Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Sponsored by
CSFI
CSFI publications can be purchased through our website www.bookstore.csfi.org.uk or by calling the Centre on +44 (0) 207 493 0173
Published by Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI) Email: info@csfi.org.uk Web: www.csfi.org.uk CSFI 2008 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of the Centre. ISBN: 978-0-9551811-7-7 Printed in the United Kingdom by Heron, Dawson & Sawyer CSFI / New York CSFI E-mail: info@csfi.org.uk Web: www.csfi.org.uk
MARCH 2008
The fact that the CSFI was asked to stretch its well-established Banana Skins brand from banking to insurance and now to that the CSFI was asked to stretch its well-established is being taken these days. It has to insurance the The fact microfinance illustrates just how seriously microfinanceBanana Skins brand from banking moved out ofand fringes microfinance illustrates just how seriously microfinance is being taken these days. It 1) into the out of the now to (which is where it was when we published our last report on the subject, in February 1998has movedmainstream at least into is developmental mainstream. When last report on to subject, in February 19981) Mohammed Yunus fringes (whichthewhere it was when we published ourhe came to talkthe us ten years ago, Grameensinto the mainstream was viewed the developmental mainstream. When he came to talk to us ten years sceptical; now, Mohammed prize at least intoby many in the financial sector as a marginal figure, preaching to the ago, Grameens he is a NobelYunus winner and by many in the right up sector as Bono and figure, preaching to the sceptical; now, he is a Nobel prizewas viewed global celebrity, financialthere with a marginalBob Geldof. winner and global celebrity, right up there with Bono and Bob Geldof. But (slightly to my surprise) it seems that the fundamental questions about microfinance remain unanswered. Is it (actually or to my surprise) it seems asset class into which rich country investors can put their savings Is a But (slightly potentially) an investible that the fundamental questions about microfinance remain unanswered.with it reasonable potentially) an return? asset class role as a rich country investors can top-down development (actually orhope of a decent investible Or is its realinto whichbottom-up alternative to theput their savings with a model that has long dominated conventional its real role thinking? reasonable hope of a decent return? Or is development as a bottom-up alternative to the top-down development model that has long dominated conventional development thinking? When the Centre first looked at microfinance, we were hoping we could make the case that it would quickly become a self-sustaining asset looked at microfinance, we were hoping we could their the case that it driving a virtuous cycle When the Centre firstclass in which rich-country pensioners could invest make savings, therebywould quickly become a in which Western investors which rich-country pensioners Unfortunately, savings, thereby driving a of exceptions, self-sustaining asset class in could do well by doing good.could invest theirwith a fairly small number virtuous cycle that proved to be investors could it probably doing though the number of exceptions has certainly grown. In many in which Western too ambitious do well by still is,good. Unfortunately, with a fairly small number of exceptions, circumstances, microfinance still it probably still is, though the number of money, technical assistance, some many that proved to be too ambitious needs a helping hand cheap money, free exceptions has certainly grown. Indegree of regulatory forbearance etc. That doesnt deny hand cheap money, free money, technical assistance, some degree circumstances, microfinance still needs a helpingthat some, perhaps many, microfinance institutions are now investible; it regulatory that one ought to look also at deny that some, perhaps many, microfinance institutions of does mean forbearance etc. That doesntthe developmental rationale for supporting microfinance. are now investible; it does mean that one ought to look also at the developmental rationale for supporting microfinance. A major appeal of microfinance is that it is a bottom up approach to development, very different to the traditional top down approach that dominated academic a bottom up approach development, of this approach are real: whatever A major appeal of microfinance is that it is thinking for many years.toThe advantagesvery different to the traditional top its shortcomings, microfinance academic thinking for many years. The advantages of this approach are real: whatever down approach that dominated does ensure that more of the development dollar gets spent at the local or village level than has historically been the does However, more of price for that not least the spent at of local or village level its shortcomings, microfinancecase. ensure thatthere is athe development dollar gets problem the scalability. How can one has historically been the case. However, there is a price for that not least the problem of scalability. How can than build a microfinance infrastructure that can deliver anything like the same amount of aid as does the conventional approach? one build a microfinance infrastructure that can deliver anything like the same amount of aid as does the conventional approach? This report doesnt address the scalability issue directly, but it does make a number of salutary points that promoters of microfinance need address the scalability issue directly, but it does make a number of salutary points that promoters of This report doesnt to bear in mind. In particular: microfinance need to bear in mind. In particular: With the notable exception of Africa, the perception is that a shortage of funding is not a problem for the microfinance industry at of present time. Indeed, too much capital is probably bigger problem the With the notable exception the Africa, the perception is that a shortage of funding isanot a problem forthan too little in that it may drive present time. Indeed, too much capital is probably a bigger problem than microfinance industry at the standards down. too little in that it may drive standards down. The two biggest problems identified by respondents appear to be growing competition as new players enter the industry, and management quality/corporate governance. Complaints about as new players The two biggest problems identified by respondents appear to be growing competitioncompetition may just the industry, and management quality/corporate governance. Complaints about competition may enterbe special pleading by incumbents; management skills are obviously in short supply in most of the countries where microfinance can play management skills are obviously in short supply in most of the just be special pleading by incumbents; a role. countries where microfinance can play a role. Government often does not help. It is widely felt that regulation is frequently inappropriate, and incentives often does not help. It also be (surprise) political interference. Government can be perverse. There can is widely felt that regulation is frequently inappropriate, and incentives can be perverse. There can also be (surprise) political interference. There appears to be a temptation towards mission drift. We noticed this a decade ago, when it seemed that appears to be a temptation towards mission drift. We full-service bankers. Now, many of them There half the microfinanciers in the world really wanted to benoticed this a decade ago, when it seemed seem to the microfinanciers in the world to flogging high interest rate consumer Now, products. The that half be shifting from serving the poor really wanted to be full-service bankers.finance many of them profits be shifting from serving the the to flogging changed with potentially adverse reputational seem to may be more attractive, but poormission has high interest rateaconsumer finance products. The impact. profits may be more attractive, but the mission has changed with a potentially adverse reputational _____________impact. 1 Peter Montagnon: _____________ Credit where Credit is Due: Bringing Microfinance into the mainstream. CSFI, February 1998.
1
Peter Montagnon: Credit where Credit is Due: Bringing Microfinance into the mainstream. CSFI, February 1998.
