Indonesian Policies toward the Chinese Minority under the New Order Author(s): Leo Suryadinata Source: Asian

Survey, Vol. 16, No. 8 (Aug., 1976), pp. 770-787 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643578 . Accessed: 22/09/2011 05:44
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INDONESIAN POLICIES TOWARD THE CHINESE MINORITYUNDER THE NEW ORDER Leo Suryadinata

THE CHINESE IN Indonesia, numberingabout 3.5 million, are a heterogeneousand complex community.Culturally they can be divided into Indonesian-speaking peranakans and Chinesespeaking totoks; legally they can be classifiedas Indonesian citizens and aliens cuttingacross the above-mentioned cultural divisions; politically they are split into pro-Jakarta, pro-Pekingand pro-Taipei groupsand otherswho are not sure of theirorientation. The majority, however,remain politically passive. Economically the Chinese are in heavilyengaged in tradingactivitiesand are influential Indonesian economic life, but they are still far fromcontrollingthe Indonesian economy the way that the Dutch did prior to 1957. in Despite the heterogeneous natureof the local Chinese community in Indonesia, most indigenousIndonesian leaders,with the exception with the communistsand minor left-wing of those affiliated parties, perceivethe Chinese as a homogeneousgroup which controlsthe Indonesianeconomy, resists assimilation and is loyal to an outsidepower, especiallythe People's Republic of China (PRC). As to the economic power of the Chinese, PresidentSuharto has been quoted as saying that the Chinese,constituting than 3% of the Indonesian populaless tion, dominate 70% of the Indonesian economy.1There is evidence that the indigenous Indonesian leaders' perceptionsrather than the actual conditionsof the Chinese influence Indonesian policies toward this minoritygroup. Understandably, Indonesian governments from Sukarnoto Suhartohave introduced policies aimed at curbingChinese economicstrength and assimilatingthem into the indigenouspopulathese policies have oftenbeen modifiedto suit dotion. Nonetheless, mestic politicaland economicrealitiesat specific periodsof time.Since 1 Shih-chie hua-ch'iao nien-chien (English Title: 1969 Universal Chinese Overseas Directory)(Hong Kong, 1970), section on "Yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya" (Indonesia), p. 15.

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during the Sukarno Indonesian policies toward the Chinese minority era have been treatedelsewhere, this article will deal primarily with educathe Suhartogovernment policieswithreference the economy, to of tion, cultureand nationality.It will also examine the consistency these policies with the proclaimed"assimilationist" principle.2

Economic Policy
The economicrole of the local Chinese has been a major concern of Indonesian governments, and thus Suharto's economic policies toward the Chinesedeservefirst attention.It is commonknowledgethat economicdeterioration a contributing to was factor the fall of Sukarno in 1965. With an inflation rate of 650%, Sukarno lost the support of the people, especiallythe middle and upper middle class Indonesians. It is not surprising thatthe new authorities, known as the New Order, to attempted improvethe economic situation-at least to reduce the rate of inflation-and to enhance the livingstandardsof the Indonesians, particularly thosewho lived in urban areas which were centersof potentialpolitical opposition. Nevertheless, immediately afterthe 1965 Coup, the overseasChinese were held responsiblefor Peking's alleged role and this resulted in violenceagainstthe local Chinese. At first onslaughtwas on all the on Chinese,but as it developed the attackwas concentrated the alien Chinese. Regional authoritiestook independent actions against this group. For instance,the militaryauthoritiesin early 1967 prohibited alien Chinese fromtradingin East Java and part of Sumatra.3 were trying to There was also an indication that local authorities reinforce well-known the PresidentialDecree No. 10 (P-P 10) banning in alien retail traders rural areas. Concernedwith economic stabilizaand asked of tion, the Ministerof Trade held a conference governors them to be cautious in enforcingthe regulation. The Minister into structed governors reviewthe situationas to whetheror not the the of reinforcement the above-mentioned regulation would cause instawere In bilityin the Indonesian economy.4 otherwords,the governors P-P 10 at theirdiscretion.Economic realities have advised to enforce prevailedsince and the regulationsaw littleenforcement. Suharto governmentwas deterThe economic growth-oriented mined to improvethe Indonesian economic situationwhich was also was very a means of legitimization. Indeed, the Suharto government from650% to 15% a year.Nonetheless, inflation successful reducing in
2 The term "assimilation" here means a process of absorption of a minority group into the host society. Jih-pao) 3 Sinar Harapan, February 17, 1967; Yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya jih-pao (hereafter, March 16, 1968. 4 Kompas, March 14, 1967.

