Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582

www.elsevier.com/locate/renene

Sustainable energy development: performance

and prospects
Michael Jefferson *
Chairman, Policies Committee, World Renewable Energy Network/Congresses, Woodside House, Melchbourne,
Bedfordshire MK44 1BB, UK
Available online 3 November 2005

Abstract
Concerns about sustainability, and the harsh realities of environmental catastrophe, can be traced back at
least 4000 years. This paper points out how human pressures on the surrounding environment have had
severe consequences over this period, coal burning has had adverse consequences traceable over the past
750 years, and the adverse environmental impacts of using other fossil fuels have aroused attention more
recently. Heightened awareness of the need for sustainable development is a modern development, evident
in international and national debates since the early 1970s. With the Brundtland Commission report
published in 1987 came a framework for sustainable energy development. However, performance under the
four elements of that framework have been almost uniformly disappointing. Fossil fuel use has continued to
rise; renewable energy use has made insufficient inroads; waste and inefficiency in energy usage continues
to be far too high; too many people remain without modern energy services or are exposed to severe
pollution in the home and local atmosphere; there are mounting concerns about the conventional oil
resource base—and future supplies and prices of oil and natural gas; greenhouse gas emissions continue to
rise and evidence of human-induced climate change continues to mount. Indices of national environmental
performance suggest no country is performing adequately; population, housing and transportation pressures
result in greater pollution, loss of natural habitats, and species reduction; and poor governance is frequently
cited as a major cause of poor environmental performance. The prospects for sustainable energy are bleak
on current trends.
q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Human activities have long had a devastating impact on the local environment and the
capacity of societies to survive. About 4000 years ago, both in the Sumerian Empire of

* Corresponding author. Tel./fax: C44 1234 708 285.

E-mail address: jeffers@dircon.co.uk

0960-1481/$ - see front matter q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.renene.2005.09.002
572 M. Jefferson / Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582

Mesopotamia and in the Indus Valley city civilisations of Harrapa and Mohenjo-daro,
societies went into terminal decline because of food and potable water shortages in relation
to population size. About 2500 years ago Hippocrates, the physician of Ancient Greece,
linked air quality and climate to human health and character. Theophrastus, nearly 2400
years ago, wrote of the links between forest clearing and local climatic change—as
Christopher Columbus was to do 2000 years later (surprising, therefore, that an Australian
research team was paid to discover the same relationship in Brazil, as announced in March,
2005). Theophrastus was following Aristotle and, in common with others of his followers,
was able to draw on Aristotle’s vast 10-part compendium on zoology drawn from first-hand
observation.
It is no accident that the knowledge of Aristotle’s teachings, passed down through
Muslims in Spain and Byzantium, has influenced later Christian thought—and, in the case
of St Francis of Assisi, daily life. Further to the East, for Confucius and Lao Tse, the need
to work with—and be at one—with Nature was an obvious truth. Similar sentiments were
to be found in the Brahmanic and Vedic literature of ancient India.
The impacts of the collapse of ancient irrigation systems and soil erosion caused by
population growth and unsustainable agricultural practices are obvious to this day in many
parts of the Middle East, from Iran and Iraq through Bahrain and some of the Emirates to
Yemen. It is clear from the indications of pantheism in the philosophical works of early
Muslim writers, and the wonderful landscapes produced in Shiraz, Isfahan, and Herat, that
there was a deep-rooted feeling of linkage between surrounding Nature and Muslims over
the centuries. In the Middle East region today, as in parts of Africa and Asia, chronic
water shortages, poor water quality, and diversion (as in Israel) threaten increased conflict.
In short, the issue of “sustainability” has long been with human societies—even in the
absence of sudden calamities arising from volcanic eruptions or tsunamis—and use of
the word sustainable in this context of sustaining life and Nature goes back at least 600
years.
However, adoption of the word “sustainable”—in the conscious and specific context of
development which manages to balance present and future needs—is of much more recent
origin, though it pre-dates its adoption in the Cocoyoc Declaration nearly 35 years ago.
Similarly, the specific concept of sustainable energy development is of recent origin,
traceable to the origin of the work undertaken by the Brundtland Commission from 1983.
Yet air quality in several of Europe’s mediaeval cities left much to be desired due to coal
burning. The best known example is London where, by the year 1257, English Royalty
were complaining about the adverse consequences of coal burning on air quality. Within 50
years the death penalty had been introduced for anyone burning coal, and it took almost
100 years and the redesign of fireplaces for that decree to be rescinded.
Over the past 250 years many parts of the World have suffered from the adverse impacts
of coal burning, and some still do, while the results of motor vehicle pollution were
widespread phenomena of the twentieth-century and are still felt today in many areas.
Nowadays, in richer societies and among the richer sections of society in many countries,
serious questions should be asked about the wasteful and profligate use of energy—and how
consumption can be reduced through increasing awareness of the need to avoid waste and
to think about how each of us uses energy. And yet it was not until 1997, at the 19th UN
Special Assmbly meeting (UNGASS-19) that the UN system first focussed intergovern-
mental attention on energy for sustainable development.
 M. Jefferson / Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582 573

