'The patient is more dead than alive'1: Prospects for political change in Russia

Introduction

A crisis...is needed to persuade members of the elite that the system is threatening their own survival. Regrettably, no examples exist in Russian history of preventive reform before a crisis hits.2 Although its full significance is still obscured by a settling veil of wildfire smoke, it is becoming clear that the summer of 2010 is likely to mark a watershed in Russian politics. The cracks in the 'power vertical' are beginning to show; the contradictions in the system appear to be reaching a point of no return. This was the year that Medvedev publicly admitted he had made no progress in the fight against corruption indeed, that his edicts were openly ignored by the bureaucracy. This was the year that prominent media personality Leonid Parfenov, holding his notes with shaking hands, made an acceptance speech at the Vlad Listyev awards in which he criticised the lack of press freedom in Russia. This was the year that the fires burning out of control around Moscow made it impossible to ignore the degree of corruption and incompetency of the authorities, the year that the second Khodorkovsky show-trial highlighted the malleability of the justice system, and the devastating terrorist attack at Domodedovo Airport reaffirmed the governments failure to resolve problems in the Caucasus. This was the year that saw a flare-up of civil society activism by the Khimki Forest defenders, the Article 31 demonstrators, the nationalists on Manezhnaya Square, by sports fishermen and automobile owners.

The commentary coming out of academia, think tanks, journalism, and online communities increasingly centres on the approach of a transformative moment in Russian politics. It is thus timely to investigate whether such a transformation is possible, and what form it is likely to take towards greater democracy, or greater repression. In order to do so, we must

1 2

, variation on a popular saying. Shevtsova, Lilia.Medvedev's Potemkin modernization, Current History, October 2010 p 280

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start by looking into the past, at the roots of the current social, political and economic conditions.

Soviet legacy

Attitudinal and structural constraints of the Soviet past One of Russia's key socio-political problems is the fact that there was no distinct rupture from the Soviet past. There was radical economic reform, certainly; but there was no corresponding revolution of values, no attempt to address the harmful effects of the Soviet system and the mentality it engendered, thus the system could not help but perpetuate itself. To expect a generation brought up under communism to suddenly become democrats and capitalists was optimistic at best. As Yana Gorokhovskaia concludes in her study of the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression and the 1992 trial of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "the lack of critical reflection has allowed for continuity with the authoritarian past to subvert the establishment of democracy." 3 With most Russians lacking the free-market nous to participate in economic liberalisation, in the 1990s, wealth and assets were captured by those actors with the greatest resources: criminals and state officials. Since it benefited both of these groups to collaborate in order to maintain their gains, the roots of corruption were firmly entrenched from the outset. The public was left with the feeling that it had been robbed by the elite, but importantly, in collusion with the West, laying the foundation for mistrust of Western reform models. About 60% of Russians still regret the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a figure that has been more or less stable since 2006.4

This is perhaps not surprising, considering that Russia's experience of the USSR's collapse was qualitatively different from that of other Soviet states. Whereas for former satellites, independence was positively construed as liberation from a colonial yoke and assertion of national identity, for Russia it represented a loss of imperial power and international prestige. After the further humiliations and disappointments of the 1990s, the desire for a

Gorokhovskaia, Yana. From Soviet dictatorship to Russian dermo-cratia: Toward a theory of political justice, Thesis, Carleton University, 2009. 4 http://www.levada.ru/press/2011041103.html

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political order that restored national pride was understandable. Richard D Anderson carries this logic a step further to assert an interesting thesis. Anderson takes the stance, unusual for the academic literature on Russian democracy, that Putin and United Russia are elected because they actually reflect most closely Russian socio-political conditions and the will of the electorate. Russian parties lack convincing ideologies that can attract supporters because communism 'flattened' the political sphere in Russia and meant that subsequent parties could not appeal to traditional leftist or rightist elements. At the same time, Russia's vast territory and poor communications infrastructure increase the costs of recruiting voters. Because of problems with ideology and recruitment, Russian political parties should be small, elitist and susceptible to erosion of loyalties. Where recruiting citizens into parties is not optimal behavior, parties composed of officials will dominate. 5

Colton and Hale reach a similar conclusion in their in-depth study of the composition of the Putin vote. While not denying that fraud and manipulation play a role, their analysis finds that voting [for Putin] follows many patterns common to democracies...we should not lose sight of the fact that Putin has also quite consistently garnered ballots through his agreement with voters on some of the biggest issues of the day and [the qualities] he has managed to project.6 The authors find that both Putin voters and the population as a whole place Putin to the right of the political spectrum, and that he is overwhelmingly associated with the continuation of market reforms when juxtaposed against a return to socialism. Putin has also gained support from people who are moderately pro-Western. Thus, it is not that the Soviet legacy yields an electorate which votes for a strong leader, but that attitudinal and structural holdovers impose boundaries on political expression and increase tolerance for single-party rule and anti-democratic behaviours by those in power.

