American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

By Michael Schearer

NSST 543-01 Issues in Asian Security Professor Thomas W. Robinson 4 May 1999

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

Schearer 2

ABSTRACT After the American disaster in Vietnam, U.S. foreign policy gave way to significant Soviet gains in the 1970s. With the

fall of Saigon in 1975 and the Soviet expansionism in Southeast Asia and Africa, the Soviets capitalized on the lack of

leadership in American foreign policy to expand their influence around the globe. This paper explores one particular strain of the Cold War, in particular the Soviet-Afghan war and the role that the United States strategy played in affecting the outcome of that war. The Americans first sought to increase costs for the Soviet

Union by supplying funds and Soviet-style arms to the Afghan resistance (mujahadeen). Second, President Reagan escalated the

conflict as part of a larger strategy, the "Reagan Doctrine." Third, the American strategy was integral in the Soviet

withdrawal in 1988-1989 and served as an important component to ending the Cold War.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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SUMMARY This paper explores the Soviet-Afghan war and the role that the United States strategy played in affecting the outcome of that war. This paper first establishes the historical context

by briefly exploring the events that precipitated the Soviet invasion. Second, the initial American response, dictated

largely by President Carter and his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, is discussed in the context of the Soviet invasion. President Third, I review the continuation of this policy under Reagan. Fourth, I explore the escalation between

1983-1986 and the role of the Chinese and the impact that it had on the eventual Soviet withdrawal. Finally, I attempt to

determine the reasons for the Soviet withdrawal as well as the strategic implications of the end of the Soviet-Afghan war. I Reagan, reach as three of conclusions: a First, Presidents Carter and and

part

"bleeder" strategy, supplied funds

Soviet-style arms to the mujahadeen.

Second, The escalation by

the United States in 1985-1986 sought to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Third, the covert campaign against the Soviets in

Afghanistan was part and parcel of larger strategy, the "Reagan Doctrine," which sought to roll-back Soviet gains in the Third World. Ultimately, this helped to end the Cold War.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR PROLOGUE On July 3, 1979, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote a note to the President in which he explained how he believed American aid to the

mujahadeen in Afghanistan would increase the likelihood of a Soviet invasion. That same day, President Carter signed a

secret directive that began the CIA's decade-long program of assistance to the Afghan resistance. According to Brzezinski,

"[t]hat secret operation was an excellent idea...The effect was to draw the Russians into...[Afghanistan]."1 of Polish Brzezinski, his "[a] in

virulent

anti-Communist

origin...saw

chance

Moscow's Afghanistan intervention to rival Henry Kissinger as a heavyweight strategic thinker."2 The trap had been set.

INTRODUCTION After the American disaster in Vietnam, U.S. foreign policy gave way to significant Soviet gains in the 1970s. With the

fall of Saigon in 1975 and the Soviet expansionism in Southeast Asia

1

and

Africa,

the

Soviets

capitalized

on

the

lack

of

"CIA Helped Mujahideen Before Soviet Intervention," Nouvel Observateur, 15 January 1998, accessed online at http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Library/9803/world_affairs/cia_afgan.htm l; 20 April 1999. 2 Dilip Hiro, "Islamic Militants, Once Encouraged by the United States, Now Threaten It," The Nation, 15 February 1999, accessed online at http://www.afghanradio.com/jan29g1999.htm; 20 April 1999.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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leadership in American foreign policy to expand their influence around the globe. Soviet repression of Czech human rights and

the perceived deficiencies of SALT II were seen vis--vis the weakness of President Carters foreign policy. economic recession, together with the Islamic Further, the fundamentalist

revolution in Iran, further entrenched Americans in pessimism. Finally, in December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

This event, more than any other, marked the failure of SALT II, the end of dtente, and the beginning of a new phase in the Cold War. The goal of this paper is to explore one particular strain of that new phase, in particular the Soviet-Afghan war and the role that the United States (especially the Central Intelligence Agency) played in affecting the outcome of that war. of this paper is threefold. The thesis

First, the goal of the initial

American response was to increase costs for the Soviet Union by supplying funds and Soviet-style arms to the Afghan resistance (mujahadeen). Second, President Reagan sought to escalate the

conflict as part of a larger strategy, the "Reagan Doctrine," which sought to move beyond containment and roll back Soviet gains made in the Third World as a result of its to 1970s the

expansionist mujahadeen,

policy. especially

Finally, the

American by

assistance President

escalation

Reagan,

together with assistance from China (and others), was integral

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

Schearer 6

in the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989 and served as an important component to ending the Cold War. To these ends, this by paper will first the establish events the that

historical

context

briefly

exploring

precipitated the Soviet invasion.

Second, the initial American

response, dictated largely by President Carter and his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, will be discussed in the context of the Soviet invasion. Third, we will review the

continuation of this policy under President Reagan.

Fourth, and

perhaps most importantly, the escalation between 1983-1986 and the role of the Chinese and the impact that it had on the Finally, we will

eventual Soviet withdrawal will be explored.

attempt to determine the reasons for the Soviet withdrawal as well as the strategic implications of the end of the SovietAfghan war.

