1 Introduction A 1927 article in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science predicted a promising future

for lighter than air aircraft: Because of its size, the airship will ... act as a long-distance carrier, particularly between continents and over oceans, with the airplane furnishing feeder lines coordinating with it1. This was a common sentiment at the time as airship development programs in Germany, Britain and the United States quickly improved the speed, range, lifting power and reliability of airships. This did not last, however. In 1949, however, Hugo Eckener, who had lead the German airship effort for decades, wrote that The role of [the airship] in commerce seems to have been ended after a brief period of glory, just as it had been developed to the point of acceptance2 While the reasons behind the end of the era of the airship are at least partially understood, it is somewhat difficult to understand this disappearance in light of existing paradigms in the social study of technologyparticularly the multi-level perspective. This essay will argue that the multi-level perspective must be modified to include the notion of a confidence gap if it is to accommodate case studies of failed technologies such as the airship. A confidence gap is a period during the transition process characterized by a high level of public exposure without a high level of public commitment. During this time, a sociotechnical transition is highly vulnerable to random happenstance such as accidents, political interference or financial mismanagement. The first section of this paper will provide a theoretical argument for the confidence gap, drawing on criticism of Geels as well as Pinch and Bijkers concept of the public proof and Callons framing and overflowing dynamic. The second section will explain the validity of the airship as a case study to demonstrate the
1 Litchfield, 1927. p. 79 2 Robinson, 1973. p. 324.

2 existence of this phenomenon, and the third section will provide evidence for this thesis using historical accounts of the German, British and American airship programs. Lastly, a discussion will conclude that the case of the airship can serve to defend the multi-level perspective from certain criticisms, but only if the theory is modified to accommodate failed technologies.

Theoretical Background According to Frank W. Geels multi-level perspective, socio-technical transitions occur when technologies which have been developed to maturity in sheltered niches are given an opportunity to supplant incumbent technologies due to pressure from the broader social landscape3. This implies that socio-technical regime changes are a function of just two processes: shifting selection pressures and coordination of resources in the socio-technical regime4. This simple dynamic allows Geels to create a kind of matrix, in which intersecting variations of landscape and niche factors can be used to describe the expected course of any given socio-technical transition process5. This implies a certain determinism, in which the success of one technology over another can be explained entirely by broad socio-technical factors. So long as the multi-level perspective is applied only retrospectively to successful technologies, as Genus and Colls have accused it of doing6, the multi-level perspective can maintain its implied determinism by reading niche and landscape causal factors into its case studies. Genus and Colls' complain that this privileging of successful technologies effectively leaves the black box closed7. The

3 4 5 6 7

Geels, 2001. p. 1258. Geels, 2007. p. 400. Geels, 2007. p. 400. Genus and Colls. 2007., p. 7. Genus and Colls. 2007., p. .9.

3 case of the airship is one good example of why such a neat and tidy view of socio-technical transitions is an insufficient explanation. Airships' attempted transition was quickly abandoned, despite a landscape that remained largely the same and a technology that continued to develop. To resolve this difficulty, it is first necessary to answer Genus and Coles' complaint that the start and end-points of a transition are ill-defined within Geels' framework8. If regime stability comes from linkages between heterogeneous socio-technical elements9, then a transition process can be declared finished once a technology that once existed only in a sheltered niche has gained the support and investment of a range of political, economic, cultural, social or other actors, institutions or structures which make it difficult to remove. There is a difficulty in attaining this status. It is not sufficient merely to court the support of powerful and wellinformed decision makers in order to push a technology into a regime. Michel Callon has shown that framing of issues between a small group of actors is a difficult and fragile process requiring a great deal of investment10. Even formal legal arrangements exist in a complex social space11. Crisis situations, such as the hole in the hole in the ozone layer or mad cow beef in Britain can lead to a situation where the various actors and their interests are in constant fluctuation, but even when they enter the debate they are incapable of reaching agreements either on the facts or on the decisions that should be taken12. Technologies in the midst of a transition must contend with public opinion before the changed socio-technical regime can return to the cold world, where actors are identified,

8 9 10 11 12

Genus and Coles, 2007. p.5 Geels, 2001, p. 1259. Callon, 1998. p. 249. Callon, 1998. p. 251. Callon, 1998. P. 254.

