\

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NE' YORK STATE COURT OF APPEALS

Preliminary Appeal Statement

Pursuant to section 500.9 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals

1. CAPTION OF CASE (as the parties should be denominated STATE OF NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS

in the Court of Appeals):

Christopher Earl Strunk

-against-

New York State Board of Elections, et al.

2. Name of court or tribunal where case originated, including county, if applicable:

New York State Supreme Court for the County of Kings I.A.S. Part 27
3. Civil index number, criminal indictment number or other number assigned to the matter in the court or tribunal of original instance: 2011-6500 4. Docket number assigned to the matter at the Appellate Division or other intermediate appellate court: 2011-11561 5. Jurisdictional basis for this appeal: __ Leave to appeal granted by the Court of Appeals or a Judge of the Court of Appeals __ Leave to appeal granted by the Appellate Division or a Justice of the Appellate Division __ CPLR 5601(a): dissents on the law at the Appellate Division _.f_CPLR 5601(b)(1): constitutional ground (Appellate Division order) _.f_CPLR 5601(b)(2): constitutional ground (judgment of court of original instance) __ CPLR 5601 (c): Appellate Division order granting a new trial or hearing, upon stipulation for judgment absolute __ CPLR 560 1(d): from a final judgment, order, determination or award, seeking review of a prior nonfinal Appellate Division order __ Other (specify) _

Continuation of Respondents counsels: Respondent 7 Erica Burke, Esq. of SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP 425 Lexington Avenue New York. New York 10017-3954 Respondent 8 JAMES C. DUGAN Esq. of WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 787 Seventh Avenue New York, N.Y. 10019-6099 Respondent 9 WILEY REIN LLP TODD A. BROMBERG ESQ. , 1776K Street, NW Washington D.C. 20006 Respondent 10 MICHAEL CARDOZO Corporation Counsel of City of New York By: CHLARENS ORSLAND, Esq. Assistant Corporation Counsel New York City Law Department 100 Church Street New York, New York 10007

Pl.7

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF BINOS I A S . Part 27 Index No.: 6500-2011 x (Hon. Arthur M. Schack J.S.C)
Christopher-Earl: Strunk, in esse
\

I
1

NOTICE OF MOTION

II

Plaintiff, -against-

KINGS COUNTY CLERK FEE PD $45.00

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF EUCTIONS; Et al..

Defendants.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the annexed affidavit of Christopher-Earl: Strunk

in esse, af'firmed February 8,2012 with exhibits annexed and memorandum of law,
Plaintiff wl move with CPLR 85601(b)(2),CPLR 2212(a)and CPLR 9220 1 request for il

a stay and for recusal with the motion return date on Friday, February 24,2012at
k 4 5 a.m. in Part 27, Courtroom 479 before the Justice Arthur M. Schack at 360
'' '

I1 [I
L

Adams Street Brooklyn New York 11201, or at a time designated by the 'court or as

soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.

Dated: February Brooklyn New York

Plaintiff self-represented wlo attorney 593 Vanderbilt Avenue #281 Brooklyn, New York 11238

.$'

.
cc:

Ph.845-901-6767
Email: chri&trunk.ws

Erica Burke, Esq. of SIMPSON THACHER 86 BARTLETT LLP 425 Lexington Avenue New York. New York 10017-3954
Todd E. Phillips, Esq. of CAPLIN 86 DRYSDALE, CHARTERED One Thomas Circle, N.W., Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20005 HARRIS BEACH, PLLC By THOMAS J. GARRY, Esq. The OMNI 333 Earle Ovington Blvd., , Suite 90 1 Uniondale, New York 11553 JAMES C. DUGAN Esq. of WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 787 Seventh Avenue New York, N.Y. 10019-6099 MARSHAL BELL, Esq. of McGUIRWOODS LLP 1345 Avenue of Americas, 7th Floor New York, New York 10105 WILEY REIN LLP TODD A. BROMBERG ESQ. , 1776K Street, NW Washington D.C. 20006 RABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, STANDARD, KRINSKY & LIEBERMAN, PC Christopher J. Latell Esq. and Daniel S. Reich Esq. 45 Broadway, Suite 1700 New York, New York 10006-379 1 ERC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of NYS by: JOEL GRABER, Esq. AAG Assistant Attorney General 120 BROADWAY - 24th Floor New York, New York 10271-0332 MICHAEL CARDOZO Corporation Counsel of City of New York By: CHLARENS ORSLAND, Esq. Assistant Corporation Counsel New York City Law Department 100 Church Street New York, New York 10007

I r

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS IAS Part 27 Index No.: ---------------------------------------------------------------------x Christopher-Earl: Strunk, in esse -againstPlaintiff,

6500-2011

(Hon. Arthur M. Schack J.S.C)

PLAINTIFFS

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; JAMES A. AFFIDAVIT IN WALSH / Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNER / Co-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA / Commissioner, GREGORY P. SUPPORT OF THE PETERSON / Commissioner, Deputy Director TODD D. VALENTINE, Deputy Director STANLEY ZALEN; NOTICE OF MOTION ANDREW CUOMO, ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN, THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, RUTH NOEM COLN, in their Official and FOR LEAVE OF DIRECT individual capacity; Fr. JOSEPH A. O'HARE, S.J.; Fr. JOSEPH P. PARKES, S.J.; FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR.; APPEAL TO THE PETER G. PETERSEN, ZBIGNIEW KAIMIERZ BRZEZINSKI; MARK BRZEZINSKI; JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.; SOEBARKAH NEW YORK STATE (a.k.a. Barry Soetoro, a.k.a. Barack Hussein Obama II, COURT OF APPEALS a.k.a. Steve Dunham); NANCY PELOSI; DEMOCRATIC STATE COMMITTEE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE COMMITTEE OF THE WORKING FAMILIES PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; RGER CALERO; THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY; IAN J. BRZEZINSKI; JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN III; JOHN A. BOEHNER; THE NEW YORK STATE REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE; THE NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE OF THE INDEPENDENCE PARTY; STATE COMMITTEE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; PENNY S. PRITZKER; GEORGE SOROS; OBAMA FOR AMERICA; OBAMA VICTORY FUND; MCCAIN VICTORY 2008; MCCAIN-PALIN VICTORY 2008; John and Jane Does; and XYZ Entities.

Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------------------------x STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS ) ) ss. )

Accordingly, I, Christopher Earl Strunk, being duly sworn, depose and say under penalty of perjury:
Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Direct Appeal Page 1 of 8

1. That Petitioner Christopher Earl Strunk (Plaintiff) submits this affidavit under

CPLR 5601(b)(2), in support of notice of motion for leave for direct appeal to the New
York State Court of Appeals on the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 Paragraph 5 natural-born Citizen (NBC) issue in this case controlling the decision of the Court, also requests a stay of actions below, and Arthur M. Schack J.S.C. recuse himself. 2. Petitioner is located for service at 593 Vanderbilt Avenue -281 Brooklyn, New York 11238 (845) 901-6767 email: chris@strunk.ws.; and is a duly registered voter in the 2008 and 2012 election cycle, and that Plaintiff has not sought this relief before. 3. That there are several motion pending a decision including the essential motion for transfer and consolidation with the active case, Index No. 29642-2008 as yet decided. 4. That at the October 25, 2011 appearance of Petitioner on the application for an Order to Show Cause for a mandate of the New York State Board of Elections to conform their Running for Office Website with citizenship requirement instruction for eligibility to the current declared candidate(s) for the office of President of the United State (POTUS), as well as for a stay of Defendant Soebarkahs fund raising until eligibility proof is provided by the declared candidate for the Democratic Primary election and General Election ballot for POTUS is a Natural-Born Citizen, a person born in the country of U.S. Citizen Parents, as defined by the SCOTUS in Minor. v. Happersett 88 U.S. 162 (1875), 21 Wall. 162, and 22 L. Ed. 627 and related citations along with the New York State Court of Appeals in Ludlum v Ludlum , 26 N.Y. 356 (1863) March Term, 1863 with related citations of New York Jurisprudence; and to wit the Court not only declined to sign a order for such a hearing but simultaneously granted an open-ended extension of time for the State to respond to the Summons and Complaint and denying Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint using the admission of the State of its facilitation and wrongdoing (see Exhibit 1);

Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Direct Appeal Page 2 of 8

5. Moreover, the Court refused a written record to be taken, and there expounded on: a supposed 14th amendment theory of citizenship as if equivalent to a natural born Citizen status; a theory that there is a supposed compelling interest of a declared candidates first amendment right equal with that of the government responsible for the ballot in compliance with the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1; and most astonishingly the Court expressed a discombobulated contention that somehow Plaintiff contends for a person to be NBC would also have to have natural born citizen parents rather than the less restrictive naturalized status at the birth, conflates the purpose of the parents allegiance status, and the Court is wanting of a timely decision. 6. That at the October 25, 2011 preliminary hearing the Court stated that a decision on the various motions would be forth coming to no avail; and when Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal of the interlocutory order (See Exhibit 2) that would resolve the issue of both State facilitation of fraud and violation of the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 NBC eligibility clause the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal without leave to appeal (see Exhibit 3) leaving no option but for this motion for direct leave. 7. On or about January 11, 2012 at the scheduled Pre-discovery conference (see Exhibit 4), as time is of the essence and feeding the contention of Court bias, it ordered an adjournment and for Plaintiff and Defendants counsels to appear at the pre-discovery conference on April 11, 2012 instead. 8. That the obvious delay and injury being caused by the Court means that the Democratic and Republican primary and electoral college ballot would be underway by April 2012 according to the 2012 Presidential Election Schedule released January 9, 2012 by the State (see Exhibit 5). 9. That Petitioner references the NYS BOE schedule issued on January 9, 2012 for the 2012 Presidential Election cycle shown as Exhibit 5 designates the start of the

Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Direct Appeal Page 3 of 8

DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN FILING DATES: 10. 2/14/12 Last day for candidates to decline designations. 2-122-a(2) 2/14/12 Last day for CBOE to notify SBOE candidates which filed at CBOE. 2-122-a(6)(h) 2/21/12 Last day for party committee to file certificate of candidacies for delegate and alternate delegate candidates. 2-122-a(7)(a-b) 3/1/12 Last day for SBOE to notify party committee of candidates who will appear on ballot. 2-122-a(7)(d) 3/2/12 Last day for boards of election to notify party committee of candidates who will appear on ballot. 2-122-a(7)(d)

That Petitioner has served a notice of intent to file a claim against the State (see

Exhibit 6) and is a matter that would be resolved by NYS Court of Appeals review. 11. That Petitioner is preparing to file objections to any certificate filed within 72

hours of a filing by Defendant Soebarkah for ballot access, and as such Petitioner filed a Complaint and Demand for Public Hearing on the Eligibility of the declared candidate Barack Hussein Obama II for Office of POTUS at the 2012 Election Cycle in New York by Election Law (EL) 3-104 (see Exhibit 7) and therein complains of the declared candidate Barack Hussein Obama II as not being eligible for the Office of POTUS, and demands a hearing on the declared candidates eligibility on 2/14/12 or as soon thereafter as the Chairman and Commissioners may chose to convene to take evidence and testimony to bar Barack Hussein Obama II from the 2012 Presidential Election cycle ballots as time is of the essence. 12. As with the evidence provided herein in the various motions before this Court

that Barack Hussein Obama II (BHO II) has already declared himself a candidate for the office of President of the United States here in the New York 2012 election cycle. That based upon the admission of Barrack Hussein Obama II with the release of his autobiography. Dreams From My Father (1995) the British subject at his birth was Barack Hussein Obama Sr.BHO II is not NBC. That according to the INS record signed by Barrack Hussein Obama Sr. he

Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Direct Appeal Page 4 of 8

is a Foreign Alien non-immigrant with a student visa and never was at anytime a US Citizen or even had a Green Card-- BHO II is not NBC. That according to the divorce decree issued from the Hawaii court of competent jurisdiction British subject Barack Hussein Obama Sr. was married to the US Citizen Stanley Ann Obama being of minor age at the time of the birth of Barack Hussein Obama II-- BHO II is not NBC; That according to the Certificate of Live Birth released by Barack Hussein Obama II during a press conference in April 2011, BHO II was born in Hawaii to U.S. Citizen Stanley Ann Dunham Obama the mother, and British Subject Barack Hussein Obama Sr. the father on August 8, 1961. 13. That at best Barack Hussein Obama II is merely a native born naturalized

citizen not a Natural-Born Citizen (NBC) that requires a person to be born in the country of US Citizen parents as defined by SCOTUS in the precedent set in Minor. v. Happersett 88 U.S. 162 (1875), 21 Wall. 162, and 22 L. Ed. 627. by Justice Waite holding that natural born citizens (NBC) per se are so by virtue of birth on United States soil when both parents were Citizens of the United States according to the US Constitution Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 de jure citizens without reaching the need of use of the 14th Amendment or the power of Congress granted with Article 1 Section 8 paragraph 4 to define naturalization and immigration status person other than NBC persons. 14. That Barack Hussein Obama II is not a Natural- born Citizen however may be

classified as Born a Citizen depending upon the power of Congress granted to define such status other than NBC. 15. That Barack Hussein Obama II, as a declared candidate with EL 14-100(1)(7)(9)

here in New York, has illegally directed his campaign fund raising here in New York to

Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Direct Appeal Page 5 of 8

proceed starting last summer as with EL 14-114; 16. That BHO II as an ineligible declared candidate seeks a ballot line in the

Democratic Primary and General Election ballot starting February 14, 2012. 17. That BHO II as an ineligible declared candidate illegally participates within this

State and personally directed his fund raising agents to proceed as defined under NYS EL 14-114 and with the fraudulent conversion of the funds as defined by EL 14-130 in relevant parts with related law. 18. That the NYS BOE is willfully facilitating BHO II as an ineligible declared

candidate since no later than the 2008 election cycle continuing now with malicious facilitation using instructions on the NYS BOE website page Running for Office contrary to the law of the land and the requirements set by the State Legislature stating therein as to citizenship status that a declared candidate need only be Born a Citizen rather than a Natural-born Citizen to be eligible for the office of POTUS. 19. That at the Courts suggestion obviously recognizing an on-going crime should

be reported as Petitioner alleges that the Chairman and Commissioners are involved in the misprision of a felony by facilitating the declared candidacy of Barack Hussein Obama II and others, and that because the crime is facilitated in Albany as the epicenter rather than Kings County; and as such, a duplicate of the complaint affidavit and demand shown as Exhibit 7 was simultaneously filed with the Albany District Attorney for investigation; and that 20. On January 26, 2012, Petitioner was a material witness at the ballot access

hearing held by the Georgia Secretary of State before a Judge of that Administrative Court in the former British penal Colony to bar Barack Hussein Obama II from that ballot, and that BHO II nor his attorney attended by default relinquish 16 electoral votes from Georgia.

Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Direct Appeal Page 6 of 8

21.