BACKGROUND While this paper does not intend to be a historical piece on either Afghanistan or the Soviet-Afghan war, it would be

impossible to discuss the role of the United States in this conflict context. without first establishing some sort of historical

Soviet Imperialism and the Breakdown of Dtente

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Soviet

imperialism

in

the

Third

World

characterized

the

later half of the 1970s. Doctrine, the Soviet Union

As part and parcel of the Brezhnev supported socialist and communist

movements in their national liberation wars.3 1979, eight dictatorships Vietnam, and were established Laos, A as

Between 1975 and Soviet clientAngola,

states: Ethiopia,

South

Cambodia, Nicaragua.

Mozambique, ninth,

Grenada,

Afghanistan,

suffered its communist coup in April 1978. signing the Helsinki and among Accord in the 1975,

In addition, despite Moscow intimidated, Charter Havel. 77 The

persecuted, dissidents,

imprisoned them the

Czechoslovak Vclav

playwright

American Right, led by then-candidate Ronald Reagan, condemned SALT II and suggested Carter was soft on the Soviet Union.4 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick summed up the prevailing opinion that

emerged: There was a strong view that dtente was not working and that the United States was becoming progressively weaker and the Soviet Union not only progressively stronger in relationship to the United States and the West, but also more aggressive.5 The fall of the Shah in Iran (worsened by the resulting oil shortages and the failed Desert One disaster) together
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and International Law, in Right v. Might: International Law and the Use of Force. 2nd ed. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 23. 4 Ronald Reagan, Interview, CNN's Cold War, Cable News Network, Episode 19, accessed online at http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/19/script.html; 20 April 1999. 5 Jeane Kirkpatrick, Interview, Ibid.
3

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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with the deepening economic crisis entrenched the United States in a deep pessimism. In short, dtente had broken

down, its future in serious jeopardy.

Afghanistan, 1978-1979
If ever a country needed a revolution it was Afghanistan. By the mid-1970s all other forms of government had been tried and had proved themselves bankrupt. Successive governments had failed to make Afghanistans people literate, failed to improve the lot of minority ethnic groups, failed to gain respect or status for women, and failed to give the country any substantial governmental or industrial infrastructure. In short, they had failed to create a 20th-century state. In April 1978, Afghanistan got its revolution.6

The revolution in Afghanistan had its roots in the April 15, 1978 murder of Mir Akber Khyber, a leader in the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). When Khybers funeral

developed into a demonstration, the secret police of President Mohammed Daoud subsequently arrested a number of significant

PDPA leaders, yet failed to arrest their military counterparts.7 On April 27, the 4th and 15th Armored Brigades (those forces loyal to the PDPA) moved on Kabul, securing the Defense Ministry and the airport.8 Central Corps MiG-21s of the 322nd Air Regiment strafed the and 8th Division headquarters of the Army,

primarily to deter wavering units from intervening.9

Finally,

the combination of a deadly air strike and armor and mechanized

Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 5. 7 Ibid., 7. 8 Ibid., 7-8. 9 Ibid., 8.
6

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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infantry

attacks

on

the

Presidential

Palace

resulted

in

the

defeat of the Daoud regime.10

On April 30, 1978, Nur Mohammed

Taraki became President and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The establishment within both of the new Army regime and met with the immediate peasantry.

resistance

the

among

Despite two purges, military units lacked any significant party organization.11 journalist Mark The Urban allegiances writes, of the Afghan between soldier, state and

were...torn

tribe or village.12

Furthermore, the new governments socialist Combined with of Islam, against the the a

reforms provoked opposition among rural rebels. mass executions and the brutal suppression

governments government.

socialist In

agenda

mobilized

peasants

September 1978, the rebel groups declared

jihad (holy war) against the Taraki government.13

In this

declaration lies the birth of the Afghan resistance movement known as the mujahadeen (holy warriors or fighters of God).14 Throughout 1979, the mujahadeen continued to gain strength, primarily in rural areas. This was bolstered in mid-1979 when A power struggle ensued between

the CIA began to intervene.15

10 11

Ibid. Ibid., 22. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid.; Kurt Lohbeck, Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIAs Secret War in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1993), 36. 14 Lohbeck, 36; Urban, xi. 15 While most literature focuses on post-invasion operations by the Central Intelligence Agency, it appears likely that covert assistance began in mid-1979, primarily from three sources: first, the admission by then-

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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President and Prime Minister Taraki and deputy prime minister and foreign minister Hafizullah Amin. Amin capitalized on

continued revolt by the resistance and further demoralization of the Army.16 By July 1979, he had taken over as both Prime When a confrontation between

Minister and Defense Minister.