4 interests are stabilized, preferences can be expressed, responsibilities are acknowledged or accepted13. This cold situation is reminiscent of Geels socio-technical regime, where understood relationships between different socio-technical spheres serve to entrench a systems presence and public opinion is a matter of little concern. In order to get to this stage, it is necessary to first transition through the hot stage, and there the public plays a large role. Pinch and Bijkers history of the pneumatic bicycle tire is illustrative of the fact that public evaluations of technology are unlikely to be entirely rational. The efficacy of public tires was in dispute until the victory of a pneumatic-tired bicycle in a race served to persuade the public of their usefulness14. This was sufficient to persuade the general public to adopt pneumatic tires, despite the fact that bicycle races were only able to prove the superiority of pneumatic tires for going as fast as possible15. This reveals the public to be only boundedly rational. Public decisions are influenced by influenced by media bias, cultural instability, disinformation, and emotion rather than a careful empirical appraisal of a technology. Pinch and Bijker's example of a public proof, must also permit the existence of a public disproof. If the effectiveness of pneumatic tires in a race can persuade cyclists to use them on their ride to work, then a fiery crash can persuade travellers or investors that a particular means of transportation is not worthwhile. Two factors are required for this: a technology must have a lot of public attention without being so widespread and entrenched as to be indispensable-it must be in Callons hot situation-as it is while gathering public support in the midst of a transition, and it must experience an event which generates a lot of negative publicity-a public disproof, as implied by Pinch and Bijker. This implies confidence gap, or a
13 Callon, 1998. p. 254. 14 Pinch and Bijker, 1987. p. 45. 15 Pinch and Bijker, 1987. p. 45.

5 period of vulnerability during a transition process in which accidents and other bad publicity can provoke a negative public reaction which can then abort a socio-technical transition

6 The Passenger Airship as a Case Study In addition to being an excellent example of an emergent technological regime which was rapidly and unexpectedly aborted, the passenger airships size and visibility had the effect of exaggerating the effects discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, the history of airships before their disappearance accords well with Geels' assertion that radical new technologies ...usually emerge as 'hopeful monstrosities' [with] relatively low technical performance...Niches are important because they provide locations for learning processes [and also] provide space to build the social networks which support innovations16 Airships were at different times and places, military weapons, propaganda tools, and tourist attractions. Further evidence for this will be provided in the following case studies. It is first necessary, however, to point out that the failure of airships cannot be explained simply by reference to technical inferiority when placed against airplanes. Airships had a considerable head-start on airplanes in the development of commercial intercontinental travel17. The first commercial airplane flights across the Atlantic were not carried out until fifteen years after the final passenger airship flights18. Aerostatic lift, furthermore, is inherently more efficient than aerodynamic lift, so airships will always have a fuel economy advantage over airplanes, allowing cheaper flights and more spacious passenger quarters19. While this paper will remain agnostic on the question of technical superiority, the following case studies show that contingency must be invoked to explain the airships failure.

16 Geels, 2007. p, 1261. 17 Abbot and Walmsley, 1998. p. 76 18 The first proper transcontinental passenger airliner was De Havilland Comet, which first flew with passengers in 1952. Walker, 2007. p. 12. 19 Robinson, 1973. p. 325