In keeping with a State devoid of judicial precedent defining Natural Born

Citizen and begrudging of the SCOTUS, Georgias Iranian Administrative Judge Malihi decided on February 3, 2012 (see Exhibit 8) after hearing of evidence and testimony chose to ignore all the testimony and evidence, and without any proof of actual place of birth used a wholly absurd Indiana State Court decision of 2009 (therein even held that the Plaintiff was without standing to complain) that that Court threw out all judicial restraint to the wind and invented a whole new eligibility status that propounded a 14th amendment theory of citizenship dicta without reference to the status of the parents that somehow would replace the de jure NBC eligibility requirement of the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 and precedent of the SCOTUS in Minor v Happersett; and that the Georgia Secretary of State used the decision shown as Exhibit 8 to grant ballot access without further proof of birthplace, merely by urban legend accepted the birth location notwithstanding the parents citizenship status. 22. There are 51 General Elections this year where the respective electoral slates

are chosen for the election of the POTUS, and notwithstanding the outcome of the expected appeal of that decision in the former British penal Colony would change the Usurpers Georgia Ballot Status, New York does not depend upon Hoosier Law, has its own New York precedents in jurisprudence consistently defining Natural Born Citizen. 23. That the New York State Court of Appeals awaits your decision to grant leave

for direct appeal as to what does the Natural-born Citizen eligibility clause mean under the US Constitution Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 according to New York.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner wishes the Court to grant an order: for direct appeal to the New York State Court of Appeals on the US Constitution Article 2 Section 1 Paragraph eligibility matter as it necessarily

Plaintiffs Affidavit in Support of Motion for Direct Appeal Page 7 of 8

affects the matters before the trial court herein and before Justice Schmidt
with Index No: 29642-2008, and pending clairn(s)at the Court of Claims,

that there be a stay of all matters before the court until the Court of Appeals decides on the constitutional issue that will resolve matters below; that Justice Schack recuse from further hearing of the matters herein; and for different and other relief deemed necessary for justice herein. That the foregoing matter involves irreparable harm as time is of the essence without any alternative forum for relief that compounds F%intiffs injury along with those similarly situated; and that the same is true to my own knowledge, except as to
#

the matters therein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be true. The grounds of my beliefs as to all matters.not stated upon information and belief are as follows: 3d parties, books and records, and r personal knowledge.

Christopher-Earl: Strunk

Sworn to before me This & l a y of February 2012

ABRAHAM HELFENBAUM Commissioner of Deeds City Of New York No. 2-9363 .Certiflcate Ffledin Kings C ,Jun Commlsslon Explres july :o l

Haintiff's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Direct Appeal ... Page 8 of 8

Strunk v. NYS BOE et al. N.Y.S. Sup.Ct. Kings Cty. Index No.: 2011-6500

Plaintiffs Affidavit in support of MOTION For Direct Appeal

Exhibit 1

of the Supreme At IAS Part Court of the State of New York Held in and for the County of Kings, at the courthouse at 360 Adams Street on the 2 b t Day of October 2011 PRESENT: Hon.

b. ~ C ~ - ~ + C Y
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.....................................................
Plaintiff,

Justiee of the Supreme Court

X

COUNTY CLERK FEE PD $45 00

?/ Christopher Earl Strunk, pr[e\I

lfnN)
et al.
*

-against-

/
Defendants.

Index No.: 6500 1 2011

- ,/ NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE EOR A MANDAMUS, BTAY AND INJUNCTION

Upon reading

7'd filing the affidavit of Christopher Earl Strunk affirmed to on the 2 0 ~

12 exhibits, and memorandum of law based upon the underlying

day of ~ c t o b e2OI&th r

Complaint filed March 22,201 1 with jurisdiction of the CPLR $403(d), $7802 in conjunction with New York State Election Law (EL) Article $ 16-100, $6-122 as applies to EL Article 12 fi-om before the start of the 2012 election cycle Presidential primary and general election. Let the respondents or their attorney show cause at the IAS Part

L7 ,Room

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47? of this Court, to be held at the2Courthouse, 360 Adams Street, Brooklyn, New York, on .
11

the __ day of

,NU, at

' o'clock in the -i noon or as soon I FO

as counsel may be heard why an order should not be made affecting the 2012 Election cycle with a. A Mandamus of the New York State Board of Elections and or its agents to correctly instruct a candidate for Office of President of the United States (POTUS) to meet the U.S,Constitution Article 2 Section 1 "natural born Citizen" eligibility requirement

instead of "born a citizen" improperly;

b. A Stay of all New York Primaries until such time as the NYS BOE has properly notified a candidate of qualifications to run for office of POTUS; c. A Stay of all ballot access until such time as the respective candidate for Office of POTUS has provided evidence of qualification eligibility; d. A Stay of all fund raising until conclusive proof of eligibility is established; e. Restraint of Defendants NYS BOE various New York State political parties and or committees, Barack Hussein Obama 11, Zbigniew Brzezinski, George Soros and or their agents from interference with the proper public notice of requirements of a candidate for office of POTUS in New York;

f. NYS BOE disclosure of Lyand all related archives in their possession or Wder its
control for the POTUS qualifications, executive session records, correspondence and or communication records with electors of the Barack Hussein Obama 11, John S. McCain 111and or Roger Calero for the 2008 election cycle forward; g. Further and different relief including reimbursement for damages incurred. As it is alleged that the New York State Board of Elections and its agents exceed authority of Law regarding determining the eligibility of candidates for the office of POTUS adversely agecting the operation of EL Article 12 in the formation of the New York Electoral College.

T-

Pending the hearing of this motion it is ORDERED that Respondents are to a. Stay all New York Primaries until such time as the NYS BOE has properly notified a

candidate of qualifications to run for office of POTUS;

-.

*"
_ i

b. Stay of all ballot access until such time as the respective candidate for Office of -" POTUS has provided evidence of qualification eligibility;
-I______-

c. Stay all fund raising in New York until conclusive proof of eligibility is established;

Pending the hearing of this motion it is ORDERED that Respondents' attorneys are to mail by delivery 24 hours prior to the hearing ordered papers upon which this order is granted; and furthermore, of the New York State
II

named Defendants shall

IAS Part

> -

Room

'7

,of this
day of
O

Brooklyn, New o'clock in the

York, on the

44 noon

or as soon as counsel may be heard why election law.

SufEcient

and the papers

upon which this and of the New Board of Elections on or before the October, 201 1 be

deemed good anc#&fIicient. An affidavit or other proof of service shall be prhnted to this

Strunk v. NYS BOE et al. N.Y.S. Sup.Ct. App. Div. 2nd Dept 2012-766

Plaintiffs Affidavit in support of MOTION For Direct Appeal

Exhibit 2

SUTEME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF WNGS

Christopher--1:
Stnmk, in esse

Plaintiff,
-against-

NOTICE OF aPPEAt
Index H . 6SUQ-2011 O:
I

NEW YORK S A T E BOARD OF ELECTIONS; JAMES A WALSH J &Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELWER / Co-Chair, EXELYN J. AQtTlLA / commissioner, GREWRY PPETERSON J Commissioner, Deputy Director TODD D. VALENTINE, Deputy Director STANLEY ZALEN; ANDRE;W CUOMO, ERIC SCHNEIDERhrlAN, THOPDLNAFrOLd, RUTH NOEM C O I ~ Ni their Qfficid , n and individual c p cm Fr, JOSEPH R O'HMW, S.J.; a ai Fr,JOSEPH P PAkEES, SJ.; . FREDERICK A-0. SCWARZ, 32.; PETER G . PETERSEM, ZBTGMF,W MkrII33f22 BFSEZINSKI; MaRK BEEZINSKI; JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.; SOEBARKAIZ (akaBarry h t o r o , aka. Barack Hus& Obama IT, a.k.a Steve Dunhm);NANCY PELOSI; DEMOCRATlC STATE COMMITTEE OF THE STATE OF NECW YO= STATE COMMITTEE OF THEWORKING F W E S PAXrrV OF NEW YO= SATE.; RdGER CAtERo., THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY; IAN J BRZEZTNSKI; . J O SLDNEY ~ MCCAIN m;JOHN A. B O E ~ E R ; THE NEW YORK STATE REPUBLICAN STATE: COMMITTEE-, THE NEW YORK STATE CQMMJXTEE OF THE INDEfENDEPJCE PARTY, STATE C O ~ ~ OF E E THE COWSERVATZVE:PARW OF N E W YORK STATE; PENNY S. PMTZKER; GEORGE SOROS; OBAII&AFCTR AMERTCA; OBAMA r n R Y F u M Q M C W V I r n R Y 2008;M C W - P R W n r WCTORY2008;John and Jane Ib% -.. and XYZ Enti-ties. Mendant%

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Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the Slate of M e w Ymk, Second Judi&l

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~ & ~ a ~ t o d e c l i n e t b s i p a n o r d e r t a ~ m ~ e , w i t h o d m m t i n g New York State Defendants the third actension of time to answer and denying
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State Supreme Court for the County of Kings of I.A.S., Part 27 by Arkhut

M. Schack

J.S.C., dated October 25,2011 and entered by the Clerk of the Court October 28,201 1. RespectfulZy submitted by:

Dated: ~kmklyn, New York November f&, 20 11

Plaintiff self-regresented without an attorney 593 Vanderbilt Avenue - #281 Brooklyn. New York 11238 (845) 90 1-6767; Email: chris@strunk.ws Cc:
The Kings County Clerk Supreme Court Bldg. 360 Adams Street Room 189,Brooklyn,NY 1 1201
J

Sarah L D m , Eaq. of SIMPSON TKACHER 8& BARTLETT LLP 425 Lexington Avenue N e w York. . New York 10017-3954 Representing: PE3ER G . PmERSON

T d d E,Phillips, Esq. of CAPLTN % DRYSQALE, CHARTERED One Thomas Circle, N.W., Suite 1100,Washington, DC 20005 Representing JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN ITI; MCCALN V I W R Y 2008; MCCRIIV-PALIN VICTORY 2008

HARRIS BEACH, PLLC By THOMAS J. OARRY, Esq. The OMNI 333 Earle Ovington Blvd., Suite 90 1 Uniondale, New York 11553 Representing: JOSEPH R, BTDEN, JR.;SOEBARKAH ( a k a . Barry Soetoro, aka. Barack Hussein Obama II, a.k.a. Steve Dunham); NANCY PELOSI; PENNY S. PRKZKER; OBAJU FOR AilOWICA., OaAMA W m R Y FUND,
JAMES C. DUGAN Esq. o WILLHE FARR a GALLAGHER LLP 787 Seventh Avenue New York, f N.Y. 10019-6099Representing: GEORGE SDROS

MARSHAL BELL, Esq. of McGtFXRE WOODS LLP 1345 Avenue of Americas, 7th Floor New York, New York 10105 RepresenZBIGNIEW KAXMIERZ BRZEZZNSKF; MARK BRZEZINSKI; I N 3. A
BRZEZINSKI.

WLEY REIN LLP - TODD A. BROMBERG ESQ. ,JAN WITHOLD BARAN ESQ. and THOMAS W. KIRBY ESQ. 1776K Street, NW Washington D.C. 2 0 M Representing: JOHN A. BOEHNER
RABINOWXTZ, BOWDIN, STANDARD, KWNSKY % LIEBERMAN, PC - Christopher J. Xatell Esq. and Daniel S. Reich Eq.45 Broadway, Suite 1700 New York, New York 10006-379 1 Representing: ;ROGER CALERO; THE SOCIALIST WORWRS PAR'IY ERIC T SCHWEIDERMAN Attorney General ofNYS by: JOEL E W E R , Esq. AAG Assistant . Attorney General Special Litigation Counsel Litigation Bureau 120 BROADWAY - 24th Flour New York, New York 10271-0332 Representing :NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; JAMES A. WALSH / &-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNER / Co-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA / Commissioner,
GREGORY P PETERSON / Commissioner, Deputy Director TODD D. VALENTINE, Deputjt . Director STANLEY ZALEW ANDREW CUOMO, ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN, THOMAS P. DIMAPOU, RUTH NOEMf CQLUN, i their Official and individual capacity; n

MICHAEL CARDOW Corporation Counsel of City o New York By: CHLAREHS ORSLAND, Esq. f Assistant Corporation Counsel New York City Law Department 100 Church Street Mew York, New York 10007 Representing: Fr. JOSEPH A. O'HARE, S.J.; JOSEPH P PARKES, S.J.;FREDERlCK . A.O. S C W A R Z , JR.

At~19-';41&BcC d of the State of New York Hcld in ind for tlre C o m e ef

Kkg!$*t8ccmdwam* 360 M a m s Street on the Day of Octekr 2011

2 bt

$ NEW YOIRK STATE BOARD OF ELECTTONS,

ORDER TO S W CAUSE R
FOR A MANDAMUS, ~ T A Y A ~ Y D ~ R

neth~b-

with New York SEateElection Law (EL) Article 516-100, $6-322 as applies to EL, Article 12

q7"1&

CAY&,to be held at tfre Courthonse, 360 Adams Street, Brooklyn,New York, on

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.#t40a,slq 3 o ,,h&is*

rrs counsel ?nay be bead why an order should not be made &e&g

the 2012 Election cycle with

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of&e New Y r State Board of E1edm and or is agents to m m d y ok t

a a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e d d e d ~ ~ ~ ~ (

s/ a , ~ ! a

U . S D d e n Article 2 Section 1 %atural born Citizen'' eligibility mpihrnmt

instead of "born a citizen" impropar1y;

e,

Restmint ofDefendantsN Y S BOE various New Y & S a epolisical parties zmj m o tt

dtms,

BaraEk Hwsein Obima a, pgniew Brzahki, George Saros aad or

MFCain ILF and or Roger Calm for IIE 2008 e1wtien cycle fmv&

Law ~~g

d -

&e eiigib'i of^^ for the officeofPOTUS adversely

Pending the bearing oftbis m o t h it is ORDEREBt k t

=a

a Stsy aZ1 New Ywk Primariesmtil such time as the N Y S BOE has properly no&d a

o r ~ * ~ * & c e o f P O m ;

b. S t a y o f a l l b a l l o t a c o e s s u d s l a a z t i m e a s i h e ~ e

POTUS has provided evidence of qualification e l i g i b ' i

c Shy d frmd mkkg iMew Y& d i d u s i v e proof ofe i i i i y i establish& . l lgblt s

-3
Pendiog the heariag ofthis motion it is OIRDEREDthatRespondents' attorneys are to

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oft b s erder,and the papem upon which this order is granted; and

o as soon as cormsel may be heard why r

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Form A - Request for Appellate Division Intervention - Civil

See 5 670.3 of the rules of this Eourt for directions on the use of this form (22 NYCRR 670.3).

~ L L ~ ~ u E ET AL JS

O 2 Aftorney's Fees
R 3 Licenses 0 4 Public Employment

lrnprrsonment

0 3 Children - Support

0 2 Conversion 0 3 Defamatron
5
Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress

U 5 Social Services

0 6 Ch~ldren AbmINeglect 0 7 Ch~ldren JDIPINS R 8 Equitable Distribution

6 Interference wlth Contract 0 7 Malicious Prosecution1 .

Abuse of Process

0 2 Bus~ness

Exclus~veOccupancy of

10 Expert's Fees 11 MatntsnarsealAlimony O 12 Marital Status [3 I3 Paternity

0 14 Spousal Support :
9 3 Construction rl4 Ernploymem

8 Malpractice 0 9 Negligeme 10 Nuisance P 11 Products Liabil~ty P 12 Strict Liability 0 13 Trespass andlor Waste

0 5 Insurance
0 6
Real Property

D2

Debtor & Cred~tor Declaratory Judgmern

0 3 ProbatelAdministratian
ure Law 207

as

Secured 0 3 General Municipal Law

0 4 Labor Law J 220
D5
Public Service Law 5 5 128

'aper Appealed From (check one only):

3 Amended Decree 5 Amended Judgment 3 Amended Order a Decis~on 3 Decree

O Determination

0 Finding D lnterlocutorv Decree

D B

P Order Order & Judgment

Partial Decree

Resettled Order

0 Ruling
B/Other tsoecihrl:
A

Judgment

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If Yes: O Jury O Nan-Jury o
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No. 4re any unperfected appeals pending in this case? 0 Yes :overed by the annexed notice of appeal with the prior appeals? rlumberls) of any prior, pending, unperfected appeals:

If yes, do you intend to perfect the appeal or appeals Yes No. Set forth the Appellate Division Cause

3ornrnenced by: $order

to Show Cause

Notice of Petition

Writ of Habeas Carpus

/ Date

~iled:/~

- 21- //

Statute amhorizinn commencement of proceeding in the Appellate Divisian:

zourt:

't)oPS

uc)~ #,?fLy
I

County:

Judge (name in full):

I Order of Transfer Date:

Description: If an appeal, briefly describe the paper appealed from. If the appeal is from an order, specify the reflet requested 3nd whether the motion was granted or denied. If an original proceeding commenced in this court or transferred pursuant t o ZPLR 78041g3, briefly describe the object of the proceeding. If an application under CPLR 5704, briefly describe the nature of -.he ex w - = + 1 -d euiwwrl -

" 10125/ l 1 The Court declines t sign this OSC. This issue i not ripe until candidates o s file nominating petitions for public office for President of US. i several months. n Further, the Court will [not] ststop fund-raising by any candidate because candidates have a right to raise money pursuant t statute and the First Amendment. The issue o o andidate qualification i subject t Court action after nominating petitions are f s o submitted and candidates are challenged in Court." sIAS " JSC"
If an appeal is from a money-judgment, speelry tne amuunr awamea. Specify the issues prnposed t o be raised on the appeal, proceeding, or application for

&mount: ssues:

CPLR 5704 review.