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Indonesialackedcapital to implement development its program. Thus, the government sought foreigncapital. At the beginningof 1967, a foreign capital investment law was promulgatedthat stated "foreign capitalshould be made usefulto themaximumto acceleratethe developmentof the Indonesian economyand utilized in the fieldsand sectorsin whichinvestment Indonesian capital is not or not yet availof able withina shorttimeto come." The law definedforeign investment as "directcapital investment." Local Chinese capital in Indonesia was not considered"foreigninvestment," but the capital of the Chinese outside Indonesia was consideredforeigncapital. To obtain foreign capital, the law offered many incentivesand privileges.For instance, foreigners prepared to invest at least US$2.5 million were exempted frompayingtaxes for the first two yearsand no restrictions were imposed on the transfer profits of and dividends.5The Indonesian government also signed an investment agreementwith the U.S. in June 1967 to show its seriousnessin utilizing foreigncapital for development. Apart from"foreigncapital," the Suharto government was also concernedwith "domesticforeigncapital," definedas "capital which has been accumulated and expanded in the territory Indonesia, of which is . . . basically national wealth in the hands of aliens."6 The government eager to utilize the domesticforeigncapital for Indowas nesia's economicrehabilitationand developmentprograms. In July1968, the Indonesian government issued a law on Domestic Capital Investment which differentiated betweennational and alien enterprises. national enterprise A was defined as an undertakingin which Indonesian citizensowned 51% of the capital (or shares),and the percentage Indonesian ownershipshould be not less than 75% of by January1, 1974. All enterprises which did not meet this requirementwere classified "alien enterprises." as For these alien enterprises, law stated they were allowed to the operateuntil December 31, 1977, if theywere in the commercialsector,but up to December 31, 1997,if theywere in the industrialsector. In otherfields, for theywould be restricted 10 to 30 years.After1977 alien commercialfirms should be changed to industrialenterprises or otherwise cease operations. The interestof the Suharto government utilizing domestic in Chinesecapital was also shownin the establishment the "Indonesian of BusinessCenter"(IBC) on June 6, 1968,in Jakarta.This organization was semi-official because it involvedhigh-ranking officials government and Chineseprivategroups.Its statedgoal was to help the new cabinet out Five-YearPlan (1969-1974) through promotion the of carry thefirst
5 Law No. 1 of the Year 1967 ConcerningForeign Capital Investment (Special Issue: 014/1967,Djakarta: Department of Information,1967), p. 6. 6 Basic Policy for the Solution of the Chinese Problem (Special Issue: 023/1967, Djakarta: Department of Information,RI, 1967), p. 6.

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cooperation betweenthe public and private sectors.Presidentof the Center was Major-GeneralSuhardiman,the Director of the State Enterprise"Berdikari,"who was sent to Taiwan representing Indothe nesian government sign a trade agreement.Other membersof the to presidiumincluded two totok Chinese who were Indonesian citizens: Suwandi Hamid (Ong Ah Lok, a banker) and Sulindro (Ma Shih-ling, a businessman).7 It was reportedthatSuhardimaninstructed Ong and Ma to form the National DevelopmentCenter(NDC) to mobilizedomesticChinese capital so thatit could be used forIndonesia's developmentpurposes. The NDC was soon establishedwith Ong as its president;Ma, Ch'iu Ch'eng-shao, Chang Chan-enand fourotherChinese were membersof the presidium.8 fact,the NDC was a local Chinese businessorganizaIn tion which aimed at coordinatingvarious economic activitiesamong the local Chinese,includingimport-export, industry, mining,forestry, fishery otherfields. and The programwas veryambitiousbut the persons involvedwere limitedto pro-Taiwan businessmen.Pro-PRC and "neutral"businessmen did not join. It is also interesting note that to most people who were active in the IBC and NDC were known only to a limitedcircleand hardlyrecognizedas top leaders in either the totok or peranakan Chinese communities.Not surprisingly, the organizationwas ineffective. Despite the government's intention to utilize "domestic foreign capital," differential treatment (i.e., discrimination)toward the local Chinese-in this case, the alien Chinese-continued to exist. This caused many Chinese to collaborate with license-holders who were indigenousIndonesians.Even long beforethe "New Order,"collaboration betweenexperience-rich Chinese businessmenand inexperienced indigenouslicense-holders been common.Many Chinese made unhad The former official with indigenouslicense-holders. arrangements prowith the latter. vided the capital,ran the businessand split the profit has This practice, knownas the "Ali Baba" system, now developed into what is known as the "Cukong System"(or Cukongism).Cukong is a Chinese (Hokkien) termmeaning "master,"but in Indonesia it is used to denotea "skillfulChinese businessmanwho closelyco-operates It as a middlemanwith those in power, especially the military."9 is in worthpointingout that this practiceis well-known otherSoutheast Asian countries (e.g., Thailand) and is an obvious alliance of mutual interests. However,this practice in Indonesia has seldom been documented. In January197], an article in the Bangkok Post discussed the Cukong practicein Indonesia. Accordingto that article,the Cukong
July 4, 1968. 7Jilh-pao, also membersof the BKUT. 8 Ibid.; Ch'in and Chang wvere 9 0. G. Roeder, "Chinese 'Impudence'," Far Eastern Economic Reviewv, (May 7, 1973), p. 34.

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group,consisting about twenty of persons,"has wide holdingsranging from airlinesand banksto flour mills,import-export companies,tourist corporations, restaurants, shipping companies, tin exportingconcessions, rice milling plants, timber concessions and a varietyof others."'0The articlealso said that Cukongs had a steadyand inside trackto government contracts, investment creditsand other funds,and alleged that 90% of project aid moneyended up in the hands of the Cukongs. The articlefinally identified generalswho were connected the with the Cukongs. When the article was translated and published in Nusantara (January30, 1971), a leading Jakartadaily closely linked to the indigenousbusinessgroup,it resultedin numerousresponsesin Jakarta newspapers. Some members of Parliament resolved to question the government this matter.The government on denied the charges.The editorofNusantarawas prosecuted his campaignagainstCukongism for and later sentencedto two yearsimprisonment, pending appeal. The Indonesiangovernment's action againstthe anti-Cukong campaignwas interpreted some foreignobserversas a measure to "reassure the by overseasChinese that they could safelycontinue investingin Indonesia.""1 At the same time,thiscould also be interpreted mean that to thepowerelite was in such firm controlthatit could removeany rivals who attemptedto jeopardize its interests.0. G. Roeder, author of Suharto's assertedthatCukongismcontinuedto prevail,and biography, identified the names of 21 Cukongs and their corporations, without detailingtheir connectionswith government officials.12 The collaboration between Chinese businessmenand indigenous power-holders had created resentment among some indigenous Indonesians, particularlyamong the less successfulbusinessmen.Foreign investment also had been seen as being more beneficialto nonindito genous businessmen because foreigninvestors preferred work with Chinese businessmenrather than their indigenous counterpartsfor obvious reasons-the Chinese were generallybetterequipped in terms of businessexperience,capital, and technicalknow-how. The most strikingexample of this resentment occurred during Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka's visit (January 1974) when Indoshould seek ethnic nesian leaders told Tanaka that his countrymen Indonesians rather than local Chinese as their partners.The antiJapaneseriots in Jakartaduring Tanaka's visit had an anti-Chinese of The riotsresultedin the destruction numerousJapaneseovertone. made cars (many of which were owned by the Chinese) and a huge shoppingcenterwhere Japanese goods were sold but where most of the shops were owned by ethnicChinese.
10 Frank Hawkins, "Indonesia's Own Military-IndustrialComplex," Bangkok Post, January28, 1971. 11 Hugh Mabbett, et. al., The Chinese in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, MinorityRights Group, Report No. 10, London, 1972, p. 12. 12 Roeder, "Chinese 'Impudence'," pp. 34-35.