Taraki and Amin erupted into gunfire, Major Taroun (an aide of Taraki) was killed.17 Within days, Tarakis death was announced;

Amin had now seized control of the government.18 The Soviets opposed Amin. Claiming they despised the KGB,

[Soviet military officers] assured [Amin] of their protection. In order to protect Amin, the number of Soviet advisors The initial Soviet objective of

increased dramatically....19

the operation was to replace Amin with Babrak Karmal, another PDPA leader who was thought to be able to secure broader

support from the people and the party.20

As Soviet paratroops

remarked to Kabul Radio operators on the night of December 27, we've come "to save the revolution."21

National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, "CIA Helped Mujahideen Before Soviet Intervention," Nouvel Observateur, 15 January 1998, accessed online at http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Library/9803/world_affairs/cia_afgan.htm l; 20 April 1999; second, a Soviet source who claimed that a freighter called the Al-Kasum, laden with arms, arrived at the Pakistani port of Karachi in June 1979, Vladimir Efros, Afghanistan: US Terrorism in Action, in Urban, 29; and third, the report that documents from the American embassy in Tehran suggest CIA involvement at this time, Urban, 29. 16 Urban, 31-36. 17 Ibid., 38. 18 Lohbeck, 40-41; Urban, 38. 19 Lohbeck, 41. 20 Urban, 42. 21 Ibid., 46.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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The Invasion
By the last week of December, all was quiet as far as the Afghan military was concerned uneasy, perhaps, but quiet. The Westerners in the Afghan capital were preparing for a subdued celebration of the Christian feastday. Although Christmas Eve is not celebrated in Kabul, and it is certainly not an Islamic holiday, December 24, 1979, will not be soon forgotten in Islamic Afghanistan.22

Beginning on December 24, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan with four motor rifle divisions (66th, 201st, 357th, and 360th) and one and with a half air assault the divisions 103rd (105th and

Guards,

reinforced

regiments

from

Guards

104th Guards).23

The reinforced air assault division was flown

in to seize key targets, while the 40th Army made a two-pronged thrust toward the Salang pass in the east and to Herat in the west.24 At the same time, the Communist party paper Pravda was

calling Western reports of the invasion "pure inventions" and repeated charges that the CIA and the Chinese were aiding Afghan rebels.25 By the time the invasion could no longer be denied,

Karmal, newly-installed by the Soviet-back coup, made a fait accompli plea for Soviet assistance.26 Brezhnev abetted Karmal's

plea by responding to President Carter with the reply that the

22 23 24 25

Lohbeck, 41. Urban, 42. See Appendix II, 314-319, for the Soviet order of battle. Ibid., 46-47. Paper Denies Troop Reports, The Washington Post, 25 December 1979,

A39. Urban, 47. In fact, 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet troops were already in Afghanistan by this time.
26

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Soviet

action the

was

response rhetoric and

to by

an

invitation.27 that

Karmal "with [of the the

continued fraternal

absurd

suggesting

assistance

undiminishing

cooperation

Soviets,] we shall win and overcome...."28

The war had begun.

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE After the April 1978 communist coup, the Carter

administration remained silent: No official of thousands presidential purges that had conceded statements were issued decrying the loss of lives of Afghans during the coup, no voice rang out against the murderous instantly swept the country...Washington the legitimacy of a Soviet puppet regime.29

Given this response (or lack thereof to be more precise), it is not difficult to wonder why the Soviets expected the American response to the invasion to be "equally spineless."30 this respect, Kurt the Soviets miscalculated. reacted Yet in to In

According

journalist remarks on

Lohbeck,

"Carter

explosively."31

December

28, Carter called the invasion "a grave In a January 4, 1980, address to the nation,

threat to peace."32

Carter called for the suspension of Senate consideration of SALT II, halted the exportation of certain high technology items,
Lohbeck, 43. Kevin Klose, Soviets Say CIA Trained Afghan Rebels in Pakistan, The Washington Post, 2 January 1980, A3. 29 Lohbeck, 37. 30 Ibid., 43. 31 Ibid. 32 White House, "American Hostages in Iran and Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan," 28 December 1979, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 15:52 (1979): 2287.
28 27

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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restricted sales.33

Soviet

fishing

rights,

and

blocked

further

grain

Speaking to Members of Congress at the White House,

Carter said that he believed "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War. It's a sharp escalation in the aggressive history of the Soviet Union."34 that Perhaps most significant, though, was Carter's call response of the international community to the

"[t]he

Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviet action."35 This statement, more than any other,

marked the beginning of a new phase in the Cold War. Brzezinski had persuaded Carter in July 1979 to aid the mujahadeen based on the strategic calculation that it would

increase the likelihood of Soviet invasion.

The goal was the

potential ability, as Brzezinski put it, "to finally sow shit in their backyard."36 Brzezinski saw the opportunity to make

Afghanistan the Soviet Union's Vietnam. invasion, Carter increased covert aid

Just days after the to the mujahadeen,

funneling weapons through Pakistan.37

White House, "Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," 4 January 1980, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 16:2 (1980): 26-27. 34 White House, "Situation in Iran and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," 8 January 1970, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 16:2 (1980): 40. "Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan," 27. Lohbeck, 43. 37 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), 45. According to Scott, the weapons were mainly .303 Enfield rifles. Further research by this author suggests that these weapons, British in manufacture, may have been fabricated and refurbished at the Pakistan Ordnance Factory in Wah, Pakistan. See "A Brief History of Lee-Enfield Rifles," accessed online
36 35 33

