschaltet oder zumindest
benachrichtigt wurde".
24. Eichmann 2, nO 1492
25. Eichmann I, p. 66, Interrogatory of Eichmann during the preliminary
investigation of his trial in Jerusalem (passage on his beginnings in
the anti-Jewish Service of the SD) :
" ... Nach einigen Tagen war dieser Entwurf fertig und er wurde auch tat-
sachlich dann gedruckt ... In diesem Bericht habe ich sachlich darge-
stellt einmal den Aufbau der zionistischen Weltorganisation, die Ziele
des Zionismus, seine Hilfsquellen und seine Schwierigkeiten und auch
die Forderung wurde unterstrichen, weil der Zionismus ja den eigenen
WUnschen ja insofern entgegenkam ... , eine Losung suchte und wollte,
eine politische Losung anstrebte ... Insofern gab es da gar nicht
viel zu andern im Hinblick auf, sagen wir mal, 'nationalsozialistisches
Wollen' ."
26. Aronson, p. 203
27. Eichmann I, pp. 70-71
28. Eichmann I, pp.75-81, Interrogatory of Eichmann during the prelimi-
nary investigation of his trial in Jerusalem (passage on the replace-
ment of Wisliceny by Hagen at the head of the anti-Jewish service
of the SD) :
"Also 36, es war 36, nun hatte Six eine Animositat gegen den an sich
etwas phlegmatischen und die Sachen dahin gleiten lassenden Wisliceny
der uns arbeiten lieB, selber aber gerne irgendwelche historischen
BUcher oder ahnliches las und sicK damit die Zeit vertrieb ... Eines
Tages kam's zur Ablosung Wisliceny's und ein Vertreter von Six namens ...
weiB ich leider nicht ... wie heiBt er bloB ... Hagen, Hagen hieB der
Mann, OberscharfUhrer Hagen ... Hagen war ein kluger Mann mit doch recht
wei tern Horizont, verfUgte Uber gesundes Allgemeinwissen und hatte eine
gute Gabe, ihm auch bis dahin fremd gewesene Angelegenheiten binnem
kurzem in sich aufzunehmen, das Wesentliche zu erkennen, herauszu-
schalen und so fort darliber einen Artikel zu schreiben. - Und so benutzte
ihn Dr.Six auch als Schreiber, Schreiber mancher Artikel in einer
Monatszeitschrift, die das Auslandswissenschaftliche Institut unter
Leitung von Dr. Six urn jene Zeit herausgab, urn hier zu den verschieden-
sten Fragen, nicht nur jUdischen Angelegenheiten Stellung zu nehmen. _
Von jlidischen Angelegenheiten, jlidischen Organisationen, deren Wollen,
deren Ziele hatte er bis dahin noch keine Ahnung. Sein erstes als er
kam, war daher, daB er sich von mir einmal liber mein Sachgebiet er-
schopfend Auskunft geben lieB. Er frug tatsachlich so umfassend und
wollte es so genau wissen, daB ich Mlihe hatte wirklich alles, was ich
wuBte, heraus zukramen, besser gesagt, er pympte mir mein Wissen,
diese Organisationen die ich nannte betreffend, jedenfalls heraus.
Und das Erstaunliche, er behielt es ... (es) kam(en) dabei zur Hilfe
die Tafeln, die ich schon erwahnen durfte, die an den Wanden hingen
und hier im wesentlichen die Namen zumindestens ja aufzeichneten ...
Nun hatte ich mir zwar die Enzyklopadia Judalka und andere Literatur
80
Notes pp. 13-14
in groBen Hengen besorgt. Ich las damals unendlich viel nur in dieser
Sparte und selbstverstandlich fast alle jlidischen Zeitungen, die ich
auftreiben konnte."
29. Eichmann I, pp. 75-81
30. Report of Hagen, December 1937, on the reorganization of the anti-
Jewish Service of the SD ( the II 112) under the sign of the Jewish
emigration and of the centralization of the action in the SD and the
Gestapo :
"Die eigentliche Bearbeitung des Gegners Judentum durch die Abteilung
II 112 begann etwa Ende 1935. Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt waren die vor-
bereitenden Arbeiten soweit fortgeschritten, daB an eine organisa-
torische Erfassung der Juden in Deutschland herangegangen werden konnte.
Diese Arbeit, die sich liber ein Jahr hinzog, hatte im wesentlichen
bereits in einigen Monaten abgeschlossen sein konnen, wenn die Arbeits-
verteilung innerhalb der Abteilung von Anfang an besser gewesen ware.
Die Folge der damals getroffenen Verteilung der Arbeit war, daB einige
Manner der Abteilung mit laufenden Arbeiten liberlastet waren, weil es
den librigen an einer umfassenden Sachkenntnis mangelte. - Eine prak-
tische FUhlungnahme mit den Juden in Deutschland war infolge der ung-
geschickten Taktik der Abteilungsleitung urn diese Zeit fast ausge-
schlossen. Man hielt sich mit der Gesamtbearbeitung lediglich an die
Staatspolizeistelle Berlin, die selbstverstandlich lediglich liber die
ortlichen Gegnerformen unterrichtet war. Bei den wenigen Verhandlungen,
die auf der Staatspolizeistelle gefUhrt wurden, haben die Manner der
Abteilung II 112 keine Gelegenheit gehabt, sich praktisch zu betatigen.
Die Verhore wurden lediglich von den Staapobeamten geflihrt. Die poli-
tische Ausrichtung der in Deutschland ansassigen jlidischen Organisatio-
nen nach staatspolizeilichen Gesichtspunkten war unter diesen Umstanden
natlirlich nicht moglich; zudem bestand nicht einmal eine Kontrolle liber
die Tatigkeit der leitenden jlidischen politischen Funktionare. - Dieser
Zustand dauerte bis etwa Marz, April 1937.
(Bericht von SS-UntersturmfUhrer Eichmann) ... - Einen grundsatzlichen
Wandel in der Arbeit der Abteilung II 112 flihrte der Funktionsbefehl
des Reichsflihrers vom 1.7.37 herbei, demzufolge der Abteilung II 112
alle allgemeinen und grundsatzlichen Fragen, in denen staatspolizei-
liche VollzugsmaBnahmen nicht in Betracht kommen, zur Bearbeitung liber-
lassen wurden. Von diesem Zeitpunkt an werden samtliche zu treffende
Entscheidungen in engstem Einvernehmen mit dem Referat II B 4 auf dem
Gebiet des Judentums gefallt. Durch regelmaBige Vorladungen der leitend-
en Funktionare der jUdischen Organisationen wird versucht die gesamte
Judenpolitik so auszurichten, daB die Auswanderung besonders unbe-
mittelter Juden laufend gefordert und verstarkt wird ... Darliber hinaus
wurde angefangen, durch die Verbindungsaufnahme mit den zustandigen
Stellen im Innenministerium und im Auswartigen Amt, direkten EinfluB
auf die praktische Durchflihrung der Auswanderung zu bekommen. Das End-
ziel, wie das noch naher in einem in Arbeit befindlichen Bericht an C
(C : Chef Heydrich) dargelegt werden soll, ist die Zentralisierung
der gesamten Bearbeitung der Judenfrage in Deutschland bei SD und
Gestapa. - Darliber hinaus wurde mit der systematischen Erfassung des
Weltjudentums begonnen (zum Teil durch direkte Flihlungnahme),weil die Ent-
scheidungen liber die weitere Losung der Judenfrage in Deutschland eine
genaue Kenntnis der leitenden jlidischen Weltorganisationen voraus-
setzen."
81
Notes pp. 15-17
31. Eichmann I, pp. 3416-3.418-
32. Report of the anti-Jewish section of the SO on October 5, 1937
(passage concerning the collaboration with the Gestapo - II B 4 -)
" Die Zusammenarbeit mit der Geheimen Staatspolizei war bisher eine
recht gute. Dies war besonders in der Person des bisherigen Leiters
des Judenreferats im Gestapa, Ass. Flesch, begrundet. Seit 15.9.37
ist der Ass.Flesch zur Staatspolizeistelle Berlin versetzt. Mit seinem
Nachfolger, Ass.Freytag, wurde personlich Fuhlung genommen. Da Ass.
Freytag noch keine Kenntnisse auf dem Gebiet des Judentums besitzt, hat
er gebeten, ihn weitgehend zu unterstutzen und vor allem auch bei MaB-
nahmen executiver Art ihn zu beraten."
33. Report of Hagen on July 2, 1938, concerning the anti-Jewish section
of the SD (passage on "Aktive Beteiligung an Stapoaktionen") :
"1m Einvernehmen mit dem Geheimen Staatspolizeiamt, II B 4 J., kon-
trolliert II 112 von Zeit zu Zeit die Arbeit der judischen Organisationen
und fuhrt laufend Besprechungen mit den Leitern der judischen Organ-
isationen durch. Die Notwendigkeit zur eigenen Durchfuhrung derartiger
Verhandlungen bzw. Aktionen ergab sich aus der Tatsache, daB die AuBen-
beamten des Geheimen Staatspolizeiamtes infolge ungenUgender sachlicher
Kenntnisse nicht in der Lage sind, die fUr die Bestimmung der grund-
satzlichen Linie notwendigen Informationen von den Juden einzuholen.-
... Das gute Einvernehmen zwischen dem Hauptamt (SD) und dem Geheimen
Staatspolizeiamt hat sich auch fordernd auf die Zusammenarbeit zwischen
O.A. und Stapoleit- bzw. Stapostellen ausgewirkt, wenn auch nicht Uber-
sehen werden darf, daB sich hier verschiedentlich noch Schwierigkeiten
ergeben. Bei groBeren Fallen konnten diese durch Interventionen beim
Geheimen Staatspolizeiamt bereinigt werden."
34. Report of Hagen on the activity of the anti-Jewish section of the
SD (II 112) of March I, 1939 (passage on Collaboration with the
Gestapo (II B 4) :
" ... Die Beziehungen zum korrespondierenden Sachreferat beim Geheimen
Staatspolizeiamt II B 4 (Regierungsrat Lischka, Regierungsassessor Hulf)
sind sehr gut. Samtliche Fragen des Sachgebietes Judentum werden auf
Grund der grundsatzlichen Stellungnahmen der Abteilung II 112 gemeinsam
erortert. Alle Vorgange, soweit sie fur Stellen bestimmt sind, die
auBerhalb des SD-Hauptamtes und des Geheimen Staatspolizeiamtes liegen,
werden gegengezeichnet. Anweisungen allgemeiner Art werden durch wechsel-
seitige Anregung und wechselseitigen Entwurf gefertigt. - Diese Art von
Zusammenarbeit hat sich insbesondere wahrend der November-Aktion gegen
die Judenschaft bewahrt ... ".
35. See note 34
' ~ i e bereits bestehenden guten Beziehungen zwischen dem Referat II B 4
des Gestapa und der Abteilungen II 112 konnten durch den Funktions-
befehl vom 1.7.37 noch verbessert werden. Die Arbeitsinitiative liegt
im wesentlichen bei der Abteilung II 112."
36. See note 34 :
"An der November-Aktion gegen die Judenschaft haben sich das Hauptamt,
samtliche O.A. und U.A. (Oberabschnitt und Unterabschnitt), teils in der
Exekutive, teils bei der Sicherung des judischen Archiv- und Bibliothek-
materials beteiligt".
82
Notes pp. 17-18
38. Report of Hagen on the activity of the anti-Jewish section of the SD
of July 2, 1938 (passage on the ideologial activity of that section) :
"Da die Heranziehung der Abteilung II 112 zur Schulungsarbeit ... nach
wie vor sehr stark ist, e':weist es sich - wie schon im ersten Tatigkeits-
bericht dargelegt - als notwendig einen wissenschaftlichen Referenten ...
einzusetzen" .
39. Letter of June 28, 1938, from Hagen to Eichmann in which the former
ridicules the representative of Streicher who had come to visit Eichmann
in Vienna and concludes that Eichmann must not accept the invitation
of Streicher to visit him in Nuremberg :
"Lieber Adolf! Wie Du es gewunscht hast, habe ich die Nummer 25 des
'StUrmer' vom Juni 1938, in der Hiemer in einem zwei Seiten langen
vollig leeren Bericht uber seinen Wiener Besuch schreibt, mir genauestens
zu Gemute gefuhrt. Ich mochte nur eines feststellen: daB es Dir trotz
Deiner gewiss nicht abzuleugnenden gr'oBen Beredsamkeit nicht im ent-
ferntesten gelungen ist, dem 'StUrmer' durch Deine sachlichen Mitteilung-
en eine andere Note aufzudrucken ... das wichtigste bleibt Hiemer nach wie
vor der Gestank in den judischen Geschaftsstellen, den er nur mit einem
Taschentuch beheben kann ..... Das tollste StUck scheint mir aber zu sein,
wenn er zu der durchaus erfreulichen Tatsache, daB sehr viele Juden in
Wien wieder zu ihrem Judentum zuruckkehren, folgende Klammerbemerkung
beifUgt :' Zu einer Religion, die die Lehren des Talmuds als oberstes
Gesetz anerkennt! Des Talmuds, der alle Verbrechen an Nichtjuden ge-
stattet!' - wenn ich so etwas hare, fasse ich mich an den Kopf: was denn
die noch eigentlich sollen! Vielleicht tragt der 'Sturmer' zu der radi-
kalen Losung bei, sie urn einen Kopf kurzer zu machen, damit sie gar nicht
erst auf den erfreulichen Gedanken verfallen konnen, sich wieder als
Juden zu bekennen ... Ich werde Dir damit kaum Neues gesagt haben. Du
wirst Dich aber auch nach diesem kleinen Exkurs durch etwas niedere
Geistigkeit daruber zu trosten wissen, daB aus einem Besuch nach Nuren-
berg vorerst nichts werden kann."
7. The SD and the Zionist Emigpation
39.a The prohibition to speak in public which was addressed by the
Gestapo an February 21, 1935 to Professor Martin Buber, signed "Flesch"
and the information that it addressed in this respect "An alle Staats-
polizeistellen" :
" ... Dr. Martin Buber ist zwar Zionist, es wurde jedoch erst jetzt fest-
gestellt, daB er der 'Internationalen Hilfsvereinigung' angehort hat,
die eine Unterorganisation der Roten Hilfe war. Buber ist in letzter
Zeit oft als Redner in judischen Organisationen aufgetreten und hat dabei
insbesondere die linksgerichteten Gruppen in der Judenheit bevorzugt".
40. Report of June 17, 1937, to Heydrich, drawn up by Hagen and signed
by Six, regarding the organization of a fact-finding trip of Eichmann
accompanied by Hagen to Palestine :
"Die judische Kolonisationsarbeit in Palastina soll eingehend studiert
werden. Die Kenntnis von diesen Arbeiten erscheint insbesondere deshalb
wichtig, als nach Proklamation eines Judenstaates oder eines judisch
verwalteten Palastinas Deutschland ein neuer auBenpolitischer Gegner
erwachsen wurde, der die politische Linie des vorderen Ostens entscheidend
beeinfluBen konnte. Zudem wlirde durch die staatliche Konstituierung
fur die in Deutschland ansassigen Juden die Minderheitenfrage akut
werden ... ".
83
Notes pp. 18-20
41. See note 40 :
" Als Gegenleistungen konnten Polkes folgende Zusicherungen gemacht
werden: I) Auf die Reichsvertretung der Juden wird ein Druck dahingehend
ausgeUbt, daB sie die aus Deutschland auswandernden Juden verpflichte-t,
ausschlieBlich nach Palastina, nicht aber in irgend ein anderes Land zu
gehen. - Eine solche MaBnahme liegt durchaus im deutschen Interesse
und wird bereits durch MaBnahmen des Gestapa vorbereitet. - Polkes Plane
zur HerbeifUhrung der jUdischen Majoritat in Palastina wlirden hierdurch
gleichzeitig gefordert werden ... "
41.a Report (November 1937) of Hagen on his fact-finding trip with
Eichmann to Palestine (anti-Jewish passage on the economic activity
of the Jews in Palestine and the adopting of a definite position against
the emigration of the Jews to Palestine) :
"Ein Problem von sehr aktueller Bedeutung ist auch in Agypten die Juden-
frage. Es herrscht bei uns sehr oft die irrtUmliche Ansicht daB es sich
bei der von den Arabern - besonders im Kampf urn die Freiheit des Landes
in Palastina - gezeigten Gegnerschaft gegen die Juden urn einen Rassen-
haB handle. Das ist falsch; vielmehr ist es eine soziale Frage, die
Angst urn das eigene Geschaft. Die Judenfrage hort also in dem Augenblick
auf, ein Problem fUr Agypter zu sein, in dem sich der Jude aus dem
Geschaft heraushalt, das der einheimische Araber fUr sich beansprucht ...
/p.28/ ., (Das) wirtschaftliche Chaos in Palastina wird nicht zuletzt
darauf zurUckgefUhrt, daB die Juden sich gegenseitig betrUgen, weil
sie aus Mangel an Ariern ihre Geschafte nicht mit diesen tatigen konnen.
Bezeichnend fUr die absolute Ungeeignetheit der Juden zur FUhrung einer
geordneten Wirtschaft im eigenen Staat ist die Tatsache daB allein in
Jerusalem 40 jUdische Banken bestehen sollen, die von dem Betrug ihrer
eigenen Rassegenossen leben! /p.41/ ...... ; Da die erwahnte Auswanderung
von 50 000 Juden pro Jahr in der Hauptsache das Judentum in Palastina
starken wUrde, ist dieser Plan unter BerUcksichtigung der Tatsache, daB
von Reichs wegen eine selbststandige Staatsbildung der Juden in Palastina
verhindert werden solI, undiskutabel."
8. The Anticipation of the "Final Solution" Hagen and Eichmann in Vienna
42. Eichmann I, p. 94
43. Eichmann I, pp.96-97
44. Hagen's report of July 2, 1938, on the activity of the anti-Jewish
section of the SD (passage on the action in Austria) :
"Ermittlungserfolge: Als wichtigste sind zu nennen: DurchfUhrung der
gesamten Aktion gegen die jUdischen Organisationen im Lande Osterreich
unter Beteiligung der AuBenbeamten des Geheimen Staatspolizeiamtes.
Neuaufbau der jUdischen Organisationen fUr das Land Osterreich.
Feststellung der internen Vorgange urn die GrUndung des Judenstaates.
Finanzierung der jUdischen Auswanderung aus Osterreich, soweit es die
Devisenverhaltnisse des Reiches zulassen."
45. See note 44 :
"Der SS-U'Stuf. Hagen war in der Zeit vom 10.3. bis 11.4.38 zur Teil-
nahme an den Aktionen in Osterreich nach Wien abkommandiert. SS-U'Stuf.
Eichmann wurde am 16.3.38 zur gleichen Dienstleistung befohlen und wurde
spaterhin mit der FUhrung des dortigen Referates II 112 beauftragt."
84
Note p. 21
46.-Eichmann I, pp. 101-102, Examination of Eichmann during his trial
in Jerusalem (passage on the creation of the 'Zentralstelle fUr
jUdische Auswanderung' in Vienna) :
"Die Schwierigkeiten .. , der Auswanderung wurden in dem MaBe groBer, je
nervoser .. das Streben der einzelnen auswandern-wollenden Juden war,
dem Druck der Parteien und auch in gewissem Sinne der Staatsdienststell-
en zu entgehen, in dieser Nervositat \,lUrden viele Hege unnUtz gemacht,
es wurden andererseits den auswandern-wollenden Juden die Wege aus einer
vielleicht sadistischen Regung heraus von den einzelnen Beamten oder
nicht-beamteten Personal mutwillig erschwert ... Kurz und gut, die Sache
war kontra-produzent und eines Tages sprachen mich Dr.Lowenherz (Pra-
sident der jUdischen Gemeinde in Wien) .. , Dr. Rottenberg .. an und
sagten mir ... : HauptsturmfUhrer so geht es nicht weiter ... ich mochte
doch irgendwie die Sache zentralisieren ... Und ich ging mir zu Rate und
noch am selben Nachmittag hatte ich die Idee geboren, von der ich glaubte,
daB es wiederum beiden Stellen recht ware. Und zwar stellte ich mir ein
laufendes Band vor, vorne kommen das erste Dokument drauf und die ande-
ren Papiere und rUckwarts mUBte dann der Reisepass abfallen. Das Wie
war natUrlich noch vollig unklar ... Als ich das hatte, habe ich ... vor-
geschlagen daB eine Zentralstelle fUr jUdische Auswanderung in Wien
eingerichtet wird, zu der die und die und die behordlichen Instanzen,
die ich namentlich nannte, .... ihrerseits ihre Vertreter, ihre Beamten
entsenden muBten, die saBen nun nebeneinander an diesem langen laufenden
Band, unter Aufsicht eines Angehorigen des SD-Oberabschnittes Hien, der
ich war".
-Hagen's report of January IS, 1938, on the activity of the anti-
Jewish section of the SD (passage on the administrative obstacles to
the Jewish emigration and the necessity of co-ordination between the
diverse ministries) :
"Es wurde bereits in einem groBeren Bericht an C (Chef:Heydrich) darge-
legt, daB die DurchfUhrung der Arbeit der Abteilung II 112 insbesondere
auf dem Gebiet der Forderung der Auswanderung in erheblichem MaBe durch
die falsche personelle Besetzung derjenigen Stellen beeintrachtigt wird,
die sich, zum Teil befugt, zum Teil unbefugt, mit der Judenfrage im
Reiche befassen. Es war bereits bei C gebeten worden, eine Besprechung
mit den Ministerien herbeizufUhren urn hierin eine Klarung zu treffen.
Insbesondere ist die starke Gegenarbeit des Reichswirtschaftsminister-
iums zu erwahnen".
-Hagen's report of January 17, 1939, on the activity of the anti-
Jewish section of the SD (passage concerning the unification of all
the Jewish social organizations and of the administration of the emi-
gration) :
' ~ u f Grund der Vorarbeiten der Abteilung II 112 im alten Reichsgebiet
und in Osterreich wurde im AnschluB an die November-Aktion gegen die
Judenschaft - wah rend der laufend Ermittlungserfolge erzielt wurden -
der Vorschlag zur Vereinigung samtlicher jUdischer Organisationen sowie
zur Errichtung von Zentralstellen fUr die jUdische Auswanderung gemacht.
-Die Vorschlage sind vom Feldmarschall Goring und allen beteiligten
Ministerien ohne Anderung angenommen worden .... Ais gut und erfolgreich
hat sich der Eingriff der Abteilung II 112 in die endgUltige Bereinigung
der Vorbereitung der jUdischen Auswanderung erwiesen. Durch die aus-
schlieBlich vom SD errichtete Zentralstelle fUr jUdische Auswanderung in
Wien wurde die Moglichkeit zur Erwagung des Plans zur Errichtung gleicher
Stellen im Reichsgebiet geschaffen ... "
85
Notes pp. 21-24
47. Letter from Eichmann to Hagen, l(or 3) May 1938 :
"Lieber Herbert! ... Am Freitag n. Woche erscheint die erste Nummer der
'Zionistischen Rundschau'. Ich habe mir die Hanuskripte einsenden lassen
und bin gerade bei der langweiligen Arbeit der Zensur. Die Zeitung
geht Euch selbstverstandlich auch zu. Es wird 'meine'
Zeitung werden ... Ieh habe von der Kultusgemeinde und dem zion. Landes-
verband eine Auswanderungszahl von 20 000 mittel loser Juden fUr die
Zeit vom 1.4.38 - 1.5.39 verlangt, mir auch zusagten, einhalten
zu wollen ... In ganz ZUgen ist die Lage der Dinge jetzt folgende:
Arisierung, Juden in der Wirtschaft noch (7) behandelt It. (laut 7)
Gauleiter BUrkel. - Das wei taus sehwierigere Kapitel, diese Juden
zur Auswanderung zu bringen ist Aufgabe des SD."
48. Report of June 17, 1938, of the Kommando taking inventory of the
Jewish archives seized in Vienna :
"Ferner wurde in den Akten der 'Union' das Schreiben eines Theodor
Krisshaber an Siegmund Freund, ein Mitglied der 'Union', aus dem Juni
1936 entdeckt, in dem er mitteilt, er seit mehr als 4 Jahren eine
geheime, erfolgreiche Abwehraktion gegen den Nationalsozialismus und
Antisemitismus leitet und mit allen Beharden in laufender Verbindung
steht ... - Der Originalbrief mit Abschriften wurde sofort U'stuf. Hagen
zugeleitet, urn feststellen zu lassen, ob der Fall Krisshaber bekannt ist.
Gegebenenfalls sofort durch den O.A. Osterreich Ermittlungen
angestellt bzw. die Verhaftung durchgefUhrt werden ... "
9. The Effopts of Hagen to Jewish Emigpation in Vapious Countpies
49. Eichmann I, pp. 3418-3419
50. Hagen's report of December 12, 1937, on the anti-Jewish activity
of the II 112 (passage on the internationalizing of the Jewish Question):
"DarUber hinaus wurde mit der systematischen Erfassung des Weltjudentums
begonnen (zum Teil durch direkte FUhlungnahme), weil die Entscheidungen
Uber die weitere Lasung der Judenfrage in Deutschland eine genaue
Kenntnis der leitenden jUdischen Weltorganisationen voraussetzen."
52. Hahne, p. 319, Notice of Hagen of June 15, 1939 :
"Mit allen Kraften Auswanderungen fordern. Einwanderung der Juden immer
schwieriger. Alle Auswanderungsplane, wohin auch, fardern."
- Hagen's notice to his section of the SD (undated) on the
"Madagascar" project:
"Ich bitte in der nachsten Zeit Material zusammenzustellen fUr eine
Denkschrift an C (Chef Heydrich), die gemeinsam mit II B 4 zusammenge-
stellt werden soll. Es soll darin klar gelegt werden, die Judenfrage
auf der augenblicklichen Basis nicht zu lasen ist (finanzielle Schwierig-
keiten usw.) und man daran herantreten eine
Lasung zu finden, wie sie bereits zwischen Polen und Frankreich ver-
hanelt wurde Notiz von Nov.38 (7):
'Uberholt')."
- Note from Dannecker from Vienna, March 24,1938,To the SD II 112
for Hagen :
" ... Bei den Wiedervorlagen findet sich eine Notiz an II 1123, die II 1123
anweist, Material fUr eine Denkschrift an C zusammenzustellen. Diese
Denkschrift soll darstellen, die Judenfrage auf der augenblicklichen
Basis nicht gelost werden Lasung)."
86

Notes pp. 25-26
10. The Men of the II-ii? Confponted "'ith the Jews
54. Letter from Hagen to the Czech journalist Jelinek, editor of the
review "Znova", concerning the propaganda to be developed in Czecho-
slovakia in the Jewish question :
Herr Jelinek! Da das Judengesetz im Protektorat ja noch nicht
veraffentlicht ist - die GrUnde liegen wohl darin, man auf deutscher
Seite mit der vorliegenden religiasen Fassung Ihrer Regierung nicht ein-
verstanden ist - , ist Ihnen die beste Gelegenheit gegeben, weiterhin
propagandistisch fUr ihre rassische Auffassung der Judenfrage zu wirken.
Ich machte Ihnen nachfolgend einige Vorschlage dafUr geben, wie die
Propaganda weiterzufUhren ware: ... "
55. Hagen's report of February 9, 1938 on the activity of the SD in the
area of Fulda-Werra :
"BezUglich der personellen Besetzung brachte er zum Ausdruck, das
Referat gemeinsam mit dem Referat II I I I durch einen Referenten,
SS O'Scharf. Henrich, bearbeitet werde, dem keine Hilfskraft zur Ver-
fUgung stUnde. Henrich wurde von Hoffmann als Referent dargestellt,
der zwar einen guten Willen und Arbeitseifer zeigte, infolge seiner
Jugend (22 Jahre) und seiner mangelnden Harte bei den notwendigen Ver-
handlungen mit den Juden fUr den Posten aber nicht geeignet sei."
56. The recollections of B. Lasener, responsible for reports of racial
questions at the Ministery of Interior of the Reich (p.292) :
"Die Korridore von den unterschiedlichen BUros in den alten Prunkzimmern,
die die Auswanderer zu durchlaufen hatten, waren gedrangt voll von jUd-
ischen Menschen, die fort muBten oder wollten. Einen von ihnen anzu-
sprechen hatte ieh nicht den Mut, denn auch ich fUhlte mich unter der
Aufsicht Eichmanns, der zwar haflich, sogar betont aufmerksam war, dessen
elslge Entschlossenheit man aber in jedem Augenblick spUrte. Frauen
rissen in den UberfUllten Korridoren ihre Kinder erschreckt beiseite,
sobald sie Eichmann sahen, der unbekUmmert wie auf leerer dahin-
ging und alles beiseite stieB, was da an menschliehem UnglUck harrte.
Ich folgte in seinem Kielwasser, bekam dieselben Blicke wie er, und mir
war elend genug zu Ilute ... Eichmann fiihrte mich auch in das BUro der
Synagogengemeinde in der Leopoldstadt, wo er mich als Referenten des
lnnenministeriums aus Berlin vorher angesagt hatte. Als ich ankam, sah
ich eine Anzahl von Juden dort auf mehreren StUhlen, auf denen sie
offensichtlich schon stundenlang auf mich gewartet hatten. Sie sprangen
sofort hoch, als wir eintraten; es waren die Bearbeiter der verschieden-
en Angelegenheiten der Synagogengemeinde Wien. Eichmann rief sie kurz
bei Namen auf, sagte mir ebenso kurz, worUber sie Vortrag zu halten
hatten, und sofort schnurrten sie wie dressierte Tiere ihre Angaben her-
unter. Der Ausdruck berechtigter Todesangst war auf jedem Gesicht zu
lesen."
87
Notes pp. 27-28
1.7. The Passage to the Final solution in the Re1:ch (J 938-193.9)
57. A few extracts from the deliberations of the authorities of the
Third Reich involved in the solution of the Jewish question who met
at the Ministery of Aviation under Goring's presidency on Nov. 12, 1938
(af ter the pogrom of Nov. 10) :
"Goring: Heine Herren, die heutige Sitzung ist von entscheidender Be-
deutung. Ich habe einen Brief bekornrnen, den mir der Stabs leiter des
Stellvertreters des FUhrers Bormann im Auf trag des FUhrers geschrieben
hat, wonach die Judenfrage jetzt einheitlich zusarnrnengefaBt werden soll
und so oder so zur Erledigung zu bringen ist. Durch telephonischen
Anruf bin ich gestern vom FUhrer noch einmal dar auf hingewiesen worden,
jetzt die entscheidenden Schritte zentral zusammenzufaBen. - Da das
Problem in der Hauptsache ein umfangreiches wirtschaftliches Problem ist,
wird hier der Hebel angesetzt werden mUssen. Selbstverstandlich ergeben
sich daraus auch eine Reihe rechtlicher MaBnahmen, die sowohl in das
Gebiet des Justizministers wie des Innenministers fallen, dann die
daraus zu folgernden PropagandamaBnahmen, die in das Gebiet des Herrn
Propagandaministers selbstverstandlich auch HaBnahmen des
Finanzministers und des Wirtschaftsministers . ... - Bei der Arisierung
der Wirtschaft ist der Grundgedanke folgender: Der Jude wird aus der
Wirtschaft ausgeschieden und tritt seine WirtschaftsgUter an den Staat
abo Er wird dafUr entschadigt. Die Entschadigung wird im Schuldbuch ver-
merkt und wird ihm zu einem bestirnrnten Prozentsatz verzinst. Davon hat
er zu leben ... - Der Treuhander des Staates schatzt das Geschaft ab und
bestirnrnt welchen Betrag der Jude bekornrnt. Dieser Betrag ist selbstver-
standlich an sich schon moglichst niedrig zu halten. Das Geschaft wird
dann von der Treuhand in arischen Besitz UberfUhrt, und hierbei ist der
Aufschlag zu erzielen d.h. das Geschaft ist entsprechend seinem norm-
alen tatsachlichen Verkehrswert und Bilanzwert an den Mann zu bringen. -
Hier setzen Schwierigkeiten ein. Es ist menschlich verstandlich, daB in
starkem MaBe versucht wird, in diese Geschafte Parteigenossen hineinzu-
bringen und ihnen so gewisse Entschadigungen zu geben. Ich habe da ent-
setzliche Dinge in der Vergangenheit gesehen: daB sich kleine Chauffeure
von Gauleitern derart bereichert haben, daB sie auf diese Weise schlieB-
lich eine halbe Million Vermogen an sich gebracht haben .... - Das sind
natUrlich Dinge, die unmoglich sind ...
Heydrich: Sachschaden, Inventar- und Warenschaden schatzen wir auf
mehrere hundert Millionen .... 7 500 zerstorte im Reich .....
Goring: Mir ware lieber gewesen, ihr hattet 200 Juden erschlagen und
hattet nicht solche Werte vernichtet.
Heydrich: 35 Tote sind es.
... - Heydrich:Bei allem herausnehmen des Juden aus dem Wirtschaftsleben
bleibt das Grundproblem letzten Endes doch irnrner, daB der Jude aus
Deutschland herauskornrnt ... Wir haben in Wien auf Weisung des Reichs-
kornrnissars eine Judenauswanderungszentrale eingerichtet, durch die wir
in Osterreich irnrnerhin 50 000 Juden herausgebracht haben, wahrend im
Altreich in der gleichen Zeit nur 19 000 Juden herausgebracht werden
konnten ... Wir haben das in der Form gemacht, daB wir den' reichen Juden,
die auswandern wollten, bei der jUdischen Kultusgemeinde eine gewisse
Surnrne abgefordert haben. Hit dieser Summe und Devisenauszahlungen konnte
eine Anzahl der arrnen Juden herausgebracht werden. Das Problem war ja
nicht, die reichen Juden herauszukriegen, sondern das jUdische Mob ...
Darf ich vorschlagen, daB wir eine ahnliche Zentrale im Reich unter
Beteiligung der zustandigen Reichsbehorden einrichten und daB wir auf
Grund dieser Erfahrungen unter Abstellung der mit Recht vom Herrn
88
Notes pp. 27-29
Generalmarschall kritisierten Fehler eine Losung fUr das Reich finden? -
Das zweite, urn die Juden herauszubekornrnen, mUBte eine Auswanderungsaktion
fUr das Judentum im Ubrigen Reich sein, die sich auf mindestens 8 bis
10 Jahre erstreckt. Wir kriegen im Jahr nicht mehr als hochstens
8 bis 10 000 Juden heraus. Es bleibt also eine Unzahl Juden drin. Durch
die Arisierungen und die sonstigen Beschrankungen wird natUrlich das
Judentum arbeitslos. Wirerleben eine Verproletarisierung des zurUck-
bleibenden Judentums. Ich muB also in Deutschland solche MaBnahmen
treffen, daB sie auf der einen Seite isolieren, damit er nicht
in den normalen Lebenskreis des Deutschen eintritt. Ich muB aber auf der
anderen Seite Moglichkeiten schaffen, die den Juden auf einen engsten
Kundenkreis beschranken, aber eine bestirnrnte Betatigung zulassen, in der
Rechtsanwaltfrage, Arztfrage, Friseurfrage usw ... Jeder Jude im Sinne
der NUrenberger Gesetze muB ein bestirnrntes Abzeichen tragen ... Das Ghetto
in der Form vollkornrnen abgesonderter Stadtteile, wo nur Juden sind, halte
ich polizeilich nicht fUr durchfUhrbar .... Als MaBnahme wUrde ich ferner
vorschlagen, daB man aile personlichen Berechtigungen wie Zulassungs-
scheine und FUhrerscheine den Juden entzieht ... ihn weiterhin in seiner
FreizUgigkeit durch Aufenthaltsverbote beschrankt ... Des weiteren was
Minister Dr. Goebbels vorhin sagte: AusschlieBung der Juden von offent-
lichen Theatern, Kinos, usw ...
Goring: lch werde den Wortlaut wahlen, daB die deutschen Juden in ihrer
Gesamtheit als Strafe fUr die ruchlosen Verbrechen usw. usw. eine Kon-
tribution von I Milliarde auferlegt bekornrnen ... - Das zweite ist folgen-
des: wenn das Deutsche Reich in irgend einer absehbaren Zeit in au Ben-
politischen Konflikt kornrnt, so ist es selbstverstandlich, daB auch wir
in Deutschland in aller erster Linie daran denken werden, eine groBe
Abrechnung an den Juden zu vollziehen. DarUber hinaus wird der
jetzt endlich einen auBenpolitischen VorstoB machen zunachst bei den
Machten, die die Judenfrage aufgeworfen haben, urn dann tatsachlich zur
Losung der Madagaskar-Frage zu kornrnen. Das hat er mir am 9. November
auseinandergesetzt. Es geht nicht mehr anders. Er will auch den anderen
Staaten sagen: 'Was redet ihr irnrner von den Juden? - Nehmt sie!'
Dann kann man noch einen Vorschlag machen: die reichen Juden konnen in
Nordamerika, Kanada oder sonstwo ein groBes Territorium fUr ihre Glau-
bensgenossen kaufen."
58. Decree of January 24, 1939, from Goring,
the responsibility for the emigration of the
(passage defining this mission):
in which he gives Heydrich
Jews from Germany
"Die Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland ist mit allen Mitteln zu
fordern. - 1m Reichministerium des Innern wird aus Vertretern der Be-
teiligten Dienststellen eine Reichszentrale fUr die jUdische Auswanderung
gebildet ... - Die Leitund der Reichszentrale Ubernirnrnt der Chef der
Sicherheitspolizei. Er bestirnrnt den GeschaftsfUhrer und regelt die Ge-
schaftsfUhrung der Reichszentrale. - tiber die Arbeit der Reichszentrale
ist mir laufend zu berichten. Vor grundsatzlichen MaBnahmen ist meine
Entscheidung einzuholen ... "
89
Notes pp. 29-30
59. H.G. Adler, p. 20, his opinion on the role of the Reichsvereinigung
der Juden in Deutschland (RVJD) :
"Die noch notigen Agenda wurden von einer neuen Organi ation
die aber gleichfalls 'Reichsvereinigung der Juden Deutschlands' hieB ...
Typisch fUr die Einrichtung der Befehlswege im nationalsozialistischen
Regime, entstanden 'gleichgeschaltete Bahnen' : das Referat IV B 4
erteilte seine 'Weisungen' a) der RVJD, b) durch Vermittlung der RVJD
deren Zweigstellen, c) an die lokalen Stapostellen, d) Uber die Stapo-
stellen an die Zweigstellen der RVJD oder direkt an die jUdischen Ge-
meinden. - Der klaglosen Abwicklung der Deportation war durch diese
Einrichtung hervorragend vorgearbeitet, ja es bedurfte kaum noch einer
weiteren Entwicklung, urn mit den jetzt hergestellten und bald einge-
spiel ten Befehlsverhaltnissen mUhelos fUr das Verderben zu operieren,
wahrend der Auswanderung ... damit nur wenig gedient wurde, wenn wir
es auch gelten lassen, daB es in dem GestrUpp schwierig zu erfUllender
und oft einander widersprechender Vorschriften fUr die Auswanderung das
Zentralamt doch als eine gelegentlich klarende Koordinationsstelle wirkte,
die das fast unmogliche zu einem gUnstigen AbschluB bringen konnte."
60. Hagen's report of March I, 1939, on the anti-Jewish activity of the
II 112 (SD) (passage on the role of the Gestapo and the SD) :
"Bei der Vorbereitung der Reichszentralstelle fUr jUdische Auswanderung
und der Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland hat II 112, da die
Vorschlage von der Sachabteilung gemacht worden waren, ursprUnglich die
Verhandlungen gefUhrt. Eine Veranderung hierin hat erst stattgefunden,
nachdem die Reichszentralstelle fUr jUdische Auswanderung dem Chef der
Sicherheitspolizei unterstellt wurde."
61. Note of Hagen, May 25, 1939, on the information given to two regional
Chiefs (O.A.:Oberabschnitt) on the reorganization of the anti-Jewish
action :
"In Gegenwart von SS-O'Scharf. Dannecker wurde ihnen ein Uberblick Uber
die Situation auf dem Gebiet des Judentums gegeben, insbesondere nach
Veranderung der Sachlage durch die Ubergabe der Leitung der Reichs-
zentralstelle fUr jUdische Auswanderung an einen Beamten der Geheimen
Staatspolizei ... Bolte betonte, daB die Stapostellen die Bildung von
Ortsstellen begrUBen wUrden. Er wurde angewiesen, sofort nach AbschluB
der Verhandlungen Uber die Errichtung der Ortsstellen nach hier zu be-
richten. - RR Lischka wurde von dieser Vereinbarung unterrichtet mit dem
besonderen Hinweis darauf, daB auch die Stapostellen dies begrUBen wUr-
den ... AbschlieBend wurden sie Uber die Lage des Judentums und die Be-
handlung der Juden im Protektoratsgebiet unterrichtet. Da beabsichtigt
sei, die Behandlung des innerdeutschen Judentums, soweit es moglich sei,
durch den SD fallen zu lassen, sei geplant, das Judentum des Auslands ...
in die Arbeit der Abteilung II 112 einzubeziehen. Aus diesem Grunde wur-
den beide gebeten, sich heute schon intensiv urn aile Vorgange Uber das
Judentum in Polen zu bemUhen."
90
Note p. 31
13. Eichmann's Task from Septembm
o
1939 to Mar'ch J941
62. Express letter of September 21, 1939, from Heydrich to the chiefs of
all the combat units of the Sipo (combat units in action in the Polish
territories) on the Jewish question in the region occupied :
"rch nehme Bezug auf die ,heute in Berlin stattgefundene Besprechung und
weise noch einmal darauf hin, daB die geplanten GesamtmaBnahmen (also
das Endziel) streng geheim zu halten sind. - Es ist zu unterscheiden
zwischen I) dem Endziel (welches langere Fristen beansprucht) und
2) den Abschnitten der ErfUllung dieses Endzieles (welche kurzfristig
durchgefUhrt werden). - Die geplanten MaBnahmen erfordern grUndliche ,
Vorbereitung sowohl in technischer, als auch in wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht.
I Ais erste Voraussetzung fUr das Endziel gilt zunachst die Konzentrier-
ung der Juden vom Land in die groBeren Stadte. Sie ist mit Beschleunig-
ung durchzufUhren. - Es ist dabei zu unterscheiden: I) zwischen den Ge-
bieten Danzig und WestpreuBen, Posen Ostoberschlesien und 2) den Ubrigen
besetzten Gebieten. - Nach Moglichkeit soli das unter Ziffer I) erwahnte
Gebiet von Juden freigemacht werden ... - Dieser EriaB gilt nicht fUr das
Gebiet der Einsatzgruppe welche etwa, ostlich von Krakau liegend, um-
grenzt wird von Polanice, Jaroslaw, der neuen Demarkationslinie und der
bisher slowakisch polnischen Grenze. Innerhalb dieses Gebietes ist led-
iglich eine befehlsmaBige Judenzahlung durchzufUhren. -
II JUdische Altestenrate ..... - ... AIs BegrUndung fUr die Konzentrier-
ung der Juden in die Stadte hat zu gel ten, daB sich die Juden maBgeblich
an den FranktireurUberfallen und PIUnderungsaktionen beteiligt haben ...
Die Konzentrierung der Juden in den Stadten wird wahrscheinlich aus
allgemein sicherheitspolizeilichen GrUnden Anordnungen in diesen Stadten
bedingen, daB den Juden bestimmte Stadtviertel Uberhaupt verboten werden,
daB sie stets jedoch unter BerUcksichtigung der wirtschaftlichen Not-
wendigkeiten - z.B. das Ghetto nicht verlassen, zu einer bestimmten Zeit
nicht mehr ausgehen durfen usw ... -
III Aile erforderlichen MaBnahmen sind grundsatzlich stets im engsten
Benehmen und Zusammenwirken mit den deutschen Zivilverwaltungs und ort-
lich zustandigen Militarbehorden zu'treffen. Bei der DurchfUhrung ist Zu
berUcksichtigen, daB die wirtschaftliche Sicherung der besetzten Gebiete
keinen Schaden leidet ....
63. Seifert, p. 88 , "Der Jude an der Ostgrenze" put out by the publish-
ing house of the NSDAP in 1941 (passage on the project of a Juden-
reservat)
"Das sind natUrlich alles nur Vorbereitungen zur Losung der Judenfrage.
Wie diese endgUltig aussehen wird, darUber heute zu sprechen, ware ver-
frUht. Man sprach eine zeitlang von einem jUdischen Siedlungsgebiet im
Lubliner Bezirk, einer Art Reservat fUr die Juden. Dort waren sie unter
sich und mUBten ausnahmsweise einmal ihr Leben und die Notwendigkeiten
dieses Lebens in jeder Beziehung selbst organisieren. - Es ist kein
Zweifel, daB dieses jUdische Siedlungsgebiet zumindestens eine Losung
ware, die das Reich vor den Juden, das deutsche Volk vor ihrem Parasiten-
tum und ihrer Zersetzungsarbeit schUtzen wlirde. Das deutsche Volk konnte
aufatmen, wenn es auf diese Weise die 330 000 Volljuden, die im Mai 1933
bei der Volkszahlung festgestellt wurden, aus dem Reich loswerden wUrde.
Doch auch das Judenreservat bei Lublin ware keine endgultige Lasung. Die
kann nur erreicht werden auf der Grundlage der Erkenntnis, daB der Jude
nicht in die Welt und in den Siedlungsraum der weiBen Menschen gehort,
sondern in die der farbigen. In ihrem Lebensgebiet wird also auch am
besten das kUnftige Siedlungsland der Juden Zu suchen sein. Aber wir
brauchen uns mit dieser Frage heute noch nicht weiter Zu beschaftigen.
91
Notes pp. 31-34
Vorlaufig gibt uns der Krieg seine Aufgaben, und der Sieg wird das
deutsche Volk vor neue, noch groBere Aufgaben stellen, von denen die
meisten wichtiger sein werden als das Problem des Judenreservats. Noch
ist das letzte Wort nicht gesprochen, aber es wird gesprochen werden zur
rechten Stunde aus maBgeblichem Mund, urn Volk und Reich endgUltig zu
befreien vom Fluch Europas, vom JUDEN AN DER OSTGRENZE!
64. Adler, pp. 125-126 and PS-2278 p.14, Report on the inspection trip
of Seyss-Inquart, as substitute for the Governor General, in the terri-
tories of the General Government in November 1939 (passage concerning
the efficacity of the project for a Jewish reserve not far from Lublin)
"Dieses Gebiet mit seinem stark sumpfigen Charakter konnte nach den
Erwagungen des Distriktgouverneurs Schmidt als Judenreservat dienen,
welche MaBnahme wohlmoglich eine starke Dezimierung der Juden herbei-
fUhren konnte."
65. Adler, p. 129
66. Bulletin-Document nO 22
67. Eichmann 2 , nO 1492 , Hand-written autobiography of Eichmann
(passage on his beginnings as chief of the service of Jewish affairs
of the RSHA) pp.87-88