2. The Concept of Sustainable Energy Development

So what is now meant by sustainable energy development? In 1987, the Brundtland

Commission’s Report provided four key elements of sustainable energy:

– sufficient growth of energy supplies to meet human needs (including accommodating

relatively rapid growth in developing countries);
– energy efficiency and conservation measures, in order to minimise waste of primary
resources;
– addressing public health and safety issues where they arise in the use of energy resources; and
– protection of the biosphere and prevention of more localised forms of pollution.

Nearly 20 years on, how have we been doing? As a World, from a European Community
perspective, from the likely vantage point of those in developing countries, and in selected
countries—in terms of each of these four? More particularly, how have we been doing in curbing
the use of fossil fuels; extending the use of ‘new’ renewable energy—especially active solar,
modern biomass, wind, small hydro, geothermal, and wave power; and cutting carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions from the use of the fossil fuels?
Brief answers can be given to each of these questions here, before providing more
information about performance on ‘new’ renewable energy and CO2 emissions. First, while
growth has continued in primary energy supplies overall, the expansion of renewable energy
supplies has been generally disappointing. Some observers and industry specialists would regard
nuclear electric power as not having had the backing it required as the principal means of
substituting relatively rapidly for the fossil fuels in electricity generation, and some of those
would be sceptical about efforts to discourage moves in this direction interpreted—rightly or
wrongly—as a cover for developing a national nuclear weapons capability. There are also, and
not least, serious problems looming for conventional oil and natural gas availability—probably
within 20 years.
Secondly, energy efficiency and conservation measures have generally been woefully
inadequate over the past 20 years, with clear signs of a lack of political leadership and courage.
One of the most obvious fields in which there has been failure is that of buildings and ancillary
services. Modern architecture has been almost universally designed around North American and
Western European fashions and preferences in terms of materials, windows, and heights. There
seems to have been little appreciation of the advantages that local architectural traditions—
vernacular architecture—can bring in tackling comfort requirements in response to extremes of
heat and cold. Yet there is widespread awareness of the beauty and energy efficiency of much of
the vernacular architecture of the Yemen, Iran, and elsewhere in the Middle East. Another
obvious area is transportation, where continuing expansion of oil use is pointing ever more
directly to the coming constraints on fuel supplied from conventional oil resources and inertia in
providing viable alternatives in time.
Thirdly, around two billion people still suffer significant health problems from the collection
and use of fuels, especially through burning traditional biomass in confined spaces and the
burning of coal without due regard to health and environmental impacts. Fourthly, coal burning
in many parts of Asia continues to have severe local environmental impacts, notably on crops,
other vegetation and human health while CO2 emissions from fossil fuel burning are rising at the
World level and many industrialised countries are continuing to increase their emissions of this
greenhouse gas.
574 M. Jefferson / Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582

