Intro Philosophy

Fall 2011. G. Ray

No Free Will: The Argument from Action

[Figure 1] We think we are unlike billiard balls. Various forces and influences act on us, but we think we make genuine choices.

[Figure 2] Something about what choosing is like We think genuine choices are explicable. But explicability implies determination: If you haven't identified factors in your decision sufficient to determine that it was A you chose over B, you haven't explained your decision at all. So, we think our actions are, in principle, fully explainable. So, if your decisions are genuine choices, these determining factors better be "up to you". Explaining our actions Factors in explanation of actions beliefs desires character maybe also emotions, physiological factors, etc. But none of these seem to be directly subject to your will. ... Uh-oh .

Intro Philosophy Formulation of this Argument: 1) Our decisions are in principle (fully) explicable.

Fall 2011. G. Ray

2) A (full) decision explanation must specify such factors that together determine that the decision went the way it did. 3) Relevant factors are our beliefs, desires, general character. 4) None of these factors are subject to our will. 5) So, our "choosings" are determined by factors that are not themselves under our control (at the time of decision). 6) Thus, while we undergo "decision processes", we do not make "genuine choices" of the sort required for free will. 7) In short, we do not have free will. Hmmm...Is that a good argument?

Free Will at Cards Set up: Player B will play either a black or a red card. If B is unfreeactions determined by prior circumstancethen if A had full prior information, A could, in principle, predict with certainty which play B will make. But A cannot predict with certainty what B will do, because... if B also has full enough information, B can always flout A's prediction Formulation of this Argument: 1) Suppose B will play either black or red. 2) Suppose A has full information about all relevant prior circumstances. 3) No matter which card A predicts B will play, B can always flout A's predictionso long as B knows what A's predictions was. 4) Thus, even a fully informed A cannot predict with certainty the choice of a well-informed B. 5) But if there was no free will, fully-informed A would (in principle) be able to predict B's decision with certainty. 6) Hence, there is free will. Hmmm....Is that a good argument?

Intro Philosophy

Fall 2011. G. Ray

The Problem of Free Will There is a tension between two ideas we have about how the world is ourselves as agents of free will the world as causally structured There wasn't supposed to be a conflict between these two things! What is going on? Traditional shape of the philosophical debate free will vs determinism The Problem of Free Will Free Will vs Determinism (and vs Indeterminism): 1) Free will: We are choiceful agents in the world, i.e. we have free will which we employ in deciding to act one way or another and thereby effect the course of events. 2a) Doctrine of Determinism: Every event has a complete prior cause. For every event, some antecedent condition obtained that necessitated (with the force of natural law) the occurrence of that event. 2b) Doctrine of Indeterminism: Every event is jointly determined to occur by antecedent causal conditions plus (perhaps) some element of chance (randomness). The Problem of Free Will So, here is The Problem (in a canonical form): 1) [We think] we have free will. 2) [It appears that] either determinism or indeterminism will turn out to be true. 3) The above two claims are incompatible. At least one of these claims must be false, but which? Deny (In)Determinism? It is not as though scientific research has or will ever establish the truth of these doctrines. So, they are not simply forced on us by Science. [Ayer] But the Argument from Action seems to show that Free Will is in tension not just with (in)determinism, but is in tension with our being causally determined in ways we all agree that we are.

Intro Philosophy Deny Free Will? May be a practical impossibility:

Fall 2011. G. Ray

at the moment of decision, we cannot help but think of ourselves as free agents. [But, so?] Apparent cost: no free will! (how sad) no morally responsible agents. Obligation to explain why it seems so much like we have free will. Traditional Taxonomy Incompatibilist Views: a) Pure Incompatibilism [van Inwagen] b) Hard Determinism c) Hard Indeterminism d) Free Willism (Libertarianism) [van Inwagen] Compatibilist Views: e) Pure Compatibilism f) Soft Determinism [Ayer]