Between mistrust and dependence Another toxic holdover from Soviet times is the fact that the bureaucracy has continued to be viewed as an instrument of personal advancement rather than service to the nation. As Lilia Shevtsova of the Moscow Carnegie Center observes, the Russian system
5

Anderson, Richard D., When the center can hold: The primacy of politics in shaping Russian democracy, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, No 43 (2010), p 405 6 Colton, Timothy J. and Henry E. Hale. The Putin vote: Presidential electorates in a hybrid regime, Slavic Review, vo. 68, No. 3 (Fall, 2009), p 502

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today has only two ideas: national egotism and personal enrichment.7 When anticorruption campaigner Alexey Navalny referred to United Russia as a 'party of crooks and thieves', 96.6% of 40,000 respondents to an online poll agreed with him.8 A more broadly cross-cutting Levada-Center poll in April 2011 found the proportion agreeing with this statement to be much lower, but still appreciable at 30%, against 45% disagreeing.9 Moreover, a March 2011 poll showed that nearly 60% of Russians believe the main concerns of the people currently in power were personal gain and the desire to hold onto their position, while only 3% felt they cared about the well-being of ordinary citizens.10 This is actually a slight improvement over 2006, suggesting that President Medvedev's anticorruption agenda, regardless of its achievements, has had an impact on public opinion. However, the preponderant view remains that state officials' own privileges, success and career came before honest service to the public; only 22% consider them to be competent specialists.

The Soviet mentality is manifest not only in the mistrust of the ruling elite, but also in a high degree of dependence upon it, and a certain resigned acceptance of the state's omnipotence. This results in the government being attributed proportionately greater responsibility for economic success hence Putin's popularity in the post-2000 boom period but likewise, inversely, for economic failure. Until recently, Putin has managed to successfully embody a Soviet-esque reassuring paternalistic aspect of power, promoting himself, as Sinikukka Saari observes, as a strong leader who reintroduced order, discipline, and national pride.11 However, despite the accusations of autocracy levied at him by the West, Putin has been a more permissive parent than his Soviet predecessors. Ivan Krastev points out that Putin's authoritarianism is a 'vegetarian' one. While political repression exists...it is fair to say that most Russians today are freer than in any other period of their history.12 The social contract in Russia comes down to the following tacit agreement
7 8

Shevtsova, Lilia.Medvedev's Potemkin modernization, Current History (October 2010), p 280 Ioffe, Julia. "Net Impact: One man's cyber-crusade against Russian corruption", The New Yorker, 4 April 2011. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/04/04/110404fa_fact_ioffe?currentPage=all 9 http://www.levada.ru/press/2011050501.html 10 http://www.levada.ru/press/2011040605.html 11 Saari, Sinikukka. European democracy promotion in Russia before and after the 'colour' revolutions, Democratization, Vol 16, No 4, August 2009 (p 740) 12 Krastev, Ivan. Paradoxes of the new authoritarianism, Journal of Democracy, Vol 22, No 2 (April 2011), p 8.

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between rulers and ruled: 'We'll leave you alone if you leave us alone'. This works as long as rulers deliver on expectations of economic and social progress, affirm Russia's place in the world, and are perceived as effective. However, as both corruption and anti-democratic transformations have become more blatant, while economic development stagnates, the tension between Medvedev's pro-modernisation, anti-corruption rhetoric, and reality, is not going unnoticed by the public.

The end of the beginning: How the Kremlin set itself up to fail

Oligarchic capitalism and the stillborn project of Russian democracy Although debate over Boris Yeltsin's legacy is polarized between those who blame him for letting former Soviet states break away from Russia and selling off domestic industry on the cheap, and those who admire him as great leader and reformer, the literature broadly agrees that his commitment to democratization during the first years of his presidency was genuine and remarkable. Equally however, the oligarch-backed elections of 1996, guided by the fear of a Communist return to power, were the first step towards the suppression of Russia's democratic impulse: the basic features of the undemocratic system...already began developing during the Yeltsin era...the crucial feature of this system is that power is legitimized through elections that are 'managed' beforehand.13 In any case, as David Rivera and others suggest, Yeltsin faced an almost impossible task in attempting to create a stable foundation for Russian democracy, in the face of needing to perform several Herculean tasks at once privatisation, democratisation, national unity, institutionbuilding).14 The absence of such a foundation (due to the failures of the 1996 election), together with the disillusionment of the population (due to the 1998 financial crisis), contributed to the ease of Putin's subsequent centralisation process.

This process accelerated towards the end of Putin's second term. The Rose Revolution in Georgia took place in the same year (2003) as Duma elections in which liberal parties were forced out, and which were widely criticised by observers while the Orange Revolution in

13 14

Saari p 739. Rivera, David W. and Sharon Rivera. Yeltsin, Putin, and Clinton: Presidential leadership and Russian democratization in comparative perspective, Perspectivevs on Politics, Vol 7, No 3 (September 2009), p 604

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Ukraine coincided with the 2004 presidential elections in Russia. The Kremlin explicitly and implicitly blamed Western powers for backing these events. Putin even hinted that the Beslan hostage-taking was instigated by Western forces. This rhetoric helped to justify subsequent anti-democratic reforms that consolidated the power of the elite surrounding Putin. Electoral laws were introduced to increase the minimum vote threshold for a party to be represented in the Duma from 5% to 7%; single-mandate seats were eliminated. Other measures included harsher NGO regulation (Federal Law No. 18-FZ), changes to the Federation Council, and to methods of selecting regional governors and mayors.