7 German Airships The case of the German airship is perhaps the most effective demonstration of the hazards of the confidence gap. Count Zeppelin built the first rigid airships in a niche as an experimental military craft with state support20. Within this sheltered environment, Zeppelin was able to perfect the most basic problems of a steerable balloon. A more effective form of niche protection came after the first long-distance flight of Zeppelin's fourth airship. The LZ4 flew over several German cities, with prompting spontaneous mass patriotic displays and canon salutes below. That night, a storm carried the LZ4 from its moorings and into a hillside, where it burned. The distress of the population on hearing of the demise of the proved to be an asset, and within the first day after the loss of LZ4, Zeppelin had raised enough money through private donations to pay for a replacement21. In Callon's terms, the zeppelin's size, visibility and prestige caused it to quickly overflow into the public sphere rather than remaining a matter to be negotiated purely between Zeppelin and the German Air Ministry22. This new association of the airship with German patriotism helped shelter the airship in its military niche23 and saw the airship through its development into a weapon which was used with marginal effectiveness during the First World War24. The outcome of the wartime airship serves as evidence for Geels' theories about the role of technical niches to allow for the improvement of technologies before they ascend into the socio-technical regime25. The wartime niche produced significant improvements in the German airships, and motivated the Zeppelin's first intercontinental flight: a supply run from
20 Robinson, 1973. p. 18. 21 Robinson, 1973. p. 39-40. 22 Callon, 1987. p. 8. 23 Syon, 2002. p. 62 24 Some German military staff were reluctant to adopt the airship due to concerns about its effectiveness, but overwhelming public support made it almost impossible to refuse their use. Robinson, 1973. p. 77. 25 Geels cites military applications as a specific example of a niche. Geels, 2001. p. 261.

8 Jamboli to Khartoum26. The terms of the armistice-a very important break in the landscapedemanded the end of the German military airship program, forcing the zeppelin to find a new niche for further development27. Hugo Eckener; Count Zeppelin's successor at the Zeppelin Company, devised a bold strategy of pursuing a transatlantic passenger airship line28. In Geels' terms, this would entail transitioning the airship from a technological niche into the techno-social regime. The process, as Eckener recognized, would require the procurement significant international political support and international investment. Eckener, therefore spared no opportunity to promote the airship to political and financial powerbrokers. Promotional flights included the delivery flight of LZ 126, which was intentionally planned to fly over major German cities on the way to the United Sates29, and a round-the world flight by a long-range passenger prototype the Graf Zeppelin, on which international media and dignitaries were given seats30. Eckener was intentionally placing the airship into what Callon would call a hot situation, in order to secure investment, political favours and customers. Early signs were that this strategy was effective. The flights earned Eckener the enthusiastic approval of the travelling public and the growing interest of American financiers31, and permitted him to build relationships with such important people as William Randolph Hearst and President Roosevelt32. The Hindenburg, intended to be the first viable intercontinental commercial airship, completed a commercially successful season flying between Friedrichshafen, Rio Di Janeiro and New York City. Its landings attracted considerable media attention, so photographers and
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 Robinson, 1973. p. 252. Robinson, 1973. p. 259. Syon, 2002. p. 107. Robinson, 1973. p. 260. Robinson, 1973. p. 268 Robinson, 1973. p. 288. Robinson, 1973. p. 267.

9 reporters were frequently present for its arrivals at Lakehurst. This meant that when the Hindenburg spontaneously burst into flames and crashed over Lakehurst, New Jersey on 2 May, 1937, the event was very well documented for the public33. This had a dramatic effect on the subsequent fortunes of the German airship. The Graf Zeppelin's homeward journey immediately after the disaster at Lakehurst was the last passenger airship flight ever flown34. While the failure of the German passenger airship can be ascribed to many causes, including the rapid developments in airplane range and lifting power during the Second World War35, the Hindenburg crash nevertheless had a dramatic short-term effect. There were two years between the crash of the Hindenburg and the outbreak of War, during which time no airships flew. The Hindenburg and its sister-ships would have had a good chance to attract American investors during those two years. Furthermore, the Hindenburg disaster removed any association between the airship and German patriotism, thereby permitting Herman Goering to destroy the airship works during the Second World War36. If the Lakehurst disaster did not kill the airship outright, its public relations fallout at least placed the airship in a coma.

British Airships The pattern established by the Hindenburg disaster repeated itself during two separate British airship development programs. Early British airships, like their German counterparts, existed in a military niche during and immediately after the First World War. This niche permitted the development of the mooring mast, which allows airships to land in difficult wind

33 34 35 36

Robinson, 1973. p. 291. Robinson, 1973. p. 294. Airships were tactically obsolete by the beginning of the Second World War. Robinson, 1973. p. 296. Syon, 2002. p. 202.