Sponsors foreword
In 1998 when the CSFI issued its first Banking Banana Skins report, microfinance was still largely unknown and obscure, a niche-interest for government-sponsored donors. Today, a decade later, with a Nobel Prize under its belt, and with foreign capital investment at US$1.5 billion a year, its a dynamic field, with a slew of new and serious investors. Microfinance is exploding. No longer the provenance only of NGOs offering microcredit to a limited number of entrepreneurs, the word microfinance has entered the general lexicon. It no longer denotes just small loans for productive purposes. Today, it actually means, for many, retail banking for millions potentially billions of poor people. This is the context in which the Citigroup Foundation and CGAP, a leading microfinance group housed at the World Bank, sponsored CSFI to write the inaugural Microfinance Banana Skins Report. This report presents the findings of the first global industry survey on the risks affecting the growth and viability of commercial microfinance institutions. Our ambition is to raise awareness and engage investors, policy makers and microfinance institution managers on the perceived risks facing this new sector. While by no means exhaustive, the twenty-nine risks identified provide a faithful snapshot of the microfinance industry today. None of the risks highlighted here are that surprising for a young, emerging industry that is expanding at breakneck speed. Nonetheless, we hope that by highlighting the perceived risks affecting the global growth of commercial microfinance the report will inject a dose of realism into the debate about the investment boom and the (mis)perception that microfinance, which has enjoyed limited default history, therefore carries little or no risk. The report is intended to distinguish areas where development is needed, particularly at an industry level, to keep things on track. It is notable that the report highlights the importance of qualitative variables, with Management Quality, and Governance topping the list of risks, and points to an old microfinance mantra: the need for increased focus on retail institution capacity building. As sponsors of the report, we are grateful for the 305 industry participants from 74 countries who contributed to the survey and whose comments form the basis of the report. We would like to thank the CSFI and David Lascelles in particular, for producing such a coherent and engaging report. The Council of Microfinance Equity Funds was also an important project partner in this endeavour, and we are grateful to them for co-ordinating the Steering Committees work. We would also like to thank the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) for their support in the survey design and outreach. We hope that the Microfinance Banana Skins Report will be a valuable tool in charting the progress of commercial microfinance, highlighting the biggest and rising risk areas on the road ahead. Bob Annibale Global Director Citi Microfinance Elizabeth Littlefield CEO CGAP
Respondents by type
Observers 24% Regulators 2% Practitioners 37% Analysts 13% Investors 24%
The observers category included aid officials, academics, accountants, lawyers, consultants etc. The analyst category included rating agencies, investment analysts, and those who compile statistical information on microfinance. The chart shows the distribution of responses by region.
Responses by region
Middle East 4% Far East 4% Asia 10% Africa 8% Multinational 2% North America 29%
Europe 24%
Summary
Microfinance Banana Skins 2008
Biggest risks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Management quality Corporate governance Inappropriate regulation Cost control Staffing Interest rates Competition Managing technology Political interference Credit risk Transparency Foreign exchange Unrealisable expectations Mission drift Fraud Strategy Ownership Back office operations Reputation Liquidity Too much funding Profitability Macro-economic trends Product development Capital availability Distribution channels Natural catastrophes Refinancing Too little funding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Fastest risers Competition Staffing Political interference Too much funding Credit risk Strategy Mission drift Ownership Interest rates Unrealisable expectations Reputation Corporate governance Managing technology Fraud Natural catastrophes Cost control Management quality Foreign exchange Product development Profitability Inappropriate regulation Distribution channels Liquidity Macro-economic trends Back office operations Transparency Refinancing Capital availability Too little funding
This survey explores the risks and challenges facing microfinance as a business and a social service at a time when the sector is undergoing profound changes. Originally a small-scale, philanthropic movement to provide credit to the neediest, microfinance has grown enormously in recent years and is now firmly established as a major supplier of a wide range of financial services to millions of people around the world. The 1,200 microfinance institutions (MFIs) who report to the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) have 53m borrowers and 64m savers,
Convergence is is occurring between microfinance and mainstream banking as MFIs Convergence occurring between microfinance and mainstream banking as MFIs grow inin size and sophistication, and commercial banks enter the market. These grow size and sophistication, and commercial banks enter the market. These trends have boosted the size and quality ofof the microfinance sector, but also created trends have boosted the size and quality the microfinance sector, but also created new pressures ofof competition and sharper expectations. new pressures competition and sharper expectations. How will these pressures affect the sector? What are the risks posed by rapid How will these pressures affect the sector? What are the risks posed by rapid growth and change? What are the lessons toto be learned by practitioners and those growth and change? What are the lessons be learned by practitioners and those who invest inin the business? This survey was conducted toto seek answers to these who invest the business? This survey was conducted seek answers to these questions, with a a special focus on MFIs with more than $5m in assets which are questions, with special focus on MFIs with more than $5m in assets which are profitable and capable ofof commercial growth. These number about 350, according to profitable and capable commercial growth. These number about 350, according to estimates from MIX, and account for the bulk ofof microfinance assets globally. estimates from MIX, and account for the bulk microfinance assets globally. The survey asked respondents toto identify and comment on the major risks, or The survey asked respondents identify and comment on the major risks, or Banana Skins, which they saw facing the microfinance sector over the next two toto Banana Skins, which they saw facing the microfinance sector over the next two three years. More than 300 people responded from 74 countries. The table shows three years. More than 300 people responded from 74 countries. The table shows the ranking ofof the 29 Banana Skins identified by the survey. the ranking the 29 Banana Skins identified by the survey. The greatest risk facing microfinance is is the uneven quality of management at MFIs The greatest risk facing microfinance the uneven quality of management at MFIs at at a time of rapid change. The survey reveals strong doubts about the ability ofof a time of rapid change. The survey reveals strong doubts about the ability many MFIs toto adapt to new demands while still retaining their social objectives. many MFIs adapt to new demands while still retaining their social objectives. The industry is is seen, particularly by investors, to be lacking in professionalism and The industry seen, particularly by investors, to be lacking in professionalism and management skills, though these deficiencies are not generalised and are being management skills, though these deficiencies are not generalised and are being addressed inin many parts of the world. addressed many parts of the world. Closely linked toto management is concern about the quality of corporate governance Closely linked management is concern about the quality of corporate governance (No 2)2) and staffing (No 5) in MFIs, both of which are seen to be weak and drag on (No and staffing (No 5) in MFIs, both of which are seen to be weak and a a drag on development. High among management concerns are poor cost control (No 4)4) due development. High among management concerns are poor cost control (No due toto lack of commercial awareness, and managing new technology (No 8), often the lack of commercial awareness, and managing new technology (No 8), often the key toto raising business efficiency. key raising business efficiency. A A further obstacle to progress is the existence in many countries of inappropriate further obstacle to progress is the existence in many countries of inappropriate regulation (No 3)3) which prevents MFIs from adopting more commercial form, oror regulation (No which prevents MFIs from adopting a a more commercial form, forces them toto change against their will. A A related concern is the unwelcome forces them change against their will. related concern is the unwelcome growth ofof political interference (No 9) by governments who want to control interest growth political interference (No 9) by governments who want to control interest rates and influence lending. Respondents reported cases ofof populist governments rates and influence lending. Respondents reported cases populist governments encouraging borrowers not toto repay their loans. encouraging borrowers not repay their loans. The rapid growth inin competition (No 7) in the microfinance market, both from new The rapid growth competition (No 7) in the microfinance market, both from new entrants and among MFIs themselves, is is a high level concern among practitioners, entrants and among MFIs themselves, a high level concern among practitioners, though it it is viewed by investors and analysts as a necessary, if painful, force for though is viewed by investors and analysts as a necessary, if painful, force for good. good. Although competition is is stimulating greater efficiency and innovation, it Although competition stimulating greater efficiency and innovation, it may also lead toto an erosion of business standards, in particular to higher credit risk may also lead an erosion of business standards, in particular to higher credit risk (No 10) asas MFIs cut corners to sustain loan volumes. Both these risks are seen asas (No 10) MFIs cut corners to sustain loan volumes. Both these risks are seen fast risers. fast risers.
