Garcia, Jemimah Grace N.

/ 2005-05067

VILAS vs. CITY OF MANILA (supra) FACTS Vilas is a creditor of the City of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States by the Treaty of Paris. Upon the theory that the city is the same juristic person and liable upon the obligations of the old city, Vilas seeks to make the present City of Manila liable for the said debt. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands held that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity and therefore is not liable for such debt. ISSUE WON the present City of Manila is liable for the municipal obligations contracted before the cession? HELD Yes. RATIONALE The present City of Manila, chartered by the Philippine Commission, with almost the same municipal attributes, territorial extension and population that it had as the municipality of Manila under the Spanish regime, is liable for the municipal obligations contracted before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States. Municipal Corporations have a dual character they exercise powers which are governmental and powers which are of a private or business character. As a governmental subdivision, the municipal corporation exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the State. As a proprietary subdivision, it is a mere legal entity or juristic person; it stands for the community in the administration of local affairs whilly beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its governmental powers are conferred. In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, there is no public reason for presuming their total dissolution as a mere consequence of military occupation or territorial cession. As to the governmental functions of the municipal corporation, their suspension may be presumed in light of their incompatibility with the new political relations. But as to the laws of municipal character, which regulate private and domestic rights, they continue in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. The Treaty of Paris provided that the property and property rights of municipal corporations were protected and safeguarded precisely as were the property and property rights of individuals. the significance of such stipulation against the impairment of the property rights of municipal corporations is that the cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of corporations.

Padilla vs. COMELEC

Garcia, Jemimah Grace N./ 2005-05067

FACTS The Municipality of Tulay-na-Lupa in Camarines Norte was to be created pursuant to RA 7155 (composed of 12 barangays in the Municipality of Labo) subject to the approval by a majority of votes cast pursuant to Article 10, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 10 the Local Government Code. Only 2,890 favored the creation of the new municipality while 3,439 voted against it. The Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the proposed municipality after the turn-out. Governor Padilla argues that the plebiscite should have been conducted only in the 12 barangays of the municipality. He files an action to set aside said plebiscite and to undertake a new one. ISSUE WON the term political units directly affected as enunciated in Section 10 of the Local Government Code only comprises those areas in the proposed LGU and not those from the mother LGU HELD NO. ATIONALE a Padillas contention that Art X, Section 10 of the Constitution has deleted the words unit or in Section 3, Art XI of the 1973 Constitution is untenable. As explained by CONCOM Commissioner Davide during the 1986 CONCOM debates, the deletion of the said words was done precisely because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the political units directly affected, it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite.It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted in the political units directly affected, it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation have a right to vote. The phrase political units directly affected contemplates the plurality of political units which would participate in the exercise.

Garcia, Jemimah Grace N./ 2005-05067

Tan vs. COMELEC

FACTS Petitioners are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental. They filed with the Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondent Comelec from conducting the plebiscite which was then scheduled for pursuant to the Act. They contend that Batas Pambansa 885 unconstitutional because it contravenes the plebiscite requirement mandated by the Constitution, particularly in Art 11, Section 3. In defense, respondent invokes the ruling in Paredes v. the Honorable Executive Secretary which supports their argument that the remaining cities and municipalities of the [parent province] not included in the area of the new province do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term unit or units affected as referred to in the pertinent Constitutional provision. ISSUE WON the term unit or units affected, for the purpose of conducting a plebiscite, includes both the voters in the parent province and in the new province.

HELD Yes. The term includes both the parent province and the new province as they stand to be affected in the creation of the new province. RATIONALE Sec. 3, Art 11, Constitution: No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negro Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that the two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negro del Norte. Therefore, a plebiscite for creating a new province should include the participation of the residents of the mother province for the plebiscite to conform to the constitutional requirements. The ruling in the case of Paredes v. Hon. Executive Secretary is not a doctrinal, binding precedent where the SC is not sure of itself and the decision itself says that that case gives considerable leeway for the Court to exercise its discretion in resolving the issue of WON residents of a mother barangay should participate in the plebiscite to create a new barangay.