The fundamental conclusion of this paper is that the World is not yet pursuing a path of
sustainable energy development. In particular, ‘new’ renewable energy, despite much talk of
needs and targets—and posturing about performance—has not made the inroads it should have
done over the past 20 years. In North America, the share of renewable energy in total primary
energy supply has actually declined, as it also has in Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Norway,
Mexico, and Turkey. This is also the case for some EU-15 countries. Perhaps more significantly,
given the stress laid by the EU Commission and most of its Member Countries on the targets of
increasing the share of renewable energy in electricity generation, it is noteworthy that between
1990 and 2003 EU-15 Member States only increased their renewables share from 13.4 to 13.7%.
[The corresponding EU-25 figures are 12.2% and 12.8%]. Wind capacity growth accelerated in
Denmark, Germany, Spain and the UK in 2004, but there is a very long way to go. For example,
wind power in the UK in 2004 represented 0.1575% of electricity generation (and 4.4% of
renewable energy), yet the UK’s Minister of Energy claimed in November, 2004 that between 70
and 80% of the UK’s 10% target of electricity from renewables would come from wind by 2010!
Although the share of renewable energy in total primary energy supply in International
Energy Agency (IEA) Member Countries increased from 4.6% in 1970 to 5.5% in 2001, most of
this increase occurred before 1990. This is highlighted by the fact that whereas renewable energy
fuelled 24% of electricity generation of IEA Member Countries in 1970, it accounted for only
15% by 2001. In the latter year about 85% of IEA Member countries’ wind and solar power
capacity remained confined to four and three countries, respectively. There is urgent need for
both wider and more rapid diffusion.
International initiatives to accelerate the diffusion of renewable energy technologies and use
have had little impact in recent years. Indeed, the G8 Renewable Energy Task Force Report was
not only most disappointing (its co-chairmanship and communications with its expert Advisory
Group were deeply flawed, its analytical framework weak, and its recommendations woefully
inadequate), it was not even discussed by G8 Ministers when they met in Genoa in mid-2001. At
Gleneagles in July, 2005, the G8 talked about acting ‘with resolve and urgency’ but were unable
to agree a timeframe or measurable targets. The UK’s Prime Minister has (to quote one of his
favoured research institutes, the IPPR) “boldly made climate change the centre of his diplomatic
efforts, pledging action during Britain’s G8 and EU Presidencies. He has underwritten this
commitment with domestic pledges setting the Government’s ambitious targets to combat global
warming. Britain leads the world in aiming for a 20% reduction on carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions from 1990 levels by 2010, rising to 60% by 2050”. Unfortunately, this clarion call was
emitted 24 h after Prime Minister Blair and his Environment Secretary had admitted that the
20% target was not realistically achievable by 2010, though they claim the EU ‘bubble’ target of
a 12.5% reduction still is—and a 14% reduction is now the target.
According to the EU’s submission to the UNFCCC’s Secretariat of July 6th, 2004, the UK
had already achieved a 14.9% reduction by 2002 for all greenhouse gases. But estimates of
energy-related CO2 emissions portray a very different picture. For these CO2 emissions alone the
reduction between 1990 and 2004 is now officially estimated at 4.2%, despite the huge benefits
from switching from coal to natural gas, privatisation, and increased competition in the early
1990s. CO2 emissions overall have been rising sharply since 2002, with those from the
transportation and residential sectors rising very rapidly. The UK Government has also rather
surprisingly announced its intention to tax windpower operators more than fossil fuel companies
through the introduction of new business rates that are expected to more than triple the taxes paid
by some green (renewable) electricity generators. This would seriously undermine the benefit of
the subsidies available to companies in the renewable energy sector. By announcing this on
 M. Jefferson / Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582 575

