LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs NATIVIDAD Facts: Herein private respondents filed a petition for the determination of just

compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat, Pampanga, which were acquired by the government pursuant to PD 27. After trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of herein private respondent ordering the petitioner to pay the amount of P30.00 per square meter, as the just compensation. Petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform is also ordered to pay petitioners the amount of P50,000.00 as Attorney s Fee, and to pay the cost of suit. Now, Land Bank contends that private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR s valuation of their properties. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the private respondents violated the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ruling: NO. The records reveal that Land Bank s contention is not entirely true. In fact, private respondents did write a letter to the DAR Secretary objecting to the land valuation summary submitted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office and requesting a conference for the purpose of fixing just compensation. The letter, however, was left unanswered prompting private respondents to file a petition directly with the trial court. At any rate, there is nothing contradictory between the DAR s primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to judicial proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function. Thus, the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB) vs. LUBRICA Facts: Suntay, now deceased, filed a petition for fixing and payment of just compensation under Presidential Decree No. 27 against DAR for his landholdings located in Occ. Mindoro. The DAR and Land Bank determined its value at P4,251,141.68 which valuation according to Suntay, was unconscionably low and tantamount to taking of property

without due process of law. After summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Suntay, ordering Land Bank to pay the former P157,541,951.30 as just compensation. Land Bank then filed a petition for just compensation with the RTC but it was dismissed. Thus, Land Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari before the DARAB. Lubrica, the successor-in-interest of Suntay, filed a petition before the CA questioning the jurisdiction of DARAB over a petition for certiorari. DARAB argued that the writ of certiorari/injunction was issued under its power of supervision over its subordinates like the PARADs and RARADs to restrain the execution of a decision which had not yet attained finality. Land Bank also raised the prematurity of Lubrica s petition for prohibition contending that the issue of whether or not DARAB can take cognizance of Land Bank s petition for certiorari may be elevated to the Office of the DAR Secretary, in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
[8]

Issue: Whether DARAB has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari filed by the Land Bank.

Ruling: NO. Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law.[26] It is settled that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law.[27] It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly designated.[28] Pursuant E.O. 229 and E.O. No. 129, the DARAB was created to act as the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR. With the passage of R.A. No. 6657, the adjudicatory powers and functions of the DAR were further delineated when, under Section 50 thereof, it was vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Special Agrarian Courts. Said laws also authorized the DAR to delegate its adjudicatory powers and functions to its regional offices. To this end, the DARAB adopted its Rules of Procedure, where it delegated to the RARADs and PARADs the authority to hear, determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and incidents in connection [30] therewith, arising within their assigned territorial jurisdiction. In the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writ of certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Bank s petition for certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment of authority.

PCGG vs. PENA Facts: This is a case about the Presidential Commission on Good Government, created through E.O. 1, charging it with the task of assisting the President in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses, including the power to issue freeze orders or sequestration of all business enterprises owned by them

upon showing of a prima facie case. PCGG issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms wherein Saludo and Yeung Chun Ho were designated as authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations. PCGG designated Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the absence of Yeung Chun Ho and Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of Saludo. Saludo, in a memorandum, revoked the authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing was a Hong Kong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere tourist visa. The PCGG Commissioner approved the memorandum. Shortly, thereafter, Saludo withdrew funds from Metrobank against the accounts of the two corporations for payment of the salaries of the stuff. Yeung Chung Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan instituted through Yim Kam Shing an action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, PCGG, the Commissioner and OIC Saludo with the RTC, questiong the aforesaid revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to Yim Kam Shing. RTC issued TRO. PCGG filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the PCGG

Ruling: NO. The Supreme Court held that RTC and the CA for that matter have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Art. XVIII, sec. 26 of the Constitution and therefore may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a coequal body with regional trial courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other. However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgment of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial bodies, E.O. 14 specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.

CARINO vs.COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS Facts: On 17 Sept 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order for their grievances to be heard. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on 17 Dec 1990, Secretary Carino ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Carino.