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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The covert weapons program begun under President Carter and continued with CIA), Egypt, the the under President Reagan was an international effort the

financial Saudis,

efforts of the United States (mainly and the British, and weapons from

China,

Pakistan, and eventually Israel.38

To maintain plausible

deniability, "it was a firm policy that only communist block weapons could be bought."39 To secure these commitments, the

Carter administration sent Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to China and Brzezinski to Pakistan.40 ready to commit to active Brown "found the Chinese began to funnel

opposition...they

weapons...through Pakistan, with whom they had a long-standing relationship."41 General Zia. Brzezinski visited Pakistan to meet with

According to journalist Kurt Lohbeck:

Brzezinski was the perfect envoy to send to Zia. The two men were among the few in the world's political hierarchy who believed that merely halting Soviet expansion would be insufficient; it must be sharply curtailed. Furthermore, they agreed that Afghanistan was the place to begin.42 These meetings, together with a new-found sense of urgency in the Carter administration, resulted in the development of an internationally-supported arms network operating against the

at http://www.uidaho.edu/~stratton/history.htm; 29 April 1999. 38 Lohbeck, 45; Mohmammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story (London: Leo Cooper, 1992) 83-84. General Yousaf notes that the Israeli weapons were Soviet-style "that had been captured in large quantities during Israel's invasion of the [sic] Lebanon." 39 Yousaf and Adkin, 83. 40 Lohbeck, 44-45. 41 Ibid., 44. 42 Ibid., 45.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Soviets (see Figure 1). While the program was covert, reports of assistance began to surface immediately. Soviet reports of CIA training of the On February

mujahadeen appeared as early as December 25, 1979.43

15, 1980, The Washington Post reported on the weapons supply, which an unidentified source called "neither big nor dramatic," yet "is a significant step beyond the aid the United States was providing...prior to the Soviet invasion."44 or overt, the objective was clear: the But whether covert of the initial

goal

American response was to increase costs for the Soviet Union. The trap set by Brzezinski in July 1979 had begun to close.
Figure 1. The Money Flow MONEY USA SAUDI ARABIA ARABS

CIA

Arms Purchases China Egypt Israel America Britain

ISI
Rawakpindi & Quetta
43

ISI IsIamabad

Paper Denies Troop Reports, The Washington Post, 25 December 1979, A39; see also Kevin Klose, Soviets Say CIA Trained Afghan Rebels in Pakistan, The Washington Post, 2 January 1980, A3. 44 Michael Getler, "U.S. Reportedly Is Supplying Weapons to Afghan Insurgents, Afghan Rebel Forces Reportedly Getting U.S. Arms Assistance," The Washington Post, 15 February 1980, A1.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Money Arms and Software Figure 1. The Money Flow. Reprinted from Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story (London: Leo Cooper, 1992), 82.

THE REAGAN ESCALATION

Of the four wars in my lifetime, none came about because the U.S. was too strong. --Ronald Reagan

The foreign policy situation at the outset of the Reagan administration was not at all positive. dtente had failed. It became clear that

American restraint in weapons development

and deployment combined with the "unprecedented" Soviet military build-up and Third-World expansion had demoralized the United States.45 According to Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "[t]he problem

confronting Ronald Reagan: to redress the correlation of forces, stop Soviet expansion, clarify the nature of the contest and its stakes, and to do this simultaneously."46 Yet early on, the Reagan administration sought to continue to continue the "bleeder" strategy, "designed to hurt Moscow and raise the costs of its occupation."47 This was
45

Funding was still low. plausible deniability.

primarily

due

to

maintaining

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The Reagan Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1985), 5-6, 9. 46 Ibid., 9. 47 Scott, 46.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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However, the seeds had been sown for a major escalation. The roots of the escalation are found primarily in two

individuals: William Casey and Charles Wilson. 1980 campaign manager, was appointed

Casey, Reagan's of Central

Director

Intelligence.

According to journalist Kurt Lohbeck:

Casey envisioned his job as having a twofold purpose: first, to restructure the agency and lift it out of the despondency caused by the unending investigations and purges of the 1970s; and second, to confront what he saw as the caldron of evil in the world - the expansionist Soviet Union. It that regard, he became the foremost adherent of the slogan of the first Reagan administration: "Peace Through Strength."48 Wilson, a Texas Congressman on the Appropriations

Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee and the House Intelligence Committee, became the major congressional supporter of the covert assistance program. in 1987, Wilson gave his In an interview with CBS News for supporting the

rationale

mujahadeen: "I wanted to hurt [the Soviets]. count bodybags going back to Moscow."49 as Brzezinski did: payback for Vietnam.

I wanted them to

Wilson saw Afghanistan

The Reagan Doctrine The escalation by the Reagan administration began in 1983 and continued through 1987 (see Figure 2).

48 49

Lohbeck, 49. Quoted in Lohbeck, 52.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Figure 2. American Assistance to the Mujahadeen

700 600 500 Billions 400 Assistance (in Billions of Dollars) 300 200 100 0 1981 1983 1985 1986 1987 1990 1980 1982 1984 1988 1989

Year

Figure 2. American Assistance to the Mujahadeen. Compiled from various sources in James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), 43-74.

