Journal of Contemporary China (2010), 19(64), March, 273289

Rise of the Great Powers 5 Rise of China? Challenges of the advancement of global history in the Peoples Republic of China
Q. EDWARD WANG*
Ever since it was rst broadcasted in 2006, the Rise of the Great Powers, a popular Chinese TV mini-series of 12 episodes, has received great attention both at home and abroad. Some have suggested that the showing of this series marked a new orientation in Chinas foreign policy and a new perception of its position in the world. Using oral interviews and written works by the historians who masterminded the project, this article analyzes the view of the Chinese historian, and of current Chinese leadership, about the globalizing world today and Chinas position in and relation to it. Using the documentary as a starting point, it discusses the status quo of world-history study in China today and argues that though receptive to the incentive for globalizing history writing, historical scholarship in China remains grounded in a Eurocentric understanding of modern world history. Chinas recent economic expansion has paradoxically reinforced this tradition, as the country is bracing for its own world power status.

China has a time-honored tradition of ofcial historical writing. From the Han period (206 BCE 220 CE) to the early twentieth century, over two dozen standard histories (zhengshi ) were churned out by court historians, offering an ofcial and authoritative view of the past. Outside this tradition, there was a persistent and vivacious interest in private historical writing, motivated not only by the desire to compliment, as well as to correct, ofcial historiography, but also by the interest in making history more accessible to the general public. The latter ourished especially from the fourteenth century, giving rise to a different genre in historical writing that brings together factual presentation and literary renement. During the early twentieth century while historical study in China entered the phase of professionalization, this interest retained its attraction among historians, journalists

* Q. Edward Wang is professor of history at Rowan University and Changjiang Visiting Professor of History at Peking University. A specialist in Chinese intellectual history and comparative historiography, he has published a number of works in both English and Chinese, including A Global History of Modern Historiography (coauthor, 2008). He is secretary general of the International Commission for the History and Theory of Historiography and editor of Chinese Studies in History (M.E. Sharpe). ISSN 1067-0564 print/ 1469-9400 online/10/64027317 q 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/10670560903444223

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and other writers.1 The rise of the so-called report literature (baogao wenxue ) from the 1930s on, for example, was a prime example, which blended history and journalism, fact and ction.2 In todays PRC, report literature remains a vibrant genre of historical/journalist writing that at once educates and entertains Chinese readers about their countrys past and present. After TV sets were made available to most households in the country during the 1970s, it also took the visual form and was made into TV documentaries. Moreover, since the media and press are under direct governmental aegis, these TV programs usually present an ofcial view of history. It thus extends the tradition of ofcial history writing in the past, even though it takes a para-literary form in presenting historical knowledge. The River Elegy (Heshang ), a popular TV miniseries aired in 1988, which offered a critical survey of Chinese history and cultural tradition, is a case in point. It remains unclear whether the series was masterminded by Zhao Ziyang (19192005), the then CCPs general secretary known for his advocacy of economic reforms, but there is little doubt that the main message of the River Elegythe necessity for China to expand its economic reform and catch up with the industrialized Westexplicated and extended Zhaos position.3 The Rise of the Great Powers (Daguo jueqi ), a new popular TV miniseries aired in 2006, is another interesting case. It is worth our attention because, unlike its predecessors and peers, which are mostly about Chinese history, the series offered a historical interpretation of the modern world. It was broadcast on Chinese Central Television (CCTV) Channel Two and was warmly receivedthe number of viewers of each episode reached four million on average, according to one estimate. Thanks to such an enthusiastic reception, the mini-series was aired again three more times, which is unprecedented for a TV documentary.4 To its directors, editors and writers, this success was a surprise because, compared to the 1980s when River Elegy was aired, then there were only a few TV channels, whereas Chinese viewers nowadays can watch over 40 daily programs, ranging from soap operas and sit-coms to mini-dramas and movies, domestic and foreign. That a history documentary shown on an ofcial TV channel with an avowed aim to educate the Chinese about the histories of nine foreign countries (Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Russia and the United States) can be so favorably embraced by the audience is indeed worthy of note. Outside China, the making and showing of Rise of the Great Powers also caught ample attention; news coverage and speculative
1. David Der-wei Wang, The Monster That is History: History, Violence and Fictional Writing in Twentiethcentury China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004); and Q. Edward Wang, Inventing China through History: The May Fourth Approach to Historiography (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001). 2. The report literature is not ctional in that it often depicts a true story with real gures in it, though its narrative is not accompanied by footnotes. Instead, it is embellished with imagined dialogues among the protagonists and descriptions of their inner emotions, but the storyline remains truthful to the unfolding of the actual event it is portraying. Cf. Charles A. Laughlin, Chinese Reportage: The Aesthetics of Historical Experience (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003). 3. See Xiaomei Chen, Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 27 48; Jing Wang, High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Dengs China (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 118136. Also see, Q. Edward Wang, Encountering the world: China and its other(s) in historical narratives, 194989, Journal of World History 14(3), (September 2003), pp. 327358. 4. Lou Hejun, Daguo jueqi ruhe jueqi? [How was Rise of the Great Powers risen (as a TV program)?], Shehui guancha [Social Observation ] 7, (2007).

