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.l
F?frIB:
391- 6.5S?
(b) (1)
Until the outbreak of hostillties in Korea/ on 2i Junc l95Or [oree rar an aLnost unknorm corrntry to the average Ancricen, The corrrse of the conflict since that ti.ne and the gffect that ii hac had on the world for the past 2O
r, Jrears have br"o.-ght greater
l-''
involned.
in Koree, here is a thrrnbncil sketch of the Korean COMINT effort (Less the KORCOM Air problen) when it:began.
llior
Lo 2J June 1950, wheR the North Korean armed forees cr.oased thq
I
I
38th pqrallel, there was vdrtuelly no COI'{INT effort on the North Korean cortuu-
nj,cations. A U; S . intercept
Arrny
bgati iaterl
cepting North Korean tra Korea4 trafflo e1$ thi-s effort weg eugnented by South Koreen
the end of Septenber L95Q, fasA4urrtqpg*Aqi!|d,. -:. -gfiitqrg; Sfeinf hat established an tdv-qnccd etcuent g1 Tadgu, Korcr and in
ruid-october the 50th signal serrrice
Ianded
t-*l-lfnon
in hrsan. Ttre total. l.lntercg;t ras laereased to 2O posltionr rhcn became operational ln'the nLdst of a golf sourse located in the outgkirts of
Scoul Ci-ty.
traffie anrlysta,
civilian
cryptanalysts and
llnguists.
There wer,e no
Ageocy
(lFA,
forerrrnner
e
of NSA).
rith ecvcral Japanese linguists, estrrblished the firrt Korean language urrit. I! war possible to convert Japanese iinguists dqe to fhe sinilarity of the gmtmrr
fenale civil-ian of Korean deseent both enployed by AFSA, together
rmit, reselrre officcr personnel with previous Korean }arngua..ge background werc rocalled to active duty and the
To augrnent bhie }anguege
'vf0
of both languages.
) began to
F[:rr]verJ fc'r
.t-
nfrfrID:
391 65.
accclerate
its proqran of trainlng U. S. Anay personncl ln the Koreen language. In the interin, one of the two U. S. Anny offlcers of Korean ancestry
to
ASAPAC. He was
later joined by the rcErinitg instructor and sevcral other AIEA linguistr in both Japan aod in Kol&. Concurlsntly rdth the shortagc of Korcan linguists, there was a$ alnost total lack of suitable Korean diciionaires and knowledge of North Korean nilitary and technlcal genninologr. fn tne beginning, terrnlnoJ-ogr appearing in North Korean mlJ-ltary coranunications was compiled and definitiona weFe
detennined by conte:<t
or by referring to
r.rere
dictionaries.
Other sources
of tennilolog5r
derived
fro
left
up
nilitary
occupation speciality
to intcrr.ogatc.
At this point,
we cannot continue
aspects
effort. In thc
and
leglnning phase of the confllct, North Korean encrypted messages used sirnple
at
NSA
tic exploitation ras not a naJor pr^oblem. Therefore, the end-product translations eroduced during the lattor paft of 1950 and through the spring of 1951 were large in nunber and of e:cLrerne value to the custqners. High echelon North
Korean messeges reveaLed nuch infomati.on about
of the }Iorth Koreanr.forccs and were considered by the U. N. tiigh Connand t field
conmanders
to
be a
vitally
imporbant source
I
of intelligence.
.; -.i:-.'"'-ll
1/
B#frIBr
{utri
391 65F?
E:<pJ-oiting Nozth Korean cryptosystens and producing
was
translation reports
not
hampered so much by
(tii.i3)-50
usc 40s
ir
This situation contifiued until the truce agreement was signed in July L953. Affitlllthe tnrce greement was signed, another narked eI'fort
North Koreans
wa6 nade
by
Lhe
sitmtion
uas becmlng
of radio
In
civil
in nany respect
Norbh Korean
cities
and
industnial cmplerres.
large variety of subjects ranging frqn personal nessages to coal, lead, zilc
and other mining
statistics.
Order
of Battle information
rnenbere
to or frm
D#frI'S
3g1 fiSS?
its
forces crossing the 38bh parallel on 2J June 195O and developing into a
full
hostllities; then with the end of the conflict graual\y changing into a peace fime COMINT effort except for couple of intense periods followLng the capLure of the PTEBIO and shootdown of a U. S. reconneisaaaco airrcraft. However, there is one difference - the Nor{h Koreana are not the North Koreans of I95O. ?hey are now & nodern, better cquj.pped, bettcr trajned and e:cpenienced nilitary nachine. In adrtitionr thcnc ars thousands of well
trained and well
walting to
ccrne armed Chinese CornrnunLst
be no lesc requirnents
(k,)(1j (b)(-r)-50 IJSC 403 (b ) ( ) -1 I r_l,si_l 7 9B (l*,) (.j) -F. t,. s6-:j6
_3
todey than
that
which