Fastest risers
Competition Mission drift Credit risk Political interference Staffing Strategy Managing technology Ownership Interest rates Management quality
The biggest concern for microfinance practitioners is the rise of competition from new entrants, which they see putting downward pressure on standards and squeezing margins. Key management challenges of cost control, credit risk and technology are also high on the list, as are people issues such as management quality and staffing. Inappropriate regulation is a widespread concern. A fast-rising risk for this group is mission drift: the danger that MFIs will be driven away from their original social purposes by commercial interests.
Analysts Biggest
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Corporate governance Management quality Interest rates Managing technology Unrealisable expectations Mission drift Inappropriate regulation Ownership Strategy Transparency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Fastest risers
Competition Too much funding Interest rates Unrealisable expectations Natural catastrophes Strategy Staffing Managing technology Mission drift Foreign exchange
Analysts of the microfinance sector focused on the control aspects of MFIs: the quality of management, corporate governance, strategy and transparency. They see the biggest risks in the rise of competition both among MFIs and investors and a greater exposure to interest rate pressure. Generally, their interest lies with the longer term issues of MFI development such as regulation and ownership rather than with short term issues of credit risk and profitability. They were particularly concerned that microfinance might not be able to meet high investor expectations.
Fastest risers
Too much funding Competition Political interference Reputation Staffing Credit risk Unrealisable expectations Strategy Ownership Interest rates
Investors were interested in the control aspects of MFIs governance, management, staffing - and in broader issues of competition and political interference. As dollar investors, mostly, they are also sensitive to foreign exchange risk. One of their sharpest concerns is with competition from other investors: they see excessive funding as both a high and a rising risk. Their relative lack of concern with issues such as profitability suggests that they are taking a longer term view of the challenges facing the industry.
Fastest risers
Competition Staffing Ownership Corporate governance Political interference Strategy Interest rates Reputation Too much funding Unrealisable expectations
Observers of the microfinance scene (consultants, academics, regulators, lawyers etc) see the main risks lying with internal control issues: corporate governance, staffing, management, transparency, cost control and strategy. They see external risks in inappropriate regulation, pressure on interest rates and rising competition. A growing concern is the rise of political interference and reputational risk, particularly if MFIs fail to deliver on public expectations. They are less concerned than other groups with the problems posed by excessive funding.
10
Fastest risers
Competition Too much funding Unrealisable expectations Reputation Political interference Staffing Ownership Interest rates Strategy Mission drift
Respondents from the US and Canada, who included a large proportion of investors, saw the greatest risks lying in the areas of management of MFIs: corporate governance, management quality, staffing and transparency. They saw external risks in inappropriate regulation and market pressures such as interest rates and foreign exchange. They also focused strongly on the risks to MFI reputations from excessive public expectations and the danger of mission drift, both of which raised the danger of greater political interference.
Fastest risers
Competition Political interference Strategy Credit risk Interest rates Natural catastrophes Foreign exchange Staffing Ownership Fraud
Latin American respondents, who were mostly practitioners, focused closely on external factors bearing on their business: competition, regulatory and political pressures. Their high concern with interest rates reflected the growing commercial pressures to which they feel exposed. Their internal concerns were with improving the quality of the business through better management of costs and credit, by raising profitability, and by expanding the range of products they offer. This group also showed concern with the rising risk of fraud.
11
Biggest risks
Management quality Corporate governance Inappropriate regulation Staffing Cost control Fraud Managing technology Too much funding Transparency Strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Fastest risers
Competition Too much funding Credit risk Unrealisable expectations Staffing Interest rates Political interference Mission drift Reputation Corporate governance
European respondents, who consisted mostly of investors in West Europe and practitioners in East Europe, saw the greatest risks in internal management issues including corporate governance, staffing, cost control and strategy, though these were not necessarily seen to be the fastest rising risks. Concerns about inappropriate regulation were particularly strong in East Europe. The areas of rising risk are the growth of competition, both in business and funding. They also see rising risks in the areas of reputation and mission drift. This group showed a strong concern with fraud.
Fastest risers
Competition Corporate governance Management quality Managing technology Staffing Distribution channels Product development Profitability Strategy Back office operations
African respondents consisted mainly of practitioners and members of aid organisations and NGOs. They were the most concerned of any group about the scarcity of funding for microfinance in contrast to other regions which saw the risk lying in an overabundance. Management issues ranked high on their list, particularly staffing. Credit risk was also seen as a high level problem. African MFIs put profitability and cost control among their strongest concerns, and saw growing challenges in the areas of distribution channels and product development.
12
Biggest risks
Managing technology Management quality Corporate governance Staffing Competition Mission drift Fraud Reputation Strategy Credit risk 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Fastest risers
Competition Staffing Credit risk Mission drift Strategy Interest rates Fraud Product development Managing technology Corporate governance
The Asian response was strongly tilted towards practitioners who saw the biggest challenges lying in the area of management, particularly technology, and also staffing and corporate governance. The rise of competition is a top level concern. This group saw credit risk as a growing problem, as well as fraud. Reputation risk and mission drift were also among their worries. This group was less concerned than others with the problems of inappropriate regulation.