With

Congressman Casey

Wilson

marshaling the expand U.S. was

congressional covert program vis--vis in

support program, through the

and the the

Director

directing sought a to

CIA's this

administration application Union."50 Decision of This

"broad strategy 75

strategy codified

Soviet

National by

Security

Directive

(written

primarily

then-National

Security Council staffer Richard Pipes in 1982) and signed on January 17, 1983.51 In terms of Afghanistan, NSDD-75 proposed to

"keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal" and "ensure that the Soviets'...costs remain high."52 Publicly, the rhetoric began to intensify. report
50 51 52

A November 1984 singled out

by

the

influential

Heritage

Foundation

Scott, 51. Ibid, 21. Quoted in Scott, 51.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Afghanistan as one of nine countries that ought to be targeted for "anti-Communist insurgency."53 Secretary of State George

Shultz visited the Nasebagh Refugee Camp in Peshawar, Pakistan, and declared: "Fellow fighters for freedom, not only in

Afghanistan but through the world. United States is very simple.

My message to you from the However, the

We are with you."54

two clearest statements of what eventually became known as the Reagan Doctrine were made by President Reagan himself. 1985 State of the Union address, Reagan proclaimed that we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives--on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua--to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth...Support for freedom fighters is selfdefense....55 At the Bitburg Air Base in the Federal Republic of Germany, Reagan sounded the clarion call for anti-Communist insurgency: Twenty-two years ago President John F. Kennedy went to the Berlin Wall and proclaimed that he, too, was a Berliner. Well, today freedom-loving people around the world must say: I am a Berliner, I am a Jew in a world still threatened by anti-Semitism, I am an Afghan, and I am a prisoner of the Gulag, I am a refugee in a crowded boat foundering off the coast of Vietnam, I am a Loatian, a Cambodian, a Cuban, and a Miskito Indian in Nicaragua. I, too, am a potential victim of totalitarianism...[F]reedom must always be stronger than totalitarianism and good must always be
53

In his

Bill Keller, "U.S. Aid to Rebels in 9 Countries Suggested By Conservative Group," The New York Times, 20 November 1984, A20. 54 Department of State, Press Release 269, 8 July 1983, American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1983 (Washington, D.C.: 1985). 55 White House, 1985 State of the Union, accessed online at http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/rr40/speeches/su85rwr.htm; 29 April 1999.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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stronger than evil.56 The nadir of escalation came in March 1985, when President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 166. 166 marked the codified change in policy from a NSSD-

"bleeder"

strategy to a "victory" strategy. 1986 State of the Union Address: fighters. America

Reagan emphasized this in his "You are not alone, freedom

will support you with moral and materiel

assistance, your right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and to win freedom in Afghanistan...."57

With more and better weapons, intelligence, and international pressure, the United States believed that it could succeed in forcing the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.58 Two of these

factors deserve special attention: the role of the Chinese and the introduction of the Stinger missiles.

The Chinese Role According to the scholar Michael Yahuda, in 1979 "China's new policies of economic reform began to take shape and...the United States and China commenced a new period of normalized

White House, "Bitburg Air Base, Federal Republic of Germany," 5 May 1985, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 21 (1980): 589. 57 White House, 1986 State of the Union, accessed online at http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/rr40/speeches/su86rwr.htm; 3 May 1999. 58 Scott, 59.

56

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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relations."59

As a result of the deteriorating situation with

Moscow, the United States saw in Afghanistan a chance to exploit the growing Sino-Soviet rift. the Soviet occupation Sino-Soviet of Deng Xiaoping's insistence that was the an obstacle to

Afghanistan made

normalizing

relations

Chinese

strategic

allies of the United States.60 Chinese support for the mujahadeen had already begun prior to the invasion.61 of he Defense "found It seems no surprise, Beijing to then, soon commit that after to when the

Secretary invasion,

Brown the

visited

Chinese funnel

ready

active

opposition...they with whom they

began had a

to

weapons...through

Pakistan, Beijing

long-standing

relationship."62

solidified their support when Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua visited Pakistan's President Zia. Urban, Chinese weapons included 12.7mm Type-54 machine guns (copies of the Soviet Dshk), 14.5mm Type-58 single and twin antiaircraft machine guns (called Zigouaks by the mujahadeen), and some 23mm twin anti-aircraft guns. The equipment was robust, could be broken down into man-pack loads, and was identical to that used to such effect by the Viet Cong. Other Chinese deliveries included 82mm mortars, 82mm recoilless rifles and innumerable different types of mine.63
Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 19451995 (London: Routledge, 1996), 79. 60 Yahuda, 93-94. Deng Xiaoping's two other famous "obstacles" were the end of Soviet support for Vietnam in Cambodia and the reduction of Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet frontier. 61 Urban, 32. 62 Ibid., 44. 63 Urban, 123.
59

According to journalist Mark

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Moreover, many of these weapons were financed through the CIA.64 According to General Yousaf, China was the major supplier of guns and ammunition until 1984, and "proved to be an excellent supplier, completely reliable, [and] discreet...."65 The Reagan escalation was also accompanied by increased

assistance from China. Utah, along and for with the both

In early 1986, Senator Orrin Hatch of of the NSC, Department of

representatives CIA, the

Defense, support

traveled to Beijing to enlist Chinese escalation and the introduction of the

Stinger missiles.66 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan thus provided a "growing Sino-American agreement on security issues."67 Capitalizing on a

growing Sino-Soviet rift, the United States worked with China to provide large amounts of weapons (generally through Pakistan) to the mujahadeen.