"Es mag etwa FrUhjahr 1940 gewesen sein, da wurde mir das Referat IV B 4
des Amtes IV, das bis dahin ein SS-Stubf. Reg.Rat Lischka innehatte
durch eine VerfUgung des Amtschefs IV Ubertragen mit SS-HptStuf.GUnther
als standigen Vertreter. Aus GrUnden, die ihre Ursache im Raummangel
hatten, wurde das Referat, wie einige andere Referate des Amtes IV auch,
auBerhalb untergebracht 'und zwar in der KurfUrstenstraBe 116. - Nebst
Mobilar kamen die bis dahin unter Lischka diensttuenden Beamten ...
Spater kamen noch hinzu: SS-Stbf. Reg.Rat Suhr, Reg.Ass. Huntsche (er
kam von der Justiz) und Reg.Ass. Boshammer. - Sie fUhrten, wie ge-
wohnlich staatspolizeiliche Arbeiten wie bisher weiter. Eine Tatigkeit,
die sowohl GUnther als auch mir bis dahin fremd war. Aber es waren alles
eingearbeitete Beamte, die ihre Vorschriften genau kannten, Vorschriften
(Weisungen, Befehle, Gesetze, Verordnungen, Erlasse), in die GUnther
und ich mich nun auch 'hineinknien' muBten und studierten. -
Dr. Rajakowitsch, der sich beim Ausbruch des Krieges 1939 freiwillig
meldete, kam auch nach Berlin; er war wie stets ein auBerordentlich
gemaBigter und kluger Jurist, auf des sen Hilfe ich deswegen nicht gerne
verzichtete , weil er die lebendige praktische Juristik und nicht die
trockene Behordenjuristerei verkorperte."
68. Statement of M.Luther (Auswartiges Amt) on the Jewish question,
August 1942 :
"Der Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich sah sich als erster genotigt, am
27.9.40 eine Verordnung Uber die Behandlung der Juden im besetzten
Frankreich zu erlassen ... Nach dem Muster der Pariser Verordnung sind
gleiche Verordnungen in den Niederlanden und in Belgien erlassen "orden".
92
Notes pp. 34-36
Eichmann I, p. 716 , Passage from the interrogatory of Eichmann for the
preliminary investigation of the trial in Jerusalem:
"Die Endlosung der Judenfrage selbst - also ieh meine jetzt mal diesen
Sonderauftrag z.B., den Heydrieh bekommen hat - urn es mal ganz krass
zu sagen -die Totung - war kein Reichsgesetz gewesen - das war ein
FUhrerbefehl gewesen, ein sogenannter FUhrerbefehl. Und Himmler und
Heydrich und der Chef des Verwaltungs- und Wirtsehaftshauptamtes
haben sich als Chefs nun in diesen Fiihrerbefehl geteilt. Naeh der da-
mal igen Rechtsauffassllng, die allgemein war, hieB es 'FUhrerworte
haben Gesetzeskraft'. Das ist eine bekannte Sache, die nicht nur in
diesem Fall, sondern in allen Fallen - auch von allen Zentralinstanzen -
entsprechend gewertet werden muBte. FUhrerworte haben Gesetzeskraft -
so hieB es immer und allenthalben ... "
PART TWO
THE ORDERS FOR THE "FINAL SOLUTION" OF THE JEl-JISH QUESTION
7. The Order of the FUhrer (del' FUhrer-bej'eM) 'in General
70, H, Frank, "1m Angesicht des Galgens", pp. 322-323 :
"Die Gefolgschaftshybris fUhrte Gedanken und Plane des FUhrers selbst-
tatig, in sieh stets Ubernehmender Weise und dessen ursprUngliche
Worte oder Grundsatze oder Auftrage verklarend-steigernd, weit Uber
jene Grenzen aus, die Hitler sich selbst oft gezogen hatte. Es war also
eine Hybris der Ubersteigerten Dienstwilligkeit. Himmler und Bormann
zum Beispiel maehten oft aus Tischbemerkungen des FUhrers, die dieser
gelegentlich fallen lieB, 'groBe konkrete Auftrage' , oder holten sieh
dabei Vollmachten fUr ihr Handeln. Die Gesehiehte des ganzen spateren
Dritten Reiches ist vall von solehen Ubersteigert vollzogenen FUhrer-
vollmachten. Doch er selbst war dann in der Regel in seiner Angst, fUr
'nieht radikal genug' angesehen werden zu konnen, zu schwach, diese
Ubertreibungen zurUckzupfeifen."
71. R. Diels, "Lucifer antePortas", pp. 91 and 255 :
"Alle diese Initiatoren und Exekutoren wirkten als ein durch das
die Ausartungen der Hitlerschen Vitalitat auf das AuBerste gesteigert
wurden. In ihrer Mitte wurden die skurilen Ideen geboren, die sieh in
seinem Kopf in totalitare Endlosungen verwandelten. - ... Mit Himmler
hat Bormann die kultisehe Erhebung harmloser AuBerungen Hitlers zu
'FUhrerbefehlen' mit rigorosester Gesetzeskraft betrieben. Ais der
Kreis geschlossen war, eilten sie bald den WUnschen, ja den Traumen des
Halbgottes voraus."
72. Otto Dietrich, p. 153 :
"Hitler gab seine dienstlichen Befehle nicht schriftlieh formuliert und
bUromaBig registriert, sondern mUndlieh-impulsiv aus dem Stegreif an
diejenigen, die gerade in seiner Nahe standen, mit dem Auftrag,sie
mUndlich oder telefoniseh an die zustandigen Stellen weiterzuleiten ...
Militarische und sonstige Dienststellen, die gewohnt waren, unter-
sehriebene Befehle zu erhalten, kamen in Konflikte, als von Hitler
beilaufig in der Unterhaltung gegebene Anrodnungen nicht als solche
erkannt und deshalb nicht ausgefUhrt worden waren. Es kam haufiger vor,
daB Hitler Besuehern, die unter unpolitischem, fUr Hitler angenehmen
93
Notes pr. 36-38
Vorwand gekommen waren, aber eine gute Laune oder gute Gelegenheit fur
ihre Zwecke ausnutzten, unter vier Augen etwas zusagte oder vielleicht
auch nicht abschlagen konnte, was dann von diesen selbstandig als
'Fuhrerbefehl' in Umlauf gesetzt wurde und Verwirrung ausloste, da es
einem anderen 'Fuhrerbefehl' diametral entgegenstand."
73. H. Picker, "Hitlers Tischgesprache", p. 511
"Diesen wirklichen Hitler, der bei allem Fanatismus so bedurfnislos-
schlicht und zuruckhaltend auftrat, ohne Tendenz und Pose zu Uherliefern
... in seinem Abtasten des ZukUnftigen, in seinem Zogern bei Ungewissem
und in seinen Hemrnungen vor 'letzten Konsequenzen a 1a Stalin' ... von
ihm im Sinne einer historisch-psychologischen Studie gerade auch die
intimen, unauffalligen, ja eventuell sagar lacherlichen Charakteristika
festzuhalten, das war das Ziel, das mich reizte."
74. B. v. Schirach, p. 282 :
"Reichsleiter Bormann hatte bei Hitler durchgesetzt, dall er bei jeder ~
politischen und militarischen Besprechung in den Hauptquartieren zugegen
war. Er machte sich unablassig Notizen und sorgte bald dafur, daB Steno-
grafen jedes Wort Hitlers festhielten, auch bei Tisch. Die Niederschrif-
ten sammelte Bormann in riesigen Panzerschranken, geordnet nach Sach-
gebieten, Namen und Daten. So wurde Bormann zum Gedachtnis Hitlers ...
Auf Bormanns Schreibtisch landeten schlieBlich aIle Briefe, Eingaben und
Beschwerden, die an Hitler gerichtet waren. Die meisten davon bekam
Hitler gar nicht zu sehen. Bormann lieB sich aus seinen Panzerschranken
die Xullerungen Hitlers zu dem jeweiligen Themengebiet heraussuchen und
fallte dann im Sinne und im Namen seines Herrn die Antworten abo Oft hatte
Hitler im Laufe der Jahre zu ein und demselben Thema die widersprUchlich-
sten Meinungen geauBert - Bormann wahlte stets die radikalste, brutalste.
Und Hitler deckte Bormann immer."
75. F. Hossbach, "Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler", p.35 :
"Es ist gar kein Zweifel, daB die Dinge auf eigenmachtiges Betreiben von
Parteistellen haufig eine Entwicklung nahmen, die mit Hitlers eigenen
Absichten ursprunglich nicht im Einklang stand. Er war in solchen Fallen
mehr der getriebene als der treihende Teil und identifizierte sich nach-
traglich aus RUcksicht auf seine Anhangerschaft mit den Vorgangen, die
er anfangs nicht oder anders gewollt hatte. Doch griff er auch manche
vollendete Tatsache, vor die er gestellt wurde, mit Leidenschaft auf
und machte sie sich innerlich zu eigen."
76. Domarus, p. 418 , Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on July 13, 1934,
after the operation against Rohm and the SA :
"Die Notwendigkeit des eigenen Vorgehens der SA wurde begrundet mit dem
Hinweis auf meine EntschluBunfahigkeit, die erst dann behoben sein wlirde,
wenn Tatsachen geschaffen werden."
7.7. R. Olden, "Hitler", p. 316 (passage concerning the action against Rohm
and the SA) :
"Warum die Entscheidung so hinausgezogert wurde, daB sie zur Katastrophe
ausartete, dafUr gibt es nur eine plausible Erklarung: weil Hitler, der
FUhrer, selbst weit entfernt davon ist, zu den Starken zu zahlen. Ware
er sonst der weibischen Anbetung der Starkeren verfallen? Seine Schwache
hat ihn verhindert, rechtzeitig die Entwicklung der SA zu bestimmen.
Seine Schwache hat ihn Blomberg und Rohm zugleich Versprechungen geben
lassen, die unvereinbar sind.
lI
94
Notes pp. 38-40
2. Publi" AmlOlu:ements of the "Final Sotution" by the FUhrer and
Chancellor of the Reich
78. Domarus, p. 1058, Hitler's speech of January 30, 1939, to the
Reichstag :
"Ich will heute wieder ein Prophet sein: Wenn es dem internationalen
Finanzjudentum in und aullerhalb Europas gelingen sollte, die Volker
noch einmal in einen Weltkrieg zu sturzen, dann wird das Ergebnis nicht
die Bolschewisierung der Erde und damit der Sieg des Judentums sein,
sondern die Vernichtung der jUdischen Rasse in Europa."
79. Minutes of the reception of the Czeck Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Chalkovsky, by Hitler, January 21, 1939, Akten p. 170
"Der Fuhrer: Bei uns wUrden die Juden vernichtet. Den 9.November 1918
hat ten die Juden nicht umsonst gemacht, dieser Tag wUrde geracht werden.
Aber in der Tschechoslowakei vergiften die Juden heute noch das Volk."
80. Domarus, p. 1663, Hitler's speech of January 30, 1941 to the
Reichstag :
"Und nicht vergessen mochte ich den Hinweis, den ich schon einmal, am
I. September 1939, im Deutschen Reichstag gegeben habe. Den Hinweis
darauf namlich, daB wenn die andere Welt von dem Judentum in einen all-
gemeinen Krieg gestUrzt wlirde, das gesamte Judentum seine Rolle in
Europa ausgespielt haben wird!"
81. Domarus, p. 1829, Speech of Hitler on January 30, 1942 to the
Reichstag:
"Wir sind uns dabei im klaren darliber, daB der Krieg nur damit enden
kann, daB entweder die arischen Volker ausgerottet werden oder daB das
Judentum aus Europa verschwindet. Ich habe am I. September 1939 im
Deutschen Reichstag es schon ausgesprochen - und ich hUte mich vor
voreiligen Prophezeiungen - daB dieser Krieg nicht so ausgehen wird, wie
es sich die Juden vorstellen, namlich daB die europaisch-arischen
Volker ausgerottet werden, sondern daB das Ergebnis dieses Krieges die
Vernichtung des Judentums sein wird ... Und es wird die Stunde kommen, da
der boseste Weltfeind aller Zeiten wenigstens auf ein Jahrtausend seine
Rolle ausgespielt haben wird."
82. Domarus, p. 1844, Hitler's proclamation of February 24, 1942 for the
anniversary of the founding of the NSDAP :
"Dieser Kampf wird deshalb auch nicht, wie man es beahsichtigt, mit der
Vernichtung der arischen Menschheit, sondern mit der Ausrottung des
Judentums in Europa sein Ende findcn .... Genauso, wie aher das deutsche
Volk im Zuge dieser Erkenntnis den jUdischen inneren Feind erfolgreich
bekampft hat und endgUltig zu erledigen im Begriffe ist, so werden sich
die anderen Volker im Laufe dieses Krieges immer mehr auf sieh selbst
besinnen und endlich gemeinsam gegen jene Rasse Front machen, die sie
aIle gemeinsam zu vernichten traehtet."
83. Domarus, p. 1920, Speech of Hitler at the Sports Palace in Berlin
on September 30, 1942 :
"Ich habe den I.September 1939 in der damaligen Reichstagssitzung zwei
Dinge ausgesprochen: Erstens, daB nachdem man uns diesen Krieg aufge-
zwungen hat, keine Macht der Waffen und auch nicht die Zeit uns jemals
niederzwingen werden, und zweitens, daB wenn das Judentum einen inter-
nationalen Weltkrieg zur Ausrottung etwa der arischen Volker Europas
anzettelt, dann nicht die arischen Volker ausgerottet werden, sondern
das Judentum."
95
Notes pp. 40-41
84. Domarus, p. 1992, Hitler's proclamation of February 24, 1943 for the
anniversary of the founding of the NSDAP :
"Heute haben die Gedanken unserer nationalsozialistischen und die der
faschistischen Revolution groBe und gewaltige Staaten erohert, und meine
Prophezeiung wird ihre ErfUllung finden, daB durch diesen Krieg nicht die
arische Menschheit vernichtet, sondern der Jude ausgerottet werden wird."
85. Meeting the 3 and 4 April 1944 in KrummhUbel of the reporters on
Jewish questions in the (diplomatc) missions in Europe (passage on the
action of extermination) :
"Gesandter Six spricht sodann Uber die politische Struktur des Weltjuden-
turns, die er weltanschaulich und historisch als Folge der soziologischen
Entwicklung seit der Franzoischen Revolution erlautert. Die Zahlen, die
im Jahre 1933 vorlagen, ergaben etwa 17 tlillionen Konfessionsjuden. Der
eigentliche Kraftquell des Judentums in Europa und Amerika sei das Ost-
judentum. Es stelle den Ausgangspunkt der Wanderbewegungen aus dem
europaischen in den amerikanischen Raum dar ... Das Judentum in Europa
habe seine biologische und gleichzeitig seine politische Rolle ausge- ~
spielt ... - Die physische Beseitigung des Ostjudentums entziehe dem
Judentum die biologischen Reserven. Seine heutige Struktur sei durch seine
Vereinigung mit den drei GroBmachten gekennzeichnet ... Nicht nur in
Deutschland, sondern auch international mUsse die Judenfrage zu einer
Losung gebracht werden. Leg.Rat v. Thadden spricht Uber die judenpoli-
tische Lage in Europa und Uber den Stand der antijUdischen Exekutiv-
MaBnahmen. Der Redner gab einen Uberblick, aus welchem Grunde die zionis-
tische Palastina-Losung oder ahnliche Ersatzlosungen abgelehnt und die
Aussiedlung der Juden in die Ostgebiete durchgefUhrt werden mUsse. Er
umriss sodann den derzeitigen Stand der antijlidischen MaBnahmen in samt-
lichen europaischen Landern ... (Da die von dem Redner vorgetragenen
Einzelheiten liber den Stand der Exekutiv-MaBnahmen in den einzelnen
Landern geheim zu halten sind, ist von der Aufnahme ins Protokoll abge-
sehen worden)."
,j. 1'hp. W'Ii/f.J/'!"'emarzts of the "Vinol SO[UU:OIl" by Hitlel' befol'e his
!h:ning Com[)(vlior!s in the [.'ilhY'efl' s lleadquClptpps
86. H. Picker, "Hitlers Tischgesprache" :
"(p.126) Aufgrund einer der Depeschen oder eines wahrend des Essens ge-
fallenen Stichwortes oder auch eines ihn zur Zeit beschaftigenden
Problems begann Hitler seine Auffassungen darzulegen, urn sich selbst
schlUssig zu werden oder urn seine Gaste zu unterhalten, zu interessieren
oder in einer bestimmten Richtung zu beeinflussen.
(p.152) Viele Juden sind sich auch des destruktiven Charakters ihres
Daseins nicht bewuBt gewesen. Aber wer Leben zerstort, setzt sich dem
Tode aus, und etwas anderes geschieht auch Ihnen nicht! (words of Hitler
pronounced on December I, 194 I) .
(pp.347-348) Beim Mittagessen bemerkte der Chef, daB das deutsche Volk
heute den Kampfern an der Front ganz anders gegenUberstehe als im
(Ersten) Weltkrieg ... Urn eben denselben Juden, der damals diesen Dolch-
stoB gefUhrt habe, lamentiere heute unser sogenanntes Blirgertum, wenn
er nach dem Osten abgeschoben werde. Das Bemerkenswerte daran sei, daB
dieses BUrgertum sich seinerzeit aber nicht darum geklimmert habe, daB
jahrlich 250 000 bis 300 000 deutsche Menschen auswanderten und ca.
75 Prozent der deutschen Auswanderer nach Australien bereits auf der
Reise starben. (Note of Picker: 'ganz falsche Zahlen') (Words of Hitler
pronounced on May 15, 1942).
96
Notes pp. 41-44
(p.378) Ganz Westeuropa mlisse deshalb nach einer bestimmten Zeit vollig
judenfrei sein. Das sei allein schon deshalb erforderlich, alB es unter
den Juden immer einen gewissen Prozentsatz von Fanatikern gebe, der das
Judentum wieder hochzubringen suche. Es empfehle sich deshalb auch nicht
die Juden nach Sibirien abzuschieben, da sie bei ihrer Klimafestigkeit
dort nur gesundheitlich noch besonders gehartet wiirden. Viel richtiger
se i es, sie - da die Araber sie in Palastina nicht haben wollten -
nach Afrika zu transportieren und sie damit einem Klima auszusetzen, das
jeden Menschen un serer Widerstandsfahigkeit beeintrachtige ... (Words
of Hitler pronounced on May 29, 1942).
(p.465) Wenn dieser Krieg zu Ende sei, konne Europa erleichtert auf-
atmen. Denn - da er (Hitler) mit Beendigung dieses Krieges auch den
letzten Juden Europas hinausgeworfen haben werde - ware dann die kommun-
istische Gefahr aus dem Osten mit Stumpf und Stiel ausgerottet. (Words
of Hitler pronounced on July 21, 1942).
(p. 471-472) Geschaftlich suche das Judentum Europa, Europa mUsse es
aber schon aus dem Sacroegoismus ablehnen, da das Judentum rassisch
harter sei. Nach Beendigung des Krieges werde er (Hitler) sieh rigoros
auf den Standpunkt stellen, daB er Stadt fUr Stadt zusammenschlage, wenn
nicht die Drecksjuden rauskamen und nach Madagaskar oder einem sonstigen
jUdischen Nationalstaat abwanderten. - Die Beseitigung der Juden auS
Wien sei am vordringlichsten, da in Wien am leichtesten gemeckert werde.
Auch aus MUnchen mUBten die letzten anderthalbtausend baldmoglichst
verschwinden. Er (Hitler) freue sich, daB wenigstens Linz bereits heute
schon judenfrei sei, so sei das bezeichnend ... Jenen Juden, die nach dem
Schlager 'ihre Wasche an der Siegfriedlinie' hatten aufhangen wollen,
werde nach dem Krieg die Frechheit vergehen .... Denn unter der Decke sei
der Antisemitismus bei den Anglo-Amerikanern wesentlieh starker als' beim
Deutschen, der sich trotz aller negativen Erfahrungen in seiner GefUhls-
duselei von d ~ r Phrase yom 'anstandigen Juden' nicht frei machen konne.
(Words of Hitler pronounced on July 24, 1942)."
1. The Ol'ciel'B of lhUe)' to lhmrnlel'
87. Memorandum of December 28,1938, from Goring to all the Ministers
defining restrictive measures in daily living for the Jews - concentrat-
ion of Jewish tenants in certain houses, prohibition to use sleeping cars,
etc., application of anti-Jewish measures to Jewish half-breeds -
(passage on Hitler's approval of the measures) :
"lch habe die Willensmeinung des FUhrers in diesen Fragen klar eingeholt,
damit sie nunmehr als einzige Richtlinie fUr das Verfahren zu gelten hat.
leh ersuche aIle Reichs- und Landesbehorden, sieh strikte an diese
Willensmeinung zu halten. - leh verlange, daB die Richtlinien, die vor-
stehend festgelegt worden sind, bis zu den untersten Staatsstellen be-
kanntgegeben werden. - lch habe Abschrift an den Stellvertreter des
FUhrers mit der Bitte gesandt, dieses Schreiben auch den Parteistellen
zuzusenden."
88. W. Schellenberg, "Memoiren", p. 73 :
"Den wenigen, die er dieser Ehre wUrdig hielt, kommentierte er (Himmler)
dann die sakralen Worte, die er kurz davor aUs den stundenlangen Mono-
logen seines FUhrers andachtig mitgenommen hatte. Einer von den wenigen,
zu denen er sich darUber auBerte, war Reinhard Heydrich, der solche Bot-
schaften jedoch schnell von aller Phantasie reinigte und sie in die
nuchterne Sprache des Geheimdienstes umsetzte."
97
Notes pp. 45-46
89. Eichmann 2, nO 1491, Deposition of Eichmann for his trial in
Jerusalem (on the orders of Himmler) :
"Es war nun nicht so, dalO Himmler sich etwa stets ausgiebig mit jUdischen
Fragen beschaftigte, aber das Thema war an sich in Parteikreisen stets
ein akutes. Es genUgte ein knapper von Himmler ausgesprochener Satz,
eine knappe Anweisung, die er seinem Adjudanten, seinem personlichen
Stab, dem C.d.S. einem hoheren S5 und Pol. FUhrer bei dessen Besuch
in seiner Feldkommandostelle, oder in Frieden in seinem Amt, und diese
eine knappe Weisung, solch ein knapper Befehl loste dann bei den daran
beteiligten Instanzen (Zentralinstanzen) eine Flut an Arbeiten, Be-
sprechungen, Einholung von Bedenkenlosigkeitserklarungen seitens anderer,
sicherheitspolizeifremder Instanzen, die aber aIle gehort und befragt,
kurz nicht Ubergangen werden durften, aus. Dies machte z.B. dem Referat
IV B 4 mit die meiste Arbeit.
fi. ri'he "Fiil.al DO/ttr/rYI" by u CO/()Jdal RpueFOC (Surf/mer' 1940 -
;;przii(1 1!J11)
90. See note 85
91. Proces, Vol. II, pp. 445-446

92. Note of Himmler, May 1940, entitled "A few considerations on the
treatment of Fremd Volkischen in the East", in Vierteljahreshefte 1967,
nO 2, p. 197 :
"Den Begriff Juden hoffe ich, durch die Moglichkeit einer groBen Aus-
wanderung samtlicher Juden nach Afrika oder sonst in eine Kolonie
vollig ausloschen zu sehen. Es muB in' einer etwas langeren Zeit auch
moglich sein, in unserem Gebiet die Volksbegriffe der Ukrainer, Goralen
und Lemken verschwinden zu lassen. Dasselbe, was fUr diese Splitter-
volker gesagt ist, gilt in dem entsprechend groBeren Rahmen fUr die
Polen."
93. Letter from Heydrich to von Ribbentrop June 24, 1940
(in Kempner, pp. 106-107) :
"Das Gesamtproblem - es handelt sich bereits urn rund 3 1/4 Millionen
Juden in den heute deutscher Hoheitsgewalt unterstehenden Gebieten -
kann aber durch Auswanderung nicht mehr gelost werden. Eine territoriale
End!osung wird daher notwendig."
94. Deposition of Abetz of May 30, 19 /,7, for his trial in Paris
(passage on his conversation with Hitler on the Jewish question)
"Mit dem FUhrer habe ieh nur einma! und zwar am 3.August 1940 Uber die
Judenfrage gesprochen. Er sagte mir, er w011e die Judenfrage fUr Europa
generell losen und zwar eine Klausel im Friedensvertrag, in dem
er den besiegten Landern zur 8edingung stellte, daB sie ihre jUdischen
Staatsangehorigen aulOerhalb Europa verhringen. Ebenso wolle er auf die
ihm verbUndeten Staaten einwirken. Er erwahnte in diesem Zusammenhang
die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika als ein Land, das lange nicht so
Ubervolkert sei wie Europa und daher in der Lage sei, noch mehrere
Millionen Juden aufzunehmen."
98
Notes pp. 46-47
95. Account of Best, chief of the administration attached to the Military
Commander in France, of April 4, 1940, in view of a conversation with
Vallat, Commissioner General [or Jewish questions (passage on the
departure of all the Jews from France) :
"Das deutsche Interesse besteht in einer progressiven Entlastung aller
Uinder Europas vom Judentum mit dem Ziele der vollstiindigen Entjudung
Europas: a) Ausweisung der Juden nichtfranzosischer Staatsangehorigkeit ..
b) Internierung einer gewissen Zahl - 3000 bis 5000 - von Juden aller
Staatsangehorigkeiten... Auf Grund der Erfahrung des deutschen Reiches
in den zur Losung des Judenproblems vor dem gegenwarigen Kriege ge-
troffenen MaBnahmen wird dem franzosischen Generalkommissar fUr Juden-
fragen empfohlen, frUhzeitig mit der Planung und Vorbereitung einer
auch der Juden franzosischer Staatsangehorigkeit
zu beglnnen ...
96. After 1940 there exists no trace of any work at all on this project
(Madagascar) by the official services. In May and July 1942 Hitler in
the course of dinner conversations (Picker, pp. 278, 471-472-see note 86)
evoked the idea of a Jewish reserve for Jews of the West "in Madagascar
or in another national Jewish state". He spoke in this respect of "dirty
Jews" who after the war possibly would not have yet evacuated the
European cities. He added that he would smash these cities to pieces.
In such a context, his words were not intended to be taken seriously.
The Nazi propaganda energetically rejected the idea of a "Jewish state",
admitting only a "reserve". As for the idea of "smashing the European
cities to pieces" if the Jews where still in them after the war, it
only brings out the fact that the remarks were made without thinking.
97. Letter of March 6, 1941, from A. Rosenberg to M. Bormann regarding
the inauguration of the Institute for Studies of the Jewish Question
(passage on the project") :
"Da ich auf einer Massenversammlung Uber das Judenproblem sprechen werde,
muB ich wissen, wie weit der FUhrer die Behandlung dieses Problems
genehmigt: Abgesehen von der allgemeinen historischen Darstellung der
Entwicklung unseres Kampfes und der grundsatzlichen Notwendigkeit der
Losung des Judenproblems fUr Deutschland und fUr ganz Europa stehen
zwei Fragen im Vordergrund : 1) Kann bei Andeutung einer territorialen
Ubersiedlung die Insel Madagaskar genannt werden in dem Sinne, wie ich
sie einmal in einem Aufsatz, der Ihnen bekannt ist, getan habe? Dieser
Aufsatz war vom FUhrer im Prinzip genehmigt, aber damals noch auf eine
Anzahl von Monaten hinausgeschoben worden. 2) 1st es moglich, die
Stellung des Judentums und seine Macht in den Vereinigten Staaten zu
behandeln, sowohl unter Wilson als auch in der neueren Entwicklung?"
98. Broadcast speech delivered by A. Rosenberg on March 28, 1941, in
Frankfurt-on-the-Main on the occasion of the inauguration of the
Institute for Studies of the Jewish Question (passage regarding the
definitive solution to the Jewish Question) :
"Es ist in diesen Jahrzehnten sehr viel von einem Judenstaat als Losung
gesprochen worden ... Dieser Traum ist nun ausgetraumt! Jetzt haben wir,
umgekehrt, zu Uberlegen, wo und wie wir die Juden unterzubringen haben.
Das kann, wie gesagt, nicht in einem Judenstaat geschehen, sondern nur
in einer Form, die ich jUdisches Reservat will. Es ist zu hoffen,
daB sich kommende Staatsmanner zusammenfinden, urn eine Ansiedlung der
Juden nach und nach einzuleiten, die unter erfahrener Polizeiaufsicht
nunmehr jene nUtzlichen Arbeiten verrichten sollen, die sie bisher von
Nichtjuden verrichtet sehen wollten. - Uber die praktische DurchfUhrung
und den Ort einer Um- und Aussiedlung ist in diesen Jahren naturgemaB
97 a
Notes pp. 47-48
vie I gesprochen worden. Es ist nicht notwendig, diese Frage jetzt zu be-
handeln. Ihre LHsung wird einer kUnftigen Abmachung vorbehalten bleiben ...
Wir als Nationalsozialisten aber haben auf aIle Fragen hier nur eine ein-
deutige Antwort zu geben: FUr Deutschland ist die Judenfrage nur dann
gelHst, wenn der letzte Jude den groBdeutschen Raum verlassen hat."
99. Address delivered by A. Rosenberg on March 26, 1941, at the inaugu-
ration of the Institue for Studies of the Jewish Question in Frankfurt-
on-the-Main (passage comparing Judaism to a tumor) :
"Der Vorwurf gegen uns ware, urn ein Bild zu gebrauchen, genau der gleiehe,
den man einem Chirurgen machen wollte, der nach langer Erforschung einer
inneren Erkrankung durch einen operativen Eingriff eine lebensgefahrdende
Gesch",,,lst entfernt."
G. The Oru..ier of tne PUhrer Jap tne "Firir;l/ ,(.:OllJ.t-iOd"
SOV7.:r?t H?!g1:0ilS
100. Jacobsen, pp. 202-205
Ow O,':Uljl>d
102. Sworn statement of June 29, 1947 to the Nuremberg Tribunal by
W.Blume, chief of a commando in the Einsatzgruppe B (mobile killing
unit B); passage on the directives received in respect to the mission
of the Einsatzgruppe :
"Wahrend der Aufstellung der Einsatzgruppen und -Kommandos in den
Monaten Mai/Juni 1941 war ieh in DUben anwesend. 1m Laufe des Monats
Juni hielten Heydrich, Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, und
Streckenbach, Amtschef I des RSHA, Vortrage Uber die Aufgaben der
Einsatzgruppen und -Kommandos. Zu dieser Zeit wurden wir bereits Uber die
Aufgaben der Judenvernichtung unterrichtet. Es wurde ausgefUhrt, daB das
Ostjudentum das intellektuelle Reservoir des Bolschewismus sei und deshalb
nach Ansicht des FUhrers, vernichtet werden mulL Diese Rede wurde in
kleinem Kreise gehalten. Obwohl ich mich an die einzelnen Herrn nicht
erinnern kann, nehme ich an, daB viele (a word crossed out) und die
Chefs der Einsatz- und Sonderkommandos anwesend waren. Ich hHrte eine
weitere Rede Heydrichs im Prinz-Albrecht-Palais in Berlin, wo er nochmals
diese Punkte unterstrich."
103. Sworn statement of O. Ohlendorf, chief of the Einsatzgruppe D,to
the Tribunal of Nuremberg, April 24, 1947 (passage on the directives
received for the mission of the Einsatzgruppen) :
"Der Chef der Sipo und des SD stellte eigene motorisierte, militante
Einheiten in Form von Einsatzgruppen auf, die in Einsatzkommandos lind
Sonderkommandos untergeteilt waren und in ihrer Gesamtheit den HCl'r.'s-
gruppen beziehungsweise Armeen zugeteilt werden sollten ... Die
gruppen hatten folgende Aufgaben: Sie waren verantwortlich fUr aIle
politischen Sicherheitsaufgaben innerhalb des Operationsgebietes der
Heeresverbande, zu denen sie zugeteilt waren und der rUckwartigen
Heeresgebiete, sofern die letzteren nicht der Zivilverwaltung unter-
standen. Ferner hat ten sie die Aufgaben , die eroberten Gebiete von
Juden, kommunistischen Funktionaren und Agenten zu reinigen. Die letzt-
genannte Aufgabe sollte durch die THtung aller erfaBten, rassisch und
politisch unerwUnschten Elemente gelHst werden, die als die Sicherheit
gefhrdend bezeichnet waren ... Befehle in Bezug auf Bereinigung von un-
erwUnschten Elementen gingen an die Einsatzkommandos unmittelbar und
kamen vom ReiehsfUhrer-SS selbst oder Uber Weitergabe durch Heydrich.