Issue: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights. Ruling: NO. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial. "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of theteachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individualteacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

LASTIMOSA vs. VASQUEZ Facts:

Dayon, a public health nurse at Cebu, filed with the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct against the Mayor of Santa Fe. The investigating officer found no prima facie evidence and recommended its dismissal. But the Ombudsman, Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape. Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor for the "filing of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City. The case eventually went to First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa. Lastimosa conducted a PI and found that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed. With the approval of Kintanar, she filed an information for acts of lasciviousness. As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Mojica ordered Kintanar and Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. Mojica issued an order placing Lastimosa and Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months as approved by Ombudsman Vasquez Lastimosa filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the orders directing them to file of the action (for Attempted Rape) against the Mayor; instructing Lastimosa and Kintanar to explain in writing why they should not be punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and failing to file the appropriate Information for Attempted Rape against the Mayor; stating that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape be filed against the Mayor in recognition of the authority of said Office. Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to investigate public officers or employees and that when the former first took cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. In any event, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. Therefore the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal. Issue: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo.

Ruling: YES. When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman. Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. Sec 31 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA6770) provides: Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act or

omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.

SYQUIA VS. BOARD OF POWER AND WATERWORKS FACTS: Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging Syquia asadministrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense of selling electricity without permit or franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco rates. In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts. ISSUE: Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction

RULING: NO. Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner. The board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise. Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction. Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs ofelectricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Private respondent CCM Gas Corporation (hereafter CCM Gas) is a customer of petitioner Manila Electric Company (hereafter MERALCO). On May 23, 1984, it was billed P272,684.81 for electric consumption for the period April 22, 1984 to May 22, 1984. The amount of the bill is broken down as follows: Actual electric energy consumed Purchased Power Adjustment P 51,383.98 213,696.00

Exchange Rate Adjustment Total

7,604.83 P272,684.81

The account was due on May 29, 1984, but CCM Gas withheld payment until its question concerning the purchased power adjustment was answered. On May 31, 1984, MERALCO gave CCM Gas notice of disconnection if its account was not paid on or before June 5, 1984. CCM Gas protested, although it made partial payment of P52,684.81. It demanded to know how the item for purchased power adjustment in the amount of P213,696.00 had been arrived at. As no information was forthcoming, CCM Gas brought this case in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, praying that: (a) MERALCO be ordered to pay moral damages and attorney s fees; (b) a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining or restraining MERALCO from disconnecting CCM Gas electric supply; and (c) a temporary restraining order be issued pending hearing on the application for writ of preliminary injunction. On June 8, 1984, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on July 21, 1984, a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting by CCM Gas of a bond in the amount of P1,031,999.69. CCM Gas having posted the required bond on August 6, 1984, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the court on August 13, 1984. On October 4, 1984, MERALCO filed, by leave of court, an amended answer in which it raised, as special and affirmative defenses, the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to try the case and lack of valid cause of action of CCM Gas. Issue: Whether or not trial court has no jurisdiction in the case at bar. Held: Clearly, CCM Gas is not invoking the jurisdiction of the Board of Energy to regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies, but the regular court s power to adjudicate cases involving violations of rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. As the Court of Appeals held:[13] To our mind, what CCM Gas demanded from Meralco was only the basis upon which the latter had computed the purchased power adjustment of P213,696.98. As the trial court observed, CCM Gas did not question the fact that the law (P.D. 1206) vests upon the BOE supervision, control and jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates; it did not question the fact that the purchased power adjustment was decided by the Board of Energy in BOE Case No. 80-117; and it did not, before the trial court, question the purchased power adjustment formulated by the BOE. . . . Since the trial court concluded that CCM Gas was not questioning before it the purchased power adjustment in question, but simply to demand a breakdown and itemization on which Meralco had based the purchased power adjustment amount of P213, 696.98 which it was trying to collect from CCM Gas, it is clear that the question of determining such breakdown and itemization is not a matter that in any way pertains to BOE s supervision, control, or jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rates. . . . The question CCM Gas raised before the trial court is a matter foreign to the functions of the BOE because it falls within the field of judicial determination and adjudication. [See La Orden de PP. Benedictinos v. Stiver and Phil. Trust Co., No. L-4568, 93 Phil. 341, 344-345 (1953)]. Thus, it is the trial court, indeed, and not the BOE, that has jurisdiction to entertain a civil action such as the case at bar and, after trial, render final judgment therein.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (RCPI) vs. BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS Facts: In BC Case No. 75-01-OC (G.R. No. L-43653) complainant respondent Diego Morales claims that while he was in Manila his daughter sent him a telegram on October 15, 1974 from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death of his wife, Mrs. Diego T. Morales. The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached him. He had to be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to catch up with the burial of his wife, he had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela. In its answer petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted from Santiago, lsabela to its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City but when it was relayed from Cubao, the radio signal became intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and unintelligible. Because of the failure of the RCPI to transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages. In BC Case No. 75-08-OC (G.R. No. L-45378) complainant respondent Pacifico Innocencio claim that on July 13, 1975 Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot, Cavinti, Laguna for the Purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the non-receipt and/or non-delivery of the message sent to said address, the sender (Lourdes Innocencio has not been notified about its non-delivery, As a consequence Pacifica Innocencio was not able to attend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. Because of the failure of RCPI to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited his hometown Moncada Tarlac on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. Likewise, he prays for damages. After hearing. the respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. I and Letter of Implementation No. 1. Issue: Whether or not the fine imposed by Board of Communication is with its jurisdiction. Held: We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, "being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication,. conferred upon it by statute".3 The functions of the Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and it has only 4 jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. As successor in interest of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission. One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of the Public Service Act governing the organization of the Specialized Regulatory Board, is to issue certificate of public convenience. But this power to issue certificate of public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. But even assuming that the respondent Board of Communications has the power or jurisdiction over petitioner in the exercise of its supervision to insure adequate public service, petitioner cannot be subjected to payment of fine under Section 21 of the Public Service Act, because this provision of the law subjects to a fine every public service that violates or falls to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. In the two cases before us petitioner is not being charged nor investigated for violation of the terms and conditions of its certificate of public convenience or of any order, decision or regulations of the respondent Board of Communications. The complaint of respondents in the two case was that they were allegedly inconvenienced or injured by the failure of the petitioner to transmit to them telegrams informing them of the deaths of close relatives which according to them constitute breach of contractual obligation through negligence under the Civil Code. The charges however, do not necessarily involve petitioners failure to comply with its certificate of public convenience or any order, decision or regulation of respondent Board of Communication. It is clear from the record that petitioner has not been charge of any violation or failure to comply with the terms and condition of its certificates of public convenience or of any order, decision or regulation of the respondent