Far East
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Biggest risks
Foreign exchange Unrealisable expectations Cost control Competition Inappropriate regulation Management quality Political interference Credit risk Natural catastrophes Mission drift 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Fastest risers
Competition Ownership Credit risk Distribution channels Mission drift Political interference Staffing Too little funding Management quality Managing technology
Respondents from the Far East included microfinance practitioners, investors and NGOs. Their response was very different from other regions. It showed a stronger concern with operational issues such as foreign exchange risk than with the management themes highlighted by other groups. Many MFI respondents felt they faced growing political pressure because of the excessive expectations that were placed upon them. This group also showed a high concern with the impact of natural catastrophes, not surprising given the number of recent disasters.
13
Biggest risks
Staffing Capital availability Competition Inappropriate regulation Interest rates Mission drift Managing technology Corporate governance Macro-economic trends Political interference 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Fastest risers
Competition Mission drift Staffing Capital availability Interest rates Unrealisable expectations Inappropriate regulation Political interference Strategy Credit risk
Middle East respondents, who were mostly practitioners, showed less concern than other groups with high level management issues, apart from staffing shortages which are a problem the world over. Instead they focused on the growing competition in their region for business and capital, and the risk that MFIs will be diverted from their missions by mounting commercial pressures. MFIs in this group feel vulnerable to growing political interference. They also felt the most exposed of any group to economic trends at the macro level.
A full breakdown of the responses by type and region is given in Appendix 2 on p 38.
14
MFIs with poor MFIs with poor management management could be the could be the losers losers
Poor regulatory Poor regulatory structures are structures are blocking change blocking change in many countries in many countries
16
Most MFIs have Most MFIs have never been good never been good at controlling at controlling costs costs
17
18
7. Competition 7. Competition
Competition is is rising strongly and having a big impact on the microfinance sector, Competition rising strongly and having a big impact on the microfinance sector, though whether this is is good or bad is an open question. Practitioners are the most though whether this good or bad is an open question. Practitioners are the most worried about it:it: they put competition risk at the top of their list, notably in Latin worried about they put competition risk at the top of their list, notably in Latin America. But other respondents ranked it it much lower, investors at No. 17 and America. But other respondents ranked much lower, investors at No. 17 and analysts at at No. 18.All groups, however, saw it it strongly on the up. analysts No. 18. All groups, however, saw strongly on the up. The facts are that commercial banks, money lenders and consumer finance The facts are that commercial banks, money lenders and consumer finance companies are taking advantage ofof low entry barriers to move into MFI territory with companies are taking advantage low entry barriers to move into MFI territory with aggressive, well-funded campaigns, bringing market forces toto bear on hitherto aggressive, well-funded campaigns, bringing market forces bear on hitherto sacrosanct lending margins. sacrosanct lending margins. MFIs are also competing more strongly among MFIs are also competing more strongly among themselves. themselves. The downside is is that competition could undermine operating standards and erode The downside that competition could undermine operating standards and erode profitability. A A practitioner from Colombia saw bad practices and greater risk profitability. practitioner from Colombia saw bad practices and greater risk emerging inin the sector. Many respondents felt that competition was destroying the emerging the sector. Many respondents felt that competition was destroying the social purpose ofof microfinance by choking off the supply of finance to the most social purpose microfinance by choking off the supply of finance to the most neediest and encouraging overindebtedness ininthe creditworthy. neediest and encouraging overindebtedness the creditworthy. A Afrequent frequent complaint from Latin American practitioners was that new entrants were complaint from Latin American practitioners was that new entrants were prostituting the market. prostituting the market. One respondent from India blamed unethical One respondent from India blamed unethical competition. competition. Ganhuyag Ch. Hutagt, CEO ofof XacBank in Mongolia, said that Ganhuyag Ch. Hutagt, CEO XacBank in Mongolia, said that competitive pressures were pushing MFIs out ofof their traditional market [with] competitive pressures were pushing MFIs out their traditional market [with] abandonment ofof the poor as result. An African regulator described competition asas abandonment the poor as a a result. An African regulator described competition destructive. destructive. But many respondents saw competition asas good thing because it it brought down loan But many respondents saw competition a a good thing because brought down loan costs and encouraged innovation. costs and encouraged innovation. An investor inin India saw it delivering benefits An investor India saw it delivering benefits toto customers through lower interest rates and availability of loans. And while customers through lower interest rates and availability of loans. And while competition might squeeze individual MFIs, it it was good for the industry as whole. competition might squeeze individual MFIs, was good for the industry as a a whole. An analyst inin the Netherlands said: The industry should start to see this as normal. An analyst the Netherlands said: The industry should start to see this as normal.
Practitioners see Practitioners see competition as the competition as the greatest risk greatest risk
19
20
Loan default is Loan default is seen as aa seen as fast-rising risk fast-rising risk
Our respondents identified many reasons for the rising trend. One is is the growth in Our respondents identified many reasons for the rising trend. One the growth in lending capacity which is is leading to greater competition and through that to lower lending capacity which leading to greater competition and through that to lower credit standards and tighter margins. A A Mexican analyst warned: As markets credit standards and tighter margins. Mexican analyst warned: As markets become increasingly saturated, the risk ofof default is rising. A A bank regulator from become increasingly saturated, the risk default is rising. bank regulator from Central Africa noted the high rate ofof non-performing loans to several MFIs in her Central Africa noted the high rate non-performing loans to several MFIs in her territory. Banks are also taking on greater risk by extending their reach into territory. Banks are also taking on greater risk by extending their reach into unfamiliar markets and new product areas. unfamiliar markets and new product areas. A A consequence of growing commercial pressure is the spread of overindebtedness as consequence of growing commercial pressure is the spread of overindebtedness as MFIs push more loans on toto their customers.A A respondent from womens bank inin MFIs push more loans on their customers. respondent from a a womens bank Colombia warned ofof the high level of indebtedness in the microfinance sector. Colombia warned the high level of indebtedness in the microfinance sector. Elizabeth Marinelli ofof Norfund in Norway said the greatest risk in the coming years Elizabeth Marinelli Norfund in Norway said the greatest risk in the coming years was potentially a lack ofof proper portfolio monitoring and provisioning. was potentially a lack proper portfolio monitoring and provisioning. Some respondents noted that borrowers were getting the message about lower Some respondents noted that borrowers were getting the message about lower standards and had become more delinquent, running up debts toto several banks at standards and had become more delinquent, running up debts several banks at once. once. Group guarantees, traditionally the underpinning ofof individual Group guarantees, traditionally the underpinning individual creditworthiness, were also weakening. Philip Biswas, executive director ofof the creditworthiness, were also weakening. Philip Biswas, executive director the Rural Reconstruction Foundation inin Bangladesh, said the main risk we are currently Rural Reconstruction Foundation Bangladesh, said the main risk we are currently facing - and it'll bebe critical in future is is the duplication of different MFIs in the same facing - and it'll critical in future - - the duplication of different MFIs in the same area with the same borrowers. area with the same borrowers.