The elite which sought to preserve its position through these reforms, was not significantly different from the one that had existed under Yeltsin. Although Putin swept the most influential pro-Yeltsin oligarchs (Berezovsky, Gusinsky) out of the way in the early years of his presidency, he cultivated a symbiotic relationship with others (Abramovich, Deripaska, Mamut, Aven). Adam Bartnicki agrees that in the nineties, public, political and economic life was dominated by oligarchs and interest groups related to them, which has seriously limited the political subjectivity of the society...Putin's election to the presidency put a stop to the oligarchy's spontaneous growth but not to the oligarchy itself.15 Oligarchic capitalism and the clan-type power structure it engenders, in which the trinity of the state, big business and organised crime form a mutually reinforcing bloc, is perhaps the main obstacle to democratisation in Russia. Indeed, as a number of sources close to the Kremlin confirm, there is no 'power vertical'. Rather, there are competing clans centred around the various ministries and security agencies. In this context, Putin's role not quite as glamorous as that of the absolutist autocrat has been to balance these interests and to ensure that none of them grows too strong. It is this arrangement which engenders the other problems that are normally pinpointed as the failings of Russian democracy: the weakness of institutions and the rule of law, the unreliability of the legal system, the corruption of the bureaucracy. Medvedev is the 'front man' who gives the system a liberal veneer, without fundamentally challenging it.

15

Bartnicki, Adam A. Simulated democracy and the free market in Russia, Baltic Journal of Law and Politics, Vol 2, No 1 (2010), p 4.

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Economic and political control: The sine qua non of the Putin regime Several conditions must be met in order for the current elite to perpetuate itself. The state must retain control of the financial and energy sectors, because this enables the Kremlin to keep the oligarchs in check by holding the purse-strings, and also provides the revenue streams to maintain the loyalty of key power brokers. However, such an arrangement is obviously irreconcilable with any purported 'modernisation', indeed, the monopoly of power by the state over the economy has been one of the main reasons why Russia returns to authoritarian modes of government (consider for instance the demise of the New Economic Policy and the rise of Stalin). Afanasyev calls this a neopatrimonial regime of private-state patronage within which the private and the state elements do not confront one another but merge together. Patron-client practices, connections, and networks supplement, reformat, and replace public institutions.16 This is evident, for instance, from the appointment of the children of Kremlin heavyweights on the boards of state companies: Boris Kovalchuk at Inter RAO UES, Alexander Ivanov and Peter Fradkov at Vneshekonombank, Sergei Ivanov at Sogaz, Denis Bortnikov at VTB, Dmitry Patrushev at Rosselkhozbank.17 The son of St Petersburg Governor Valentina Matvienko, Sergei, went from VP of Bank St Petersburg to general director at VTB-Development, while at the same time owning a private company with the wonderfully apt name ZAO Imperia (Empire). Under such circumstances, Medvedev's symbolic act of removing top state officials from board membership, rings distinctly hollow.

Second, the state must strike a balance between control and appeasement of alternative centres of influence in the regions, particularly in the North Caucasus. On the one hand, the Kremlin has the prerogative to appoint regional governors while on the other hand, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov to all intents and purposes extorts money from the Kremlin, in the form of huge budget transfers, knowing that his position is buttressed by the loyalty of his private army, the Kadyrovtsy, who were nominally reorganised into Interior Ministry battalions in 2006.

16

Afanasyev, Mikhail. The quality of the state Russia's chief problem, Russian Politics and Law, Vol 47, No 4 (July-August 2009) p 63 17 : , Vedomosti (13 May 2011) http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/260152/nashe_blagorodie

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Thirdly, hostile political forces must be kept on a short leash, such that real opposition does not materialise. Various commentators agree that the elite knows it will not survive under conditions of political competition: the rhetoric of modernization so far has not changed the principles on which the Russian system is built. The Kremlin's new tactics, instead of expanding freedoms for society, only try to co-opt civil society and the opposition and discredit any viable alternative to established power.18 In fact, these tactics are not even very new: as Luke March shows, the practise of 'managed opposition' the creation by the Kremlin of a left-leaning parastatal parties to absorb competition has been present since 1995 and Rybkin's Nash dom-Rossiia, through to Rodina and Just Russia. Limited competition acts as an antidote to the centralized and bureaucratic tendencies of a single ruling party...while co-opting opposition elites into regime-sanctioned activity and marginalizing extra-systemic opposition. Overall, it bolsters regime stability by reducing (particularly electoral) unpredictability.19 March suggests that Putin's sojourn in Dresden enabled him to witness firsthand the 'Dresden party system' which involved the ruling party heading a 'popular front' of non-communist parties.

The use of the term 'popular front' takes on a special resonance now that Putin, in the leadup to Duma elections, has created yet another Kremlin chimera, the National Front. The movement is meant to renew the cadre composition of United Russia, to open the way for new ideas, to attract civil society the youth, womens, veterans organizations, business circles, trade unions and all people who are not indifferent to solving the most important questions of the nations development,20 and in theory allowing independent candidates, unaffiliated with United Russia, to stand. The population, however, will not be duped: 29% of Russians surveyed by Levada-Centre believed that the National Front had been created to guarantee United Russia more votes in the elections, while a further 28% felt that its purpose was to shore up United Russia's declining popularity. When presented with the question, against whom this project was directed, the preponderant answer was against no

18

Shevtsova, Lilia.Medvedev's Potemkin modernization, Current History (October 2010) p 276; see also Graeme Robertson op cit. 19 March, Luke. Managing opposition in a hybrid regime: Just Russia and parastatal opposition, Slavic Review, Vol 68 No 3 (Fall 2009) p 507. 20 : , United Russia official website, 6 May 2011 (http://www.er.ru/er/rubr.shtml?111552)