Die Oberbefehlshaber waren durch Hitler angewiesen, die DurchfUhrung dieser
Befehle zu unterstUtzen."
98 a
Notes pp. t,8-49
104. "Richtlinien fUr das Verhalten der Truppen in RuBland"(June 6,1941)
" 1) Der Boischewismus ist der Todfeind des nationalsozialistischen
deutschen Volkes. Dieser zersetzenden Weltanschauung und ihren Tragern
gilt Deutschlands Kampf. 2) Dieser Kampf verlangt rUcksichtsloses und
energisches Durchgreifen gegen bolschewistische Hetzer, Freischarler,
Saboteure, Juden und rest lose Beseitigung jeden aktiven und passiven
Widerstandes."
105. Order of the day of the Army from Generalfeldmarschall von Reichenau,
October 10, 1941 (passage on the implacable expiation to be imposed on
the Jews in occupied USSR); Jacobsen, p. 223 :
"Der Soldat ist im Ostraum nicht nur ein Kampfer nach den Regeln der
Kriegskunst, sondern auch Trager einer unerbittlichen vHlkischen Idee
und der Racher fUr aIle Bestialitaten, die deutschem und artverwandtem
Volkstum zugefUgt wurden. - Deshalb muss der Soldat fUr die Notwendigkeit
der harten, aber gerechten SUhne am jUdischen Untermenschentum voIles
Verstandnis haben. Sie hat den weiteren Zweck, Erhebungen im RUcken der
Wehrmacht, die erfahrungsgemaB stets von Juden angezettelt wurden, im
Keime zu ersticken. - Der Kampf hinter der Front wird noch nicht ernst
genug genommen. Immer noch werden heimtUckische grausame Partisanen und
entartete Weiber zu Kriegsgefangenen gemacht, immer noch werden halb
uniformierte oder in Zivil gekleidete HeckenschUtzen und Herumtreiber
wie anstandige Soldaten behandelt und in Gefangenenlager abgefUhrt ...
Ein solches Verhalten der Truppe ist nur noch durch vHllige Gedanken-
losigkeit zu erklaren. Dann ist es aber fUr die Vorgesetzten Zeit, den
Sinn fUr den gegenwartigen Kampf wachzurufen."
106. Memorandum for the dossier on a conference of July 16, 1941, of
Hitler with Rosenberg, Lammers, Keitel and GHring (passage on Hitler's
determination to absorb the USSR and on the pretext that he put forward
as a "justification" for the exterminations in the zones occupied in
the East) :
"Auf Anordnung des FUhrers fand heute bei ihm urn 15 Uhr eine Besprechung
mit Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reichsminister Lammers, Feldmarschall Keitel
mit dem Reichsmarschall und mir statt. - Grundsatzlich kommt es also
darauf an, den riesenhaften Kuchen handgerecht zu zerlegen, damit wir ihn
- erstens beherrschen - zweitens verwalten und - drittens ausbeuten -
kHnnen. - Die Russen haben jetzt den Befehl zum Partisanen-Krieg hinter
unserer Front gegeben. Dieser Partisanenkrieg hat auch wieder seinen
Vorteil: er gibt uns die MHglichkeit auszurotten was sich gegen uns
107. Report of December 2, 1941, from an armaments inspector in the
Ukraine to General Thomas, chief of the economic department for armaments
of the Wehrmacht (passage on the extermination of Jews in the Ukraine)
"Die jUdische BevHlkerung ist im unmittelbaren AnschluB an die Kampf-
handlungen zunachst unbehelligt geblieben. Erst Wochen, z.T. Monate
spater wurde eine planmaBige Erschiessung der Juden durch dazu eigens
abgestellte Formationen der Ordnungspolizei durchgefUhrt. Diese Aktion
ging im wesentlichen von Osten naeh Westen. Sie erfolgte durch Hffentliche
Hinzuziehung ukrainischer Miliz, vielfach leider auch unter freiwilliger
Beteiligung von Wehrmachtsangehorigen. Die Art der DurchfUhrung der
Aktionen, die sich auf Manner und Greise, Frauen und Kinclerjeden Alters
erstreckte, war grauenhaft. Die Aktion ist in der Massenhaftigkeit der
Hinrichtungen so gigantisch wie bisher keine in der Sowjetunion vor-
genommene gleichartige MaBnahme."
99
Notes pp. 49-51
108. Report of the Regional Commissioner in Slonim on the situation
(passage concerning the Jews) :
"Bei meiner Ankunft zahlte das Gebiet Slonim ca. 25 000 Juden, davon
allein in der Stadt Slonim ca. 16 000 ... Ein Ghetto einzurichten war
unmoglich, da weder Stacheldraht noch Bewachungsmoglichkeiten vor-
hand en waren. Daher traf ich von vornherein Vorbereitungen fUr eine
kUnftige groBere Aktion. Zunachst wurde die Enteignung durchgefUhrt ...
Dann erfolgte eine genaue Erfassung der Juden nach Zahl, Alter und
Beruf, eine Herausziehung aller Handwerker und Facharbeiter, ihre
Kenntlichmachung durch Ausweise und gesonderte Unterbringung. Die yom
SD am 13. I I. durchgefUhrte Aktion befreite mich von unnotigen Fressern
und die jetzt vorhandenen ca. 7 000 Juden in der Stadt Slonim sind samt-
lich in den ArbeitsprozeB eingespannt, arbeiten willig aufgrund standiger
Todesangst und werden im FrUhjahr genauestens fUr eine weitere Ver-
minderung UberprUft und aussortiert. Das Flache Land wurde eine Zeit-
lang groBzUgig von der Wehrmacht gesaubert; leider nur in Orten unter
I 000 Einwohnern. In den Rayonstadten wird nach der DurchfUhrung der
Hilfsarbeiten fUr die West-Ost Bewegung das Judentum bis auf die not-
wendigsten Handwerker und Facharbeiter ausgemerzt werden ... Die besten
Fachkrafte unter den Juden mUssen unter Aufsicht in meinen Handwerker-
schulen ihre Kunst intelligenten Lehrlingen urn einmal den
Juden auch im Handwerk entbehrlich zu machen und auszuschalten."
109. Letter of July 28, 1942, from Himmler to G. Berger, chief of the
central administration of the SS and at that period delegated by
Himmler to the Ministery of the East (passage on the mission with which
Hitler entrusted Himmler in the occupied USSR) :
"Lieber Berger! Ieh lasse dringend bitten, daB keine Verordnung Uber
den Begriff 'Jude' herauskommt. allen diesen torichten Festlegungen
binden wir uns ja seIher die Hande. - Die besetzten Ostgebiete werden
judenfrei. Die DurcbfUhrung dieses sehr schweren Befehls hat der FUhrer
auf meine Schultern gelegt. Die Verantwortung kann mir ohne dies niem-
and ahnehmen. Also verbiete ich mir alles Aktennotiz Lammers
erhalten Sie demnachst."
'riu (}J' lh' "i,I/'lll.l ifY 1'::rt(JY'!ni;;cztoY'Y
i.(} {he ;"c(!il)}';"; ("j,'/l.:3L of I./zr-' /:::)[;1,") (Aul-Im]!! J9,11)
110. Decree of Goring, July 31,1941, entrusting Heydrich with the pre-
paration of the final solution of the Jewish question in the occupied
territories as well as in the Reich, adapting his actions according to
the circumstances :
"In Erganzung der Ihnen bereits mit Erlass Yom 24.1.39 Ubertragenen
Aufgabe, die Judenfrage in Form der Auswanderung oder Evakuierung einer
den Zeitverhaltnissen entsprechend moglichst gUnstigen Lasung zuzufUhren,
beauftrage ich Sie hiermit, aIle erforderlichen Vorhereitungen in organ-
isatorischer, sachlicher und materieller Hinsicht zu treffen fUr
Gesamtlasung der Judenfrage im deutschen Einflussgebiet in Europa.
So fern dabei die Zustandigkeiten anderer Zentralinstanzen berUhrt
werden, sind diese zu heteiligen. - Ieh heauftrage Sie weiter, mir in
Balde einen Gesamtentwurf tiber die organisatorischen, sachlichen und
materiellen VorausmaBnahmen zur ])urchfUhrung der angestrehten Endlosung
der Judenfrage vorzulegen."
I I I. Kempner, p. 98
100
;J
Notes pp. 51-54
112. Eichmann I, pp. 169-170, Interrogatory of Eichmann for the pre-
liminary investigation of his trial in Jerusalem :
"1m Juni glaube ich war der Kriegsbeginn, Juni oder Juli, war der Kriegs-
beginn. Und glaub ich zwei Monate spater mag es wohl gewesen sein, es
kann auch drei Monate spater gewesen sein. Es war jedenfalls Spatsommer.
Ieh werde gleich sagen, warum ich weiB, daB es Spatsommer war, als
Heydrich mich zu sich befahl. Meldete mich und der sagte mir: Der
FUhrer, also das mit der Auswanderung usw. usw. mit einem kleinen speech
vorher: 'Der FUhrer hat die physische Vernichtung der Juden befohlen'.
Diesen Satz sagte er mir. Und als ob er jetzt nun die Wirkung seiner
Worte prUfen wollte, machte er, ganz gegen seine Gewohnheit, lange
Pause ... Und dann sagte er zu mir: 'Eichmann, fahren Sie zu Globocnik,
Lublin ... Der ReichsfUhrer hat Globocnik bereits entsprechende Weisung-
en gegeben und sehen Sie sich an, wie weit er mit seinem Vorhaben ge-
kommen ist. Er benUtzt,glaube ich, die russischen Tankgraben hier zum
Vernichten der Juden."
113. Hoss, p. 155
114. Eichmann I, pp. 239-240 and Eichmann 3, audience 96,
Deposition of Eichmann at his trial in Jerusalem on the authorization
given retrospectively to Globoenik to exterminate the Jews :
"Gen. Staatsanwalt: ' ... WarlO sagte Ihnen Glohocnik und verlangte von
Ihnen eine nachtragliche Bestatigung der Ermordung von so und so vielen
Tausenden Juden ... ?' Angeklagter: 'Die verlangte Globocnik nicht von
mir, sondern die hatte er entweder von MUller oder Heydrich oder
Himmler verlangt, aber ich habe sie hinbringen mlissen. Die hab ich auch
hingehracht ... 'Gen.Staatsanwalt: 'Was stand in diesem Brief?'
Angeklagter:'Ich entsinne mich ungefahr, daB er ermachtigt ist weitere
150 000 oder 250 000 Juden der "End Wsung" zuzufUhren.' Angeklagter:
' ... es muB etwa im Sommer oder Spatsommer 1942 gewesen Bein ... '
Gen.Staatsanwalt: ' War das der einzige Befehl zur Judenermordung,den Sie
Glohocnik hrachten?' Angeklagter: 'Ich sagte ein oder zwei Mal ... '
Gen. Staatsanwalt: 'Globoenik war der Einzige. der solche Sac hen schrift-
lich verlangte, nicht wahr?' Angeklagter: 'Ja, er war der Einzige und
ich entsinne mich noch, daB MUller ... sagte, daB es ein merkwUrdiger
Mensch ist, er verlangt diese Bestatigung ... ' "
115. Memoirs of B. Lasener, responsible for reports on racial matters
at the Ministery of the Interior of the Reich;
in Vierteljahreshefte, 1961, nO 3, p. 303 :
"Zur Frage der Evakuierung der Juden aus dem Altreich gab SturmbannfUhrer
Eichmann noch bekannt, der FUhrer habe auf einen dahingehenden Antrag
des ObergruppenfUhrers Heydrich Evakuierungen wahrend des Krieges ab-
gelehnt; darUber lie8e dieser jetzt einen Vorschlag ausarbeiten, der
auf Teilevakuierung der groBeren Stadte ziele."
116. Himmler's letter to Creiser (GAuleiter and Reichsstatthalter of the
Warthegau -Lodz-), September 18, 194 I; Krausnick, p. 374 :
"Der FUhrer wUnscht, daB moglichst bald das Altreich und das Protektorat
yom Westen nach dem Osten von Juden geleert und befreit werden. Ich bin
daher bestrebt, maglichst noch in diesem Jahr die Juden des Altreichs
und des Protektorats zunachst einmal als erste Stufe in die vor zwei
Jahren neu zum Reich gekommenen Ostgebiete zu transportieren, urn sie im
nachsten FrUhjahr noch weiter nach dem Osten ahzuschieben."
I 17. Bednarz, p. 33
99 a
Notes pp. 54-55
118. Accounts of the meeting on October 19, 1941, of Heydrich with
Eichmann and the officials of the administration and the police in the
Protectorate on the deportation of Jews from Prague (passage on the
destination of the deportations in relation with Einsatzgruppen)
Eichmann 2, nO 1193 :
"In den nachsten Wochen sollen die 5 000 Juden aus Prag nun evakuiert
werden. - SS-Brif. Nebe und Rasch konnten in die Lager fUr kommunistische
Haftlinge im Operationsgebiet Juden mit hineinnehmen. Dies ist
nach Angabe von SS-Stubf. Eichmann eingeleitet."
I 19. Eichmann I, pp. 3424-3444, Interrogatory of Eichmann for the pre-
liminary investigation of his trial in Jerusalem on the meaning of the
term "Operationsgebiet" employed in the preceding document :
"Examining magistrate: 'Was heiBt aber Operationsgebiet? 1st das wo
die Einsatzgruppen operieren?' Eichmann: 'Sicherlich ist das so zu ver-
stehen, natlirlich ... ' II
121. Memoirs of B. Losener, responsible for reports on racial matters
at the Ministery of the Interior of the Reich;
in Vierteljahreshefte, 1961, pp. 310-31
"Kurz vor Weihnachten 1941 kam Reg.Rat Feldscher auf mein Dienstzimmer
und berichtete mir, was ein zuverlassiger Bekannter von ihm tags zuvor
als Augenzeuge Uber Massenermordungen deutscher, vor allem Berliner
Juden bei Riga erzahlt hatte. Es war so grauenhaft, daB ich hier von
Einzelheiten absehe. Zum erstenmal erfuhr ich, daB meine schlimmsten
BefUrchtungen Uber das Schicksal der Deportierten eingetroffen, oder
richtiger, noch weit Ubertroffen worden waren ... Ich trug Stuckart
(Staatssekretar im Innenministerium) vor, was mir zu Ohren gekommen
war ... Ich bat Stuckart, mich mit sofortiger Wirkung von meinem Referat
zu entbinden ... Stuckart entgegnete zunachst: 'Wissen Sie nicht, daB
diese Dinge auf hochsten Befehl geschehen?' "
122. Letter from Brack (who until August 1941 was in charge of the
euthanasia of the mentally deranged and other sick people) to Himmler
c
J
on June 23, 1942, proposing to keep alive 2 to 3 million Jews fit to work
out of the 10 million European Jews, this on the condition that they
be sterilized (passage on the extermination of the Jews by gassing)
"Sehr geehrter ReichsfUhrer! - Ich habe dem BrigadefUhrer Globocnik
auf Anweisung von Reichsleiter Bouhler fUr die DurchfUhrung seiner
Sonderaufgabe schon vor langerer Zeit einen Teil meiner Manner zur Ver-
fUgung gestellt. Bei dieser Gelegenheit vertrat BrigadefUhrer Globocnik
die Auffassung, die ganze Judenaktion so schnell wie nur irgend moglich
durchzufUhren, damit man nicht eines Tages mitten drin steckenbliebe,
wenn irgendwelche Schwierigkeiten ein Abstoppen der Aktion notwendig
machen. Sie selbst, ReichsfUhrer, haben mir gegenUber seinerzeit schon
die Meinung geauBert, daB man schon aus GrUnden der Tarnung so schnell
wie moglich arbeiten mUsse. Beide Auffassungen, die ja im Prinzip das
gleiche Ergebnis zeitigen, sind nach meinen eigenen Erfahrungen mehr als
berechtigt; trotzdem mochte ich Sie bitten, in diesem Zusammenhang
folgende Uberlegungen von mir vortragen zu dUrfen." (Brack afterwards
exposed his 'plan' for the sterilization of the Jews to be kept for work).
100 a
Note p. 56
123. Address of H. Frank to the council of his government on
December 16, 1941, in Cracow (passages concerning the extermination
of the Jews)
"Mit den Juden - das will ich Ihnen auch ganz offen sagen - muB so oder
so Schluss gemacht werden. Der FUhrer sprach einmal das Wort aus: wenn
es der vereinigten Judenschaft wieder gelingen wird, einen Weltkrieg zu
entfesseln, dann werden die Blutopfer nicht nur von den in den Krieg
gehetzten Volkern gebracht werden, sondern dann wird der Jude in Europa
sein Ende gefunden haben. Ich weiB, es wird MaBnahmen, die jetzt
im Reich gegenUber den Juden getroffen werden, Kritik geUbt. - BewuBt
wird - das geht aus den Stimmungsberichten hervor - immer wieder versucht,
von Grausamkeit, von Harte usw. zu sprechen. Ich mochte Sie bitten:
einigen Sie sich mit mir zunachst, bevor ich jetzt weiterspreche, auf
die Formel: Mitleid wollen wir grundsatzlich nur mit dem deutschen Volke
haben, sonst mit niemanden auf der Welt. Die anderen haben auch kein
Mitleid mit uns gehabt. Ieh muB auch als alter Nationalsozialist sagen:
wenn die Judensippschaft in Europa den Krieg Uberleben wUrde, wir aber
unser bestes Blut fUr die Erhaltung Europas geopfert hatten, dann wUrde
dieser Krieg doch nur einen Teilerfolg darstellen. Ich werde daher den
Juden gegenUber grundsatzlich nur von der Erwartung ausgehen, daB sie
verschwinden. Sie mUssen weg. Ich habe Verhandlungen zu dem Zwecke an-
geknUpft, sie nach dem Osten abzuschieben. 1m Januar findet Uber diese
Frage eine groBe Besprechung in Berlin statt, zu der ich Herrn Staats-
sekretar Dr.BUhler entsenden werde. Diese Besprechung soIl im Reichs-
sicherheitshauptamt bei SS-ObergruppenfUhrer Heydrich gehalten werden.
Jedenfalls wird eine groBe jUdisehe Wanderung einsetzen. - Aber was solI
mit den Juden geschehen? Glauben Sie, man wird sie im Ostland in Sied-
lungsdorfern unterbringen? Man hat uns in Berlin gesagt: weshalb macht
man diese Scherereien; wir konnen im Ostland oder im Reichskommissariat
auch nichts mit ihnen anfangen, liquidiert sie seIber! Meine Herren, ich
muB Sie bitten, sich gegen Mitleidserwagungen zu wappnen. Wir mUssen die
Juden vernichten, wo immer wir sie treffen und wo es irgend moglich ist,
urn das GesamtgefUge des Reiches hier aufrecht zu erhalten. Das wird
selbstverstandlich mit Methoden geschehen, die anders sind als diejenigen,
von denen Amtschef Dr.Hummel(l) gesprochen hat.Auch die Richter der Sonder-
gerichte konnen nicht dafUr verantworlich gemacht werden, denn das liegt
eben im Rahmen des Rechtsverfahrens. Man kann bisherige Anschauungen nicht
auf solche gigantischen einmaligen Ereignisse Ubertragen. Jedenfalls
mUssen wir aber einen Weg finden, der zum Ziele fUhrt, und ich mache mir
darUber meine Gedanken. - Die Juden sind auch fUr uns auBergewohnlich
schadliche Fresser. Wir haben im Generalgouvernement schatzungsweise
2,5 , vielleicht mit den jUdisch Versippten und dem, was alles daran
hangt, jetzt 3,5 Millionen Juden. Diese 3,5 Millionen Juden konnen wir
nicht erschieBen, wir konnen sie nicht vergiften, werden aber doch Ein-
griffe vornehmen konnen, die irgendwie zu einem Vernichtunserfolg fuhren
und zwar im Zusammenhang mit den vom Reich her zu besprechenden groBen
MaBnahmen. Das Generalgouvernemnt muB genau so judenfrei werden, wie es
das Reich ist. Wo und wie das geschieht, ist eine Sache der Instanzen,
die wir hier einsetzen und schaffen mUssen und deren Wirksamkeit ich
Ihnen rechtzeitig bekanntgeben werde."
(I) Dr. Hummel in fuis session of the government made his report on the
activity of the special courts which pronounced the death penalty against
Jews found outside of the aera of the ghetto.
101
Notes pp. 56-57
124. Note (Vermerk) dated December I, 1941, of the Sipo-SD,section IV B 4,
concerning the invitation of a representative of the General Government
to the conference of Wannsee (suburb of Berlin) planned at that time
for December 9, 1941, later set for January 20, 1942;
Eichmann 2, nO 1101 :
" I) Am 28. I. dieses Jahres sprach SS-ObergruppenfUhrer KrUger beim Chef
der Sipo-SD vor, urn u.a. die Frage einer zentralen Bearbeitung der
Judenangelegenheiten im Gerneralgouvernement zu besprechen. - Aus den im
Generalgouvernement in letzter Zeit auf diesem Gebiet getroffenen MaB-
nahmen sei in@er starker zu ersehen, daB der Generalgouverneur bestrebt
ist, die Behandlung des Judenproblems vollig an sich zu ziehen. -
2) Bei der sich anschlieBenden RUcksprache wurde Referent IV B 4 ange-
wiesen, zu der fUr den 9.12.41 in Berlin angeraumten Besprechung neben
den bisher eingeladenen Zentralinstanzen im Interesse einer Bereinigung
und Klarung dieser Angelegenheiten dem Staatssekretar BUhler und dem
ObergruppenfUhrer KrUger Einladungen zugehen zu lassen."
R. fHUpy"s Appy'oval of (he (J(!nr:pc;l/:;",j "FiNal :;ui.?(t1:UIl" and the
CmIeN'I!('!' of Wamwr:e (Januupy J .91::)
125. The conference on the final solution of the Jewish question called
by Heydrich in Wannsee on January 20, 1942, to co-ordinate all of the
authorities, represented at this conference by the Secretaries of State
and other leaders (fundamental passage of Heydrich's report) :
?
"Die FederfUhrung bei der Bearbeitung der Endlosung der Judenfrage liege
ohne RUcksicht auf geographische Grenzen zentral beim ReichsfUhrer-SS
und Chef der Deutschen Polizei (Chef der Sicherheitspolzei und des SD). -
Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD gab sodann einen kurzen RUck-
blick Uber den bisher gefUhrten Kampf gegen den Gegner. Die wesentlichs-
ten Momente bilden a) die ZurUckdrangung der Juden aus den einzelnen Le-
bensgebieten des deutschen Volkes, b) die ZurUckdrangung der Juden aus
dem Lebensraum des deutschen Volkes. - 1m Vollzug dieser Bestrebungen
wurde als einzige, vorlaufige Losungsmoglichkeit die Beschleunigung der
Auswanderung der Juden aus dem Reichsgebiet verstarkt und planmaBig in
Angriff genommen. - ... Inzwischen hat der ReichsfUhrer-SS und Chef der
Deutschen Polizei im Hinblick auf die Gefahren einer Auswanderung im
Kriege und im Hinblick auf die Moglichkeiten des Os tens die Auswanderung
der Juden verboten. - Anstelle der Auswanderung ist nunmehr als weitere
Losungsmoglichkeit nach entsprechender vorheriger Genehmigung durch den
FUhrer die Evakuierung der Juden nach dem Osten getreten. - Diese Aktion-
en sind jedoch lediglich als Ausweichmoglichkeiten anzusprechen, doch
werden hier bereits jene praktischen Erfahrungen gesammelt, die im Hin-
blick auf die kommende Endlosung der Judenfrage von wichtiger Bedeutung
sind. - 1m Zuge dieser Endlosung der europaischen Judenfrage kommen rund
II Millionen Juden in Betracht, die sich wie folgt auf die einzelnen
Lander verteilen: ' ... (Heydrich gives statistical figures) ... Unter
entsprechender Leitung sollen nun im Zuge der Endlosung die Juden in
geeigneter Weise im Osten zum Arbeitseinsatz kommen. In groBen Arbeits-
kolonnen, unter Trennung der Geschlechter, werden die arbeitsfahigen
Juden straBenbauend in diese Gebiete gefUhrt, wobei zweifellos ein GroB-
teil durch natUrliche Verminderung ausfallen wird. - Der allfallig end-
lich verbleibende Restbestand wird, da es sich bei diesen zweifellos urn
den widerstandsfahigsten Teil handelt, entsprechend behandelt werden
mUssen, da dieser, eine natUrliche Auslese darstellend, bei Freilassung
als Keimzelle eines neuen jUdischen Aufbaues anzusprechen ist. (Siehe
die Erfahrung der Geschichte.) - '" Die evakuierten Juden werden zu-
102
Notes pp. 58-60
nachst Zug urn Zug in sogenannte Durchgangsghettos verbracht, urn von dort
aus weiter nach dem Osten transportiert zu werden. - ... Staatssekretar
Dr. BUhler stellte fest, daB das Generalgouvernement es begrUBen wUrde,
wenn mit der Endlosung dieser Frage im Generalgouvernement begonnen wUrde,
weil einmal hier das Transportproblem keine Ubergeordente Rolle spielt
und arbeitseinsatzmaBige GrUnde den Lauf dieser Aktion nicht verhindern
wUrde ... Von den in Frage kon@enden etwa 2 1/2 Millionen Juden sei Uber-
dies die Mehrzahl der FaIle arbeitsunfahig. - Staatssekretar Dr.BUhler
stellte weiterhin fest, daB die Lasung der Judenfrage im Generalgouverne-
ment federfUhrend beim Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD liegt und
seine Arbeiten durch die Behorden des Generalgouvernements unterstUtzt
wUrden. Er hatte nur eine Bitte, die Judenfrage in diesem Gebiet so
schnell wie maglich zu losen. - AnschlieBend wurden die verschiedenen
Arten der Losungsmoglichkeiten besprochen, wobei sowohl der Gauleiter
Dr. Meyer als auch seitens des Staatssekretars Dr. BUhler der Standpunkt
vertreten wurde, gewisse vorbereitende Arbeiten im Zuge der Endlosung
gleich in den betreffenden Gebieten selbst durchzufUhren, wobei jedoch
eine Beunruhigung der Bevolkerung vermieden werden mUsse ... "
126. Statement of M. Luther (Auswartiges Amt) on the Jewish question,
August 1942 :
"Die vorgesehenen Abschiebungen stellen einen weiteren Schritt vorwarts
auf dem Wege der Gesamtlosung dar und sind im Hinblick auf andere Staaten
(Ungarn)' sehr wichtig. Der Abtransport nach dem Generalgouvernement ist
eine vorlaufige MaBnahme. Die Juden werden nach den besetzten Ostgebieten
weiterbefordert, sobald die technischen Voraussetzungen gegeben sind."
D. 'Ph' "F[',Ld :";()/i/li()}:" by ('hlJ.llh('y':-; ;1 {',)}!('r-:)!LputiolIUr'!f :;ynt.em
(c:unnei' J.Y'7:. - (ie,tob"p IDN)
127. Himmler's letter of January 25, 1942, to CHicks, inspector of the
concentration camps (on the decision to develop the labour force thereby
represented by the deportation of the Jews) :
"Nachdem russische Kriegsgefangene in der nachsten Zeit zu erwarten sind,
werde ich von den Juden und JUdinnen, die aus Deutschland ausgewandert
werden, eine groBe Anzahl in die Lager schicken. Richten Sie sich darauf
ein, in den nachsten 4 Wochen 100 000 mannliche Juden und bis zu
50 000 JUdinnen in die KL aufzunehmen. GroBe wirtschaftliche Auftrage
und Aufgaben werden in den nachsten Wochen an die Konzentrationslager
herantreten. SS-GruppenfUhrer Pohl wird Sie im einzelnen unterrichten."
128. Note of June 15, 1942, drawn up by Dannecker for Knochen and Lischka
on the decision to beg inn the massive deportations to the East of the
Jews of Holland, Belgium and France :
"Am 11.6.42 fand im Reichssicherheitshauptamt - IV B 4 - eine Besprechung
statt, an der neben dem Unterzeichnenden (SS-HauptsturmfUhrer Dannecker)
auch die Judenreferenten aus BrUssel und Den Haag teilnahmen.
a)Gegenstand: Aus militarischen GrUnden kann wahrend des Sommers ein Ab-
schub von Juden aus Deutschland in das ostliche Operationsgebiet nicht
mehr erfolgen. - RFSS hat daher angeordnet, entweder aus dem SUd-
osten (Rumanien) oder aus den besetzten Westgebieten groBere Judenmengen
dem K.Z. Auschwitz zwecks Arbeitsleistung Uberstellt werden. - Grundbe-
dingung ist, daB die Juden (beiderlei Geschlechts) zwischen 16 und 40
Jahre alt sind. 10% nicht arbeitsfahige Juden konnen mitgeschickt werden.
b)Vereinbarung: Es wurde vereinbart, daB aus den Niederlartden 15 000,
aus Belgien 10 000 und aus Frankreich einschlieBlich unbesetztes Gebiet
insgesamt 100 000 Juden abgeschoben werden ...
101 a
Notes pp. 60-63
c) Technische AusfUhrung: 1. Wegen der Gestellung des Transportmaterials
soli auf Anweisung des RSHA durch den Unterzeichnenden mit ETRA, Paris
(Generalleutnant Kohl) Verbindung aufgenommen werden. Dabei solI auch
die Frage der fUr Belgien erforderlichen 10 TransportzUge geklart werden .. "
129. Administrative memorandum of Himmler, October 9, 1942, KrUger and
Globocnik, to the RSHA and to Wolff on the re-organization of the Jewish
labour force in the General Government and on the short-comings in this
connection (passage on the total extermination of this labour force
desired by Hitler) :
"Es wird dann unser Bestreben sein, diese jUdische Arbeitskraft durch
Polen zu ersetzen und die groBere Anzahl dieser jUdischen KL-Betriebe
tunlichst im Osten des Generalvouvernements zusammenzufassen. Jedoch
auch dort sollen eines Tages dem Wunsche des FUhrers entsprechend die
Juden verschwinden."
l(). The "Pinal Solution", "Page of Glory", whieh will have neither'
to be !,ipitten nor to be For'gotten
7
130. Krausnick, p.447, Account of Himmler of his report to Hitler
June 19, 1943, in Obersalzberg :
"Der FUhrer sprach auf meinen Vortrag in der Judenfrage hin aus, daB die
Evakuierung der Juden trotz der dadurch in den nachsten 3 bis 4 Monaten
noch entstehenden Unruhe radikal durchzufUhren sei und durchgestanden
\verden mUs se. 'I
131. Krausnick, pp. 446-447 ; Buchheim 1, p. 329; Speech of Himmler,
October 6, 1943, before the Reichsleiter and the Gauleiter of the NSDAP
in Poznan :
"lch bitte Sie, das, was ich in diesem Kreis sage, wirklich nur zu horen
und nicht darUber zu sprechen. Es trat an uns die Frage heran: Wie ist es
mit den Frauen und den Kindern? - lch habe mich entschlossen, auch hier
eine ganz klare Lasung zu finden. lch hielt mich namlich nicht fUr be-
rechtigt, die Manner auszurotten - sprich also: umzubringen oder umbringen
zu lassen - und die Racher in Gestalt der Kinder fUr unsere Sahne und
Enkel groB werden Zu lassen. Es muBte der schwere EntschluB gefaBt werden,
dieses Yolk von der Erde verschwinden zu lassen ... Damit mochte ich die
Judenfrage abschlieBen. Sie wissen nun bescheid, und Sie behalten es fUr
sich. Man wird vielleicht in ganz spater Zeit sich einmal Uberlegen
konnen, ob man dem deutschen Yolk etwas mehr darUber sagt. lch glaube, es
ist besser, wir - wir insgesamt - haben das fUr unser Yolk getragen,
haben die Verantwortung auf uns genommen (die Verantwortung fUr eine Tat,
nicht fUr eine Idee) und' nehmen dann das Geheimnis mit in unser Grab."
132. Himmler's address in Poznan, October 4, 1943, to the GruppenfUhrer
of the SS (passage on the extermination of the Jews) :
"lch will hier in aller Offenheit auch ein ganz schweres Kapitel er-
wahnen. Unter uns solI es einmal ganz offen ausgesprochen sein, und
trotzdem werden wir in der Offentlichkeit nie darUber reden. Genauso
wenig, wie wir am 30.Juni 1934 gezogert haben, die befohlene Pflicht zu
tun und Kameraden, die sich verfehlt hatten, an die Wand zu stellen und
zu erschieBen, genauso wenig haben wir darUber jemals gesprochen und
werden je darUber sprechen. Es war eine, Gottseidank, in uns wohnende
Selbstverstandlichkeit des Taktes, daB wir uns untereinander nie da-
rUber unterhalten haben, nie darUber sprachen. Es hat jeden geschaudert
und doch war sich jeder klar darUber, daB er es das nachste Mal wieder
tun wUrde, wenn es befohlen wird und wenn es notwendig ist. - lch meine
jetzt die Judenevakuierungen, die Ausrottung des jUdischen Volkes. Es
102 a
Notes pp. 63-66
gehort zu den Dingen, die man leicht ausspricht. - 'Das jUdische Yolk
wird ausgerottet', sagt ein jeder Parteigenosse, 'ganz klar, steht in
unserem Programm, Ausschaltung der Juden, Ausrottung, machen wir'.
Und da kommen sie aIle an, die braven 80 Millionenen Deutschen, und jeder
hat seinen anstandigen Juden. Es ist ja klar, die anderen sind Schweine,
aber ist ein prima Jude. Von allen, die so reden, hat keiner
zugesehen, keiner hat es durchgestanden. Von Euch werden die meisten
wissen was es heiBt, wenn 100 Leichen beisammen liegen, wenn 500 daliegen
oder wenn I 000 daliegen. Dies durchgehalten zu haben, und dabei - abge-
sehen von AuBnahmen menschlicher Schwachen - anstandig geblieben zu sein,
das hat uns hart gemacht. Dies ist ein niemals geschriebenes und nie-
mals zu schreibendes Ruhmesblatt unserer Geschichte, denn wir wissen,
wie schwer wir uns taten, wenn wir heute noch in jeder Stadt - bei den
Bombenangriffen, bei den Lasten und bei den Entbehrungen des Krieges -
noch die Juden als Geheimsaboteure, Agitatoren und Hetzer hatten. wir
wUrden wahrscheinlich jetzt in das Stadium des Jahres 1916/1917 ge-
kommen sein, wenn die Juden noch im deutschen Volkskorper saBen."
133. Himmler's letter, April 9, 1943 to the Chief of the Sipo-SD, Kal-
tenbrunner, about the Korherr report on the "Final Solution of the
Jewish Question" :
"lch habe den statistischen Bericht des Inspekteurs fUr Statistik Uber
die Endlosung der Judenfrage erhalten.
Ich halte diesen Bericht als allenfallsiges fUr spatere Zeiten,
und zwar zu Tarnungszwecken fUr recht gut. 1m Augenblick darf er weder
veroffentlicht noch weitergegeben werden.
Das Wichtigste ist mir nach wie vor, daB jetzt an Juden nach dem Osten
abgefahren wird, was Uberhaupt nur menschenmaglich ist. In den kurzen
Monatsmeldungen der Sicherheitspolizei will ich lediglich mitgeteilt
bekommen, was monatlich abgefahren worden ist und was zu diesem Zeit-
punkt noch an Juden Ubrig blieb."
134. Ordonance of October 9, 1942; in "VerfUgungen/Anordnungen/Bekannt-
gaben", 1. Band - Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Frz.Eher Nachf. ,MUnchen,
pp. 131-132 :
"Vorbereitende MaBnahmen zur Endlosung der europaischen Judenfrage -
GerUchte Uber die Lage der Juden im Osten.
1m Zuge der Arbeiten an der Endlosung der Judenfrage werden neuerdings
innerhalb der Bevalkerung in verschiedenen Teilen des Reichsgebiets
Erarterungen Uber 'sehr scharfe MaBnahmen' gegen die Juden besonders in
den Ostgebieten angestellt. Die Feststellungen ergaben, daB solche Aus-
fUhrugen - meist in entstellter und Ubertriebener Form - von Urlaubern
der verschiedenen im Osten eingesetzten Verbande weitergegeben werden,
die selbst Gelegenheit hatten, solche MaBnahmen zu beobachten.
Es ist denkbar, daB nicht aIle Volksgenossen fUr die Notwendigkeit sol-
cher MaBnahmen das genUgende Verstaridnis aufzubringen vermogen, besonders
nicht die Teile der Bevolkerung, die keine Gelegenheit haben,sich aus
eigener Anschauung ein Bild von dem bolschewistischen Greuel zu machen.
Urn jeder GerUchtebildung in diesem Zusammmenhang, die oftmals bewuBt
tendenziosen Charakter tragt, entgegentreten zu konnen, werden die nach-
stehenden AusfUhrungen zur Unterrichtung Uber den derzeitigen Sachstand
wiedergegeben.
Seit rund 2000 Jahren wurde ein bisher vergeblicher Kampf gegen das Juden-
tum gefUhrt. Erst seit 1933 sind wir darangegangen, nunmehr Mittel und
Wege zu suchen, die eine vollige Trennung des Judentums vom deutschen
Volkskorper ermaglichen. Die bisher durchgefUhrten Losungsarbeiten lassen
sich im wesentlichen wie folgt unterteilen:
103
Notes pp. 1;6-68
I) ZurDckdrangung der Juden aus den einzelnen Lebensgebieten des
deutschen Volkes.
Hier sollen die durch den Gesetzgeber erlassenen Gesetze das Fundament
bilden, das die Gewahr dafUr bietet, aueh die kUnftigen Generationen vor
einem etwaigen neuerlichen Uherfluten durch den Gegner zu schUtze.
2) Das Bestreben, den Gegner aus dem Reichsgbiet vOllig hinauszudrangen.
In Anbetracht des dem deutschen Yolk zur VerfUgung stehenden, nur eng
begrenzten Lebensraumes hoffte man, dieses Problem im wesentlichen durch
Beschleunigung der Auswanderung der Juden zu losen.
Seit Beginn des Krieges 1939 wurden diese Auswanderungsmoglichkeiten
in zunehmendem MaBe geringer, zum anderen wuchs neben dem Lebensraum des
deutschen Volkes sein Wirtschaftsraum stetig an, so daB heute in Anbe-
tracht der groBen Zahl der in diesen Gebieten ansassigen Juden eine rest-
lose ZurUckdrangung durch Auswanderung nicht mehr moglich ist.
Da schon unsere nachste Generation diese Frage nicht mehr so lebensnah
und auf Grund dec ergangenen Erfahrungen nicht mehr klar genug sehen wird
und die nun einmal ins Rollen gekommene Angelegenheit nach Bereinigung
drangt, muB das Gesamtproblem noch von der heutigen Generation gelost ?
werden.
Es ist daher die vollige Verdrangung bzw. Ausscheidung der im europaischen
Wirtschaftsraum ansassigen Millionen von Juden ein zwingendes Gebot im
Kampf urn die Existenzsicherung des deutschen Volkes.
Beginnend mit dem Reichsgebiet und Uberleitend auf die Ubrigen in die
Endlosung einbezogenen europaischen Lander werden die Juden laufend
nach dem Osten in groBe, zum Teil vorhandene, zum Teil noch zu errichten-
de Lager transportiert, von wo aus sie entweder zur Arbeit eingesetzt
oder noch weiter nach dem Osten verbracht werden. Die alten Juden sowie
Juden mit hohen Kriegsauszeichnungen (E.K.I., Goldene Tapferkeits-
medaille usw.) werden laufend nach der im Protektorat Bohmen und Mahren
gelegenen Stadt Theresienstadt umgesiedelt.
Es liegt in der Natur der Sache, daB diese teilweise sehr schwierigen
Probleme im Interesse der endgUltigen Sicherung unseres Volkes nur mit
rUcksichtsloser Harte geliist werden kiinnen."
135. Goebbels, "TagebUcher" , p. 142 ; (March 27, 1942)
"Aus dem Generalgouvernement werden jetzt, bei Lublin beginnend, die
Juden nach dem Osten abgeschoben. Es wird hier ein ziemlich barbarisches
und nicht naher zu beschreibendes Verfahren angewandt, und von den Juden
selbst bleibt nicht mehr viel Ubrig. 1m groBen kann man wohl feststellen,
daB 60% davon liquidiert werden mUssen, wahrend nur noch 40% in die Arbeit
eingesetzt werden konnen. Der ehemalige Gauleiter VOn Wien, der diese
Aktion durchfUhrt, tut das mit ziemlicher Umsicht und auch mit einem Ver-
fahren, das nicht allzu auffallig wirkt ... Keine andere Regierung und
kein anderes Regime konnte die Kraft aufbringen, diese Frage generell zu
losen. Auch hier ist der FUhrer der unentwegte Vorkampfer und WortfDhrer
einer radikalen Losung, die nach der Lage der Dinge geboten ist und des-
halb unausweichlich scheint. .. Die in den Stadten des Generalgouvernements
frei werdenden Ghettos werden jetzt mit den aus dem Reich abgeschobenen
Juden gefUllt, und hier solI sich dann nach einer gewissen Zeit der ProzeB
erneuern."
104
Notes pp. 69-70
136. In the WilhelmstraBe-Trial in Nuremberg (see "Urteil"), passages
on the directives given for the press (p.133) in respect to the anti
Jewish operation, by the Reichspresseehef O. Dietrich in 1943 :
"Am 5. Februar 1943 hieB es: 'Gleichwertig neben unserer anti-bolsche-
wistischen Propaganda steht diejenige gegen das Judentum. Jedem Volks-
genossen muB es zu unumstoBlichen Gewissheit werden, daB die Juden
die unerbittlichten Feinde unseres Volkes sind und sowohl hinter dem
Bolschewismus als aueh hinter den Plutokratien stehen. Die Behandlung
dieses Themas gehort in den Rahmen der kDrzlich hier als notwendig
bezeichneten Weckung von HaBgefUhlen ... In den Arbeiten, fUr die der
'Deutsche Wochendienst' umfangreiehe Anregungen und Themenvorschlage
bringt, ist zu betonen, daB es im Judentum nicht, wie das in anderen
WHkern der Fall ist, einzelne Verbrechen gibt, sondern daB das Judentum
als Ganzes aus verbrecheriseher Wurzel stammt und seiner Anlage nach
verbrecherisch ist. Die Juden sind kein Yolk wie andere Volker, sondern
Trager einer zum Scheinvolk zusammengeschlossenen Erbkriminalitat ....
Die Vernichtung des Judentums ist kein Verlust fUr die Menschheit, sondern
fUr die Volker der Erde ebenso nUtzlich wie die Todesstrafe oder Sicher-
ungsverwahrung fUr kriminelle Verbrecher'. Am 22. April 1943 stellte der
Nachrichtendienst fest, daB die Juden fUr den Massenmord polnischer
Offiziere in Katyn verantworlich seien; die Juden hitten die Absicht, die
Volker Europas zu ermnrden und bei dem Katyn-Zwischenfall handle es sich
nicht nur urn einen einzelnen HaBausbruch der Juden gegen Polen, sondern
urn eine HaBpolitik der Juden gegen aIle Nicht-Juden ... Uber die Not-
wendigkeit, aIle Widerstandskrafte des deutschen Volkes wachzurufen,
ist im 'Zeitschriften-Dienst' schon mehrfach gesprochen worden. Der
'Deutsche Wochendienst' zeigt, wie es den Volkern gegangen ist, die das
Judentum in seine Macht hekommen hat. Es kann dabei an das Wort des
FUhrers geknUpft werden, daB es am Ende dieses Krieges nur Uberlebende
und Vernichtete geben wird. Indem auf die feste Absicht des Judentums
zur Vernichtung aller Deutschen hingewiesen wird, ist der Wille zur
Selbsthehauptung zu starken."
137. Conversation of Hitler and Ribbentrob with Horthy, April 17, 1943
(passage on the solution of the Jewish problem) :
"Der FUhrer beschrieh sod ann Horthy die deutschen RationierungsmaBnahmen,
die in voller Ordnung durchgefUhrt wUrden ... Horthy bemerkte dazu, daB
diese Probleme fUr Ungarn sehr schwierig seien. - Der FUhrer erwiderte,
daB daran die Juden schuld seien ... - Auf die Gegenfrage Horthys, was
er denn mit den Juden machen solIe, nachdem er Ihnen so ziemlich aIle
Lebensmoglichkeiten entzogen habe - erschlagen konne er sie doch nicht
erklarte der RAM (ReichsauBenminister), d a ~ die Juden entweder vernichtet
oder in Konzentrationslager gebracht werden mUBten. Eine andere Moglich-
keit gehe es nieht ... 1m AnschluB hieran kam der FUhrer auf d i ~ Stadt
NUrnberg zu sprechen, die 400 Jahre lang keine Juden bei sich geduldet
hatte, wahrend FUrth die Juden bei sich aufgenommen hatte. Das Ergebnis
sei eine groBe BIDte NUrnbergs und ein volliger Niedergang FUrths ge-
wesen ... Wo die Juden sich selhst Uherlassen waren, wie z.B. in Polen,
herrsche grausamstes Elend und Verkommenheit. Sie seien eben reine Para-
siten. Mit diesen Zustanden habe man in Polen grUndlich aufgeraumt.
Wenn die Juden dort nicht arbeiten wollten, wUrden sie erschossen. Wenn
sie nicht arbeiten kiinnten, miiBten sie verkommen. Sie waren wie Tuberkel-
bazillen zu behandeln, an denen sich ein gesunder Karper anstecken konne.
Das ware nicht grausam, wenn man bedenke, daB sogar unschuldige Natur-
geschopfe wie Hasen und Rehe getotet werden mUBten, damit kein Schaden
entstehe. Weshalh sollte man die Bestien, die uns den Bolschewismus
bringen wollen, mehr schonen?"
103 a
Notes pp. 71-72
138. Article of Streicher in "Der Stlirmer" of November 4, 1943 ,entitled
"Jlidische Neuordnung" (passage on the affirmation of the extermination
of the Jews by the Reich) :
"Auch die Juden nahmen den Hinlibergang in das flinfte Kriegsjahr zum
AnlaB einer besinnlichen Betrachtung ... In der Schweiz ist es das
'Israelitische Wochenblatt', das in seiner Ausgabe vom 27.8.1943 am
Ende des vierten Kriegsjahres eine Betrachtung vom Stapel lieB ... -
... Das Schweizer Judenblatt schreibt weiter: 'Sozusagen verschwunden
sind die Juden Europas, mit Ausnahme von England und den unbedeutenden
Gemeinden in den wenigen neutral en Landern. Das jlidische Reservoir des
Ostens, das imstande war die Assimilationserscheinungen des Westens
auszugleichen besteht nicht - Das ist kein Judenschwindel. Es ist
wirklich Wahrheit, daB die Juden'sozusagen' aus Europa verschunden sind
und daB das jlidische 'Reservoir des Ostens', aus dem die Judenseuche
seit Jahrhunderten liber die europaischen Volker gekommen ist, aufgehort
hat zu bestehen. Wenn das Schweizer Judenblatt hehuupten will, daB die
Juden eine solche Entwicklung nicht in Rechnung gestellt hatten, als sie
die Volker in den zweiten Weltkrieg stlirzten, so ist dies ihnen zu ?
glauben. Aber der Flihrer des deutschen Volkes hat schon zu Beginn des
Krieges das nun gekommene pr'Ophezeit. Er sagte, daB der zweite Weltkrieg
die verschlingenwerde, die ihn haben wollten. - ... Man vernichte
die Ursache, den Juden, und die Welt ist von Judenfeindschaft befreit.
Es ist begreiflich, daB die Juden eine solche Losung nicht wlinschen. Sie
verlangen vielmehr die Ausrottung jender Nichtjuden, die durch das
Vorhandensein der Juden zwangslaufig zu Judengegnern geworden sind ...
- So nun wissen wir es, was man im Volk Juda von der Neuordnung der
Welt erwartet: die Entrechtung der nichtjlidischen Volker und Aufzwingung
einer radikalen Judenherrsehaft. Wer angesiehts solchen jlidisehen Be-
kennens noeh nicht begreifen sollte, daB es bei dem Kampf, den wir als
Deutsche in diesem zweiten Weltkrieg zu bestehen haben, wirklich urn unser
Letztes, urn unser Leben geht, dem ist wahrlich nicht mehr zu
helfen."
139. Interrogatory of Eichmann during the preliminary investigation of
his trial in Jerusalem (passage concerning Himmler's directives for the
operation of the deportation of the Jews from Hungary)
Eichmann I, p. 3230 :
" ... Die Richtlinien waren so mannigfaltig gewesen und so verschieden
gewesen, daB man sie damals schon immer sich eigens heraussuchen muBte;
und heute bin ich nicht mehr in der Lage, die einzelnen Richtlinien zu
unterscheiden.
1I
140. Interrogatory of Eichmann for the preliminary investigation of his
trial in Jerusalem (passage on the full significance of the real meaning
of the "final solution to the Jewish question")
Eichmann I, pp. 3185-3187
"Eichmann: Wie das zum SchluB dann gewesen ist, Herr Hauptmann, das weiB
ich nicht. lch weiB nur so viel, das zum SchluB - unter dem SchluB mochte
ich verstehen gegen Ende 43-44, 45, da - es ist zwar libertrieben, wenn
ich das - wenn ich mich so ausdrlicke, - sangen's ja aIle Vogel vom
Dach bereits."
104 a
REPLY TO THE
NEO-NAZI FALSIFICATION
OF HISTORICAL FACT'S
CONCERNING
THE HOLOCAUST
by Georges WELLERS
?
In the long series of crimes and atrocities of which the National-
Socialist regime is guilty, the fate reserved for the Jews and the Gypsies
occupies a totally exceptional place. In fact, no other category of vic-
tims of this regime was collectively and intentionally condemned to an
extermination in which neither age nor physical nor intellectual weakness
of the individuals saved them from a violent death. In addition, at no
other epoch and in no other place was an undertaking of this nature
so deliberately conceived and so systematically executed as in Nazi
Germany in the twentieth century. It is this crime which made the
Hitlerian regime particularly odious; and those nostalgic of the latter,
powerless to justify the crime, are reduced to denying it. It is essentially
a question of two aspects of the problem which shed a stark and insup-
portable light on the Nazi regime: on the one hand, the invention of a
means such as the gas chambers of putting to death an unprecedented
number of human beings, and on the other hand the exploitation of the
latter on a gigantic scale which brought about several million deaths in
the course of but three years.
There is a whole literature (28) the task of which is to disparage the
unbearable reality. With the years, its volume increases, its diffusion
widens and its agents express themselves in French, German, English,
Spanish or Arabic.
The general "philosophy" of this campaign is exceedingly simple: the
existence of the gas chambers and the six million victims are declared
to be lies entirely invented by world Judaism after the war. The prin-
cipal motive of this colossal fraud would be the desire to extract from
conquered Germany a monetary compensation which would be greater
in proportion to the gravity of the wrongs attributed to Germany. This
world-wide plot would be inspired and supported by the Center of
Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris, the Yad Vashem Institute
in Jerusalem, the Jewish Historical Institute of Warsaw, the State Mu-
seum of Auschwitz, the Institute of Contemporary History of Munich,
(4) etc. The means employed by the conspirers would consist of false
accusations proferred by European Jews who survived the Second World
War, of declarations just as false extracted under torture and martyri-
zation from the elite of the SS of the Nazi regime (the very essence of
the Aryan race) and, finally, in the falsification of documents of the
Nazi regime the purpose of which would be to wrongly condemn it.
Paradoxically, the foundations for the justification of Nazism through
the refutation of its crimes were laid down not by a former Nazi nor even
by a German, but by a Frenchman and, what is particularly curious, by
a former resistant arrested in France by the Gestapo and deported to
the camp of Buchenwald and then to that of Dora. The person in
question is Paul Rassinier, author of a series of works (38 to 42) dedi-
cated to the rehabilitation of the SS and to a lively and astute polemic the
purpose of which is to demonstrate on the one hand the absence of valid
proofs of the existence of gas chambers intended to exterminate people
and, on the other hand, that the number of dead among the Jewish victims
had been infinitely inferior to what was said.
107
The paths marked out by Rassinier are faithfully followed by his
imitators who constantly refer to the master, citing him as a "classic"
who has "definitively" demonstrated this or that. More and more often,
the pupils go beyond the master. For example, if Rassinier ends up by
admitting that there perhaps existed gas chambers for industrial purposes
in certain concentration camps, and that perhaps some rare mad SS had
used them to kill Jews, a certain F.J. Scheidel (47), J.G. Burg (7), E.
Aretz (3), Thies Christophersen (9), R. Harwood (23), A.R. Butz (8)
affirm quite simply that the gas chambers are a calumny. In the same
way, whereas Rassinier claims that the number of Jewish victims of
the "final solution" was a minimum of 500,000 and a maximum of
1,500,000, Butz (8) affirms that it did not exceed a million; and Harwood
(23) writes that it must "be in the order of size of thousands and not
millions. " Schlegel (48) finds" at the maximum" three to four hundred
thousand, M. Roeder (44) two hundred thousand including natural
deaths. Finally, for a certain R. Faurisson, everything is crystal clear:.
"The time is ripe," it is the "imposture of genocide" (21). ~
My remarks are not at all addressed to the fanatical authors and
propagandists of the pro-Nazi campaign, for there is no hope of persuad-
ing them of anything whatever. Their unique concern is to rehabilitate
the Nazi regime at all costs and to cleanse of all smears the "German
honourj" identified with that of National-Socialism and its worst ser-
vants. Their production does not stem from an historical school but
from a vulgar political propaganda from the school of Grebbels where
all the means of attaining the purpose designated in advance are good
and recommended.
On the contrary, my observations are addressed to men and women
who are quite sincere but who ignore the real facts and who, for. this
reason, risk lending an ear to the disparagements and unfounded affirma-
tions of the apologists of Nazism.
My account will be limited to the two essential problems designated
above: the use of gas chambers with a view to the massacre of the Jews,
and the nwnber of victims.
108
Part I The Existence
of Gas Chambers
Our knowledge concerning the gas chambers is based on three sources
of information: 1) the archives of the Nazi administrations; 2) the
statements of particularly qualified members of the SS and 3) the numer-
ous declarations of former prisoners of camps such as Auschwitz
Belzec or Treblinka.
Naturally, the part of personal accounts in this information is consider-
able. Among them, a particular attention must be accorded to those
given before the end of the war or during the first years of the post-war
period, when memories were still keen and precise and when the absur-
dity of the fable of the Jewish plot to obtain German reparations
is obvious. At that time, neither the State of Israel nor the Federal
Republic of Germany, the two parties to the future agreements (1), had
yet come into existence.
However, an exception to this rule must be made for what concerns
the "evidence" of Thies Christophersen. This is not because the docu-
ment is especially serious or convincing, but rather because the author is
the sale "witness" among the apologists of Nazism who even so knew
the camp of Auschwitz a little and, above all, because the exploitation
of his story for the last five years has become the immutable rule for
all of the other neo-Nazi polemists. This account dates from 1973, or
twenty-eight years after the war.
A: The Gas Chambers
at Auschwitz
It is perhaps not useless for the clarity of this expose to briefly recall
the essential part of our current knowledge on the subject of the gas
chambers at Auschwitz and which is denied as a whole.
The camp of Auschwitz was originally and for the first two years of
its existence (May 1940-spring 1942) a camp which resembled many
109
THE EXISTENCE OF GAS CHAMBERS
others, and its population was exclusively Polish. In 1942 this camp,
later called "Auschwitz I," was divided in two parts by the construction
of a new center three kilometers from the first and which soon took on
size, becoming Birkenau or "Auschwitz II." In 1943 a third camp was
built eight kilometers away from the first and took the name of "Buna-
Monowitz or Auschwitz III." Parallel to this, thirty-nine smaller camps
or" commandos" swarmed out in the region occupying a territory of a
radius of nearly thirty-five kilometers.
Beginning in the spring of 1942, the convoys of Jewish d e p o r t e e ~
coming from all of the occupied countries and disembarking at Birkenau
resulted in the fact that among the internees the number of Jews soon
became heavily dominant.
From the first period on, the mother camp, "Auschwitz I," was
provided with a crematorium, whereas until the spring of 1943 no other
camp nor commando had one. In autumn 1941, during the first exper-
iments of gassing, a cellar of Block 11 at Auschwitz I was fitted out mp
a temporary gas chamber and the bodies of the victims of these experi-
ments were burnt in the crematory oven. Following these tests, in 1942
two houses abandoned by peasants and situated in a wood at Birkenau
were transformed by the camp's own means into gas chambers and
known as "bunkers." A dependency of the crematorium of Auschwitz
I was. also occasionally used as a gas chamber. There was still no crema-
torium at Birkenau, and the bodies of the gassed were at first buried in
the vicinity of the gas chambers and later burnt in vast open trenches.
In the spring of 1943, on the territory of Birkenau, the construction
of four modern and perfected plants designated by the vague terms of
"Crematoriums I, II, III and IV", was completed. they were built by
industrial enterprises exterior to the camp, and each was composed of
three parts: an area for the crematory ovens, an area for the undressing
of the victims and a gas chamber. Henceforth, the "bunkers" were
used only in case of necessity, as were the trenches for incinerating
bodies. Neither the camp of Buna-Monowitz nor any of the thirty-nine
commandos of Auschwitz ever possessed crematory ovens or gas cham-
bers.
The "selection "of the victims was effected in two manners: on the
one hand, upon arrival of the trains and without even enrolment and
on the other hand following periodical selections among the registered
internees of the camps and the commandos brought to Birkenau for
execution.
On October 7, 1944, Crematory III was out of order following a
bloody revolt of the prisoners of the "Sonderkommando" responsible
for its cleaning and maintenance. In January 1945, with the approach of
the Russian army, the four plants were dynamited by the SS.
Further on, we shall see the foundations of our knowledge, but let us
say immediately that since 1973 it is denied by constant reference to
the "testimony" of Christophersen who speculates on the fact that he
had personally known the "camp of Auschwitz" where, he says, he
110
The Gas Chambers at Auschwitz
never saw a gas chamber (9). As a matter of fact, arriving at Auschwitz
in January 1944 and attached to a small commando, "Ralsko," located
a few kilometers distant from Auschwitz I and where certain phantas-
magoric "research" in botany was carried on, he had the occasion to
visit another commando, "Bielitz," as well as the camp of Auschwitz I;
and he went once to Birkenau to take charge of a hundred prisoners
attached to Ralsko.
We concede without the slightest difficulty that there were no gas
chambers at Bielitz, nor at Auschwitz I (in January 1944). As for
Birkenau, a few documents from German archives are amply sufficient
to judge the value of Christophersen's declarations.
1. A Few Documents from Archives
If the easy transformation of a cellar of Block 11 of Auschwitz I or
of two cottages in the middle of a wood at Birkenau into a gas chamber
could be accomplished by the artisanry of the camp itself, the construc-
tion of a large complex of industrial nature, one part of which consisted
of a crematory oven destined to burn up human corpses, could not be
effected without the collaboration of specialists taken from outside of
the camp personnel. The construction of the crematoriums I, II, III
and IV at Birkenau was in fact entrusted to the firm Topf and Sons
of Erfurt, long-time specialists in the construction of crematoriums.
Moreover, the fitting out of gas chambers of extraordinary dimensions
and conceived for operating at an accelerated rate of speed necessitated
ventilation equipment which was not at all common and for which the
opinion of the chemists and technicians producing "Zyklon B" was
important. The specialists of the company "Degesch," supplier of the
Wehrmacht in "Zyklon B," those of the firm "Testa," their concession-
ary, and those of "Heerdtlinger," their sub-contractor, were consulted.
An abundant correspondance was exchanged between these companies.
It exists and was gathered together at the time of the trial of the
industrialists before the American Military Tribunal which took place
at Nuremberg between October 1947 and April 1949.
Here, as an example, is what one reads about gas chambers at Ausch-
witz in the following three letters: on December 24, 1942, Heerdtlingler
wrote Testa a letter which mentions "the installation of a gas chamber"
(" ... die Erstellung einer Begasungskammer") (8), following which the
Degesch wrote on December 31, 1942, to Testa that it was a question of
"the making up of chambers using cyanhydric acid" (" ... die Bearbeitung
der Blausaurekammern") (in the plural, GW) (17) and on January 2,
1943, the Testa answered Degesch concerning the "disinfection in the
plants for gassing by cyanhydric acid" (" ... Entwesung mit Blausaure
dienende Begansungsanlagen") (17).
111
And here is a letter the contents of which are ve.ry eloquent: (2, p.336;
49, p.145).
SS-Vstuf (F) Kirschneck B.V.3
Copy January 29, 1943
Bftgb. No: 2250/43/BIIL
(Order)
Objet: Crematorium II, Condition of the Building
Reference: Telegram of SS-WVHA, No: 2648 of 1-28-43
Enclosure: 1 report of extermination
To the Chief of the Amtsgruppe C, SS-Brigadeftihrer and Major-General of
the Waffen-SS Dr. Engineer KAMMLER
Berlin-Liechterfelde-West. Vnter dem Eichen 126-135.
Crematorium II has, with the exception of a few details of construction,
been completed thanks to the use of all available people, despite immense
difficulties and freezing weather, by day and night shifts. The ovens
were lighted in the presence of the chief engineer, M. Prtifer of the firm
Topf u. S6hne, Erfurt, which was in charge of their construction; and they
function perfectly. One has not yet been able to plaster the concrete
ceiling of the body cellar (Leichenkeller) because of the action of the frost.
That is, however, without importance given that the gassing cellar (Verga- ?
sungskeller) can be used for this purpose.
Because of the unavailability of railway carriages, the company of Topf u.
S6hne was not able to deliver on time the ventilating apparatus ordered
by the central management for buildings. After the arrival of this equip-
ment, the incorporation of it will be begun at once so that one may foresee
that it' will be completely in service by 2-20-43.
Enclosed is a report of the engineer-inspector of the firm Topf u. S6hne.
The Chief of the Group for Constructions of the Waffen-SS and of the
SS-Hauptsturmftihrer
Distribution:
1 SS-Ustuf Janish v. Kirschneck
Police at Auschwitz
1 File (Crematorium dossier) Certified copy Pousth (?) SS-Ustuf (F.)
It is thus grotesque to claim, like the "witness," Christophersen, that
there were no gas chambers at Auschwitz. And it is his "testimony" that
is henceforth considered as decisive by the neo-Nazi literature.
It is true that the correspondance between the industrialists speaks
of gas chambers in view of "disinfection," and the letter of the Chief of
the Group for Constructions at Auschwitz does not stipulate the destina-
tion of these gas chambers where, however, the "Krematorium" is
situated in the vicinity of a "Leichenkeller" and a "Vergasungskeller."
This is not at all surprising, forit is a question of a hermetically sealed
State Secret where euphemisms are obligatory in the entire
Nazi administration. The accused industrialists claimed that for them
it was the "disinfection" which was in question. The Tribunal did not
agree with their version of the matter. But what is important to us is
that Christophersen does not say that at Birkenau he saw gas chambers
destined for disinfection. He says that he did not discover any gas
chambers at all.
This permits an evaluation of his account, of his intelligence, the faith-
fulness of his memory ofter twenty-eight years or ... his dishonesty.
112
2. Declarations of Members of the SS
On the subject of the camp at Auschwitz we are in possession of two
fundamental testimonies of two particularly qualified members of the SS.
A certain ex-SS-Unterscharfiihrer Pery Broad was captured on May
6, 1945, in the British zone of occupation. A citizen' of Brazil and
who spoke English very well, he became an interpreter for the British
authorities. In 1945 he drew up a lengthy memoir 'concerning the camp
of Auschwitz which he entered in 1942 and where he was attached to the
"Political Section" ("Politische Abteilung") until the liberation of the
camp in January 1945 (6). On July 13, 1945, he gave this memoir
to the authorities of the British Intelligence Service. On December 14,
1945, at Minden, he made a declaration under oath which is a sort of
abridged versio:o. of his memoir (1S). These documents were not render-
ed public and remained unknown to the International Court which
judged Grering and his consorts in 1945-46. During the last trimester
of 1947, when the American Military Tribunal opened proceedings against
the German industrialists implicated in the deliveries of large quantities of
"Zyklon B" to the camp of Auschwitz, these documents were produced.
It is thus that the declaration of Broad of December 14, 1945, was
translated into English only on September 29, 1947, nearly two years
later. On October 20, 1947, at Nuremberg, Broad deposed new testi-
mony which was translated into English on November 20 of that year
(20). In all of these testimonies and declarations, Broad relates the
procedures of mass murders in the gas chambers of Auschwitz with
some details when compared to his memoir of July 13.
In 1947, Broad was released by the English and worked in diverse
private companies without being bothered until April 30, 1959, the
date at which he was accused in the trial of the former SS of Auschwitz
which was held in Frankfurt from December 20, 1963, to August 20,
1965 (29, p.537; 30 p. 372). In the course of this trial, the memoir
of 1945 was presented to Broad, who acknowledged being its author. He
was clearly surprised and embarrassed, for in his memoir he very cle-
verly represented himself as innocent if not a victim of fate; whereas
he accused his former colleagues, presently his co-defendants, of atroci-
ties. Discussing certain details concerning the latter, he retracted
nothing of his account of the events and evoked neither torture nor pres-
sure from the British in 1945. It is from this time on that his memoir
finally became really known to the public and to historians.
In his memoir Broad described the first temporary arrangement of
a place for experimenting with murder by means of the gas "Zyklon B" in
the cellars of Block 11 of Auschwitz (6, pp. 61-S), the first permanent and
"home-made" gas chambers installed in the two abandoned farms at
Birkenau (Auschwitz II) and designated in the jargon of the camp as
"Bunkers I and II," (6, pp. 69-7S) and finally, the construction at
Birkenau of four enormous complexes with undressing room, gas cham-
ber and crematorium, designated by the numbers I, II, III and IV. He
precisely described their characteristics and their functioning (6, pp.SO-
113
4) as well as the procedure of the "selection" of Jewish victims upon
arrival of the convoys, the memorable extermination of the Gypsies in the
gas chambers and the revolt of the "Sonderkommando" in 1944 (6,
pp. 86-91).
The other essential SS witness is of the highest rank.
On March 11, 1946 (ten months after Broad), Rudolf Hoess was
arrested in Schleswig-Holstein, in the British zone of occupation, where
he had been employed under a false name as an agricultural worker.
Hoess, SS-Obersturmbannfiihrer (Lieutenant-Colonel), was the founder
of the camp of Auschwitz and its first Commandant (May 20, 1940 to
November 11, 1943), the inventor in 1941 of the utilization of the
insecticide "Zy klon B" as a means of mass extermination, builder of
all the gas chambers, temporary or permanent, at Auschwitz I and at
Auschwitz II (Birkenau). After his arrest, he was brought to Minden,
near Hanover, still in the British zone, where he made a sworn statement
on March 14, 1946 (32, p. 152). Then he was transferred to Nurem-
berg, where the International Tribunal jUdging Geering and his
was in session, and he there made a second sworn statement on Apnl
5, 1946 (32, p. 159). While drafting them, Hoess was completely
ignorant of the memoir and the declarations of his ex-subordinate
Broad which had been written several months earlier. The International
Tribunal was equally unaware of them and, in addition, cited the testi-
mony of Hoess in its verdict. It is therefore evident that the two
witnesses were independent from each other. However, with regard to
the gas chambers at Auschwitz, their testimonies coincide.
Throughout his two statements of 1946, Hoess indeed related the
genesis of the camp of Auschwitz and his visit to Treblinka, where the
killing was done in gas chambers filled with the exhaust fumes from a
Diesel engine. Hoess did not find the latter adequate to the task,
which is why he decided to use "Zyklon B." He considered that it had
important advantages and enumerated them. This said, he mentioned
the temporary premises for gassing at Auschwitz I, the two farms at
Birkenau transformed into "Bunkers," then the construction of four
big" modern" plants, also at Birkenau, which each consisted of an un-
dressing room, a gas chamber and a crematorium. He gave the descrip-
tion of the functioning of these plants after the" selection" of victims upon
arrival of the convoys. In short, his declarations contain all of the
elements that the account of Broad dedicated to the operation of the
gas chambers: their number, their topographical position, their charac-
teristics, their functioning.
From Nuremberg, Hoess was transferred to Poland at the disposal of
the Supreme Tribunal sitting in Warsaw. He was judged between March
11 and April 2, 1947, and condemned to death. He was executed on
April 16 on the very territory of the former camp of Auschwitz I. Dur-
ing the proceedings of his trial in Poland, he wrote a copious autobiogra-
phy. The French translation contains nearly 250 pages (24).
This long account consists of a great quantity of personal information,
considerations of all kinds, opinions on a wide variety of subjects and,
114
above all, a very important amount of information concerning the camp
of Auschwitz. Among the latter, that relating to the gas chambers
interests us essentially. This autobiography contains all of the essential
elements of the previous declarations made on this subject by Hoess to
the English, and those of the account and the declarations of Broad:
the fitting out of the "experimental" gas chambers at Auschwitz I (24,
p. 222), the fitting out of the abandoned farms in Birkenau as
"bunkers" (24, pp. 174, 229), the construction of four "modern" and
perfected plants at Birkenau (24, pp. 235, 240, 245), their characteristics,
their fl..'Iflctioning on "Zyklon B," the "selections" of the victims (24,
pp. 178, 233, 237), the work of the" Sonderkommandos," etc. Written
entirely from memory, this autobiography contains certain obvious and
inevitable errors; and, of course, there is some information which is not
to be found in the account of Broad and vice versa. That is a supplemen-
tary proof of the absence of all connivence between the two men. In
fact, the contrary would be highly suspicious, particularly when one of
the men was a simple SS-Unterscharfiihrer responsible for a single
bureau, even such an important one as the "Political Section," and the
other was an SS-Obersturmbannfiihrer, commandant and creator of the
largest Nazi concentrationary complex.
It remains to be added that it seems probable that the statements
by Broad in 1945 were equally unknown to the Supreme Tribunal of
Warsaw, and thus to Hoess at the time of his detention in Poland and his
trial. As for the statements of Broad in 1947, they were made several
months after the trial and execution of Hoess.
Finally, much later, at the time of the trials of Auschwitz, for example,
that of Frankfurt in 1963-65, eight former members of the SS examined
as witnesses recognized having seen with their own eyes the gas cham-
bers at Birkenau in operation. (These witnesses were R. Bock, G. Hess,
K. Hoblinger, Dr. K. Morgen, H. Stroch, F. Hofmann and Dr. G.
Wiebeck). None of the defendants denied their existence, but only
his personal participation in their use (29).
But the Neo-Nazi propagandists, from Paul Rassinier to those of the
present day, still repeat one after the other that the statements of Hoess
concerning the gas chambers are false or absurd and without value. It
is claimed that their content was obtained by horrible tortures to which
the unfortunate person would have been subjected. No one ever men-
tions Pery Broad, who confirms the statements of Hoess in their entirety,
and whose memoir of 1945 had already been made public in 1947 at the
time of the trial of the German industrialists by the American Military
Tribunal, in 1949 at the Assize Court of Frankfurt and in 1963-65 at the
time of the trial of Auschwitz. As to the tortures to which Hoess was
submitted, there is no serious indication concerning them. It is to pre-
sent that tough old SS, that "glorious" representative of the elite of the
"race of Lords," a man of unshakable courage, as a cowardly individual
who had collapsed under the ordeal and was ready to betray the regime
to which he had sworn eternal fidelity with neither breach nor compro-
mise.
115
3. Statements of Former Prisoners at Auschwitz
We are currently in possession of at least nine declarations written
prior to the end of the war. They were therefore made before even the
maddest minds could have conceived of the so-called "Jewish world
conspiracy," the objective of which was to extort fabulous sums of money
from Germany.
These statements are those of five persons who escaped from the
camp of Auschwitz and of four others who died there before its libera-
tion in January 1945.
The escapees are two Slovak Jews who got away from Birkenau on
April 7, 1944, two others escaped on May 27, 1944, and a non-Jewish
Polish officer who had arrived at Auschwitz on March 2S, 1942, and
remained there for nearly two years. After having left Auschwitz,
these five former prisoners were able to transmit to the United States
accounts of what they had seen and personally experienced. In
ber 1944 (five months before the end of the war), the Executive Office
of the War Refugee Board of the President of the United States published
them, adding that their "names will not momentarily be revealed in the
interest of their own security" and that "the Office has every reason to
believe that these reports provide an exact picture of the horrible things
which are going on in these camps" (S).
It is known today that the first two escapees are Rudolf Vrba and
Fred Wetzler. The former now lives in Canada and related the details
of his escape and the story of his report, published anonymously in 1944,
in a book which appeared in 1963 (S1). The latter now lives in Slo-
vakia. The two escapees of May 1944 are Czeslaw Mordowiz and
Ernst Rosin. On the other hand, I ignore the name of the Polish
commandant. Wetzler was deported on April 13, 1942, from Sered in
Slovakia directly to Auschwitz. Vrba was deported from Novaky in
Slovakia to Maidanek and was then transferred on June 27, 1942, to
Auschwitz. They thus were familiar with Auschwitz-Birkenau for nearly
two years, as was the Polish officer. The date of the arrival at Auschwitz
of the two escapees of May 27 is not given, but it is certainly prior to
April 7, 1944. Their report was received in Switzerland via Slovakia.
then sent to the USA.
These reports are very rich in information of all kinds. We shall,
however, retain from this mass of particulars only what is directly rele-
vant to the problem of the gas chambers. Each report speaks of them.
Wetzler, who knew Birkenau at its beginnings, described the first
systematic selections upon arrival of the convoys, after which those
selected were sent without other formality from the siding directly to the
birch-wood forest (at Birkenau, G.W.) where they were administered
the gas and where they were incinerated" (S, p. 14). He spoke of the
first "Sonderkommando" (S, p. 1S). "At the end of February 1943,
a new modern establishment of crematory ovens and gas chambers was
inaugurated at Birkenau," he wrote. "The administration of the gas
116
and the burning of the bodies in the birch-wood forest was stopped, and
everything now took place in the four crematory ovens specially built."
( ... ) "At present," he continued, "there are four crematory ovens in
operation at Birkenau, two large ones, I and II, and two small ones,
III and IV. Those of type I and II are composed of three parts: (A)
the room with the ovens, (B) the big hall, (C) the gas chamber."
(S, p. 17). He then gave the description of the procedure of gassing
which may thus be summarized: the victims were brought into the hall
(B) where they undressed, then went into the gas chamber (C) where
they were killed with "Zyklon B". Finally, their corpses were trans-
ported to the ovens (A) and incinerated. He added: "The crematory
ovens I and IV operate on nearly the same principles ... " (S, p. 17).
Vrba devoted a third of his short report to the camp of Mai'danek and
the rest to Birkenau. He simply spoke several times of those who were
"executed by gas." (5, p. 29-30).
The report of the two Jews who had escaped on May 27, 1944,
related the effect produced at Birkenau by the escape of Vrba and
Wetzler seven weeks before, emphasized the "selections" (S, p. 34), the
"executions by gas" (S , p.34) and the "incinerations." They added,
concerning the very numerous convoys of Hungarian Jews who arrived
at Auschwitz in the spring of 1944:
"It was necessary to increase the size of the "Special Commando" to 600
men and, after two or three days, it was enlarged to 800... Three crematory
ovens operated day and night (at this time the fourth was being repaired),
and as the capacity of the ovens was not sufficient, large pits thirty meters
long by fifteen meters wide were dug out ... in the "Birchenwald" where
bodies were burned night and day" (5, p. 34).
Three-quarters of the report of the Polish Commander was devoted
to the fate of the non-Jewish Poles who during the first two years of
the existence of Auschwitz were the only prisoners. However, a special
chapter of it described the destiny of the Jews: "selections" (S, pp. 46-
48) after which "all those who were not fit to work were brought to
the Birch Forest (Trzinski) and executed by means of hydrocyanic gas
(S, p. 48) in "shanties with special gases" after having been obliged to
"entirely undress" and go into "the building until it was completely
full. " Then, when "all the exits were hermetically sealed ... " specially
trained units of the SS cast hydrocyanic bombs through the ventilation
shafts ... " (S, p. 48-49). Later "the crematory ovens had been finished"
( ... ) and "the execution by gas and the incineration took place at record
speed. The arrivals of corpses became so great that one was occasion-
ally obliged to resort to the old method of incineration in the open air"
(S, p. 49) ..
Before proceeding farther in our study, it is perhaps useful to recall
that all of these reports were edited at the time when the outcome of
the war was uncertain, the landing in Normandy had not yet taken
place, when in the East there was stiII fighting on the Russian soil and
in all Europe Jews were dying en masse or hiding to escape death. The
future reparations on the part of the future and unforeseeable Federal
Germany negociated by the inexistant and unimaginable State of Israel
117
certainly did not enter the imagination of even the mad among the Jews.
The four following accounts were uncovered in the course of the
excavations effected on the territory of Birkenau where, before dying,
their authors, all members of the Sonderkommandos, buried them at
different periods. AlI of these missives from beyond the tomb present
a very great documentary interest, but as sources of information concern-
ing our subject-the gas chambers- their importance, as we shall see,
is uneven.
The oldest find was made in February 1945, shortly after the libera-
tion of the camps of Auschwitz on January 27, 1945. It is a letter in
French dated November 6, 1944, that a certain Chaim Herman wrote
for his wife and his daughter (22). This letter was found buried in a
bottle near a crematorium at Birkenau. The author, of Polish origin,
indicated that he was deported from Drancy on Marcq. 2, 1943; and his
name does in fact appear on the deportation list n 49 of March 2, 1943.
This husband and father was worried about the dangers whiCll. menaced
his family who remained in France and wrote that he himself could only
count on a miracle to survive. Nevertheless, he obviously avoided
unduly traumatizing his wife and his daughter by the description of
his misfortunes and limited himself only to saying that upon the arrival
of his convoy a hundred persons were selected to remain in the camp
and the rest went sent "to the gases and then to the ovens" (" ... der Rest
kam ins Gas und dann in die Of en "). The author was attached to the
Sonderkommando as a bearer of corpses.
A little later, March 5, 1945, an aluminum bottle was dug up on
the grounds of Crematorium II at Birkenau. It contained a letter dated
September 6, 1944, signed by a certain Salmen Gradowski and a note-
book the pages of which were covered with the same writing as the
letter and the text of which stops in the middle of a sentence (22).
Gradowski was a Jew of Polish origin who was deported to Birkenau in
the beginning of January 1943 with six members of his family, all of
whom were dead after the selection upon arrival. He described with
precision and details the extreme difficulty of the conditions of the long
journey as well as the selection, the meaning of which completely escaped
those concerned. He himself was part of the Sonderkommando, and
he mentioned the four modern crematoriums.
Much richer in information concerning the gas chambers at Birkenau
is the text dug up in the summer of 1952 on the grounds of Crematory
II. It is a notebook twenty-one pages of which are covered with text.
The first four are devoted to events of the camp of Belzec, whereas the
seventeen others relate to Auschwitz. The whole was written in 1943-
44 at Birkenau. The last date figuring in the text is November 26,
1944. The author of this highly readable account is unknown, but it
is evident that he had been at Auschwitz for a long time and that he was
part of a Sonderkommando (22). The author described not without
118
talent several moving scenes which took place at different periods in the
"undressing room" (Auskleideraum" or "Entkleidungsraum") and in
the "Bunker" or the "Gasbunker" or the "Gaskammer" and which
reveal the courageous attitudes of the victims confronted with death.
These scenes recall certain descriptions which appear in the autobiogra-
phy of Hoess and in the memoir of Broad in 1945. The author specified,
moreover, that the walls of Crematory III (damaged at the time of the
revolt of the Sonderkommando on October 7, 1944, G.W.) were
knocked down on October 14; that on October 20 the documents, the
collections of maps, the death certificates, etc., were taken away in two
little taxis and a camp vehicule to be burnt; that "today," November 25,
the dismantlement of Crematory I was begun, followed by that of
Crematory II carefully conserving the material used "zum Vergas en
von Menschen;" he mentioned the two other crematories and said that
he had buried other manuscripts on the grounds of Crematories I and II.
He ended by saying that one hundred and seventy last men of his Sonder-
kommando were to leave their quarters, and he added that "we are
sure that they will lead us to death."
Finally, on October 17, 1962, a glass jar was found in the vicinity
of Crematorium II of Birkenau. It contained sixty-five sheets of paper
covered with writing, a part of which was more or less damaged and thus
difficult to read.
The author of this text is a certain Salme Lewental, of Polish origin,
who arrived at Auschwitz on December 10, 1942, and was immediately
attached to the Sonderkommando taking care of Bunkers I and nand
the pits for incineration of the bodies, as that was done before the
construction of perfected crematoriums (22). The author spoke numer-
ous times of the "Bunkers," where the men, women and children
"vergast wurden" or "kommen im Gas" or "in der Todesbunker flihren
und si mit Gas ersticken" or "ins Gas kam" or "Alle Menschen aus
dem Gasbunker waren herausgeschleppt," "vergasene Menschen," etc.;
of the manner in which" Zyklon B" was introduced into the gas cham-
bers, the state of mind of the members of the'Sonderkommandos and of
the bloody revolt of October 7, 1944. Concerning the latter, he gave
the names of his comrades among whom was Salmen Gradowski, the
author of the manuscript of which we have spoken above.
After the end of the war, a few rare survivors among the members
of the Sonderkommandos testified confirming the written documents
known following the excavations. They were Janowski as of April 13,
1945; Bacon, Buki, Filip and Don Paisikovic, Filip Mueller, the bro-
thers Shlomo and Avram Dragon, Rosemblum, Silbergerg, Drs. S.
Bendel, M. Nyiszli and A. Lettich. Each of them gave numerous
supplementary and precious details. There probably is not a single
account of a former prisoner of Auschwitz which does not speak of the
gas chambers of Birkenau, for their existence was notorious.
119
B: The Gas Chambers
at Belzec
and the Declarations
of Gerstein
Birkenau (Auschwitz II) was not the only camp where there were
gas chambers for the extermination of the Jews. The same installations
existed, still in Poland, at Belzec, Treblinka, Sobibor and Maldnek as
well.
Let us consider the case of Belzec.
'7
The declarations of Gerstein gave a good deal of anxiety to Rassinier
who spent himself in mental gymnastics in an attempt to discredit
them. His destructive passion is easily understood: it is a testimony of
cardinal importance from an eye-witness of the gas chambers of Belzec,
the functioning of which is described in detail; and it affords precious
indications concerning those of Treblinka, Sobibor and Maldanek.
This account is particularly important due to the fact that its author
is not a chance spectator, -but rather an SS officer specialized in the
matter who was on official mission to SS-Gruppenftihrer Globocnik; and
because this author told his staggering experience to trustworthy third
parties as of the month of August 1942, in the middle of the war, far
from the defeat, in complete liberty, spontaneously. It is this account
that-he was to set down in black and white in April 1945, still spontane-
ously, in conditions that we shall soon see; and it is an account which ~
was to be authenticated by his confidants of 1942. (10, 45, 25 p. 283-290.)
That is what the "Gerstein report" is. Here, in a few words, is its
history.
1. Kurt Gerstein and his report
Kurt Gerstein was an SS-Obersturmftihrer who belonged to the
Medico-technical Service of the Central Office of the SS Administration.
On November 9, 1941, he was entrusted with the perfecting and the
construction of establishments of the Waffen-SS for disinfection and
extermination of lice and which also included the sections of highly
poisonous gases.
120
The Gas Chambers at Belzec and the Declarations of Gerstein
The eighth of June, 1942, the SS-Sturmbannftihrer Hans Gi.inther of
the RSHA ordered him to procure a hundred kilograms of prussic acid
and to transport it to a place known only to the driver of the lorry. On
August 17, Gerstein, accompanied by Professor Pfannenstiel, arrived
in Lublin (Poland) where they were received by the SS-Gruppenftihrer
Globocnik, Chief of the SS and of the Police of the District of Lublin.
They had a conversation with him in presence of a certain Dr. Herbert
Linden, director at the Ministry of the Interior. Two days later, they
left for Belzec where Gerstein, escorted by the SS-Hauptsturmftihrer
Obermeyer, of Pirmasens, was able to visit the gas chambers. He
returned there the next day and was present at the arrival of a convoy.
Its forty-five railway cars contained 6,700 persons of whom 1,450 were
already dead upon arrival. Remaining where he was, Gerstein followed
everything that went on afterwards under the command of a certain
Captain Wirth: brutal unloading of the cars of their live cargo, undres-
sing of everyone, the column conducted towards the gas chambers where
men, women and children were forced to crowd together and, finally,
their atrocious and interminable agony of three hours and twenty-one
minutes by the clock, for the Diesel engine of which the exhaust fumes
were intended to kill the unfortunate people did not work; and two
hours and forty-nine minutes were necessary to repair it, then thirty-two
minutes to finish the killing. Gerstein was present at the opening of
the gas chambers, at the evacuation of the bodies and their quick burial
"in big pits of about 100x20x12 meters, located' near the death cham-
bers. " Professor Pfannenstiel was present at all that with him.
The next day Gerstein and Pfannenstiel went in Captain Wirth's car to
Treblinka, where they visited installations identical to those of Belzec,
but bigger.
Leaving Poland, Gerstein in the train from Warsaw met the Secretary
of the Swedish Legation in Berlin, Baron Goran von Otter. For lack
of sleepers, the two men remained in the corridor where Gerstein, over-
whelmed by what he had seen at Belzec, recounted his terrible visit
to the diplomat, asking that the latter transmit his account to the Swedish
Government and, through its intermediary, to the Allies at war. Follow-
ing this, he again met the diplomat on two occasions and was told
that the latter had sent a report to his government. Moreover, Gerstein
presented himself to the Papal Nuncio in Berlin who, learning that
Gerstein was an SS, refused to receive him. He was, however, able
to relate his ,journey to Poland to the Secretary of the Episcopate of
Berlin, Dr. Winter.
Here is a very succinct resume of his "report."
What is known is that in April 1945, in the midst of the Nazi defeat,
Gerstein was in Bade-Wurtemberg. He crossed without difficulty the
front line near Reutlingen, occupied by French troops, then proceeded
to Rottweil, also occupied by the French. He was arrested, freed the
next morning, but assigned to house arrest in a room of the Hotel
Mohren, which had been requisitioned. It was in this room that he
wrote of his visits to the extermination camps in Poland in 1942. Two
121
copies of the this report were written in German and the third, abridged,
directly in "a chaotic French" (25, p. 236) which was however, com-
prehensible. There was also a note in English.
At the beginning of the month of May, Gerstein met two officers,
one American and the other English, to whom he r e l a t ~ d his journey
to Poland and his visit to Belzec and to Treblinka. He gave them the
note in English and his account in French, as well as a certain number of
bills which he had in his possession concerning the delivery of important
quantities of "Zyklon B" to the SS.
Shortly thereafter he was transferred by the French from Rottweil to
Paris and incarcerated in the prison of Cherche-Midi, where he hanged
himself.
Upon leaving Rottweil, Gerstein was to leave a copy of his report
in the German language to the proprietress of the Hotel Mohren, who
was to send it to his wife (25, p. 238), whereas the other was to be
found later at the hotel and published with a few cuts through the gpod
offices of Professor H. Rothfelds in the German historical periodIcal,
"Vierteljahreshefte fUr Zeitgeschichte" (1953, number 2, p. 185) under
the title" Augenzeugenbericht zu den Massenvergasungen" (45).
The report in French as well as the bills for "Zyklon B" were to be
discovered in the archives of the American delegation on January 30,
1946, by the French prosecutor, M. Charles Dubost, at the time of the
first major trial at Nuremberg. The report in German was to be used in
1947, at the time of the trial of the Nazi doctors in Nuremberg, and in
January 1949 at Frankfurt during the trial of the directors of the LG.
Farbenindustrie, which produced "Zyklon B. ,\ It is thus that the
"Gerstein report" became public. It is impossible to read the report
without being profoundly upset, for the description of the scenes wit-
nessed by Gerstein is eloquent... and atrocious. Naturally, the interna-
tional press gave it abundant coverage.
2. Proofs that the Gerstein testimony is a "forgery"
Rassinier endeavoured to demonstrate that this report was a forgery.
His first attempt, which appeared in 1961 in his book "Ulysses Betrayed
by His Own People," on pages 30 and 112 in identical terms, follows
-a passage declaring that the writings of David Rousset, of Eugene
Kogon and of the
"Hungarian Communist Niyzli Miklos" are historical forgeries" fabricated
in "work-shops" where Russians "correct history all day long." It must, in
addition, be recognized that they are improving, especially if one takes into
account that in January 1946 they had succeeded in having accepted as
authentic by the Tribunal of Nuremberg jUdging the doctors the document
PS 1553-R.F.350 (39, pp. 30,112) according to which the Jews were asphy-
xiated "by groups of 750 to 800" in gas chambers which measured "25
meters at the base and were 1.80 meters high."
This flood of insults and sarcasms typical of the manner of Rassinier
was, however, manifestly insufficient to discredit the "report," and the
problem was taken up again a year later in the new work, "The Real
122
Eichmann Trial," on pages 80, 116 and 223-228, then in "The Drama
of the European Jews" on pages 58, 65, 67-71, 78, 106, 107, 108. This
time, Rassinier accumulated all of the "proofs" of the evident machina-
tion concerning Gerstein and his report. These" proofs" are of diverse
nature.
First of all, there is the heavy mystery regarding a series of circum-
stances, a mystery which is extremely eloquent, according to Rassinier;
for it hides disquieting enigmas. It is thus, Rassinier tells us, that
neither the date on which the French troops entered Rottweil, nor the
conditions in which Gerstein found himself in relation with the two
Anglo-American officers, nor the prison in which he was incarcerated
in Paris, nor the date of his suicide, nor the means by which he took his
life, nor what became of his corpse are known. Rassinier attaches a
very great importance to the knowledge of the details enumerated,
information which he does not find in the diverse authors who have
written on the Gerstein report, which "seems to me to explain many
things," he insinuates in his usual manner. And he began to write
a real thriller in five pages by advancing four possible hypotheses to ex-
plain the guilty silences concerning the death of Gerstein. Among
them "the most likely" would be the following: "Suppose, for example,
that the two minus habens armed to the teeth and of whom it is said
that they proceeded to the interrogation of Kurt Gerstein" forced him
to say what is contained in this document ( ... ), they would have then,
themselves, proceeded to the drawing-up of the French text which they
would have then submitted to Kurt Gerstein for signature and inviting
him to write a few lines himself at the bottom of the last page to make
the authenticity indisputable." To obtain this result, "the two instruc-
tors of the affair would have submitted him to the treatment usual in
those cases. Exaggerating, however, which is again very likely ... " Then
in the same way -the German text was obtained; it did not, however,
bear the signature of Gerstein, and this leads to Rassinier's conviction:
"Suppose, finally, that Kurt Gerstein was so properly interrogated that
he fell unconscious or in a coma then died before having gotten to the
formula and signing ... " (41, pp. 67-68).
The reader will find the account of Rassinier's other hypotheses in
the next part of the analyzed text, but all are of the same inspiration.
And all of this incredible story because, claims Rassinier,the obviously
unacknowledgable circumstances of the meeting between Gerstein and
the two officers and those of his death are not given by any writer.
Beyond any doubt it is an outrageous contrivance by ace forgers and
which is easily brought to light by the perspicacious Rassinier.
It does not dawn on this intrepid hunter of historical truth that it
is necessary to seek out the information to which one attaches importance
not in the writings of authors who perhaps do not find the same interest
in them, but rather in applying to the source, for example to the French
Military Justice, the first competent in the case of Gerstein. Rassinier
did not do this, and this "seems to me to explain many things," to use
his own expression.
123
3. Irrefutable documents
It so happens that others than he have had that idea and, how
ironic, these are the notorious "forgers" of the Center of Contemporary
Jewish Documentation (CDJC) in Paris, first of all M. Leon Poliakov and
execrated by the not at all curious" scholar," Rassinier.
As a matter of fact, in the review of the CDJC, "Le Monde Juif,"
(36, pp. 4-20; 37, pp. 4-16), M. Leon Poliakov published a series of
documents relating to the "Kurt Gerstein Dossier." From them we here
reproduce extracts solving the majority of the enigmas which trouble
Rassinier and his likes, all of whom burn with a sacred love of historical
truth:
"Military Justice. Central Depository of Archives. 1 and 3, Noefort
Street, Meaux (Seine and Marne).
Meaux, October 26,1960
Officer ( ... ), Clerk of Court ( ... ) ?
to Mr. the Minister of the Armies ( ... )
Reference: today's telephone call from Colonel Lequette
Object: Concerning a man of the name of Kurt Gerstein
Following the instructions cited in the reference, I am pleased to inform
you that owing to his activity in France ( ... ), he was the subject of the
inquiry No. 1171 of July 10, 1945, of the General Military Governor
of Paris for murder and complicity, for the Second Military Tribunal.
That finding himself incarcerated at the military prison of Cherche-Midi
since July 5, 1945, in accordance with imprisonment order No. 12560/JM
of the said day of the general officer cited above, he voluntarily took his
own life by hanging, in his cell, on July 25, 1945, at five o'clock in the
afternoon ( ... ). That the commandant of the military prison indeed sent
on July 26, 1945, to the Commissioner of the Government attached to
the Second Permanent Military Tribunal of Paris a report relating to the
suicide of the person in question accompanied by a letter of the last-
mentioned (in all likelihood written shortly before killing himself in view
of justifying his act). ( ... ) on the prison calendar of the military prison
of Cherche-Midi appears the hand-written notation: "I established
this day, July 25, 1945, at 5:25 P.M., the decease of the prisoner
Gerstein, Kurt; the cause of death is obvious as attested by the visible furrow
on the neck of the subject and the position in which the body was found.
It results from this that death is due to hanging. This manner of taking
one's own life can absolutely not be avoided in a prison." This regi-
stration is signed "J. Trouillet," doctor of the military prison of Paris.
The body was given over to the Police Superintendant of the ward of Notre-
Dame-des-Champs on July 26, 1945, to be transported to the Medico-
Legal Institute for autopsy (enclosed is the copy of this attestation found in
the archives of the military prison of Cherche-Midi).
Following up this information, I asked the Prefecture of Police to let me
known where the victim was buried.
By the letter No. 1716/CAB/SD dated May 2, 1958, the Prefect of Police
informed me that in consequence of the verifications which he had ordered,
notably at the Medico-Legal Institute, it had been established that the body
of Gerstein had been buried on August 3, 1945, in the cemetery of Thiais."
To complete the grotesque "dossier of enigmas" of Rassinier, here
is first of all a short document:
124
"Prefecture of Police, Police Station of the Ward of Notre-Dame-des-
Champs.
Paris, July 26,1945
Received from the Prison of Cherche-Midi the corpse of Kurt Gerstein
for transport to the Medico-Legal Institute for autopsy.
The Police Superintendant,
Signed: (illegible)
(Stamp of the Police Station, City of Paris, Ward of Notre-Dame-des-
Champs).
Certified true copy by the Officer-Clerk of Court, Chief of the Central
Depository of Archives of the Military Justice.
Moreover, Pierre Joffroy reproduces the report of the colonel command-
ing the military prison of Paris to the Ministry of War on page 290 of
his fine book "The Spy of God" (25) devoted to Gerstein and written
after a thorough investigation made with a seriousness and talent which
are completely lacking in the compiler, Rassinier:
"At 2:15 P.M. on July 25 the sergeant major and guard Dubois-Dandien
advised me that the chief sergeant Entz, working on the second floor, had
just found, hanged in his cell, the prisoner Kurt Gerstein, German subject
locked up since July 5, 1945, charged with "war crimes, murder and com-
plicity."
Sergeant Entz, assisted by sergeant-major Andre Ucci, cut the rope and
began artificial respiration. The firemen of the barracks of Vieux-Colombier,
who had been alerted, went to the establishment and pronounced death.
The prisoner hanged himself with the help of a small rope made up from
a piece of blanket which he had afterwards hung on the window of his cell;
his head was turned towards the wall and his feet touched the floor.
The prisoner had first of all occupied a cell with three other Germans, indicted
on the same charge.
At the request of Colonel Sauzey, Gerstein had been placed on July 20,
1945, in an individual cell in order not to be able to repeat the facts of
his interrogation to his fellow-citizens.
It is to be feared ,that the three other Germans seek to take their own lives
in the same fashion, and it is materially impossible to avoid that such
events recur unless one strips them naked and takes away all of the
bedclothes. "
Here are the extracts from another document concerning the meeting
of Gerstein with the two allied officers (36, pp. 12-13), the American
John W. Haught, employed by the company du Pont-de-Nemours, and
the Englishman Derek Curtis Evans, major in the British scientific
service, who are the "minus habens armed to the teeth" born of
Rassinier's imagination:
"The present assessors met Dr. Gerstein by chance in a requisitioned
hotel in Rottweil. He told us that we were the first Americans or English
that he had seen and that he wanted to speak to us of what he knew about
the German concentration camps. ( ... ) He obtained a responsible position
in the Nazi Party. In this capacity, he attended meetings in the course
of which the fate of the prisoners of the concentration camps was discussed.
Asked whether he was aware of the utilization of gas chambers for the
killing of prisoners, he answered that as an engineer he had often had to give
advice on the functioning of these chambers. He said that the two gases
utilized were cyanhydric acid and the exhaust fumes of internal combustion
engines. ( ... ) He said ... that in the case of HCN, death was nearly instanta-
neous, whereas a period of fifteen to twenty minutes was necessary in the
case of the exhaust fumes. Dr. Gerstein escaped from the Nazis only
about three weeks ago: it is very obvious that he is still affected by his
experiences and he speaks of them with difficulty. But he ardently
125
InSiSts that those guilty be judged for their crimes and says that he is
fully ready to serve as a witness. He hopes that the information furnished
by him will be transmitted as rapidly as possible to the competent autho-
rities in London. He handed over to the preSent assessors a note in
English, an account of seven typewritten pages, and a few bills of the
firm Degesch for the furnishing of "Zyklon B" (cyanhydric acid) to the
concentration camps. He also showed a religious pamphlet that he had
written in 1938 in order to bear witness as to his past activities.
There is reason to wonder if Dr. Gerstein should not be protected against
the local Nazis.
May 5, 1945
Signed: Major D.C. Evans, l.W. Haught
In another connection, the reader of the book of P. Joffroy will know
(16, p. 234) that the city of Reutlingen where Gerstein passed the front
line on April 22, 1945, had been occupied the day before by the 5th
Armoured Division under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Gambiez
and that the services of the First French Army under the command of
Captain Bessy were located at Rottweil (25, p. 235).
So the "troubling enigmas" to which Rassinier consacrates pages a n ~
pages of a sterile gossip, instead of looking into the "Gerstein dossier'"
of the French Military Justice, are hereby solved.
4. The Gerstein report at Nuremberg
There is another circumstance which, according to Rassinier, shows
that the Gerstein report is a "visible forgery" and upon which he
greatly insists in these two works, "The Real Eichmann Trial" (48, pp.
80, 224, 227) and "The Drama of the European Jews" (41, pp. 59, 60,
64, 93): the Nuremberg Tribunal, before which M. Dubost, the French
Prosecutor, had produced the French text of Gerstein's account, "refus-
ed to listen to the reading of it," which proves "that the Gerstein
document was an historical forgery so false that the Tribunal of Nurem-
berg itself had cast it aside as not conclusive, January 30, 1946." This
"argument" is a model of hypocrisy and outrageous deceit typical of
the procedures currently employed by Rassinier. It is a model o f ~
hypocrisy, for God knows how much spleen Rassinier vented on the
Tribunal of Nuremberg and its decisions, how many documents admitted
by the Tribunal were declared by him to be "forged," "apocryphal,"
"falsified," "worthless," "not conclusive," etc. to not take seriously
his sudden and virtuous indignation before the fact that the Gerstein
document is still considered authentic and essential. Outrageous deceit,
for in reality the Tribunal, during its morning session on January 30
did in fact "refuse to hear the reading" of the Gerstein report, but not
at all because it considered it "inconclusive," but rather for a purely
technical reason: a certificate establishing its origin, obligatorily required
by the Tribunal for every paper produced, was lacking. In the after-
noon of the same day, the British Assistant Prosecutor General declared:
(25, pp. 267-268).
"All of the documents PS belong to a series of seized documents of which
the origin and the filing were authenticated on November 22 by Comman-
126
dant Coogan... The series of PS has been verified and when it is read to the
Tribunal, it can be accepted." To this declaration, the President of the
Tribunal replied: "( ... ) I should like to say, on behalf of the Tribunal,
that we apologize to the French public ministry, for we have just now
discovered that the marginal note is found on the copy. M. Dubost,
please accept my apologies"
Is that sufficiently dear? The incident is closed for everyone ...
except for Rassinier, naturally: He fearlessly maintains his positions
for, says he, the Gerstein document "was not retained as a charge against
the defendants" (40, p. 80). This is true in what regards the defendants
of the trial of Grering and associates; but that is rather a problem which
may interest jurists and not historians, for it has nothing to do with the
authenticity of the document. If the "argument" is nevertheless advan-
ced by Rassinier, it is evidently in the hope of spreading confusion and
perhaps even so leaving a certain doubt in the mind of the scatter-brained
or unthinking reader. The process is typical of Rassinier.
5. Stockholm confirms
There is, in addition, another obvious means of knowing if the account
of Gerstein is veracious. that is to address oneself to the Swedish
Government.
Gerstein indeed said that in the course of his journey from Warsaw
to Berlin in 1942, he related what he had seen two days earlier at
Belzec to the Swedish diplomat Otter and that, later, the latter told him
that he had informed his government of it. There is perhaps nothing more
important, especially for the person who has doubts on the authenticity
of the Gerstein report written in 1945 in semi-captivity, than to know
if the Swedish Government had in fact received the report of the diplo-
mat in 1942. That goes without saying for the person who doubts
sincerely. And this verification was made. Naturally, it was not done
by Rassinier, but by the "falsifier," by the "forger," by the "head of
the gang" of the Center of Jewish Contemporary Documentation in
Paris, Poliakov.
Here is the correspondance that M. Leon Poliakov exchanged with
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, a correspondance which is
briefly summarized on page 220 of his classic work, "The Breviary of
Hatred," which appeared in 1951 and was published in its entirety in
the article of "Le Monde Juif" of 1964 (36, p. 13-14).
"Stockholm, November 10, 1949. Annex I.
Dear Sir,
~ n reference to your letter of October 19, 1949, relative to the former
member of the Waffen SS, Gerstein, I have the honour to inform you that the
documents which are in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Sweden confirm the declaration that Gerstein made. It is therefore true
that Gerstein, in the course of a journey from Warsaw to Berlin, according
to information received one of the last days of August 1942, was in
contact with an official of the Swedish legation of that time in Berlin.
Baron von Otter, who was travelling in the same train. What occurred on
this occasion appears from the enclosed memorandum, which was
written in London on August 7, 1945, and which the Swedish legation in
127
that city put at the disposal of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs for
any measures which would be judged useful. .
M. Leon Poliakov, Chief of Research, Center
Documentation, Paris."
Memorandum. Kung!. Utrikes Department.
Sincerely yours
(Signature: illegible)
of Jewish Contemporary
Concerns: the engineer Kurt Gerstein, member of the SS sanitary section,
Siesebrechstr.
Probably born in 1907 in Brunswick (?). Address in 1943: Berlin BUlow-
strasse 49.
In August 1942, Gerstein established contact with an official of a neutral
embassy in Berlin and related to him the following story:
He had just come back from a brief mission to the extermination camp of
Belzec near Lublin, and he gave a detailed description of its set-up (gas
chambers, role of the personnel, the collecting of deposits in gold, etc.)
He showed diverse papers, his identification cards and instructions from the
commandant of the camp for the supplying of prussic acid.
Gerstein declared that he endeavoured to inform neutral observers of
this state of affairs and that he was firmly convinced that as soon as large
masses of the German population learnt the fact of this extermination and '7
that it was confirmed to them by unbiassed foreigners, the German people
would not tolerate the Nazis a single day longer. Gerstein
declared in addition that he had already spoken with a high-
ranking religious authority, the Superintendant General Dibelius, of this
matter (That was later confirmed by Dibelius himself, who vouched for the
seriousness and the veracity of Gerstein.) ( ... ) Six months later, Gerstein
again paid a visit to this same foreign diplomat of a neutral country and
asked if the latter had been able to undertake anything in the meantime.
Following this, no further news of him was had. The sorrow and the shame
of Gerstein in regard to the extermination camps appeared to be as real as
they were profound; and his desire to inform the outside world of these
things, in order to put an end to the atrocities, was no doubt sincere."
Let us add, finally, that after the end of the war, Kurt Gerstein was
classified among the criminals; that on August 17, 1950, his case was
posthumously reexamined by the denazification Chamber of Wurtem-
berg-Hohenzollern which classed him as a "minor Nazi," and that this
verdict was confirmed on November 16, 1950; that his "report" and
his case were evoked at length in March 1949 at the Assizes Court ot
Frankfurt-on-the-Main, at the time of the trial of the directors of the I.G.
Farbenindustrie, the producer of "Zyklon B," which heard numerous
witnesses. It is thus that the ministers Niem611er and Ehlers, the bishop
Dibelius, the canon Buchholz, the priests Michalski and Rehrig confirmed
that at different periods, but still during the war, Gerstein had told them
of his visit to Belzec, as he had told it to Otter, and that Dr. Dibelius
had transmitted this information to the Archbishop of Upsala in Sweden.
6. The Gerstein testimony and the insincerity of its detractors
One must therefore be both terribly insincere and possessed of he
blind passion of the apologist of Nazism in its most cruel and most
cynical aspect to continue to affirm that the "Gerstein report" is not an
account of an atrocious experience lived in 1942, but rather a text forged
in 1945 under the effects of torture or fear; that it is a "story which is
128
macabre, phantasmagoric" (41, p. 58) or "macabrely fantastic" (40,
p. 227) or a "story absolutely incredible ... " (41. pp. 64-65).
In his will to discredit the terrible, "Gerstein report" at all costs,
Rassinier also affirms that a part of his (Gerstein's) text or "the one
attributed to him" (40, p. 255), is only a text which is "apocryphal,"
"falsified," "traffiked," "re-arranged" by "forgers" seeking to heap
abuse on the Nazis and that, moreover, it is full of unlikelihoods.
What is scarcely credible is that the man who so often vaunts his
position of professor of history, his training' as a historian,and who writes
pages and pages of "analyses" of the text of the "Gerstein report"
has never had either the curiosity or the professional honesty to procure
it. Nevertheless, this text, at least in photostat, is easy to find. It
may be procured, for example, in the archives of the Center of Contem-
porary Jewish Documentation, which are accessible to everyone. It
may also be found elsewhere. This is typical of Rassinier and of
his "working habits." What he does is to judge the text of the
"report" through the reading of the works of different authors who cite
it more or less abundantly according to what they themselves esteem
to be particulary interesting, significant or important and therefore
worthy of citation. Proceeding in this way, these authors are doing
what all historians from antiquity to the present day have done, and
without which it is not possible to write a book of history without
rendering it incredibly long and without making its reading indigestible.
This is true unless, of course, one is dealing with a "collection of com-
plete texts" of documents, which is quite a different problem. It is
natural that, comparing the pieces of the "report" cited by some with
those cited by others, Rassinier often "discovers" that such and such
sentences are missing or, what amounts to the same, that there are sen-
tences "added on" from one author to another. The stupidity of this
"method" can give no other results than to everywhere find "frauds"
and" falsifications" imaginary and" evident." It is curious to note that
Rassinier and his likes do not at all seem troubled by the strangeness
of the fact that the "falsifiers" and the "forgers" who have the same
goal in mind-falsely condemn the Nazis-do not manage to agree and
act together, as would a gang of ill-doers, to avoid the evident "contra-
dictions. "
Rassinier's ignorance of the Gerstein text is often anecdotal. For
example, he states: "As far as one can deduce from the writings of
these brilliant historians (it is a question of a series of authors), Kurt
Gerstein was a chemical engineer" (40, p.225). Now then, the "Gerstein
report" begins by a few details of his biography where he says himself:
Gerstein, Kurt, mining engineer ( ... ), graduate engineer." No one needs.
"brilliant historians" to learn it first-hand and to notice by the same
occasion that Rassinier sticks onto a "mining engineer" the degree of
"chemical engineer" ... in which he makes himself guilty of "falsifica-
tion ", "fraud ", "re-arrangement", in conformity with the terminology
which he applies to others.
The objective of Rassinier is to overwhelm the reader with a flood
129
of comparaison of texts and to heap abuse upon their authors by means
of sarcasms, insinuations, injurious words and mockeries, a detestable
art in which he excells.
Knowing the "Gerstein report" by bits and pieces, Rassinier finds a
quantity of unlikelihoods in its content. It is thus ihat summing up
in his own manner the conversation between Gerstein ana 'G!obocnik,
Chief of the SS and of the Police of the District of Lublin, Rassiliier
writes on an ironic tone which is to provoke in his reader the idea of the
evident absurdity of the account: "The same day, one meets the Grup-
penfiihrer (General) Globocnik in charge of the extermination of the
Jews in the Warthegau and who had not yet found another means of
carrying out his task than ... the exhaust fumes of Diesel engines (!) which
he caused to arrive in chambers especially fitted out for this." (40, p.
225). Now then, the subject of this conversation is very normal and very
likely when it is known that it is precisely this means of massive extermi-
nation which was practised in Germany itself, since October 1939, in
the framework of the "euthanasia" operation and that one of tIfe
specialists of the procedure was the police commissioner Wirth ("Haupt-
mann Wirth" of the "report") put at the disposal of Globocnik and,
at the period of the visit of Gerstein, commandant of the camp of Belzec
and his guide.
On June 23, 1942, Victor Brack, SS-Oberfiihrer, Superior Chief of the
Service of the Chancellery of the Fuhrer, whom Reichsleiter Bouhler in
1939 made responsible for the organization of the suppression of "use-
less mouths " (euthanasia), wrote to Himmler: (32, p. 126).
"Some time ago already, I put at the disposal of BrigadefUhrer Globocnik
a certain number of my men for the accomplishment of his special mission,
in conformity with the orders of Reichsleiter Bouhler. Following a new
request from him, I again sent him personnel. On this occasion, Brigade-
fUhrer Globocnik supported the thesis that it is fitting to carry out '-the
anti-Jewish action as rapidly as possible to avoid that unforeseen obstaCles
oblige us to stop the operation in the middle of its execution."
This sheds a light of sharp truth on Gerstein's sentence: "The Haupt-
mann of Police Wirth asked me not to propose to Berlin any other mode(
whatsoever of gas chambers and to leave everything as it was."
Continuing the account of this conversation in which Globocnik in-
forms Gerstein of the existence, under his authority, of four extermina-
tion camps-Belzec, Tteblinka, Sobibor and Mai'danek, which was being
constructed-Rassinier still writes in a mocking tone destined to demon-
strate the unlikelihood of the confidence: "Naturally, the Gruppenfiihrer
who is logical begins by telling... In his region, three establishments
exist to exterminate the Jews by Diesel exhaust fumes ... " (40, p. 226).
This confidence is not only likely but appears inevitable. In fact, for
what reason would Globocnik not inform SS-Obersturmfiihrer Gerstein
of the RSHA of the situation in his (Globocnik's) district? Gerstein was
sent to him from Berlin as chief of the section of poisonous gases of the
Waffen-SS, precisely in order to help him improve the procedure of
killing in use at his establishments.
In the same way, Rassinier, citing the works of two well-known
130
historians, writes that "one further deduces (from these two works, G.W.)
that the Fuhrer was in Lublin two days before, August 15 (one apparent-
ly shrinks before nothing in the factories for the manufacture of histo-
rical forgeries!) with Himmler and they gave the order to "accelerate
all the action." This visit appears to Rassinier an obvious "historical
forgery" and, by the ambiguous construction of his sentence, his reader
is led to impute it to Gerstein or to the two historians. But a reading
of the report itself brings out that it is a question of a declaration of
Globocnik in the course of the conversation with Gerstein, Professor
Pfannenstiel and Dr. Herbert Lindner (in reality Linden): "( ... ) the Fuhrer
and Himmler, who were here on August IS-that is two days ago-have
obliged me to personally accompany all those who must see the establish-
ments ... , "says Globocnik (25,p.284). It is thus neither Gerstein nor the
two historians who in this case fabricate an "historical forgery" (if there is
an "historical forgery"!), but Globocnik. There is nothing astonishing nor
unlikely in that, for whether the visit is real or false, in any event
Globocnik thus makes his interlocutor sense his very great intimacy with
the two all-powerful personalities of the regime. This is just his way
of doing things and, besides, is very close to the truth. But Rassinier
deceives his reader with the help of insinuations, ambiguities and willful
deformations.
It is easy to multiply similar examples of Rassinier's dishonesty.
7. The Gas Chambers at Belzec
His objections concerning certain details contained in the "Gerstein
report" seem, however, more serious; and they deserve a more attentive
examination.
Gerstein, speaking of his first visit to Belzec, writes: "Before us a
house as a bathing establishment ( ... ). After climbing a little staircase,
on the right and on the left, three and three rooms like garages 4 by 5
meters, 1.90 meters high. ( ... ) Moreover, this afternoon-I didn't
notice" (25, p. 285). Further on, describing the functioning of the gas
chambers which he observed the next day, he says: "In the chambers,
the SS squeeze the men (in). "Fill up well "... Hauptmann Worth has
ordered it. The naked men are standing up at the feet of the others,
700 to 800 for 25 square meters and 45 cubic meters! ( ... ) After two
hours and forty-nine minutes-the stop-watch recorded it all-the Diesel
began. Until this moment, the men in the four chambers already filled
up (were) living, living, four times 750 persons to four times 45 cubic
meters!" (25, p. 285).
It has been seen that Gerstein once speaks of six chambers ("three
and three") of 4 meters by 5 meters and of 1.90 meters high, then of
four chambers of 25 square meters and 45 cubic meters, therefore of
1.80 meters in height.
And here is how Rassinier reports Gerstein's account: " ( ... ) in the
course of this visit, he saw the gas chambers which used Diesel exhaust
fumes and he measured them: 5x5 = 25m2 in surface, 1.90 in height
131
THE EXISTENCE Of GAS CHAMBERS
= 45 m3, he calculates." (41, p. 63). This manner of presenting
Gerstein's account necessitates a few observations.
First of all, Rassinier is inventing when he says that Gerstein" measur-
ed" the dimensions of the gas chambers that he had seen; for Gerstein,
he who in another connection gave the detail that he had measured the
. duration of the gassing with a stop watch, says nothing like that. It is
perfectly obvious that it is a question of an estimate by "the naked eye ",
with all of the approximation which it implies, particularly on behalf
of a man who was profoundly and violently struck by what he saw in
1942 and who still remained at the height of his emotion in 1945, in the
middle of the defeat, while writing his "report." This explains the
fact that one time he indicates an area of 4x5 meters and another time
5x5. As for the number of gas chambers that he mentions-at one
time 6 and at another time 4 (never ten as Rassinier abusively indicates),
the contradiction is only apparent: an attentive reading of Gerstein's
text reveals only that at the time of the first visit he saw six empty cham-
bers (" Moreover, this afternoon I did not notice," he underscores) a n ~
the next day four in operation without one's knowing whether it was
a question of the same and how many there were in all at Belzec. Based
on his declarations, it is possible only to say that there were at least six,
but there is no contradiction. Gerstein says twice that 700-800 or 750
persons had been piled into each of the chambers. It is evident that
here, too, he gives not a precise figure which, besides, he had no means
of establishing, but rather an estimate expressing an extreme piling up,
underscored in the context: "In the chambers, the SS push the men.
"Fill up well "-Hauptmann Wirth has ordered (it). The naked men
are standing at each other's feet... " And further on he adds again:" At
Belzec and Treblinka the trouble was not taken to count in any exact
manner the number of Jews killed."
Finally, Gerstein speaks of a train containing 6,700 persons, which
Rassinier finds unlikely, writing in the usual tone of mockery "( ... ) it is
certain that with its mere 6,700 ( ... ) persons, this train of forty-five
carriages was the most nightmarish of all the trains transporting depor-'"
tees ( ... ). Thus Kurt Gerstein decidedly"has not an accurate eye, and
for an engineer that is not very flattering" (41, p. 64). Rassinier is
wrong to exercise in this matter his ironic and acid verve; Gerstein
indicates sufficiently clearly that it was in fact a question of a "night-
marish" train, since he says that upon arrival out of 6,700 persons there
were already 1,450 dead. As for the accuracy of engineer Gerstein's
eye, there is every chance that no one had ever taught him nor given
him the opportunity before his journey to calculate with precision the
area of the chambers of a slaughter-house for men, nor the number of
persons that could be piled in there by force to exterminate them. It
is perhaps more exact to say that confronted with the sight this engineer
lost his calmness to the point of forgetting all of the compasses in the
world, which is rather "flattering" for him.
It is undeniable that there are some flagrant contradictions in the
"report" and that certain of them are real, for example the area of the
132
gas chambers; whereas others are only apparent, such as the number
of the latter. Rassinier here sees the "proof" that it is a document that
has been coldly "forged," "falsified," etc. It is necessary, on the con-
trary, to see there the spontaneity of the writing, the author being in a
hurry to deliver up the memories which oppress him without checking
himself nor even re-reading himself attentively. Interviewed by Pierre
Joffroy in 1967, Madame Bek, the owner of the Hotel Mohren at
Rottweil where Gerstein was lodged in April-May 1945 and where he
wrote his accounts, related (25, pp. 235-236):
.. I remember. The man was overwhelmed. He spoke to us of the
concentration camps, of his past experience. Alone, without news of his
family ... we sometimes invited him to have coffee with us. ( ... ) Having made
the acquaintance of the minister Hecklinger, he had borrowed his (Hecklinger's
typewriter to type up his report. He was always at the stationery shop
to supply himself with paper, but (paper) there was less and less of it at
that time."
No "falsifier" or "forger" would ever have let such obvious contra-
dictions appear in his work.
There is also the affirmation that 700 or 800 people were piled up in
premises of an area of 20 or 25 m2. This is very difficult to believe
if one takes literally both the number of persons indicated and the area
given. That is what Rassinier did naturally and triumphantly, without
taking into account the real circumstances described in the "report"
and which exclude the possibility of Gerstein's having determined with
precision the area of the chambers and the exact number of persons.
What the text of the "report" does allow one to conclude is that the
chambers were not very vast and that the number of persons who filled
them up to the very maximum attained the hundreds.
It seems useless to continue the analysis of Rassinier's work on the
"Gerstein report," his obsession which he desperately sought to dis-
credit with the assistance of the most detestable processes: deceit,
deformation of the texts and the facts, insinuation, ambiguity. All in
vain.
We have seen that none of his" arguments" withstands a serious exa-
mination. None of his wiles to create false mysteries and false pro-
blems to obscure the real ones stands up: Gerstein did in fact see the gas
chambers of Belzec in operation in 1942; he did in fact see how an
industrial enterprise for the extermination of men and women and
children worked, and he did in fact relate all of this several times
before the end of the war to thoroughly reliable persons. It was in
fact he himself, in his own hand, spontaneously and freely, who drew
up his declaration of 1945. It is in reality a terrible act of accusation.
8. A Mysterious Visitor and his "Testimony" (?)
But it is impossible to conclude this chapter without giving a place
to the strange story that Rassinier told in his work "The Drama of the
European Jews" (pp. 79-91). It is the sole and unique attempt at a
positive contribution to our knowledge on the Nazi extermination
133
camps which we owe to the compiler Rassinier, who did nothing other
than relentlessly distort the patient work of others without ever
succeeding.
Rassinier wrote that one day in the month of June 1963,
"I received a strange visit: a tall German of a fine presence, appearing to
be about sixty (in the conversation I learnt that he was in reality very much
older), something military in his bearing, of an extreme distinction and
an exquisite politeness ( ... ). First of all, he introduced himself and told
me the purpose of his visit; and he insisted that it be kept confidential. I
promised him that, and it is the reason for which the presentation of the
character as well as the circumstances of this meeting are found here only
in terms which absolutely cannot allow his identification, the content of
the conversation which we had being the only thing rigourously authentic."
The very distinguished person related to Rassinier that he had been
a "senior officer of very high rank in a very important department,"
that after the war he had been denazified, which had created "endless
trouble" for him, and excused himself for the "cowardice which had
ordered him" to remain silent until that time. That specified, the persq?
declared to Rassinier,
"You assure ( ... ) that none of the witnesses who claimed to have been
present at exterminations by gassing have until now ever been able to
affirm that in your presence ( ... J. Well then, I have come to tell you that
I myself was present at an extermination by gassing."
And he explained himself:
"( ... ) I was on mission to Lublin, and 1 had just gone into Globocnik's
when Gerstein had himself announced; ( ... ) I found myself again with
him in Belzec the next day."
A resume follows of the conversation, Rassinier drafted this sum-
mary "to retain only what was essential in it":
"( ... ) Globocnik had spoken only of Belzec, but absolutely not of the other
camps cited. He had not, moreover, begun by speaking of extermination
but only of the disinfection of clothing ( ... ) deploring the scanty possibilities
of disinfection at the camp of Belzec, he said that he himself had found
a very expeditious means which at the same time radically resolved the
Jewish question: his Diesel engine in Belzec. But, Globocnik added, I
should have to dispose of a more powerful gas ( ... ) and that is why I
have sent GUnter to Gerstein with the objective of obtaining from him
(Gerstein) what his department had that was best adapted to this task,
for then one could proceed on a large-scale to the solution of the Jewish
question in this manner."
At that moment the mysterious personage asked Globocnik a question;
"( ... ) that is a crime, and you are sure that is what the FUhrer means by
definitive solution?" Globocnik limited himself to answering, "Yes, I am
sure of it" ( ... ) and, with a very knowing look, without stating precisely
from whom he had his mission but in such a way that one could believe
that it was from the FUhrer himself, he insisted upon its secret, ultra-secret
nature. In contrast to what is said in the Gerstein document, he did not
state precisely that Himmler and Hitler were in Lublin two days previously:
pure invention." ( ... )
"In Belzec he saw the camp: a very small camp, a few shanties which could
contain four or five hundred persons. He saw them walking about in this
camp, fat, in good health, all Jews. ( ... ) A very small station at which
arrived from time to time, by the sole track, a train of a few cars full
134
of their co-religionists: they told him that they were charged with exter-
minating the latter with the exhaust fumes of a Diesel engine in a little
house ( ... ) upon which a placard announced ( ... ) the "Heckenholt Founda-
tion"-from the name of the Jew in charge of operating and servicing
the engine."
.. ( ... ) Police Captain Wirth... commandant of this camp... and an SS
officer, his assistant, ( ... ) were persuaded that in Berlin nothing was known
of what went on here ( ... ). They said that here only a train of a few
cars arrived from time to time, two ore three up to the present day (August
18, 1942). Accompanied by Wirth and his SS assistant, he (the mysterious
personage) also visited the small house appropriated for the exterminations
( ... ). A heightened ground-floor, a corridor, with on each side, three
small rooms which he did not measure but the area of which was surely
less than 5 x 5 (meters- perhaps 4 x 5 at the most. At the end of the
corridor, the room in which the Diesel was located ( ... )."
In reply to a question from Rassinier, the mysterious personage
specified that the duration of the gassing was a quarter of an hour; but
Rassinier thought that it must have been between one hour and a half
and two hours.
"The next morning, between seven and eight o'clock, the convoy of Jews
which had been announced arrived: a train of four or five cars, about
250 to 300 people-men, women, children, old people-and not 6,000 to
6,700 piled into 45 cars, as is claimed by the Cerstein Document ( ... J. No
brutality, no doors ripped off, no bludgeoning ( ... ) Then one had them
enter the building of the crime; in a haphazard manner, they divided up in
the six rooms-40 to 50 per room, .. The doors were closed up, the lights
turned off; and, at that moment, the unfortunate people were heard beginning
to pray. Cries of fright, also, of the women and children ... "
On his return to Berlin, the mysterious witness
"went... directly to Dr. Grawitz, who was his friend and a direct collaborator
of Himmler. At the account he gave him, Grawitz jumped up, horrified,
and without waiting, rushed to Himmler's ( ... ) ... about ten days afterwards,
Dr. Grawitz came himself to tell me,"
said the personage.
" ... that an investigation was in progress on the facts I had brought him,
and a few weeks after. .. that the camp was closed and Globocnik once
again transferred."
And farther on:
..... what interests me ... is the problem of the extermination by gassing, the
only one by which the honour of Germany is really at
stake... in 1950 you gave a most correct interpretation of it when... you
concluded that there were very few exterminations of this type, and that
only one or two madmen among the SS ( ... J were responsible for them."
Rassinier himself wrote,
"If I have insisted on concluding this chapter with this account, it is on
the one hand because an historian worthy of the name must not hide
anything that he knows; and on the other because I could not seriously
challenge it ... and that rightly or wrongly, the good faith and the sincerity
o( its author had seemed evident to me. ( ... ) All this ... does not mean that
I guarantee this account ( ... )."
The whole story is hard to believe: the deep mystery which hides the
name of the personage as well as the date, the country and the place
where the conversation was held justifies all doubts and all suspicions.
Had any other historian, especially Jewish, presented an account dis-
turbing to Rassinier in such non-verifiable similar conditions, one senses
135
immediately that Rassinier would have showered him with a flood of
mockeries, sarcasms and insults.
Furthermore, the mystery is perhaps less dense than Rassinier thought.
Numerous details lead us to believe that the man "of extreme distinction
and exquisite politeness, senior officer of a very high rank in a very im-
portant department," denazified after the war, who speaks with Globoc-
nik and asks him "what the Fiihrer thinks of the definitive solution,"
who the next day visits the camp of Belzec with Gerstein, two days
later is with him during the gassing operation where he notes "the pray-
ers and the cries of the unfortunate victims" and who speaks to Dr.
Grawitz "to denounce the scandal" to Himmler, could be Professor Dr.
Wilhelm Pfannenstiel. Pfannenstiel was titular of the Chair of Hygiene
at the University of Marburg. He held the rank of SS-Obersturmbann-
fiihrer (lieutenant colonel). Arrested by the English, he was freed for
lack of evidence but lost his chair. He was the protege of Dr. Grawitz,
SS-Gruppenfiihrer, Chief of the Health Service of the SS and the Police,
the man who, according to Gerstein, asks Globocnik "but what doe;s
the Fiihrer say?", puts his ear against the door of the gas chamber and
exclaims, "You can hear them crying as at the synagogue ... "
Be that as it may, this" testimony," which we know only in Rassinier's
wording, claims that Gerstein's account "is as false as can be from one
end to the other." In reality, he confirms it almost entirely. The de-
scription of the places, the number and the dimensions of the gas cham-
bers, their functioning by means of the exhaust fumes of a Diesel engine
are indeed identical in both. So is the description of the hasty burial of
the corpses of the men, women and children killed in the "Heckenholt
Foundation. " Even the references of Globocnik to Hitler are identical
in both.
That is the real crux of the problem of the gas chambers in the
extermination camps.
9. "Witness X" and the Legend of the Mad 55
Nevertheless, the version of "X" is made to measure to justify the
legend of "accidents" due to some rare, mad SS. This legend was
dear to Rassinier: there were scarcely two or three small convoys of four
or five cars of fifty people each which arrived in Belzec up to August
18, 1942, that is to say, in the five months of the existence of this
camp. All of that must illustrate the initiative of "rare madmen." In
the same way, the affirmation that Wirth and his assistant implored the
important visitor X to intervene in high places so that "this scandal"
would cease, which happened quickly owing to the intervention of Dr.
Grawitz, illustrates the thesis according to which those in high places
were ignorant of everything, that when they were informed of it the
whole enterprise of madmen was rapidly liquidated and the madmen
punished. It was also a thesis of Rassinier.
These two elements of "testimony X" for Rassinier justified its
pUblication. Moreover, this "testimony" very opportunely illustrates
136
the accusation which attributes the total responsibility for the worst
horrors of the camps to the "Haftlingsfiihrung" and not at all to the SS.
This is because it is a question of Jews (" fat, healthy") taking the respon-
sibility for the extermination of their co-religionists in the "Heckenholt
Foundation," named after the Jew' in charge of running and servicing
the Diesel engine!
Now then, in their zeal and in their ignorance of the facts, the
"very distinguished" witness X and his "confessor", Rassinier, did not
conjecture that certain affirmations of the "testimony" are easy to verify.
This verification shows their absurdity: '
1) At the beginning of February 1943, a railway car containing
3,000 kilos of uniquely female hair was sent from the camp of Belzec
to the Minstry of the Economy of the Reich. It was intended for the
spinning-mills (Doc. NO-1257 and USSR-51l). The weight corresponds
to the hair of about 200,000 women. This documentation should
suffice to discredit the affirmation of "witness X", according to which
"only a train of few cars arrived from time to time, two or three until
the present writing".
2) The camp in Belzec was closed in spring 1943, more than six
months after the so-called intervention of "witness X" and of Dr.
Grawitz (the latter of whom saw Himmler). "Witness X" thus invented
Dr. Grawitz's intervention or, at the very least, its consequences.
3) Globocnik left his post in Poland only on September 13, 1943.
He received a new and equivalent post on the Adriatic coast, as
well as a fine letter from Himmler. This letter, dated November 30,1943,
expressed Himmler's thanks and gratefulness to "lieber Globus" for the
latter's services in Poland. "Witness X" thus invented the fact that
Globocnik was penalized because of the camps placed under his autho-
rity.
4) In autumn 1942, Wirth was named, under Globocnik's orders,
"Inspector" of three extermination camps in the district of Lublin-
Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka-with headquarters in Lublin. It was
a promotion and not at all a punitive sanction.
5) On April 13, 1943, Globocnik sent the RSHA a recommendation
for promotion in which is read: "The Reichsfiihrer, after his visit to the
camp of Sobibor, had formally approved a promotion in favour of the
most deserving chiefs and men. The enclosed list contains the names
of the best in the three camps. Police Major Christian Wirth (SS No
345.464) is the inspector in charge: (he was) promoted commandant on
January 30, 1943, I earnestly request a simultaneous promotion for him
to the rank of SS-Sturmbannfiihrer. ( ... ). Propositions: Waffen SS-
Hauptscharfiihrer Josef Oberhauser (Obermeyer of Gerstein) to the
rank of SS-Untersturmfiihrer, Waffen SS-Oberscharfiihrer Lorenz Hecken-
holt to the, rank of SS-Hauptscharfiihrer ( ... )" (25, pp. 164-165).
"Witness X" thus invented the punitive sanctions which supposedly
struck the" mad" SS.
The reader has no doubt noticed on this list the name of SS-Ober-
scharfiihrer Lorenz Heckenholt of the "Heckenholt Foundation" of
Belzec. It is therefore Gerstein who was right when he said that "the
137
operator of the Diesel the exhaust fumes of which are intended to kill
the poor people" is the SS-Unterscharfiihrer Heckenholt. It was
"Witness X" and, in back of him, Rassinier who invented that it was
a Jew for the needs of the cause and by hatred for the Jews ..
The cause is that of "the honour of Germany" confounded with that
of the worst torturers and murderers No German having a care for his
honour and that of his native land should admit such a shameful assimila-
tion.
The Gerstein Report should no longer allow it.
t(
138
Part II The Number of
Victims of the
"Final Solution" and
the J{orherr Report
As soon as the war had ended, the question was raised as to the number
of victims of the "final solution to the Jewish question."
It is evident that this macabre accountancy had to be kept by the
administration of the Third Reich, so that the precise and total evaluation
of the exterminations had to exist somewhere. Unfortunately, at the
current writing, the archives of the Gestapo have yielded only incomplete
data of this aC9ountancy. They do, however, attest its existence.
The first summary indication concerning the problem was given at the
time of the first important Nuremberg trial (1945-46), that of Grering
and his associates, during the depositions of two witnesses, Wilhelm
Hoettl, SS- Sturmbannfiihrer of the Central Security Office of the Reich,
and Dieter Wisliceny, SS-Hauptsturmfiihrer. They were both friends
of Eichmann and the second his close collaborator. On November 6,
1945, Hoettl declared that in April 1944 in Budapest, Eichmann had
told him under the seal of secrecy that "in different exterminatien camps
four million Jews had been killed, whereas two million more had met
their deaths in another manner" (32, pp. 100-101). For his part, Wis-
liceny, under interrogation on January 3, 1946, related that at the end
of February 1945, in Berlin, Eichmann had spoken to him of the murder
of five million Jews (32, pp. 99-100).
1. Convergence of Diverse Estimates
Later a report due to Korherr, the "Inspekteur flir Statistik" of the
SS, was found. We shall refer to this below. Let us say immediately,
however, that this report stopped at the date of March 31, 1943, so that
it appears interesting only for the first year of the execution of the
program of the "final solution," a program which was continued for
another year and a half after that date. It nevertheless presents the
inestimable advantage of a direct "accountancy" of the number of
victims, drawn up by the executors of the "final solution" themselves.
In the course of the year 1945, an American specialist of statistics
and demography, Jacob Lestchinsky, accomplished an important piece
of work by attacking the problem of the number of Jewish victims
according to statistical methods: he thus calculated the "balance sheet"
139
THE NUM BER OF VICTIMS
from the number of Jews in different European countries before the
war and immediately following it. He came to the conclusion that
there was a loss in lives of 5,978,000 (31), a figure which coincides with
that advanced by Hoett! and Wisliceny according to the confidences of
Eichmann. This study was published in 1946. The indirect method
employed by Lestchinsky has been used again by many other authors,
the majority of whom have reached the same result of about six million
victims. Only the Englishman Gerald Reit!inger (43), who imposes upon
himself systematically and deliberately the adoption in each hypothesis of
the lowest figures, gives an estimate which even so varies between a mini-
mum of 4,194,200 and a maximum of 4.581,200. All of the authors, with-
out exception, who utilize this indirect method underscore the multiple
objective difficulties that it presents. One must take into consideration
the uncertainties as to the number of the Jewish population in many
countrIes, the multiple border changes between States which took place
especially in"Eastern Europe between 1939 and 1945, and the important
movements of human masses before the advances of the armies i(and
the perils of all kinds due to events of the war. It is therefore always
a question of approximations.
In 1951, Leon Poliakov (34, p.10) employed another procedure of
direct estimation: the adding up of the number of victims of the principal
extermination camps (Belzec, Treblinka, Sobibor, Chelmno and Ausch-
witz) as well as those of the "Einsatzgruppen." He thus reached a total
of 5,300,000 without "taking into account innumerable deaths by
famine, by sickness, etc., in the vast ghettos of Poland, in numerous
work camps scattered across all of Europe." The idea of this procedure
of direct calculation is right: nevertheless, the number of victims of the
camps and of the Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing units) are known only
approximatively, so that uncertainties are not always avoided. In addi-
tion, as the author underscored, a no doubt considerable number of
deaths outside of the camps and the operations of the Einsatzgruppen
escape it completely.
What is nonetheless striking is the fact that whatever the method em-
ployed, the figure obtained is always about six million; and on the basis
of a calculation deliberately limited to the lowest data, such as that of
G. Reitlinger, ones arrives even so at more than four million.
2. Rassinier's figures and his methods
Rassinier, conscious of the crushing weight which similar massacres
cast on the reputation of the Third Reich, its chiefs, its elite SS, sought
by all possible means to demonstrate that the six million victims were
but a scandalous invention of omnipotent world Judaism.
He consacrated more than two hundred pages to this demonstration
in his works. He came back to it constantly and poured out quantities
of astute arguments, cleverly constructed mistakes and false, unfounded
affirmations to reach the following conclusion: there were not six million
140
Rassinier's Figures and his Methods
people massacred, but only 500,000 to 1,000,000 (39, pp. 64-65), or
rather 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 (40, p. 94) or 896,892 to 1,485,292 (41,
p. 210-211).
He reached these figures by astutely mixing reasonings and false
information with semblances of demographic calculations. The lines
of argument are often completely absurd; the information was taken
from highly debatable sources when not notoriously false. The demo-
graphic data were gleaned without any discernment at one time in this
work, at another time more simply in a newspaper article presenting
no guarantee of seriousness. Sometimes they were taken from an
improvised speech not claiming to be an exact piece of reasoning,
or even from a chance declaration having but a very distant connection
with the problem of the victims of the "final solution." All of this
hotch-potch was put together by Rassinier to stupefy the reader and
lead him to blindly accept the former's "conclusions."
A few examples will clearly illustrate Rassinier's methods. The sole
difficulty lies in the fact that there are only too many of these examples
to choose from.
Here is the first, very simple specimen: Rassinier approached (41,
p. 114) the problem of the number of Jews living in Russia, and he
cited the total of two to three million in 1962 according to the estimate
of the "Institute of Jewish Affairs" in London. But that did not seem
serious to him, "if one believes M. N ahoum Goldmann," who himself
mentioned the figure of three million in 1963. According to Rassinier,
this proved that the "statistics of Jewish origin" were falsified. It is
to be pointed out that M. Goldmann did not at all discuss the problem
of the number of Jews in Russia, but rather that of their position in that
country; and the statistics remain in this context without importance.
If Rassinier had not sought to confuse one of the most simple problems
and to create doubt for his reader, it would have been very easy for him
to satisfy his curiosity by examining the results of the official census of
the population of the USSR by "nationality." He would have thus
learnt that in 1959 there were 2,268,000 Jews in that country.
Since we are considering the problem of the Jews in Russia, another
example comes to mind of the "seriousness" of Rassinier's work. On
numerous occasions, he quoted an article by a Soviet Jewish journalist,
David Bergelson. The latter had written on December 5, 1942, in the
Yiddish paper published in Moscow and known to Rassinier thanks to
the newspaper, "Der Weg," of Buenos Aires (January 1953) that "due
to the evacuation (inside Russia, G. W.) the majority (80%) of the Jews
from the Ukraine, White Russia, Lithuania and Latavia were saved."
Rassinier unreservedly accepted this information. It allowed him to
figure up that in the Baltic countries alone there were" 196,000 certain
survivors" and "49,000 missing in 1945" (41, pp. 177-178). The
reader should be informed that Bergelson was a journalist who belonged
to an ad hoc Jewish "Committee" in the USSR at the end of 1941. It
141
THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS
was entrusted by the government with obtaining the instinctive attraction
and the financial support of American Jews for Russia at war. The C.om-
mittee was liquidated after the war; and its leaders, including Bergelson,
were shot.
Rassinier did not ask what credit could be given to a pwpaganda
article in favour of a country living through dark hours of its history, nor
how a simple journalist could have obtained the information in question
during the chaos of the battle of Stalingrad. He did not ask how the Rus-
sians could evacuate 80% of the Jews from the Baltic countries which
had. been cut off from Russia by the lightning advance of the German
armies during the first days of the "Blitzkrieg," when the Soviet troops
themselves had not the time to save themselves from being encircled,
nor to avoid being captured. Instead of taking his information without
any discrimination, Rassinier could have read the secret report dated
January 31, 1942, of the SS-Obergruppenfiihrer commanding the "Ein-
satzgruppe A." Important extracts from it were published in French
as of 1949 through the good offices of the Center of Contemportary
Jewish Documentation (32, pp. 286-287). He would have thus learnt
that on the date of October 25, 1941, the number of Jews that had
been executed was 123, 930 among whom: .
In Lithuania
In Latvia
80,311. ~ t 5.500 liquidated in the pogroms
30,025 5
In Estonia 474
In White Ruthenia 7,620
TOTAL 118,430 + 5,500 123,930
~
Moreover, in Latvia, for example, there were still 28,000 persons in
Riga, 24,000 of whom were already shut up in the ghetto. Other
ghettos existed "in other cities still peopled by a sufficient number of
Jews ... " (32, p. 285). And seven months later, in the report dated June
12, 1942, one may read (32, pp. 308-309):
" ... After the entry of the German troops, there were still 70,000 .Jews
in Latvia, whereas the others had fled with the Bolshevik armies that were
retreating. ( ... ) Presently, but few Jews, who are employed as specialists,
are still in the ghettos. It is a question here of the following figures: in
Riga about 2,500; in Dunabourg about 950; in Libau about 300. Leaving
these Jews out of account, Latvia has in the meantime been freed of its
Jews."
142
Rassinier's Figures and his Methods
According to the 1935 census, there were 93,479 Jews in Latvia; so
that the 70,000 persons that the German troops found upon their arri-
val in Latvia in June 1941 represent 75% of the total population who
were surely not "saved," instead of the 80 % "of certain survivors"
discovered by Rassinier. Moreover, the comparison between the 123,930
people killed as of October 1941 in the Baltic countries and the "49,000
missing in 1945" according to Rassinier, provides a new occasion to
judge his self-conceit and his frivolity. That is how he wrote history.
3. The Hungarian Chapter
The last example exposing Rassinier's methods concerns the deporta-
tion of the Hungarian Jews in 1944. Rassinier came back to the
problem innumerable times for two reasons: the first is that he was
desperately seeking to discredit a book by a Jew deported from Hungary,
Myklos Nyiszli, who described the operation of the gas chambers at
Auschwitz and indicated the frequency of the arrival of the convoys;
the second is that he had his own ideas on the subject. The least in-
coherent of these ideas takes up ten pages in his book, "The Drama of
the European Jews" (41, pp. 150-190). It may be summed up in the
following manner: different Jewish sources, including the Tribunal of
Jerusalem which judged Eichmann in 1961, fix the number of Jews de-
ported from Hungary in 1944 at more than 400,000 persons transferred
in two months by 147 trains of 3,000 people each following each other
at a rhythm of two to three per day. Rassinier revolted against such
inventions and showed that it was materially "impossible" and therefore
completely false. He advanced two reasons to explain why it was
impossible. First of all, according to Kasztner (one of the leaders of
the Jewish community of Budapest), the "Eichmann Kommando" dis-
posed of but 1,000 railway cars of which "only two-thirds could be
affected to the deportation, hardly more. Let's say 700," conceded
Rassinier. The three hundred remaining cars, according to Rassinier,
were used to bring the future deportees to the assembly point. Further-
more, personal experience of the deportation showed Rassinier that the
gathering together, the setting them on their way from the assembly-point
to the train, the embarking of only 3,000 persons in the train required
"a good half-day," whereas the single voyage from Hungary to Ausch-
witz, by his calculations, required four days plus an a additional four
days for the return of the empty cars. The consequence was that in
few days "the system was blocked." Finally, Rassinier's personal exper-
ience allowed him to affirm that to guard 147 trains at the rate of two
to three per day during two months, Eichmann had to dispose of
22,050 policemen; whereas he (Rassinier) could affirm that it was
impossiple to transport 3,000 persons in a convoy. For all of these
reasons and for many others of the same nature, Rassinier reached the
conclusion that there were really 77 trains instead of 147, transporting
143
"at the maximum" 2,400 persons in 30 cars instead of 3,000 at 80 per
car. All of this gives a total of 200,000 deportees instead of 434,351
retained by the Tribunal of Jerusalem or of 500,000 mentioned by
Kasztner report.
All of these highly developed divagations were intended to impress
the reader with the competence of a "specialist on the deportations,"
whose opinions were to be accepted without discussion.
Here is the reality such as it appears from a series of telex and secret
reports ("Nur als Verschlussache zu behandeln") sent to Berlin by
the German Ambassador to Budapest and SS-Brigadefiihrer Veesen-
mayer. Anyone may consult them freely in the archives of the Center
for Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Paris (11).
This series begins with the telegram dated April 28, 1944 (No 1108),
which is thus drafted. "Today the first transport of 1,800 Jews between
sixteen and fifty years of age and fit to work has left Budapest.
morrow a new train of 2,000 Jews fit. to work will leave Topolya." The
series g<?es up to July 9, 1944; and the ensemble of the operations (tS
summed up in a telegram of October 28, 1944, which reads: "Total
number of Jews in Hungary on March 19 of this year, about 800,000.
Already transported into the territory of the Reich, about 430,000.
Jewish work force of the Hungarian Army about 150,000. In the
region of Budapest about 200,000."
And here are the details:
Deportations of the Hungarian Jews
(Accordmg to the secret reports of Veesenmayer, German Ambassador
to BUdapest).
(Archives of the C.D.J.e. of Paris, classification numbers CLXXXIX-
22, 33. 37, 39 40 et 46)
Interval Total number
Number of
Average
Dates between of deportees
deportees
number
af the reports two succes- on the dates
between two
of deportees.
sive reports indicated
successive
each day
renarts
I 4,28 and i9- 2 days 3,1\00 1.800
1944
2.000
I 5-18-1944 19 days
23,363 19.563 1.030
6-7-1944 20 days 273,949 250.586 12.529
6-13-1944 6 days 303,499 29.550 4.925
6-14-1944 1 day 316,803 13.304 13.304
6-15-1944 1 dav 324,005 7.202 7.202
6-25-1944 10 351,850 27.845 2.784
7-1-1944 6 days 377,601 25.751 4.292
7
c
6-1944 5 days 381,661 4.060 801
7-9-1944 3 days 429,028 47.367 15.789
73 days 5.877
144
The Hungarian Chapter
These data merit a brief observation. It can be seen that by calcu-
lating the average number of deportees per day, one establishes .that
it is nearly 6,000 and that several times it exceeds 10,000. Once it
even reached 15,789. This gives a particularly grotesque
to Rassinier's comments concerning Dr. Nyiszli's account. The former
wrote: "it is clearly obvious that the five trains per day, of 4,000 persons
each at one point in his testimony and of 5,000 at another, were an
imbecility ... (41, p. 189). However, Veesenmayer wrote in the secret
telegram of May 4, 1944, that "the transfer of 310,000 Jews ( ... ) is to
begin in the middle of May: four transports of 3,000 Jews each are plan-
ned each day" (32, p. 235). We thus have all of the elements necessary
to decide where the imbecility was to be found.
4. The Korherr Report
It is not conceivable that the administration of the Third Reich
could not realize the number of victims of the "final solution." This
obvious fact has been fully confirmed by the Korherr report which was
found in the mass of documents assembled at the time of the preparation
of the first important trial of Nuremberg.
Its history is the following.
On January 18, 1943, Himmler ordered Korherr, "Inspekteur fUr
Statistik" of the SS, to draw up a report on "The Final Solution of the
Jewish Question in Europe" ("Die Endlosung der europaischen Juden-
frage") (12). The latter complied and on March 23, 1943, sent a
sixteen-page report to the SS-Obersturmbannfiihrer Dr. R. Brandt, of
the personal staff of the Reichsfiihrer SS Himmler. The statistics ended
at the date of December 31, 1942 (12). On April 9, 1943, Himmler
wrote to the Chief of the Sipo and of the SD that he found Korherr's
report to be excellent because it could later serve as camouflage but that
for the moment he forbade its diffusion. In the future he wanted to
receive short monthly reports concerning the number of Jews evacuated
and how many still remained (13).
(" Ich halte diesen Bericht als allenfallsiges Material fUr spatere Zeiten,
und zwar zu Tarnungszwecken filr recht 1m Augenblick darf er werder
Veroffentlicht noch weitergegeben werden ( ... ). In den kurzen Monatsmel-
dungen des Sicherheitspolizei will ich ledeglich mitgeteilt bekommen,
was monatlich abgefahren worden ist und was zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch
an Juden ubrig blieb.")
See Appendix A for the first unabridged publication of the two Korherr
reports. The original German text is followed by an Engish translation.
Information is also provided concerning Korherr's past and present activities
(Editor'S note).
145
The next day, April 10, R. Brandt informed Korherr that his report
had been received by Himmler who wished that "nowhere it be spoken
of the "special action applied to the Jews." ("Er wunscht, dass an keiner
Stelle von "Sonderbehandung des Juden" gesprochen wird") (14).
In fact, the following sentence is found on page 10 of the Korherr Report:
"Total of the evacuations (including Theresienstadt and also the
Special Action... 1,873,539." ("Evakuierungen insgesamt einschl.
Theresienstadt und einschl. Sonderbehandlung") (14). In the mean-
time, on April 1, 1943, Himmler ordered Korherr to draft a summary
of his report "to be presented to Hitler" ("zur Vorlage an den Fuhrer").
The result was a report of six and one-half pages addressed to Dr.
Brandt on April 19, 1943. The statistical data are completed until
March 31, 1943 (15,35).
All of this correspondance, which is stamped "Geheime Reichssache"
(" State Secret "), is very edifying. It shows in fact that the results of
the "final solution" interested Hitler himself as much as Himmler, that 'I
is to say, the summit of the regime. On the other hand, thanks to the
gaffe of Korherr, one has, were it necessary, a confirmation coming
from the top that the "Sonderbehandlung der J uden" was an operation
so un acknowledgeable that it was to be carefully camouflaged under the
term still more innocent of "evacuation" even in a report for internal
internal use of the SS. By the same occasion we henceforth know
that the heading "evacuations" of the Korherr Report covered the
.. Sonderbehandlung. "
It is so clear that the Korherr Report does not permit knowledge of
the total number of victims of the "final solution" that it is hardly neces-
sary to underscore it: the report stops at March 31, 1943. At the .#
present time, it is however possible to complete it on some points, which
are precise and limited, due to documents coming from the Nazi admi-
nistration which Korherr would surely have used had he continued his
work after March 31, 1943. But the sole data of this report are already
very largely sufficient to realize the folly of the Rassinier of all sorts,
when they attack the number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust and
oppose to the figure of six million their grotesque lucubrations.
Let us examine first of all what the abridged report of six and one-
half pages reveals on the subject of "evacuations."
146
I
I
I
I
The Korherr Report
" EVACUA TrONS "
I
Number of
Period
Number of I
Territory from ..
evacuees evacuees
up to first
to 12-31-1942
12-31-1942 trimester 1943
Old Reich
(region of 1-30-1933
100,516
I ~
Slldetenland
I
included) (9-29-1938)
Austria 3-13-1938 47,555
I
Bohemia and
3-16-1939 69,677 113,015
Moravia
I
I
Regions 0 f the
Sept. 1939 ~ I
East (with
(june 1940)
222,117
I
Bialystok)
General
Sept. 1939
I
Government 1,274,166
(with Lemberg)
(june 1940)
France (occupied before
41,911 7,995
zone) 11-10-1942
Holland
"
38,571 13,832
Belgium
"
16,886 1,616
Norway
"
532 158
Greece
"
- 13,435
Slovakia
"
56,691 854 I
I
Croatia
"
4,927
I
-
I
Bulgaria
" -
I
11,364
Regions of Russia,
i
including the Baltic
countries, since
633,000
the beginning of the
campaign in the
East
TOTAL = 2,506,849 + 162,269
GENERAL TOTAL = 2,669,118
147
This table calls for a few remarks.
1) Korherr wrote on the subject of the statIstIcs of his report that
were included "but partially the deaths of Jews in the occupied regions
of the East, whereas the deaths which occurred in the rest of Russia
and in the zone of the front are not at all included in it." Thus one is
warned that the total of 2,669,118 "evacuees" is incomplete, that it is
notoriously too low. The expression "deaths which occurred ... in the
zone of the front" seems to exclude from this accountancy the operations
of the "Einsatzgruppen" which acted precisely "in the zone of the front,"
immediately following the front-line troops of the Wehrmacht to whose
authority this zone was subordinated. It is a gap and no doubt a con-
siderable one. We shall come back to it shortly.
2) It may be asked what value may be attributed to Korherr's work.
His great responsibilities within the SS, his indiscutable competence
in statistics, the fact that the addressees of his report are Hitler and
Himmler, whose brutality in case of sanctions is well-known, are already
serious guarantees. But one may go still farther. In fact, in the casy',
of at least two countries it is possible to verify the accuracy of Korherr's(
data and at the same time to realize that he drew them from authentic
reports of the "competent services." The countries are France and
Belgium where, for the periods up to 12-31-42 and from 1-1 to 3-31-43,
the number of deportees, as well as the dates and the place of deporta-
tion are known with certainty owing to the nominative lists of the per-
50ns of each convoy. These were established in several copies which
were found after the liberation in the files of the "J udenreferat" of
Paris and are conserved in the archives of the C.D.J.C. At the depar-
t ure of the train, the "J udenreferat" confided two lists to the chief
of the escort and communicated the others:
a) to the Inspectorship of the Concentration Camps in Oranienburg.
b) to the Service IV B4 of Eichmann in Berlin and to
c) the camp of destination.
This permits us to know the exact number of ,Jews deported from ...
France at the date of 12-31-42 and between this date and 3-31-43
(27,46,50). An analogous situation is found in Belgium (26).
Insofar as France is concerned, on 12-31-42 the number of persons
marked on the nominative lists is 41,951, instead of 41,911, the figure
given by Korherr (27). Between 12-31-42 and 3-31-43 the number of
persons accordings to the name lists is equal to 8,001 (7,995 indicated by
Korherr). Thus, out of almost 50,000 persons, the difference is of 46
people or of 0.09%. That means that in the case of France the sta-
tistics of Korherr are remarkably verified.
In the case of Belgium, the count according to the name lists is of
16,861 until 12-31-42 and between this date and 3-31-43 of 1,604.
Korherr indicated 16,886 and 1,616 respectively. The discrepancy is
of 37 persons out of 18,500 or 0.20%. One may therefore consider
Korherr's work as worthy of confidence. It is obvious that it is based
on first-hand information coming from either the "Inspectorship of the
148
The Korherr Report
Concentration Camps" at Oranienburg and/or from Eichmann's service
in Berlin.
5. The KOTherr Report Completed
As we have seen, Korherr's statistics stop at the date of 3-31-43, at
the end of the first year of the deportations of the Jews which had begun
in March 1942, but continued for another year and a half. His data are
thus very partial; and we know that even for the periods chosen by
Korherr they are incomplete, at the very least in respect to the occupied
regions of Russia. Yet at the current time it is possible to complete
them, notably for the following four countries-France, Belgium, Holland
and Hungary- always taking as a basis the incontestable sources of
the Nazi administration. There is no doubt that if Korherr had continued
his work as Himmler ordered, he would have utilized these sources.
It is plausible that the rest of the report that we know today will even-
tually be discovered in the mass of documents of the SS which still
remain unstudied.
In fact, in France and in Belgium the number of convoys of Jews
deported and the number of persons that they carried away are known;
and this is true up to the liberation of these two countries in the same
way that we know them until 3-31-43 (26,27,46,50,52). As far as Hol-
land is concerned, the archives of the Gestapo have been found, notably'
those of 106,000 persons interned at the camp of Westerbork and
deported in 98 convoys, with the exclusion of 918 people liberated in
1945 as well as those of 5 convoys set out from Apeldoorn, Amsterdam
and Vught (3 convoys). Among these 103 convoys, 67 were directed
to Auschwitz, 19 to Sobibor, 6 to Theresienstadt, 9 to Bergen-Belsen
and 2 to Ravensbruck. The total number of deportees is 105,000.
This data was published through the good offices of the Dutch Red Cross
in four parts published in 1947, 48, 52 and 53 under the general title of
"Auschwitz." Finally, the statistics concerning the deportations of
Jews from Hungary are known from the reports of the Ambassador of
the Third Reich to Budapest.
If one takes into account the figures thus known, the Korherr report
is completed in the following manner:
Number of Difference to be
Country Total number deportees added to the
of deportees
appearing in the Korherr report
Korherr report
France .75,721 (a)
49,906
25,815
Belgium 25,437 (b)
18,502
6,935
Holland 105,000 (c) 52,403
52,597
Hungary 429,028 (d)
- 429,028
Total
514,375
Total of the Korherr report, more than 2,669,118
New total, more than
3,183,493
149
(a) 27, p. 13.
(b) 28, pp. 108-9.
(c) "Auschwitz", Het Nederlansche Rood Kruis, Gravenhage, vol. I,
pp. 4-5, 1947.
(d) 11.
Before continuing farther in our investigation, it is interesting to
underscore that the some 3,000,000 victims of the" final solution" found
while using as a basis the incomplete accountancy of the Nazi admini-
station itself, already exceed two to six times the whimsical figures
advanced by Rassinier (500,000 to 1,500,000).
6. Genocide in the USSR, in the Baltic Countries
and in Bessarabia
The great unknown in the Korherr Report concerns the number of
Soviet Jews victims of the "final solution." A conjunction of circum-
stances allows one to bridge this gap if not with complete certainty, at (
least with a great probability of coming close to the real facts. The (
USSR is one of those countries where the "nationality" of the citizens
is obligatorily part of the civil status. In this way, the exact number
of "Jews" of the USSR has been known for a long time, just as the
number of "Russians," "Ukrainians," "Armenians," etc. One is thus
not reduced to "estimates." On the other hand, the USSR is a coun-
try where emigration and immigration are very slight, so that the
results of the census of the population at different epochs are comparable
and sure. Finally, luck has it that the last census before the war dates
from 1939, or just before the hostilities. The conditions are therefore
very favourable for following the fluctuations in the number of Soviet
citizens, notably those of the Jewish population, between periods suffi-
ciently long to cancel out the effects of accidental causes.
Nevertheless, to make valid comparisons, the border changes of the
USSR before and after the war must be taken into account. This problem
is well-known and does not raise insurmountable difficulties. In fact, ~
on September 28, 1939, a part of eastern Poland was occupied by Soviet
troops, but without annexation. On August 16, 1945, a part of these
territories was ceded by restored Poland to the USSR, but with the
right for these populations to leave Russia and rejoin Poland. It is
obvious that a certain number of those concerned did not take advantage
of this right, remained definitively in the USSR and became Soviet citi-
zens of Polish nationality. The number of these latter did in fact more
than double between the censuses of 1939 and 1959, as one can see
below. To our knowledge, it is unknown at the time of the present
writing if Jews originally from the same ex-Polish territories which had
become Soviet, and who could have found themselves following the
events of the war in USSR, all went back to Poland or, rather, if a least
a part of them stayed in Russia becoming Soviet citizens and thereby
increasing the effectives of the Jews recorded in 1959 without having
been deducted in 1939. This unknown can be a source of errors in
150
The Korherr Report
our attempt to calculate the Jewish losses in Russia. It does not,
however, seem that this eventual error would change the data of the
problem considerably. In any case, if there is an error, it goes in the
direction of the diminution of the calculated number of Jewish victims
in Russia.
In August 1940, the three Baltic countries, Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia became Soviet Republics; and Lithuania acquired the region
of Vilno to the detriment of Poland. After the war, this allocation of
territories was confirmed. Finally, in June 1940, Rumania had to
cede Bessarabia and North Bukovina to the USSR, into which they were
incorporated. This situation was confirmed in 1944.
Thus the annexation of the Baltic countries and of Bessarabia had
brought definitively to the USSR in 1940 a Jewish population whose
importance was the following (the number of Jews in Estonia ar....d in
Finnish Carelia was negligible):
Lithuania (census of 1939), with Viloo ................. 269,600
Memel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,000
Latvia (census of 1935) .............................. 93,479
Bessarabia (census of 1941) .......................... 290,000
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 562,079
This said, let us look at the results (abridged) of three censuses of
the population of the USSR, among which that of 1959-twenty years
after the beginning of the war-when the return of the ex-Polish
populations to Poland was definitively ended and the situation after the
war stabilized. Let us add that the emigration of the Soviet Jews to
Israel began on a discern able scale only in 1971, twelve years later.
7. Results of the Census by Nationality of the Population
of the USSR
Population 1926 (54) 1939 (54) 1959 (55) 1959/1939
Total 147.028.000 170.467.000 208.826.000 1,22
Russians 77.791.000 99.020.000 114.588.000 1,16
Ukrainians 31.195.000 28.070.000 36.981.000 1,32
Bielorussians 4.739.000 5.267.000 7.829.000 1,49
Poles 792.000 627.000 1.380.000 2,20
Rumanians 279.000 260.000 2.214.000 8,51
Estonians 156.000 142.000 1.400.000 6,82
Latvians 154.000 127.000 969.000 11,02
Lithuanians 43.000 32.000 2.326.000 72,69
Georgians 1.821.000 2.240.000 2.650.000 1,18
Armenians 1.568.000 2.152.000 2.787.000 1,29
Germans 1.247.000 1.424.000 1.619.000 1,14
Jews 2.672.000 3.020.000 2.268.000 0,75
151
What is striking is to see that of all the nationalities the Jews are the
only people whose population in 1959 is less than in 1939 and even
in 1926, and this despite a contribution of nearly 700,000 persons in
1940 coming from the Baltic countries and from Bessarabia. The
effectives of all the other nationalities increased between 1939 and
1959. In the case of the Russians, the Georgians, the Armenians and
the Germans, it is certainly due to natural growth. In other cases-
Ukrainians, Bielorussians-to an increase somewhat exaggerated, no
doubt, following the annexations of regions in which these nationalities
were relatively numerous. In the case of the Poles and especially that
of the Rumanians, the Estonians, the Lithuanians and the Latvians,
there is a fantastic leap forward which is evidently explained by annexa-
tion. No less evident is the explanation of the considerable and speci-
fic decreases in the Jewish population after 1939: they are consequences of
the" final solution."
This analysis can be improved and it allows one to figure up these
consequences with a good approximation. In fact, one may consider /l
the years from 1926 to 1939 as a reference period for the growth l
of the population of the USSR: it begins five years after the end of the
civil war, with the recovery due to the "new economic policy;" and despite
the very numerous upheavals which characterize the history of Russia
during the Thirties, it remains relatively stable from the demographic
point of view. In any event, it is much more stable than the period
which succeeds it with the war from 1941 to 1945, the invasion of vast
territories, the heavy military and civilian human losses, and the long
absence from their homes of young people at the age of procreation.
By calculating the annual growth rate in the conditions of the USSR
during the period, 1926-39, it is possible afterwards to extrapolate for
the following twenty years by thus determining what its numerical value
should "normally" have been in 1959. A comparison of the value thus
calculated with the one really ascertained by the census allows one to
figure up, with good probability, the consequences in human losses of the
war years.
The problem of highest priority for us is that of the Jewish population.
However, it is instructive to compare the results of the calculation
obtained in the case of other nationalities numerically comparable to
the Jewish population and for whom the effects of the war were not
specifically grave. Such are the cases of the Georgians, the Armenians
and the Germans. In fact, the Georgian and Armenian Republics
suffered a short-lived occupation, without particular violence on the
part of the occupier. As for the Germans in the USSR, thei were in
large part deported to Siberia in 1941, where they lived in material
conditions which were certainly difficult, but less dramatic than those,
for example, of the Ukrainians or the Bielorussians. Also, the
of the sexes did not take place because they were not mobilized into
the army. Finally, after the war, there was a small immigration of
50,000 Armenians, which is numerically negligible, who came to
USSR from eastern Asia and from Europe. As for the Germans of the
152
The Korherr Report
Baltic countries and the region of Konigsberg, all of which had been
annexed, they immigrated massively to Germany progressively with the
retreat of the Wehrmacht. The number of those among them who could
have augmented the number of Soviet Germans is thus very minor.
Let us therefore sum up the results of the censuses for the four natio-
nalities mentioned:
Nationality 1926 1939 1959
Increase in
13 years (1926-39) 1 year
Georgians 1.821.000 2.240.000 2.650.000 + 419.000 + 32.230 = 1.77 "/n
Armenians 1.568.000 2.152.000 2.787.000 + 584.000 + 44.920 = 2.86 "/0
Germans 1.247.000 1.424.000 1.619.000 + 177.000 + 13.610 = 1.09 "/0
Jews .2,672.000 3.020.000 2.268.000 + 348.000 + 26.770 = 1.00 "/0
As of 1939 + 662.079
3.682.079
Extrapolation 1926-1959 == 33 years
Population :
Nationality 1920 1959
real
calculated
Georgians : 1.821.100+ (1.77 % X 33 = 58,41 %) = 1.821.100 +1.063.646 91.9 0J0
= 2,884,646
Armenians: 1.568.000+ (2,86% X 33 = 94,38"/0) = l.5()8.000 + 1.479.878 91.4 0J0
= 3,047,878
Germans : 1.247.000+ (1.09"/0 X 33 = 35,97%) = 1.247.000 + 448.546 95.4 "/0
= 1,695,546
By calculation, the numerical values of the Georgian and Armenian
porulations of 1959 are found again save 8% and those of the Germans
save 4.5%, which would be a highly satisfactory rate of precision. In
reality, the deficits thus discovered in these three cases are certainly
not due to the imprecision of the method of calculation employed, but
rather to the destructive effects of the war: loss in lives and separation
of the sexes. As one could expect, for the reasons exposed. above,
these effects are distinctly less grave in the case of the Germans than in
those of the two other populations.
The case of the Jewish population of the USSR within its borders of
1939 is different from that of the Georgians, the Armenians and the
Germans in that one must consider that between 1942 and 1945 its
natural growth was not only slowed down, but reduced to a very low
level. Korherr indicates, for example, that during the first trimester
of 1943, in Germany itself, 22 births were registered as opposed to 1,113
deaths among the Jewish population still at liberty. So therefore if one
leaves completely out of account the natural growth of the Jewish
153
population of the USSR from 1942 and until 1945 (extremely rigourous
hypothesis and probably excessive), it is necessary to calculate on the
one hand the numerical value of this population in 1942 and on the
othe hand in 1945. To obtain the first datum, it suffices to add to the
number of Jews in 1939 the rate of growth still normal for the three
following years. To obtain their number in 1945, to deduct from the
number of Jews in 1959 the rate of growth for the fourteen preceding
years.
Here are the results of this calculation:
1) Jewish population in 1942:
3,682,079 + (1 % x 3 = 3 %) = 3,682,079 + 110,462 = 3,792,541
2) Jewish population in 1945:
2,268,000-(1 % x 14 = 14 %) = 2,268,000-317,520 = 1,950,480
Deficit: 1,842,061 (3,792,541 - 1,950,480).
Jewish population in 1945
=-= 51.4 %
Jewish population in 1942
Thus, in the case of the Jews, the enormous deficit is 48.6 %: nearly
half of the Soviet Jews (the only ones indicated in the censuses) within
the borders of the USSR enlarged in 1939 and restored since 1945
are missing at the roll-call; and among all the nationalities composing
the USSR they are the only ones in this situation. It is not a question
of "evacuees" nor of deportees, nor of emigrants because there were
no even slightly perceptible possibilities of emigration for the Soviet
. Jews until 1959. They were even excluded from the mass of Soviet
civilians brought by force to Europe during the war as "workers." It
is a question of deaths, of more than 1,800,000 deaths. It is the
"final solution of the Jewish question" in all its horror.
8. Number of Victims Recorded
A Part of this deficit of 1,842,061 is marked in the Korherr
Report under the heading "evacuees" from "regions of Russia, includ-
ing the Baltic countries" (see above) )Vhere it is numbered at 633,300.
The difference between these two figures is 1,208,761 which must be
added to the preceding total of 3,183,493 to complete the Korherr
Report concerning the USSR in its boundaries of 1945. One thus
reaches a new total of 4,392,257 "evacuees."
The new total is from three to nine times superior to the one "deter-
mined" by Rassinier. This once again shows the delirious nature of
the "works" of this "historian."
But that is not yet the end of the information which Korherr delivers to
us in his report. On the subject of deaths, he mentions two categories:
154
(I
The Korherr Report
a) Excess of mortality in the Old Reich + Sudetenland + Austria
+Bohemia and Moravia from 1933 to March 31,1943 ., 83,889
b) Deaths in the concentration camps
from 1933 to December 31, 1942. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,347
On the subject of captives on December 31, 1942, the four following
categories are presented:
c) The ghettos .................................... 297,914
d) The work camps ................................ 185,776
e) The concentration camps ............................ 9,127
f) The prisons ........ '................................ 458
Total .................. 604,511 ,
Preceding total ......... 4,392,254
New total .............. 4,996,765
. These data merit a few precise details.
In the first place, it is necessary to underscore that out of a total
of 4,996,765 direct victims of the anti-Jewish persecution enumerated
until present, there are 4,392,254 "evacuees," that is to say, 87.9%.
Among the latter 1,953,297 (44.5%) are in reality dead: on the one
hand, the 1,842,016 missing at the census in Russia and, on the other
hand, those accounted for by Korherr under the heading "excess of
mortality" (83,889) and "deaths in the concentration camps" (27,347).
"Excess of mortality" is commented upon by Korherr in the abridged
report in the following manner: "The extraordinary excess of mor-
tality of the Jews of the Old Reich stems from the senility and vital
weakness of Judaism as well as from it great mortality: in the first
trimester of 1943, 22 births were recorded and 1,113 deaths."
In the text of the detailed report of sixteen pages, very numerous
suicides are mentioned. That means that in 1942, in Germany itself,
births are practically inexistant and the "extraordinary" "natural" mor-
tality is explained by suicides.
The "deaths in the concentration camps" obviously relate to the
persons arrested in Germany since the "rise to power"; among them
27,347 are dead and 9,127 are still alive on December 31,1942
(the latter are found under our heading "captives in the concentration
camps "). To be accounted for apart, it is obvious that these dead
and these captives were arrested for other motives than the measures
of "evacuation."
Are they persons arrested for political motives or those of common law?
The same question may be raised as to the 458 persons incarcerated in
the prisons.
Insofar as the ghettos are, concerned, in the detailed report seven
large ones in Poland appear, with their effectives on 12-31-42. The
155
size of the ghetto of Warsaw is indicated as equal to 50,000 persons,
which is perhaps inferior to the actual number. In fact, in his report
concerning the liquidation of this ghetto in May 1943, following the
second uprising, the SS-Brigadefiihrer Stroop boasts of having captured
and exterminated 56,065 people. Let us add that the systematic and
total destruction of the ghettos in Poland began in the second half of
1942 with numerous murders and the transfer of the survivors to the
concentration camps.
The work camps enumerated in the Korherr Report, with their effectives
at the beginning of 1943, are those which were found in Germany in the
regions of Konigsberg, of Breslau and in Posnania. In the actual state
of our knowledge, it is impossible for us to complete the data of Korherr
on this subject beyond the beginning of 1943. What is known is that
the conditions of existence in these camps were as harsh as those which
prevailed in the concentration camps, less the gas chambers and )he
selections. Their liquidation by the sending of the survivors to the
concentration camps began in the middle of 1944.
The next to the last category of persons of which mention is made in
the Korherr Report is that of emigrants. Their census is given as of
12-31-42, and, according to countries, their numbers are the following:
Regions
Period from .... '1
to 12-31-42 Number
Old Reich (region of Sudetenland 1-30-33
382,534
included)
9-29-38
Austria
I
3-13-38 149,124
Bohemia and Moravia 3-16-39 25,699
- 6
Regions of the East (with Bialystok) I
Sept. 1939
334,673* .
Government General (with Lemberg)
(June 1940)
427,no*
Total: 1,319,950
* Emigration and excess of mortality combined.
Of course the "emigrants" are a category of which the iqterest is
relatively secondary when compared to other victims of the anti-Semitic
persecution. But it is not useless to point out that progressive-
ly, according to the conquests of the Wehrmacht, a certain number of
"emigrants" were taken back from the countries which had received
them and deported. For example, in the statistics concerning 75,721
Jewish deportees of the camp at Drancy classed by nationality, one finds
7,000 Germans, 4,500 Russians, 3,300 Rumanians, 2;500 Austrians,
26,300 Poles and a thousand Danzigers, Latvians, Lithuanians and
156
The Korherr Report
Czechoslovaks (27, p. 23). That means that the passage. from the
category of "emigrant" to that of "evacuee" had taken place, and this
underscores the relativity of the position of "emigrant" for a Jew in
Europe during the Nazi era.
In general, the following citation from the Korherr Report well
summarizes the finally limited and short-lived role that was played by
emigration in the program of the "final solution": "From before the
war, the Old Reich and Austria had gotten rid of more than half of
their Jews especially by way of emigration, whereas in the East a rapid
decrease vf the Jewish masses, dangerous because of their fecundity,
began only after the outbreak of the war and above all since the mea-
sure of evacuation of 1942."
Finally, the last category recorded by Korherr is that of the Jews
still at liberty on December 31, 1942:
Regions
Number
Old Reich .................. }
51,327
Sudetenland ................
Austria .........................
8,102
Bohemia and Moravia ........
15,550
Regions of the East .......... about
233,210
Total ....... '1
308,189
A recapitulation of the effectives of the different categories explored
by Korherr until December 31, 1942 yields the table below:
Excess of mortality .....
At liberty ............ .
Emigrants ........... .
Ghettos ............. .
Concentration camps ... .
Work camps .......... ,
Prisons .............. .
Evacuees ............ .
Total
83,8891
308 189 ~ Old Reich + Sudetenland
, + Austria + Bohemia and
1,319,950 Moravia + Regions of the
East + General Government
297,914
36,474
185,776
458
2,506,849
4,739,499
Poland
Greater Reich
Looking at this table one sees that at the date of 12-31-42 alone,
in the total of all of the categories united, the "evacuees" represent
more than half (52.9 %). One remarks that they are counted neither
among the dead by natural death, which, nevertheless, includes the
157
suicides, nor among those who are not yet captives, nor among the
emigrants, nor in the ghettos, nor in the concentration camps, nor in the
work camps, nor in the prisons; and one then wonders where they
could have been evacuated. Where were they hidden so that they could
nowhere be found? The question is logical. Moreover, the Neo-Nazis
affirm that the "evacuation" or the "Sonderbehandlung" meant nothing
distressing, as the Jewish calumniators claim. So a second question:
why are the "evacuations" designated by Korherr, with Himmler's
approval, as the principal cause of the "rapid decrease of the Jewish
masses?"
As long as the Rassinier of all kinds give no clear answer to
these two legitimate questions, any man of common sense and sincer-
ity will remain convinced that they were "evacuated" to extermination
places such at Auschwitz, Treblinka, Sobibor, Chelmno, etc ... where they
were killed and their bodies destroyed.
9. Number of Dead and Survivors r!
This sini.ster fate is evident in the case of the 1,842,061 "missing"
in Russia, to whom are related the 83,889 of the "excess of mortality"
and the 27,347 "dead in the concentration camps" recorded by Korrherr;
in all, 1,953,297 deaths.
It thus remains to detremine the destiny of still 3,043,468 persons:
the" evacuees" (2,550,193 according to the completed Korherr Report and
not including Russia), the captives of the ghettos (297,914), those
detained in the work camps (185,776), in the concentration camps
(9,127) and in the prisons (458).
We shall begin with the category which is the most important numer-
ically, that of the "evacuee," according to the terminology imposed on
Korherr by Himmler, and which, as we know, means the "Sonderbe-
handlung. "
It is a question of persons arrested in different countries and trans-
ported towards the extermination camps in Poland. It is necessary
to distinguish two categories among these camps:
a) those where a part of the "evacuees" is immediately assassinated
in the gas chambers, at the very arrival of the train, without being
registered, and the other part admitted inside the camp to work in the
factories, the mines, the work-shops, etc ... and which is enrolled. Such
are the camps of Auschwitz and of Majdanek;
b) the extermination camps properly speaking where only a very sn;tall
proportion of the" evacuees" are kept alive, just what is necessary to as-
sure the functioning of the camp itself and where the overwhelming ma-
jority of the "evacuees" are led directly to the gas chambers. Such
are the camps of Belzec, Chelmno, Sobibor, Treblinka.
Thus the essential difference between these two categories of camps
lies in the fact that the "selection at the arrival of the convoy" leaves
a certain number of "workers" alive in the first type; whereas in the
second this number is minimal, if not negligible.
158
The Korherr Report
Among these camps, that of Auschwitz is by far the most gigantic
(three large camps and thirty-nine auxiliaries scattered about a vast
territory) and the most studied. It is possible to have a rather precise
idea of the proportion of "gassed" on arrival and of "workers" enrolled
at the camp of Auschwitz. In fact, the number of deportees to Ausch-
witz from France, for example, is known from the archives of the Gestapo
and the number of" enrolled" among them is known from the archives
of Auschwitz. The difference between these two numbers corresponds
to the number of "gassed" upon arrival. Here are a few results of this
calculation: out of 61,953 deportees from France between August 3,
1942 (beginning of the systematic selections) and August 11, 1944
(last convoy), 41,696 persons, or 67.3 %, were sent to the gas chambers
on arrival of the train (27, p. 13). The same calculation made in respect
to the Belgian deportees demonstrates that out of 25,437 deportees be-
tween August 4,1942, and July 31,1944,17,543 were gassed on arrival,
or 68.9 % (26). In the case of the Jews deported from Greece, the
same method shows that 76.6 % were gassed immediately. On the other
hand, on December 16, 1942, the SS-Gruppenfiihrer Mliller, Chief of
the Gestapo in the RSHA, wrote to Himmler that in the month of
January 1943 Auschwitz would receive 45,000 Jews coming from the
region of Bialystok, from the ghetto of Theresienstadt, from Holland and
from Berlin among whom, "once the sorting out has been done, at least
10 to 15,000 workers (underlined) will be available after the assignment
of the Jews arrived at Auschwitz" (32, p. 117). The proportion of
"non-workers" is thus from 66.7 to 77.8 % of the totality of deportees.
The average of all these percentages is 71.2 %, and it varies
between 69.9 and 72.6 according to whether one takes into account one
or the other figures appearing in Muller's letter. So much for
the camp of Auschwitz.
In the case of the extermination camps properly speaking, of the type
Treblinka or Belzec, similar calculations do not seem possible at the
current moment because of the lack of precise data. What is neverthe-
less certain is that the number of those selected for the gas chambers
was surely much greater in these camps than at Auschwitz or Majdanek.
If one thus admits for the entirety of the extermination camps of both
categories the figures of 80 % of persons selected for the gas chambers
and 20 % of "enrolled," one is very probably below the true figures for
the "gassed." Nevertheless, that means that out of 2,550;193 "eva-
cuees," 2,040,154 were killed in the gas chambers as soon as they arrived
and 510,059 were enrolled as "workers."
An analagous fate was that of 297,914 persons counted by Korherr
on December 31, 1942, in the ghettos: all of them sooner or later ended
up by being "evacuated" to the extermination camps of one or the
other category. It is therefore realistic in their case to admit the same
rate of selection upon arrival: 80 % for the gas chambers and 20 % ad-
mitted to the camps. That means 238,331 "gassed" without being
enrolled and 59,583 "enrolled workers."
159
Added to the two preceding, figures, the total obtained is 2,278,485
gassed and 569,642 "workers."
To the latter are added the 185,776 persons who, according to
Korherr, were already in the work camps as of December 31, 1942, the
9,127 others designated by Korherr as detained '-in the concentration
camps" and 458 in the prisons. In all, 195,361 "workers" to add to the
569,642 identified above. One reaches a total of 765,003 persons
"enrolled" and submitted to the murderous regime of the camps and
whose fate must be determined.
Here we possess a certain number of precise points of reference. Thus
Korherr in his report indicates that out of 36,474 Jews detained in the
concentration camps in Germany, 27,347 were dead in December 31,
1942. This corresponds to a mortality rate of 75 %. In addition, the
nominative list of deaths among the men of the convoy which left
France on March 27, 1942, is preserved in the archives of Auschwitz.
Out of 1,112 deportees of this convoy integrally admitted to the camp c:J
without selection on arrival, 70 % were dead in the course of the two
first months and 83 % during the three first (52, p. 119). In the same
way, out of 999 persons deported from France on June 22, 1942, and
"enrolled" as a whole, at the end of 7 112 weeks, 747 had died, or 80 %.
So its appears reasonable to admit that for the Jewish workers the
mortality rate in the camps was about 80 % at the end of a few months.
Nevertheless, it must be underscored that the statistics mentioned con-
cern the French convoys of the second half of 1942, a period which
was particularly murderous; and that the mortality rate in the camps,
at all periods, naturally depended on the length of detention. The
chances of survival were greater for the deportees in 1944 than for
those admitted in 1943 and evidently more so than for those deported in
1942. Because of all this, it is more prudent to admit rather a morta-
lity rate of 75 % than of 80 %.
By applying this last mortality rate to the 765,003 "workers" enume-
rated by Korherr, the figures reached are of 574,752 dead and 191,251
definitive survivors.
At the end of this study and before concluding, it is essential to make
a final remark which concerns the number of Soviet victims of the
"final solution." In fact, we have been able to determine the number
of dead among them at 1,842,061. But in all the categories of victims the
number of dead is always inferior to the number of captives, for there
are survivors. It is thus, for example, that among the 2,550,.193
"evacuees" of all the countries of Europe (without Russia), there are
2,422,683 dead and 127,510 survivors. There is no doubt that there
were also survivors among the Soviet Jews, and there is every reason
to believe that the proportion of dead and survivors in their case was
the same as among other nationalities. If such is the case, to 1,842,061
dead must correspond 96,940 survivors; and thus the total number of
Soviet Jews who were direct victims of the Nazi persecution was
1 ,939,001.
160
The Korherr Report
The entirety of our current knowledge on the number of victims of the
"final solution" may be summed up in the following manner:
-,-
Categories Total Dead Survivors
"Evacuees" (with-
out Russia) 2,550,193
2,422,683 127,510
"Excess Mortality" 83,889
83,889
Concentration Camps 36,474
34,192 2,282
Work Camps 185,776
139,332 46,444
Prisons 458
343 115
Ghettos (without
Russia)
297,914 283,0115 14,896
Russia 1 ,939,001 1,842,061 96,940
TOTAL 5,093,673 4,805,518 288.17U
In conclusion, it may be affirmed at the current wntmg that out of
5,093,673 persons, 4,805,518 died (94.3%) and 288,170 survived
(5.7%).
But once again it must be strongly underscored that these figures do
not at all correspond to the total number of victims. This is because, on
the one hand, for most of the countries Korherr's data s ~ o p at March
31, 1943, and that in the current state of our knowledge, it seems im-
possible to validly complete them. Such are the cases of Poland in
its frontiers since 1945, of Norway, Greece, Slovakia, Croatia and
Bulgaria. On the other hand, and for the same reasons, we have left
aside from our preoccupations countries such as Italy, Yugoslavia and
Rumania.
No doubt a day will come when the progress of our knowledge of Nazi
sources will allow us to bridge these gaps. In the meantime, we have
renounced trying to do so. This was all the more easily done because
our objective was not to try to establish the total number of victims
of the" final solution." It was rather only to demonstrate to the sincere
reader all of the absurdity of the figures advanced by Rassinier and his
pupils, who go far beyond the "master" in outrageousness.
It has been done thanks to Mr. "Inspekteur flir Statistik" of the SS
and with the august approval of Mr. "SS-Reichsflihrer." More competent
authority on the matter cannot be found.
] 61
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162
Appendices
THE FIRST UNABRIDGED
PUBLICATION
OF THE TWO
KORHERR REPORTS
163
The First Korherr Report
Der Inspekteur fUr Statistik
beim ReichsfUhrer SS
Geheime Reichssache
DIE ENDLOSUNG DER EUROPAISCHEN JUDENFRAGE
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
Statistischer Bericht
I n hal t
Vorbemerkung
Die Judenbilanz in Deutschland
JUdische Volksschwache
Die Auswanderung der Juden aus Deutschland
Die Evakuierung der Juden
Die Juden in den Ghettos
Die Juden in den Kon7.entrationslagern
Juden in Justizvollzugsanstalten
Der Arbeitseinsatz der Juden
Europaische Judenbilanz
I. VORBEMERKUNG
Zur Anfstellung einer Bilanz Uber die Ergebnisse auf dem Wege zur Los-
ung der Judenfrage bedarf es der zahlenmaBigen Erfassung des Juden-
turns undseiner Entwicklung. Die WidersprUche in den Zahlenangaben Uber
das Judentum machen jedoch eine Vorbemerkung dahingehend notig, daB
Zahlen Uber das Judentum stets mit besonderem Vorbehalt aufzunehmen sind
und ohne Kenntnis ihrer Quelle und Entstehung oft zu FehlschlUssen
fUhren. Die Fehlerquellen liegen vor allem im Wesen des Judentums und
seiner historischen Entwicklung, in seiner tausendjahrigen ruhelosen
Wanderschaft, den zahllosen Aufnahmen und Austritten, den Angleichungs-
bestrebungen, der Vermischung mit den Wirtvolkern, in dem BemUhen des
Juden, sich unbemerkt der Erfassung zu entziehen, und schlieBlich in
falschen oder falsch ausgelegten Statistiken Uber das Judentum.
DarUber hinaus hat die Statistik - teils als statistischer Notbehelf,
teils wegen der weitgehenden tibereinstimmung zwischen jUdischem Glauben
und jUdischer Rasse, teils in Unkenntnis des Rassegedankens, teils im
reiigiosen Denken der jeweiligen Zeit befangen - bis zuletzt die Juden
fast nie nach ihrer Rasse, sondern nach ihrem religiosen Bekenntnis er-
faBt. Die Erfassung der Rasse setzt eine vieljahrige Schulung und auch
Ahnenforschung voraus. Auch gestaltet sie sich schwierig, vor allem in
sUdlichen und ostlichen Landern, weil trotz aller Vbereinstimmung eine
einheitliche jUdische Rasse sich statistisch schwer abgrenzen lieB. Das
Bekenntnis zum mosaischen oder israelitischen Glauben ist wieder kein
vollgUltiges Beweismittel, weil es infolge der einstigen jUdischen
Missionsbewegung mit ihrer Aufnahme von Nassen von Heiden und Christen,
auch durch die Ubertritte zum Judentum in neuer Zeit durch Mischehen und
"Bekehrung" nicht wenige Glaubensjuden nichtjUdischer Rasse gibt,wahrend
165
Appendix A
umgekehrt das Zwangschristentum und die im letzten Jahihundertwieder
stark angestiegene Zahl der getauften Juden und daneben der Gemein-
schaftslosen mit jUdischer Rasse die Judenzahl drUckten. So schatzte
Leroy-Beaulieu 1893 den Verlust des Judentums durch das Christentum
auf das Vier- bis Zehnfache seiner heutigen Anhanger, nach Maurice
Fishberg und Mathias Mieses ist das Dreifache der heutigen Judenzahl im
arischen Europa aufgegangen. Sogar Hans GUnther schatzt die Zahl der
Juden in Deutschland auf das Doppelte der Zahl der Juden mosaischen
Glaubens, die deutsche Staatsangehorige sind. SchlieBlich geht der
litauische Jude Brutzkus so weit, die Berliner Juden nach ihrer Blut-
zusammensetzung als reinere Europaer zu bezeichnen als die Deutschen in
Berlin.
Entsprechend diesen Meinungen hat man die Anteile der Rassejuden samt
Mischlinge in Europa vielfach dreimal so hoch als die der Glaubensjuden
angenommen (in Osteuropa zweimal, in Mitteleuropa viermal, im Ubrigen
Europa gar achtmal so hoch) und mit etwa 6vH mehr oder weniger jUdischem
Blut in der europaischen Bevolkerung gerechnet. DemgegenUber fUhrte
Burgdorfer die Judenzahlen fUr das Deutschland von 1933 auf 850 000
Voll-,Halb- und Vierteljuden (bei 502 799 Glaubensjuden) in seinen
Schatzungen zurUck, fUr Osterreich von 1934 auf 300-400 OOO(bei 191 481
Glaubensjuden). Die Erhebung der Rassejuden bei der deutschen Volks-
zahlung von 1939 hat bei 307 614 Glaubensjuden nur die etwas hohere
Zahl von 330 892 Volljuden, 72 738 Halbjuden und 42 81 I Vierteljuden er-
geben, die vor allem bezUglich der Halb- und Vierteljuden keinesfalls
als zuverlassig angesehen werden kann. Die gewonnenen Zahlen lassen sich
nur als Mindestzahlen werten. Sie kamen durch die in einer "Erganzungs-
karte"zur Haushaltungsliste der Volkszahlung 1939 enthaltene Frage
"War oder ist einer der 4 GroBelternteile Volljude?" zustande, die fUr
jeden GroBelternteil mit "ja" oder "nein" zu beantworten war. Da diese
Erganzungskarte in verschlossenem Umschlag abzugeben und darum der Kon-
trolle am Ort entzogen war, wurde sie schlecht ausgefUllt. Vielfach
wurden statt einer Antwort nur Striche in die entsprechenden Facher
gemacht.
Der erste amtliche Versuch, die Juden nach ihrer Rasse zu erfassen,
wurde von den Juden sofort sabotiert. Er geschah bei der
en Volkszahlung vom 7. Marz 1923. Vizekanzler Dr. Frank (GroBdeutsche
Volkspartei) unterzeichnete kurz vor der Zahlung eine Verordnung, wo-
nach zur Frage 7 des Zahlblattes (Sprache) "auch die Volkszugehorigkeit
und Rasse" anzugeben war. Da die Zahlblatter bereits 3edruckt waren,
wurde darauf nur in einem roten Merkzettel ohne Erlauterung, Anleitung
und Musterbeispiel hingewiesen. Die osterreichischen Juden sabotierten
diese Frage dadurch, daB die jUdisch-marxistische Presse unmittelbar
vor dem Zahlungstag ihre Leser aufforderte, die Frage nach der Rasse mit
" wei B " zu beantworten. Das Ergebnis war, daB daraufhin die "weiBe.
Rasse in Osterreich etwa so weit verbreitet war, wie die EinfluBspare
der jUdisch-marxistischen Presse und Parteien reichte". Nur in Karnten
und im Burgenland wurde die Aufbereitung des Materials mit recht zweifel-
haftem Erfolg durchgefUhrt, in den anderen Bundeslandern und vor allem
in Wien aber als zwecklos eingestellt.
166
II. DIE JUDENBILANZ IN DEUTSCHLAND
Die folgenden Angaben Uber die Zahl und Entwicklung'der Juden in
Deutschland fuBen auf den amtlichen Zahlen der Volkszahlungen und sonst-
igen Erhebungen des Reiches und auf den Berechnungen und Schatzungen
der Wissenschaft, sind aber in der Hauptsache von der Reichsvereinigung
der Juden in Deutschland und von den Kultusgemeinden in wien und Prag
erstellt, die mit Zahlungen, Zahlkarten fUr die Bevolkerungsbewegung,
Fortschreibung und daneben mit Berechnungen und Schatzungen arbeiten.'
Diese jUdischen Dienststellen arbeiten unter der Kontrolle des Reichs-
sicherheitshauptamtes und fUr dessen Zwecke. Vom fraglichen Anfangsbe-
stand der Juden abgesehen scheint die Reichsvereinigung der Juden in
Deutschland zuverlassig zu arbeiten. Aufgrund der an dieser Stelle ge-
fertigten und vom Reichssicherheitshauptamt bislang UberprUften Stat is-
tiken kann folgende Bilanz Uber die Entwicklung des Judentums in Deutsch-
land von der Machtergreifung (30. I. 1933 im Altreich, Marz 1938 in Oster-
reich, Marz 1939 im Protektorat Bohmen-Mahren) bis zum I. I. 1943 ge-
zogen werden:
I. Judenbilanz des Altreichs
Zahl der Juden im Altreich
--n;nzig) am 30. I. 1933
mit Sudetengau und Danzig
(ohne Sudetengau und
---- rund
6 I 193
- 352 534
- 100 516
561 000
Abgang vom 30.1.33 bis 1.1.43 durch
--sterbeUberschuB(im Altreich)
Auswanderung
Abwanderung(Evakuierung)
- 514 243
Zugang vom 30.1.33 bis 1.1.43 durch
Eingliederung des Sudeten-
landes
sonstige Veranderungen(Danzig,
Zuzug, Wegzug, genehmigte Aus-
tritte, Anerkennung als Misch-
ling I.Grades, Neuerfassung,
Karteibereinigung)
Zahl der Juden im Altreich (mit Sudetengau
Danzig) am I. I. 1943 ---
2. Judenbilanz der Ostmark
Zahl der Juden in der Ostmark am 1.3.1938
--sterbeUberschuB
Auswanderung
sonst.Veranderungen
Zahl der Juden in der Ostmark am I. I. 1943
167
+
2 649
x
)
+ I 921
+ 4 570
5 I 327
rund
220 000
14 509
- 149 124
47 555
710
- 211 898
8 102
Appendix A
3. Judenbilanz des Protektorats Bohmen-Mahren
Zahl der Juden im Protektorat am 15.3.1939
SterbeUberschuB
Auswanderung
Zahl der Juden im Protektorat am 1.1.1943
7 074
26 009
69 677
118 310
- 102 760
15 550
x) Diese Zahl von 2 649 Juden im Sudetenland wurde bei der Volkszahl-
ung 1939 festgestellt. Vor Eingliederung des Sudetenlandes ins Reich
betrug die Judenzahl rund 30 000 die aber sehr rasch ohne Uber-
schreitung einer Staatsgrenze und ohne Vermogensverluste Pro-
tektorat abstromten.
In der Bilanz sind die neu erworbenen Ostgebiete (mit Ausnahme von
Danzig) nicht enthalten. Ihre Bilanz kann noch nicht erstellt werden.
Doch gibt es Uber die Juden in diesen Gebieten zur Zeit der Ubernahme
ins Reich verschiedene Schatzungen, die auf eine Zahl von etwa 630 000
Juden hinfUhren dUrften. Dazu kommen etwa 160 000 Juden im Bezirk
Bialystok und rund 1,3 Millionen Juden im Generalgouvernement zur
Zeit seiner Errichtung
X
). Das wUrde zusammen im gesamtdeutschen Raum
(ohne die besetzten Ostgebiete) Ende 1939 eine Gesamtzahl der Juden von
etwa 2,5 Millionen ergeben
x
), deren weitaus groBter Teil auf den neuen
Osten entfallt. .
Am 1.1.1943 zahlt das Reich ohne die neuen Ostgebiete, ohne das Alters-
ghetto Theresienstadt und ohne den Arbeitseinsatz im Rahmen der Organ-
isation Schmelt nur mehr 74 979 Juden, davon 51 327 im Altreich,
8 102 in der Ostmark und 15 550 im Protektorat. Im Altreich mit Sudeten-
land sind nur mehr 9,2 vH der Zahl der Juden vom Tag der MachtUbernahme
vorhanden. Am 30.1.1943 betragt ihre Zahl nur mehr 48 242 oder 8,6 vH,
am 28.2.1943 gar nur mehr 44 589 oder 7,9 vH. Berlin, wo schon 1880
ein Achtel, 1910 Uber ein Viertel, 1933 fast ein Drittel der Juden
Deutschlands wohnten, zahlt am 1.1.1943 nicht weniger als 32 999 oder
64,3 vH der gesamten Juden des Altreichs, am 30.1.1943 noch 30 121,
am 28.2.1943 noch 27 281. In der Ostmark weist nur mehr Wien Uberhaupt
noch Juden auf.
Von den 51 327 Juden des Altreichs sind 23 197 Manner und 28 130 Frauen.
40 351 sind Glaubensjuden, 10 976 sind Nichtglaubensjuden. 16 760
leben in Mischehe, in der Ostmark 4 803 (von 8 102), im Protektorat
6 2 1 1 (von 15 550).
III. JUDISCHE VOLKSSCHWACHE
Die Judenbilanz in Deutschland weist einen Uberordentlichen SterbeUber-
schu auf, der nicht allein durch die sehr hohe Sterblichkeit der Juden
bedingt ist, sondern mehr noch durch die ausgesprochene Geburtenarmut.
So hat sich die natUrliche Bevolkerungsbewegung im Altreich mit Sudeten-
x) ohne Distrikt Lemberg mit rund 700 000 Juden
168
land von 1933 bis 1942 folgendermaBen entwickelt (nach den Schatzungen
und Unterlagen der Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland, da die
Auszahlungen nach Glaubensjuden vie I komplizierter und unzuverlassiger
sind):
Geburten und Sterbefalle der Juden im Altreich
(bis 1939 berechnet und geschatzt)
Jahre Geburten Sterbefalle SterbeUberschuB (-)
1933 3 425 8 925 5 500
1934 2 300 8 200 5 900
1935 2 500 8 100 5 600
1936 2 300 8 000 5 700
1937 2 100 8 000 5 900
1938 000 7 448 6 448
1939 610 8 136 7 526
1940 396 6 199 5 803
1941 351 6 249 5 898
1942 239 7 657 7 418
1933-1942 15 221 76 914 - 61 693
Vom Tag der Machtergreifung (30.1.1933) bis 1.1.1943 betragt der Sterbe-
UberschuB der Juden im Altreich mit 61 693; er stellt das
Ergebnis aus 14 921 Geburten und 76 114 Sterbefallen dar. Die Wanderung-
en einesteils, die in den ersten Jahren fehlende und seitdem mangelhafte
Erfassung vor allem der Sterbefalle in den Konzentrationslagern durch
die Reichsvereinigung der Juden andernteils geben hier zwar fUr viele
Fehlerquellen Raum, doch laBt auch der ungefahre Uberblick die trotz des
RUckgangs der Judenzahl etwa gleichbleibende Hohe der Sterbefalle er-
kennen. Die jUdische Sterblichkeit wUrde demnach 80-85 (gegen 10 his 15
im europaischen Durchschnitt) auf 1 000 hetragen (im Jahre 1942).
DarUber hinaus fallt der RUckgang der Geburten auf, der dem RUckgang
der Judenzahl weit vorauseilt. Die Geburtenziffer der Juden im Altreich
wUrde danach im Jahre 1942 nur mehr rund 2 1/2 auf 1 000 betragen.
Ahnlich treffen in der Ostmark vom 1.3.1938 bis 1.1.1943 auf 15 188
jUdische Sterbefalle nur 679 jUdische Geburten. 1m Altreich wurden
schlieBlich im Dezemher 1942 nur mehr 14, im Januar und Februar 1943
nur mehr 7 bzw. 8 jUdische Kinder geboren. Es ist dabei zu berUcksichti-
gen, daB das Judentum schon seit Jahrzehnten in den zivilisierten ahend-
landischen Staaten in der Kinderarmut voranging, wie sich an Hand der
konfessionellen Geburtenstatistik ergab. Der Jude Felix Theilhaber hat
schon 1911 auf den daraus folgenden"Untergang der deutschen Juden" hin-
gewiesen, der nur durch den dauernden Zustrom ostjUdischen Blutes ver-
deckt wurde. Nur zum Teil hing diese Erscheinung mit der Uberalterung
des europaischen GroBstadt-Judentums zusammen: In der Hauptsache handel-
te es sich urn wirkliche Lebensschwache.
Bei der heutigen auBerordentlichen Sterhlichkeit der Juden und ihrem
Geburtentiefstand muB jedoch der auBerst ungUnstige Altersaufhau der
Juden mitberUcksichtigt werden. Die Juden in Deutschland setzen sich
169
Appendix A
nach der Abwanderung ihrer besten Jahrgange groBtenteils aus alten
en zusammen, sodaB ihr Altersaufbau bei graphischer Darstellung in Ge-
stalt der Alterspyramide nach dem Stichwort der Reichsvereinigung der
Juden der Form einer "Keule" gleicht, was objektiv zutrifft. Es mangeln
die Kinder und die zeugungsfahigen Jahrgange, wahrenddie Jahrgange der
alten Leute nicht nur verhaltnismaBig zu stark sind, sondern auch
rein zahlenmaBig viel starker sind als die jlingeren Jahrgange. Daraus
entspringt auch z.T. die stark liberhohte Selbstmordziffer der Juden,
da der Selbstmord liberwiegend eine Todesart der alten Leute ist.
IV. DIE AUSWANDERUNG DER JUDEN AUS DEUTSCHLAND
Die Wanderung der Juden aus Ost- nach Mittel- und Westeuropa und aus
ganz Europa nach Ubersee und hier wieder in erster Linie nach den Ver-
einigten Staaten von Nordamerika ist eine seit Jahrzehnten allgemein
beobachtete Erscheinung. Aus Deutschland wanderten vor allem von
1840-1870 sehr viele Juden aus, doch nach 1870 horte ihre Auswanderung
durch die neuen wirtschaftlichen Hoglichkeiten im Reich fast vollig auf.
Daflir wanderten nun die Deutschen aus. Die jlidische Auswanderung aus
Deutschland seit 1933, gewissermaBen ein Nachholen der 1870 unterbroch-
enen Bewegung, erregte die besondere Aufmerksamkeit der gesamten zivil-
isierten Welt, besonders der jlidisch regierten demokratischen Lander.
Die Zahl und Struktur der Auswanderer wurde von verschiedensten Seiten
und mit verschiedensten Methoden zu erfassen versucht. Doch gelangte
man zu keinen einheitlichen Ergebnissen. Die Zahlen der deutschen
Auswanderungsstatistik, jene der Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutsch-
land und der israelitischen Kultusgemeinden in Wien und Prag, die
zahlreichen auslandischen Erfassungen, Berechnungen und Schatzungen,die
Statistiken des internationalen Judentums und die Zahlen wissenschaft-
licher Untersuchungen weichen sehr stark voneinander ab. So rechnete
Prof. Zielenziger -Amsterdam- mit einer Zahl von 135 000 Auswanderern
von der Machtergreifung bis Ende 1937, die Reichsvereinigung der Juden
mit 203 000 Auswanderern. Seit 1938 ist die Auswanderung noch betracht-
lich angestiegen, endete aber fast restlos (bis auf einige wenige
Ausnahmefalle je Monat) durch das Verbot der jlidischen Auswanderung im
Herbst 1941. Die Reichsvereinigung der Juden und die israelitischen
Kultusgemeinden in Wien und Prag kamen bis I. I. 1943 zu folgenden
Auswanderungszahlen (einschl.Doppelzahlungen):
Auswanderer aus Zahl Zeitraum
Altreich mit Sudetenland 352 534 (30.1.33-1.1.43)
Ostmark 149 124 ( 1.3.38-1.1.43)
Protektorat 26 009 (15.2.39-1.1.43)
Die anfangs liberstlirzte Auswanderung machte genaue Angaben liberhaupt un-
moglich. Ebenso dlirfte das angegebene Auswanderungsziel, soweit es sich
urn europaische Lander handelt, vielfach nur als Zwischenstation zu be-
trachten sein. Von den Auswanderern aus dem Altreich gingen rund
144 000 nach anderen europaischen Landern, rund 57 000 nach USA,
54 000 nach SUdamerika, 10 000 nach Mittelamerika, 53 000 nach Palastina,
15 000 nach Afrika (vor allem Slidafrika), 16000 nach Asien (China),
4 000 nach Australien. Von den 144 000 nach europaischen Landern ausge-
wanderten Juden gingen allein liber 32 000 nach England, 39 000 nach
170
i
Polen bzw. ins Generalgouvernement, 18 000 nach Frankreich, 8 000 nach
Italien, 7 500 nach den Niederlanden, 6 000 nach Belgien.: Es ist anzu-
nehmen, daB der groBte Teil dieser Auswanderer von diesen Landern nach
Ubersee weiterzogen. Flir die jlidischen Auswanderungen aus der Ostmark
werden folgende Ziele angegeben: 65 500 nach europaischen Landern,
50 000 nach Amerika, 20 000 nach Asien, 9 000 nach Palastina, 2 600
nach Afrika, 2 000 nach Australien.
V. DIE EVAKUIERUNG DER JUDEN
Die Evakuierung loste, wenigstens im Reichsgebiet, die Auswanderung der
Juden ab. Sie wurde seit dem Verbot der jlidischen Auswanderung ab Herbst
1941 in groBem Stile vorbereitet und im Jahre 1942 im gesamten Reichs-
gebiet weitgehend durchgeflihrt. In der Bilanz des Judentums erscheint sie
als "Abwanderung".
Bis I. I. 1943 wanderten nach den Zusammenstellungen des Reichssicherheits-
hauptamtes ab:
aus dem Altreich mit Sudetenland
100 516 Juden
aus der Ostmark
47 555
aUs dem Protektorat
69 677
Zusammen 217 748 Juden
In diesen Zahlen sind auch die ins Altersghetto Theresienstadt evakuiert-
en Juden enthalten.
Die
und
von
gesamten Evakuierungen ergaben im Reichsgebiet einschl. Ostgebieten
darliber hinaus im deutschen Macht- und EinfluBbereich in Europa
Oktober 1939 oder spater bis zum 31.12.1942 folgende Zahlen:
I. Evakuierung von Juden aus Baden
und der Pfalz nach Frankreich ................ .
2. Evakuierung von Juden aus dem Reichsgebiet
einschl. Protektorat und Bezirk
Bialystok nach Osten ................
3. Evakuierung von Juden aus dem Reichsgebiet
und dem Protektorat nach Theresienstadt ........ .
4. Transportierung von Juden aus den Ostprovinzen
nach dem russischen Osten: ..................... I
5.
Es wurden durchgeschleust
durch die Lager im General-
gouvernemen t .............................. I
durch die Lager im Warthegau ............. .
Evakuierung von Juden aus andernen Landern,
namlich:
Frankreich(soweit vor dem 10. I I. 1942
besetzt) ................................. .
Nieder lande ............................. .
Belgien ................................. .
Norwegen ................ .
171
6 504 Juden
170 642
87 193
449 692
274 166
145 301
4 I. 911
38 571
16 886
532
Appendix A
Slowakei .............................. . 56 691 Juden
Kroatien .............................. . 4 927
Evakuierungen insgesamt (einschl.Theresien-
stadt und einschl.Sonderbehandlung) .......... 1 873 549 Juden
ohne Theresienstadt .......................... 1 786 356
6. Dazu kommt noch nach den Angaben des
Reichssicherheitshauptamtes die
Evakuierung von .............................. 633 300 Juden
in den russischen Gebieten einschl. der
frUheren baltischen Lander seit Beginn
des Ostfeldzuges.
In den obigen Zahlen sind nicht enthalten die Insassen der Ghettos
und der Konzentrationslager.
Die Evakuierungen aus der Slowakei und aus Kroatien wurden von diesen
Staaten selbst in Angriff genommen.
VI. DIE JUDEN IN DEN GHETTOS
Es sind hier zu nennen:
1. Das Altersghetto Theresienstadt, dem insgesamt zugefUhrt wurden:
87 193 Juden,
davon aus dem Reichsgebiet
Protektorat
47 471 (Ostmark 14 222)
39 722.
Es zahlt zu Beginn des Jahres 1943 insgesamt an jUdischen Insassen:
davon mit deutsch.Staatsangehorigkeit
Protektoratsangehorigkeit
49 392
24 313
25 079.
Die Verminderung trat vor allem durch Sterbefalle ein. AuBer Theresien-
stadt gibt es im Reichsgebiet eine Anzahl von jUdischen Alters-und Siech-
enheimen mit kleinerem Fassungsvermogen, die aber weder als Ghettos noch
als Evakuierungsorte angesehen werden.
2. Das Ghetto Litzmannstadt zahlt Anfang 1943 87 180 Juden,
davon 83 133 mit ehem. polnischer Staatsangehorigkeit.
3. Die Uberwiegend in Rest-Ghettos untergebrachten Juden des
gouvernements werden fUr 31.12.1942 folgendermaBen angegeben
geschatzt:
im Distrikt Zahl der Juden
Krakau 37 000
Radom 29 400
General-
bzw.
Lublin 20 000 (geschatzt)
Warschau 50 000
Lemberg 161 514
Generalgouv. zus. 297 914
172
VII. DIE JUDEN IN DEN KONZENTRATIONSLAGERN
In den Konzentrationslagern erfolgten von der Machtergreifung
bis zum 31.12.1942
73 417 Einlieferungen von Juden
davon
wurden entlassen
sind durch Tod abgegangen
Restbestand vom 31.12.42:
36 943
27 347
9 127 Juden
Es ist hier zu beachten, daB die Zahl der Einlieferungen von Juden
groBer sein wird als die Zahl der in die Konzentrationslager eingelief-
erten Juden, da wiederholte Einlieferungen eines Juden wiederholt
zahlen.
Nicht enthalten sind die im Zug der Evakuierungsaktion in den Kon-
zentrationslagern Auschwitz und Lublin untergebrachten Juden.
Nach Konzentrationslagern ergeben sich, untergeteilt nach Einlieferungen,
Entlassungen, Todesfallen und dem Bestand vom 31.12.1942 folgende
Zahlen:
Juden in den Konzentrationslagern
Konzentrations-
lager Einlieferungen Entlassungen Todesfalle
Lublin/Manner
Lublin/Frauen
Auschwitz/Manner
Auschwitz/Frauen
Buchenwald
Mauthausen/Gusen
Sachsenhausen
Stut thof / ~ J a n n e r
Stutthof/Frauen
RavensbrUck/Frauen
RavensbrUck/Manner
Dachau
GroB-Rosen
Lichtenburg
Neuengamme
FloBenbUrg
Sachsenburg
Esterwegen
Niederhagen
Natzweiler
K L zusammen
23 409
2 849
4 917
932
16 827
2 064
7 960
28
3
321
273
12 026
231
195
192
80
52
36
12
10
73 417
4 509
59
13 805
6 570
531
44
11 140
195
2
2
52
33
36 943
173
14 217
131
3 716
720
2 795
985
344
13
787
229
886
231
190
78
3
12
10
27 347
Bestand vom
31.12.1942
4 683
2 659
200
212
227
79
46
15
3
3
9 127
Appendix A
VIII. JUDEN IN JUSTIZVOLLZUGSANSTALTEN
Zu Beginn des Jahres 1943 saBen in Justizvollzugsanstalten des Reichsge-
bietes 458 Juden ein, die sich auf Manner und Frauen und auf Arten
des Strafvollzugs folgendermaBen verteilen:
Strafhaft
Sicherungsverwahrung
Arbeitshaus
Justizvollzugsanstalten
insgesamt
Manner
350
29
379
Frauen
78
79
IX. DER ARBEITSEINSATZ DER JUDEN
Zusammen
428
29
458
In kriegswichtigem Arbeitseinsatz waren zu Beginn des Jahres 1943 im
Reichsgebiet tatig
185 776 Juden.
Davon waren eingesetzt
I) innerhalb der Inspekteur-Bereiche der Sicherheitspolizei und
des SD (ohne Posen und ohne sojwet-russische Juden) 21 659 , davon
18 546 mit deutscher Staatsangehorigkeit, 107 mit Protektoratsange-
horigkeit, 2 519 Staatenlose und 487 Auslander. Sie verteilen sich
nach Inspekteur-Bereichen (ohne Posen) folgendermaBen:
Berlin 15 100 Konigsberg
2
) 96
Braunschweig I 10 MUnchen 313
Breslau
l
) 2 451 NUrnberg 89
Danzig Sal zburg 7
Dresden 485 Stet tin 18
DUsseldorf 673 Stuttgart 178
Hamburg 497 wi en 226
Kassel 259 Wiesbaden 139
I)ohne Organisation Schmelt 2)ohne sowjetruss.Juden
2) im Inspekteur-Bereich Konigsberg auBerdem 18 435 auslandische,
d.h. fast ausschlieBlich sowjetrussische Juden.
3) im Inspekteur-Bereich Posen im Ghetto- und Lagereinsatz 95 112
hauptsachlich polnische Jude-n-.---
4) im Rahmen der Organisation Schmelt (Breslau) 50 570 Juden, davon
42 382 Staatenlose und 8 188 Auslander.
174
x. EUROPAISCHE JUDENBILANZ
Der Zusammenbruch des europaischen Judentums wurde schon vor Jahrzehn-
ten durch den volkischen Verfall des europaischen GroBstadt-Judentums
einesteils, durch die jUdische Auswanderung andernteils eingeleitet.
Der jUdische Statistiker Lestschinsky hat den RUckgang des Judentums
in Europa im Jahre 1927 folgendermaBen verdeutlicht: "Zu Anfang des
19.Jahrhunderts lebten in Europa 85% und allein in RuBland, Osterreich-
Ungarn und Deutschland 80% aller Juden, in Amerika gab es zu jener Zeit
nur 2 - 3 000 Juden. 1m Jahre 1925 waren 63% aller Juden in Europa
ansassig, innerhalb der Grenzen, Deutschlands, Osterreich-Ungarns und
RuBlands lebten nur noch 57% des Gesamtjudentums, in Amerika dagegen
lebten 30% , in den Ubrigen Weltteilen 7% ". Nach Berechnungen des
Statistischen Reichsamts betrug der Judenanteil Europas im Jahre 1880
sogar 88,4 vH, im Jahre 1937 nur mehr 60,4 vH. 1943 dUrfte der euro-
paische Anteil noch 1/3 des Weltjudentums betragen.
Urn 1930 und in den letzten Jahren betrug die Zahl der Juden in einigen
wichtigen Staaten Europas:
Neuere Zahlung od. Schatzung
Volks- Zahl Zahl der vH der Bevolker-
Staat zahlungs- der Jahr Juden ung des Wirts-
j ahr Juden in 1000 volkes
Altreich 1933/35 502 799 1943 51 0,07
Osterreich 1934 191 481 1943 8 0, I
Tschechoslow. 1930 356 830
-Protektorat 1943 16 0,2
Danzig 1929 10 448
Memelgebiet 1925 2 402 1937 3 2,0
Belgien 1937 80 1,0
Bulgarien 1934 48 398 1937 50 0,8
Finnland 1937 2 0,04
Frankreich 1937 280 0,7
Griechenland 1928 72 791 1937 90 1,1
GroBbritann. 1931/33 234 000 1937 345 0,7
Italien 1930 47 825 1937 52 0, I
Irland 1936 4 0, I
Jugoslawien 1930 68 405 1937 75 0,3
Lettland 1935 93 479 1937 96 4,9
Li tauen 1923 155 125 1937 175 7,4
Niederlande 1930 III 917 1937 135 1,6
Polen 1930 3113933 1937 3 300
1
) 9,6
Rumanien 1930 984 213 1941 302 2,2
Slowakei 1940 89 3,4
Sowj etruBl. 1926 2 570 330 1939 4 600
2
) 2,4
Ungarn 1930 444 567 1940 750
3
) 5,8
I)Neuer Gebietsstand.
2)Neuer Gebietsstand, mit Ostpolen; die Zahl ist geschatzt.
3)Neuer Gebietsstand; die Zahl ist berechnet.
175
Appendix A
Die Gesamtzahl der Juden auf der Erde schatzt man urn das Jahr 1937
im allgemeinen auf rund 17 Millionen, wovon liber 10 Millionen auf
Europa entfallen. Sie haufen bzw. hauften sich in Europa vor allem
in den von Deutschland besetzten frliheren polnisch-russischen Gebieten
zwischen Ostsee und Finnischem Meerbusen und dem Schwarzen und Aso-
wschen Meer, daneben in den Handelsmittelpunkten und im Rheingebiet
Mittel- und Westeuropas und an den Klisten des Mittelmeers.
Von 1937 bis Anfang 1943 dlirfte die Zahl der Juden in Europa teils
durch Auswanderung, teils durch den der Juden in
Mittel- und Westeuropa, teils durch die Evakuierungen vor allem in
den volkisch starkeren Ostgebieten, die hier als Abgang gerechnet
werden, urn Schatzungsweise 4 Millionen zurUckgegangen sein. Dabei
darf nicht Ubersehen werden, daB von den Todesfallen der sowjetruss-
ischen Juden in den besetzten Ostgebieten nur ein Teil wurde,
wahrend diejenigen im librigen europaischen und an der Front
liberhaupt nicht enthalten sind. Dazu kommen die uns unbekannten Wander-
ungsstrome der Juden innerhalb in den asiatischen Bereich
hinliber. Auch der Wanderungsstrom der Juden aus den europaischen
Landern des deutschen Einflusses ist eine weitgehend un-
bekannte Insgesamt dlirfte das europaische Judentum seit 1933,
also im ersten Jahrzehnt der nationalsozialistischen Machtentfaltung,
bald die Halfte seines Bestandes verloren haben.
176
The Firtst Korherr Report
The Inspector of Statistics
for the ReichsfUhrer SS
Secret Reich Haterial
THE FINAL SOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWISH PROBLEM
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
VII
VIII
IX
X
Statistical Report
Con ten t s
Preface
Jewish Statistics for Germany
The Weakness of the Jewish Race
Jewish Emigration from Germany
The Evacuation of the Jews
The Jews in the Ghettos
The Jews in the Concentration Camps
The Jews in Penal Institutions
The Jews Involved in Work Projects
European Jewish Statistics
I. PREFACE
The numerical recording of Jewry and its development are necessary for
setting up a statistic representation of the results on the way to the
solution of the Jewish problem. The contradictions in Jewish figures
make preliminary remarks necessary to the effect that the numerical
data of Jewry are always to be accepted only with reservations and that
lack of knowledge about the origin and source of these data can lead
to false conclusions. The sources of error are above all to be found in
the nature of Jewry and its historical developement, the many thousands
of years of restless wandering, the numerous conversions to and from
Judaism, the efforts of the Jews to integrate, the interbreeding with
the native populations, the efforts of the Jews to avoid registration
and lastly in erroneous or falsely interpreted statistics of Jewry.
Moreover, up to now, partly due to the large degree of overlap between
the Jewish religion and the Jewish race, ignorance cf racial theory,
and partly due to being caught up in the religious thought of the times,
Jewish statistics have never been compiled on the basis of race but
rather on the basis of religion. The classification of the race pre-
supposes many years of training and a knowledge of genealogy. It was
also difficult, particualarly in southern and eastern countries, despite
this overlap, to isolate a homogeneous Jewish race statistically. The
avowal of Moasic or Jewish faith is also no foolproof evidence, because
as a result of the former Jewish missionary movement with its convers-
ions of masses of heathens and Christians, also because of changes
of faith in modern times via mixed marriages and "conversions", there
are more than a few people of Jewish faith who are not racially Jewish.
On the other hand compulsory Christianity in the last century and the
increase in baptized Jews and non-practiseing Jews have reduced their
177
Appendix B
number. Thus in 1893 Leroy-Beulieu estimated the loss of Judaism to
Christianity to be between for and ten times as great as the present
number of adherents to the Jewish religion. According to Maurice
Fishberg and Mathias Mieses, three times the present Jewish population
have been absorbed by Aryan Europe. Even Hans GUnther the
Jewish population of Germany at double the number of Jews of moasic
faith with German nationality. Finally, the Lithuanian Jew Brutzkus goes
so far as to classify the Berlin Jews on the basis of their blood
composition as beine purer Europeans than the Germans in Berlin.
According to these opinions the number of racial Jews in Europe includ-
ing half-breeds was assumed to be three times as great as the number of
religious Jews (in Eastern Europe twice as great, in Middle Europe four
times as great and in the rest of Europe as much as eight times as great)
and approximately 6% Jewish blood was calculated to be in the European
population. In contrast Burgdorfer estimates the Jewish population of
Germany in 1933 at 850 000 full, half and quarter Jews (based on
502 000 religious Jews) and the Jewish population of Austria in 1934
at between 300000 and 400000 (based on 191 481 religious Jews). The
German census of the racial Jews in 1939 lists the only slightly higher
figure of 330 892 full 72 738 half and 42 81 I quarter Jews with the
figure 307 614 religious Jews. These figures cannot be regarded as
trustworthy, particularly in the case' of the half and quarter Jews.These
figures can only be considered to represent minimums. They originated as
anSwers to a question appearing on a card to be filled out for the
German census of 1939 "Was or is one of your grandparents Jewish?" This
question was to be answered yes or no for each grandparent. Since these
cards were to be handed in in a sealed envelope and could not be exa-
mined on the spot, they were filled out poorly. In many cases instead of
an answer there were only marks made in the corresponding boxes.
The first official attempt to classify Jwes by race was immediately
sabotaged by the Jews. It occurred during the Austrian census of
March 7, 1923. Vicechancellor, Dr. Frank (Greater German Peoples'Party)
signed a decree shortly before the census, according to which question 7
(language) of the census form was also to be answered by listing
"ethic origins and race". Since the census forms had already been print.J'd
this was only indicated on a red page without any explanation, instruct-
ions or examples. The Austrian Jews sabotaged this question in the
Jweish Marxist press shortly before the census by calling on its readers
to answer the quetion about race "w hit e". The result was that the
"white race in Austria was about as widespread as the influence of the
Jewish Marxist press and parties". Only in Karnten and Burgenland were
the data analyzed with dubious results, whereas in the remaining states',
particularly in Vienna the project was abandoned as pointless.
II. JEIVISH STATISTICS IN GERMANY
The following material on the number and development of Jews in Germany
is based on the official census figures, on similar statistical investi-
gations of the Reich and on statistical calculations and estimates. The
material is however, mainly provided by the Reich Jewish Union in Germany
and the Jewish Religious Centers in Vienna and Prague which deal with
census forms and figures, population movement and extrapolation in
addition to calculations and estimates. These Jewish offices work under
178
the supervision and for the purposes of the Main Reich Security Office.
Aside from the questionable initial statistics on Jews the Reich
Jewish Union of Germany seems to do reliable work. On the basis of
statistics prepared by this office and checked by the Main Reich Security
Office the following figures can be established for the development of
Jewry in Germany from the seizure of power (Jan.30, 1933 in Altreich,
Mar. 1938 in Austria, Mar. 1939 in the Protectorate of Bohemia and
Moravia) up to Jan. 1, 1943:
1. Jewish Population of Altreich with Sudetengau and Danzig
Jewish population of Altreich(without Sudetengau
und Danzig on Jan. lO, 1933 ------ approx. 561 000
Decrease from Jan.30, 1933 to Jan. 1,1943 due to
Excess deaths (in Altreich) 61 193
- 352 534 Emigration
Evacuation - 100 516
- 514 243
Increase from Dec. I, 1933 to Jan. I, 1943 due to
the annexation of the Sudetenland +
Other changes (Danzig, movements within the
area, officially conversions,
2 649
x
)
recognition as a first class half-breed,
new registrations, cleaning up of files) + 921
+ 4 570
Jewish population of the Altreich(with Sudetengau
and Danzig) on Jan. I, 1943 ---- 51 327
2. Jewish Population of Ostmark
Jewish population of Ostmark on Mar. 1,1938
Decrease from mar. I, 1938 to jan. 1,1943 due
Excess Deaths
Emigration
Evacuation
Other changes
Jewish population of Ostmark on Jan. I, 1943
approx.
to
14
- 149
47
509
124
555
710
220 000
- 211 898
8 102
3. Jewish Population of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia
Jewish population of the Protectorate
on Mar.ls, 1939 118 310
Decrease' from Mar. 15, 1939 to Jan. 1, 1943
Excess deaths
Emigration
Evacuation
Jewish popUlation of the Protectorate
on Jan.l, 1943
due to
7 074
26 009
69 677
- 102 760
15 550
x) Tis figure of 2 649 Jews in the Sudetenland was arrived at in the
179
Appendix B
census of 1939. Before the annexation of the Sudetenland into the
Reich the Jewish population was approximately 30 000, who rapidly
moved to the Protectorate without crossing a national border and
without loss of property.
The newly acquired Eastern Territories (except for Danzig) are not
included in the statistics. These figures cannot be calculated. There
are, however, various estimates of Jewish population at the time of the
annexation into the Reich which indicate a figure of approximately
630 000. In addition there are approximately 160 000 Jews in the district
of Bialystok and there were approximately 1,3 million Jews in the
General Government when it was set up (without the district of Lemberg
with a Jewish population of approximately 700 000). That would give us
a total Jewish population of about 2,5 million for the entire Greater
German Territory (without the occupied Eastern Territories), the greater
part of which are in the new East.
On Jan. I, 1943 the Jewish population of the Reich without the new
Eastern Territories , without the Ghetto for the Aged in Theresienstadt
and without the Jews working in the programs of the Schmelt organization
is only 74 979. Of these 51 327 in Altreich, 8 102 in Ostmark and
15 550 In the Altreich with the Sudetenland only
9,2% of the Jewish population at the time of the seizure of power now
remain. On Jan.30, 1943 the Jewish population was only 48 242 or 8,6%.
On Feb.22, 1943 only 44 589 or 7,9%. Berlin,which comprised 1/8 of the
Jewish population of Germany in 1880, over 1/4 in 1910 and almost 1/3
in 1933, had not less than 32 999 Jews on Jan. I, 1943 or 64,3% of the
total Jewish population of the Altreich, on Jan.30, 1943 only 30 121
and on Feb.28, 1943 only 27 281. In Ostmark it is only Vienna that
accounts for any Jewish population at all.
Of the 51 327 Jews of the Altreich 23 197 are men and 28 130 women.
40 351 are religious Jews, 10 976 non-practiseing Jews. 16 760 l;ve
in mixed marriages, in Ostmark 4 803 (of 8 102), in the Protectorate
6 21 I (of 15 550).
III. THE WEAKNESS OF THE JEWISH RACE
The Jewish population of Germany shows an extraordinarily high excess
of deaths which is not ortly due to the high mortality rate of the Jews
but also to the very low birth rate. Thus the natural popUlation change
in the Altreich with the Sudetenland from 1933 to 1942 developed as
follows (according to the estimates and data of the Reich Jewish Union
of Germany since the figures based on religious Jews are much more
complicated and less reliable):
180
Jewish Deaths in the Altreich
(figures up to 1939 are calculated or estimated)
year births deaths excess of deaths
1933 3 425 8 925 5 500
1934 2 300 8 200 5 900
1935 2 500 8 100 5 600
1936 2 300 8 000 5 700
1937 100 8 000 5 900
1938 000 448 6 448
1939 610 8 136 526
1940 396 6 199 5 803
1941 351 6 249 5 898
1942 239 657 418
1933-1942 15 221 76 914 - 61 693
From the day of the seizure of power (Jan.30,1933) to Jan. I, 1943 the
excess of deaths of the Jews in the Altreich with the Sudetenland was
61 693; this represents the result of 14 921 births and 76 114 deaths.
The emigration on the one hand and lack of data on the number of deaths
in concentration camps in the figures provided by the Reich Jewish
Union on the other leave room for many errors, however, despite the
decrease in the Jewish population a cursory examination is enough to
recognize the relatively constant Jewish death rate. That would give us
a Jewish mortality rate of 80-85 per 1000 (compared to the average
European mortality rate of 10 to 15 per in 1942.
Moreover, the decrease of births is noticeable and is far ahead of the
decrease in the Jewish population. The birth rate for the Jews in the
Altreich would only be approximately 2 1/2 per 1000 in 1942 according
to these calculations. Similarly in Ostmark between Mar. 3, 1938 and
Jan.l, 1943 there were 15 188 Jewish deaths as opposed to 679 births.
Finally in the Altreich there were only 14 Jewish children born in
Dec. 1942 and in Jan. and Feb. of 1943 only 7 and 8 respectively. It must
be taken into consideration that Jewry has had a low birth rate in the
civilized Western countries for decades, as shown by the denominational
birth statistics. The Jew Felix Theilhaber pointe to the "fall of the
German Jew" in 191 I which was only kept in balance by the constant re-
supplying of East Jewish blood. This phenomenon was only partly due to
the ageing of Jews in major cities, mainly it was a result of the real
weakness of the Jewish race.
The age structure of the Jel"ish population must be taken into consider-
ation when trying to understand the extraordinarily high Jewish death
rate and their low birth rate. After their long wandering the German
Jews are composed mainly of the aged so that their age distribution
represented graphically resembles a "club" in the words of the Reich
Jewish Union, which is also objectively the case. Children and people
in their fertile years are missing while the aged comprise not only a
greater proportional part of the population but also a numerically
greater part of the popUlation. This is also the cause of the high suicide
rate among the Jews since suicide is primarily prevalent amont the aged.
181
Appendix B
IV. JEWISH HlIGRATION FROH
The emigration of the Jew8 from the East to Middle and Western Europe
and from Europe overseas to the United States of America is a pnenomenon
which has been observed for decades. Hany Jews emigrated from Germany,
mainly between le40 and 1870, after this, however, this emigration all
but ceased due to the new economic possibilities of the Reich. Instead
the Germans began to emigrate. The Jewish emigration from Germany after
1933, to a certain extent a continuation of the interrupted emigration
of 1870, attracted the attention of the entire civilized world, parti-
cularly of the Jewish-governed democracies. Attempts were made by
various groups using different methods to classify this emigration nu-
merically and structurally, however, no consistent results were ob-
tained. The statistics on German emigration, the figures of the Reich
Jewish Union in Germany and of the Jewish Religious Centers in Prague
and Vienna, foreign statistics, calculations and estimates, the statis-
tics on international Jewry and the figures of scientific studies ex-
hibit a great variation. Prof. Zielenziger of Amsterdam calculated an
emigration of 135 000 between the seizure of power and the end of 1937
wheras the Reich Jewish Union lists the figure 203 000. This emigration
increased considerably after 1938 but ceased almost completely (with
a few exceptions per month) with the prohibition of Jewish emigration
in the autumn of 1941. The Reich Jewish Union and the Jewish Religious
Centers of Prague and Vienna list the following high emigration figures
(including duplications):
Emigration from Figure Time Period
Altreich with Sudetenland 352 534 (Jan.30, '33-Jan. I, '43)
Ostmark 149 124 (Har. I,' 38-Jan. I, '43)
Protectorate 26 009 (Feb.15,'39-Jan.I,'43)
The initially hectic emigration precludes the possibility of obtaining
exact figures. Also, the countries listed as destinations, insofar as
concerns European countries, can be considered as a temporary stopover in
most cases. Of the emigrants from the Altreich approximately 144 000
went to other European countries, 57 000 to U.S.A., 54 000 to South
America, 10 000 to Hiddle America, 53 000 to Palestine, IS 000 to Africa
(mainly South Africa), 16 000 to Asia (China) and 4 000 to Australia.
Of the 144 000 who emigrated to other European countries over 32 000
went to England, 39 000 to Poland or the General Government, 18 000 to
France, 8 000 to Italy, 7 500 to the Netherlands and 6 000 to Belgium.
It is to be assumed that most of these emigrants went on to emigrate
overseas. The following figures are listed for the Jewish emigrants from
Ostmark: 65 500 to other European countries, 50 000 to America, 20 000
to Asia, 9 000 to Palestine, 2 000 to Australia and 2 600 to Africa.
182
V. THE EVACUATION OF THE JEWS
The evacuation of the Jews superseded the Jewish emigration , at least
in the territory of the Reich. This evacuation was prepared after the
prohibition of Jewish emigration in autumn 1941 on a large scale and
was carried out extensively in the entire Reich territory in 1942. In
Jewish statistics this appears under the heading "emigrations". Accord-
ing to the figures of the Hain Reich Security Office the following
number of Jews had "emigrated" by Jan. I, 1943 :
from Altreich with Sudetenland
from Os tmark
from the Protectorate
total
100 516
47 555
69 677
2T7748
These figures also include the Jews evacuated to the Ghetto for the
aged in Theresienstadt.
The figures for evacuations from Reich territory including the Eastern
Territories and also from territories under German control or influence
between Oct. 1939 and Dec.30, 1942 are:
I. Jews evacuated to France from Baden
and the Palatinate .............................. .
2. Evacuation to the East from Reich territory
including the Protectorate and the district
of Bialystok .................................... .
3. Evacuation from Reich territory and the Protec-
torate to Theresienstadt ........................ .
4. Transportation of the Jews from the Easterns
Provinces to the Russian East ................... .
Number passed through the camp
in the General Government ................... .
through the camp at Warthegau ............... .
5. Evacuation of the Jews from other countries,
namely:
France (as occupied before Nov.IO, 1942) .. .
Holland ................................... .
Be 19ium ................................... .
Norway ................................... .
Slovakia ..................................
Croatia ..................... " ............ .
Total evacuation (including Theresien-
stadt and special treatment) .................... .
without Theresienstadt .......................... .
183
6 504
170 642
87 193
449 692
274 166
145 301
41 911
38 571
16 886
532
56 691
4 927
873 549
786 356
Appendix B
6. In addition there are the figures of
the Main Reich Security Office for the
evacuation of the Jews from the Russian
territories including the formerly Baltic
countries since the beginning of the Eastern
campaign ...................................... . 633 300
The above figures do not include the Jews in ghettos and concentration
camps. The evacuations of Jews from Slovakia and Croatia were carried
out by these countries themselves.
VI. THE JEWS IN THE GHETTOS
Here are to be listed:
I. The ghetto for the aged in Theresienstadt where have been
delivered a total of 87 193 Jews
of these from the Reich Territory 47 471 (Ostmark 14 222)
from the Protectorate 39 722.
At the beginning of 1943 there were 49 392 Jewish inhabitants
of these were German citizens 24 313
were from the Protectorate 25 079.
The decrease in these figures was primarily due to deaths. Besides
Theresienstadt there were a number of Jewish homes for the aged and
hospitals for invalids with a much smaller capcity. They are in the
Reich territory and are not counted as ghettos nor places of evacuation.
2. The ghetto Litzmannstadt with a Jewish population of 87 180
in the beginning of 1943. Of these 83 133 are of former
Polish nationality.
3. The figures for the rest of the Jewish population, mainly living
in the remaining ghettos of the General Government were listed or
estimated as of Dec.31, 1942 at:
District
Krakau
Radom
Lubl in
Warsaw
Lemberg
Total for the
General Government
184
Jewish Population
37 000
29 400
20 000 (estimated)
50 000
161 514
297 914
VII. THE JEWS IN THE CONCENTRATION CAt1PS
From the seizure of power to Dec31, 1942
ed to concentration c a m ~ s ,
73 417 Jews were deliver-
of these
were again released
have died
leaving a balance on Dec.31, 1942 of
36 943
27 347
9 127 Jews.
It is to be observed that the first figure does not represent different
Jews as the repeated commitment of one Jew would be counted more
than once.
The Jews in the evacuation stations of Auschwitz and Lublin are not
included in these figures.
The concentration camps yield the following figures, divided according
to commitments, releases, deaths and population on Dec. 12, 1942:
Jews in Concentration Camps
Concentration Camp Commitments Releases Deaths Population
-----
on Dec.31, 1942
Lublin/men 23 409 4 509 14 217 4 683
Lub I in/women 2 849 59 131 2 659
Auschwitz/men 4 917
3 716 200
Auschwitz/women 932
720 212
Buchenwald 16 827 13 805 2 795 227
Mauthausen/Gusen 2 064
985 79
Sachsenhausen
960 6 570 344 46
Stutthof /men
28
13 15
Stutthof/women 3
3
RavensbrUck/women 321 531 787 3
RavensbrUck/men
273 44 229
Dachau
12 026 I I 140 886
GroB-Rosen
231
231
Lichtenburg
195 195
Neuengamme
192 2 190
FloBenbUrg
80 2 78
Sachsenburg
52 52
Esterwegen
36 33 3
Niederhagen
12
12
Natzweiler
10
10
Totals
73 4 I 7 36 943 27 347 9 127
185
Appendix B
VIII. JEWS IN PENAL INSTITUTIONS
At the beginning of 1943 there were 458 Jews in penal instituti"ons
in the territory of the Reich as follows:
Sentenced
Preventive detention
Hark house
Totals
Men Women
350
29
379
78
79
IX. JEWS INVOLVED IN WORK PROJECTS
Total
428
29
458
At the beginning of 1943 there were 185 776 Jews involved in work
projects relevant to the war effort in the territory of the Reich.
They were divided as follows:
I) Within the inspectorates of the security police and the SD
(without Posen and without the Russian Jews) there were 21 659 Jews.
Of these 18 546 with German nationality, 107 from the Protectorate,
2 519 stateless and 487 foreigners. They are divided among the inspec-
torates as follows (without Posen):
Berlin 15 100 Konigsberg
2
) 96
Braunsch)'ei g 110 MUnchen 313
Breslau
1
2 451 NUrnberg 89
Danzig Salzhurg 7
Dresden 485 Stettin 18
DUsseldorf 673 Stuttgart 178
Hamburg 497 Vienna 226
Kassel 259 Wiesbaden 139
l)without the Schmelt organization 2)without the Russian Jews
2) In the inspectorate Konigsberg there are also 18 435 foreign Jews
i.e. almost exclusively Russian Jews.
3) In the inspectorate Posen in ghettos and work camps there are
~ Jews, mainly Polish-.----
4) In the Schmelt organization (Breslau) there are 50 570 J e w s ~
Of these 42 382 are atateless and 8 188 are foreign.
186
The Firtst Korherr Report
x. EUROPEAN JEWISH STATISTICS
The collapse of European Jewry began decades ago with the racial deter-
ioration of the Jews in the cities on the one hand and the Jewish
emigration on the other. In 1927 the Jewish statistician Lestschinsky
elucidated the decline of European Jewry as follows: " In the beginning
of the 19th century Europe accounted for 85% of the world Jewish
population with Russia, Austrohungaria and Germany having 80% of all Jews.
There were only 2 - 3 000 Jews in America at that time. In 1925 63% of
all Jews were in Europe, within the borders of Germany, Russia and the
Austrohungarian Empire there were only 57% remaining, 30% in America
and 7% in the rest of the world". According to the calculations of the
Reich Office for Statistics, in 1880 Europe accounted for 88,4% of the
world Jewish population, in 1937 only 60,4%. In 1943 Europe should not
account for more than 1/3 of the world Jewish population.
The following is a list of the Jewish population in some important
European countries:
More Recent Census or Estimate
Country Census Year Jewish Year Jew.pop. % of
population in 1000 total pop.
Altreich 1933/35 502 799 1943 51 0,07
Austria 1934 191 481 1943 8 0, I
Czechoslovakia 1930 356 830
-Protectorate 1943 16 0,2
Danzig 1929 10 448
Memel Territory 1925 2 402 1937 2,0
Belgium 1937 80 1,0
Bulgaria 1934 48 398 1937 50 0,8
Finland 1937 2 0,04
France 1937 280 0,7
Greece 1928 72 791 1937 90 I, I
Great Britain 1931/33 234 000 1937 345 0,7
Italy 1930 47 825 1937 52 0,1
Yugoslavia 1930 68 405 1937 75 0,3
Ireland 1936 4 0, I
Latvia 1935 93 479 1937 96 4,9
Lithunia 1923 155 125 1937 175 7,4
Netherlands 1930 III 917 1937 135 1,6
Poland 1930 3 113 933 1937 3 300 ) 9,6
Rumania 1930 984 213 1941 302
1
2,2
Slovakia 1940 89 3,4
Soviet Russia 1926 2 570 330 1939 4 600
2
) 2,4
Hungary 1930 444 567 1940 750 3) 5,8
I) New territorial division.
2) New territorial division with East Poland; the figure is estimated.
3) New territorial division; the figure is calculated.
187
Appendix B
The total Jewish population of the world was estimated at 17 million
in 1937. Of these, over 10 million were in Europe. They are or were
concentrated in Europe the formerly Russian
and Polish territories between the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland
and the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, also in the trading centers of
Middle and Western Europe, in the Rhine and along the Mediterranean coast.
Between 1937 and the beginning of 1943 the Jewish population of Europe
should have decreased by an estimated 4 million, partly due to excess
mortality of the Jews in Hiddle and Western Europe and partly due to
the evacuations, mainly in the Eastern territories, which are counted
as a decrease here. Moreover, it was not possible to count all of the
deaths of the Soviet Russian Jews in the occupied Eastern Territories
while those in the remaining European part of Russia and on the front
have not been included at all. In addition to this there are the masses
of Jews who have fled from European Russia to Asian Russia and the
emigration of Jews ahroad from the European countries outside German
influence is a largely unknown quantity. Altogether European Jewry
must have decreased by almost 1/2 since 1933 that ist to say, during
the first decade of the development of power of National Socialism.
188
Der Inspekteur fUr Statlstik
Tgb.Nr.;6/g.R8. Dr.K./K.
Ap:"),lid i Cl'S
Fiji /
Berlin, 2;.;.194;
r oh'.;. r:\ ("1", ...... .......-h "1
v __ , 1\..,1f"':"; ..... ..... , .... \-"
H-Cberstur.:abanni'tihrer Dr. R. Bra n d t
Para.Stab Re1chs:ftihror-H
Bar 1 1 n
Lieber Pg. Bra n t
Befehl des -Gel:ei.!lI-.vcn:. 18.1.194'3.
Tgb.Nr.32/2/43 g und den entsprecr.enden
Relchs1'\r:lrers (ill das Reicn33iche::-l:ei tsha'..!:;;ta.::::t hace io:;'
dem RelchssiC'herhe1tshaupta:nt den i:l. Absch::-i:'t
Berlcht tiber DDie Endloaung dar europlilschen Juden!ruge"
al8 eTaten vorlaufigen :!lericht zur Ver:t'Ugung gestellt.
Ein endgUltlger, auagebautar Bericht mit tadelloeem
Zahlenmaterial und mit einer hieb- und stlchfesten 3ilsnz
tiber die zahlenmaI31ge Entw1.cklung deB Judentt1:.1S dlirfte
am besten viellei,:)ht fUr den Stand yom 1.Juli, 1.0Lt.)Der
oder 31.12.1943 nach Voroereitu.:ng der Z'.).-
nachst noch sehr w1dersprechenden zahlenmiDigen Unter-
lagen zu erst ellen sein. leh ware L'men da.."lk:bar. 'Renn
Sis dem Reichaflihrer einen dieabezUglichen Vorschlag
machen wtirden, zugleich 'Nsre ieh fUr teilung da."Ubar.
welche Einzelfragen aus dem Bericnt dar Reiccsfuhrer
besser ausgearbei tet oder zurlickges tell t hub,,;n 'Nill.
Anlage: 1 Ber1cht
(16 Bliitter)
JP.9
B e 1 1 R - I 1 t 1 l:l J. .
4- 4,;#