Board. The charge does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of public convenience. If in the two cases before Us complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Innocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications. Much less can it impose the disciplinary fine of P200 upon the petitioner. In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29236) and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29247), this Court speaking thru Justice Enrique Fernando, ruled: There can be no justification then for the Public Service Commission (now the Board of Communications as successor in interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer . The only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was to fix rates It could not take to task a radio company for an negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. That it did then in these two petitions lacked the impress of validity. In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service Commission lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion.

GLOBE WIRELESS LTD vs PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION Facts: A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by private respondent Antonio B. Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted to the Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. The latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee. After being informed of said fact, private respondent Arnaiz, sent to then Public Service Commissioner Enrique Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the incident. Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the letter-complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery of the message to the addressee. Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order finding petitioner "responsible for the inadequate and unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the Public Service Act" and ordering it "to pay a fine of TWO HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS under Sec. 21 of Com. Act 146, as amended." petitioner was likewise required to refund the sum of P19.14 to the remitter of the undelivered message. Issue: Whether or not Public Service Commission has jurisdiction on this matter. Held: Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended otherwise known as the Public Service Act, vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction, supervision and control over all Public services and their franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited respondent Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner only to the rate which petitioner may charge the Public. Thus,

Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee only with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to international commitments made or adhered to by the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.) The act complained of consisted in petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic message of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed negligence had nothing whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner. Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as amended, the Commission was empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure by a Public service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. petitioner operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to violate. Neither was there any order, decision or regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied or disregarded. Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under consideration belonged to this category.