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one, it is yet another stillborn bureaucratic creation (26%) while the response against the extra-systemic opposition came a close second (21%).21 Simultaneously with the management of opposition, the passivity of the electorate needs to be assured through selective intimidation of agents of change, such as NGOs and journalists; through the discreditation of the West; and the co-optation of youth (e.g. via Nashi or its predecessor, Iduschiie vmeste). Analysing the manipulation of civil society under Putin, Graeme Robertson concurs that Brezhnev-style pre-emptive detention and harassment are the two primary weapons in the regime's arsenal against social movements. He writes that Putin's second term saw a major redesign of state-society relations, as the regime sought to more closely integrate civil society groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into the state. The result is a strengthening of groups with a non-political or pro-state orientation and the isolation of more adversarial groups22

Over-promising and under-performing This system would be perfectly self-reinforcing , as the rather colourful businessman Dmitry Potapenko intoned, to the chagrin of a panel on corruption in Moscow in May 201123 if not for one fatal flaw. Under Putin's breed of electoral authoritarianism, elections are a double-edged sword: they are a source of both regime weakness (instability and unpredictability) and strength (legitimacy, mobilization), and this precise balance constantly changes.24 Elections mean that incumbents must be particularly vigilant about maintaining unity within the elite, and importantly, must still seek a certain degree of public approval, to defend against being unseated by a rival faction exploiting popular discontent. The Putin presidency hitched its legitimacy to the rising star of oil-fuelled economic growth and political stability; as well, to a lesser extent, as nationalism and Russia's international Great Power status. Then Medvedev shifted the discourse towards the modernisation of the economy and the fight against corruption.

21 22

http://www.levada.ru/press/2011051901.html Robertson, Graeme B. Protest, civil society, and regime in Putin's Russia, Slavic Review, Vol 68, No 3 (Fall 2009) p 531 23 Center 'Memorial', Moscow. 24 March, Luke et al. Responses: Political science, democracy and authoritarianism, Slavic Review,Vol 68, No 3 (Fall 2009), p 554

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Over the past year, these sources of legitimacy have begun to work against the regime. Despite grand projects and promises, the state apparatus is becoming blatantly inadequate to changing social needs and to the challenges of national development. 25 Putin's muchvaunted stability is increasingly resembling stagnation: even as oil prices rise to record highs, Russians' standard of living is falling,26 and levels of capital flight are soaring, reaching $30 billion in the first quarter of 2011.27 Most Russians now believe that the 1999 war in Chechnya should not have been fought, that the federal authorities have little control over the republic, and that civilian deaths in anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya are unjustified.28 In a survey asking Russians to evaluate Putin and Medvedev's strengths, the proportion of respondents finding Putin to be honest and non-corrupt to be fell from 24% in 2008 to 8% in February 2011.29 Indeed, on almost all indicators, the perception of Putin's strengths returned to levels reported in 2000, when he was a virtually unknown figure. Over the past two years, Russians' confidence in his erudition, professionalism, intellect and capability fell 20%, while belief in his charm and consistency on political questions fell 17%. Tellingly, both Putin and Medvedev's worst quality was , all talk and no action reaching 16% for Putin (from 7% in 2008) and 21% for Medvedev (from 5%).
Why isn't our society significantly improving? Why is this possible in our country? Why are the laws ineffective, while corruption flourishes, budget funds are stolen, there are bombings, skinhead riots, the innocent are convicted, federal programmes are unfulfilled, GLONASS satellites fall out of the sky, the death rate rises, tens of thousands are killed in car accidents, inflation makes savings worthless, millions of people are out of work, millions live below the poverty line, billions of roubles are sent abroad, juvenile and recidivist crime rates are increasing, prison conditions are inhuman, roads collapse, palaces are built on nature reserves...and hundreds of similar questions. Who will answer? We came to terms with these circumstances in the 1990s, when the country lived on credit, the Soviet legacy left many problems, there were no normal laws, no money for salaries or pensions. But why does all this remain today,
25 26

Russians' standard of living fell 3.4% YoY in March 2011. Goble, Paul. Despite rising oil prices, Russians' standard of living is falling, Eurasia Review, 27 April 2011 (http://www.eurasiareview.com/despiterising-oil-prices-russians-standard-of-living-is-falling-analysis-27042011/) 27 Some estimate that this figure could be just half of the total being moved out in fraudulent or informal ways. Englund, Will. Russian investors parking billions abroad despite oil revenue, strengthening ruble, Washington Post, 27 May 2011 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russian-investors-parking-billionsabroad-despite-oil-revenue-strengthening-ruble/2011/05/27/AG3rqxCH_story.html ) 28 http://www.levada.ru/press/2010033002.html 29 http://www.levada.ru/press/2011022109.html

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why is our life not significantly improved, why does the human being, 30 his life, health, rights and freedoms not concern the bureaucrat..? Sergei Levin, Lawyer and former Legal VP at OAO Vostok

Moreover, despite Medvedev's anti-corruption campaign, Russia has been slipping backwards on most indicators. Probably the most detailed source of analysis of the success or otherwise of anti-corruption measures introduced in 2008-2009, is the GRECO report for 2010.31 The report finds that since 2007, Russia has implemented only 9 of GRECO's initial 26 recommendations in full (including anti-corruption strategy, improving law enforcement coordination and recruitment of prosecutors, ethics training, guidelines for tax authorities). As President Medvedev himself has admitted,32 anti-corruption measures have not yielded the expected outcomes, and corruption has in fact worsened. This is witnessed by Russia's declining rating on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (154 th in 2010 from 146th), numerous media reports on corrupt officials,33 the near-doubling in size of the average bribe in 2010, the inefficacy of measures such as the declaration of officials' incomes, and so on. For example, as the most recent income declarations showed in March 2011, the wives of officials make suspiciously large amounts of money. 34 Transparency International Russia postulates that the increase in bribe costs since Medvedev launched his campaign partly reflects the increasing risk of bribe-taking, and partly state officials' motivation to take as much as possible while they still can.