Inspector of Statistics
Tgb.Nr.36/g.Rs. Dr.K./K.
Appendices
Berlin, Mar. 23, 1943
SECRET REICH MATERIAL
SS-ObersturmbannfUhrer Dr.R. Bra n d t
Personal Staff ReichsfUhrer SS
Berlin
Dear Comrade Bra n d t ,
According to the secret order of the ReichsfUhrer of
Jan. 18, 1943, Tgb.Nr.32/2/43 g and the corresponding
orders of the ReichsfUhrer to the Main Reich Security
Office, I have placed the first preliminary report,
copy enclosed hereby, as to the "Final Soltion of the
European Jewish Problem" at the disposal of the
Reich Security Office.
It should be possible to produce a definitive elaborated
report with flawless numerical material and unassailable
figures as to numerical development of Jewry, perhaps
at best as of July I, Oct. I or Dec. 31, 1943 , after
careful preparation of the presently still very contra-
dictory numerical data. I would appreciate your passing
this suggestion on to the ReichsfUhrer and would also
be grateful if you could inform me as to which points
in the report the ReichsfUhrer would like to have ex-
panded or deleted.
Enclosed: I Report
(16 pages)
190
H e H tie r
Korherr
Der
Tgb.4.
:17".
Appendices
p ;.1)4-'
;1/1' - I -/
I
i \.... "';',',
I
Geh.ei..M Re1ch&AlCJhe
-.---......
All dell At1.5
ehd der und dee SD.
B e r 1 1 11
Ic.h habe .ie., stati.3t1ochan 3erlc!l+'; das 10-
tl.i.r Statis!:1.k die d,u'