"TheCourterredwheni t r e f u s e d ~ o h e a r t h e a d m i s s i o n o n t h e p a r t d ~ i t ~t~ to t m n f m e d t o Si n the express terms of the US ConstiMion Article 2 Section 1 in the insmctions lo prospective candidates for the ofice of President ofthe United S a e (POTUS) tts

The Court erred when it unilakrdly gmuted the State a third open ended extension oftime to answer the complaint when the State is alleged the b l h t u r ofthc injury in fact to plaintiff while all the other Defendants have responded wrth motions to dismiss tbaE arc p d ~ t t and integd to the State response for g the Court to properly decide the maims;

Issues Continued:

The Court d

Eo hear the application when in fact the issues raised by the State admission as conclusive proof a n concrdling ofthe matiom before the &.
7

The C a r t ourt whea'it has the duty to & e ahtian to m f e r and consolidate fust based upon the M Stale's admission offkilitatim of wrongdoing in prior election cycle mhming anto the present ele&on cycle an& the Court went so far eve^ d t h the &ss~~on offQcil&tion that the i m e is NOT

RIPE.
The Court is biased toward p l a W when *sing to hear the application based upon State's admission controlling to the issues raising in the complaint denied a $anscript record, and dcnied a h amended t complaint that d d incorporate the State's admission of facilitation of Defendants to injm Plaintiff along w i those similarly situated. ~

F>

The Court is biased toward Plaintiff for multiple additional rearms including the cmrt charactmkxation that plaintiff is pursing a deIudcd fiction, in which the Cmrt imtemiorntlty misqmsmted Piahrtiffi complaint and super-impostxi the courts own set of facts not before it.

Fhf tn the name of each party t o the actlon or proceed~ng,one Instmcticms: name per Iqne. Ifthis form is to be filed for an appeal, indicate the natus of the party In me court of orrgrnal instance and his. her, ar its starus In this coun, if any. If thjs f m is to be filed for a proceeding commenced in thrs court, fill in only the party's name and his, hsr, or its status in thls court.
r

Examples of a party's arrglnal status ~nclude: plaintiff, defendant, pe%itroner. respondent, claimant, defendant thrrd-parry pla~ntitf, fhrrd-part) defendant, and intewemr. Examples of a party's Appellate Dlvls~onstatus include: appellant, respondanr, petltroner. and ~nterv%nor. apwllant-respondent.
I

respondent-apv~llant

No.

Party Name

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'0.3). If Tha use of this farm lis expidned in 5 670.3 of the r u k ~f the ~ p p e I a t e bivfdon. S%condWpartrmant t22.N Division this f o m is.to be filed for an.appalr place the requiwd papers In the following order: (1) the ReqtJest for C Intervetion' [Form A, thig documentj, (2) any required Additional Appeal lnfomation Forms IFom UI, (4) any required Additional Pa* and Aitarney Information Forms [Form C3, (4j the notice of appeal or order granting leaver to appeal, 15) a copy of the,paper or papers from which the eppaaf or appeals covered in the notice of appeal or order grantinig leave t lo appeal is or are taken, and f8) a copy of.the decision or decisions of the court of original instance, if any.

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Appeltat@

. . Attornel GREGORY P PETERSON / Commissioner, Deputy D b x t m TODD D VALENTINE, Deputy . Direc~~ SIlANLErY ANDREW CUOMO, ERIC SCHPTETDERW, THOMAS P DINAPO.LI, . Address RUTH N D E COL$N, in their O f f k i d and individual capacity; ~
City:
Attorney Type: Party 07
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Attorney General Special Litigation Counsel Litigatiun Bureau 120 BROADWAY - 24th Flmr New York, N m 1 2 1-0332 R-ag 07 : WE&r Y m SATE OF E m O H S ; JAMES k WALSH -Chair, DOUGLAS k KELLNER / &-Chair, EVELYN J. A Q W / Commissioner,

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MICHAEL CAWOZO h -1 ofCity of New Y r oL CHMFkENS O R S ~ Esq. , Ymk City UW t 10F)Ch3 York, NCW -tion 1 Yo* 10007 Representing: R.JOSEm A. O ' W , S.J.; JOSEPH P. P-S, S.J.; F*REDEIIICK -.F. .I..u y......- ..-.. R.O. S C H W m , a
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Party or Parties Represented (sat forth party rwmtrar~sifmm mbie above or from ~ t m c1: AttorneylFirm Name:

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The use-af this form is exphird in 5 670.3 of the rules of the Appellate Division, Second Department (22 NYCRR 670.3L If this form is to be filed.kor & appeal, place the required papers In the following order: I t 1 the Request for Appellate Division I Intervention [Form A. this documentl, (2) any required Additionsl Aopeal lnformstian Forms I F o m 8-. 43) any reauired 1 . Additional Party and Attorney Information Fonns [form G , 14) the notic:e of app I der grant1 leave to appet I ing al or orderr grantin! leave t cb appeal copy of the paper or papers Worn which the appeal or appea'ls c wered in the notiei c B is or are taken, and (6) a copy of the decision or d e i s b n s of thst court of original i~ f any.

SI,WREMECOURT OFTHE STATE OF NF,W YORK

COUNTY OF KINGS

Index N. 6500-2011 o:
x

-against-

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS e at, t

STATE OF NEW YO=

COINI'Y OF KIENGS
4

1 1=* 1

AccardingIy, I, Julian Pamchyd, being duly sworn, d e p e d say under penalty of perjury:
a Amm18pearsof~andnota~tothis~on. b My place ofbusiness i I o c a at 32-15 Cmxmt Stre&, Suite 5L ]long Tsland City, NEW York 11106. . s ~ c. O n ~ t e m ~ 1 9 , 2 0 1 1 , C ~ h e r S t r u n k k s ~ ~ m e t a 8 e m a ~ e e O n f d e o ~ o f ~ e PLADVTFF'S N m C E OF APPEAL WITH COPY OF DECLdVED ORDER AND W I - C I V I Z . FORM W d NorJember 18,2011 for the case SYntnA: v NYS BOE e d. t NYS County of K i n p Supreme Court with index
6500-201 by USPS service upon Defendants' Counsels. 1, d O n November 19,2011,1 -use$ each copy with proper -&kg@ . for service bp first clam mail &listed counsels and going to the post ofice where each envelope was deposited with the USPS for sewice upon:

sarah L Dunn, Esq. of STMPSON THACHER i% EtAFTLm LLP . 425 k g t a n Avenue New York New York 10017-3954

o CAPLW Bb DRYSDALE, CHARTE3WD One Tholmas Circle, N.W., Suite 1100, f Tdd E P i . m Washington, C 20 05

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HAaWS EEACH, PLU2 By THOMAS J. GbRKY, J3q. The OMM 333 Eark Ovington Bhd., Suite 901 Uniondale, New York 1 1553

JAMES C.DUGAN of WLWCIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 787 Seventh Avenue New Ymk, N.Y. 1 0 0 194099

MARSHAL BELL, Esq. of McOUXlPWOODS U P 1345 Avenue ofAmericas, 7th Floor New York, New Ywk 10105
W l t m REIN LLP TODD k BROMBERG ESQ JAN Wl"HOLD BARAW EX). a d THOMAS W. KIRBY ESQ. L 7 K S w NW W&@OII D.C. 20006 76

RABMOBOUDRJ, STANDARD, KRJNSKY & LIEBERMAN, PC-Clrrist~@~l LattIl and Dmiel S,Rtich Eq. 45 Broadway, Suite 1700New York, New York 10006-3791

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ERIC T SCHMETDERMAN Attomey G e n d d N Y S by: JOEL GRABER, Esq. AAG Assistmt Attome~7 . General S p A Litigation Counsel Litigation Bureau 120 BKOADWAY 24th Floor Mew Ymk, New York 10271-0332

M E C W L CARD020 Dorpomtion C o u d o City o New York By: CKUWENS ORSUND, f f A d m t Corporation Counsel New York City l a w hprbnent 1 0 Chutch S b x t New York, M e w York 0007 0

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ARNOLD 1. T~SHFF&D N0.41-4611662 Qualified In Queens County Certified I Kings County n Commission Expires March 3C, 20

~ofaryPublic State Of New York

FORT HAMILTON STPTLON

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BROOKLYN, New York 112099997 3568080319-GO94 11/19/2011 (800)275-8777 11:47:57 AM

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SUPREME W R OF TRE STATE OF NEW YURX OT COUNTY OF KIN------------------------PC-C-..U"U--II"II--U*I---"--~~-~-.-~

Christopher Ertrl S e ,

Index R0.r 6500-2011

New Yark State Board of EIectiens et A.

Dated:

mln k , p Hew Ymk November 19,201 1

plaintiff self-qmsmt without being an attorney

593 Vanderbiit Avenue #281, Brooklyn, New York 11238, (845) 90 1-6767 E d CM-.WS

Strunk v. NYS BOE et al. N.Y.S. Sup.Ct. App. Div. 2nd Dept 2012-766

Plaintiffs Affidavit in support of MOTION For Direct Appeal

Exhibit 3

L--

BQtprrnQ l m t r t o f t t p ~ o f N ~ u r ~ m k
Appellate Biuisinn: h ~ m jluZlirtal E?qmrtment b
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, A.P.J. REWALDO E RlVERA . P E r n B. S K n O S MARK C. DELON DANIEL D ANGIOLIUO, 3J. .

>

MI30881 Slsl
.*

Chistapher Earl S appellm~ v New Ymk State Board of Elections, et al., respondents.

(Index No.650611 1)
1 . 1
1

I ,

Appeal by the p~aintiff from an Octok25,2011.

'&-

hr of the Supreme court, Kings County, dated e

:

On the Court's own motion, it is

.-

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as the order dated Octok 25,201 I, is not appealable as of right and leave to appeal has not Been grant& (see CPLR 5701). .we..

M A S m , A.P.J., RI\TERA,S-OS,

DILLON and ANGIOLTLLO, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Clerk of the Court

Jarmasy 3,2012

STRUNK v NEW YORK STATE BOARD O ELECTTONS F

Strunk v. NYS BOE et al. N.Y.S. Sup.Ct. Kings Cty. Index No.: 2011-6500

Plaintiffs Affidavit in support of MOTION For Direct Appeal

Exhibit 4

H4

&#preme

k
'.

C m t of &e S S ot Beku bo Civic Center Bmklyn, New York 11201

e&

'9%'

Dec 21,2011 CHRISTOPHER-EARL

593 VANDERBILT AVJE

- Prose

BROOKLYN

NY 11238-

Index N . 0006500~011 o: Caption: S T R W CHRlSTOPHER-EARL

---

vs.

This is to advise you that our r d s indic& that the above refereneed case has not had a Preliminary Conference as required by Uniform Court rules 202.19 (bX13,Therefore you must mmpIy with the following :
\

I I

;
I L '

.-- - --

q*

I
L b

I .You are hereby directed to appear for a Preliminary Conference on OI/I 1/12 at L T=-m & e i t d c e located-at 360 X G s Street, RoE52-4 - Brooklyn NY 11201. : ~ It is: yonr mpunsibilitv to notify aQother ~arties this adorn of the new date. in

scheduling conflicts. Counsel must bring all pertinent and necessary documents, including ) the bill of particulars, a11 insurance information and all medical reports. The representative : must also be m a r e d to address any outstanding discavey issues. The failure of such a t . . . , representative ,to/appear may result in. the;Prelimin* Conferevce,being held ,ex-parte or , .,, othet judicial action. I
I

-. The repmentativa who appears from your ofice must be fully famiIiar with and ; authorized to proceed with this case. The representative should therefore be aware of any

i
L

I
I I I
I

I
I , .

I
I

Strunk v. NYS BOE et al. N.Y.S. Sup.Ct. Kings Cty. Index No.: 2011-6500

Plaintiffs Affidavit in support of MOTION For Direct Appeal

Exhibit 5

STATE OF NEW YORK

STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS

CALENDAR FOR THE APRIL 24, 2012

PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY ELECTION for SELECTING DELEGATES to a NATIONAL CONVENTION Requirements and dates herein are provided for in Chapter 147 of the Laws of 2011
40 STEUBEN STREET ALBANY, NY 12207 (518) 474-6220 www.elections.ny.gov

January 9, 2012

DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN:

DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN FILING DATES:

REGISTRATION FOR PRIMARY ELECTION

3/30/12; 4/4/12 Mail Registration: Last day to postmark application and last day it must be received by board of elections. 5-210 (3) In Person Registration: Last day application must be received by board of elections to be eligible to vote in primary election. 5-210, 5-211 & 5-212 Change of address. 5-208 (3)

Pursuant to Chapter 147 of the Laws of 2011, a state committee providing for the selection of delegates and alternate delegates to a national party convention or conference must select either the 3 plan or the 4 plan contained in the act.

2/14/12

Last day for candidates to decline designations. 2-122-a(2) 3/30/12 Last day for CBOE to notify SBOE candidates which filed at CBOE. 2-122-a(6)(h) Last day for party committee to file certificate of candidacies for delegate and alternate delegate candidates. 2-122-a(7)(a-b) Last day for SBOE to notify party committee of candidates who will appear on ballot. 2-122-a(7)(d) Last day for boards of election to notify party committee of candidates who will appear on ballot. 2-122-a(7)(d)

2/14/12 12/6/11 Last day for other political parties to choose Republican plan. 2-122-b(1) Last day for a party to select the delegate selection method. 2 Ch. 147 of 2011 3/1/12

2/21/12

4/4/12

11/1/11

ABSENTEE VOTING FOR PRIMARY ELECTION:

4/17/12 Last day to postmark application for ballot. 8-400 (2)(c) Last day to apply in person for ballot. 8-400 (2)(c) Last day to postmark ballot and date it must be received by the board of elections. 8-412 (1) Last day to deliver ballot in person to county board. 8-412 (1)

3/2/12

4/23/12

REPUBLICAN DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN FILING DATES: THE FOLLOWING DATES APPLY TO ALL DELEGATE SELECTION PLANS:
2/21/12 Last day for matching funds candidate to file certificate with State Board requesting ballot access. 2-122-b(3)(a)

4/23/12; 5/1/12 4/24/12

DESIGNATING PETITIONS
1/31/122/21/12 Dates for nationally known candidate to file certificate with State Board requesting to appear on ballot. 2-122-b(3)(b) Last day for party to certify the number of delegates for the convention. 2-122-b(2) Last day for presidential candidate to certify slate of delegates and alternate delegates. 2-122-b(3)(d) Last day for presidential candidate to invalidate their candidacy. 2-122-b(3)(e) 1/3/12 First day for signing designating petitions. 6-134 (4) Dates for filing designating petitions. 6-158 (1)(a) Last day to decline a designation. 6-158 (2) 4/17/12 2/21/12 4/17/12 Last day to fill vacancy after declination. 6-158 (3) 4/23/12

MILITARY/SPECIAL FEDERAL VOTERS FOR PRIMARY ELECTION:

1/31/12

2/6/12 2/9/12 2/14/12

3/30/12

2/21/12

Last day for a BOE to receive application for ballot if not previously registered. 10-106 (5) & 11-202 (1)(a) Last day for a BOE to receive application if previously registered. 10-106 (5) & 11-202(1)(b) Last day to apply personally if previously registered. 10-106 (5) Date for county boards to send out Military/Special Federal ballots. 10-108 (1) & 11-204 Last day to postmark ballot and date it must be received by the board of elections. 10-114(1) & 11-212

CERTIFICATION
3/9/12 3/1/12 Certification of Primary ballot by SBOE of designations filed in its office. 4-110 Certification of Primary ballot by CBOE of designations filed locally. 4-110 4/23/12; 5/1/12

3/2/12

Strunk v. NYS BOE et al. N.Y.S. Sup.Ct. Kings Cty. Index No.: 2011-6500

Plaintiffs Affidavit in support of MOTION For Direct Appeal

Exhibit 6

NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE CLAIM

ERIC T.SCHNElDERhrlAN
Attorney General o New York State f

The Capitol Albany, New York 12224 STAEOFlPEWYORK

COwmOFFQZPGS

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1 ss.