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analysis have since appeared in the New York Times, on the BBC and in other major media organs across the world.5 I In contrast to the making of River Elegy in the late 1980s, which was to promote Zhao Ziyangs (as well as Deng Xiaopings) reform agenda in the country, not agreed by all in the politburo at the time, the catalyst for making the Rise of the Great Powers stemmed from a joint decision by the politburo led by Hu Jintao, the current communist party leader. During a certain week in November 2003, Qi Shirong, a historian specializing in modern world history at Capital Normal University in Beijing, and Qian Chengdan, a historian of modern English and European history at Nanjing University, were invited by the politburo to give tutorial lessons on world history, a synonym for foreign history in the PRC since 1949. They lectured on the histories of the major advanced countries, focusing on their ascendance to the so-called world powers in modern times. It remains unknown as to who (the historians or the politburo) selected those countries and identied them as world powers.6 However, it seemed to be common knowledge that the politburo studied collectively the histories of major industrial countries. A year later, a group of historians in Nanjing compiled a book, entitled The Course of Development of Major Advanced Countries in the World since the Fifteenth Century, though there are 11 countries examined in the book, instead of nine, including Italy and Canada.7 According to his own admission, shortly after hosting the study sessions for the party leaders, Qian Chengdan was approached by Ren Xuean, a CCTV editor, and Zhou Yan, the managing director. Ren and Zhou expressed interest in working with Qian and the historical community to make a TV mini-series. Qian suggested that they contact the History Department at Peking University, for it boasts the best history program in the country. Insofar as the teaching and research of world history is concerned, PKU also has about 25 faculty members, or about a quarter of its total history faculty.8 Endorsed and arranged by such PKU administrators as He Fangchuan (1939 2006), the universitys vice-president and a historian of Africa and Asia, many members of the universitys history faculty specializing in world history participated in Ren Xueans project. They wrote the manuscripts for the documentary, which were the bases for the script drafted by Ren and Chen Jin,
5. See, for example, Joseph Kahn, China, shy giant, shows signs of shedding its false modesty, New York Times, (9 December 2006). 6. Though I interviewed both Qi and Qian, I got no details as to why and who chose these nine countries, or what the politburo would mostly like to know about their rise as great powers in modern times. Qian said to me at Peking University on 28 December 2007 that he was advised by the party not to reveal these details. 7. See Chen Xiaolu, ed., 15 shiji yilai shijie zhuyao fada guojia fazhan licheng [The Course of Development of Major Advanced Countries in the World since the Fifteenth Century ] (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 2004). Chen was a colleague of Qian Chengdans at Nanjing University. Given that the book covers 11 countries instead of nine, it is possible that in their lectures Qian and Qi did give lessons on more than nine great powers. This suggests that the choice of nine might have come from the documentarians. 8. Qi Shirong in his Woguo shijieshi xueke de fazhan ji qianjing [The development and future of the world history discipline in our country], Lishi yanjiu [Historical Research ] 1, (1994), pp. 155168, states that there were about 40% of teaching faculty in Chinas colleges and universities whose specialization falls in the category of world history, or non-Chinese histories. But his estimate is too optimistic; there are only about 25% of faculty members in every history department who work on histories outside Chinas today.

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a research fellow of the Central Bureau of Compilation and Translation. The CCTV then sent out a team of photographers and journalists to these countries, shooting the footage and interviewing scholars and historians for about 18 months. The interviewees included both foreign and Chinese scholars; the latter are either noted specialists in China (including some of the original authors at PKU) or overseas Chinese scholars working in respective countries. Ren Xuean, Chen Jin and the CCTV team were mainly responsible for selecting and editing the material and turning it into a screenplay. In the process, they occasionally consulted Qian Chengdan whereas the PKU historians who wrote the original manuscripts were seldom contacted. When the mini-series was aired in 2006, many of the historians found that the nal product was quite different from their original work.9 As its title indicates, the major theme of Rise of the Great Powers is to show how those nine countries rose to become world leaders in modern times. Episode One depicts Portugal and Spain in the Age of Discovery. It rst describes how the Portuguese gained strength in battling with the Muslim Moors and established a new Christian kingdom, which provided a stable political base for launching maritime expeditions. Yet the main hero is Prince Henry the Navigator (1394 1460) who receives accolades for his devotion and determination that eventually led to Portugals success, though a small country with a population of less than 200,000, in monopolizing the trade with Asia during the sixteenth century. The same Christian Reconquista theme is repeated in describing the success of Spain in colonizing America. Columbus discovery naturally receives central attention, but it also mentions that though a commoner, Columbus engaged in a lengthy negotiation with Queen Isabella (1451 1504), the mighty ruler of Spain, for sponsoring his historic voyage, underlining the latters open-mindedness. The decline of Portugal and Spain is attributed to the fact that while both empires gathered enormous wealth via colonial expansion, they failed to use it to develop the economy. Consequently, the wealth ooded out as quickly as it had ooded in. Episode Two presents the miraculous rise of Holland, for like Portugal, Hollands population was also quite small, fewer than 200,000. Yet Dutch merchants devotion to international trade and dedication to protecting their patrons interests earned them an excellent reputation and enabled them to dominate the East West trade during the seventeenth century. Two examples are given in detail for illustration: one was that a Dutch cargo ship was once trapped in the frozen sea for several months, but the crew refused to use the clothes and medicine on board; the other example was of a Dutch diplomatic entourage that went to Qing China, and out of their business acumen, they performed the kowtow ritual as the court demanded without hesitation. Episodes Three and Four are devoted to Englands quick ascendance because, like the previous three countries, England was/is also relatively smallthe writers emphasize that even today, the population in Great Britain is only around 60 million. At the peak of its colonial conquest, however, the British Empire controlled over 300 million people and was hailed as the Empire on which the sun never sets. According to the producers, the reason behind this success was twofold: a strong nationalist
9. Based on author interviews with Professors Gao Yi and Dong Zhenghua on 17 December 2007. Gao wrote the manuscript on French history whereas Dong wrote that on Dutch history.

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government that prized, since the 1688 Glorious Revolution, peaceful and piecemeal reform over bloody and violent revolution, and technological invention and innovation that paved the way for its industrialization. France, treated in Episode Five, is presented as a country full of passion and ideals ( jiqing , lixiang ), which helped shape not only the course of the countrys modern history but also that of world history. Louise IV and Napoleon were emblematic gures, but the episode also stresses that France is the birthplace of the Enlightenment and that it has a rich and glorious cultural and intellectual tradition. Twice the Pantheon appears in the episode where political leaders paid homage to such intellectual gures as Madam Curie and Alexandre Dumas in state burials, for in France, great ideas command respect. A similar argument is made in Episode Six on modern Germany. Again, political leaders such as Bismarck and Hitler receive ample attention, but due attention is also given to intellectual gures whose ideas and writings shaped the German national spirit (minzu jingshen ), which is characterized as both resilient and self-critical, underpinning the ebb and ow of modern Germany. Japan is shown in Episode Seven and Russia in Episodes Eight and Nine. These episodes share one common themehow a backward country leapt ahead by copying and appropriating useful experiences from advanced countries. Reform-minded gures thus receive praise. In Japan, though Okubo Toshimichi and Ito Hirobumi, heroes in the Meiji Restoration, are covered, their importance seems eclipsed by that of a Confucian-turned-businessman named Shibusawa Eiichi (1840 1931). As the father of modern enterprise in Japan, Shibusawas metamorphosis is regarded as embodying Japans success in transcending its cultural past for embracing modern capitalism. Peter the Great is credited for Westernizing Russia. While his courage and audacity are commended, his extreme iconoclasm is deemed harmful for Russia. Russias terrible performance in World War I became a case in point. However, it gave rise to Soviet power, which ushered in a new era. In contrast to the traditional presentation of Lenin as a determined communist revolutionary, Episode Nine provides a detail in which Lenin worked with an American businessman to help recover Russias war-wrecked economy. It stresses that Soviet Russias solid economic development enabled it to defeat Nazi Germany in World War II. Episodes Ten and Eleven are about the United States, the newest great power. Thomas Edison (1847 1931) gures centrally in Episode Ten, which describes the rise of America from an English colony to an independent nation. Yet the episode not only applauds Edisons creativity as an inventor, it also credits the US government for establishing the patent system, protecting the inventions by Edison and others, which helped stimulate economic development. In Episode Eleven, however, the producers hasten to add that while laissez-faire capitalism engendered ingenuity and enthusiasm, it also wrought havoc, as shown in the Great Depression. Franklin Roosevelts New Deal policy receives accolades for putting the country back on track and catapulting it to the coveted status of a superpower. Episode Twelve, the last one in the series, offers a summary of the lessons behind the rise and fall of the great powers, yet it is not a systematic presentation, for the task itself is perhaps an impossible one. However, it seems to me, the way in which the series producers present the historical trajectory and the examples they have selected 277