Government procurement is a particularly problematic area: some 3 trillion roubles (3% of GDP) are lost from the state budget annually, sometimes even siphoned from fictitious projects created specifically to line the pockets of officials. The courts system also continues to suffer from corruption, bias and undue state influence. The Bertelsmann Foundation's
30

Facebook note, May 2011. www.facebook.com/notes/-/-----/143899942348514 31 Group of States Against Corruption, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/evaluations/round2/GrecoRC1&2(2010)2_RussianFederation_EN .pdf 32 Dmitry Medvedev admits Russia has made no progress in fighting corruption, The Telegraph, 14 July 2010 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7891236/Dmitry-Medvedev-admitsRussia-has-made-no-progress-in-fighting-corruption.html ) 33 See e.g. Top Russian police official arrested on $46 mln fraud charges, RIAN, 21 January 2011 (http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110121/162237576.html ) 34 http://www.bfm.ru/articles/2011/04/11/kremlevskie-zheny-zarabatyvajut-za-dvoih.html#text

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2010 Transformation Index report for Russia finds that "official accusations of corruption are still perceived as public relations campaigns inspired by political power struggles. The judicial prosecution of corruption charges has improved neither in quantitative nor in qualitative terms. Accordingly, there are no indications that corruption in Russia has been reduced in recent years".35

Thus far there has been a willingness to tolerate corruption in the name of stability, but this pay-off cannot be maintained indefinitely. Corruption is impeding Russia's economic development both in terms of modernisation and investment, and in the absence of high oil prices, there is a risk of systemic collapse. Corruption seriously affects the ability of the state to function effectively and implement policy. When Medvedev noted the lack of improvement in corrupt practises in 2010, he also complained that officials were simply not following his orders, referring to the 'sabotage' of key national projects. This shows that progress is very unlikely to come from the top down in the near term. It is thus most likely that corruption will continue to be the dry rot at the heart of the federal power structure during the next presidency, increasing the probability of the system eventually imploding under the weight of its own inefficacy.

'Tightening the screws' The growing dissonance between rhetoric and reality is leading Russians such as lawyer Sergei Levin (inset, above) to become disillusioned and cynical, not only towards malfunctioning state institutions which has always been more or less the case36 but also towards Putin, Medvedev and United Russia. In this context, faced with internal disorder and external loss of support, the regime has one of two options: towards change, or towards greater ossification. The words of one contributor to an online forum discussing the narrowing of civil liberties in Russia express a common sentiment: The population of our country is in some measure not the same one that existed in 2008. People's consciousness is changing, they are more likely to evaluate [the political situation] with lucidity. I remember such a 'blossoming of consciousness' twice in my lifetime: the first at the end of the 1980s, which ended with a change of political regime, and the second in 1993, which ended with the siege of the
35 36

http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/159.0.html?&L=1 See e.g. Gerritts, Andre W.M. Exploring democracy in the Russian Federation: political regime, public opinion and international assistance, Contemporary Politics, Vol 16, No 1 (March 2010) p 47

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White House and the limitation of freedoms. Hypothetically it could be postulated that a 'new' force could win the coming elections...but few believe this is possible. There will simply be a further tightening of the screws.37

The beginning of the end: Dictatorship, decay, or democracy?

Gloomy forecasts The Spring of 2011 saw the blossoming of a spate of reports by establishment think tanks, advising the Kremlin on the political climate, necessary measures, and possible outcomes in preparation for the Duma and Presidential elections of 2011-2012. Medvedev's Institute of Contemporary Development (INSOR) issued the 300-page Strategy 2012; the 12th expert group on Russia's national development strategy brought out a report on Real Federalism, Local Government and Inter-Budget Policy; and the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), a foundation formerly headed by Elvira Nabiullina and German Gref, published "The political crisis in Russia and the possible mechanisms of its development". The remarkable aspect of all three reports, given the pro-Kremlin orientation of their creators, was their pessimistic diagnosis of the current regime. The 12 th expert group, for instance, argued that the Russian federal system is in deep crisis, citing the absence of democratic processes, the disorganization of institutional mechanisms needed for society to function effectively, high transaction costs for business activity, and the degeneration of the elite. Strategy 2012 echoed this critical stance, claiming that official propaganda obscured Russia's increasing dependence on raw materials exports; dangerous level of deindustrialisation, depopulation and brain drain; ineffective institutional reforms, growing administrative burden, and personalised political structure. The report warns that such inertia makes modernisation impossible and will lead to economic collapse and social tension. The most interesting findings, however, were those of the Centre for Strategic Research.38 The authors, while generally in agreement with INSOR's "Strategy 2012", believe that it
37 38

http://forum.pskovonline.ru/index.php?showtopic=26691 Belanovsky, S. and M. Dmitriev, *"Political crisis in Russia and the possible mechanisms of its development"+, Center for Strategic Research, 28 March 2011. Available at