Accordingly, I, Christopher-Earl: Strunk i esse being duly m o m , depose and say under penalty of n perjury: Claimant is located for sewice at 593 Vanderbilt Avenue -28 1 Brooklyn, New Y o ~ k 1238 (845) 9011 6767 email: chri@stxunk.ws. Pursuant to the requirement under law this i m y Notice of Intent to File a CIaim with the NYS s Court of Claims to recover damages caused by the arbitmy and capricious acts of the New York State Board of Elections that gave instructions for qualifications for a candidates for the Office o President o f f the United States a the 2008 and 2012 election cycles as to the *citizenshipn t requirement using the term "Born a Citizen* rather than *natural born Citizen"as required by the US Constitution Article 2 Section 3. See
a

http:1~www.scribd.com/doc/67542472 /NY-State-BOE-Way-Back-Machine
http:/ I www.scribd.com/ doc / 69647960 / UPDATE-for-OSC-in-re-H~tiff-s-~davit-in-Su~~ort~of0 ~ ~ - w - e x h i b i t s - a n - ~ 0 ~ i n - ~ ~ - ~ ~ - ~ i n ~ 11 i n d 6 5 ~ 0 - 2 0 s - ; and

http:/ /~~~.scribd.corn/doc/72 1 /Van-Allen-NOM-to-Intervene-in-Strunk-v-Paterson-NYSSC19926 lndex-29642-08-w-AFF-Exhibits-MOL-~nd-hended-Summons-w-Suwplement-to-the-Complaintwith-Plai

That Claimant discovered the O f f i d New York State Board of Elections website at 'Running for Office" on September 15,20 L 1 and as such intends t o recover damages in the amount of no less than $106,410.00 plus the present value of say $252,000.00 over 30 years for a total of $358,410.00valued in the floating market value of gold troy ounces going from say $74 1 per troy ounce on November 4, 2008 to say $1620 per troy ounce today. That Claimant knows the damages of say $358, 410.00thereof apply to m e by misapplication and administration of laws; the same i true ta m y own howledge, except as to the matters therein stated to s be alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be true. The grounds of my beliefs as to all matters not stated upon informat records, and personal knowledge.

Christopher-Earl: S t r d Sworn $0 before me This day o w m b e r 2011

ARblOLD I. TlSMFlELD Notary Public S:?.te Cf NZWY0l.k Na.41-4611EEi2 ~ u a l i f i e d Queens County In Certified In Min9s Cauniy Cclmrnission Expiros March 30, 20 -

40 Steuben Street Albany, NewYork , 12207-2109

CC:NYS BOE General Counsel New York State Board of Elections

7009 344.10 O(WO

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Lsehdec comp~ete section this

Complete this section upon Ddlvery:

Strunk v. NYS BOE et al. N.Y.S. Sup.Ct. Kings Cty. Index No.: 2011-6500

Plaintiffs Affidavit in support of MOTION For Direct Appeal

Exhibit 7

Complaint and Demand for Public Hearing on the Eligibility of the declared candidate Barack Hussein Obama I1 for Office of POTUS at the 2012 Election Cycle in New York
N W YORK STATE BOARD OF E L E C T ~ N S , E 40 Steuben Street Albany New York 12207 Attention: JAMES A. WALSH / Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNER / Co-Chair, EVELYN J; AQUILA / Commissioner, GREGORY P. PETERSON / Commissioner,
STATE OF NEW YORK
)
)

CEIYI'IFIED RETURN RECEIPT No:70111570000033846626

COUNTY OF KINGS

1 8%

Accordingly, I, Christopher-Earl: Strunk in esse being duly sworn, depose and say under penalty of perjury: 1. Petitioner is located for service at 593 Vanderbilt Avenue -281 Brooklyn, New York 11238 (845)9016767 email: chris@strunk.ws.; and is a duly registered voter in the 2008 and 2012 election cycle. 2. That Petitioner with Election Law (EL) 3-104 hereby complains of the declared candidate Barack Hussein Obama I as not being eligible for the Office of President of the United States (POTUS)and 1 demands a hearing on the declared candidates eligibility on 21 14112 or as soon thereafter as the Chairman and Commissioners may chose to convene to take evidence and testimony to bar Barack Hussein Obama I from the 2012 Presidential Election cycle ballots as time is of the essence. 1 3. That Petitioner references the N S BOE schedule issued on January 9 2012 for the 2012 Y Presidential Election cycle that designates the start of the DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION P A FILING DATES: L N 21 14112 Last day for candidates to decline designations. 82-122-a(2) 21 14112 Last day, for CBOE to notify SBOE candidates which filed at CBOE. 82-122-a(6)(h) 212 1112 Last day for party committee to file certificate of candidacies for delegate and alternate delegate candidates. 82-122-a(7)(a-b) 3/ 1/ 12 Last day for SBOE to notify party committee of candidates who will appear on ballot. 82-122-a(7)(d) 3/21 12 Last day for boards of election to notify party committee of candidates who will appear on ballot. 82-122-a(7)(d) 4. That based upon information and belief Barack Hussein Obiuna I1 (BHO 11) has already declared himself a candidate for the office of President of the United States here in the New York 2012 election cycle. 5. That based upon the admission of Barrack Hussein Obama I1 with the release of his autobiography. "Dreams From M Father" (1995)the British subject at his birth was Barack Hussein Obama Sr. y 6. That according to the INS record signed by Barrack Hussein Obama Sr. he is a Foreign Alien nonimmigrant with a student visa and never was at anytime a US Citizen or even had a "Green Card" 7. That according to the divorce decree issued from the Hawaii court of competent jurisdiction British subject Barack Hussein Obama Sr. was married to the US Citizen Stanley Ann Obama being of minor age at the time of the birth of Barack Hussein Obama 11; 8. That according to the Certificate of Live Birth released by Barack Hussein Obama I1 during a press conference in April 20 11, BHO I1 was born in Hawaii to U.S. Citizen Stanley Ann Dunham Obama the mother, and British Subject Barack Hussein Obama Sr. the father on August 8, 1961. Strunk Complaint and Demand for Hearing with EL 3-104 Page 1 of 2

9. That Barack Hussein Obama I1 is merely a native born naturalized citizen not a Natural-Born
L

a .

Citizen (NBC)a person born in the country of US Citizen parents) a s defined by the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS)in the precedent set in Minor. v. Hcwpersett 88 U.S. 162 (1875),21 Wall. 162, and 22 L. Ed. 627. by Justice Waite holding that natural born citizens (NBC) se are so per by virtue of birth on United States soil when both parents were Citizens of the United States according to the US Constitution Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 de jure citizens without reaching the need of use of the 14th Amendment or the power of Congress granted with Article 1 Section 8 % paragraph 4 to define3aturaljzation and immigration status person other than NBC persons. 6 10. That Barack Hussein Obama I1 is m t a Natural- born Citizen however may be classified a s "Born a Citizen" depending upon the power of Congress granted to define such status other than NBC. 11.That Barack Hussein Obama I1 is a declared candidate with EL 14-100(1)(7)(9) here in New York, and has illegally directed his campaign fund raising here in New York to proceed starting last summer as with EL 14-114; 13 b 12. That BHO I1 as an ineligible declared candidate,,seeking a ballot line in the Democratic Rimary and General Election ballot starting February 14, 20 12. 13.That BHO I1 a s an ineligible declared candidate illegally participates within the state and personally directed his fund raising agents to proceed as defined under N S EL 14-114 and the fraudulent Y w conversion of the funds as defined by EL 14-130 in relevant parts with related law. 14. That the N S BOE is willfully facilitating BHO I1 a s an ineligible declared candidate since no later Y than the 2008 election cycle continuing now with malicious facilitation using instructions on the N S BOE website page "Running for Office" contrary to the law of the land and the requirements set Y by the State Legislature stating therein as to citizenship status that a declared candidate need only be "Born a Citizen" rather than a "Natural-born Citizen" to be eligible for the office of POTUS. 15. That Petitioner alleges that the Chairman and Commissioners are involved in the misprision of a . felony by facilitating the declared candidacy of Barack Hussein Obama I1 and others, and that 4 duplicate of this complaint affidavit is simultaneously filed with the Albany District Attorney for investigation; and that 16. On January 26, 2012, Petitioner was a material witness a t the ballot access hearing held by the Georgia Secretary of State before a Justice of that Court to bar Barack Hussein Obama I1 from that ballot and BHO I1 nor his attorney attended by default relinquish 16 electoral votes from Georgia. 17. Petitioner knows the wrongful acts to facilitate the'continued fund raising and attempt for ballot access by the declared candidate is an irreparable harm with time as the essence that applies to me by misapplication and administration of laws; the same is true to my own knowledge, except a s to the matters therein stated to be alleged on information and belief, and a s to those matters I believe it to be true. The grounds of my beliefs a s to all matters not stated upon information and belief are a s follows: 3rd parties, books and records, and personal knowledge.

~?b'Idopher-~arl: Strunk ARNOLD I. TISHFIELD Notary Public State Of New York N0.41-4311662 Qualified In Queens County Certified In Kings County Commission Expires March 30, 20

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CC: Office of the District Attorney . Albany County Judicial Building 6 Lodge Street Albany, NY 12207 Cert RR No: No: 70 111570000033846633ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of New York State The Capitol Albany, New York 12224 Page 2 of 2

Strunk Complaint and Demand for Hearing with EL 3-104

Strunk v. NYS BOE et al. N.Y.S. Sup.Ct. Kings Cty. Index No.: 2011-6500

Plaintiffs Affidavit in support of MOTION For Direct Appeal

Exhibit 8

OFFICE OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE EIF,ARINGS STATE OF GEORGIA

DAVID FARRAR, LEAH LAX,CODY JUDY, THOMAS MALAREN, L A W ROTH,
Plaintiffs,
Y.

E (1 3 2012 3 l

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:

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V ~ ~IC I<LIII, C I
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A>\I)I,IIII

Docket Number: OSAH-SECSTATE-CE1215136-60-MALIHI

Counsel for Plaintiffs: Orly Taitz

BARACK OBAMA, Defendant.

DAVID P.WELDEN,

Counsel for Defendant: Michael Jablonski

Plaintiff,
v.

: : :

Docket Number: OSAH-SECSTATE-CE-

1215137-60-MALMI
Counsel for Plaintiff: Van R. hion Counsel for Defendant: Michael Jablonski

BARACK OBAMA,
:

Defendant.

CARL SWENSSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Docket Number: OSAH-SECSTATE-CE121 621 8-60-MALMI

Counsel for P a n i f J. Mark Hatfield litf

BARACK OBAMA,
Counsel for Defendant: Michael Jablonsh

Defendant.

KEVIN RICHARD POWELL,

Plaintiff,
v.

Docket Number: OSAH-SECSTATE-CE1216823-60-MALIHI

Counsel for Plaintiff: J. M r Hatfield ak

BARACK OBAMA,
Counsel for Defendant: Michael Jablonski

Defendant,

DECISION"
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant President Barack Obama does not meet Georgia's eligibility requirements for candidacy in Georgia's 20 12 presidential primary election.

Georgia law mandates that candidates meet constitutiona1 and statutory requirements for
the office that they seek. O.C.G.A.

5 21-2-5(a),

Mr. Obama is a candidate for federal

office who has been certified by the state executive committee of a politicaI party, and
therefore must, under Georgia Code Section 21-2-5, meet the constitutional and statutory qualifications for holding the Office of the President of the United States. Id. The United
States Constitution requires that a President be a "natural born [clitizen." U.S. Const. art.
11, 8 1,
CI. 5 .

As required by Georgia Law, Secretary of State Brian Kemp referred Plaintiffs'

challenges to this Court for a hearing. O.C.G.A. 5 21-2-5(b). A hearing was held on January 26, 2012. The record closed on February 1 , 2012. Plaintiffs Farm, Lax, Judy, Malaren, and Roth and their counsel Orly Taitz, Plaintiffs C r Swensson and Kevin al

Richard Powell and their counsel d. Mark Hatfield, and Plaintiff David P.Wetden and his

counsel Van R. Irion, all appeared and answered the call of the case. However, neither
Defendant nor his counsel, Michad Jablonski, appeared or answered. Ordinarily, the
Court would enter a default order against a party that fails to participate in any stage of a proceeding, Ga, Comp.

R. & Regs.

616-1-2-.30(1) m (5). Nonetheless, despite the d

This Decision has been consolidated to include the four challenges to President Obama's candidacy filed by PIaiatiffs David Earrar, el al., David P.Welden, Carl Swensson, and Kevin Richard Powell. Section I of this Decision applies only to the case presented by Ms. Taitz on behalf of Mr. Farrar and his co-plaintiffs, Leah Lax,Cody Judy, Thomas MaIaren, and Laurie Roth, and does nor pertain, i any way, to the cases af n Mr. Welden, M .Swensson, and Mr. PowelI. Section I1 applies to a11 Plaintiffs. r

Defendant's failure to appear, Plaintiffs asked this Court to decide the case on the merits

of their arguments and evidence. The Court granted Plaintiffs' request.

By deciding this matter on the merits, the Court in no way condones the conduct

or legal scholarship of Defendant's attorney, Mr. Jablonski. This Decision is entirely

based on the law, as well as the evidence and legal arguments presented at the hearing.

I.

Evidentiary Arguments of Plaintiffs Farrar, et at.

Plaintiffs Farrar, Lax, Judy, Malaxen, and Roth contend that President Barack
Obama is not a natural born citizen. To support this contention, Plaintiffs assert that Mr.
Obama maintains a fraudulently obtained social security number, a Hawaiian birth

certificate that is a computer-generated forgery, and that he does not otherwise possess

valid U.S. identification papers. Further, Plaintiffs submit that Mr. Obma has previously

held Indonesian citizenship, and he did not use his Iegd name on his notice of candidacy,
which is either Barry Soetoro or Basack Obama Soebarkah. (P1.s' Am. Compl. 3.)
At the hearing, Plaintiffs presented the testimony of eight witnesses2 and seven

exhibits in support of their position. (Exs. P-1 through P-7.) When considering the
testimony and exhibits, this Court applies the same mIes o f evidence that apply to civil nonjury cases in superior court. Gn. Comp. R. & Regs. 61 6-1 -2-. 18(1)-(9). The weight

to be given to any evidence shaII be determined by the Court based upon its reIiability

and probative value. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 616-1-2-. 1 8(1O).

The Court finds the testimony of the witnesses, as well as the exhibits tendered, to
be of little, if any, probative value, and thus wholly insufficient to support Plaintiffs' allegations.'