21
Can MFIs match Can MFIs match up to what is up to what is expected of them? expected of them?
The risk lies on two fronts. One is is that public expectations will be disappointed, The risk lies on two fronts. One that public expectations will be disappointed, leading toto political and regulatory backlash.The other is is that investors, drawn to leading political and regulatory backlash. The other that investors, drawn to microfinance by philanthropic oror commercial motives, will become cynical and go microfinance by philanthropic commercial motives, will become cynical and go elsewhere. Brigit Helms, a a project manager with the IFC in Cambodia, said that elsewhere. Brigit Helms, project manager with the IFC in Cambodia, said that once many ofof the new players seduced into the sector (the Gates and the JP once many the new players seduced into the sector (the Gates and the JP Morgans ofof this world, especially) realise that microfinance may not be able to Morgans this world, especially) realise that microfinance may not be able to resolve all the world's problems asas advertised, the disillusionment may cause them to resolve all the world's problems advertised, the disillusionment may cause them to withdraw their capital and support, toto the detriment to the sector as whole. withdraw their capital and support, the detriment to the sector as a a whole. The denouement could bebe even more dramatic: a few negative newspaper articles The denouement could even more dramatic: a few negative newspaper articles exposing mismanagement and corruption, oror researchers producing evidence that exposing mismanagement and corruption, researchers producing evidence that microfinance is is having minimal impact on poverty could severely damage the microfinance having minimal impact on poverty could severely damage the standing ofof the industry. Anne Hastings, director ofof Fonkoze in Haiti, said standing the industry. Anne Hastings, director Fonkoze in Haiti, said microfinances biggest risk was that it it will not be able to produce credible evidence microfinances biggest risk was that will not be able to produce credible evidence that it it does indeed reduce poverty. that does indeed reduce poverty. Many respondents said it it was up to the industry to respond to these risks by stressing Many respondents said was up to the industry to respond to these risks by stressing that microfinance was not a panacea, and by launching robust studies toto measure that microfinance was not a panacea, and by launching robust studies measure the investment and social performance ofof MFIs. the investment and social performance MFIs.
23
Loans for jewellery and cosmetics Loans for jewellery and cosmetics
Microfinance is isnow seen asasa ahighly profitable area in inwhich to toinvest, Microfinance now seen highly profitable area which invest, forgetting/ignoring that the clients behind the "profits" are people from very low forgetting/ignoring that the clients behind the "profits" are people from very low income sectors, living at at the margin and using microloans as way to to improve their income sectors, living the margin and using microloans as a a way improve their small incomes. This is is attracting many new profit-seeking players with access to small incomes. This attracting many new profit-seeking players with access to funding and technological advances that genuine microcredit players will find very funding and technological advances that genuine microcredit players will find very hard to to compete with. hard compete with. These new players are inducing "the poor" to to take out loans that carry very high These new players are inducing "the poor" take out loans that carry very high interest rates for short term consumer purposes, rather than for productive activities interest rates for short term consumer purposes, rather than for productive activities which require serious loan repayment capacity and lower interest rates. Consumer which require serious loan repayment capacity and lower interest rates. Consumer loans are going to to purchase luxury items such as jewellery, ornaments, perfumes and loans are going purchase luxury items such as jewellery, ornaments, perfumes and cosmetics, even "wellness" products that "poor women sell to to other "poor women". cosmetics, even "wellness" products that "poor women sell other "poor women". In In countries with large populations living below the poverty line (Mexico, Brazil, countries with large populations living below the poverty line (Mexico, Brazil, Argentina to to name few in in this region) this consumer lending mentality will seriously Argentina name a a few this region) this consumer lending mentality will seriously threaten the performance of of the microcredit sector and, more importantly, will threaten the performance the microcredit sector and, more importantly, will produce clients who are unable to to repay their loans, who end up in credit risk produce clients who are unable repay their loans, who end up in credit risk bureaux, and will never again have access to to a loan. In the meantime, the new bureaux, and will never again have access a loan. In the meantime, the new players will make enough profits soso that, when the going gets tough, they will get out players will make enough profits that, when the going gets tough, they will get out of of the market and no one will care about the many who are left in "civic death" on the the market and no one will care about the many who are left in "civic death" on the way. way. Pilar Ramirez Pilar Ramirez General manager General manager Locfund Locfund Bolivia Bolivia
The initial The initial objective is being objective is being brushed aside brushed aside
by little, toto MFIs putting profitability ahead of social development objectives. In by little, MFIs putting profitability ahead of social development objectives. In Syria, Namaan Adra, country manager ofof the Aga Khan Agency for Microfinance, Syria, Namaan Adra, country manager the Aga Khan Agency for Microfinance, feared that due toto pressure to be sustainable, MFIs will change their focus from feared that due pressure to be sustainable, MFIs will change their focus from poverty reduction totoprofit-making. This is iscompounded by the increase inin poverty reduction profit-making. This compounded by the increase competition from the commercial sector. Prakash Raj Sharma, general manager ofof competition from the commercial sector. Prakash Raj Sharma, general manager Nirdhan Utthan Bank inin Nepal, said that in the name of sustainability, some Nirdhan Utthan Bank Nepal, said that in the name of sustainability, some institutions are trying toto make themselves more commercialI think the challenge is institutions are trying make themselves more commercialI think the challenge is toto create balance between a pro-poor system and commercialisation. create a a balance between a pro-poor system and commercialisation. This Banana Skin provoked dozens ofof passionate responses, most of which blamed This Banana Skin provoked dozens passionate responses, most of which blamed return-hungry investors for turning up the commercial heat on MFIs. A A respondent return-hungry investors for turning up the commercial heat on MFIs. respondent from India said investors were pushing MFIs toto deliver faster growth at the cost of from India said investors were pushing MFIs deliver faster growth at the cost of sacrificing their reach totothe underprivileged community. sacrificing their reach the underprivileged community. Jerome Aba, a a Jerome Aba, microfinance expert at at PlaNet Finance in France, said that too many financiers are microfinance expert PlaNet Finance in France, said that too many financiers are imposing their diktats supposedly on the basis ofof sustainability. Malcolm Harper, imposing their diktats supposedly on the basis sustainability. Malcolm Harper, anan independent researcher, said that microfinance was in danger of becoming just independent researcher, said that microfinance was in danger of becoming just another exploitative business which will continue the trend towards growing another exploitative business which will continue the trend towards growing inequity, worldwide. inequity, worldwide.