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The Sulharto government was sensitiveto the resentments the of indigenous Indonesian businessmen.On several occasions, President Suharto himselfurged nonindigenousbusinessmen(i.e., Chinese) to seek indigenouspartners that the position of the latterwould imso prove. He stated that all nonindigenouscompanies were obliged to sell 50% of theirsharesto the government whichwould thensell them to indigenous businessmen.'3 However, this policy was not enforced. The division between indigenous (pribumi) and nonindigenous Indonesians was reemphasizedafter Tanaka's visit and the antiJapaneseriots.PresidentSuharto announced that the government intended to deny medium-term financing fromstate banks to nonindigenous Indonesians.On January22, 1974, PresidentSuharto made a statementconcerningpolicy directivesfor private investment.The Presidentreiterated that all foreigninvestment (with the exceptionof mining,banking,and insuranceoperations)should be in the formof joint-ventures:
The national holding in joint-ventures shall be increased as fast as possible to a majorityposition of not less than 51 per cent of the total should be equality of interestbetween indigenous and non-indigenous Indonesians. . Direct participationin new foreignjoint-ventures non-indigenous by Indonesiancitizenswill no longerbe permtted. Participationis possible, however,by means of a corporatepartnershipbetween indigenous Indonesians and Indonesians fromother ethnic groups which can then enterinto an agreementfor a joint-venture with the foreignorganization.14 holding.
. .

. It is essential that within the national holding, there

No time schedule was set to implement"indigenization"of the above-mentioned enterprises,and one suspects that this is more become than substantive rhetoric policy.However,should it eventually would be difficult two reasons-first,the govfor law, implementation ernmentwould need a large amount of funds,and second, it would that the government createan impression practices"racial discrimination" againstIndonesian citizensof Chinese descent.Given the present economicsituationin Indonesia where the developmentprogramhas the been heavilydependenton foreign investment,15 exclusion of nonindigenousIndonesianswould in turnjeopardize Indonesia's economic If stability. the exclusion law was applied only to ethnic Chinese, it since the Chinese play a keyrole in \WVestwould stillcreateinstability
58-59.
14 13

Merdeka, April 12, 1972; Ching-chiyiieh-pao (Singapore), April 10, 1972, pp.

"Policy Directives for Private Investment(Statement of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, January22nd 1974)," (Mimeograph), p. 2. 15About 78% of the public finance for the First Five-Year Plan came from foreign sources. Suhadi Mangkusuiwonclo, "The Indonesian Development Effort: The First SuccessfulYear," Asia (New York), vol. 19 (1970), p. 31.

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ern and Japanese enterprises. Moreover,the law could result in apprehension among foreign investors. addition,the power elite who In gain advantages from the present arrangementwould oppose any drasticact which mightjeopardize their position. Ralph Anspach maintained that the Suharto governmentwas closely"allied to indigenousprivatebusinessinterests" and "tended to act less forcefully restrainxenophobia than had the previousgovto ernments."16 However,evidence contradicts statement, his mainly because the presentgovernment has a greaterdependency on foreign sourcesand therefore seems to have been more restrainedin its antiforeign economicpolicy than previousgovernments. The Indonesian government by no means abandoned "indigenism,"especiallyin has the economicsector,as a long-term goal. It is likely that a decree of would be introduced "indigenism" onlyif it did not disruptIndonesian economicstability perceivedby the rulingelite,however. as Educational and CulturalPolicies Suharto'seducational policies toward the Chinese have a stronger "assimilationist"flavor than his predecessor's.All Chinese-medium schoolswere closed shortly afterthe 1965 Coup, and the IndonesianmediumBaperkischools(schoolsrun by the socio-political organization called the ConsultativeBody for Indonesian Citizens), including the Baperki-sponsored Res Publica University(Ureca), were also placed under government supervisionand were eventuallytaken over by the authorities. Alien Chinese childrenwere deprivedof any education foralmost two years.Only early in 1968 did the Indonesian government issue a regulation,known as the PresidentialDecree No. B12/Pres./I/1968, the establishment schools sponsored by privategroups of permitting withinthe Chinese community. These schools.called Sekolah.Nasional ProjectChusus (SNPC) or "Special Project National Schools,"were introduced 1969.17 in They were declaredopen to aliens as well as Indobut more than 40% nesiancitizens, alien students should not constitute was identical to that of reguof the total enrollment. The curriculum was lar government schools.The mediumof instruction the Indonesian
16 Ralph Anspach, "Indonesia," in F. H. Golay (ed.), Underdevelopmentand Economnic Nationalismn in Southeast Asia (Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 200. 17 For the full text of the regulation, see Lie Tek Tjeng, Masalah V/NI dan

Masalah Huakiait (Djakarta, 1970), pp. 60-61. For a detailed study of various "Special Project National Schools," see Mely G. Tan and Leo Suryadinata,"The 'Special Project National Schools' in Djakarta" (Paper presented at the 28th Orientalists' Congress,Canberra, January 1971). The firsttwo schools were Ta-t'ung chung-hsiao hsileh-hsiao(SNPC Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) and Ch'ung-te hsichl-hsiao (SNPC Djaja Sakti), both in Jakarta. Aside from the clearance of the Ministryof Education, the consent of the governorwas required. There was a stipulation that in return for the permit,the school board involved should build a school for the Djakarta Metropolitanarea.