Ms. Taitz attempted to solicit expert testimony from several of the

witnesses without qualifying or tendering the witnesses as experts. See Stephens v. State,
219 Ga. App. 881 (1996) (the unqualified testimony of the witness was not competent

evidence). For example, two of Plaintiffs' witnesses testified that Mr. Obma's birth
2

Originally, Ms. T a b indicated to the Court that she would offer the testimony of seven witnesses. However, during her closing argument, Ms. Taitz requested to testify. Ms. Taitz was sworn and began her testimony, but shortly thereafter, the Court requested that Ms. Tatiz step-down and submit any Eurther testimony in writing.

' The credibility of witnesses is within the sole discretion of the trier of fact.

In non-iurv cases that discretion lies with the judge. See Mustang Tmnsp., IHC. v. W # Lowe & Sons, Inc., 123*~;. App. 350, K 352 (1 971).

certificate was forged, but neither witness was properly qualified or tendered as an expert
in birth records, forged documents or document manipulation. Another witness testified

that she has concIuded that the social security number Mr. Obama uses is fraudulent; however, her investigatory methods and her sources of information were not properly

presented, and she was never qualified or tendered as an expert in social security fiaud, or
fraud investigations in general. Accordingly, the Court cannot make an objective

threshold determination of these witnesses' testimony without adequate knowledge of

their qualifications. See Knudsen v. Duffee-Freeman, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 872 (1957) (for

the testimony of an expert witness to be received, his or h a qualifications as such must be first proved). None of the testifying witnesses provided persuasive testimony. Moreover, the

Court finds that none of the written submissions tendered by Plaintiffs have probative
value. Given the unsatisfactory evidence presented by the Plaintiffs, the Court concludes
that Plaintiffs' claims are not persuasive.

IT.

Application of the "NaturaI Born Citizen" Requirement

Plaintiffs allege that President Barack Obama is not a natural born citizen of the

United States and, therefore, is not eligible to sun in Georgia's presidential primary

election. As indicated supra, the United States Constitution states that Lb[n]o person
except a natural born Citizen.

. . shall be eligible for the Office of the President . . . ."

For the purpose of this section's analysis, the following facts are considered: 1)

Mr. Obama was born in the United States; 2) Mr. Obama's mother was a citizen of the
United States at the time of his birth; and 3) Mr. Obama's father was never a United

States citizen. Plaintiffs contend that, because his father was not a U.S. citizen at the time

of his birth, Mr. Obama is constitutionally ineligible for the Office of the President of the

United States. The Court does not agree.

In 2009, the Indiana Court of Appeals ("Indiana Court") addressed facts and
issues similar to those before h i s Court. Arkeny v. Governor, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009). In Arkeny, the plaintiffs sought to prevent certification of Mr. Obama as an

eligible candidate for president because he is not a natural born citizen. Id. at 68 1. The
pIaintiffs argued, as the Plaintiffs argue before this Court, that "these's a very clear
distinction between a 'citizen of the United States' and a 'natural born Citizen,' and the

difference invoIves having [two] parents of U.S. citizenship, owing no foreign

allegiance." Id. at 685. The Indiana Court rejected the argument that Mr. Obama was
The definition of th~sclause has been the source of much debate. See, P-g.,Gordon, &o Can Be President o the United States: The Unresolved Enigmo, 28 Md.L. Rev. 1 ( 1968); Jill A. Pryor, Note, The f Nahral-Barn Citizen Clause and Pre.Fidentio1 Eligibiliv: An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years o Uncertainty,97 Yale L.J. 881 (1988); Christina S. L o b a n , Presidential Eligibility: The Meaning o the f f Natural-Born Cituen Clause, 36 Gonz. L. Rev. 349 (2000): William T. Han, Beyond Presidential Eligibility: The Natural Born Citizen Clause as a Source qf Eirthrighr Citizenship, 58 Drake L. Rev. 457 (2010).
4

ineligible, stating that children born within the United States are natural born citizens,

hs regardless of the citizenship of their parents. Id. at 688. T i Court finds the decision
and analysis of Arkeny persuasive,
The Indiana Court began its analysis by attempting to ascertain the definition of
"natural born citizen" because the Constitution does not define the term. Id. at 685-86;
See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167 {I 875) ("The Constitution does not,

in words,

say who shall be natural born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that.");
see

oho United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (noting that the only

mention of the term "natural born citizen" i the Constitution is in Article 11, and the term n is not defined i the Constitution). n
The Indiana Court first expIained that the U.S. Supreme Court has read the

Fourteenth Amendment and Article I1 (natural born citizen provision) in tandem and held
that "new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization." Id. at 685
(citing Minor, 88 U.S. at 167); See U.S. Const. amend. XIV,

1. ("All persons born or

naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States . . . .*'). h Minor,the Court observed that: At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was neva doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. Id. at 167-68. Plaintiffs ask this Court to read the Supreme Court's decision in M n r as io defining natural born citizens as only "children born in a country of parents who were i t s

citizens." 88 U.S.at 167. However, the Indiana Court explains that M n r did not define io

the term natural born citizen. In deciding whether a woman was eligible to vote, the

Minor Court merely concluded that children born in

a country

of parents who w r its ee

citizens would quaIify as natural born, and this Court agrees. The Minor Court lefl open
the

issue of whether a child born within the United States of alien parent(s) is a natural

born citizen.

Next, the Indiana Court looked to United Stares v. Wolzg Kim Ark, in which the
Supreme Court analyzed the meaning of the words "citizen of the United States" in the

Fourteenth Amendment and "natural born citizen of the United States" in Article IE to
determine whether a child born in the United States to parents who, at the time of the

child's birth, were subjects of China "becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the

United States, by virtue of the first clause of the fourteenth amendment . . . .'"Id.

at 686

(citing Wong Kim Ark, 1 69 U.S. at 653). The Indiana Court determined that the two

provisions "must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history

of which were familiarIy known to the fixmess of the constitution." Id. (citing Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. at 654). The Indiana C u t agreed that "[tjhe interpretation of the or
constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions
are framed in the language o f the English common law, and are to be read in the light of
its history." Id. (citing Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655) (internal citation omitted). The

Wong Kim Ark Court extensively examined the common law of England in its decision

and concluded that Wong Kim Ark, who was born in the United States to alien parents,

became a citizen of the United States at the time of his birthb5 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at
705.

The Wong Kim Ark Court explained:

The fundamental principle of the common law w t regard to English nationality was birth ih within the allegiance, also called ""lgealty," "obedience," "faith" or "power," of the King. The principle embraced a11 persons born within the King's allegiance and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual . . . and were not restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance; but were predicable of aliens in amity, so long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born in England, of such aIiens, were therefore naturaI-born subjects. But the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation of part of the King's dominions, were not natural-born subjects, because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as wouM be said at this day, within the jurisdiction of the King.

169 U.S. at 655. It thus clearly appears that by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country, and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the Cmwn of EngIand, were within the allegiance, the obedience. the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, the jurisdiction, of the English Sovereign; and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of s foreign State, or af an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
Id. at 658. Further:

Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a counw*while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth.
Id. at 660 (quoting Inglis v. Trustees o Sailors ' Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, I64 (1 830) (Story, J., f concurring)). And:

The fmt section of the second article of the constirution uses the language, 'a natural-born citizen.' It thus assumes that citizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the constitution, whch referred citizenship to the place of birth.
Id. at 662 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 576 (1 856) (Curtis, J., dissenting)). Finally:

All persons born in the allegiance of the king are natural-born subjects,m a 1 persons born in d 1 the allegiance of the United States are nanual-born citizws. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England.

Id, at 662-63 (quoting Unifed States v. Rhodes, ( 1866) (Mr. Justice S wayne)).

Relying on the language of the Constitution and the historical reviews and analyses of Minor and Wong Kim Ark, the Indiana Court concluded h a t
persons born within the borders of the United States are "natural born citizens" for Article 11, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship of their parents. Just as a person "born within the British dominions [was] a natural-born British subject" at the time of the framing of the U.S. Constitution, so too were those "born in the allegiance of the United States [] natural-born citizens."
916 N.E.2d at 688. The Indiana Court determined that a person qualifies as a natural born

citizen if he was born in the United States because he became a United States citizen at
birthV6
For the purposes of this analysis, this Court considered that President Barack Obama was born in the United States. Therefore, as discussed in Arkmy, he became a citizen at birth and is a natural born citizen. Accordingly,
CONCLUSION

President Barack Obama is eIigible as a candidate for the presidential primary

election under O.C.G.A. r) 2 1-2-5@).

MICHAEL M.MALIHI, Judge

This Court recognizes that the Wong Kim Ark case was not deciding the meaning of "natural born citizen" for the purposes of determining presidential qualifications; however, this Court finds the Indiana Court's analysis and reliance on these cases to be persuasive.

Strunk v. NYS BOE et al. N.Y.S. Sup.Ct. Kings Cty. Index No.: 2011-6500

Plaintiffs Affidavit in support of MOTION For Direct Appeal

Exhibit 9

http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2012/02/all-that-is-wrong-with-georgia-state.html All That Is Wrong with Georgia State Judge Michael M. Malihis Decision that Putative President Obama Is a Natural Born Citizen