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to highlight the process have already left some intended ideas for the viewers. The producers ingenuity is also shown in making this episode: it consists mostly of interviews with scholars and politicians, home and abroad. First, the series stresses the importance of having an effective and strong nationalist government, especially in promoting economic development. Second, while political gures naturally receive ample attention, sufcient coverage is also allocated to great thinkers (e.g. Voltaire, Rousseau, Adam Smith), successful businessmen (e.g. Shibusawa Eiichi, John D. Rockefeller, Henry Ford) and scientic inventors (e.g. James Watt, Thomas Edison), driving home the point that successful economic expansion is often powered by intellectual creativity and innovation. Third, it emphasizes that each trajectory of a rising great power differs from others; in order to become a great power, a country has to develop its own system which should be both stable and exible. The former allows it to weather challenges whereas the latter enables it to adjust constantly to changing circumstances, avoiding violent disruptions (modern England after 1688 is clearly a favored example, in contrast to the doomed fate of Germany and Japan in the twentieth century). This leads to the fourth point: modernization has been the central theme around which the stories of great powers revolved and unfolded. The fth and nal idea is also the most relevant: how to catch up with the advanced countries while avoiding military conict, an issue that seems to confront the present-day Chinese leadership, for since 2003, they have repeatedly stated that Chinas goal is to achieve a peaceful rise [to the world power status] (heping jueqi ).10 The documentarians acknowledge that achieving this goal can be an unprecedented task, yet the episode does end with an optimistic note: Though we dont know how these great powers will behave in the twenty-rst century, one thing however is certain: to establish a peaceful, prosperous and harmonious world is a common goal for all humankind. That is, what China desires is also desired by the world. Though the documentarians chose to present these ideas through interviews, punctuated with orid and sound-biting asides, the airing of the series sparked many scholars and journalists to speculate on the issues raised by the series and also express criticisms.11 Indeed, the Rise of the Great Powers has succeeded in meeting the viewers curiosity for the success stories among foreign countries. This curiosity suggests that despite its leaderships hitherto modest claim about Chinas current position in the world, the Chinese people have already braced themselves for becoming a new world power. This readiness is evidenced in part by the
10. The concept was coined by Zheng Bijian, the vice president of the Central Party School, in 2003 and was quickly picked up by both Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jingtao, though Hu prefers peaceful development ). (heping fazhan 11. See Zi Zhongyun, Shuobujin de daguo xingshuai [Talking endlessly about the rise of great powers], Nanfengchuang [Window of Southern Breeze ] 1, (2007); Yuan Weishi, Daguo xingshuai zhi wuda shuji [Five major reasons for the rise of great powers], Nanfengchuang [Window of Southern Breeze ] 1, (2004); Yang Yumou, Daguo ruhe jueqi [How great powers rose?], Zhongguancun 4, (2007). The criticisms include Xi Wang, Rise of great nations or great powers?, Chinese Historical Review 14(2), (Fall 2007), pp. 291 301; Lin Fengchun Daguo jueqi de lingyizhong liliang: ruan shili [Another force behind the rise of great powers: soft strength], Juece yu xinxi [Strategy and Information ] 5, (2007), which criticizes the documentary for its vague denition of the word rise and its overemphasis on military power instead of cultural development. Wang Xiaoling questions whether the establishment of autocratic government is a necessary step for the rise of a country as world power: Wang Xiaoling, Wangquan zhuanzhi shi daguo jueqi de yuanyin ma? [Is despotism the cause for the rise of the great powers?], Xueshujie [Academic Circles ] 6, (2007).