10 conditions37; apparatus to deploy airplanes while in flight38; and the removal of an airships keel, allowing significant weight savings39. Important British airship achievements included a world endurance record set in 1919 by NS 11, which was destroyed by a lightning strike shortly thereafter40, and he first transatlantic airship flight, which took place aboard the British R34 in 191941. British military governance in the post-war years prioritized economy, and so military support for the airship program waned. Faced with the imminent destruction of their technological niche, the British airship's supporters attempted to promote the commercial potential of lighter than air craft. These efforts were ended dramatically with the wreck of the R38, which crashed and burned over Hull in 1921, killing 44 American and British servicemen. Robinson recounts the public reaction to this: The deaths of so many brave men from both sides of the Atlantic brought an outcry against the rigid airship, and together with the economy drive which closed down the British airship service after August 1, 1921, the R38 disaster seemed to put paid to a costly experiment which had failed to produce any results42

As a result of the disaster, the R34 was grounded and no British airships flew for over a decade. This was not the end of British experimentation with rigid airships. With the commercial airplane still in its infancy, the airship remained the most effective way for Britain to access its colonies in North America, India, Africa and Australia. A sea voyage from Britain to Australia

37 38 39 40 41 42

Abbot and Walmsley, 1998. p. 24. Abbot and Walmsley, 1998. p. 63. Robinson, 1973. p. 158. Abbot and Walmsley, 1998. p. 7. Robinson, 1973. p. 164. Robinson, 1973. p. 173.

11 would take six weeks, while an airship flight would take only two days43. A second British naval airship program was therefore initiated to reach overseas colonies. Two airships were constructed: One, the R100, by a private company, and the other, the R101, by the air ministry44. Landing infrastructure-a sign of growing socio-technical entrenchment- was constructed in Britain, Canada, India, South Africa and Australia before either airship flew45. The R100 experienced early success: a flight to Montreal was completed without any serious incidents46. Like the Graf Zeppelin, and the R34, however, R100's success was tempered by its sister-ship's failure: R101, suffering from numerous design problems, crashed and burned in a field outside of Beauvais, France on its way to India47. The crash of the R101 ...together with a Cabinet minister and so many brave men, produced a thrill of horror and revulsion, not only in the British public but also in the Labour government48. The R100 was scrapped and British rigid airships never flew again. Catastrophe during a critical testing period had twice caused negotiations over the British airship to overflow into the public sphere, where it was quickly rejected it as a dangerous technology.

American Airships Unlike with civil airships in Britain and Germany which attempted to transition out of a military niche, the American transition had widespread military use as its endpoint. The import of the USS Los Angeles from Germany in 1924 set off a string of purely military airship innovations including mid-flight water recovery49 and improvements to the launch of scout
43 44 45 46 47 48 49 Robinson, 1973. p. 296. Robinson, 1973. p. 297. Robinson, 1973. p. 298. Abbot and Walmsley, 1998. p. 89. Abbot and Waslmsley, 1998. p. 93. Robinson, 1973. p. 314. Robinson, 1973. p. 198.

12 planes from the ship50. The eventual goal was to create an effective long-range airship scout in the Pacific51. When the Shenandoah, the Americans' first home-built airship and the world's first helium airship52, flew over New York and Washington, it was greeted with ticker-tape parades below53, and a two-way transcontinental flight was hailed as a precursor to an American passenger airship service54. The end of the American airship began with the loss of the Shenandoah in bad weather over Ohio. This did not have any significant relations affect, but it did have the notable effect of killing Commander Zachary Lansdowne-a competent commander and important advocate for naval airships. The fate of the American Naval airship would undoubtedly have taken a different course had he survived55. The airship program continued despite the loss of the Shenandoah, as the USS Akron had already been built and the Macon was on the way. The Akron, however, suffered a series of misfortunes. Weather damage prevented its participation in the 1932 annual fleet problem56, and it had performed poorly on a number of scouting exercises57. Its destruction in a storm was, according to Robinson, the beginning of the end of the rigid airship in the United States58. Admiral Moffatt, another staunch advocate for the airship, was lost in the crash, and the high death toll began to turn public and military opinion against the rigid airship. Akron's sistership, the Macon, performed poorly in exercises, partly because a skeptical naval leadership denied it funding that to improve its methods59. Macon

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

Robinson, 1973. p. 240. Robinson, 1973. p. 182. Robinson, 1973. p. 191. Robinson, 1973. p. 191. Robionson, 1973. p. 200-201. Robinson, 1973. p. 206. Robinson, 1973. p. 234. Ibid. Robinson, 1973. p. 238. Robinson, 1973. p. 240.