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overlooks a key fact: the rapidly growing deligitimisation of the government and declining trust towards Medvedev, Putin and United Russia. National and regional surveys have shown that since July 2010, the political consciousness of the Russian population has undergone radical and unexpected changes. In the first place, between May 2009 and March 2011, the level of trust in Medvedev, Putin, and United Russia fell appreciably, which the authors interpret as a sign that the political system as a whole is perceived as less legitimate:

May 2009 Medvedev Putin United Russia (vote rating) Medvedev Putin KPRF+LDPR+SR (vote rating) Medvedev Putin United Russia/ KPRF+LDPR+SR (correlation of vote ratings) 58 71 56 12 9 17

March 2010 . Trust rating (%) 58 65 50 B. Mistrust rating (%) 13 12 22

March 2011 49 56 45 18 17 24 31 39 21

Change -9 - 15 - 11 +6 +8 +7 - 15 - 23 - 18

C. Balance (trust minus mistrust) 46 45 62 53 39 28

Secondly, the report presents a series of quotes from focus groups run by the CSR in various cities. Notably, the phrase "the people are being taken for fools" ( ) is heard with increasing frequency. Moreover,

The view that the situation in the country is improving, prevalent over the past 10 years, has all but disappeared from discussion; Personal trust towards the 'tandem', and the fear of a 'third candidate' wreaking undesirable political havoc, have both significantly decreased over the last 8 months; Medvedev is perceived as a puppet who is not worth voting for; Putin's role in creating stability is still acknowledged, but this stability is now seen as maintained at the cost of a corrupt system that does not serve the people's interests;

http://www.csr.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=307%3A2011-03-28-16-3810&catid=52%3A2010-05-03-17-49-10&Itemid=219&lang=ru

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Negative judgments about Putin have appeared, having been virtually nonexistent until recently; and Much of Putin's loyal electorate would cease to support him if he returns to the presidency, as he would be perceived as betraying the 'honest game' (chestnaya igra) attributed to the tandem, and acting solely out of a desire for power.

The legitimacy of either candidate is thus likely to suffer further if they should run in the presidential elections. According to the authors, if the downward trend in approval ratings continues, and no measures are undertaken to "reset trust" ( ) in the political system, the resultant political crisis could exceed that of the late 1990s and approach the situation at the end of the 1980s. Their vision of the potential mechanisms and aggravating factors of the crisis is summarised below.

Mechanisms of the crisis

Risks precipitating the crisis

1) Reverse conformism. The conformism of political 1) Weakness of formal opposition, leading to the views in Russia can serve the opposition as much as it creation of spontaneous opposition movements, currently serves those in power. which however are unlikely to be well organised, competent, or constructive, due to the constraints of 2) Urban opposition. Opposition support will reach the current system, thus failing to offer an alternative. critical mass in Moscow and other large cities by the autumn, and this sentiment will spread thanks to the 2) Growth of political extremism, including dominance of the media by urban centres. nationalism. 3) Loss of moral and ideological leadership. Policies and platforms proposed by existing authorities (such as United Russia), no matter how objectively wellfounded they might be, will be treated with scepticism and cynicism simply because they emanate from de-legitimised institutions. 4) Parliamentary and presidential elections. Elections do not serve as a mode of dialogue between the government and the people, enabling the restoration of trust; rather, due to their illegitimacy, they may become one of the means by which the crisis will spread. 5) Proliferation of protest movements. Given low support for the authorities, even the smallest grievance can turn into protest action, and such protests will be almost impossible to contain use of force will only de-legitimise the authorities further. 6) Degradation of economic policy. An unpopular government will be unable to implement effective 3) 'Ukrainisation' of political life, whereby the political opposition attempts to gain support via economic populism, harmful to the economy, leading to frequent economic and political crises. However, populism is less likely to succeed in Russia due to lower poverty levels and a developed urban middle class. 4) Destabilisation of the North Caucasus. Any acute escalation of the situation in the North Caucasus will deal a potentially fatal blow to the existing political system. 5) Prolongation of the crisis. The political crisis may become drawn out over ten years or more, as has been the case with past crises in the Soviet space, creating a 'lost decade' for Russia's economic development.

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economic policy, leading to macroeconomic instability, inflation, capital flight, et al.

The report concludes, similarly to the 12th expert group which recommends gradual decentralisation and democratisation, that the only way to avoid a crisis is by transforming the political system. The goal of such transformation primarily via greater plurality and narrower presidential powers should be to restore trust, in order to guarantee socioeconomic reforms and sustainable economic development in the coming 5-10 years.

Public opinion and poor performance Although the CSR's forecasts should be viewed with a critical eye they are to some extent alarmist they are also based on measurably real trends. United Russia's performance in the March 2011 regional elections was much worse than in the 2007 parliamentary elections. Despite winning 70% of seats in 12 regional legislatures, it only received a majority of votes in three of these, and its best showing was in Dagestan, where vote-counting is notoriously non-transparent. Opposition parties LDPR and the Communists made vote share gains of 173% and 185% respectively compared to the previous elections, in contrast to United Russia's effective loss of 15%.39

Moreover, Russians are sceptical with regards to the upcoming elections. In answer to the question "Do the forthcoming Duma elections interest you", only 7% answered 'definitely yes', 33% agreed somewhat, 37% disagreed somewhat, and 18% strongly disagreed. Some 57% of Russians felt that the elections would actually be a fight between bureaucratic clans for access to the state budget rather than true national elections; 54% believed that the authorities would decide who won seats in the Duma, and 50% believed the elections would take place by 'dirty' methods. The percentage of individuals who expected that the Duma elections would lead to changes that will improve life in Russia were split roughly equally, with 'no' exceeding 'yes' by 8%. When asked To what degree do regular elections make the government execute the will of ordinary people? 25% said they have no effect