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overwhelming support among the Chinese, including overseas Chinese communities, for the hosting by China of the Twenty-Eighth Olympic Games in 2008. The event was viewed as an important landmark registering the countrys rapid ascendance in recent years. II The Rise of the Great Powers also offers us a chance to examine and analyze the view of the Chinese historian, as well as of the current Chinese leadership, about the globalizing world and their perception of Chinas position in and relation to it. In the rst instance, the production of the Rise of the Great Powers provides a refraction of the status quo of world-history study in the PRC and the key issues that interest the Chinese world historians today, for its making was their brainchild. Since the project originated from a study session of the partys politburo, examining its content, perhaps, also sheds light on the worldview of Chinas top leadership. This brings us back to Qian Chengdan, for he not only appears in Episode Twelve but most of the historical lessons discussed in the episode also resonate well with his interpretation of the historical development in the modern world. Though initially he accompanied Qi Shirong, the more senior scholar with whom he had worked during the 1980s, to the politburo to give lectures on the subject, it was Qian who later became a central gure in making the Rise of the Great Powers. Indeed, as its academic advisor (xueshu zhidao ), Qian is arguably the mastermind of the documentary. (By comparison, perhaps because of his advanced age, Qi was not invited to participate in producing the TV series.12) Having earned one of the earliest Ph.D.s in history in the country after the Cultural Revolution (1966 1976), Qian (who also received some postdoctoral training in the UK and the US) also commands a certain seniority among Chinese world historianssince 2005 he has become the head of the World History Program at PKUs History Department. In addition, there are important scholarlyas well as politicalreasons for Qian to become instrumental in producing the Rise of the Great Powers. Since the late 1980s, Qian has developed a strong interest in the processes and trajectories of modernization in the world. He has published a number of articles on the successes and failures of modernization in Germany, Japan, Egypt, India, the Ottoman Empire, and countries in Latin America.13 The focus of his research is on explaining why England, in his
12. It is said that Qi Shirong is now taking charge of revising the mini-series. 13. Qian Chengdan, Xunzhao xiandaihua de kaimo: lun Mingzhi weixin de shiwu [In search of the model of modernization: on Meiji Restoration], Kaifang shidai [The Open-door Era ] 3, (2000); Qian Chengdan, Zongjiao duikang guojia: Aiji xiandaihua de nanti [Religion vs. state: the modernization challenge in Egypt], Shijie lishi [World History ] 3, (2000); Qian Chengdan, Latin meizhou duli zhanzheng de lish juxian jiqi yingxiang [The inuence and limitation of independence wars in Latin America], Lishi jiaoxue wenti [Questions in Historical Education ] 3, (1999); Qian Chengdan, Yindu xiandaihua jinchengzhong de zhongxinzhi yingxiang [The inuence of caste system in the course of Indias modernization], Nanjing daxue xuebao [Journal of Nanjing University ] 4, (1999); Qian Chengdan, Aosiman diguo ziwo gaizao de shibai jiqi yuanyin [The causes of the failure of the selfrenovation in the Ottoman Empire], Lishi jiaoxue [Historical Education ] 10, (1999); Qian Chengdan, Tan xiandaihua guochengzhong lingdaozhe liliang de cuowei: yi Deguo weili [On leadership imbalance in the course of modernization: a case study of Germany], Nanjing daxue xuebao [Journal of Nanjing University ] 3, (1998). Qian Chengdan also coauthored a book with Liu Jinyuan, entitled Huanqiu toushi: xiandaihua de mitu [The Road to Modernization Went Astray: A Global Perspective ] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1999), in which they presented both successful and unsuccessful cases of modernization among countries.

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words, became the rst modern country. Qians answer is, simply and perhaps also simplistically, that the English were and are able and willing to make constant adjustment to new social conditions and avoid violent, bloody revolutions. Specically, he points out that, since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the English have learned a valuable historical lesson from their tumultuous past that reform, instead of revolution, is a better solution to the demand for social change and progress. As they carried on this political tradition throughout the nineteenth centuryin contrast to continental Europe which was swept over by erce revolutionary tidesEngland enjoyed over a century of peaceful development.14 This emphasis on Englands peaceful rise strikes a familiar chord with the message the current Chinese leadership is hoping to get across to the international community. Moreover, Qians emphasis on piecemeal social reform, avoiding ferocious class struggle, also corresponds squarely with Hu Jintaos call for advancing a harmonious ) in China. However, though his historical works society (Hexie shehui have clearly answered the messages promulgated by the top leadership, Qian has not deliberately used his study of English history to espouse the current government policy. His many publications had appeared propitiously before such ideas as peaceful rise and harmonious society were broached in the early 2000s.15 Of Qian Chengdans interpretations of modern history, his interest in and advocacy of modernization are most notable, which is also undoubtedly the underlying theme in the Rise of the Great Powers. Since the 1990s, Qian has argued repeatedly that modernization has not only characterized the course of modern history but it also points to the future direction of human evolution. In his words, the question is not whether or not we want modernization; rather, [modernization] has become a reality that we must accept.16 He comes to this conclusion by taking a broad, comparative view of the development of modern history from 1500 onward. During this period, he nds, countries in Western Europe, such as England, embarked on the course of industrialization, bidding farewell to agricultural life. By contrast, in such nonWestern regions as China, India and the Middle East, agriculture-based civilizations were reinforced by political regimes and continued well into the nineteenth century.17 This observation has led him to recommend that the history curriculum of Chinas colleges and universities be reorganized around the theme of modernization. Inspired by the rise of global history writing in Euro America,18 he contends that it is now time for Chinese historians to overcome the China/West divide in the history
14. Qian Chengdan, Shehui biange de heping fangshi: Yingguo de fanli [The peaceful approach to social change: England as the example], Xuexi yu tansuo [Research and Exploration ] 6, (2005); Qian Chengdan, Biandong yu shiying: dui Yingguo xiandaihua guocheng de zairenshi [Change and adaptation: restudying the course of English modernization], Shixue jikan 2, (2002). 15. The idea of harmonious society came from Hu Jingtao and was adopted by the central committee of the CCP in 2005. 16. Qian and Liu, The Road to Modernization Went Astray, p. 2. 17. See, for example, Qian Chengdan, Shijie jinxiandaishi de zhuxian shi xiandaihua [Modernization characterizes the outline of modern history], Lishi jiaoxue [Historical Education ] 2, (2001). 18. Qian Chengdan, Tanxun quanqiushi de linian: di 19 jie guoji lishi kexue dahui yinxiangji [In search of the idea of global history: a report on the Nineteenth International Congress of Historical Sciences], Shixue yuekan [History Monthly ] 2, (2001).