the eve of the UK’s Presidency of the G8 it was unclear what signals the Government was trying
to transmit.
Meanwhile, the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP) instituted in
August, 2002, following a Brazilian initiative (unfortunately BP has estimated that Brazil increased
its CO2 emissions by 52.7% between 1990 and 2004—far higher than any other Latin American
country in their estimates), made a great play at the Johannesburg Summit. Since then over 4500
‘results’ for REEEP have appeared on the Google Website, but unfortunately most of these go to
confirm the relative ease of emitting words rather than providing evidence of real action. This is but
one indication, of many, that blatant exaggeration of the ‘progress’ of new renewable energy
technologies and their use, especially by the windpower sector, is being substituted for reality. Many
of us would like to see a logical continuum of environmental sensitivity about all forms of energy and
its usage, from the impacts of the fossil fuels to those of renewable forms of energy, rather than
avoidance of the negative impacts of the former or (admittedly usually the lesser) the latter.
A third area, where there are grounds for concern is that of international climate change
negotiations and effective action to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Since the 1992 Earth
Summit in Rio and the adoption of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) very little has actually been achieved. The 10th Conference of Parties to the
UNFCCC, held in December, 2004, was dismissed by some delegates as the “Adaptation
Fiasco” (Earth Negotiations Bulletin, December 20, 2004, p. 23). While some have high
expectations that the introduction of emissions trading schemes will achieve significant results,
many others believe that these expectations are excessively high. Not only are greenhouse gas
emissions far higher for most Annex I Parties (some 24 industrialised countries and eleven
transitional ones) than they were in 1990 (and much higher than trajectories consistent with the
Kyoto Protocol), few countries are ready to embark on post-2012 negotiations. Thus Russia’s
accession to the Kyoto Protocol, which thereby brought the Protocol into force in February,
2005, currently seems a rather hollow success intended more to attract financial inflows under
Articles 6 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol than to curb emissions.
This rather pessimistic assessment was reinforced at the preparatory meeting for COP-11 (the
eleventh Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change), held in
Bonn 16–17 May, 2005. Industrialised countries could not find common ground on how to progress
beyond 2012, while developing countries refused to cap their emissions—partly on the grounds that
the industrialised countries for the most part were both increasing their emissions and failing to meet
their commitments to assist developing countries. Since then, at a large meeting in New York City in
September, 2005, the UK’s Prime Minister made several dismissive comments about the Kyoto
Protocol - which he (unhelpfully) described as "Fatally flawed"
The slow and weak progress on climate change negotiations is also paralleled, in the view of
some commentators, by insufficient progress within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). The IPCC is now engaged in its Fourth Assessment, but changes in that body’s
chairmanship and failure to bring in a sufficient number of people with practical experience have
undermined the standing of the organisation in a period when the impacts of climate change
appear to be growing.

3. Energy supplies

The first point that can be made about energy supplies is that the share of the fossil fuels in the
World’s primary energy mix has not fallen. In fact it rose between 2000 and 2004, and there are
good reasons to believe that this pattern will have continued through 2005 given the strong
576 M. Jefferson / Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582

Table 1
Fuel shares in world primary energy use—1990, 2000, 2004 (%)

1990 2000 2004

Oil 37.1 33.8 32.8
Natural gas 18.7 20.9 21.1
Coal 24.3 22.2 24.2
Total fossil fuels 80.1 76.9 78.1
Nuclear 5.5 6.0 5.4
Traditional biomass 11.0 9.6 8.8
Large hydro 2.0 5.4 5.5
‘New’ renewables 1.4 2.1 2.3

Source: BP “Annual Statistical Review of World Energy”, 2005 and author.

demand for coal and oil (not least in China). The shares of nuclear, large hydro, and traditional
biomass have declined, while coal has increased since 2000 (even in Germany, the UK, and
Sweden—Western Europe’s leaders in CO2 emissions reduction) (Table 1).
There has also been a great deal of work done on ultimately recoverable conventional oil
resources (not the conventional proved or probable reserve/production ratios). Using the US
Geological Survey’s (USGS) high, mid, and low resource estimates together with standard
demand estimates, we have reached the conclusion that on the USGS ‘mid’ estimate World
conventional oil demand is likely to be unmet by the year 2023. These results have been
presented in papers published in ‘Nature’, ‘Energy’ and elsewhere. Table 2 summarises the
results drawing on 36 scenarios:
The issue here is not only the coming scarcity of conventional oil, and in the slightly longer
term natural gas, but rising oil and natural gas import dependency and the declining number of
significant exporters. Whereas OECD oil import dependency was around 70% in the 1970s,
falling to 50/55% in the 1980s, by 2010 this figure is expected to exceed 60% and by 2020 70%.
For natural gas, EU-15 import dependency is expected to rise from 40% in 2000 to 70% by 2020,
and for the USA from 10% to over 40%. Such rapid rises in import dependency, and their high
absolute level, suggests that the potential for supply disruptions and sharp price rises will be
markedly increased, especially if importing nations have been cavalier about developing mutual
respect and understanding.
Troubles in the Middle East in recent decades highlight the dangers of failure to develop
mutual understanding and respect, together with the mutual tolerance of different religious faiths
and political systems. Most obviously, the Palestinian/Israeli conflict has for over 60 years
soured relationships throughout the region and created despair among Palestinians. Various
Western powers, led by the USA since the early 1940s at least, have failed to adopt an even-
handed approach or done what they should to pursue a just and sound solution to the plight
of Palestinians. The just resolution of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict will take appropriate
Table 2
Summary of results of 36 Conventional Oil Production Scenarios