All That Is Wrong with Georgia State Judge Michael M. Malihis Decision that Putative President Obama Is a Natural Born Citizen By Mario Apuzzo, Esq. February 3, 2012 Georgia State Administrative Law Judge, Michael M. Malihi, issued his decision on Friday, February 3, 2012, finding that putative President, Barack Obama, is eligible as a candidate for the presidential primary election under O.C.G.A. Sec. 21-2-5(b). The decision can be read here, http://obamareleaseyourrecords.blogspot.com/2012/02/judge-malihi-rules-against-plaintiffs.html . I must enter my objection to this decision which is not supported by either fact or law. The Court held: For purposes of this analysis, this Court considered that President Barack Obama was born in the United States. Therefore, as discussed in Arkeny [sic meant Ankeny], he became a citizen at birth and is a natural born citizen. But there is no evidence before the Court that Obama was born in the United States. The court can only rest its finding of fact on evidence that is part of the court record. The judge tells us that he decided the merits of the plaintiffs claims. But he does not tell us in his decision what evidence he relied upon to consider[] that Obama was born in the United States. The judge considered that Obama was born in the United States. What does considered mean? Clearly, it is not enough for a court to consider evidence or law. It must make a finding after having considered facts and law. The judge simply does not commit to any finding as to where Obama was born. Using the word considered is a cop out from actually addressing the issue. Additionally, we know from his decision that neither Obama nor his attorney appeared at the hearing let alone introduced any evidence of Obamas place of birth. We also know from the decision that the judge ruled that plaintiffs documents introduced into evidence were of little, if any, probative value, and thus wholly insufficient to support Plaintiffs allegations. Surely, the court did not use those insufficient documents as evidence of Obamas place of birth. Nor does the judge tell us that he used those documents for any such purpose. The judge also does not tell us that the court took any judicial notice of any evidence (not to imply that it could). The judge did find that Obama has been certified by the state executive committee of a political party. But with the rules of evidence of superior court applying, this finding does not establish anyones place of birth. Hence, what evidence did the judge have to rule that Obama is born in the United States? The answer is none. The court did not engage in its own thoughtful and reasoned analysis of the meaning of an Article II natural born Citizen, but rather relied only upon Ankeny v. Governor of the State of Indiana, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. Ct.App. 2009), transfer denied, 929 N.E.2d 789 (2010), a state-court decision which erred in how it defined a natural born Citizen. The court says that Ankeny is persuasive. The court does not show us why Ankeny is persuasive other than to just provide some quotations from the decision. On the contrary, upon close analysis, we can see that Ankeny is far from persuasive on the definition of a natural born Citizen. The courts decision can only be as sound as the Ankeny decision may be. But an analysis of that decision shows that it was incorrectly decided as to its definition of an Article II natural born Citizen. Presidential eligibility is a national issue. Under our Constitution, like the States do not have power to naturalize citizens, they also do not have power to change, add, or diminish the meaning of an Article II natural born Citizen. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (states have no
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authority to change, add, or diminish the eligibility requirements for members of Congress). Moreover, as naturalization needs uniformity, so does the citizenship standard needed to be met by those wishing to be eligible to be President. Hence, any state court decision on the meaning of a natural born Citizen is not binding on the nation in determining who is eligible to be President. Such a decision can only be ultimately made by the U.S. Supreme Court which would make its decision the law of the entire nation. The Ankeny case is a decision of the Indiana state court and not by the U.S. Supreme Court. For this reason, the Ankeny decision is not binding on any court deciding the question of what is a natural born Citizen. But not only is the decision not binding, it also needs to be rejected for diminishing the meaning of an Article II natural born Citizen. Apart from the Ankeny decision not being binding on the national issue of what is a natural born Citizen, the decision itself should be rejected on its merits. The Constitutions text does not define a natural born Citizen. Yet, Ankeny did not even discuss what the Founders and Framers original intent was in including the natural born Citizen clause in the Constitution. It is a rule of constitutional construction that we can learn what the Founders and Framers intended by a certain term they included in the Constitution by discovering what their purpose was for including the term in that document. But the Ankeny court told us what an Article II natural born Citizen is without examining the purpose for which the Founders and Framers included that clause in Article II, Section 1. No where in the decision do we see that the court examined what the Founders and Framers intent was for inserting the clause in the Constitution. The court conducted no independent historical research or analysis regarding what the Founders and Framers intended when they wrote the natural born Citizen clause in the Constitution in 1787. In fact, no where in the decision did the court even raise the issue of the Founders and Framers intent when they wrote the clause in Article II. It provided no sources from the Founding period which in any way supports its holding. It discussed no historical records or declarations of historical figures. So its decision as to what a natural born Citizen is has no historical or legal support. The Founders and Framers placed their trust in the Laws of Nature and of Natures God. The Declaration of Independence, para. 1. They came to learn what natural law was from studying ancient history and its influence in the then modern world. They knew from studying this history and the great publicists, including Emer de Vattel who was the Founders and Framers favorite, that natural law became the law of nations. And Vattel in Section 212 of his The Law of Nations (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758) defined what a natural born Citizen is. There he said that the natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. The Indiana state court in Ankeny did not even discuss natural law and the law of nations. The Ankeny court just barely acknowledged Emer de Vattel. It refers to Vattel's highly influential work, The Law of Nations, as "an eighteenth century treatise" and discusses neither Vattel nor his work. Hence, it fails to understand the importance of the law of nations and Vattel to the Founders and Framers and in the founding of our nation and their drafting of our Constitution in which they included the law of nations and not the English common law as part of Article III "Laws of the United States." The court hardly knew who Emer de Vattel was. This should be an indication to anyone who has seriously studied the Obama eligibility issue of how much reliance we can place on the courts ruling as to what a natural born Citizen is. Judge Malihi also did not discuss the early naturalization statutes passed by our early Congresses. These acts are critical in understanding the definition of a natural born Citizen because so many members of the early Congresses were Founders and Framers. The significance of such a statute passed by the first Congress was, of course, the fact that many of the framers of the Constitution were Members of that first Congress, as well as the fact that the first Congresss understanding of the meaning of the terms of the Constitution was most contemporaneous in time with the documents adoption. One author has noted that of the Committee of Eleven, which first proposed to the Convention of 1787 the eligibility requirement
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of being a natural born citizen, 8 of the 11 committee members were in that first Congress, and none stated objections to or disagreement with the characterization of the term natural born by statute by the Congress. Christina Lohman, Presidential Eligibility: The Meaning of the Natural-Born Citizen Clause, 36 Gonzaga Law Review 349, 371 (2000/2001). The Naturalization Acts of 1790, 1795, and 1802, prove that only a child born in the United States to U.S. citizen parents can be an Article II natural born Citizen. These acts treated children born in the United States to alien parents as aliens themselves. These acts also naturalized children born abroad to U.S. citizen parents to be in 1790 natural born citizens and then in 1795 and thereafter citizens of the United States. By analyzing these acts, we can see that the only child over whom Congress did not exercise its naturalization power was a child born in the United States to citizen parents. Hence, that child was the natural born citizen. Ankeny misread Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), saying that the Minor Court read Article II and the Fourteenth Amendment "in tandem," suggesting without any support that the latter somehow amended the former. It also erred when it said that Minor "left open the issue of whether a person who is born within the United States of alien parents is considered a natural born citizen." The Court did no such thing. Rather, the Court left open that question as it applies to a Fourteenth Amendment born "citizen of the United States," not an Article II "natural born Citizen." Minor told us that there is no doubt who a natural born Citizen is, telling us that it is a child born in the country of two U.S. citizen parents. That definition is based on natural law and the law of nations and not the English common law. Indeed, this confirms that the Founders and Framers gave us only one citizenship definition to be used to determine eligibility to be President. On the other hand, Minor added that there is doubt as to whether a child born in the U.S. to alien parents was even a citizen. The Framers gave Congress the power to make future citizens of the United States through naturalization. Hence, the doubts have been over the definition making persons the parents of a future natural born Citizen, not over the definition making the child of those parents a natural born Citizen. It also confounded Minor and U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) as relying upon the English common law to define a citizen and a natural born Citizen. It said that Minor relied upon the English common law like Wong Kim Ark did when it did not do any such thing, for it relied upon natural law and the law of nations which when applied in the United States became common-law (the language that Minor used), which given the definition of a natural-born citizen that the Court provided (including the citizenship of the parents as a condition of being a natural-born citizen) could not have been English common law but rather was American common law. In order to justify its decision, Ankeny gave authority and respect to the feudal English common law (per Lord Coke and Lord Chief Justice Cockburn) on matters of U.S. citizenship and gave no such authority and respect to our own American common law which Minor showed replaced that feudal law in the new republic. In fact, there is not one word in the Minor decision which sounds in the language of the English common law, yet Ankeny said that it relied upon English common law. It distinguished Minor in footnote 12 by saying that it contemplates only scenarios where both parents are either citizens or aliens, rather in the case of President Obama, whose mother was a U.S. citizen and father was a citizen of the United Kingdom. But it did not explain how or why having one U.S. citizen parent rather than none would make any difference when applying the natural born Citizen clause. Wong Kim Ark, a Fourteenth Amendment citizenship case, answered the question left open in Minor, which question concerned whether Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United States, not an Article II natural born Citizen. Wong Kim Ark relied upon the English common law, which historically had been used to define British nationality and not American nationality, to define a citizen of the United States. But Ankeny mistakenly concluded that Wong Kim Ark ruled Wong Kim Ark to be a natural born Citizen rather than a citizen of the United States. Wong Kim Ark did no such thing. There is nothing in Wong Kim Ark decision that suggests that the Court declared Wong Kim Ark an Article II natural born Citizen and therefore eligible to be President. The U.S. Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett (1875) already had told us that there was no doubt as to who could be a natural born Citizen. Since there is no doubt and if Wong Kim Ark was a natural born Citizen, the U.S. government would not
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have argued that he was not even a citizen of the United States, let alone a natural born Citizen. Also, Wong Kim Ark never said that Minor was wrong in defining a natural born Citizen in the way that it did under natural law and the law of nations and not the English common law. Also, Ankeny relied strictly upon U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark and its historical sources for its decision on what a natural born Citizen is. They made a monumental declaration as to the meaning of the clause based solely upon a 1898 U.S. Supreme Court case that did not even involve any dispute regarding the meaning of a natural born Citizen and which ironically confirmed Vattels definition of a natural born Citizen as stated by Minor v. Happersett in 1875. Ankeny incorrectly took the Wong Kim Ark holding that Wong was a Fourteenth Amendment born "citizen of the United States," and even though Wong itself provides a different definition for an Article II "natural born Citizen," and even though Wong cites and accepts Minor's definition of a "natural born Citizen," the Ankeny court equated the Wong "citizen of the United States" with an Article II "natural born Citizen" and said that the Wong decision stands for such a proposition when it does not. Hence, it erroneously relied upon Wong Kim Ark, stating that the Court there declared Wong a natural born citizen when it only declared him a citizen of the United States. In Footnote 14 it said: We note the fact that the Court in Wong Kim Ark did not actually pronounce the plaintiff a 'natural born Citizen' using the Constitutions Article II language is immaterial." This is a fantastic statement given the care and precision which the Founders and Framers used with their language in drafting and adopting the Constitution, a circumstance which has always been recognized by our U.S. Supreme Court when called upon to interpret the Constitution. Additionally, Wong Kim Ark itself distinguished between a child born in the country to one or two alien parents and a child born in the country to citizen parents, telling us that while both are citizens, only the latter is a natural born Citizen." Wong said: The child of an alien, if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle. p. 22, note. Wong Kim Ark, at 666-67 (citing and quoting Binneys 1853 pamphlet on citizenship). Ankeny erroneously conflated an Article II "natural born Citizen" with a Fourteenth Amendment "citizen of the United States." Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 and other parts of the Constitution are clear in distinguishing between a natural born Citizen and a Citizen of the United States. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment defines a citizen of the United States, not a natural born Citizen. Even if we were to give them any controlling effect which they do not have, there is also nothing in the legislative debates which indicates that the amendment was designed to change the meaning of an Article II natural born Citizen. We cannot just forget about the distinction made by the Framers in Article II between a natural born Citizen and a Citizen of the United States. Just ruling someone to be a citizen of the United States does not necessarily mean that the person is a natural born Citizen, for citizens of the United States are made up of natural born Citizens and naturalized citizens of the United States. The latter are naturalized either at birth or after birth. Natural born Citizens are citizens by virtue of natural law. Other U.S. citizens are citizens by virtue of positive law which in Wong Kim Ark was by virtue of the first clause of the fourteenth amendment. Wong Kim Ark, at 686. Ankeny as did Wong Kim Ark also mistakenly relied upon Inglis v. Sailors Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99 (1830). What the court did is cite and quote from Justice Story who was in the minority and whose opinion was not accepted by the majority. The majority of the Court in Inglis, which included Chief Justice John Marshall, did not rely upon the English common law jus soli rule but rather the law of nation jus sanguinis rule when it held that if the demandant was born in New York after July 4, 1776, his minority incapacitated him from making any election as to which citizenship to chose and he therefore inherited the character and election and therefore the citizenship of his father (father and mother) who, if born a British subject and if he continued that national character as of the time of his sons birth, made the son British also, subject to the son renouncing the citizenship chosen for him by his British father during
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minority and choosing U.S. citizenship upon becoming an adult. Id. at 124 and 126. The majority cited and relied upon Vattel when arguing that a person has a right to elect what nation to be part of in time of revolution. Id. at 122. Justice Story put forth the English common law jus soli rule for citizenship and ruled that the damandant if born in New York was an American citizen regardless of the citizenship of his parents (Id. at 164 and 170). But Justice Story was in the minority. The majority of the Court did not adopt Justice Storys opinion and reliance on the English common law. Both Ankeny and Wong Kim Ark also mistakenly relied upon that part of the dissenting opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), which was not directed to the issue of slavery disabling blacks from being citizens but rather directed to whether we defined U.S. citizenship under natural law and the law of nations or under the English common law. This dissenting opinion did not carry the day and was also rejected by the Minor court which in 1875 defined a natural-born citizen as a child born in a country to citizen parents. Ankeny used English common law to define an Article II "natural born Citizen" when all U.S. Supreme Court cases, including Minor and Wong Kim Ark, have used American common law to do so. Ankeny said: Although President Arthurs status as a natural born citizen was challenged in the 1880 Presidential Election on the grounds that he was born in Canada rather than Vermont, the argument was not made that because Arthurs father was an Irish citizen he was constitutionally ineligible to be President. But the court provided no evidence that anyone then was aware that when Chester Arthur was born, he was born to an alien father. Additionally, even if anyone of any authority was aware that Arthurs father when he was born was an alien, one constitutional violation does not justify another. Ankeny cited and quoted from Diaz-Salazar v. I.N.S., 700 F.2d 1156, 1160 (7th Cir. 1983) in support of its definition of a "natural born Citizen" when the question of the meaning of the clause did not exist in that case and the only reference therein to a "natural born Citizen" was made by the court when it recited the facts but not when it provided any legal analysis. It is incredible that the court would give such weight to such a statement of dicta and not give any weight to the U.S. Supreme Courts definition of a naturalborn citizen in Minor. The pro se plaintiffs in Ankeny claimed, among other things, that Obama was not eligible to be President under Article II, Section 1. The court said that persons born within the borders of the United States are natural born Citizens for Article II, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship of their parents. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs complaint on defendants motion that on its face plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. What is also amazing about the Ankeny case is that after it went through its explanation as to what a natural born Citizen is and while it dismissed the plaintiffs case in which they argued both that Obama has yet to prove that he was born in the United States (it called that claim a non-factual assertion[]) and that even if he were so born he still fails to meet the legal definition of a natural born Citizen, it neither held that Obama was born in the United States nor that he is a natural born Citizen. In fact, there was absolutely no evidence before the court that Obama was born in Hawaii. And as we have seen, there was also absolutely no evidence before Judge Malihi showing the Obama was born in the United States. Hence, the Ankeny opinion regarding whether Obama is a natural born Citizen is nothing more than an advisory opinion, for the Court never ruled that he was such. The court never addressed the question of whether he was born in Hawaii. No evidence was presented to the court whether he was born within the borders of the United States. The court never even examined that issue. Hence, its statement that persons born within the borders of the United States are natural born Citizens for Article II, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship of their parents does not prove that Obama was, in fact, born within the borders of the United States and that he is therefore a natural born Citizen.