24
MFIs are reluctant MFIs are reluctant to share to share fraud experience fraud experience
25
Neglecting the Neglecting the back endis not a a back endis not healthy trend healthy trend
Concerns focused particularly on larger MFIs which might be overwhelmed by rapid Concerns focused particularly on larger MFIs which might be overwhelmed by rapid growth or which put backback office upgrading low lowtheirtheir of priorities, though growth or which put office upgrading too too on on list list of priorities, though many smaller MFIs were also also seen todangerously under-equipped. many smaller MFIs were seen to be be dangerously under-equipped. Howard Howard Brady, president and and CEO of MFI Resources in US, US, said that system providers Brady, president CEO of MFI Resources in the the said that system providers are not doing a veryvery good of training and and implementing systems, and MFIs are are not doing a good job job of training implementing systems, and MFIs are not willing to pay the costs of a of a good MIS. The result is systems thatinferior and and not willing to pay the costs good MIS. The result is systems that are are inferior are heldheld together with frequent patches that create more problems. are together with frequent patches that create more problems. Maria Nerissa Cochingco, an MF MF consultantthe Philippines, said said that as the Maria Nerissa Cochingco, an consultant in in the Philippines, that as the volume of transaction increases, systems fail to adapt most of the time. C.O.C.O. Joby, volume of transaction increases, systems fail to adapt most of the time. Joby,
26
Gloomy responses on this issue tended toto come from investors in the developed Gloomy responses on this issue tended come from investors in the developed world rather than practitioners inin the developing. An investor inin the US said that world rather than practitioners the developing. An investor the US said that microfinances image was threatened by profits off high interest rates, misguided microfinances image was threatened by profits off high interest rates, misguided expectations and a lack ofof studies demonstrating the effectiveness of microfinance in expectations and a lack studies demonstrating the effectiveness of microfinance in
poverty alleviation. A A Dutch investor said that there was potential for backlash. poverty alleviation. Dutch investor said that there was potential for backlash. Jeremy Leach, executive director ofof FinMark Trust in South Africa, saw the risk of Jeremy Leach, executive director FinMark Trust in South Africa, saw the risk of consumer and regulatory backlash against (a) compulsory financial products (eg consumer and regulatory backlash against (a) compulsory financial products (eg credit life insurance) (b) high interest rates (c) sub-standard products (especially credit life insurance) (b) high interest rates (c) sub-standard products (especially contractual savings products). contractual savings products). Reports from practitioners tended toto be more upbeat. A A Latin American respondent Reports from practitioners tended be more upbeat. Latin American respondent said that the reputation ofof MFIs was safe so long as management was transparent said that the reputation MFIs was safe so long as management was transparent and profitable. and profitable.
28
Profitable growth is only possible for the Profitable growth top only possible is 50-75 MFIs for the top 50-75 MFIs
22. Profitability
But some respondents took issue with the fact that there was too much funding. A Colombian practitioner said: No scenario exists with that type of funding supply.
The profitability of MFIs is being squeezed by greater competition, though this is not seen as a risk everywhere. The picture painted by respondents was patchy with MFIs in some regions doing well, in others less so. Concerns were strongest in Latin America and of MFIsfollowed squeezed by greater competition, though this is not The profitability Africa, is being by Asia. seen as a risk everywhere. The picture painted by respondents was patchy with One respondent said the sector was rich in success storiesConcerns were strongest in but Jan Lamboo, CEO of MFIs in some regions doing well, in others less so. MFDAQ, the microfinance capital market, in Aruba, said that profitable growth was Latin America and Africa, followed by Asia. only possible for the top 50-75 MFIs. Many of the other 3,000 MFIs need to upgrade in all managerial aspectswasorder in success top. Abut Jan Lamboo, CEO of One respondent said the sector in rich to join the stories respondent from India said that increasing competition leading to in Aruba, said that profitable growthby MFDAQ, the microfinance capital market, falling interest rates, compounded was rising costs, is leading totop drop in MFIs. Many of the other 3,000 MFIs need to only possible for the a 50-75 margins. This sense of imminent profitability decline was widely shared. aspects in order to join the top. A respondent from India upgrade in all managerial said that increasing competition leading to falling interest rates, compounded by The need for MFIs to focusa more on margins. This sense of imminent profitability rising costs, is leading to drop in profitability was a strong message. Andrew Pospielovsky, widely shared. decline was general manager of Microfinance Bank of Azerbaijan, said that in order to ensure their long-term sustainability, MFIs have to ensure that they are profitable and MFIs to focus more on profitability technical assistance or Andrew The need for commercially viable without any was a strong message. other Pospielovsky, general manager of Microfinance Bank of Azerbaijan, said that in order to ensure their long-term sustainability, MFIs have to ensure that they are The Compartamos affair without any technical assistance or other profitable and commercially viable
Compartamos, the hugely successful Mexican MFI, is a living example that microfinance can be commercially viable. But has it done more harm than good? The Compartamos affair Founded in the 1990s, Compartamos grew at breathtaking speed, achieving annual Compartamos, the hugely successful Mexican MFI, is a living example that growth rates of 50 per cent and profits of $50m a year. By the time it was floated on microfinance can be commercially viable. But has it done more harm than good? the public markets in April 2007, it had over 600,000 borrowers. The flotation valued the bank at over $400m and made many of its shareholders millionaires. Founded in the 1990s, Compartamos grew at breathtaking speed, achieving annual growth rates of 50 per cent and profits of $50m a year. By the time it was floated on But Compartamos also acquired a reputation for aggressive business tactics, charging the public markets in April 2007, it had over 600,000 borrowers. The flotation valued its borrowers over 100 per cent a year, all of which made it highly controversial among the bank at over $400m and made many of its shareholders millionaires. our respondents.
22. Profitability
But Compartamos also acquired a reputation for aggressive business tactics, charging Although many argued that MFIs must become more commercial, they feared that its borrowers over 100 per cent a year, all of which made it highly controversial among Compartamos had damaged the industrys image and stoked investor expectations up our respondents. to unrealistic levels. A backlash might be in the offing. A US investor saw the danger of greater political interference due to deals like the Compartamos IPO where super Although many argued that MFIs must become more commercial, they feared that high profits are made on the back of very high interest rates. Richard Rosenberg, a Compartamos had damaged the industrys image and stoked investor expectations up senior adviser with CGAP, said that the disastrous publicity generated by to unrealistic levels. A backlash might be in the offing. A US investor saw the danger Compartamos showed that the industry needed to strike a better balance in its of greater political interference due to deals like the Compartamos IPO where super double bottom line. high profits are made on the back of very high interest rates. Richard Rosenberg, a senior adviser with CGAP, said that the disastrous publicity generated by But others drew encouragement from the strong commercial message in Compartamos showed that the industry needed to strike a better balance in its Compartamos. A South African analyst said that successful MFI flotations would double bottom line. attract private capital to the sector. This is a good thing as long as it does not mean exploitation of the end client through very high interest rates. What the sector needs But others drew encouragement from the strong commercial message in is more competition to keep services appropriate and affordable, but also profitable. Compartamos. A South African analyst said that successful MFI flotations would attract private capital to the sector. This is a good thing as long as it does not mean CSFI / New York CSFI E-mail: info@csfi.org.uk exploitation of the end client through very high interest rates. What the sector needs Web: www.csfi.org.uk 29 is more competition to keep services appropriate and affordable, but also profitable.