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language. Teachers and principalsof these schools had to be Indoof nesian citizensapproved by the Ministry Education. The "specialness" of theseschools lay in the inclusion of the teachingof Chinese numberof hours a week, but failurein this as a subject fora specific the subject would not affect promotionof the students.The fact that these "national schools" were "special projects" indicated that they and even elimination. and were experimental subjectto modification attempts The establishment SNPCs was one of the government's of to solve the "Chinese problem."Even beforethe SNPC regulation,the had issued a decree (Presidential Decree No. 15/1967) government establishingthe Staf Chusus Urusan T7jina (SCUT, Special Stafffor whose purposewas to assistthe cabinet in formulating ChineseAffairs) of the implementation the Chinese and supervising policies regarding Soenarso. those policies.t8SCUT was headed by Brigadier-General Colonel Sukisman,a graduate of the Departmentof Sinology at the of Colonel Sukisman University Indonesia, was appointed secretary. was also the head of Badan Kontak Urusan Tjina (BKUT, Contact which served as a communicationlink beBody for Chinese Affairs) and Chinese communities tweenthegovernment (especiallytotokChinese).19Undoubtedly,it was SCUT togetherwith BKUT which recof ommendedthe establishment SNPCs. The decisionto let the Chinese establishSNPCs was based on various political considerations.After the closing of Chinese-medium schools,some alien Chinese were eager to send theirchildrento Indonesian schools. However, places in these schools were limited and was given to Indonesian citizens.A large number of alien priority did not go to school at all. Many parentshired childrenpresumably former Chineseschool teachersto give privatelessonsto theirchildren. It was argued that these formerteachersmight be used by foreign agencies to propagate an undesirable ideology among alien Chinese to It children. was also difficult controlalien Chinese childrenoutside The government schools.20 hoped that the establishmentof SNPCs Chinese childrenand place themunder the direct would accommodate controlof the Indonesian authorities. to from some totokChineseleadersalso contributed estabPressure lishmentof thesespecial schools. The leaders of the totokswho were with the Taiwan group believed that Chinese education was affiliated
18For the full text of the regulation ("Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 15 Tahun 1967"), see Lie, Masalah WNI, pp. 56-59. The SCUT was dissolved to were transferred other Ministries.Sinar Harapan, June in 1969 and its functions 23, 1969. 19 There were fiveChinese membersin the BKUT, Ch'iu Ch'eng-shao (Hakka), Li Shih-t'ien (Hakka), Liang Hua-jung (Cantonese), Chang Chan-en (Cantonese) and Ch'en yui-hsin (Hokkien). All were related to the Kuomintang and were involved in the SNPC Djaja Bakti. Colonel Sukisman himselfwas a special adviser to the school. The BKUT was also dissolved in 1969. 20 Interviewwith a formermember of the BKUT, 1970.

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still desirable, although they themselveswere not sure how much Chinese the childrencould learn in the special national schools.Some Chinese leaders also saw an urgentdemand for Chinese schools. One can contendthat permissionto set up SNPCs was one of the concesto sionsgivenby the authorities the totoks. The Indonesian authorities have made severalconcessions the Chinese since early 1968 in order to to win theirsupportin stabilizing Indonesian economicand politithe cal situation. There was no reaction in the peranakan Chinese community to the SNPCs. This was understandablesince the peranakans had long in been interested Dutch schools during the colonial period and in Indonesian schools (especiallymissionary schools) afterindependence. The peranakansdid not see any prospectsfor Chinese-medium school in graduates Indonesia. However,the links with Chinese language and culturewere still well-established the totok Chinese. Not surprisfor ingly,theywished to maintain Chinese language and culture through Chinese education. The establishment SNPCs coincided with the of demandof the totokChinese for"Chinese" education. Totok Chinese who were pro-PRC did not classify the SNPCs as Chinese schools.Some even doubted that totokchildrenwould have a decent command of the Chinese language after studyingin these schools.But a group of pro-Taiwan Chinese who were associatedwith Indonesian officers and followed Indonesian politics closely realized thattherewas no possibility that the pre-Suharto typeChinese schools would be reestablished. a compromise, As theyagreed to set up SNPCs with the Chinese language as an extra subject. One of their leaders even commentedto the author that he did not know whether the SNPCs could survive. But one can conclude that these schoolswere in greatdemand, especiallyin the totok community, shown by their as continuing increase. The indigenousIndonesiansexhibitedlittlereaction to the establishmentof the SNPCs. Surprisingly, news regardingthe SNPCs was not published in Indonesian newspapers.The only significant commentswerepublished in Yin-tu-ni-hlsi-ya jih-pao (Indonesian title:Harwhichis operated ian Indonesia), thesole Chinese language newspaper, and controlledby indigenousIndonesians,mainlyarmyofficers.21 The paper published an article criticizing the authoritiesfor allowing the SNPCs to be set up on the grounds that the teachingof Chinese in of national schools was against the national interests Indonesia as it shifted the loyaltyof Indonesian citizensof Chinese descent to a forfor The Chinese language was not necessary Indonesian eign country. citizens Chinese origin.Two dayslater,the newspaperpublishedan of of editorial which argued that establishment SNPCs would lead to
21 The leadership is in the hands of two indigenous Indonesians, M. Jusuf Sirath, B.A., and SIK. HI. Wibowo, both of whom were associated with the armysponsoredBerita Yudha.