The Stinger Missiles Perhaps the most significant debate concerning the Reagan escalation that occurred concerned the decision to supply the mujahadeen with the portable "Stinger" anti-aircraft missile.

According to Walter B. Wriston:

64 65 66 67

Lohbeck, 44. Yousaf, 85. Scott, 63. Ibid.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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its basic ground-to-air version uses an IR (infrared) homing sensor, can be carried by one man, and is fired from the shoulder. The Stinger is effective against low-flying helicopter gunships as well as fixed-wing aircraft. It is a so-called fire-and-forget missile and carries on board a sophisticated information system to identify friend from foe....Weighing 34.5 pounds, including the launcher, the missile uses a solid-fuel rocket motor [and has]...an estimated range of two to three kilometers and a very high target interception rate....68 The decision to send Stinger missiles to the mujahadeen was a result of increasing pressure from an alliance consisting of activists within the CIA and the Department of Defense and mostly conservative legislators in the Congress. On February

25, 1986, an inter-agency review recommended introducing the Stinger missiles.69 time Journalist with the Kurt Lohbeck (who spent a

significant

mujahadeen)

believes

his

conversation with Director Casey "tipped the scales in his mind in favor of providing the Stinger missiles."70

Conservatives in the Congress brought pressure on Secretary of State Shultz to support the introduction of the Stingers.71 Reagan himself had apparently first made the suggestion as early as September 1983 that Stingers should be sent, but the
68 Walter B. Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), 161. Some reports suggest the Stinger has a range of up to five miles, David B. Ottaway and Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels; Afghans, Angolans Get Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy," The Washington Post, 30 March 1986, A1. 69 Ottaway and Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels; Afghans, Angolans Get Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy." 70 Lohbeck, 151. 71 Ottaway and Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels; Afghans, Angolans Get Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy."

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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CIA voiced cautions over concerns of escalation, technology transfer, and plausible deniability for both the United

States and Pakistan.72 [among weaponry inflicted them and spetznaz more

By 1986 however, "Soviet-backed forces troops] aggressive were employing more they lethal have from

tactics...where Together with

heavy

casualties."73

support

within the CIA and the Department of Defense, as well as pressure from Congress, Reagan approved the first shipment of Stingers in March 1986.74 Following several months of training from the CIA, U.S. Special Forces, and the British SAS,75 the first use of Stingers came on September 25, 1986. The mujahadeen ambushed a group of

Mi-24 Hind helicopters, shooting down three and damaging several others.76 Soon thereafter, the Soviets publicly acknowledged the While the success rate of the Stingers remains

Stinger threat.77

subject to debate, best estimates put the rate between 50-79 per cent.78
72

Regardless the exact rate, it appears now the Stinger

David B. Ottaway, et al., "The CIA in Transition; Casey Strengthens Role Under 'Reagan Doctrine,'" The Washington Post, 31 March 1986, A1. 73 Ottaway and Tyler, "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels; Afghans, Angolans Get Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy." 74 Ibid. 75 Scott, 62; Michael Evans, "Ex-soldier Says SAS Helped in Afghan War," The (London) Times, 4 November 1998. 76 Yousaf, 174-176; Urban, 206. 77 "Soviets Confirm Afghan Rebel Use of Stinger Missiles," The Los Angeles Times, 20 December 1986, 1-14. 78 Based on statistics compiled by Pakistan and the U.S. Army and interviews with the mujahadeen. See Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 199; Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan (London: Brassey's, 1991), 90; Yousaf, 183.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

Schearer 25

was taking its toll.

As we will see next, privately the Soviets

were already considering withdrawal.

THE IMPACT OF THE STINGER AND THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL Despite some debate, it is generally acknowledged that the introduction of the Stinger missile marked a turning point in the Soviet-Afghan war.79 According to Deputy Director of

Central Intelligence Robert M. Gates: There is little question that providing the Stingers was a major turning point in the Afghan war. It greatly increased Soviet and Afghan aircraft (and pilot) losses and thus the cost of the war to Moscow; it forced changes in Soviet tactics that helped the [mujahadeen] on the ground; and it was a big psychological boost for the resistance. The huge increases in funding, which vastly improved the flow of all kinds of assistance to the [mujahadeen], more sophisticated targeting of Soviet and Afghan installations based on U.S. satellite information, and the flow of Stingers by the end of 1986, had begun to turn the tide. The Soviets had to either reinforce or lose. Because they clearly were not winning.80 General Yousaf of the Pakistani ISI writes that the Stingers marked "the turning-point of the campaign...."81 While he

questions the military effectiveness of the Stinger, journalist Mark Urban suggests that "undoubtedly the arrival of the weapons bolstered guerrilla morale."82
79 80