No. of scenarios Oil resource estimate Year of global production decline Year global demand unmet
12 Low 2012 2007
12 Mid 2030 2023
12 High 2041 2033

Source: Hallock, Tharakan, Hall, Jefferson, Wu in “Energy”, Vol. 29 (2004), pp. 1673–1696, using USGS resource
estimates (their ‘High’ exceeded all previous estimates bar one).
 M. Jefferson / Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582 577

actions—and after sponsoring Israel for 60 years many will doubt the good faith and
effectiveness of US commitment to this goal.
More recently there has been talk of exporting democracy to the Middle East, and promoting
liberty and freedom. The upholding of democratic values has always been a sensitive issue, and
the subject of liberty and freedom a complex one. The need to balance the two concepts of
“liberty to” and “liberty from”—or “freedom to” and “freedom from”. The threats posed by even
genuine democratic regimes to these concepts when those in power seek to manipulate others.
The ease with which the collective arrogance of leaders and the supine acquiescence of close
followers can result in the abandonment of key principles and the committal of unacceptable
actions. There are ever-present dangers of “big government” eroding freedom and liberty even in
supposedly democratic regimes; the risks of political powers working on inadequate information
or false premises; the frequency with which government interventions have unintended
consequences—including increasing the extremism of opponents; and the hazards of failure to
act within the law.
The USA, which can proudly claim to have been central in defending liberty, freedom and
democracy during the two World Wars of the 20th-century, has not always used its military and
political hegemony sparingly, wisely, and well. In contrast to the response to Iraq’s incursion
into Kuwait in August, 1990 (the key role played by the US in the Gulf War January/February,
1991), more recent events in Iraq, and in response to terrorism, highlight the dangers. Both in the
USA and the UK there has been evidence of responses which undermine the fundamental values
validly claimed by both countries. Difficult though it is when faced with terrorism against
civilians, and incitement to terrorism from those claiming spiritual authority, it is essential that
the rules of traditional law and diplomacy are strictly adhered to.
Whereas in most business circles it would be axiomatic to seek the best feasible relationships
with suppliers, this seems to have been too often overlooked in dealings with critically important
oil and natural gas suppliers in the Middle East region as well as the region’s population at large.
The result has been an increased risk of supply disruptions and price hikes; loss of mutual
understanding and respect; reduced reliance on international law, diplomacy and conciliation;
and failure to gain overwhelming support for international action. In the absence of confidence
that the political and energy supply challenges mentioned here will be resolved and tensions
diminished in the near term, it might have been assumed that close attention would have been
given to expanding rapidly the contribution of ‘new’ renewable energy resources. Despite the
rhetoric, this has not been the case. As shown in Table 1, ‘new’ renewable energy increased its
contribution by just under one percentage point between 1990 and 2004, from 1.4 to 2.3%.

4. The Contribution of ‘New’ Renewable Energy

We have already noticed that in several industrialised countries renewable energy has
accounted for a declining share of total primary energy supply and, in even more countries, for a
declining share of electricity generation—the focus of EU policy and ‘optimistic’ targets. The
detailed figures for the EU-15 countries reinforce the picture of how little improvement there has
been since 1990 (Table 3):
It is true that there was a 42% increase in the EU’s supply of renewable and waste energy in
the period 1990 to 2003, and that there were increases across the board (although there have been
more recent declines in hydropower). Nevertheless, it is EU Governments and the EU
Commission which have trailed the bold targeted increases in the share of electricity generation
from renewable energy, and Eurostat which has presented the bleak reality. Only
578 M. Jefferson / Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582

Table 3
Shares of renewable energy in electricity generation—EU 15 1990 and 2003 (%)

1990 2003
Austria 65.4 55.9
Belgium 1.1 1.8
Denmark 2.4 23.2
Finland 24.4 21.8
France 14.6 13.0
Germany 4.3 7.9
Greece 5.0 9.6
Ireland 4.8 4.3
Italy 13.9 12.8
Luxembourg 2.1 2.3
Netherlands 1.4 4.7
Portugal 34.5 36.4
Spain 17.2 22.3
Sweden 51.4 40.0
UK 1.7 2.7
EU-15 13.4 13.7
EU-25 12.2 12.8