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among one group of Indonesian citizensand that sentiment exclusivist of thiswas againstthe principles Indonesian national education.22 of the In connectionwith the criticism, Ministry Education made which stated that the SNPCs were not Chinese a public statement Chinese childrenwho could schools but wereaimed at accommodating schools in early not go to school afterthe closing of Chinese-medium that the SNPCs were national schools with a curricu1966. It stressed lum identical to that of the Indonesian governmentschools. The is medium of instruction Indonesian and the schools are under the of directcontrolof the Ministry Education.23 A few weeks later,news concerningthe SNPCs appeared again. The PAB News Agency(the ArmedForces News Agency)reportedthat the aims of the SNPCs were to provideChinese childrenwith national education and to exercisecontrolover the education of Chinese children.24It was Colonel Sukisman'sopinion that the schools were directedat mixingIndonesian citizensof Chinese descentand alien Chinese in orderto creategood Indonesians.Sukismanassertedthatif the Ministry Education did not take over the education of alien Chiof would do the job and thiswould not be in the embassy nese,a foreign national interest.Nevertheless,some indigenous Indonesians were doubtfulof the ability of the SNPCs to achieve the goals set by the of Ministry Education. They were suspiciousof the Chinese language and did not agree with teaching it even as a subject to Indonesian and had a tendencytowardscrecitizensbecause it was "unnecessary ating exclusivism."25 schools; even alien ChiThere are no longerany Chinese-medium nese can go onlyto the SNPCs foreducation.Accordingto regulations, the numberof Chinese who are Indonesian citizensshould outnumber alien Chinese,but in realitymostof the studentsin these schools are aliens. howIn early 1971,therewere only eight SNPCs. More recently, continuedto growsince thesewere the onlyschools ever,theirnumbers In to which alien Chinese could be easily admitted.26 late 1973, there were 35 SNPCs in Sumatra alone. The growthof the SNPCs alarmed who assertedthat SNPCs in Sumatra had used the local authorities and hence violated government Chinese as the mediumof instruction regulations.In March 1974 all SNPCs in Sumatra were closed, taken and then convertedinto regular Indonesian over by local authorities, SNPCs in other areas seem to have managed schools.27 Nevertheless, to survive. One of the objectivesof Suharto'seducational policy toward the
Jih-pao,February 13 and 15, 1969. ibid., February 18, 1969. Ibid., March 8, 1969. Ibid., March 13, 1969. 26 No information available on the precise numbers of these schools. is 27 Jih-pao,October 11, December 19, 1973; March 7, 1974.
22 23 24 25

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Chinesewas thereductionin the use of the Chinese language in Indoto nesia. In fact,as earlyas 1958, the effort curtail the use of the lanof guagehad begun,when Nasution,as Commander-in-Chief the Army, issued an orderdeclaringthat all newspaperspublishedin other than Latin and Arabic letterswould be allowed to operate only if they was later The order,however, publishedin the Indonesian language.28 to werepermitted be publishedon A modified. fewChinesenewspapers thegroundsthattherewas still a need forsuch newspapersin order to policies, regulationsand other informthe Chinese about government were soon banned again. Only in 1963 matters.29 thesenewspapers But when Sino-Indonesianrelations were cordial did Chinese language appear again, but this time theywere all owned by Indonewspapers with existingpolitical or mass ornesian nationalswho were affiliated
ganizations.30

All Chinese language These newspaperswere also short-lived. were closed afterthe 1965 Coup, and since April 1966 only newspapers jih Yin-tu-ni-hsi-ya pao has been published the government-sponsored In in Jakarta, with a Medan edition establishedsoon afterward. April 1974 theMedan editionwas closed but the Jakartaeditionwas allowed to continuewith,however,an increasein the column using the Indostatenesian language. The ultimategoal, accordingto a government ment,is to printall pages in Indonesian in the near future.31 Use of the Chinese language in public was discouraged.For inheld an "Indonesian Language stance,the Pontianak local authorities Week" and urgedthe Indonesian citizensof Chinese originto abandon theiruse of Chinese.32 Not only was the Chinese language considered but even Chinese religion and customswere regarded as "harmful," undesirable.In December 1967, a PresidentialInstructionstated that in (in beliefsand customs Indonesia) originated their "Chinesereligion, may generateunnatural ancestralland and theirvariousmanifestations mentalityand moralityof Indonesian influenceon the psychology, It citizensand therefore impede natural propensity."33 was therefore ordered that Chinese religion be observedonly in the familycircle. if celebrations, held in public, should not be Religious and customary of and should be regulatedby the Ministry Religion upon conspicuous, General. of the recommendation the Attorney This policy was retainedup to at least 1968, but in 1969 the gov29SinzPo, May 24, 1958. and 30 Oey Hong Lee, indonesian Governmnent Press During Guided Demnocracy (Hull Monographs on Southeast Asia, 1971), pp. 128-129. In September 1965 it was of reportedthat therewere 104 newspapersin Indtonesia, which 13 (all were affiliated with either political or mass organizations) were Chinese language newspapers. Chung-ch'engpao, September 10 and 11, 1965. 21 Sinar Harapan, January26 and March 27, 1974. 32 Jih-pao,February 17, 1970. 33"Instruksi Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 14 Tahun 1967"; Lie, Masalah WNI, p. 54
28 "Penguasa Perang Pusat No. 010/19'8," Sin Po, April 18, 1958.