39

http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/dmitri-oreshkin/putin%E2%80%99s-national-front-lifebeltfor-sinking-regime

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whatsoever, 31% that they had an insignificant impact, 32% to some degree, and only 8% significantly although these figures have remained roughly stable since 2000.40

Perhaps the most telling indicator of a profound fatigue and disillusionment with the political situation is the fact that during the past year, the proportion of Russians who would rather vote neither for Putin nor Medvedev has risen to 25%, nearly the same percentage as would vote for Putin himself.
Who would you like to see as a candidate in the 2012 presidential elections?
June 2010 Dmitry Medvedev Vladimir Putin Both Neither No response 14 30 21 19 16 Sept 2010 14 31 19 19 16 Dec 2010 17 29 19 18 17 March 2011 18 27 16 25 14

Source: http://www.levada.ru/press/2011041304.html

Such sentiments are both echoed and encouraged by non-state-owned media, in an increasingly impudent way. The business magazine Kommersant-Vlast' advertises itself in Moscow with big billboards reading "Vlast': Power you can trust" implying that the other power, at the Kremlin, cannot be trusted. The new publication Moskovskiye Novosti launched a promotional campaign under the slogan "We tell it like it is" ( ). The advertising posters displayed pointed quotations such as Thank God I always loved my country in its own interests, and not my own, or A large empire, like a large pie, is most easily gnawed around the edges. They were promptly taken down by the authorities as was an enormous image hung by opposition activists on a bridge across from the Kremlin, which showed Khodorkovsky and Putin (behind bars) with the message Time to switch places.

Even in the state-sanctioned realm, there have been signs of dissent, as when TV host Leonid Parfenov made his famous subversive speech to a room full of the stars of state-run television and representatives of the Kremlin: Behind every broadcast you can clearly see
40

http://www.levada.ru/press/2011042801.html

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the goals and strategies of the government. For a federal channel reporter, top authorities are not people who make news; they are his boss' bosses. But then a reporter becomes not a journalist, but an official.41 People seem to be discovering that they can speak their minds, that in doing so they overcome their fears, and that these fears become less significant. A 2011 Levada-Centre study of the status of civil society organisations in Russia, based on interviews with their leaders, while largely pessimistic, ended on a positive note: that the view among the new generation was that things should not be left as they are, that there is in a sense a moral imperative to act.42 The internet is also allowing people who might otherwise remain passive, to participate in political activism anonymously. A good example of this is anti-corruption campaigner Alexey Navalny's RosPil website43, where the public can report suspicious government tenders. RosPil claims to have already uncovered 1.6 billion RUR worth of shady deals since the site was set up this year.

Potential for unrest That said, there are still factors which would appear to militate against political change coming from below. One of these is Russians' stereotypical apathy and reluctance to go out into the streets. In surveys regarding the likelihood of unrest in local communities, 70-80% of individuals consistently say they are unlikely to participate in protests or strikes. On the other hand, the perceived probability of political protest is at its highest since 2006 (23% believing it quite likely), and the evaluation of the probability of protests against falling living standards and defending rights is also highest (28%), though over 60% still consider protests unlikely. Among residents of Moscow and other large cities this assessment of the probability of protests rises to 37%, yet Muscovites are the least likely to participate (88% against), as are people with higher education (77%). The demographics most likely to participate are youth (24-39), and residents of small towns and villages.44

However, these responses are not set in stone. Russians have been apathetic in part because the chaos of the 1990s made them run in terror towards stability at any cost, but under the
41 42

http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1547888 Volkov, Denis. , Levada-Center (February 2011). This view was also expressed by Elena Panfilova of Transparency International at the above-noted panel on corruption at Memorial. 43 www.rospil.info 44 http://www.levada.ru/press/2011041804.html

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right circumstances, they are entirely capable of seeking change through direct action. Highlighting the thousands that attended Dissenters' Marches in 2007, and the 2,900 other protests that took place that year with 800,000 attendees in total, Graeme Robertson concludes that the resilience of political protest despite the Putin regime's efforts is often overlooked.45 If the collective action website www.ikd.ru is to be believed, between 2,0006,000 people participate in various protests across Russia each month, on such diverse issues as environmentalism, civil rights, consumer rights, social welfare, small business, and others.

Some authors suggest that Russians also equivocate between democracy and public order: not only does their support for economic 'rights' and public order far exceed their backing of civil rights...many Russians believe in the ideal of democracy and still back their authoritarian government.46 This would imply that there is a rather high threshold to be overcome before the Russian population is willing to disturb order and stability in favour of democratisation. However, Russians' preference for order may be overestimated; it is worth noting that surveys show political preferences durably favouring social-democratic values over authoritarianism.

Political persuasion Communist (it is most important to defend class interests, state ownership of the means of production) Socialist and social-democratic (the state should guarantee social welfare under market economy conditions) Agrarian (stimulating agricultural development is of primary importance) Russian nationalist-patriotic (the interests of the Russian people are primordial) Liberal (in favour of reinforcing private property rights and development of the market economy) "Strong hand" regime (all power should be in the hands of a strong political leader) Other/No response

April 2005 17 39 21 14 12 22 14

April 2011 18 40 19 12 12 18 13

Source: http://www.levada.ru/press/2011042801.html

Another factor which would seem to operate in favour of the current regime is that Russians perceive their material circumstances as improving since Putin came to power. The proportion of respondents evaluating their family's material situation as 'average' has risen
45 46

Robertson, op cit, p 537. Gerritts, op cit, p 41.