Source: Eurostat (August, 2005).

two countries—Denmark Spain—have achieved an expansion of renewable energy greater

than five percentage points. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the IEA has pointed out that by 2001 85%
of its member countries’ wind and solar power was confined to four and three countries,
respectively.
It is extremely unlikely that offshore windpower, and other well-publicised initiatives, can
achieve anywhere near the trumpeted targets for the UK by 2010, although in the longer run the
UK’s offshore wind and wave resource are very substantial. Windpower developments have
been taking place at an increasing pace in a number of other EU Member countries, most notably
Spain (though insufficient to counter Spain’s 60% increase in CO2 emissions since 1990). But
this writer has queried the feasibility of many EU-15 Member countries achieving their ‘bubble’
target ever since it was agreed on 17th June, 1998, and the fact that the UK Government
withdrew its own 20% target reduction on December 8th, 2004, is symptomatic.
Although, as shown in Table 1, the global contribution from ‘new’ renewable energy increased
by almost one percentage point between 1990 and 2004 the challenge remains that renewable
energy continues to start from a small base. This is particularly the case for the potentially
important, but currently minor sources such as solar and wave power (here tidal barrages are
specifically excluded, because on most estuaries so far considered they would have seriously
adverse environmental impacts). As the World Energy Assessment 2004 Updated Overview from
UNDP has shown, ‘new’ renewable energy continues to be overwhelmingly supplied from
biomass and geothermal (Table 4):

5. Exaggerated claims

One of the problems faced by policymakers and more casual observers alike is the large claims
made by protagonists of the various forms of ‘new’ renewable energy (with stridency that
arguably matches some in the fossil fuel businesses and ‘naysayers’ on whether human activities
can lead to global climatic change). Who would believe, for instance, that in 2004 in the UK
 M. Jefferson / Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582 579

Table 4
‘New’ renewable energy by source, 2001 (% contribution)

Modern biomass 68.0

Geothermal 23.8
Small hydro 4.1
Low-temperature solar heat 2.3
Wind electricity 1.7
Solar PV electricity 0.04
Solar thermal electricity 0.04
Marine energy 0.03

Source: World Energy Assessment Overview, 2004 Update, Table 6, p. 49, UNDP.

windpower only accounted for 4.4% of the 3.58% of electricity generation provided by renewable
energy (with capacity utilisation recovered to 26.6 from 24.1% the previous year)? Who would
know, outside this specialist field, that building windfarms in deep offshore waters is relatively
unknown territory, and not the guaranteed 20% contribution to electricity generation that some
organisations have loudly proclaimed (for the UK at least)? Who would guess that The
Netherlands’ first offshore wind farm will not start construction until Autumn, 2005 (at Egmond-
aan-Zee)? Who is aware that even Denmark’s impressive record has faced regular obstacles? We
know already that construction and maintenance costs of offshore wind farms are relatively high.
In the same vein, who would already realise that International Energy Agency member countries
fuelled 24% of their electricity generation from renewable sources in 1970, but only 15% in 2001?
The fact that wind-powered and solar PV electricity can claim 30% or so annual increases in
production in the past few years (other forms of renewable energy cannot make claims anywhere
near this mark) simply highlights the problem of achieving big successes from modest
beginnings. In 30 or 40 years time such annual increments, if they have been steadily
maintained, will indeed reach significant scale. But well before then, as Table 2 indicated for
conventional oil, the world is likely to be confronted with energy crises on a far larger scale.

6. Greenhouse gas emissions and climate change

Then, of course, there is the issue of greenhouse gas emissions and global climatic change.
Here the numerous statistical sources arguably add to the confusion rather than to enlightenment.
There is much to be said for keeping things as simple as possible—for instance, by using CO2
emissions estimates derived from primary energy balances (as provided by BP) rather than the
almost infinitely more complicated sources which seek to determine measurements for all
greenhouse gases at the establishment level (as attempted by many national sources). Using the
former source we can be fairly confident that World CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use rose by
24.4% between 1990 and 2004. Some ‘naysaying’ (to employ the expression used by the lead US
negotiator at the second Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change in 1996) or ‘sidling’ governments—such as the USA (up 24.4%), Canada (up 27.5%),
Australia (up 38.0%), New Zealand (up 24.1%)—may not occasion surprise. But Austria (at
C24.3%), Belgium (at C26%), Finland (at C19.2%), Greece (at C29.1%), Ireland (at
C58.6%), Italy (at C14.3%), Netherlands (at C23.8%), Norway (at C19.5%), Spain
(at C60.5%), or Portugal (at C55.4%)?
The only West European countries that succeeded in reducing their CO2 emissions between
1990 and 2004 are Germany (estimates vary between K11.7 and K12.6%), the UK (estimates
vary between K4.2 and K2.6%), Switzerland (K1.4%), and possibly Sweden (estimates vary
580 M. Jefferson / Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582