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curriculum and use modernization as a common thread to connect the teachings of Chinese and foreign histories.19 Needless to say, Qians emphasis and insistence on modernization as the main trend of historical development reects a teleological understanding of world history. It redoubts the notion (now increasingly besieged in the academes across the globe) that due to many elements unique in European history, Euro America has led the development of world history in modern times. Qian has not shown much interest in many valuable studies appearing recently in Euro America critical of the uniqueness of Western modernity. Some of them, Andre Gunder Franks Re-Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age and Kenneth Pomeranzs The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy, have actually appeared in Chinese in a timely fashion and aroused animated discussions among academics. In an article entitled Unbalanced development and modernization in the twentieth century, Qian argues that the pace of modernization differed among countries and that those who fell behind had adopted different strategies (reform, revolution and war of national independence) to catch up with the advanced ones. Meanwhile, advanced countries of the West too looked for ways in which they could revise (xiuzheng ) or improve their accomplishment in modernization.20 Up to now, he concludes, world history is marked by the unbalanced developments of countries and such imbalance, or the disparity between rich and poor, the strong and the weak, and the leader and the follower, is inevitable, if not ineluctable. The task facing China is how to become the rich, the strong and the leader. If this emphasis on modernization invariably gives rise to a West-centered, or Eurocentric, approach to understanding and interpreting modern world history and the recent historical changes amidst the onrush of globalization, Qian Chengdan has been its major exponent; but he is by no means the only one among Chinese world historians. Rather, as some scholars have duly pointed out, this Eurocentric view of world history is deeply embedded in the study of world history in China ever since it was rst established in the early twentieth century.21 In more recent decades, the study of modernization, with a focus on the success of the Western world, has become a new favorable subject among Chinese historians.22 Since modernization made its rst appearance in Euro America, this interest also extends the Eurocentric focus in world-history study in China. In order to understand how and why many Chinese world historians have concentrated their work on Euro America, we need to trace briey the introduction of foreign history study from the late nineteenth century. Chinese historians began writing about the outside world beyond the Sinitic sphere in the wake of the Opium
19. Qian Chengdan, Yi xiandaihua wei zhuti goujian shijie jinxiandaishi xinde xueke tixi [Using modernization to restructure the curriculum of modern history], Shijie lishi [World History ] 3, (2003). 20. Qian Chengdan, Bupingheng fazhan: 20 shiji he xiandaihua [Unbalanced development: modernization in the twentieth century], Shixue yuekan [Historical Monthly ] 10, (2002). 21. Ralph Croizier writes in his World history in the Peoples Republic of China that Marxs teleological scheme of historical evolution caused Chinese historians to focus on the West in teaching world history: Journal of World History 1(2), (1990), p. 158. Also see, Xu Luo, Reconstructing world history in the Peoples Republic of China since the 1980s, Journal of World History 18(3), (2007), pp. 325350. 22. Liu Xincheng, ed., Lishixue bainian [Historical Study over the Past Century ] (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1999), pp. 415456.

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War (1839 1842), out of the strategic need to know more about their Western adversaries. Their knowledge increased throughout the nineteenth century, aided too by translated works by Western missionaries. After the shattering defeat by Japan in the Sino Japanese War of 1894 1895, interest in foreign history, that of the West as well as of Japan, augmented considerably; yet the motivation for Chinese historians to embark on the study remained essentially the same, which was to nd out the secret for the success of the West (also Japan) and the cause(s) for Chinas decline from its ) amongst vaunted status as the Central Country/Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo ). For Liang Qichao (18791929), a reformer-cumall under Heaven (tianxia ) was needed so historian, a historiographical revolution (shijie geming that history-writing could be rendered useful for constructing the new Chinese nation. Since then, the writing of national history has generated considerable interest among Chinese historians.23 The study of world history became part and parcel of this endeavor, for it educated the historians about the need for building a strong nation. It was expected to offer useful tips about how to achieve this nationalist goal in order for China to reclaim its past glory as the center of the world. The production of the Rise of the Great Powers amounts to a new effort to approach the goal set by Chinese nationalist historians in the early twentieth century. It is part of the world-history study that aims to empower the Chinese nation by catching up with the advanced West, pursued by the Chinese government over the last few decades. By emphasizing the need of modernization, the TV series extended the attempt by the Chinese leadership of the 1990s, headed by Jiang Zemin, to educate students about their nations modern history. It was generally agreed that Jiang gave the directive to make the Modern Chinese History (Zhongguo jindaishi ) course mandatory on college campuses throughout the country, hoping to inculcate the students with the notion that [a countrys] backwardness will cause it ), using Chinas to be bullied by others (luohou shi yao aida de painful struggle with the modern woes as an example. The Rise of the Great Powers of course has a different focus. It depicts how some countries leaped ahead in gaining wealth and power and even became bullies of others, though the latter, or the brunt of colonialism and imperialism in the modern world, was seriously overlooked by the producers (Germanys and Japans aggressions in World War II excepted).24 The series, however, addresses the other side of the same coinChina should not repeat its mistakes made during 1840 and 1919, covered in the Modern Chinese History course, but should strive to modernize itself, lest it be bullied again. By underscoring the importance of nation-building in modern China, world-history study gained its legitimacy; its growth also beneted from enthusiasm among Chinese students for studying abroad from the beginning of the twentieth century. Among those who returned from the West emerged the rst generation of world historians in China. Given their academic background and the elds emphasis on catching up with the West in modernization, these historians tended to focus their study on the history of modern Euro America, but from time to time, world
23. Liang Qichao, Xin shixue [New Historiography ], in Liang Qichao shixue lunzhu sanzhong [Liang Qichaos Three Works in History ] (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 1980), pp. 342. 24. This omission, whether intentional or otherwise, caused the series to be seriously criticized by some historians and government leaders. As of now, the Rise of the Great Powers is being asked to undergo a revision.

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historians in China took it upon themselves to critically engage with the Eurocentric interpretation of history. As early as 1928 when Lei Haizong (1902 1962), later a celebrated gure in the eld, earned his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago and returned to China, he published his very rst essay, which, indeed, was a critical review of H.G. Wells (1866 1946) Outline of History. Lei was troubled by the inconsistency between the books title and its content: a book which was supposedly to depict the history of the world ironically only focused on that of the Western world, ignoring, egregiously and outrageously, those of other regions and cultures.25 During the 1950s and the early 1960s when world-history study in China was under the shadow of the Soviet inuence, Zhou Gucheng (1898 1997), another prominent historian whose scholarship straddled both Chinese and world history, also criticized the Soviet model of world-history writing, which was translated into Chinese and then hailed by Chinese historians as the exemplar of Marxist historiography, noting that it remained Western-oriented, failing to qualify as true world history.26 Zhou Guchengs criticism of Soviet historiography was extraordinary at the time in that right after the founding of the PRC in 1949, world-history study witnessed a remarkable growth. Yet ironically, Chinese Marxist historians have not been the most capable group in transcending the tradition of Eurocentrismone might argue that Marxist historiography was an offshoot of the same cultural legacy. With regard to the advance of world history as an academic eld in China, it is necessary to look at the inuence of Marxism which became visible during the 1910s and inuential from the 1930s.27 Thanks to the inspiration of Marxs relentless criticism of capitalist economy and his ecumenical enthusiasm for worldwide revolutions against the capitalist world, Chinese Marxist historians demonstrated much more interest in the histories outside Euro America than did their peers in other ideological persuasions. The teaching and research of world history in the PRC cover not only the history of Euro America, but also that of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and the rest of Asia.28 However, this can also be deceiving. Chinese Marxist historians took an interest in the histories of non-Western regions because the interest corresponded to the Marxist goal of uniting working classes in the world in order to wage a worldwide revolution to decimate the capitalist system; but the necessity of this noble task is predicated on Marxs teleological adumbrationbased on his observation of the historical experience in Western Europeof the social progress from primitive, slavery to feudalism and capitalism, and then to socialism and communism in worldwide human evolution. According to Marx, the rise of capitalism constitutes a necessary
25. Lei Haizong, Bolun shixueji [Collection of Lei Haizongs Historical Essays ] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2002), p. 578. 26. Zhou Gucheng, Zhou Gucheng shixue lunwen xuanji [Selected Essays of Zhou Gucheng on History ] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983). 27. Arif Dirlik, Revolution and History: Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 19191937 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978). For the Marxist inuence in the PRC, see Q. Edward Wang, Between Marxism and nationalism: Chinese historiography and the Soviet inuence, 1949 1963, Journal of Contemporary China 9(23), (2000), pp. 95 111. 28. Liu Xincheng, Lishixue bainian; Chen Qineng, ed., Jianguo yilai shijieshi yanjiu gaishu [An Introduction to the Studies of World History after the Founding of the PRC ] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1991); and Dorothea Martin, The Making of a SinoMarxist World View: Perceptions and Interpretations of World History in the Peoples Republic of China (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990).