lcb. halta disee!l Bcrl.c:.ht al3 allO!l.f'all.zigu
Uatorial t'W:' apatere Zei tOil, 1l!ld Z1I3r ZU
tUr gut. Ia Augenbllek d.nr.t ax" wader Ye..""6r!entUcht
noo.U "i tergegebeA werden.
Du. 1st mir Il3.cb. 1I1e Tor, dA3
Jetzt an Juden naeh dcm Vsten. fibgt)!a!lren .. !.rd, .. as U-berhaupt:
nur at. In den lrurzen der
Sicherhe1tspolize1 will len lediglieh
.111 aonatlieh abgetah.ren worden 1st und 1928 zu diesOlll Zci 1;-
p.JJlkt noch an Juden Ubrig bliab.
191
The Reichsfuhrer-SS
Tgb.Nr. 1573/43
RF/V.
Appendices
Field Command Post, Apr.9, 1943
3 copies
copy 3
To the Chief of Security Police and SO
B e r 1 i n
------
I have received the statistical report of the
Inspector of Statistics about the final solution
of the Jewish problem.
I consider this report to be good material for a
later date if necessary, namely for cover-up pur-
poses. At present it must not be published nor
allowed to circulate.
What is of primary importance to me at the moment
is that as many Jews be transported to the East as
is humanly possible. In the short monthly reports
of the security police I only want to be informed
as to how many Jews have been transported per month
and how many still remain.
Hirranler
192
Appendices
/Vo - 19 b
Dol.'
Stab