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Ankeny was advisory on the "natural born Citizen" issue because it gave us its definition of a "natural born Citizen" but never applied that definition to Obama's personal situation. It resolved no real controversy. After it pronounced what the law was, it needed to apply that law to the facts. It needed to find that Obama was born in the United States and that he was thus a "natural born Citizen" to give its opinion any binding effect. It never made the finding that Obama was born in the United States. It never said that such a fact was established by the evidence before the court. So its whole opinion on what is a "natural born Citizen" is purely advisory. To conclude that plaintiffs did not state a sufficient claim given the courts ruling as to what a natural born Citizen is, there would have to exist uncontroverted evidence that Obama was in fact eligible to be President. The question of presidential eligibility is a legal question which the court could examine on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. But in order to make any conclusion as to whether plaintiffs adequately challenged Obamas eligibility, given the fact that on a motion to dismiss a complaint the court is supposed to view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with every reasonable inference construed in the nonmovants favor, and given the courts own definition of what is a natural born Citizen, the court had to examine whether Obama was born within the borders of the United States. This legal hurdle shows that the court could not decide the question of the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs complaint by simply examining its face alone. Rather, the court needed evidence outside the complaint (e.g. a birth certificate) which means that the court would have had to convert the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment. But not only was there no evidence presented to the Ankeny court showing that Obama was in fact born in the United States, the court never called for such evidence nor did it even make such a factual finding. By the courts own words, the citizenship of Obamas parents was not relevant. But surely the only element of its natural born Citizen test, that Obama was born in the United States, was critically relevant. Yet the court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim without any evidence that Obama was born in the United States. Hence, how can the court dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim? Rather, what the court did is just by way of advisory opinion tell us what it believes to be a natural born Citizen without applying its definition to the question of whether Obama is constitutionally eligible. If the court had addressed the place of birth issue, given its definition of a natural born Citizen, it would have ended the live controversy. It did not do that so its opinion is a mere advisory opinion with no application to a live factual controversy producing a just resolution. Lastly, if the courts decision had not been advisory, the nation today would know whether Obama was or was not born within the borders of the United States. The Ankeny plaintiffs may have argued that place of birth did not matter, given the two-citizen parent argument. But surely, they did not concede that Obama was born in the United States and the court did not make a finding that they made any such concession. Hence, once the court rejected the citizen-parents element and relied strictly on the place of birth, it could not simply conclude that plaintiffs did not state a claim, for the ultimate issue was always Obama's eligibility which they clearly stated in their complaint. Again, the court was duty bound on a motion to dismiss on the face of the complaint to give the nonmoving party every reasonable inference. I cannot imagine, given that the court was well aware of the issue of place of birth, the plaintiffs never conceded that Obama was born in the United States, the ultimate issue was eligibility, and the requirement that a court faced with a motion to dismiss on the face of a complaint is to give the non-movant the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the court not treating a complaint that says that Obama was not eligible as also encompassing the place of birth issue or in the alternative not giving the non-moving pro se parties the opportunity to amend their complaint. The Ankeny court could have completely disposed of the case on an independent state ground. There was no need for the court to journey into the waters of what an Article II natural born Citizen is. Not being satisfied with giving us its opinion on what a natural born Citizen is as it pertains to persons born in the
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United States, the court in Footnote 15 even cautioned that while the question of whether someone born out of the United States can be a natural born Citizen was not before it, its decision should not be interpreted to mean that being born in the United States is the only way someone can be a natural born Citizen. As we have seen, Ankeny is simply bad law for many reasons. The main one is that it rests on the incorrect notion that Wong Kim Ark declaring that Wong was a citizen of the United States from the moment of birth under the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily means that the Court said he was a natural born Citizen. Such a position is remarkable given that the Indiana court itself admitted in its own opinion that it is aware that the Constitution contains both natural born Citizens and citizens of the United States and that the Wong holding did not include natural born Citizen. So, any citation to Ankeny v. Governor of Indiana is misguided for at least two reasons, and as we have seen above there are many more. It read Minor v. Happersett as having doubts about who was a natural born Citizen when it had no such doubt. Its doubts were only whether a child born in the U.S. to alien parents was a citizen under the law existing prior to the Fourteenth Amendment and necessarily also under that very amendment. It also read Wong Kim Ark as resolving those non-existing doubts and holding that Wong was a natural born Citizen. But Justice Gray only held that Wong was a citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment. He never held that he was a natural born Citizen. So Wong, not addressing the issue, never resolved any doubts concerning what a natural born Citizen is. In fact, the Court cited and quoted Minor v. Happersetts definition of the clause which was a child born in the country to citizen parents. Judge Malihi finds that Obama became a citizen at birth and is a natural born citizen. What he is saying is that by the mere fact that Obama was a citizen at birth, he is a natural born Citizen. But this is not the definition of a natural born citizen. Judge Malihi's definition must fail just on a textual basis. The clause is "natural born Citizen," not "born Citizen." The "natural" must also be given meaning. And when we do give "natural" meaning, we see that it cannot be separated from the word of art and idiom, "natural born Citizen" which means a child born in the country to citizen parents. The Founders and Framers looked for a citizenship standard that would assure them that the President and Commander in Chief would have the most allegiance, attachment, and loyalty to the republic. A citizenship test that depended only upon when a child became a citizen would not be sufficient, for it alone would not say anything of how the child would be reared. But a test that included to whom a child was born and that provided some indication of how the child would be raised much better provided for their needs for allegiance to the nation. For those reasons, a natural born citizen could not just depend upon being declared a citizen from the moment of birth, which any positive law could declare. Rather, the Founders and Framers included two natural components which were that the child would have to be born in the country to citizen parents. This was the time-honored definition of a natural born Citizen under natural law and the law of nations and this is what they accepted. A born citizen, citizen at birth, citizen by birth or citizen from birth, if he or she does not satisfy this original American common law definition, is an Article II Citizen of the United States as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment, Congressional Act, or treaty, but not an Article II natural born Citizen as defined by natural law and the law of nations which definition is a child born in the country to citizen parents. In other words, a born . . . citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment or Congressional Act is simply a person born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. As can be seen, in the Fourteenth Amendment there is no citizen parents requirement, but there is a subject to the jurisdiction thereof requirement. In contradistinction, in the natural born Citizen definition, there is a citizen parents requirement, but there is no subject to the jurisdiction thereof requirement, for being born in the country to citizen parents, such a child could not be born other than
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"subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States. Since the amendment is designed only to allow someone to become a member of the United States and nothing more, according to Wong Kim Ark there is no need to require citizen parents but at least to require that the child be born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Since a child that is born in the United States to citizen parents will always be born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, we do not engage in jurisdiction analysis when exploring whether one is a natural born Citizen, but rather just look to see that the person was born in the United States to citizen parents. This is why Minor engaged in no subject to the jurisdiction analysis when examining Virginia Minors citizenship status. On the other hand, since under Wong Kim Ark a Fourteenth Amendment (or Congressional Act) "born . . . citizen of the United States" can be born in the United States to one or two alien parents, Wong Kim Ark instructs that we must do a "subject to the jurisdiction" analysis which is what it did of Wong. All this tells us that there is a fundamental constitutional difference between an Article II "natural born Citizen," who is born within the sole, full, and complete legal, political, and military allegiance and jurisdiction and therefore sole citizenship of the United States and a Fourteenth Amendment "born . . . citizen of the United States" who is born with divided allegiance, jurisdiction, and citizenship. If any born citizen, citizen at birth, citizen by birth or citizen from birth does not satisfy the natural born Citizen definition, we cannot simply amend Article II by changing the definition of a natural born Citizen to one of these phrases. In other words, we cannot just take an Article II Citizen of the United States as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment or Congressional Act and convert that person into an Article II natural born Citizen as defined by American common law which has its basis in natural law and the law of nations. Rather, if one is going to maintain that he or she is an Article II natural born Citizen, then let he or she prove it under the time-honored definition of the clause. Let us not accept that the definition of an Article II natural born Citizen has somehow been changed to some other phrase such as a citizen at birth or citizen by birth without seeing any evidence of that ever happening. Let us not because of political expediency take someone who may at best be a Fourteenth Amendment citizen of the United States and convert that person into an Article II natural born Citizen. The burden of proof is on those seeking to change the Constitution and its original and longstanding definition of a natural born Citizen, not on those who are fighting to preserve, protect, and defend them. So as we can see, our U.S. Supreme Court has given the exact natural born Citizen clause only one definition and that is a child born in the country to citizen parents. See Minor v. Happersett (1875); U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898). This means that only a child born in the United States to two parents who are either Article II natural born Citizens or Fourteenth Amendment or statutory born or naturalized . . . citizens of the United States is an Article II natural born Citizen. This is the consensus opinion of a natural born Citizen as provided by our U.S. Supreme Court and Congress since the beginning of our nation. Consequently, a Citizen of the United States is any citizen so made by Act of Congress, treaty, or other positive law such as the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, while a Fourteenth Amendment born . . . citizen of the United States may be born with dual and divided allegiance to the United States, an Article II natural born Citizen is born only within the sole, full, complete, and undivided legal, political, and military allegiance and jurisdiction of and sole citizenship in the United States. A natural born Citizen includes all those who are born with no foreign allegiance and excludes all those who are born with any foreign allegiance. On the other hand, a citizen, native-born citizen, born Citizen, or citizen of the United States who is not a natural born Citizen can be born with foreign allegiance but through positive law is nevertheless naturalized to be a citizen of the United States either at birth or after birth. Hence, a natural born Citizen has only one definition which was recognized during the Founding and which has been confirmed by our U.S. Supreme Court, Congress, and other historical sources. That definition is a child born in the country to citizen parents. Satisfying this definition removes from the child foreign allegiance which may attach by birth on foreign soil (by jus
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soli) or by birth to one or two foreign parents (by jus sanguinis). It is by satisfying this definition that one is born with no foreign allegiance and thus attached and loyal only to the United States. Consequently, all natural born Citizen[s] are citizens of the United States, but not all citizens of the United States are natural born Citizen[s]. Therefore, any born . . . citizen of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment must still show that he or she satisfies the American common law definition of a natural born Citizen in order to be considered a natural born Citizen. Failing to make that showing, a born or native born citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment is just that but not an Article II natural born Citizen. Judge Malihi has not made any findings of fact concerning the question of where Obama was born. Obama the candidate wants to be President again. Under Article II, Section 1, Clause 5, Obama has the burden of proof to conclusively prove that he is a natural born Citizen. As part of that burden, he has to conclusively prove that he was born in the United States. Neither Obama nor his attorney appeared at the hearing to present any evidence on the issue. Judge Malihi found the plaintiffs documentary evidence to be insufficient for whatever purposes it could have been used. Nor did he find that that evidence, which includes a paper copy of the computer scan of Obamas alleged long form birth certificate, to be sufficient to prove that Obama was born in Hawaii. We can see from the exact words used by Judge Malihi that Obama has failed to carry his burden to conclusively prove that he was born in the United States. Judge Malihi said that he considered that Obama was born in the United States. We do not know what this means and it appears that Judge Malihi attempts to avoid the issue of whether he found that Obama was born in the United States. Clearly, considered does not mean found. Since Obama failed to carry his burden of proof as to his place of birth and Judge Malihis decision actually confirms that fact, the Georgia Secretary of State should reject Judge Malihis decision and rule on his own that Obama not be placed on the primary ballot. Should the Georgia Secretary of State find that there is sufficient evidence in the record which conclusively shows that Obama was born in the United States, then he can still find that Obama is still not a natural born Citizen. We have seen that Judge Malihi relies on Ankeny which is bad law when it comes to the definition of an Article II natural born Citizen. He fails in not giving controlling effect to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Minor which clearly defined a natural born citizen. Finally, Judge Malihi incorrectly reads Wong Kim Ark and gives controlling effect to that incorrect reading. The timehonored American common law definition of the clause is a child born in the country to citizen parents. There is no dispute that Obama was born to a non-U.S. citizen father (his father was a British citizen) and U.S. citizen mother. Being born to an alien father, Obama also inherited his fathers British citizenship under the British Nationality Act 1948. All this demonstrates that Obama was not born in the full and complete legal, political, and military allegiance and jurisdiction of the United States. He is therefore not an Article II natural born Citizen and cannot be placed on the Georgia primary ballot. Mario Apuzzo, Esq. February 3, 2012 http://puzo1.blogspot.com/ #### Copyright 2012 Mario Apuzzo, Esq. All Rights Reserved

Mario Apuzzo, Esq. February 3, 2012 on the Malihi Georgia Decision Page 9 of 9

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS I.A.S. Part 27 Index No.:

6500-2011

------------------------------------------------------------------------x (Hon. Arthur M. Schack J.S.C) Christopher-Earl: Strunk, in esse -againstPlaintiff PLAINTIFFS

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; JAMES A. MEMORANDUM WALSH / Co-Chair, DOUGLAS A. KELLNER / Co-Chair, EVELYN J. AQUILA / Commissioner, GREGORY P. IN SUPPORT OF THE PETERSON / Commissioner, Deputy Director TODD D. VALENTINE, Deputy Director STANLEY ZALEN; NOTICE OF MOTION ANDREW CUOMO, ERIC SCHNEIDERMAN, THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, RUTH NOEM COLN, in their Official and FOR LEAVE OF DIRECT individual capacity; Fr. JOSEPH A. O'HARE, S.J.; Fr. JOSEPH P. PARKES, S.J.; FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR.; APPEAL TO THE PETER G. PETERSEN, ZBIGNIEW KAIMIERZ BRZEZINSKI; MARK BRZEZINSKI; JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.; SOEBARKAH NEW YORK STATE (a.k.a. Barry Soetoro, a.k.a. Barack Hussein Obama II, a.k.a. Steve Dunham); NANCY PELOSI; DEMOCRATIC COURT OF APPEALS STATE COMMITTEE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE COMMITTEE OF THE WORKING FAMILIES PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; RGER CALERO; THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY; IAN J. BRZEZINSKI; JOHN SIDNEY MCCAIN III; JOHN A. BOEHNER; THE NEW YORK STATE REPUBLICAN STATE COMMITTEE; THE NEW YORK STATE COMMITTEE OF THE INDEPENDENCE PARTY; STATE COMMITTEE OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY OF NEW YORK STATE; PENNY S. PRITZKER; GEORGE SOROS; OBAMA FOR AMERICA; OBAMA VICTORY FUND; MCCAIN VICTORY 2008; MCCAIN-PALIN VICTORY 2008; John and Jane Does; and XYZ Entities.

Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Plaintiff, Christopher-Earl: Strunk, in esse self-represented without an attorney, provides this Memorandum with his affidavit with exhibits annexed affirmed February 8, 2012 in support of his Notice of Motion for direct appeal to the New York State Court of Appeals with CPLR 5601(b)(2) and CPLR 3035 as of right under the State Constitution Article 6 Section 3 on the U.S. Constitution Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 Natural Born Citizen (NBC) eligibility Issue controlling matters in Trial Court and pending claims at the Court of Claims as time is of the essence with irreparable harm.

Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of Direct Appeal Page 1 of 10

Table of Citations U.S. Constitution Article II Section 1 paragraph 5: No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States. Minor. v. Happersett: 88 U.S. 162 (1875), 21 Wall. 162, and 22 L. Ed. 627 Cases citing Minor: Boyd. v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135 (1892); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S 55 (1980); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commm of Montana, 436 U.S 371 (1978) ; Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); US v. CLASSIC, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935); Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911); Hague v. Committee For Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Harris v. Mcrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S 47 (1907); Kepner v. U.S., 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962); N.Y. Ex Rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 816 (1971); Schick v. U.S., 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); South Carolina v. US, 199 U.S. 437 (1905); In Re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark,169 U.S. 649 (1898); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) Ex Parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894), that is essentially the holy grail of support for Minor v. Happersett, as it states:In Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, this court held that the word citizen is often used to convey the idea of membership in a nation, and, in that sense, women, if born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction of the United States, have always been considered citizens of the United States, as much so before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution as since (Emphasis added) and also the City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) Inglis v. Sailors Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 3 Pet. 99, 7 L.Ed. 617 (1830) therein C.J. John Marshal on how New York law and British common law apply before and after 1776 Independence affects the right to take land in controversy by decent in New York:

New York State Provision of Law New York State Constitution Article 6 Section 3 (a) (b) (1)(2) CPLR 5601(b)(2) -- Direct Appeal from Court of Original Instance (When That Court Is Not the Appellate Division) CPLR 2212(a) -- for motion CPLR 2201 --- for stay CPLR 3035 --- Simplified procedure authorized.

Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of Direct Appeal Page 2 of 10

New York Miscellaneous Reports PEOPLE v. QUIROGA-PUMA, 18 Misc.3d 731 (2007) No. LX6701631. MATTER OF BROWN, 132 Misc.2d 811 (1986) July 7, 1986 . AGOSTINI v. DE ANTUENO, 199 Misc. 191 (1950) February 20, 1950. PEOPLE EX REL. CHOOLOKIAN v. MISSION OF IMMAC. VIRGIN, 192 Misc. 454 (1947) December 30, 1947. New York Appellate Division Reports WILLIAMS v. VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER, 97 App. Div. 84 (1904) July, 1904 New York Court of Appeals Reports MUNRO v. MERCHANT, 28 N.Y. 9 (1863) September Term, 1863 LUDLAM v. LUDLAM, 26 N.Y. 356 (1863) March Term, 1863. WADSWORTH v. WADSWORTH, 12 N.Y. 376 (1855) March Term, 1855 McCARTHY v. MARSH, 5 N.Y. 263 (1851) September Term, 1851 HOYT v. THOMPSON, 5 N.Y. 320 (1851) September Term, 1851 Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand.Ch. 583, 659-663 (N.Y. 1844) Other References: Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) Therein Justice Marshal stated No provision of the Constitution may render any other provision meaningless. The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 289 (1814) Storer Et al. v. Brown, Secretary Of State of California, Et Al. 415 U.S. 724 (1974) U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (states have no authority to change, add, or diminish the eligibility requirements for members of Congress) Ankeny v. Governor of the State of Indiana, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. Ct.App. 2009), transfer denied, 929 N.E.2d 789 (2010), a state-court decision which erred in how it defined a natural born Citizen. Congressional debates on U.S. Constitution 13th Amendment, in re: the 1866 Civil Rights Act then affirmed by 14th Amendment and for the 15th Amendment. Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758) All That Is Wrong with Georgia State Judge Michael M. Malihis Decision that Putative President Obama Is a Natural Born Citizen By Mario Apuzzo, Esq. February 3, 2012.

Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of Direct Appeal Page 3 of 10

Petitioner as a matter of background for this motion focuses upon the fact that the Court has given the State lead actor a pass on its obligation to answer or otherwise respond to the Summons and Complaint until some undetermined date after the Court disposes of the various motions to dismiss that Petitioner contends are not possible to be rightfully done until the State has answered and or the admission on the record that it refuses to change the wrongful use of Born a citizen as the States instruction to the declared candidates to ignore the U.S. Constitutional requirement that a candidate be eligible only as a natural born citizen that Petitioner contends is not the same term of art as the invention Born a citizen is made part of an amended complaint. In effect the Court has facilitated the State facilitator in continuation of the fraud perpetrated by Defendants, and by delaying and deconstructing the imperatives worsens the irreparable harm imposed upon Plaintiff and those similarly situated is outrageous; and may only be resolved by allowing the New York State Court of Appeals to review the meaning of Natural born Citizen from a set of precedents with New York Jurisprudence that conform exactly to the meaning and use of the term of art used by the SCOTUS in the precedent of Minor v Happersett and related citations. That Petitioner has a fundamental right under the State Constitution Article 6 Section 3 ( 1 ) to directly appeal a constitutional question and request that this court

a. The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be limited to the review of questions of law except where the judgment is of death, ..or modifying a final or interlocutory judgment in an action or a final or interlocutory order in a special proceeding, finds new facts and a final judgment ; but the right to appeal shall not depend upon the amount involved. b. Appeals to the court of appeals may be taken in the classes of cases hereafter enumerated in this section; In civil cases and proceedings as follows: (1) As of right, from a judgment or order entered upon the decision of an appellate division of the supreme court which finally determines an action or special proceeding wherein is directly involved the construction of the constitution of the state or of the United States, (2) As of right, from a judgment or order of a court of record of original jurisdiction which finally determines an action and on any such appeal only the constitutional question shall be considered and determined by the court.

Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of Direct Appeal Page 4 of 10

grant leave for the Direct appeal on this constitutional issue alone so that when heard and decided will relieve this Court from the political burden that is obvious weighing heavily herein. Based upon the conditions of this application only that are satisfied for a direct appeal, it is Petitioners understanding that the Constitutional Question alone without any other issue put before the Appeal Court with CPLR 5601(b)(2) by Direct Appeal from Court of Original Instance (When That Court Is Not the Appellate Division) requires that the only constitutional question may be involved and where issues are involved that must be resolved in addition to the constitutional question, the appeal is transferred to the Appellate Division (Jetro Cash and Carry Enters. v State of New York Dept. of Taxation and Fin., appeal transferred 81 NY2d 776 [1992] [discussion of plaintiff's possible failure to exhaust administrative remedies]; Town of Brookhaven v State of New York, appeal transferred 70 NY2d 999 [1998] [Court required to determine whether disputed material issues of fact existed prior to determining whether summary judgment could be granted on constitutional claims; threshold finality inquiry]; Matter of Morley v Town of Oswegatchie, appeal transferred 70 NY2d 925 [1987] [question of statutory interpretation that could be dispositive of constitutional question]; New York State Club Assn. v City of New York, appeal transferred 67 NY2d 717 [1986] [ripeness, standing, subject matter jurisdiction, issue whether declaratory judgment action is proper vehicle to test constitutionality of legislative enactment]; Kerrigan v Kenny, appeal transferred 64 NY2d 1109 [1985] [mootness]). That as referenced in Petitioner as a matter of New York law referenced by Chief Justice John Marshal in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99

Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of Direct Appeal Page 5 of 10

as to New York use of British Common Law as applied before and after the 1776 Independence affects the right to take land in controversy by decent in New York: Page 28 U. S. 165 That the father and mother of the demandant were British born subjects is admitted. If he was born before 4 July, 1776, it is as clear that he was born a British subject. If he was born after 4 July, 1776, and before 15 September, 1776, he was born an American citizen, whether his parents were at the time of his birth British subjects or American citizens. Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children even of aliens born in a country while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government and owing a temporary allegiance thereto are subjects by birth. If he was born after 15 September, 1776, and his parents did not elect to become members of the State of New York, but adhered to their native allegiance at the time of his birth, then he was born a British subject. If he was in either way born a British subject, then he is to be deemed an alien and incapable to take the land in controversy by descent unless he had become at the time of the descent cast an American citizen by some act sufficient in point of law to work such a change of allegiance. And that the majority in Inglis v. Sailors Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 3 Pet. 99, 7 L.Ed. 617 (1830) cited Vattel on the right of election to change ones allegiance and thus citizenship in the context of the new nation being formed after revolution. The Court found on principles consistent with Vattels jus sanguinis and not on the English common law rule of jus soli, that simply being born in New York, after July 4, 1776 and before September 15, 1776, when the British took possession of New York, was not sufficient to establish ones status as an American citizen, for a child of minor years is incapacitated from making any citizenship election but rather followed the citizenship held or chosen by the father. On the contrary, relying upon principles of the English common law, Justice Johnson and Justice Story, who wrote separate minority concurring opinions, would have found the child born in New York during the same time period a citizen of the State of New York, regardless of the citizenship of his parents. Id. 136 and 164. This case shows what the majority rule was on citizenship and that it followed the Vattelian doctrine that a child when born took on the national character of his or her father (meaning father and mother under the doctrine of merger
Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of Direct Appeal Page 6 of 10

of the wifes citizenship into the husband) and did not acquire his or her citizenship from the territory in which he or she was born. That as referenced in Petitioners affidavit as to the New York State Court of Appeals review of the case Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356 (1883) as applies to the New York jurisprudence foundation to properly address natural-born citizen it stated : In this case, it appeared that Richard L. Ludlam, a citizen of the United States domiciled in New York, went at the age of eighteen to Peru for business purposes, but took no steps toward naturalization in Peru, or toward a permanent change of domicile. He remained in Peru fourteen years and when in Peru married a Peruvian woman, who also was a native of that country. A child was born to him in Peru. This child was held by the Court of Appeals to be a citizen of the United States, domiciled in New York. From the opinion of the court which was delivered by Selden, J., we learn the following: "It seems to me to result of necessity from these principles, that the children of English parents, though born abroad, are nevertheless regarded by the common law as natural born citizens of England. The decision upon the plea in Calvin's case, which was merely repeating what was decided in Cobbledike's case, as early as the reign of Edw. I, see Calvin's case, p. 9 b., necessarily implies that a child may owe allegiance to the king (i.e., not merely local or temporary, but natural and permanent allegiance), although born out of the king's dominions; and also that this was a broad general rule, not confined to a few exceptional cases, because if this was an exception the plea could not have been held bad on demurrer, as it was in both Cobbledike's and Calvin s cases; but the exception must have been pleaded. Now, upon what ground can allegiances in such cases be claimed ? If natural allegiance or allegiance by birth, does not depend upon boundaries or place, as Calvin's case asserts, upon what does it depend? There can be but one answer to the question. It is impossible to suggest any other ground for the obligation than that of parentage. It must, I apprehend, be transmitted from the parents to the child, or it could not exist. This being then the nature of permanent allegiance, it follows that the king of England may properly claim allegiance from the children of his subjects, wherever born. If then the child of English parents, though born abroad, is subditus natus a born subject of the king, he must also be a born citizen of the kingdom. Allegiance and citizenship are as we have seen, correlative terms, the one being the consideration of the other. So long therefore as the parents continue to owe allegiance to the crown of England, so long will their children, by the rules of the common law, whether born within or without the kingdom, owe similar allegiance, and be entitled to the corresponding rights of citizenship. ****
Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of Direct Appeal Page 7 of 10

I suppose the doctrine that children, if legitimate, follow in regard to their political rights and duties, the condition of their fathers, to be found in natural law, and to be substantially the same in most, if not all, civilized countries. Vattel says: " Society not being able to subsist and perpetuate itself, but by the children of its citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers and succeed to all their rights." B. 1, ch. 19, 212. In a subsequent action the same author says: " It is asked whether the children born of citizens in a foreign country are citizens, the laws have decided this question in several countries, and it is necessary to follow their regulations. By the. law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights. The place of birth produces no change in this particular, and cannot of itself furnish any reason for taking from a child what nature has given him. I say of itself, for the civil law, or politics, may order otherwise from particular views. Id., 215. It is shown by Vice Chancellor Sandford, in Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 675, that the law of France, Spain, and Portugal is in accordance with this doctrine, by express enactment it is true, as it is now in England and in this country. But the uniformity goes to show that it is founded upon a law of nature, and of course prevails in every country, unless, as Vattel says, it is changed from the municipal law from particular views.

Suffice it to say for the information of the Court that were it to entertain Hoosier law as Judge Malihi did in the curious Decision shown as Exhibit 8, the skewering that my friend Mario Apuzzo, Esq. did on Judge Malihis decision February 3, 2012 (see Exhibit 9) would apply and is properly lauded by Leo DOnofro, Esq. at http://naturalborncitizen.wordpress.com/2012/02/04/a-rat-called-tandem/ said of Marios scholarship quote Everyone needs to read Mario Apuzzos in-depth exposure of the blatant flaws in Judge Malihis holding, wherein you will experience a brilliant researcher exposing a truly defective legal opinion. ; and as such Plaintiff cites from Mr. Apuzzos analysis shown as Exhibit 9 that quote Presidential eligibility is a national issue. Under our Constitution, like the States do not have power to naturalize citizens, they also do not have power to change, add, or diminish the meaning of an Article II natural born Citizen. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (states have no authority to change, add, or diminish the eligibility requirements for members of Congress). Moreover, as naturalization needs uniformity, so does the citizenship
Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of Direct Appeal Page 8 of 10

standard needed to be met by those wishing to be eligible to be President. Hence, any state court decision on the meaning of a natural born Citizen is not binding on the nation in determining who is eligible to be President. Such a decision can only be ultimately made by the U.S. Supreme Court which would make its decision the law of the entire nation. The Ankeny case is a decision of the Indiana state court and not by the U.S. Supreme Court. For this reason, the Ankeny decision is not binding on any court deciding the question of what is a natural born Citizen. But not only is the decision not binding, it also needs to be rejected for diminishing the meaning of an Article II natural born Citizen. That Petitioner references Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) as a foundation for the proper interpretation and use of the Fourteenth amendment that does not apply to use in the de jure definition of NBC that quote: This section [Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment] contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' The evident meaning of these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards, except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts; or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired.

That Petitioner underlines the compelling interest and responsibility of the State to provide a true and accurate ballot free from fraud or artifice as applies herein in the matter of State facilitation of fraud with the use of the term of art Born a Citizen versus Natural-born Citizen references Storer Et al. v. Brown, Secretary Of State of California, Et Al. 415 U.S. 724 (1974) in regards to a compelling state interest to prevent fraud cited Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S., at 145, when the unanimous SCOTUS Court decision said: "The Court has recognized that a State has a legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S., at 442;

Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of Direct Appeal Page 9 of 10

W l i m v. Rhodes. 393 U. S., at 32. In so doing, the State understandably and ilas properly seeks to prevent the clogging of its election machinery, avoid voter confusion, and ... Moreover, a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U. S., at 442.':

In Conclusion
Petitioner wishes an order of the Court permission for a direct appeal

to the NYS Court of Appeals as of right solely on the U.S. Constitutional Article 2 Section 1 paragraph 5 "Natural Born Citizen" term of art meaning that based upon the Court of Appeals own holdings will decide the status of the cases below in trial court r k and pending to be filed at the Court of Claims as against the ~ e k ~ oState Board of Elections and John Does and Jane Does, and warrants for other and different relief as the Court deems necessary for justice herein.

Dated: F e b r u a r y , 20 12 Brooklyn New York Christopher-Earl: Strunk in esse self-regresented without an attorney 593 Vanderbilt Avenue - 28 1 Brooklyn, New York 11238 Phone - 845-901-6767 Email: chris@strunk.ws

Plaintiffs Memorandum in support of Direct Appeal Page 10 of 10

n"

SUPREME COURT OF T H ~ A T OF NEW YORK E COUNTY OF KINGS

L ,

Index No.: 6500-2011

Christopher-Eel: Strunk in esse,

Plaintiff,

I
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al.,

\

--------STATE OF NEW YORK )

) ss.

Defendants.
X

COUNTY OF KINGS
Accordingly, I,

k'we CvAN'y~7c1r, duly sworn, depose and say under penalty of perjury: being
I

a. Am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. b. My place of business is located a t 593 Vanderbilt Avenue Brooklyn NY 11238.. c. On February 9, 2012, Christopher Strunk instructed me to serve a true conformed copy of the

PWNTlFF'S NOTlCE OF MOTlON FOR LEAVE FOR DIRECTMPEAL TO THE NYS COURT OF APPEALS W T H SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW affirmed February 8, 2012 with exhibits annexed for the case Stmnk v NYS BOE et al. NYS County of Kings Supreme Court
with index 6500-20 11, by USPS service upon Defendants' Counsels.
d. On February 9, 2012, I caused each copy with proper postage for senrice by regular mail of listed counsels and where each envelope was deposited with the USPS for service upon:

Erica Burke, Esq. of SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP 425 Lexington Avenue New York. New York 10017-3954 RITA C. TOBIN, Esq. of CAPLIN & DRYSDALE, CHARTERED 375 Park Avenue 35th Floor New York. New York 10152-3500 HARRIS BEACH, PLLC By THOMAS J. GARRY, Esq. The OMNI 333 Earle Ovington Blvd., Suite 901 Uniondale, New York 11553 JAMES C. DUGAN Esq. of WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP 787 Seventh Avenue New York, N.Y. 10019-6099 MARSHAL BELL, Esq. of McGURE WOODS LLP 1345 Avenue of Americas, 7th Floor New York, New York 10105 WILEY REIN LLP - TODD A. BROMBERG ESQ., JAN WITHOLD BARAN ESQ. and W THOMAS W. KIRBY ESQ. 1776K Street, N Washington D.C. 20006 RABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, STANDARD, KRINSKY & LIEBERMAN, PC - Christopher J. Latell Esq. and Daniel S. Reich Esq. 45 Broadway, Suite 1700New York, New York 10006-3791 ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of NYS byi JOEL GRABER, Esq. AAG Assistant Attorney General Special Litigation Counsel Litigation Bureau 120 BROADWAY - 24th Floor New York, New York 10271-0332 MICHAEL CARDOZO Corporation Counsel of City'of New York By: CHLARENS ORSLAND,.Esq. Assistant Corporation Counsel New York City Law Department 100 Church Street New York, New York 10007

Sworn to before me This r d a y of February 2012

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EDDIE HAMPTON JR. Notary Public, State of New York No. 01HA6044027 Qualified in Kings County Commission Expires June 26. 20 0

SUPREME COURT OF THE COUNTY OF KINGS

LATE YORK OF NEW

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Index ~ d .6500-2011 :

~hristo~her-~arl: in esse, Strunk

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al.,

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-------STATE OF NEW YORK )

) ss.

Defendants.

---

COUNTY OF KINGS
Accordingly,. I, W F m

1
W6).f(m@sworn, depose and say under penalty of perjury: being duly

a. Am over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. b. My place of business is located a t 593 Vanderbilt Avenue Brooklyn N 11238.. Y c. On February 9, 2012, Christopher Strunk instructed me to serve a true conformed copy of the

PETITIONER'S PRE APPEAL STATEMENT AFFIRMED February 8,2012 with PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF MOTION FOR LEAVE FOR DIRECTAPPEAL TO THE NYS COURT OFAPPEALS W T H SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW affirmed February 8,2012 with exhibits annexed for the case Stmnk v NYS BOE et al. NYS County of Kings Supreme Court with index
d. 6500-20 1 1, by USPS service upon Defendants' Counsels. On February 9, 2012, I caused each copy with proper postage for service by regular mail of listed counsels and where each envelope was deposited with the USPS for s e ~ c upon: e

Erica Burke, Esq. of SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP 425 Lexington Avenue New York. New York 10017-3954

RITA C. TOBIN, Esq. of CAPLIN 86 DRYSDALE, CHARTERED 375 Park Avenue 35th Floor New York. New York 10152-3500 HARRIS BEACH, PLLC By THOMAS J. GARRY, Esq. The OMNI 333 Earle Ovington Blvd., Suite 901 Uniondale, New York 11553 JAMES C. DUGAN Esq. of WILLKIE FARR 86 GALLAGHER LLP 787 Seventh Avenue New York, N.Y. 10019-6099
'
5

MARSHAL BELL, Esq. of McGUIRE WOODS LLP 1345 Avenue of Americas, 7th Floor New York, New York 10105 WILEY REIN LLP - TODD A. BROMBERG ESQ., JAN WITHOLD BARAN ESQ. and THOMAS W. KIRBY ESQ. 1776K Street, NW Washington D.C. 20006 RABINOWITZ, BOUDIN, STANDARD, KRINSKY & LIEBERMAN, PC - Christopher J. Latell Esq. and Daniel S. Reich Esq. 45 Broadway, Suite 1700 New York, New York 10006-3791 ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney. General of .NYS by: JOEL GRABER, Esq. AAG Assistant Attorney General Special Litigation Counsel Litigation Bureau 120 BROADWAY - 24th Floor New York, New York 10271-0332 MICHAEL CARDOZO Corporation Counsel of City of New York By: CHLARENS ORSLAND; Esq. Assistant Corporation Counsel New York City Law Department 100 Church Street New York, New York 10007 ,

Sworn to before me This r d a y of February 20 12

EDDIE HAMPTON JR. Notary Public, State of New York NO.01HA6044027 Qualified in Kings County commission ~xpges June 26, rn
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Index No.: 6500-2011 COUNTY OF KINGS I.A.S. Part 27 x (Hon.Arthur M. Schack J.S.C)
Christopher-Earl: Strunk, in esse
'

NOTICE OF MOTION

Plaintiff,

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; E t al.. .,

Defendants.
.

Notice of Motion Plaintiff Afndavit in support pf Notice of motion for direct appeal Exhib .t 1 Declined to sign O.S.C.October 25, 20 11 Exhib .t 2 Notice of Appeal of the interlocutory order Exhib .t 3 Appellate Court sua sponte dismissal the appeal without leave to appeal Exhib .t 4 Notice of January 11, 20 12 at the scheduled Pre-discovery conference Exhib .t 5 2012 Presidential Election Schedule released January 9, 2012 by the State Exhib .t 6 Notice of intent to file a claim against the State Exhib .t 7 Complaint and Demand for Public Hearing on the Eligibility Exhib .t 8 Georgia Hearing decision of Judge Malihi decided on February 3, 20 12 Exhib S 9 Mario Apuzzo, Esq. analysis of Judge Malihi's decision February 3, 20 12
4

Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in support of Direct Appeal Affidavit of Service

Dated: February 8,2012 Brooklyn New Yor

,wt?&
Christopher-Earl: Strunk in esse Plaintiff self-represented wlo attdrney 593 Vanderbilt Avenue #281 Brooklyn, New York 11238 Ph. 845-901-6767 Email: chris@strunk.ws