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ernmentofficially recognizedtwo minorityreligions-Buddhism and Confucianism. Law No. 5 of 1969(UU No.5/1969) stipulatedthatthese two religionsand four others(Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism and Hindu-Bali) were officially recognizedby the government. Since the Indonesian state ideology,the Pancasila, included "Belief in God" as the first principle,everyperson in Indonesia was expected to have a religion of some kind. The law was firstannounced in 1965 when Sukarno was still in power, and was reissued in 1969. Prior to this, various religiousmovements were already under way, partly as a result of the anti-Communist movementfollowingthe downfall of the PKI and Sukarno.The new Sukarto government probably perceived religion as a forcewhich could be used to preventthe reemergence of the PKI and otherleft-wing movements. Everyonewas expected to state theirreligiousbelief on theiridentitycards and it was assumed thatonly Communists not have a religion. did Confucianismand Buddhism are observedby some membersof the Chinese minority(especially peranakans).34The recognitionof "minority religions" does not fit in with Suharto's "assimilationist" policy towardthe Indonesian Chinese, and thus the adoption of this policy seems to indicate that short-term political considerations prevailed over the long-term goal of "nation-building." However, local conditions,especiallythe political climate in Indonesia, are not favorable to Chinese religions,particularly Confucianism. Many Chinese, with especially youngperanakans,are reluctantto associate themselves thisreligiousinstitution which is a prime targetof Indonesian nationalist attack. the In orderto further curtailChinese culturalinfluence, Jakarta Movie Censor Board ruled that Chinese characters were not to be aleven and lowed in Mandarin movie advertisements,35 the government consideredrestricting the importationof Hong Kong and Taiwanmade movies. Nevertheless, once again economic considerationsprevailed overthe "assimilationist" principle.Large numbersof Mandarin movies were imported and consequentlydominated the Indonesian movie market.Some Indonesian leaders were irritatedwith this and to attempted reduce theirimport. In Medan, for instance,Mandarin movieswerebanned fora timebut were again allowed to be shownbe30 cause of the loss of revenuesuffered the local government. by The clearestmanifestation the assimilationist of principle in the cultural fieldwas the name-changing regulation issued in December 1966. Previously, law (UU No.4/1964) had given all Indonesian citia
34 According to the 1971 census there were 1,092,314 Biuddhists (primarily Chinese) anid 972,133Confucians in Indonesia. See Biro Statistik,StatistikIndonesia 197411975 (Jakarta,[1976]), p. 32. The Ministryof Religion recorded that there were 242,867 Buddhists in Indonesia, buit had no figure on Confucian followers. StatistikIndonesia 1970/1971 (Jakarta,1972), p. 42. 35 Jih-pao,January 12, 1972. 36Jih-pao,April 22, 1974.

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zens of foreign descentthe opportunity change theirnames to Indoto nesian (or Indonesian sounding)names. The applicant was required to obtain lettersof recommendation fromgovernorsor local regents and local police chiefs.37 Nonetheless,the law was not widely publicized and the government not activelypromoteit. did In December 1966, however,the Suharto government simplified theprocedure orderto encouragename-changing in among Indonesian citizensof foreign descent(i.e., Chinese). The government was active in promoting name-changing the regulation and was widelypublicized. It stated that the Indonesian government intended to accelerate the of assimilation Indonesian citizensof foreigndescentinto the "Indonesian nation"; changingnon-Indonesiannames to Indonesian names was perceivedas one way to speed up the assimilationprocess.38 Accordingto the regulation,Indonesian citizens of Chinese descentwho intended to change theirnames could simplysubmit their applicationsto local authorities (usually governors, regentsor mayors) to be registered. low fee would be charged for registration. A These applicationswould be passed on to the Departmentof Justice.If no objectionswere raised by the local community three months,the in from new name would become legal. This regulation was effective January1967 to March 1968, but it was later extended for an additional yearbecause Indonesian citizensof Chinese originwho changed theirnameswere fewerthan expected.In August 1969,the Department of Justiceannounced that only 232,882 persons had changed their were complex.Some believed that names.39 Reasons forname-changing it would make life in Indonesia easier (e.g., to obtain licenses,to obtain places in the schools or colleges, to be accepted by indigenous Indonesians). Some liked to identifywith the "Indonesian nation," and believed that the solution of the "Chinese problem"was through But otherChinese did not thinkthat the Indocompleteassimilation. nesian nation should be definedin termsof an indigenousIndonesian nation.They were proud of theirethnicorigin and wanted to remain ethnicChinese.

Nationality Policy
Finallylet us turnto Suharto'snationality policy towardthe local froze Chinese. It was under Suharto that the Indonesian government Dual Nationality of the continuedimplementation the Sino-Indonesian in Treaty (which became effective 1960) as well as suspended diplomatic relationswith the PRC followingthe 1965 Coup. In 1969, the new Indonesian Parliamentdecided to renounce the Dual Nationality Treaty.
37 "Status Hukum Keturunan Tjina," Ekspres (July 26, 1970), p. 11. 38 Lie, Masalah WNI, p. 45. For a full text of the regulation, see "Keputusan in Presidium Kabinet No. 127/U/Kep/12/1966," Lie, MasalahHWNI, pp. 45-47. 39 KAompas, August 28, 1969.