-V.
An don
n'"?-"
, .... ... "" :/, ../ \ ..
2
fb, Auafert1;:;ung
wl>oktour ti.!.r StntiBt1lt , Xorhorr
Bor11n
Dor hat I.llrGn otntlstlochon
Dorlcli1i fibor "Dio E:ldlo::nm3 dar ouro:pll1nchen Judontl'nc;o"
orh1ll. ton. VJUl'l.ocht, do.,'l M ke1nor Sto110 V()Zl
lung dar \:Jird. 1114 Selta 9, I'Uokt 4, r.ufl (13
co1Bona
vo,n Judcn QUB ,don
Ootprov1.nzcn oach den rucs1.1::chon OntC'o1I
ED wuruon
du:.:-ch <110 L.lcor 1J:l Gcnoralc;ouvornot'.'Jilt
durch dio Lacer 1.111 Warthoc;au "
undoro dart nioht GonCll:'.Clon wordon.
loll sonde dD:l von boroltu .I::;c' pI.'
daB Dol'1chtoo zurliok JJ1t dar Dltto,dicDQ Scite 9 entapl'oeil'" l
und'QS zurUckzuDondon.
f'r-. ',A--<:" ,\ 1:-1,/,," r'{"
t..J<c. .. 9. (
(-'7 L 1-'-<-( _