Scott R. McMichael, writing in

Cordovez and Harrison dispute this "widespread assumption," 199. Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 350. 81 Yousaf, 177. 82 Urban, 214, 296-297.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Stumbling

Bear:

Soviet

Military

Performance

in

Afghanistan,

argues that "[t]he real breakthrough in rebel air defence [sic] came with the to arrival B. of the US-made "[i]t Stinger is missiles."83 not an the

According

Walter to say

Wriston,

probably

exaggeration

that not since the musket destroyed of massed men has new

once-overwhelming

firepower

technology

performed such an equalizing role."84 More importantly, though, was the effect the Stinger had on the Soviets. According to the Politburo minutes of November 13,

1986, Andrei Gromyko complained that "[t]he situation is worse today than it was six months ago. searching for a political solution."85 We must be more active in Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev

intoned, "[w]e have lost the struggle for the Afghan people."86 According to the scholar Richard Crockatt, "[the minutes] also show that the American supply in of 'Stinger' was missiles in to the up

[mujahadeen]

guerrillas

1986

decisive

making

Gorbachev's mind [to leave Afghanistan]."87 Journalist Mark Urban identifies six factors which led the Soviets to withdraw: (a) the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev and his 'new thinking' in
McMichael, 90. Wriston, 161. 85 Quoted in Michael Dobbs, "Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End of War; Gorbachev Pressed to Pull Out of Quagmire for Soviets During Secret 1986 Debate," The Washington Post, 16 November 1992, A1. 86 Ibid. 87 Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991 (London: Routledge, 1995), 362.
84 83

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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foreign policy; (b) Afghan resistance; (c) diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union; (d) the internal cost to the USSR; (e) a belief that the PDPA regime would survive; (f) external military support for the mujahadeen.88 In terms of this paper, the most important factors to consider are the Afghan resistance, the internal cost to the USSR, and external military support for the mujahadeen. to recognize is that, The in reality, these What Urban fails three the factors are for

interrelated.

mujahadeen

provided

foundation

opposition against the Soviets.

External military support from

the United States (and other nations such as China) was provided for the explicit purpose of increasing the costs for the Soviet Union. This was the stated purpose of the Reagan Doctrine. I

believe this strategy was an integral component in the Soviet withdrawal.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS The thesis of this paper has been threefold. First,

Presidents Carter and Reagan sought to increase costs for the Soviet Union by supplying funds and Soviet-style arms to the mujahadeen. Second, President Reagan sought to escalate the
88

Urban, 299.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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conflict as part of a larger strategy, the "Reagan Doctrine," which sought to move beyond containment and roll back Soviet gains made in the Third World as a result of its 1970s

expansionist policy.

Finally, the escalation by President

Reagan, together with assistance primarily from China, was integral in the Soviet withdrawal in 1988-1989 and served as an important component to ending the Cold War. To these ends, I have attempted to demonstrate that the American strategy was, in large part, a coordinated effort of the then first the the Reagan Carter administration (especially Casey, Brzezinski), Shultz, and

administration

(including

Reagan himself) together with strong support from the Congress (especially Wilson and conservatives like Hatch). Early on,

efforts to support the resistance were kept low-key, because of concerns about escalation, technology transfer, and plausible However, finally The

deniability for both the United States and Pakistan. by the time a of the Soviet point escalation, within the momentum had

reached

culminating

administration.

counter-escalation by the United States in 1985-1986 sought to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Two secondary factors stand out as integral parts of the covert effort against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. First,

the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave the Americans a chance to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift, and they capitalized on it

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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immediately. weapons States General by to

The provision of large amounts of Soviet-style the Chinese to the mujahadeen deniability. Chinese were helped the United as

maintain

plausible the

Furthermore, "an

Yousaf

confirmed,

excellent

supplier, completely reliable, discreet, and, at a later stage, even providing weapons as aid as well as for sale."89 Finally,

the Chinese helped to facilitate the introduction of Stinger missiles through Pakistan. Incidentally, the second factor

which proved to be an integral component of the covert campaign were the Stinger missiles themselves. While ultimately the

Stinger's military success rate may be in doubt, the positive psychological impact that Stingers had on the mujahadeen and the negative psychological The impact they had on the Soviets ordered is by

unquestioned.

American

counter-escalation

Reagan, of which the Stinger was the most prominent feature, was the decisive factor in persuading Gorbachev to first consider Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. In a strategic sense, the covert campaign against the

Soviets in Afghanistan was part and parcel of larger strategy to roll-back Soviet gains in the Third World. attempted in other Third World states, Covert programs were such as Angola and

Nicaragua, with varied success.

Yet military victory per se by

the resistance movements was never really an objective of the

89

Yousaf, 85.

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Reagan Doctrine.