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The treaty, one peranakan lawyerargued,had servedits purpose because the majorityof the dual nationals had opted for Indonesian citizenshipby the end of 1961.40 Nonetheless,she contended that the treaty continuedto require childrenof Indonesian citizensof Chinese extraction born prior to January 1962, to choose eitherChinese or 20, Indonesian citizenship. her view,thiswould createa "hazy national In status"amongchildren Chineseextraction of because thosewho wanted to choose Indonesian citizenship were still required by law to make a statement abandoningChinese citizenship. similarrequirementalso A applied to those who wanted to become Chinese citizens. However, the statement abandoning Chinese citizenshiphad no meaning after the suspension Indonesian-Chinese of relations(October 1967), and an application to become a Chinese citizenwas impossiblebecause there was no agencyto handle this matter.She concluded that continued enforcement the treaty of was no longerin Indonesia's national interests. renunA more important factorin the Indonesian government's childrenwhose ciationof the treaty political.The treaty was permitted parentshad chosen Chinese citizenshipduring the option period to become Indonesian citizenswithoutbeing screenedby Indonesian authorities. The Suhartogovernment wanted to discontinuethis practice of becauseit suspectedthe political orientation theseChinese.41 alien Chinese childrencould become IndoSince 1969, therefore, nesian citizensonly through naturalization under the 1958 Citizenship will be able to screen Act. This means that the Suharto government alien Chinese who want to become Indonesian citizens.As for the throughthe Chinesewho had alreadyobtained Indonesian citizenship Dual NationalityTreaty, their statusremained unchanged,and their The 1958 Citizenship children are considered Indonesian citizens.42 Act requiredan alien who applied forIndonesian citizenship through issued by his countryof origin naturalizationto submit a statement himself that nationality.Given the break in relationsbeof divesting tween the PRC and Indonesia, it was unlikelythat an alien Chinese fromChina. The Indonesian statement could obtain such an official of authoritieshave taken a liberal interpretation the provisionsby waivingthisrequirement; instead,a declarationof willingnessto give is up Chinesecitizenship consideredsufficient.43 of The termination the treaty depriveda numberof Chinese chilof dren under the age of eighteenof the opportunity becomingIndonesian citizens easily.On theotherhand, applicationsfornaturalization
40 Nj. Titi Sumbung SH, "Perdjandjian RI-RRT Mengenai Masalah DwiWarganegara," Sinar Harapan, February 26 and 28, 1969. 41 For this argument,see Tambahan Lembaran Negara RI, 1969, No. 2891. The Indonesian governmentalso argued that the treatygave "special treatment"favoring a particular group of the Indonesian population which was not enjoyed by other groups. This treatment deviated fromthe principle of equality before the law. 42 Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia, No. 17 (1969), p. 2. 43 "14 Surat Untuk 1 Putus Asa," Tempo, August 17, 1974, p. 2.

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which were seldom processedprior to 1969 are now being accepted. of The possibility naturalizationis greaterthan before,but the procedure is complicatedand costly.A recentreportin Tempo revealed documentsto filean application and thatone needed at least fourteen pay a cost ranging from 30,000 to 100,000 rupiahs (approximately while othershave claimed thatthe cost rangedfromhalf US$75-250),44 Even with such high fees, there were still to one million rupiahs.45 many applicationsto be processed.Dr. Lie Tek Tjeng, a peranakan historian,contendedthat 75-90% of "stateless"Chinese would have become Indonesian citizens had the procedure been simplifiedand But the Suharto government seemed to have tightthe feesreduced.46 ened thecontrolover theseapplications.In June 1973, the government the Body to screenthebackground established CitizenshipInvestigation of each applicant.Each applicationhad to be approvedby the Attorney in offices served merely General'sOffice Jakartaand the local attorney's rationalizationfor this as a coordinatingbody.47The government's to by policychangewas based on alleged attempts subversives become Body) Indonesian citizens. BAKIN (the State IntelligenceCoordinating was involvedin screeningall applicants; withoutits clearance the application could not be processed.48 process,"the govup Togetherwith tightening the "naturalization announced that therewere 1,000 illegal Chinese immigrants ernment who had entered Jakarta from Hong Kong.49 Most of these were who went to the PRC during the 1960s and later restudents former in turnedto Hong Kong due to difficulties adjusting to life on the believed that therewere many mainland. The Indonesian authorities subversive elements among the illegal immigrantsin Indonesia. In announced that about 1,000 illegal Chinese the mid-1975, government and that more were still at large. were under detention,50 immigrants local authoritiesin In connectionwith illegal Chinese immigrants, descent Jakartaand West Java required Indonesian citizensof foreign before theycould obtain new identitycards. themselves to re-register Kalimanthatin Pontianak (WVest About thesame time,it was reported were later tan), 468 Chinese who had acquired Indonesian citizenship
44 The amount of money was increased from 5,000-10,000 rupiah to 30,000100,000rupiabs in accordance with the decision of the Minister of Justice in 1968. See Tempo, August 17, 1974, p. 48. 45 Mabbett, Chinese in Indonesia, p. 7. 46 Lie, Masalah MINI, p. 21. Many alien Chinese want to become Indonesian citizensfor practical reasons-Indoncsian citizens enjoy more privileges than aliens. For example, alien Chinese are required to registerperiodically, to pay a special alien tax, to obtain a permit to work fromthe Ministryof Labor and, at one time, were not allowed to reside in West Java, East Java and part of Sumatra. 47 Sinar Harapan, June 21, 1973; Tempo, August 17, 1974, p. 48. 48 "14 Surat 1 Putus Asa." Tempo, August 17, 1974, p. 48; Jih-pao, September 16 and 30, 1974. 49 Sinar Harapan, August 27, 1974. 50 "Liku-liku Immigran Gelap," Tempo (July5, 1975), pp. 5-6.