between K2.6 and K3.9%). In the case of both Germany and the UK, there have been increases
in CO2 emissions over the most recent period for which data exist, partly due to increased coal
use.
Some data series place higher figures still on countries’ CO2 emissions. There are also
examples of reductions in emissions of some other greenhouse gases with much higher global
warming potentials (such as methane, nitrous oxide, and the hydrofluorocarbons) which have led
some countries to produce more encouraging sounding reductions in CO2 equivalent (CO2e)
emissions numbers. Iceland is a particular case, having introduced aluminium smelting and its
associated sulphur hexafluoride emissions with a Global Warming Potential estimated by the
IPCC at 15,100 times that of CO2 over 20 years (22,200 over 100 years). In summary, the basic
data on fossil fuel use and CO2 emissions and trajectories are not nearly so encouraging at either
the global level or among the industrialised countries.
Inevitably, some of the largest percentage increases in CO2 emissions since 1990 have
occurred in developing countries, but where per capita emissions levels remain much lower than
in the leading industrial economies. China increased its CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2004
by about 94%, and by volume by nearly 700 million tonnes of elemental carbon (or 37% of the
total World increase over that period). Ten developing or newly industrialised countries
increased their CO2 emissions by even higher percentage figures (although the highest increase
in volume terms—India—was less than 12% that of China).
Looking at the various World regions, CO2 emissions rose over 42% in Central and South
America; by nearly 37% in Africa (including North Africa), with the poorer African countries
raising their emissions by 42%; and in the Asia/Pacific region these emissions rose by 78%. In the
Middle East region (including North Africa) the percentage rises have been significant (Table 5):
Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change the special circumstances of
developing countries are recognised; commitments on developing countries are dependent
upon effective implementation by developed country Parties to the Convention; and full
consideration should be given to the specific needs and concerns of—inter alia—countries
whose economies are highly dependent on income generated from the production,
processing, and export of fossil fuels. The Kyoto Protocol in turn lays stress on the
common but differentiated responsibilities of the Parties to it, and specifically refers to no
new commitments being taken on by Parties not included in Annex I. This last provision is
one that the USA in particular strongly objects to, believing that developing countries
should also have their (albeit vague) emissions reduction or constraint targets. One of the
accidents of history was the failure of the Chairman on the final morning of the Kyoto
Protocol negotiations to work a way through the desire of the US delegation to accede to
Table 5
Increases in CO2 emissions in the Middle East Region: 1990–2004 (%)

Qatar 142
Iran 110
Kuwait 108
UAE 76
Saudi Arabia 64
Egypt 53
South Africa 35
Algeria 10
Other Middle East 61

Source: BP (2005).
 M. Jefferson / Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582 581

the protocol provided there was some vague acknowledgement that leading developing
countries would seek to curb their emissions (at a time when many G77 countries would
have agreed provided relevant funding and technologies were made available). However,
with only four industrialised countries having reduced their CO2 emissions since 1990 (and
struggling to retain their reductions) the outlook is not encouraging. Only those economies
which are undergoing transition to a market basis have shown large reductions since the
break-up of the former Soviet Union. These comprise eleven Annex I Parties to the
UNFCCC, and in all but two of these countries CO2 emissions have begun to creep up
again with economic recovery.