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historical phase that is to precondition, also pave the way for, the advance of socialism and communism. Thus, it is legitimate and even compelling for Chinese Marxist historians to focus on the rise of capitalism in Western Europe and explain its causes and inuences in delineating the course of modern world history.29 By comparison, their interest in non-Western histories serves a different purpose. The historians hope to nd the reasons why non-Western cultures, including the Chinese culture, have failed to bring about capitalism as did the Western culture. They are looking for a counterexample to construct and complete the West/non-West dichotomy. III Although the tradition of world-history study in China has been conducive to a focused interest in the modern Western world, Chinese historians today have not been oblivious of, or indifferent to, the criticisms of Eurocentrism in English scholarship and the rising interest in global history and historiography in recent years. In fact, globalization in todays PRC has become a popular catchword, attracting sufcient attention in both media and academic communities. In the eld of history, it also generated a good deal of fanfare for the study of global history. In fact, at Capital Normal University where Qi Shirong used to teach, a Research Center for Global History was established in 2004, headed by Liu Xincheng, a historian of early modern Europe who also recently became the universitys president. Under the guidance of Liu and his colleagues, a dozen or so Chinese students are currently working on their masters and doctoral degrees, hoping to become global historians.30 The Centers faculty also recruits such eminent world historians as Jerry H. Bentley, professor of history at the University of Hawaii and editor of the Journal of World History, with endowed visiting positions. Bentley now regularly hosts seminars there in his visits to China. His popular textbook on global history, Traditions and Encounters: A Global Perspective on the Past, coauthored with Herbert F. Ziegler, also appeared in Chinese by Peking University Press in 2007. That Bentley and Zieglers book has been warmly received in China today is not so surprising because over two decades ago, in 1988, the Chinese had already rendered L. S. Stavrianos The World since 1500: A Global History into Chinese. Since then, Stavrianos text has been so well received on Chinese college campuses that it ran several prints afterwards and, in 2004, was reissued by Peking University Press. It has also resulted in ten book reviews appearing in various academic journals between 2001 and 2007.31 One can thus well imagine that Stavrianos book could have sold more copies in China than it has in the US, where it was originally published in 1971. The enthusiasm among Chinese historians for global history is also manifest by the fact that they have published a good number of studies on global history. A quick
29. The best example is a college textbook by Pan Runhai and Lin Chengjie, Shijie jindaishi [A History of the Modern World ] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 1999), which focuses on the rise of capitalism in Western Europe and delineates its spread all over the world. Other similar textbooks are discussed in Xu, Reconstructing world history in the Peoples Republic of China since the 1980s. 30. Liu Xincheng et al., Shenmeshi quanqiushi? [What is global history?], Lishi jiaoxue wenti [Issues in Historical Education ] 2, (2007). 31. This is a result from a search of the database of the Chinese Network of Periodicals.

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search of the database of the Chinese Network of Periodicals (Zhongguo qikanwang), using global history as the keyword has resulted in a total of 68 articles published during the period between 1999 and 2007. There has also appeared an anthology, entitled Globalization and Global History (2007), put together by Yu Pei, then director of the World History Institute in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, offering a cross-section of representative publications on the subject.32 This is not the place to give a full-scale evaluation of these Chinese publications of global history. I am mainly concerned with the reasons that motivate the Chinese historians to pursue an interest in global history. A glimpse of these publications reveals that the authors have turned attention to global history for a twofold purpose. The rst has a good deal to do with the traditional interest in Western historical scholarship among the historians in the eld. As a new trend in Western historiography, the writing of global history piques their curiosity because ever since the late 1970s when China ended its self-imposed isolation, the Chinese academics and general public have displayed a high level of enthusiasm for knowing about the outside world, especially that of the West. As we analyzed earlier, having perceived the West as the model of success, the Chinese are eager to follow suit by studying closely every major cultural and intellectual trend in Western countries. Prior to and coinciding with the reception of global history, Chinese historians across the Taiwan Straits have demonstrated a considerable interest in the postmodern critique of modern historiography. Along with postmodernism, postcolonialism is also ltering its inuence into the historical discourses in the Chinese-speaking world today.33 The second and more meaningful reason for Chinese historians to pursue an interest in global history is that they consider it a useful way to connect seemingly divergent trajectories of historical development in the world. Global history, or the ) which they prefer, has global outlook on history (quanqiu shiguan enabled them to integrate Chinese history with world history in the hope of understanding the movement of Chinese history, both past and present, in a larger context. For this reason, Chinese scholars have shown great interest in the works by Western scholars in this area, particularly Gunder Franks Re-Orient and Kenneth Pomeranzs Great Divergence after they appeared in Chinese. They seem quite impressed by the novel approaches adopted by both authors to understanding the development of Chinese history from a comparative and global perspective. Franks work, for example, is praised for offering a brand new outlook on the history of imperial China, enabling Chinese scholars to depart from the traditional view of seeing pre-nineteenth century Chinese history as a backward and stagnated semi-feudal and semi-colonized society. Franks novelty, they write positively and appreciatively, lies in that he takes a longue duree approach to interpreting the evolution of world history whereby he looks beyond the modern capitalist system

32. Yu Pei, ed., Quanqiuhua yu qianqiushi [Globalization and Global History ] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2007). 33. See Chen Qineng and Jiang Peng, Georg G. Iggers and the changes in modern Chinese historiography, in Q. Edward Wang and Frank L. Fillafer, eds, The Many Faces of Clio: Cross-cultural Approaches to Historiography (Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 233 246.