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disqualified the groundsthat theydid not fulfill on the legal requirements.5' The question arises as to the numberof local Chinese who hold Indonesiancitizenship. The Department Immigration of reportedthat priorto the 1965 coup, 1,134,240 alien Chinese were registered PRC as This meant thatapproximately citizensand only 1,252as "stateless."52 1,466,000 local Chinese were Indonesian citizens.Compared with 800,000 in 1962,the numberof Indonesian citizensof Chinese extraction had increasedby about 666,000withintwo to threeyears.In the light of the slow rate of naturalizationbefore 1969 and a limited number of dual nationality childrenwho became Indonesian citizens,a rapid increasewas veryunlikely.The author suspectsthat many alien Chinese,forreasonsunclear to him,did not register. in Dr. Lie Tek Tjeng estimated 1967 that therewere threemillion ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, of which 1,500,000had Indonesian citiand 1,250,000 were "stateless."53 zenship,250,000had PRC citizenship, He did not explain what he meant by "stateless"Chinese. These Chinese could not be Taiwan nationals since they were not likely to possessTaiwan passportsor other legal documentsissued by Taiwan. It was also doubtfulthat these"stateless"Chinese would want to identify with Taiwan. The only reasonable explanation seems to be that Dr. Lie used the termin a political ratherthan legal sense-both Taiwan passportholdersand alien Chinese who did not wish to identify themselves with eitherthe PRC or Taiwan. Dr. Lie's estimatefor "stateless"Chinese appeared Nevertheless, too high while his estimatefor PRC citizenswas too low as is shown released by the Departmentof Immiby the 1971 registration figures grationin Jakarta.According to the Department,1,010,652Chinese were registered aliens, of which 871,090were PRC citizens,149,486 as were "stateless" and only 66 were Taiwan nationals (presumably The classification alien Chinese into of Taiwan-passportholders).54 these threecategoriesdid not coincide with existingregulations.In of July1969the Indonesian Department Justiceannounced that "stateless" was used to referto "A. Those who are not citizensof any counof which Indonesia does try;or B. thosewho hold citizenship a country not recognize."55 Legally speaking,alien Chinese in Indonesia cannot be regarded as "persons who are not citizensof any country." Peking claims that all alien Chinese who are not Indonesian citizensare Chinese nationals. Taiwan also claims all Chinese (both aliens and Indonesian citizens)
52Komipas,May 5, 1967. According to my estimate, the Chinese population in Indonesia was about 2.6 million in 1965. 53 Lie, Mfasalal IFNI, p. 20. 54 Sinar Hara pan, November 24, 1972. 55Sinar Harapan, July 21, 1969; Kompas, July 92, 1969.
51 Sinar Hra pan, December 9 and 18, 1975.

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as nationals of the Republic of China. However, some alien Chinese can be classified "personswho hold citizenship a countrywhich as of Indonesia does not recognize" (i.e., Taiwan nationals),and hence these people, in the eyesof the Indonesian government, "stateless."But are are those"stateless" Chinese (149,486)identified the Indonesian auby thoritiesnationals of Taiwan in the sense that they hold Taiwan passports, 66 Taiwan nationalsdid? The authorsuspectsthattheydo as not hold anyTaiwan legal documents. The factthatthe Department of Immigration differentiated "Taiwan nationals" from "stateless"Chinese in its statistics also indicated that they are not the same. We hereis used in the politicalsense to refer to would arguethat"stateless" bothresident Chinese who are Taiwan sympathizers thosewho do and not wish to be associatedwith either the PRC or Taiwan. But legally speaking, theyare PRC citizensbecause Jakartastill recognizes Peking. The Immigration Department's figures alien Chinese are much on too low. If alien Chinese constituted only 1,010,652 the 3.29 million of Chinese population in 1971, this meant that more than two million doubtful that within Chinese are Indonesian citizens.It is extremely fiveor six years (1966-1971) the number of Indonesian citizens of Chinese extractionhas increasedby more than 100% in the light of the factthat applications for Indonesian citizenshiphad been frozen and thenreopenedonlyin 1969. The JakartaHigh Court in 1969 indicatedthatabout 100 Chinese weregrantedIndonesian citizenship each month.56 Assumingthat this figure confined was only to Jakartaand the totalnumberbeing granted Indonesian citizenshipwas 300 each month,within a two-year period (1969-71) therewould be 7,200 new Indonesian citizens.If each person had threechildrenunder 18 yearsof age (under Indonesian law they became Indonesian citizens),this would bring the total automatically numberto 18,800.This is still veryfar fromthe suggested that figure, of is, over one million! The author suspectsthat about two-fifths the Chineseare Indonesian citizensand the restare still aliens. It appears that the Indonesian government has not yet made up its mind with regardto the alien Chinese. If it allows large numbers of alien Chinese to become Indonesian citizens,it fearsthat it would not be able to controland absorb them.On the otherhand, if it maintains the statusquo, Peking would be obliged and entitled to protect alien Chinese,who, by Chinese law, are PRC citizens.The hesitancy in of the Indonesian government adopting a more liberal nationality of policyseemsto lie in the Indonesian perceptions the Chinese minoritywhichhave been developed over a long period of time.
June 11, 1969. o5GJihl-pao,

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Conclusion
Most indigenousIndonesiansresentthe highereconomicstatusenjoyed by the Chinese as a group. Various measureshave been introduced to curtailChinese economicstrength with little success.Bebut cause the Suharto government orientedtoward "economic developis ment," the capital and skills of the local Chinese have not been ignored. However, the government, while using ethnic Chinese capital

and skills,is suspicious thisminority of group and would like to absorb the Chinese into the indigenouspopulation, provided that these Chinese are not consideredpolitical risksby the government. The namethe "Special Projects National Schools," and the chanoging regulation, easing of the naturalization processshow that the Suhartoadministration has moved toward assimilatingthe Chinese into the indigenous But on the other hand, practicesand regulationsthat decommunity. viate fromthispath also exist. For instance,the official readoption of the derogatory term"Cina" has offendedand alienated many ethnic Chinese. The high feeschargedfornaturalizationproceduresalso bar manyChinesefrom becomingIndonesian citizens. The recategorization of indigenousand nonindigenousIndonesians in the economic field and the administrative practicesin some cities,requiringIndonesians of Chinese descentto re-register securityreasons, perpetuate the for divisionbetweenthe local Chinese and indigenousIndonesians.Moreover,therevivalof minority religionsand observations Chinese cusof toms tend to consolidateChinese "separateness." These contradictory policies and practicesare the result of the conflictbetween the inof digenousperceptions the Chinese minority and the complex domestic situation.The assimilation all Chinese into the Indonesian popof ulation is stillfarfromcertain.

LEO SURYADINATA Studies, Singapore.

is a research officer the Institute of Southeast Asian at