ERDULFO C. BOISER vs COURT OF APPEALS Facts: The petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City and other municipalities in the province of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing business under the name and style of Premiere Automatic Telephone Network. Sometime in August, 1965, the petitioner and private respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a contract denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities through the use of the PLDT relay station in Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. The arrangement enabled subscribers of Premiere in Bohol to make or receive long distance and overseas calls to and from any part of the Philippines and other countries of the world. Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services and qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the required standards in the operation of facilities under the agreement. On February 27, 1979, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate the connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone system in the province of Bohol. Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation of the aforecited " Interconnecting Agreement." To avert serious consequences to the public and private hours resulting from any disruption of the petitioner's telephone network and, of course, to the long distance and overseas aspects of its business, the petitioner was compelled to seek judicial relief. It instituted Civil Case No. 17867 with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu now a Regional Trial Court, for injunction and damages. On March 2, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Cebu is a temporary restraining order against respondent PLDT and directed the preservation of the status quo between the parties. On August 2, 1979, or five (5) months after the issuance of the temporary restraining order, the private respondents filed a motion to dissolve or lift the restraining order. Thereafter, the petitioner and the private

respondents submitted the merits of the main case to a hearing and agreed to consider jointly in said trial on the merits the motion to dissolve or lift temporary restraining order including the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether or not National Telecommunication Commission has jurisdiction over breach of contract case. Held: The case before the trial court is for injunction arising from breach of contract. Premiere asks for compliance with the terms of the contract and for the payment of P100,000.00 exemplary and moral damages in addition to attorney's fees. PLDT has cited in full the authority and powers given by Presidential Decree No. 1 to the Board of Communications, now National Telecommunications Commission. There is nothing in the Commission's powers which authorizes it to adjudicate breach of contract cases, much less to award moral and exemplary damages. The two authorities cited by the private respondents in the bid to dissolve the CFI restraining order do not appear adequate to disregard the thirty (30) day prior notice provided by the Interconnecting Agreement. But even if they were, this question is one which should be clarified in the civil case for breach of contract. Clearly, therefore, what the petitioner is questioning is an order which does not merely involve "a purely internal transaction of a telecommunications company" but one which would necessary affect rights guaranteed it by the contract allegedly violated. We ruled in RCPI v. Board of Communications (80 SCRA 471): We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, 'being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute'. Filipino Bus Co. vs. Phil. Railway Co., 57 Phil. 860.) The functions of the Public Service Commission are limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by Statute. (Batangas Laguna, Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Public Service Commission, L-25994 and L-2600426046, August 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 111.) As successor in of the Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same powers, jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the Public Service Commission. ... The Board of Communications has been renamed National Telecommunications Commission. The NTC has no jurisdiction, and the PLDT has made no showing of any, not even by necessary implication, to decide an issue involving breach of contract. And as we stated in RCPI v. Board of Communications, "if in the two cases before us, complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Inocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation, ... the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications." Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. (Pimentel v. Comelec, 101 SCRA 769). It cannot be conferred by the will of the parties. (Salandanan v. Tizon, 62 SCRA 388). The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint. (Lat v. PLDT, 67 SCRA 425.)

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR vs HONORABLE CARLITO A. EISMA,

Fact: National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao, Zamboanga City. 3 Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm 4 before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances. Then came, on May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against private respondent, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice, non-payment of living allowances; and "employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. 5 It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike, "including the ninety (90) ballots, of which 79 voted for yes and 6 7 three voted for no." The strike began on May 23, 1982. On July 9, 1982, private respondent Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and members of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order." 8 It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and suppliers free ingress to or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. It was contended that the acts complained of were incidents of picketing by defendants then on strike against private respondent, and that therefore the exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, not to a court of first instance.10 There was, as noted earlier, a motion to dismiss, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for damages filed by the employer. Held: On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in three decisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter, not a court, that ossesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike. In PepsiCola Bottling Co. v. Martinez, 25 the issue was set forth in the opening paragraph, in the ponencia of Justice Escolin: "This petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raises anew the legal question often brought to this Court: Which tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over an action filed by an employee against his employer for recovery of unpaid salaries, separation benefits and damages the court of general jurisdiction or the Labor Arbiter of the 26 National Labor Relations Commission [NLRC]?" It was categorically held: "We rule that the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction over the case." 27 Then came this portion of the opinion: "Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue before us should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute now in force. We find that law in presidential Decree 1691 which took effect on May 1, 1980, Section 3 of which reads as follows: ... Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: ... 3. All money claims of workers, including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits; 4. Cases involving household services; and 5. All other claims 28 arising from employer-employee relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code." That same month, two other 29 30 cases were similarly decided, Ebon v. De Guzman and Aguda v. Vallejos.

Angara vs Electoral Commission In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of

office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC. ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter. Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries. That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority. That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.