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centering on Europe and forcefully challenges Eurocentrism in modern historiography.34 Pomeranzs Great Divergence too has left a strong impression on Chinese scholars. First and foremost, they admire the authors erudition, which is deemed necessary to conduct a comparative research as such. Meanwhile, they appreciate the way Pomeranz raises and frames the question in structuring his work. In particular, they like Pomeranzs question: why didnt England become Jiangnan (Southeast China)? because conventional wisdom tends to ask the opposite question: why didnt China become England?. That is, to Chinese readers, Pomeranz has taken a novel, different approach to interpreting the emergence of the modern world, jettisoning traditional scholarship which considers England as the norm and yardstick by which other countries histories are compared and assessed. Li Bozhong, a noted economic historian at Tsing-hua University, for instance, states that owing to the publication of the Great Divergence, Chinese scholars now can reevaluate the study of the so-called capitalist sprouts of late imperial China because in the past, the study did not go anywhere because the scholars always compared China with England in describing the characteristics of commercial activities in Southeast China. Since they considered England as the norm, they tended to emphasize the differences between those capitalist sprouts in China and the capitalist activities in England in order to explain why, in the end, capitalism was only able to expand in the latter, rather than in the former. Reading Pomeranzs book, Li believes, encourages Chinese scholars to come out of their self-imposed inferiority in viewing Chinese history and come to appreciate and assess the economic development in imperial China in its own right.35 By sharing their appreciation of Gunder Frank and Kenneth Pomeranzs methodological innovations, Chinese scholars readily acknowledge that these innovations arise from both authors critical stance toward Eurocentrism in modern historiography. As Chinese, they welcome the effort by their colleagues in Western academes. However, they are also quite critical of both authors with respect to their specic arguments. For instance, many Chinese scholars disagree with Franks main argument in the Re-Orient that prior to the rise of Western Europe, China had been the hub of a world system that played a crucial role in bringing about the modern world. They express disbelief that the Chinese Empire, as Frank contended, had been the driver of world economy simply because it enjoyed a trade surplus with the West and attracted silver inow around the world. All this, they argue, is insufcient to make China the center of an earlier world system before the rise of the West.
34. Ye Shuzong, Zhuanhuan guancha Zhongguo banfengjian, banzhimindi bainianshi de shijiao: du Baiyin ziben [Changing the perspective on the semi-feudal and semi-colonial history of the past century: a review of Re-Orient], Lishi jiaoxue wenti [Issues in Historical Education ] 6, (2000); Chen Jinfeng, Guonei xuezhe dui Baiyin ziben de jiedu jiqi qishi [Discussion of the Re-Orient among Chinese scholars and its meaning], Daqin shifan xueyuan xuebao [Journal of Daqing Teachers College ] 26(6), (December 2006); He Weibao, Zhouqi lilun yu changshiduan: yetan Baiyin ziben [Cyclical theory and long duree: some remarks on Re-Orient], Shixue lilun yanjiu [Historiography Quarterly ] 3, (2003); Zhou Lihong, Fulanke sixiang de zhuanhang yu beilun: jianping Baiyin ziben jiqi zai Zhongguo yinfa de zhengyi [The re-orient and dilemma in Gunder Franks view (of history): a discussion of the Re-Orient and the controversy it caused in China], Shixue yuekan [History Monthly ] 1, (2002). 35. Li Bozhong, Yingguo moshi, Jiangnan daolu yu ziben zhuyi mengya [The English model, the Jiangnan way and the sprouts of capitalism], Lishi yanjiu [Historical Research ] 1, (2001); He Aiguo, Zhongshuo fenyun Da fenliu [The controversies over the Great Divergence], Shixue lilun yanjiu [Historiography Quarterly ] 3, (2005).

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Even though Franks Re-Orient was translated as The Silver Capital (Baiyin ziben ) in its Chinese title, many disbelieve that silver alone had turned China into an axis of proto-capitalism, anticipating the emergence of the capitalist modern West. In challenging Eurocentrism, the Chinese reviewers comment, Gunder Frank has gone too far and hence failed to achieve his supposed goal, for his argument was lopsided and built on selected sources. One reviewer even charges that Franks work was a product of [anti-Western] ideology, rather than the fruit of serious scholarship.36 Pomeranzs thesis in the Great Divergence too has received some criticism. While Chinese scholars appreciate Pomeranzs criticism of Eurocentric teleology in outlining the development of modern world history, they nd it hard to fully embrace his argument that the rise of the West was fortuitous, dependent accidentally on such exogenous, or even extraneous, factors as the establishment of colonial settlements in North America. Instead, they seem inclined to believe that there was something indigenous and intrinsic that helped such countries as England in Western Europe to rst develop capitalism. Xu Sumin, a philosophy professor of Nanjing University, argues that though well-intended, Pomeranzs work overlooks human and cultural factors, such as the expansion of human rights, democratic governmental system and scientic research and innovation, which had turned England into the rst modern country in the world.37 His opinion echoes Qian Chengdans interpretation of modern English history; both of them are tinged with the teleological outlook in modern historiography challenged and chastised by Pomeranz and Frank. Thus, while the Chinese are clearly inspired by recent criticisms of modern historiography rendered by Western scholars, they still have not much faith in the claim that the rise of the modern West was something coincidental. While aware of the danger of historical teleology, they retain the belief that industrialization rst took place in Western Europe and resulted from a preconditioned environment, shaped by the earlier developments in the region. In order to fully understand the occurrence, they believe, teleological perspective remains an effective tool, for the alternative, attributing European modernization to some accidental events, seems even less convincing to them. In his review of the Great Divergence, Shi Jianyun, an economic historian at the Institute of Modern History in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who translated Pomeranzs book, writes that because Pomeranz refuses to take future developments into account, he has to assert several presuppositions without historical referentiality.38 There are several reasons why Chinese historians are hesitant to eschew completely the teleological outlook on the transition from pre-modern to modern
36. Zhou Lihong, Fulanke sixiang de zhuanhang yu beilun; An Ran, Dui xiandaixing de fouding yu ziwo fouding: du Gongde Fulanke de Baiyin ziben [The negation and self-negation of modernity: a review of Gunder Franks Re-Orient], Shixue lilun yanjiu [Historiography Quarterly ] 1, (2003). 37. Xu Sumin, Renxue shiguan shiyu xiade zhongxi dafenliu: dui weishenme Jiangnan bushi Yingguo de xinsikao [A humanist discussion on the great divergence between China and the West: a new answer to why Jiangnan did not become England], Tianjin shehui kexue [Tianjin Social Sciences Journal ] 6, (2005). 38. Shi Jianyun, Chongxin shenshi zhongxi bijiaoshi: Da fenliu shuping [A new look at comparative history of China and the West: a review of the Great Divergence], Jindaishi yanjiu [Study of Modern History ] 3, (2003); Wang Jiafan, Zhongguo shehui jingjishi mianlin de tiaozhan: huiying Da fenliu de wenti yishi [A new challenge to the study of Chinese socioeconomic history: a response to the problematique of the Great Divergence], Shilin [The Forest of History ] 4, (2004).