\93
Appendices
The ReichsfUhrer-SS
Personal Staff
Tgb.Nr.
Field Commando Post,Apr. 10, 1943
-v.
2 copies
copy 2
To the Inspector of Statistics, Comrade Korherr
Berlin
The ReichsfUhrer-SS has received your statistical report
on the "Final Solution of the European Jewish Problem".,
He does not wish the words "special treatment of Jews"
to be used at all. On page 9, point 4 the text must
read as follows:
"Transportation of Jews out of the
Eastern Provinces to the Russian
East:
Number of those passed
through the camp in the General Government ..
through the camp in Warthegau .............. ,"
A different formulation must not appear. I am sending
back the copy of the report already signed by the
ReichsfUhrer-SS with the request to make the indicated
changes on page 9 and return it.
Brandt
I Enclosure
SS-ObersturmbannfUhrer
194
The Korherr Report Completed
Geheime Reichssache
/JIO- ::-;CJJ
I
DIE El';DLUSL'NG DBR JUDZ!lt'R.Ai.lE
._ D D a z.a
Statistischer Bericht
llotwendige Vorbemerkung. Judenstatiatiken sind immer m1t
Vorbehalt au.tzunehmen, da bei der zahlenmiii.l!.:;en Erta,Hlung
des Judentums etete mit besonderen zu rechnen
Fehlerquellen liegen u.a. in Mesen und Entwtcklung des
Judentums, seiner Abgrenzung, seiner mehrtauaendJnhr1gen
ruhelosen ,ianderschnt't, den zahllosen Aufnahmen und Aus-
tritten, den Angleichungsbestrebungen, der Vermischung mit
den .i'1rtsvoljcern, vor allem aber 1m BemUhen des Juden, s1ch
der Erfaseung zu entziehen.
Schlie311ch hat die Statistik teils nla Notbehelf, ta11s
wegen der weitgehenden Ubereinstimmung jUd1scher
Rasse und jUdischem Glauben, te1ls im kontessionellen
des letzten Jahrhunderts betangen, bis zuletzt die
Judan nicht nach ihrer assse, eondern nach
Bekenntnis erfaat. Die Ertassung der Juden nech der Rasae
gestaltet aich auch -vor allem durch die auaerliche Ver-
kleinerung des Judentums infolge Austritt,
weiter zurUckliegender rassischer Verm1schung und durch
Tarnung- eehr echwlerig, .ie die miUlungene Erfessung der
RasseJuden in Osterreich 192} und die der Voll-,
Hal1:- und Vierteljuden bei der deutschen 1959
zeigen. Bestandazahlen sind im allsemeinen nur cIa
zu 'Rerten, !lobei der .r'ehler m1 t
jUdischem Blutanteil immer Kird.
,'nat unUberR1ndl1che Schwieriskeiten bereitet die ;;rstellw.t:"
einer e1nigermaDen zuverI1ssicen Stat1st1k und
des Judentums in den ges.snten Ostgebieten se1 t
lJeginn des z,veiten Neltkr1et:"es, der unkontrollierbarc
:Jasl5en von Juden in Be',vegung sebracht hat.
195
Gebiet
Appendix C
-2-
-,1/ ...'"
/;1 <.../
t-. / .. / :2
\ .../
BlLALlZ Di::S JUD.t.:lL.'u-:.;S
., e 1 t. Die GeaamtZahl der Juden au1' der ':;rde scc.!itzte
man im letzten Jahrzehnt auf 15 bis 18 :':illionen, zuweilen
auch auf weit tiber 20 llil1ionen. Das Statistische Heichsamt
gab fUr das Jahr 1937 die Zahl mit 17 an.
E u r 0 p a. Davon Itben um 1937 et ... a 10,3 ,.:1l11onen(60v:i;
in i:.'uropa und 5,1 !Jillionen( 30 vH) in Amerika. Ut::. 1.'380 hat t
der europtiische Anteil noch 88 vH, der erst
gut 3 vH betragen.
In ZuroI'a hliufen bz,v. hliuften sic:: die vor i:1
den von besetzten frUheren polnisch-
russischen und baltiscten Gebieten z.vischen 0stsee und
Finnischem :Jeerbusen und dem Sch'Rarzen und Asom:chen ::eer,
daneben in den Handelsclttelpunkten :.:ittel- '.lnd ieste'.lroi1D.s,
1m .:llietngebiet und an den KUsten des ::itte:b:eers.
D e u t s c h 1 and Die ';udenbilanz des J.eici:es iet
an die verschieden erollen Zei tri"iUlLe sei t der je.veil1.:en
:JachttibernahJ:le in seinen Tel1Gebl.:ten geb'=den. ,,:rst von
dieaen Zei tpu."lkten = beCi=t das ..\bfl uten der J'.1Uen in
groUem Stile Vorher gab es in munchen Gebieten soser e:ne
Zunahme der Juden als Folge de& Abtlusses aus Gebieten,
die zum Reiche kamen.
Zur Zeit der jeweiligen QDd 8ffi
betrug die Zanl der Juden in
Zeitpunkt der
:Jech t Ubernabne
Z a hId e r J u d e r.
vor der
:,!achtUbernal'..r.:e 31.12.1')42
Altreich
Sudetenland
Ostmark
30.1.1933
29.9.1938
13. ;.1 ?38
16.3.193')
Sent .1939
561 OvO
30 ceo
22v i.,vU
}
51
"",)'7
I
8 1 ,'2
3c)u:}en und U:ihren
OstGec1ete
(tit Bialystok)
Gener!l.lSouv.
kit :'e:;;be rt;)
i. Usa :::J. ::1 .? n
(Ju..n1 1940)
Sept.1939
(J'.mi 1 '}4U )
196
118 0\.-'0
15 550
79J JOG 253 210
2 Ch..'O 2,(}7 1]1
) '119 ,,_J t) ... "j _
The Korherr Report Cotn"leted
-3- /110- 0-
1
73
Zu den Zahlen vor der jeweiligen MachtUbernahme iet ergunzend
zu bemerken, daG aie z.T. So stromte der
GroBteil dar 30 ooa Juden des Sudetenlandes (27 000
juden) vor der Vereinigung mit dem Reich ohne UbersChreitung
einer Staatsgrenze und ohne rasan ins
Protektorat ab, ist alao in den Zai:.len fUr Bl'hmen und Mlihrell
von 1939 zu einem Teil wieder enthaltell. Dus Sudetenland
zKhlte am 17.5.1939 nur mehr 2 649 Juden.
FUr die Zeit kurz vor dem zwe1 ten .1el tJcrieg Bl3t sieh die
Zahl der Juden im Reichsgebiet mit Protektorat und General-
gouvernement fUr einen festen &e1 tpunkt. an,geben bZ'If. ab-
echatzen. Sie betragt um den 17.5.1939 in
Altreich
Sudetenland
Oatmark
233 973
2 649
94 270
BOhmen und UIDlren 110 000
Oetgebiete rd. 790 000
Generalgouv. rd. 2 000 000
ZU8aJIl1!1en :3 120 892
}
Zum Verghdch:
am 31.12.1942
51 327
8 102
15 550
233 210
297 914-
606 103
Altreich und Ostmark batten bis zum Kriege 'Reit tiber die
Halfte ihres -z1vilisierten und sterilen-
bereits abgegeben, vor allem dUrch Aus ... anderunt:, R:',trend im
Osten der Zusamroenbruch der fUr die
fruchtbaren Judenmassen UberR1egend erst im Krieee und
besonders seit den von 1942
wird.
Daa Jadentum hat aich dam1t von 1933 bis 1943 lnnerha)b
erweiterten Reichsgebietes, also im ze:'..tlich-r.'hll:!lichen
Bereich der nat1onalsoziulistischen Sta&.tsf"inrurlg. um r.md
, 1 U111ionen vermindert. Im Altreich sank der
Bestand auf fast 1/12, in der Ostmark gar auf 1/27,
ralgouvernement und in B1,;hmen und iJ:ihren auf et'll'u 1/7. in
f
den Ostgebieten auf 1/3 bis 1/4.
197
Gebiet
Utreich
\..
-4-
AuswandtH'.l!lij. St.erbeUbt::rschul3 und Jicscr .'.'':::k-
gant; ist. das Ergebnis des '::uso.=Gn,vir<:ens von .':"US.'/o.:,c:.<i=-:.1'1
0