Perhaps the best description of the relative

success of the efforts to support the mujahadeen is how the Soviets saw their failure: There is not a single piece of land [in Afghanistan] that the Soviet soldier has not conquered. Despite this, a large chunk of territory is in the hands of the rebels. We control Kabul and the provincial centers, but we have been unable to establish authority over the seized territory. We have lost the struggle for the Afghan people.90 It would be wrong to suggest that the mujahadeen ever defeated the Soviet army in a military sense. Marshal rebel Akhromeyev's victory. statement larger are than meant But, the implications of clear: that victory Soviet is the for failure is

Even

strategic the United

ramification: States.

Soviet

failure

Without the loss of one American soldier, the United

States engaged the Soviet Union in their backyard and defeated them. The Reagan Doctrine exploited the Soviet strategic

overstretch, set back the Soviets on a number of fronts, and helped to bring an end to the Cold War.

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, quoted in Michael Dobbs, "Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End of War; Gorbachev Pressed to Pull Out of Quagmire for Soviets During Secret 1986 Debate."

90

American Strategy in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Galiullin, Rustem. The CIA in Asia: Covert Operations Against India and Afghanistan. Trans. Gayane Chalyan. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988. Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Getler, Michael. U.S. Reportedly Is Supplying Weapons to Afghan Insurgents; Afghan Rebel Forces Reportedly Getting U.S. Arms Assistance. The Washington Post, 15 February 1980, A1. Gwertzman, Bernard. "U.S. Rushing Missiles to Pakistan; Cites Air Raids From Afghanistan." The New York Times, 12 July 1985, A1. Harsch, Joseph C. USSR and Afghans. The Christian Science Monitor, 1 October 1985, 16. Hiro, Dilip. "Islamic Militants, Once Encouraged by the United States, Now Threaten It," The Nation, 15 February 1999, accessed online at http://www.afghanradio.com/jan29g1999.htm; 20 April 1999. Jordan, Amos A., William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb. American National Security: Policy and Process. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993. Keller, Bill. U.S. Aid to Rebels in 9 Countries Suggested by Conservative Group. The New York Times, 20 November 1984, A20. Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. Interview. CNN's Cold War, Cable News Network, Episode 19, accessed online at http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/19/script.html; 20 April 1999. ---. The Reagan Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1985. Kirkpatrick, Jeane Human Rights, International York: Council J., and Allan Gerson. The Reagan Doctrine, and International Law, in Right v. Might: Law and the Use of Force. 2nd ed. 19-36. New on Foreign Relations Press, 1991.

Klose, Kevin. Soviets Say CIA Trained Afghan Rebels in

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Schearer 33

Pakistan. The Washington Post, 2 January 1980, A3. Lohbeck, Kurt. Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIAs Secret War in Afghanistan. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1993. McManus, Doyle, and Sara Fritz. "U.S.-Backed Insurgents on Capitol Hill; Rebel Lobby Becomes New Growth Industry." The Los Angeles Times, 2 September 1986, 1-1. McMichael, Scott R. Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan. London: Brassey's, 1991. Ottaway, David B., and Patrick E. Tyler. "U.S. Sends New Arms To Rebels; Afghans, Angolans Get Stinger Missiles in Change of Policy." The Washington Post, 30 March 1986, A1. Ottaway, David B., et al. "The CIA in Transition; Casey Strengthens Role Under 'Reagan Doctrine.'" The Washington Post, 31 March 1986, A1. Paper Denies Troop Reports. The Washington Post, 25 December 1979, A39. Pear, Robert. Arming Afghan Guerrillas: A Huge Effort Led by U.S. The New York Times, 18 April 1988, A1. Reagan, Ronald. Interview. CNN's Cold War, Cable News Network, Episode 19, accessed online at http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/19/script.html; 20 April 1999. Roy, Olivier. "The Lessons of the Soviet Afghan War." Adelphi Papers No. 259. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991. Scott, James M. Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996. "Soviets Confirm Afghan Rebel Use of Stinger Missiles." The Los Angeles Times, 20 December 1986, 1-14. Urban, Mark. War in Afghanistan. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. U.S. Department of State. Press Release 269. 8 July 1983.

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American Foreign Policy Current Documents 1983. Washington, D.C.: 1985). "U.S. Tries to Intensify War with Stinger Missiles, Afghanistan Says." The Los Angeles Times, 2 April 1986, 1-15. Weymouth, Lally. Does Moscow Really Plan on Leaving Afghanistan? The Washington Post, 21 February 1988, B1. White House. 1985 State of the Union, accessed online at http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/rr40/speeches/su85rwr.htm; 29 April 1999. ---. 1986 State of the Union, accessed online at http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/rr40/speeches/su86rwr.htm; 3 May 1999. ---. "American Hostages in Iran and Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan." 28 December 1979. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 15:52 (1979): 2287. ---. "Bitburg Air Base, Federal Republic of Germany." 5 May 1985. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 21 (1980): 587-589. ---. "Situation in Iran and Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan." 8 January 1970. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 16:2 (1980): 39-43. ---. "Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan." 4 January 1970. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 16:2 (1980): 25-27. Wriston, Walter B. The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming Our World. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992. Yahuda, Michael. The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995. London: Routledge, 1996. Yousaf, Mohammad, and Mark Adkin. The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story. London: Leo Cooper, 1992.