There is aa need There is need to manage for to manage for the eventual the eventual downturn downturn
What about the global credit crunch? What about the global credit crunch?
Although MFIs are traditionally seen to to be insulated from trends in global markets, Although MFIs are traditionally seen be insulated from trends in global markets, that could change asas they become more integrated with mainstream banking and that could change they become more integrated with mainstream banking and therefore more vulnerable to to contagion. Several respondents raised the risk that therefore more vulnerable contagion. Several respondents raised the risk that liquidity and investment might become harder for MFIs if global markets continue to to liquidity and investment might become harder for MFIs if global markets continue deteriorate. A A Canadian economist said that this could have direct impact onon the deteriorate. Canadian economist said that this could have a a direct impact the cost of of capital for microfinance institutions leading to slow down in in the growth of the cost capital for microfinance institutions leading to a a slow down the growth of the sector. sector. If If MFIs suffer, they will also lose one of their investment appeals: lack of correlation MFIs suffer, they will also lose one of their investment appeals: lack of correlation with global markets. In In this case they would have to find other elements of with global markets. this case they would have to find other elements of attractiveness to to compensate, according to one MFI investor. Such a a dose of attractiveness compensate, according to one MFI investor. Such dose of reality might bebe healthy for an overfed industry, said another. reality might healthy for an overfed industry, said another.
30
31
If funding problems exist for MFIs, they are very selective. Respondents singled out MFIs problems small, unprofitable, are very selective. in remote areas, or If fundingwhich wereexist for MFIs, they unregulated or located Respondents singled those with exclusive small, unprofitable, unregulated or located in remote Some out MFIs which were missions that were unlikely to become commercial. areas, or funding-starved institutions also operate unlikely to become commercial. or those with exclusive missions that werein countries with inhibiting politicalSome regulatory environments, particularly in Africa where large numbers of political or MFIs are funding-starved institutions also operate in countries with inhibiting very small, non-viable and non-profitable according to large numbers regulatory environments, particularly in Africa whereone respondent. of MFIs are very small, non-viable and non-profitable according to one respondent. In Bangladesh, Moiz Ahmed Chowdhury, chief financial officer of the Shakti Foundation for Moiz Ahmed Chowdhury, chief financial officer of financial In Bangladesh,Disadvantaged Women, said local MFIs had only limited the Shakti resources for Disadvantaged Women, said Due to this scarcity, he said, financial Foundationto meet unlimited client demand. local MFIs had only limited many of our clients are unlimited client demand. Due to this scarcity, he said that resources to meetleaving our organization. A practitioner in Guatemalasaid, many financial resources to take of our clients are leavingon more customers will be limited.in Guatemala said that our organization. A practitioner
financial resources to take on more customers will be limited. Several respondents also said that the overabundance of funding for top tier MFIs was not trickling down to tiers two and three, though this was often because MFIs Several respondents also said that the overabundance of funding for top tier MFIs were reluctant to come to terms with market forces or obtain credit ratings which was not trickling down to tiers two and three, though this was often because MFIs might open the door to capital investment. were reluctant to come to terms with market forces or obtain credit ratings which might open the door to capital investment.
33
34
Just over a quarter Just over a quarter of of respondents respondents say that MFIs are say that MFIs are well prepared to to well prepared handle risks handle risks
two two thirds gave a mixed response, mainly because they differentiated between large thirds gave a mixed response, mainly because they differentiated between large MFIs which were on the whole better prepared thanthan small ones, or because they saw MFIs which were on the whole better prepared small ones, or because they saw some countries offering a better operating environment thanthan others. some countries offering a better operating environment others. The The breakdowntypetype of respondent shows a quarter of practitioners and analysts breakdown by by of respondent shows a quarter of practitioners and analysts thinking that that MFIs were well prepared, onlyonly a fifth of investors. Investors also thinking MFIs were well prepared, but but a fifth of investors. Investors also led led those who gave a mixed rating. Practitioners led led the (small) number of those who gave a mixed rating. Practitioners the (small) number of respondents whowho thought they were poorly prepared. respondents thought they were poorly prepared.
Many respondents felt felt that present trends competition, commercialisation and and Many respondents that present trends of of competition, commercialisation growing dependence on management and and technological skills would widen gap gap growing dependence on management technological skills would widen the the between MFIs that that were well prepared those that that were not. between MFIs were well prepared and and those were not.
35
CSFI
5, Derby Street, London W1J 7AB, UK Tel: +44 (0)20 7493 0173 Fax: +44 (0)20 7493 0190
Question 1. Please describe the main risks you see facing the microfinance industry (both
individual institutions and the sector as a whole) over the next two to three years.