Ste=beUb,,:::,schw; und .'IOZU noch .:;erir.;.:r':ic:i:e
sonstige kOmI:len (z.J. sener.m15te ;';l-
erkennung als :':ischline I .Grades, :jeuerfc.ssung. ':,-rt.eibe-
reinigung), !{orUber die 'rabelle Au!'schl
Zeitruwr. A b n a h m e (-) oder Zunahme der ,;\1':'..8n
von durcn
bis 31. Aus'.van- ,:,VaiCU- ;:onst.
12.1942 a: e I"'1.lIl2; Uber- '}er:in- InSf""8SU!r..
schuB
382 534 -61 193 - 100 516 '+4 570 - 539 6F;
,l'Jit Sude-
1
30
.1.33
(29.9.38)
i
;enland
)st::Jz;.rk
I
1 3. j. )8 149 I -14 5i)9
- 47 555 - 710 - 21 1
l\';=en und
- 25 699 j - 7 074 :.;ahren 16.3.39
-
69 677
-
- 1.:;2 450
)steebiete
I Sept. 39
- 334 673 - 222 117
-
- 556 79J
cit Bialy- (Juni 40'
,tok)
:eneralgouv. I Sept. 39
mit Lemberg)i (Juni 40'
- 427 920 -1 274 166
-
-1 702 Cd6
Z usa m men -1 402 126 -1 114 031 +3 86ll - 3 112 8
Die 13ilanz fUr Al treich. ,)stmark und und:.;::lrer.
men sieht aUG:
Z'J.:3[4fl-
Anfanesbestnnd Juden
bei
durch:
Auswand.e rung
SterbeUberschW3
Evakuierung
US'll
Hestand 8::J 51.12.1942:
929 GOO
- 557 357
- 82 776
- 217 74d
+ 3 860
- 1:64 c.l21
74 979
Sterbe:.ibcrzl..!na':':' der ir', n,l..:'-
reich 1st 1nfolb"t? der "oJ oc:r3.1 'l.::.i .
che des ebenso S'.1'::' l{i'2 3'..1;' 1:0':" .
11cb:.<:eit i:::: 1.'.,'lertel 194) ::-,[;,J! .2": .0'"-
b)lIten, 1 11,) Sterbe!:.ille. ;)ie 'J.:'.J
SterbeUberschu1.l(Kriec::s.vi::re:1!) der,)st;,;:.;icce ',<.'1d. ,i'=3
_ 2:'r:.C. L:.: .. cnprJ.:'cElr. :.il... -::'::,i ': ;:',
198
The Korh.rr
-5-
Ergebnis aus Anfangs- und und der
Juden.
Vom 1. 1. 1943 bis 31. 3.1943 fand nus dem rleiehsz;ebiet ::U t
Buhmen und neuen Ostgebleter. und Bezirk Bialystok
Nieder die Evakuierung von 113 015 Juden naeh vsten
stat t, e benso die ;lohnsi tzverlegung von 8 025 Juden ins
Al tersghet to 'l'b.eresienstad t. Die Judenzahl in Deut schlanrl.,
nrunentlich in den Ostgebieten, '.vurde dadurch neuerdings
stark herabgesetz
t

Die der Juden 1m :le1chsgebiet 1939
am 31.12.1942 einen nicht ger1ll6en von Juucn in

Juden
davon in
"est
am 31.12.42
:Jischehe
;,ltrelch
51 327
16 760
34 567
Ostmark
8 102
4 803
3 299
Bohmen und
15 550
6 211
9 359
Zusammen

27 774.
47 205
Die Judenzahl des Altreichs hat sich inz,Yi!3chen ,'leiter von
51 327 am 31.12.1942 auf 31 910 am vermindert. un-
ter diesen 31 910 Juden leben \iber die Hlilfte, u:.iml1ch
16 668 in dnvon 12 117 in privilecierter ur.d
4 551 in nicht pr1vllegierter ":isehehe. AuDercie::: d',:rfte in
der Auistelluns noch eine Anzc.hl von :ni tc
e
-
zc,hlt sein, die schlieSlici:l als U11').U!'tindbsr ab;:;eschriaben
'/lerden wissen,.vie es aucn t.ei jede:n c;in,Yoil:.er;cotJ.:Jter 1::1-
tr;e!" '}lieder Jer 3estcnd dcr Jt.:.dC.l L:. a1':.':::1 ,\e'..cl.s,
gebiet( Ostsebicte) n:\he::t s::..cn seine:::
Arbei tse1ns:::.tz. 'Ion tie::. i::i
bet::',r:der.. slch Zll des ,;r...tres 1'?45
21 659 in
ill Arceitsei!1sQ..tz 1'-1 455
rU3sisc!le 5) S';.
sto.ater .. lase und i=. : t
'.t:"lc!.. ()5 112 :.::-. ::; .. et::)- " ..:"''1''':'
: .. i:.: : .. :r 2,::2' .
Ig9
-6-
Appendix C
Konzentrat1onsl;gar. In Konzentrat1onslugern befanden sich
am }1.12.1942'insgesamt 9 121 Juden, in Justizvollzugsnnetal-
ten 458 Juden. Die 13elegstnrlce dar i:onzentrationslcger mit
luden war !olgende:
Mauthausen!Gusen 79
Lublin 7 }42 Sachsenhausen 46
Auschwitz 1 412 Stuttho! 18
Buchenwald 227 RavensbrUck 3.
Altersghetto. Im einzigen Altersghetto Theres1enatadt gab
es Antang 1943 zusamcen 49 392 Juden, die von den Bestands-
zahlen abgesch.rieben sind.
Evak'..lierung uua anderen europl"lischen :':'ndern. Im deu';schen
Macht- und a'..l13erhalb der lteichssrenzen far.den
tolgende Evakuierungen von Juden
L1Ulder
Frankreich (soweit vor
bis 31.12.42
dem 10.11.42 besetzt)
Niederlande
Belgien
Norwegen
Griechenland
Slowake1
Kroatien
Bulgarien
Auaerdem in den russiscnen
Gebieten e1nschl. der
frtiheren bultischen
LOnder seit Beginn
des 0st!'eldzuges
Zusamz:;en
41 911
}8 571
16 886
5}2
56 691
4 927
635 300
792 818
1m 1.V1erteljahr
!ill
7 995
13 832
1 616
158
13 435
854
11 364
49 254
E u r 0 p H 1 s c h e J u dan b i 1 a n z. Ver-
minder1.lnc des Judentuns in "::uropa dlirfte druni. bervitD [::1
4 :-:11lionen i{(3pfe be tr:lgen. ::;:he re ,J uden be st::nde Co.lI'
dem europ. :(ontinent (neben .1u..ilanu r;U; etlla 4 ..:El.) nur !'".'ld
Unsarn (750 v\.J0) '.lnd :\;.:;::).'nien (3..;2 0JU), v1ellaL:;;t noeh
t dcm
eli, Aus.l.:..r.c.er.lr.: :.mel den ;t.,]r:-:ch ' . 1.;
-7-
ftO - c
l
1'3
in den auUerdeutschen Stauten und ;/esteuropae, aber
auch die unbedinst vorkoUlmenden 1n1'ol7e der
jildischen llulctuat10n, drum dUrl'te die Verminder'.lnC des Ju-
dentums 1n :europa von 1957 bis Anfung 1943 !lui 4 ;"2
nen zu sch.;';tzen se1n. Dabe1 kor..nte von den der
sowjet-russischen Juden in den besetzten Ostgeb1eten nur ein
Te1l erfaSt werden, d1ejenicen im Ubr1gen europai-
schen RuJllnnd und an der rront Uberhaupt nicht
sind. Dazu kommen die Yunderungsstrome der Juden 1nnerhalb
RW3lands in den as1atischen Bereich hinJber. Auch der .i1:.Ul-
derungsstrom der Juden aus den europiiischen Liindern a".l...er-
halb des deutschen nech Coersee
weitgehend unbekarJlte
Insgesamt dUrfte das eurooa1sche Judentum seit
1m ersten Jlilirzehnt der
bald die Halfte se1nes verloren nahen.
Davon ist wieder nur etwa die also ein Viertel des
europnischen von 1937, den ande=en
len zugeflossen.
200 201
Appendix D
Secret Reich Material
THE FINAL SOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWISH PROBLEM
Statistical Report
Necessary Preliminary Remarks. Jewish statistics are to be accepted only
with reservations since certain mistakes must be reckoned with in the
statistical analysis of Jewry. Among the causes of these errors are
the character and development of Judaism, its definition, the many
thousand years of restless wandering, the numerous conversions to and
from Judaism, the efforts towards integration, the miscenigation with
the native population and above all the efforts of the Jews to avoid
registration.
In the end, partly as an expedient and partly due to the large degree
of overlap between the Jewish race and the Jewish religion, partly
caught up in the denominational thought of the last century, Jews have
been classified not according to their race but according to their
religion. The registration of Jews according to race is extremely diffi-
cult, above all because of the reduction in their numbers due to
secessions, conversions, earlier rill'ial interbreeding and concealment,
as shown by the unsuccessful regislrnt ion of Jews by race in Austria
in 1923 and the classification of .lpws into full, half, and quarter Jews
in the German census of 1939. Jewish statistics should generally be
interpreted as minimal figures whereby the errors of classification tend
to vary in inverse proportion to the amount of Jewish blood.
We have faced almost insurmountable difficulties in the compilation of
accurate statistics regarding the Jewish population and its movements
in the Eastern Territories since the beginning of the second world war,
which set uncontrollable masses of Jews in movement.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF JEWRY
w 0 rId. The total Jewish population of the world was estimated
to be between 15 and 18 million in the last decade, sometimes at over
20 million. The Statistische Reirhsamt (German Bureau of Statistics)
estimated the total Jewish population of the world at 17 million in 1937.
E u r 0 p e . In 1937 10,3 million (60%) were living in Europe and
5,1 million (30%) in America. In 1880 the European Jews comprised 88%
of the world Jewish population and the American Jews only slightly
more than 3%.
In Europe the Jews are, or rather, were concentrated in the formerly
Polish, Russian and Baltic territories now occupied by Germany between
the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland and the Black Sea and the Sea of
Azov, also in the trading centers of Middle and Western Europe, in the
Rhine and along the Mediterranean coast.
202
G e r man y . The Jewish population of the Reich is related to the
length of time since the seizure of power in the different territories.
This marks the beginning of the great Jewish exodus. Up to then there
had even been an increase in the Jewish population in some territories
as a result of their exodus from territories already occupied by the
Reich.
At the time of assumption of power and on Dec.3l, 1942 the Jewish
population was:
Terri tory.
Altreich
Sudeten land
Ostmark
Bohemia and Moravia
Eastern Territories
(incl. Bialystok)
General Government
(inc 1. Lemberg)
Tot a 1
Date of Assumpt-
ion of power
Jan.30, 1933
Sep.29, 1938
Mar.13, 1938
Har.16, 1939
Sep. 1939
(June 1940)
Sep. 1939
(June 1940)
Jew ish Pop u 1 a t ion
before Assumpt- on Dec.31, 1942
ion of power
561 000 51 327
30 000
220 000 8 102
118 000 15 550
790 000 233 210
2 000 000 297 914
3 719 000 606 103
There is a certain amount of overlap in the figures prior to the
assumption of power. Thus most of the 30 000 Jews of the Sudetenland
(27 000 religious Jews)before the annexation into the Reich rapidly fled
to the Protectorate without crossing a national border and without loss
of property and appear again in the figures for Bohemia. and Moravia in
1939. On the 17 May 1939 there were only 2 649 Jews in the Sudetenland.
For the time shortly prior to World War II it is possible to list figures
for or estimate the Jewish popUlation of the Reich territories with
the Protectorate and the General Government:
for comparison
Mar. 17, 1939 Dec. 31, 1942
Altreich 233 937
51 327
Sudeten land 649
Ostmark 94 270 8 102
Bohemia and Moravia 110 000 15 550
Easterns Territories c. 790 000 233 210
General Government c.2 000 000 297 914
Total 3 120 892 606 103
Altreich und Ostmark had already lost well over half of their
civilized and sterile Jewsih population before the war, mainly due to
emigration, while in the East the collapse of the dangerous fertile
Jewish masses only became clear during the war and particularly after the
evacuation measures of 1942.
203
Appendix D
The Jewish population of the extended German Reich was reduced hy
3,1 million between 1933 and 1943 under the leadership of National
Socialism. In Altreich the population dropped to 1/12, in Ostmark to 1/27,
in the General Government and in Bohemia and Moravia to ahout 1/7 and
int the Eastern Territories to between 1/3 and 1/4.
Emigration, Excess Mortality and Evacuation. This reduction in the popu-
lation is the result of a combination of emigration, excess mortality
and evacuation and certain minor changes due to other factors (such as
officially allowed conversions, recognition as a first class half-breed,
new registrations and cleaning-up of files).
The following chart explains:
Territory Time Period Decrease (-) or Increase in the Jewish Pop. _I
from ... to due to
Dec.31,1942 Emigration Exceso;. Other Total i
Mortallt tlon -----
Altreich Jan. 30,1933 -382 534 -61 193 - 100 516 +4 570 - 539 673
(with Sudet-(Sep.29, 1938)
enland)
Ostmark Mar.13,1938 -149 124 -14 509 - 47 555 - 710 - 211 898
Bohemia and
Moravia Mar. 16,1939 - 25 699 - 7 074 - 69 677 - - 102 450
Eastern
Terriaries Sep. 1939
- 334 673 - 222 117
-
- 556 790
(wi th Bia ly- (June 1940)
stok)
General Gov. Sep. 1939
- 427 920 -I 274 166 - -I 702 086
(with Lemberg(June 1940)
Tot a 1 -I 402 726 -I 714 031 +3 860 -3 112 897
The figures for Altreich, Ostmark Bohemia and Moravia together are:
Jewish Population at time of
Assumption of Power
Changes due to
Emigration
Excess Mortality
Evacuation
New Registration etc.
Population on Dec. 31, 1942
+
929 000
557 357
82 776
217 748
3 860
854 021
74 979
The unusual excess mortality among the Jews, for example in Altreich,
can be attributed to abnorming aging and the weakness of Jews as well as
to a low birth rate and a high mortality rate. In the first quarter of
1943 there were 22 births and 1 113 deaths. The firgures for emigration
and excess mortality (the turmoil of war!) in the Eastern Territories
204
and the General Government cannot he checked. The figures represent re-
sults calculated from the origin Jewish population, the final population
and the evacuations.
Between Jan. I, 1943 and 1943 113 015 Jews "ere evacuated from
the Reich including Bohemii and Moravia, the new Eastern Territories and
the district of Bialystok to the East and 8 025 Jews were moved to the
Ghetto for the Aged in Theresienstadt. The Jewish population of Germany,
particularly in the Eastern Territories was significantly reduced once
again hy this.
Mixed Marriages. The Jewish population of the Reich in the boundaries
of 1939 includes a significant proportion of Jews in mixed marriages:
Jewish Population Mixed Ma rriages Rest
as of Dec.31, 1942
Altreich 51 327 16 760 34 567
Ostmark 8 102 4 803 3 299
Bohemia and Moravia 15 550 6 21 I 9 339
Total 74 979 27 774 47 205
The Jewish population of the Altreich has continued to decrease from
51 327 on Dec.31, 1942 to 31 910 on Apr.l, 1943. Of these 31 910 Jews
more than half, namely 16 668 are living in mixed marriages, 12 117 of
them in privileged marriages and 4 551 in not privileged marriages.
These figures also include a number of Je",s who are untraceable, as
always happens in any registration of inhahitants. The Jewish population
in the old Reich (without the Eastern Territories) is approaching its end.
Deployment of Labor. Of the Jews living in Reich territory at the be-
ginning of 1943
21 659 were working in areas important for the ",ar effort.
In addition to this 18 435 Jews from Soviet Russia were involved in the
war effort in the inspectorate of Konigsberg, 50 570 stateless and
foreign Jews were working in the camp at Schmelt (Breslau) and 95 112
formerly Polish Jews were working in ghettos and camps in the inspecto-
rate of Posen.
Concentration Camps. There were a total of 9 127 Je",s in concentration
camps and 458 in penal institutions on Dec.31, 1942 as follows:
Lublin
Ausch",itz
Buchenwald
7 342
412
227
Mauthausen/Gusen
Sachsenhausen
Stutthof
RavensbrUck
79
46
18
3.
Ghetto for the Aged. In the only Ghetto for the Aged in Theresienstadt
there were a total of 49 392 Jews in the beginning of 1943. This figure
represents a compilation of other figures.
205
Appendix D
Evacuation from other European Countries.Within the realm of German
influence and power beyond the boundaries of Reich the following
evacuations have taken place:
Country
France (as occupied be-
fore Nov. 10, 1942)
Holland
Belgium
Norway
Greece
Slovakia
Croatia
Bulgaria
In the Russian terr-
itories including the
former Baltic countries
since the beginning of
the eastern campaign
Total
up to Dec. 12, 1942
4 I 9"
38 57 I
16 886
532
56 69 I
4 927
633 300
792 8 I 8
in the first quarter
of 1943
995
13 832
616
158
13 435
854
I I 364
49 254
E u r 0 pea n Jew ish S tat i s tic s . These figures indi-
cate that the Jewish population of Europe has already been reduced by
4 million. On the European continent (after Russia with c. 4 million)
only Hungary (750 000), Rumania (302 000) and possihly France have
large Jewish populations. In additon to the abovementioned figures, if
one takes into account the Jewish emigration, the excess mortality in
the non-German countries of Middle and Western Europe and the unavoidable
double counting due to the fluctuation of the Jews, then the reduction
of the Jewish population of Europe from 1937 to the beginning of 1943
could be estimated at 4 1/2 million. Moreover, it was not possible to
count all the deaths of Soviet-Russian Jews in the occupied Estern
Territories while those in the remaining European part of Russia and on
the front have not been included at all. In addition to this there are
masses of Jews who have fled from European Russia to Asian Russia and the
emigration of Jews from the European countries outside German influence
abroad is a largely unknown quantity.
Altogether, European Jewry must have been reduced by almost 1/2 since
1933, that is to say, during first decade the development-orl'0wer
of National Socialism. Again half, that is a quarter of the total Jewlsh
population of 1937, has fled to other continents.
206
;,\p:"\( nd ices
J>er lnapekteur rur W 35. 19.4.1543
Tgb.Br. 48/43 geh.Ra. JPotadamer StraBe 61
Geheime Reichssacha
ij-Oberaturmbanntuhrer Dr.B. Bra n d t
Pers.Stab
B e r I 1 n
Lieber Pg. Bra n d t
Mein kUrzllcher Berloht Uber dle der Judentrage
mlt 16 Selten Umtang war von mlr zur Ber10htung an den BY
erstellt worden, wie mir der RF mtindllch betohlen hatte.
GemaE dem neuen Befehl des Relohs!Uhrers vom 1.4.1943 an
den Chet der Sloherheltspolizel und des SD zur Erstellung
eines gekUrzten Ber1chtes sur Vorlage an den FUhrer m1t
eindeut1ger Bilanz habe ieh vor einigen Tagen dem Reiebs-
slcherbeitshauptamt den in Abscbrltt beifolgenden Berlebt
von 6 1/2 Selten zur E1narbe1tung in seinen Gesamtberleht
sugeleltet.
loh dart dazu, falls der RF nlcbt ganz einverstanden sain
sollte, bemerken: Eine eindeutige Bilanz tur elnen
Zeltraum fUr das ganze heutige Reich laBt sich trotz alles
vergossenen SohweiBes niebt erst ellen . lob habe darum nebel,
einer Geeamtbilanz mlt wecbselndem Antangezeitpunkt ver-
schledene Teilbilanzen gebraeht. Die vorhandenen verschie-
denen .An!angs - und SohluIlzahlen d1fferieren z. T. tlIJl hundert.
tausende von Juden. Die vorhandenen lassen Rich
auch mit den vorhandenen Unterlagen nicht, w1e es wUn-
schenswert ware, nacb Juden im Arbe1tseinsGtz, in KL's,
1m Altersghetto, in privilegierter i.:1schehe teilen, sodaS
der verblelbende Rest sofort rUr die Evakuierung zur Ver-
fUgung steht. Sowohl beim Arbeitseinsatz wie in den KL'8
lassen dle bisberigen Unterlagen keine zuverlassigen
SchlUsse beztiglich der raumlichen Zugeboriekeit dar
(von der Staatsangehorigkeit abgesehen) zu. Darum muBte
1ch hier eine eindeutige doch geben
die Zahlen an sicb einen brauchbaren Anhaltapunkt.
Anlage g.Bs. H e 1 1 H 1 tIe r

Tgb.Nr. 48/43 ge.Rs.
Appendices
Berlin W 35, Apr. 19, 1943
Potsdamer StraBe 61
SECRET REICH
SS-Obersturmbannflihrer Dr.R. Bra n d t
Personal Staff Reichsflihrer-SS
Berlin
Dear Comrade Bra n d t ,
My recent 16 page report on the final solution of the Jewish
problem was prepared by myself to be delivered to the Reichs-
fUhrer, as ordered verbally by the Reichsflihrer.
According to the new order of the Reichsflihrer of Apr. I, 1943 to
the Chief of Police and SO as to the preparation of a condensed
report with rigorous numerical data to be shown to the FUhrer,
I passed on the enclosed 6 1/2 page report to the Main Reich
Security Office several days ago for inclusion in its overall
report.
I would like to add, in case the ReichsfUhrer is not in agree-
ment, despite great effort it is not possible to arrive at
accurate totals for a particular time period for the whole
German Reich. Therefore, in addition to a total figure with
changing beginning dates I have also listed various subtotals.
The initial and final figures differ in places by hundreds of
thousands of Jews. Unfortunately, the remaining Jews cannot
be divided, according to our statistical information, into
Jews involved in work, in concentration camps, in the Ghetto
for the Aged, in mixed marriages, so that the remainder would
be ready for evacuation. The information up to now on Jews
involved in work and Jews in concentration camps does not allow
uS to draw accurate conclusions as to their former geographic
distribution (aside from nationality).For these reasons I had
to avoid a clear numerical total, nevertheless, the figures
serve as a useful basis.
1 Enclosure Secret Reich Material
H e H t 1 e r
Korherr
208
Appendices
DER II XViI/lt Geheime Reichssache
Der Inspekteur fUr Stlltistlk .:---
Tgb.Nr. 51/43 g.Rs _ H l::- ') P.lld.m .. S .... 1Io1t
\
.- .' Berlin W 35, den 28 4 1943

< ...... - ..
'- )
)

,. l' t. .> (_'..J T.,of ft .. ..
\,. . .
Betr.z Abtinderung dee Berichtee Uber "DIe EndlHsung der
Judenfrage
Bezugz Dort. Schreiben T. 10.4.4' Tgb.Nr. -- -V.
An den
Pereonlichen Stab RF-U
lII.lId. Mel n e
B e r lin SW 11
Yrlnz-Xlbreo&t:Straae 8
Liebe Pg. M e i n e
2 Aus!ertigungen
"'. Auster tigung

Beiliegend gebe ich den mir mit obigem Sohrelben Uber-
eandten Berioht naoh ertolgter surUck.
1 Anlage
Hitler!

209
THE REICHSFUHRER SS
Tgb.Nr. 51/43 g.Rs. - H.
Appendices
Berlin W 35, Apr.28, 1943
Potsdamer StraBe 61
Tel. 22 46 02
2 copies
copy I
Concerning: Changes in the report "The Final Solution
of the European Jewish Problem"
Referring to letter of Apr. 10, 1943 Tgb.Nr. -- -v.
To the Personal Staff RF-SS
to the attention of SS-HauptsturmbannfUhrer Mel n e
B e r lin SW I I '
Prinz-Albrecht-StraBe 8
Dear Comrade Men e ,
I enclose the changed report returned to me in your above-
mentioned letter.
H e H t 1 e r
I Enclosure
Korherr
210
Appendix E:Korherr's Past and Present Activities
:l
Richard KORHERR lives in Braunschweig (Lower Saxony).
Gripenkerlstr. 4, Tel.: (0531) 791777.
Photograph taken in July 1978 (Cop. Klarsfeld).
In a letter to "Der Spiegel" (31-1977) Korherr said that it had been
,published "that on Himmler's orders I had calculated the number of
Jewish victims in the spring of 1943. Actually, these figures were
delivered to me complete and with a text by the Main Reich Security Office
with the order to change neither the wording nor the figures".
In July 1978, in a conversation with a member of our group, Korherr
implicitly recognized that he actively participed in the drawing-up of the
two "Korherr Reports" on the basis of the documentation provided by
Eichmann's Service.
211
INDEX OF PERSONAL NAMES
CITED IN THE STUDIES OF
DR. BILLIG AND MR. WELLERS
Abetz, 46
Adler, II
Aretz, In
Bek, 133
Bergelson, 141-142
Berger, 49
Bormann, 27,36,37,41,70
Bouhler, 55,56,130
Brack, 55, 130,
Brandt, 45,55,56,145,146
Broad, 113,115,119
Buber, 17
Buhler, 56,57
Burg, 108
Butz, 108
Christopherson, 108,110-112
Coogan, 126
Dannecker, 8,13,16,23-25,28-34
Dibelius, 128
Diels, 7,36,60
Dietrich, 36,69-72
Dubost, 122,126
Eichmann, 6,8,12-14,16-21,23-
35,43,45,46,51-57,60,
139,143,148,149
Evans, 125
Faurisson, 108
Feldscher, 55
Flesch, 15
Frank, 32,36,53,56
Freytag, 7, 15
Frick, 5
Gerstein, 120-138
Gil bert, 38,64
Globocnik, 22,52,53,55,56,58,61,
64,68,120,121,130,131,
134,136,137
Glucks, 59
Goebbels, 1,2,4,26,38,68-70
Goering, 3,7,9,26-28,44,48,50,51,
56,57,63,113,114
Goldmann, 14
Grawitz, 135-137
Greiser, 53,54
212
Grynszpan, 16,26
Gunther, 33,121,134
Gustloff, 5
Hagen, 8,12-30,33,34,46
Hasselbacher, 7
Haught, 25
Heckenholt, 135-138
Heerdtlinger, 111
Heimer, 17
Hess, 5
Herman, 118
Heydrich, 4,7,8, la, 11,14,17,18,
20,22,24,27-29,31-35,
37,42,44-47,50-59,61,
65,67,68
Hinnnler; 4,7,8, la, 11,15,17,22,
36-38, 41,43-50,52-55,
57-65,70,130,134,135,
145, !lt6, 148, 158, 159
Hitler, 1-10,15,27,28,32,36'-52,
55-57,61,63-65,69-72,
134,136,146,148,149
Hoess, 5,53,55,56,58,60,114,115
Hoettl, 139, 140
Horty, 70
Hossbach, 37
Joffroy, 125,126,133
Kaltenbrunner, 37, 63
Kasztner, 143,144
Kammler, I 12
Keitel, 48
Kirschneck, 112
Knochen, 17,30,33,34
Kogon, 122
Korherr, 63-65, 139, 145,146,148-
150,153-161
Krisshaber, 22
Kruger, 56,61
Lahousen, 45
Lammers, 48,58
Laval, 68
Lestchinsky, 139,140
Lewental, 119
Ley, 5
Linden, 121,131
Lischka, 7,15,16,29-31,33,34
)
Loesener, 25, 53-55
Luther, 33,46,57
Meyer, 57
Mildenstein, 8,12
Mordowitz, 116
Muller, 11,53,55,159
Nebe, 11,54
Neumann, 58
Niyszli, 119,143,145
Oberg, 68
Oberhauser, 137
Obermeyer, 121,137
Ohlendorf, 47
Olden, 38
Otter, 121,127
Pfannenstiel, 121,131,136
Picker, 36,41
Pohl, 60,61
Poliakov, 124,127,128,140
Polkes, 18,19
Priifer, 112
Rasch, 54
Rassinier, 107,115,120,122-126,
128-137,140-143,145,
150,154,158
Rath, 26,28
Reichenau, 48
Reitlinger, 140
Ribbentrop, 4,45,46,57,70
Roeder, 108
INDEX
213
Rohm, 37
Rosenberg, 4,19,44,47,48
Rosin, 116
Rothfelds, 122
Rousset, 126
Rublee, 4
Schacht, 4
Scheidel, 108
Schellenberg, 30,44
Schirach, 37, 63
Schlegel, 108
Schroeder, 8,12,19
Schwarz, 24
Seyss-Inquart, 32
Six, 8,13,14,16-18,22-25,30,41,45
Speer, 6
Stahlecker, 21
Streicher, 4,12,17,25,71
Stroop, 156
Stuckart, 55
Thomas, 49
Vallat, 46,
Veesenmayer, 144,145
Vrba, 116,117
Wetzler, 116
Winter, 14
Wirth, 121,130,132,135-137
Wisliceny, 8,12,18,19,30,139,
140
Wolff, 45,61
BEATE KLARSFELD FOUNDATION
(extracts of the Certificate of Incorporation
under Section 402 of the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law)
hereby certified that:
. The purposes for which the corporation is formed are to advance public awareness
1e persecution of Jews and other minorities as practiced during the period of the Nazi
me in Germany; to educate the public about genocide and about the evils of Nazism,
-Semitism and other anti-minority ideologies; to warn against and to expose the
,ivai and the resurgence of anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination and
secution identified with Nazi ideology; to gather and to disseminate information
ut the Nazi persecution of Jews and other minorities, about genocide and the Nazi
locaust; to gathef and to disseminate information about Nazi, anti-Semitic and
-minority ideologies and practices wherever they may exist; to contribute to the
Ition and maintenance of a moral and ethical climate inimical to Nazi, anti-Semitic
anti-minority ideologies and practices in all their forms and inimical to their survival
and to do any other act or thing incidental to or connected with the
purposes or in advancement thereof ... "
Ir contribution is deductible for income tax purposes and may be sent to Beate
lfsfeld Foundation, 515 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y 10022.
opy of the last financial report filed with the Department of State of the State of New
k may be obtained by writing to New York State Department of State, Office of
lrities Registration, Albany, N.Y 12231 or to Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 515
dison Avenue, New York, N.Y 10022.
214
Beate I<ilarsfeld was born in Berlin in 1939. A German and a
Lutheran, she has become throughout the world, by virtue of her coura-
geous acts, a symbol of the most praiseworthy struggle against anti-Semi-
tism, against the vestiges of Nazism 'and for peace 'between the Arab
countries and Israel . These words describing Beate Klarsfeld were sent
from Israel to Oslo in 1977, when she was the first German to be nomi-
nated by Israel for the Nobel Peace Prize. Her candidacy was supported by
fifty-six members of the Knesseth (among whom we may cite Menahem
Begin, Itzhak Navon, Abba Eban) and by numerous university professors.
For ten years, she has led the combat to end the impunity of Nazi
criminals. In 1975, she succeeded in obtaining the ratification by the
Bundestag of the law authorizing the trial of leaders of the Nazi police
network which operated in France. In July 1978, she was instrumental in
obtaining the indictment of the three Nazis primarily responsible for the
deportation of 76.000, Jews from France: Lischka, Hagen and Heinrichsohn
are to be tried in Cologne.
Beate Klarsfeld awoke the conscience of the, German people when in
1968 she publicly slapped Kurt Georg Kiesinger, former Nazi propagandist,
in a courageous protest against the latter's presence in the German chan-
cellery.
Arrested several times in Germany, Mrs. Klarsfeld was imprisoned in
Warsaw in 1970 and in Prague in 1971 as she demonstrated against anti-
Semitic campaigns and repression. She was again arrested in 1972 in
La Paz, where she found and identified the former head of the Gestapo
of Lyon, Klaus Barbie. She demonstrated in Damascus after the Yom-Kippur
war against the refusal to puhlish a Ust of Israeli prisoners of war and
against their mistreatment. In October 1974, she was arrested in Rabat,
during the summit meeting of the Arab States, as she was distributing in
the streets leaflets in favour of Israel. In May 1977, she demonstrated in
Buenos Aires and in Montevideo to denounce torture and growing anti-
Semitism.
In 1977, Beate Klarsfeld was honoured in New York with the first.
Adele Rosenwald Award of the United Jewish Appeal. She lectures in the
United States every year under the auspices of the Anti-Defamation League
of the B'Nai Brith. The Klarsfelds and their two children live in Paris.
Serge Klarsfeld, a lawyer, also holds a Master's degree in history from
the Sorbonne. He is in addition a graduate of the Institut des Sciences Po-
litiques in Paris.
Born in 1935, he escaped by miracle from the Gestapo at the time of
the arrest of his father. The elder Klarsfeld perished at Auschwitz.
Active with his wife in the fight to obtain the trial of Nazi criminals,
Serge Klarsfeld is the most virulent enemy of the Neo-Nazis in Germany.
He is also the author of the monumental Memorial of the Deportation
of the Jews from France .
215
by Georges WELLERS
Edited
by Serge KLARSFELD
.Those propagandists who seek to rehabilitate Nazism are perfectly aware that
wh#marks it indelibly is the infamous genocide of the Jewish people. They take
advantage of the credibility of the public and the more or less unconscious desire
of the latter that this nightmarish mass murder had never taken place. That is why
the Neo-Nazis have during recent years launched an offensive which has had a
certain success. Their principal themes are the following: that Hitler was not
responsible for the "Final Solution ", that the gas chambers as a means of extermi-
nating the Jews never existed, that the number of Jewish victims has been very
considerably exaggerated.
The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania is based on irrefutable
German documents. Through an examination of often unpublished papers of the
Service for Jewish Affairs of the SD, a careful study of the orders for the "Final
Solution" and the Fuhrer's announcements of this Solution, Dr. Joseph Billig for
the first time shows step by step how the decision to exterminate the Jews was
reached.
Professor Wellers in a first study demolishes the Neo-Nazi arguments which
are in contradiction with the accounts of those, SS or internees, who themselves
saw the gas chambers in operation.
In the second study, devoted to the number of victims"Professor Wellers
brilliantly demonstrates that more than 1,800,000 Jews were liquidated by the
Nazis in the Soviet Union. His conclusions are supported by indisputable .figures
which have never before been presented. He explores, in addition, the extraordi-
nary report drawn up for Himmler by the Inspector of Statistics of the SS, Richard
Korherr, who established with great precision the Jewish losses as of December 31,
1942, and as of March 31, 1943.
Georges Wellers thus succeeds in demonstrating that, in taking as a basis
only the indisputable figures, one reaches a total of more than 4,800,000 proven
victims, all while leaving out of consideration other Jewish victims in numerous
countries.
An contains the totality of the Korherr reports in the original
German Their unabridged versions are publicly printed for the first time
and are followed by an English translation. Moreover, we have succeeded ip:--
locating the infinitely valuable Korherr himself in Lower Saxony. The
will therefore not be able to claim that Korherr never existed and that the
ments in question were falsified or even invented. f
THE BEATE KLARSFELD FOUNDATION
515 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 leN 543.313.20 { Printed In Franc;e

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