13 crashed over the Pacific in 1935. There were no casualties, but as a result of the crash, Congress and the public were convinced by an unremitting newspaper campaign that rigid airships were expensive killers and useless into the bargain. No more American airships were built to replace the Macon.

Discussion and Conclusion The three case studies mentioned in this paper all display the same pattern: airships found supportive military niches in three different nations, where the technology was improved until it had the capacity for intercontinental flight. The beginnings of a socio-technical transition were illustrated by an alignment of public opinion, political accommodation and business interests as the airship began to incorporate itself into the socio-technical regime. This transition was then aborted due to dramatic accidents which quickly turned public opinion against the airship. Had the airship been commercially successful, its ascent could likely have been modelled as an example of Geels' reconfiguration pathway60. After Zeppelins early experiments, the airship was adopted in a local military context. It began to ascend to be a widespread form of passenger transportation and had potential to become an important part of the socio-technical regime. In reality, this transition pathway was cut short by a series of unpredictable accidents.. The destruction of the Hindenburg, R101, R38, USS Akron and USS Macon came from random happenstance that is not accounted for in the Multi-Level Perspective. It is important to note that there were other airship accidents that did not have this effect. The American and British airship programs continued undeterred by the wrecks of the
60 Geels, 2007. p. 411.

14 Shenandoah and NS 11 respectively, and the wreck of the LZ4 actually improved the standing of the airship in Germany. That the timing of such accidents is crucial: the airship crashes which proved most devastating occurred in a crucial transitional period. Technologies are uniquely vulnerable to such blind happenstance while they attempt to cross this confidence gap. To put it bluntly with reference to the most well-known example, the Hindenburg chose the worst possible time to explode. To answer Genus and Coles' criticism of the multi-level perspective as overly dependent on case studies of successful technologies61, more multi-level perspective research should be conducted on failed technologies. If Geels' framework is to be turned in this direction, however, it must allow for the added complexity produced by random contingencies by incorporating the confidence gap as a necessary phase in a socio-technical transition. So long as airship crashes, untimely deaths, personal feuds or other random events exist to upset a technology during this vulnerable stage, the multi-level perspective never be entirely predictive.

61 Genus and Coles, 2007. p. 6.

15 References

Abbot, Patrick and Walmsley, Nick. 1998. The British Airship in Pictures: An Illustrated History 1784-1998. Colonsay: Redwood Books. Callon, Michel. An Essay on Framing and Overflowing. In M. Callon, ed. 1998. The Laws of the Markets. Oxford: Blackwell. p. 244-269. Geels, Frank W. 2001. Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: a multi-level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy 31. p. 1257-1274. Geels, Frank W. And Schot, Johan. 2007. Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways, Research Policy 36. p. 399-417. Genus, Audley and Coles, Anne-Marie. 2007. A Critique of Geels' Multi-level Perspective of Technological Transition. International Summer Academy on Technology Studies-Transitioning the Energy System. Litchfield, P.W. 1987. Lighter-Than-Air-Craft. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. 131. p. 79-85. Pinch, Trevor J. And Bijker, Wiebe E. The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology might Benefit Each Other. In Bijker, Wiebe E. Pinch, Trevor J., and Hughes, Thomas Park, eds. 1987. The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the History of Science and Technology. Cambridge: MIT Press. 17-50. Robinson, Douglas-Hill. 1973. Giants in the Sky: A History of the Rigid Airship. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Syon, Guillame de. Zeppelin!: Germany and the Airship, 1900-1939. Baltimore: Johns Hopskins University Press. Walker, Timothy, 2007. The First Jet Airliner: The Story of the De Havilland Comet. Newcastle: SCOVAL publishing.