P 180955Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9469 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003004 SUBJECT: A TALE OF TWO NEIGHBORHOODS

- IDP RETURNS IN BAGHDAD REF: BAGHDAD 2960 Classified By: PolMinCons Robert Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1. (C) Summary: In the past two months, security gains and GOI evictions of illegal tenants have contributed to return of internal displaced persons (IDP) in Baghdad, but progress is far from uniform. Hurriya, a district in western Baghdad, and Doura, on the city's southern flank, both suffered severe sectarian violence in 2006. Today some neighborhoods in Doura have seen notable returns of displaced persons, while returns to Hurriya are comparatively insignificant. For now, the IDP returns in Doura have been less complicated and may not be a true indicator of progress. Illegal tenants in Hurriya are reportedly a lucrative source of income for Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) criminal groups, so it will be tougher to dislodge squatters there without a concerted GOI effort. Senior members of Iraq's Sunni political establishment believe the Shi'a-led GOI perceives an electoral

advantage in going slow on the return of Baghdad's mainly Sunni IDPs. While there have been some encouraging signs in Baghdad IDP returns, but perceptions of security problems real or exaggerated - are hindering faster return of the large displaced Sunni Arab population. This in turn threatens sustained progress on security. End Summary. 2. (C) The highest-ranking Sunni cleric in Iraq, Sheikh Ahmed Abdelghaffour Samarrai'e, underlined to us on September 14 that Sunni Arabs displaced from their West Baghdad neighborhoods are concerned first and foremost with security. Where they feel safe returning, they do. Where they hear that either Shia militias and/or partisan ISF continue to operate, they stay away. Ministry of Displaced Persons and Migration programs are important, but less so than perceptions of security, he said. Ammar Abdalghaffar Al-Samarrai'e, Sheikh Ahmed's son, told poloff on September 3 that the situation in western Baghdad was tenuous for Sunni families. The continued presence of JAM and the ISF's allegedly sectarian enforcement of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki's relocation orders were making it difficult for families to return, he asserted. Ammar al-Samarrai'e claimed that during the week of September 1, the ISF evicted approximately 70 Sunni families, originally displaced from Hurriya, from interim lodgings in the adjacent neighborhood of Adl (Comment: The Waqf appears to be on message, since the same information was reported by Sheikh Mahmoud to Refcoord. See REFTEL. End Comment). The families could not return to Hurriya because there was no concurrent removal of Shia families squatting in the Sunnis' Hurriya properties. (Note:

Sunni contacts report that Hurriya was roughly 70 percent Sunni, 30 percent Shia before 2006. They claim the same area is now 95 percent Shia, following the displacement of 25,000 mostly Sunni families. Baghdad is especially important in assessing the situation of returnees. International Organization of Migration (IOM) assesses almost 64 percent of Iraqi IDPs originate from Baghdad. End Note.) 3. (C) Sheikh Mahmoud al Falahy, the Sunni Waqf's representative in Hurriya, corroborated this information on September 4. Sheikh Mahmoud also complained that Hurriya was still plagued by JAM, and that the Iraqi Army (IA) had made no effort to regain control of Hurriya. Falahy called for the eviction of Hurriya squatters (mainly Shi'a from poor neighborhoods), a U.S.-led security operation to clear the area of JAM, and a sustained security presence to keep the militias out. Falahy described Huriya as a lucrative income source for the JAM, which was illegally renting houses vacated by Sunnis to fund their insurgent activities. Al Samarrai'e informed poloffs that the Waqf had given the names of JAM members to the IA, with no result. These frustrations notwithstanding, Al Samarrai'e asserted that the security situation in western Baghdad, from the view of local residents, was better two months ago. Ammar's father and officially the senior Sunni cleric in Iraq, Sheikh Ahmed Abdelghaffour Samarrai'e, underlined to us on September 14 that Sunni Arabs displaced from their West Baghdad neighborhoods are concerned first and foremost with security. Where they feel safe returning, they do. Where they hear that either Shia militias and/or partisan ISF continue to

operate, they stay away. Ministry of Displaced Persons and Migration programs are important, but less so than perceptions of security, he said. 4. (C) IDP returns are faring better in some Doura mahallahs. Each Doura mahallah(neighborhood) has adopted its own formal or semi-formal IDP return process, usually with the assistance of the National Police (NP) and local Sons of Iraq (SOIs the predominantly Sunni militias paid by coalition forces to maintain security). For example Hadar neighborhood's NP allows IDP returns once a week, every Thursday; poloffs witnessed moving vans queuing at a checkpoint. In Mahallah 840, the process is less formal and relies on less structured coordination between the NPs and SOIs. 5. (C) At his residence in the Musaffee neighborhood of Doura, Abu 'Ula, a local SOI commander, explained to us why IDP returns had not been disruptive in his muhallah. Abu 'Ula said Mahallah 840 is walled-in with two entrances manned by the NP and SOI; only former residents were allowed to move back into the mahallah, so the area was not saturated with new IDPs. Secondly, Abu 'Ula noted that some of the abandoned homes in his mahallah remained vacant and returning IDPs were able to move in easily. (Note: This situation is in stark contrast to Hurriya, where JAM and JAM affiliates collect rent from illegal tenants and are therefore financially motivated to fill homes with squatters. End note). 6. (C) Senior Sunni political leaders, including

Deputy Prime Minister Rafi' Eissawi and top Iraqi Islamic Party official Alaa Makki, told Polmincouns in recent conversations that they believe the GOI perceives little urgency in resolving the Baghdad IDP problem. The murder and intimidation campaigns of 2005 and 2006 mainly displaced middle and upper class Sunnis from their Baghdad neighborhoods, replaced by lower class Shi'a who form a political base for the ruling Da'wa and ISCI parties. Should Sunnis return to their neighborhoods in Baghdad, mainly Shi'a controlled seats in the provincial assembly will be at risk. 7. (C) Comment: The IDP return process in Baghdad has just begun, with some neighborhoods showing initial signs of success, but so far this appears mainly to be "low hanging fruit." Security remains the bedrock of IDP returns. Our contacts who at the street level agree that when displaced persons sense they can return to their homes in safety they will want to do so quickly. If they sense their old neighborhoods are still unsafe, they will hesitate. There are other factors that also facilitate IDP returns at the mahallah level: vacant homes, walled-in communities of manageable size, existing diversity in the community, and a pro-active ISF presence with strong community ties. Neighborhoods like Hurriya highlight the obstacles impeding IDP returns: criminal groups and militias, insufficient or partisan ISF presence, and halfhearted and uncoordinated enforcement of property rights. 8. (C) Comment continued: The number of returning IDPs is an important indicator, but must be viewed

in a broader context. Of particular concern is Baghdad's Sunni community, which is worried not only about IDPs, but also about the planned integration of SOI units into the Iraqi Security Forces as well as the Sunnis' current underrepresentation in provincial government. An inadequate IDP return process could perpetuate Sunni disenfranchisement and this, combined with an insufficient or counter-productive transition of SOI contracts to GOI control could increase Sunni frustrations with the GOI and increase the possibility for a return to violence. End Comment. CROCKER (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of