7. Prospects

With performance in recent years over a wide range of sustainable energy development issues
having been so poor, what are the prospects for improvement and eventual success? It can be
claimed with some confidence that the prospects for early improvement are poor, but with
intensifying pressures over the longer-term chronic failure may ultimately be avoided. However,
the most recent and comprehensive examination of environmental sustainability around the
World [the latest version of the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), covering 146
countries, was published on 27th January, 2005], suggested to the Dean of the Yale School of
Forestry and Environmental Studies that: “No country is on a sustainable trajectory—and the
ESI demonstrates this.”
The ESI ranks countries on 76 variables (including energy consumption/GDP, renewable
energy production, coal use, vehicles in use, gasoline prices, VOC emissions, greenhouse gas
emissions, sulphur dioxide emissions, and particulate concentration); and 21 indicators
(including environmental governance, natural resource management, eco-efficiency, reducing
air pollution, participation in international collaborative efforts, and greenhouse gas emissions).
Stress is placed on assessments not only of pollution levels, but also environmental management
efforts and a society’s capacity to improve its environmental performance over time. Although
income is an important driver of environmental results, some countries have a poorer record on
good governance—including robust political debate, a free press, civil and political liberties,
lack of corruption, the rule of law, government effectiveness, participation in international
environmental improvement efforts, encouraging environmental knowledge creation, and
innovation capacity—than others. Thus Sweden and Belgium have similar income levels, but
pollution control and natural resource management are relatively weak in Belgium and as a
result Sweden is ranked fourth on the ESI whereas Belgium achieves only 112th place.
Another of the characteristics of those countries achieving high ESI rankings is low
population density. This poses a number of challenges to those countries with relatively high
population density—both many developing countries and such countries as The Netherlands,
Japan, Belgium and the UK which are within the top 30 countries in the World for high
population density. As more and more land goes for housing and infrastructure developments so
natural habitats are lost, energy use increases, and emissions rise. Iran is in the middle ranking on
population density, but for those countries already suffering high population density there are
grounds for maintaining strict controls on inward migration. One of the ESI’s 21 indicators is
success or otherwise in reducing population pressures.
Poor performance on waste generation, energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions
pulls a number of countries down the ESI rankings, particularly the USA. Land degradation and
poor air quality pulled down the UK’s ranking, while it benefited from its geographical position
582 M. Jefferson / Renewable Energy 31 (2006) 571–582

Table 6
Environmental Sustainability Index 2005 (for selected countries of 146 ranked)

Ranking Ranking
Finland 1 Venezuela 82
Norway 2 Oman 83
Uruguay 3 Jordan 84
Sweden 4 Turkey 91
Iceland 5 Algeria 96
Canada 6 Nigeria 98
Brazil 11 India 101
Japan 30 Morocco 105
Germany 31 United Arab Emirates 110
Russia 33 Egypt 115
France 36 Syria 117
USA 45 South Korea 122
Tunisia 55 Libya 125
UK 66 Lebanon 129
Italy 69 Pakistan 131
Spain 76 Iran 132

to achieve high scores on water quantity and improving quality which many other countries
through force of circumstances were physically unable to achieve.
The creator of the ESI has said: “By highlighting the leaders and laggards, which
governments are wary of doing, the ESI creates pressure for improved results.”
While it is correct, as one of the leading contributors to the ESI has said, that “it is shocking
how many critical environmental issues are still not measured in any usable way”, the ESI’s
rankings do give us an indication of the challenges which we all face (Table 6):
What the ESI does highlight is that it is not only environmental stresses and vulnerability that
count, but also the capacity to manage them and the involvement in stewardship at the
international level. The ESI found that the USA, Ireland, Denmark, The Netherlands, UK,
Belgium, Taiwan, South Korea, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan under-performed on the
income-based expectations of the ESI’s analysis. The ESI can be accessed at www.yale.edu/esi,
and is produced by a team from Yale and Columbia Universities (USA), the World Economic
Forum, and the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission.

8. Conclusion

The brief conclusions of this paper are that performance in promoting sustainable energy
development in general, and expanding the use of ‘new’ renewable energy across the World in
particular, has been patchy and on the whole very disappointing. The ‘North’ provide few good
examples in addressing these issues, whether in the accelerated use of new renewable forms of
energy; or of consistent environmental sensitivity to the negative impacts of supplying and using
the various forms of primary or secondary energy (including the visual impacts of wind farms
and large-scale biomass; biodiversity issues raised by modern biomass; or ecological impacts of
estuarine tidal barrages). So far as prospects are concerned, the immediate outlook is also rather
bleak. There is plenty of scope for South/South initiatives to address the many aspects of
sustainable energy development.