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consistently every year, from 44% in 2000 to 60% in 2011, while the number evaluating it as very bad has fallen consistently, from 51% in 2000, to 27% in 2011. 47 Why would people want to protest against a system from which they have benefited? Yet the same poll that asked about material well-being, found that respondents' mood has been worsening. Asked to evaluate their mood in the past few days, 52% said that they were in a normal state of mind (against 61% in 2010, 57% in 2008, 46% in 2000), while 25% were stressed (23% in 2010, 22% in 2008, 35% in 2000), and just 7% were in excellent spirits (10% in 2010, 12% 2008, 5% in 2000). Some 57% agreed that life is hard, but can be tolerated (53% in 2010, 51% in 2000); 21% felt that things were not too bad (29% in 2010, 11% in 2000), and 18% that it was impossible to tolerate our calamitous situation any longer (from a low of 12% in 2008, 32% in 2000). Moreover, the percentage viewing Russia's economic situation as bad or very bad reached 37% (34% in 2010, 24% in 2008, from 73% in 2000).

This presents us with a curious paradox. Perceived living standards are rising, while contentment and approval ratings are falling. One possible explanation is that an appreciable number of Russians are attaining a level of middle-classness at which they feel that the authorities are more of a hindrance than a nuisance that corruption and stagnation actively detract from their potential to achieve the life they want. Indeed, an online survey by the Jobs.ru website found that Russians with an income greater than 50,000 RUR per month were least likely to vote for Putin (24%); similarly, only 25% of men would vote for him, and men were also most likely to favour an opposition candidate.48 Valeria Kasmara of the Higher School of Economics explains the results as follows: Men with decent earnings suffer from elevated expectations which they cannot realise. They are highly adaptable, confident, and believe they can achieve more. However, in the current situation, they are forced to remain at a certain level...they are not afraid of change, but their energy has nowhere to go.49

47 48

http://www.levada.ru/press/2011042903.html , Finam.info, (20 July 2010) http://www.finam.info/need/news2352100001/default.asp 49 Ibid.

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Conclusions

Constitutional Court adviser and director of the Higher School of Economics programme on corporate entrepreneurship, Vladimir Pastukhov, has written an excellent article titled Perestroika Second edition, in which he postulates that Russia has been in a state of more or less permanent revolution and counterrevolution over the last century, if not longer.50 His view is that the Kremlin's 'modernisation' project is a revolution analogous to Gorbachev's perestroika, following the violent counterrevolution of the 1990s and early 2000s. Perestroika was a failure, and Russia has returned essentially to the point at which it started in the 1980s: Gosplan is replaced by the FSB and MVD, the 'political economy of socialism' by the 'police-economy of capitalism'. History remained unsatisfied...it had not achieved its goals. The question of Russia's historical future remains open, and therefore a new perestroika can at any moment float upwards in the order of the day.51 Political conditions are lagging ever further behind Russians' social and economic aspirations, and this contradiction must almost inevitably be redressed. An appreciable segment of the elite, not directly affiliated with security structures, has, Pastukhov believes, tired of sitting on a powder-keg in a system whose primary rule is the lack of any rules. Even the siloviki prefer to keep their money in countries governed by the rule of law. The new reality can no longer be described in the terms of the 'police-economy'. The main thing is that this contradiction has arisen. The rest is a matter of time...on this objectively gloomy background, a hidden mobilisation of elites is taking place. Not one of these components separately, nor all of them together, seems capable of change. But add a catalyst, and everything will change instantly.52

This catalyst could be a drop in oil prices, an economic crisis, or a wave of mass protest, but the deciding factor is likely to be the will of those at the top. Melville, after conducting several joint studies regarding the circumstances conducing to democracy in Russia, concludes that actors are more important than structural constraints : political actors are in
50

Pastukhkov, V.B. " - : , Polis, No2 (2011) 51 Ibid. p 23 52 Ibid. p 26

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principle capable of overcoming 'structural' limitations and constructing democratic institutions and practise in 'unfavourable' conditions53 Gerritts, for his part, feels that significant competition could either develop from competition between regime-party formations...semi-oppositional parties...or, more probably, emerge from divisions among or within regime-parties, mobilized by different segments of the ruling elite.54

The course of Russian history is notoriously difficult to predict, and many an academic reputation has been lost in the attempt. There are numerous complexities at play, the majority of them taking place behind closed doors. If Putin is re-elected, the system may, for a time, continue in the direction of greater authoritarianism, a 'tightening of the screws', parasitic bureaucracy and an oligarchy that siphons Russia's wealth abroad but all this means is that the correction will ultimately be more dramatic. Alternatively, the elite may heed warnings and choose the path of gradual reform under Medvedev or similar, but this too will involve a period of instability as the whole system is corrupt from top to bottom, and any partial reforms carry the risk of challenge and collapse. The fact remains that social and political conditions are tilting towards change, that a generational shift is on the horizon, and that Russia stands today at the crossroads between self-destruction and rebirth. As Pastukhov writes, " -- ".

53

Melville, A. Yu. / : ?, (19 June 2010), p 76 54 Gerritts, op cit, p 36

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