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times and embrace more enthusiastically the global view of history that de-centers the European historical experience. One of them has to do with their Marxist training, which predisposed them to a deterministic view: history evolves along a predestined path from lower stages of social development to higher ones. Among the world historians in China, there is a distinguished group who received academic training in the Soviet Union in the 1950s and, despite their advanced age, remains quite active and inuential in the historical community today. As explained above, though comparative and even universalistic, Marxist historiography is not immune from Europe-centered historical teleology. For obvious reasons, the Soviet version of Marxist historiography was more dogmatic and Eurocentric than that of their counterparts in Western Europe. Moreover, since modernization has been the focus of their attention in studying the histories around the world, it naturally gives rise to a Europe-oriented outlook on history because it was in Europe that capitalism originally emerged. There are, of course, other groups with different academic backgrounds, such as the pre-1949 generation who were mostly educated either in the West or in the missionary colleges founded by Westerners. Qi Shirong, for example, was educated partially at Yen-ching University, an American missionary school, between 1945 and 1947. Wu Yujin (1913 1993), a well-respected world historian in the PRC, held a Ph.D. from Harvard in 1946. As leading experts on European history, Wu and Qi were chief editors of a recent multivolume work of world history written by Chinese historians. In the late 1980s, Wu was especially known for putting forward the thesis, echoing Marx,39 that true world history did not exist until the fteenth and sixteenth centuries, or before the rise and spread of capitalism in the world. Wu argued that what constitutes world history must be the formation of a closely linked world system within which various regions engage in frequent exchanges with one another. His perception of world history thus bears the characteristics used by scholars today in describing that of global history. Yet at the same time, it remains clear that in this Chinese view of global history, the capitalist West is regarded as the driving force behind the process of globalization. Since the 1980s, many projects have been launched by Chinese historians to study, understand and explain various trajectories of modernization in the world. All of them have chosen to focus on the rise of the modern West.40 All this helps us better understand the making of the Rise of the Great Powers TV mini-series and its warm reception by the Chinese audience. On the one hand, the series clearly shows and extends the interest in making sense of the globalizing
39. Wu quoted frequently Marxs statement: World history has not always existed; history as world history a result [sic ]: Grundisse: Foundation of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), trans. with a forward by Martin Nocolaus (London: Allenlane, 1973), p. 109. 40. See Wu Yujin, ed., Shiwu shiliu shiji dongxifang lishi chuxueji [A Preliminary Study of Eastern and Western Histories of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries ] (Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1985); and Wu Yujin, ed., Shiwu shiliu shiji dongxifang lishi chuxueji xubian [A Preliminary Study of Eastern and Western Histories of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries: A Sequel ] (Wuhan: Wuhan daxue chubanshe, 1990). An elaboration on Wu Yujins idea is in Li Zhinan, Shijie lishi shi lishi fazhan de jieguo [World history is a result of historical development], Wuhan daxue xuebao [Journal of Wuhan University ] 56(4), (July 2003). A similar project was conducted by Peking University historians: Ding Jianhong, ed., Fada guojia de xiandaihua daolu: yizhong lishi shehuixue de yanjiu (Beijing: Peking University Press, 1999), which covers the modernization of six countries: England, France, Germany, the US, Italy, Russia and Japan.

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world. Though China only receives passing attention, it is quite apparent to the Chinese viewers, and those outside China, that what the documentary portrays and adumbrates is the direction in which China is to move in the near future. It reects a global view of world history engendered by Chinese historians. This global view builds on the tradition of world-history study from the early twentieth century, which is intrinsically and inexorably West-centered because it has pursued the aim of helping China to catch up with the industrialized world. Thus one might have reason to predict that before China becomes the tenth world power, this Eurocentric focus will remain the major characteristic of Chinese global history study for the years to come. The half-hearted Chinese reception of the criticism of Eurocentrism by Western scholars (e.g. Gunder Frank and Kenneth Pomeranz) is a case in point. On the other hand, while the interest in modernization engenders the Eurocentric view of history and shapes the way the Chinese write history, including making the Rise of the Great Powers, it also amounts to a valiant effort by Chinese intellectuals to transcend the legacy of Marxist historiography practiced in the country from the mid-twentieth century. Lionizing violent revolution as a driving force in historical movement, this legacy retains some of its inuence in the historical community today. Having become a leading advocate of using modernization to adumbrate the course of modern history, for example, Qian Chengdan has also been criticized by some others for overlooking and downgrading the importance of class struggle and revolutionary movements in history.41 The Rise of the Great Powers also received essentially the same kind of criticism: while portraying the ascent of these Western powers, the documentary, it is said, overlooks and even whitewashes the brutality of Western colonialism and imperialism, whereas in traditional Marxist historiography, the ruthless exploitation of Western capitalism often constituted the major reason for the exploited classes and peoples to mount (communist) revolutions. All this suggests that while critiquing the work of the Chinese historian, there is a need to exercise caution and not to dismiss its value too quickly. Rather, one must take note of the circumstances under which the work is produced. Indeed, if the Rise of the Great Powers did try to divert attention from the dark legacy of colonialism for propelling Western countries to become Great Powers, this might suggest exactly what China is intending to do in becoming a new world leader, or to pursue a peaceful rise without harming others. Whether this is achievable remains to be seen, of course; but the making of the documentary indicates that some efforts have been made by the historians, if not also by the current leadership.

41. See, for example, Li Shian, Xiandaihua nengfou zuowei shijie jinxiandaishi xueke xintixi de zhuxian [Can modernization become a major theme in the new system of (teaching) modern world history?], Lishi yanjiu [Historical Research ] 2, (2008).

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