Garcia, Jemimah Grace N./ 2005-05067

Miranda vs. Aguirre FACTS RA 8528 entitled An Act Amending Certain Sections of RA 7720 was enacted in 1998 amending RA 7720, which law was enacted in 1994. RA 7720 was the law converting the municipality of Santiago into an independent component city to be known as the city of Santiago. RA 8528, on the other hand, converted the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. RA 8528 provided that (1) the words an independent be deleted so that the amended section will read The Municipality of Santiago shall be converted into a component city and (2) Sec. 51 of RA 7720 be deleted and in its stead be placed a section providing that the voters of Santiago be qualified to vote in the elections of the governor, vice-governor, sangunnian panlalawigan and other elective provincial positions and that such qualified voter be allowed to become a candidate for such provincial positions and any elective provincial office. Petitioners now assail the constitutionality of RA 8528 on the ground of the lack of provision in said law submitting it for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. Respondents argued that a plebiscite is unnecessary because RA 8528 did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUs, They also contend that RA 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS WON RA 8258 is unconstitutional on the ground that it lacks a provision requiring a plebiscite? HELD Yes. RATIONALE Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires a plebiscite; and this provision is reiterated in the LGC. The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of LGUs belongs to Congress. The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution. The resolution of the issue depends on WON the downgrading of Santiago City falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Sec. 10 of Art. X of the Constitution. The creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries involve a common denominator material change in the political and economic rights of the LGUs directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people in the political units directly affected. Sec. 10 of Art. X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby LGUs were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the LGU directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of LGUs. It is an instance of direct democracy of the people and not democracy thru peoples representatives. There are many substantial changes that will result from the downgrading, these include: (1) the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished; (2) the city mayor will now be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor whereas before before he was under the supervision of the Office of the President; (3) the

Garcia, Jemimah Grace N./ 2005-05067

resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board; (4) taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. The petitioners also noted that the downgrade will benefit the province since the territorial land area of Santiago will be added to the land area of the province of Isabela thereby increasing the latters share from the IRA (IRA is based on land area and population of LGUs). Also, that the registered voters of Santiago will vote for and can be voted as provincial officials. When the city was upgraded from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite. There is no reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City upon the citys downgrading. There is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. The IRR of the LGC provides that a plebiscite is required in case of all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in material change in the LGU directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people. Answer to Justice Buenas dissent: Justice Buena argues that the Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City and that the amendment merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a city as no new city was created nor a former one dissolved by RA 8528. In answer, the majority says that the Congressional power to amend a law is limited by the Constitution which mandates a plebiscite. The spirit of Sec. 10, Art. X calls for the people of the LGU directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities; even if the amendment merely caused a transition, the fact remains that such transition will radically change the citys physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people. Answer to Justice Mendozas dissent: Justice Mendoza argues that only if the classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the LGU is there a need for such changes to be approved by the people x x x. The majority answers that such an interpretation is contrary to the letter and spirit of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. The Constitution imposes 2 conditions that the criteria fixed by the LGC be met and that a plebiscite be had. The criteria/requirements under the LGC are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the LGU and were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. The 2 conditions have different purposes. The criteria are designed to achieve an economic purpose while the plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose to use the peoples voice as a check against the pernicious political practice of gerrymandering. The cases cited by both Justices Mendoza and Buena showings instances when allegedly independent component cities were downgraded into component cities without need of a plebiscites do not hold. In those cases, the cities involved were chartered but were not independent component cities; thus, the grant to the voters of those cities of the power to vote in provincial elections was consistent with its status as a component city. The Court finds that the reason given for the downgrading which is ti enable the peple of the city to aspire for the leadership of the province is unconvincing. The Court finds that the people of Santiago were aware that they gave up that privilege when they voted to be independent from the province of Isabela.

Garcia, Jemimah Grace N./ 2005-05067

Tobias vs. Abalos Facts: Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong" for violating the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution. Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675. Petitioners also argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Issue: Whether R.A. No. 7675 is unconstitutional

Held: No, it is not. The Supreme Court ruled that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of Article VI, Sec. 5(1) shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. It should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.