36
Trend
Rising Steady Falling
Comment
Question 3. How well prepared do you think your own and other institutions are to handle
the risks you have identified? Poorly Mixed Well
37
Sector breakdowns
Analysts Corporate governance Management quality Interest rates Managing technology Unrealisable expectations Mission drift Inappropriate regulation Ownership Strategy Transparency Staffing Back office operations Product development Credit risk Foreign exchange Liquidity Political interference Competition Cost control Fraud Capital availability Too much funding Refinancing Too little funding Reputation Distribution channels Natural catastrophes Profitability Macro-economic trends Competition Too much funding Interest rates Unrealisable expectations Natural catastrophes Strategy Staffing Managing technology Mission drift Foreign exchange Liquidity Inappropriate regulation Fraud Political interference Credit risk Ownership Product development Refinancing Reputation Distribution channels Back office operations Corporate governance Management quality Cost control Profitability Macro-economic trends Capital availability Too little funding Transparency Investors Management quality Corporate governance Foreign exchange Inappropriate regulation Staffing Too much funding Political interference Managing technology Interest rates Unrealisable expectations Reputation Transparency Back office operations Cost control Ownership Credit risk Competition Fraud Liquidity Profitability Strategy Mission drift Macro-economic trends Distribution channels Refinancing Natural catastrophes Product development Capital availability Too little funding Too much funding Competition Political interference Reputation Staffing Credit risk Unrealisable expectations Strategy Ownership Interest rates Distribution channels Mission drift Corporate governance Fraud Managing technology Natural catastrophes Product development Management quality Foreign exchange Transparency Cost control Macro-economic trends Inappropriate regulation Profitability Back office operations Liquidity Refinancing Too little funding Capital availability Observers Corporate governance Staffing Management quality Transparency Inappropriate regulation Interest rates Competition Cost control Managing technology Strategy Back office operations Reputation Unrealisable expectations Ownership Too much funding Political interference Fraud Credit risk Liquidity Distribution channels Product development Capital availability Mission drift Natural catastrophes Profitability Foreign exchange Refinancing Macro-economic trends Too little funding Competition Staffing Ownership Corporate governance Political interference Strategy Interest rates Reputation Too much funding Unrealisable expectations Credit risk Mission drift Managing technology Cost control Fraud Product development Back office operations Inappropriate regulation Distribution channels Management quality Profitability Natural catastrophes Transparency Macro-economic trends Foreign exchange Capital availability Refinancing Liquidity Too little funding
38
39
40
Africa
Angola Benin Cameroon Ethiopia GuineaConakry Rwanda South Africa Uganda Zimbabwe
Asia
Afghanistan Azerbaijan Bangladesh India Kyrgyzstan Mongolia Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Tajikistan
Europe
Albania Belgium Bosnia & Herzegovina Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Kosovo Luxembourg Montenegro Netherlands Norway Romania Russia Slovakia Sweden Switzerland UK
Far East
Australia Cambodia China Hong Kong Philippines
Middle East
Egypt Jordan Lebanon Morocco Palestine Sudan Syria United Arab Emirates
41
CSFI PUBLICATIONS 1. Financing the Russian safety net: A proposal for Western funding of social security in Russia, coupled with guarantee fund for Western investors. By Peter Ackerman/Edward Balls. September 1993 Derivatives for the retail client: A proposal to permit retail investors access to the risk management aspects of financial derivatives, currently available only at the wholesale level. By Andrew Dobson. Nov 1993 (Only photostat available) Rating environmental risk: A proposal for a new rating scheme that would assess a companys environmental exposure against its financial ability to manage that exposure. By David Lascelles. December 1993 Electronic share dealing for the private investor: An examination of new ways to broaden retail share ownership, inter alia, by utilising ATM networks, PCs, etc. By Paul Laird. January 1994 The IBM dollar: A proposal for the wider use of target currencies, i.e. forms of public or private money that can be used only for specific purposes. By Edward de Bono. March 1994 UK financial supervision: A radical proposal for reform of UK financial regulation, (prepared pseudononymously by a senior commercial banker). May 1994 Banking banana skins: The first in a periodic series of papers looking at where the next financial crisis is likely to spring from. June 1994 A new approach to capital adequacy for banks: A proposal for a market-based alternative, using the concept of value-at-risk, to the present mechanistic Basle approach to setting bank capital requirements. By Charles Taylor. July 1994 New forms of Euro-Arab cooperation: A proposal for a new public/private development finance corporation to promote employment-generating projects in the Arab world. By Jacques Roger-Machart. October 1994 Banking banana skins II: Four leading UK bankers and a senior corporate treasurer discuss lessons for the future from the last banking crisis. November 1994 IBM/CSFI essay prize: The two winning essays for the 1994 IBM/CSFI Prize. November 1994 Liquidity ratings for bonds: A proposed methodology for measuring the liquidity of issues by scoring the most widely accepted components, and aggregating them into a liquidity rating. By Ian Mackintosh. January 1995 Banks as providers of information security services: Banks have a privileged position as transmitters of secure data: they should make a business of it. By Nick Collin. February 1995 An environmental risk rating for Scottish Nuclear: An experimental rating of a nuclear utility. By David Lascelles. March 1995 EMU Stage III: The issues for banks: Banks may be underestimating the impact of Maastrichts small print. By Malcolm Levitt. May 1995 Bringing market-driven regulation to European banking: A proposal for eliminating systemic banking risk by using cross-guarantees. By Bert Ely (Only photostat available). July 1995 The City under threat: A leading French journalist worries about complacency in the City of London. By Patrick de Jacquelot. July 1995 The UK building societies: Do they have a future?: A collection of essays on the future of UK building societies and mutuality. September 1995 (Only photostat available). Options and currency intervention: A radical proposal on the use of currency option strategies for central banks. By Charles Taylor. October 1995 Twin peaks: A regulatory structure for the new century A proposal to reform UK financial regulation by splitting systemic concerns from those involving consumer protection. By Michael Taylor. December 1995 Banking banana skins III: The findings of a survey of senior UK figures into where the perceived risks in the financial system lie. March 1996 Welfare: A radical rethink - The Personal Welfare Plan: A proposal (by a banker) for the private funding of health, education, unemployment etc. through a lifetime fund. By Andrew Dobson. May 1996 Peak Practice: How to reform the UKs regulatory structure. Implementing Twin Peaks. By Michael Taylor. October 1996 Central bank intervention: a new approach: A radical approach to central bank intervention without foreign exchange reserves. By Neil Record. November 1996 40/$65
2.
10/$15
3.
25/$40
4.
25/$40
5.
15/$25
6.
25/$40
7.
25/$40
8.
25/$40
9.
25/$40
10.
25/$40
11. 12.
10/$15 25/$40
13.
25/$40
17. 18.
25/$35 10/$15
19. 20.
20/$35 25/$40
21.
25/$40
22.
25/$40
23. 24.
25/$40 25/$40
25.
The Crash of 2003: An EMU fairy tale.: An all too plausible scenario of what might happen if EMU precedes economic convergence. By David Lascelles. December 1996 Banking Banana Skins: 1997: A further survey showing how bankers might slip up over the next two or three years. April 1997 Foreign currency exotic option: A trading simulator for innovation dealers in foreign currency (with disc). Winner of the 1997 ISMA/CSFI Prize for financial innovation. By Stavros Pavlou. September 1997 Call in the red braces brigade... The case for electricity derivatives: Why the UK needs an electricity derivatives market, and how it can be achieved. By Ronan Palmer and Anthony White. November 1997 The fall of Mulhouse Brand: The City of Londons oldest merchant bank collapses, triggering a global crisis. Can the regulators stave off the disaster? A financial thriller based on a simulation conducted by the CSFI, with Euromoney and PA Consulting Group, to test the international system of banking regulation. By David Shirreff. December 1997
25/$40
26. 27.
25/$40 25/$40
28.
25/$40
29.
25/$40
30. Credit where credit is due: Bringing microfinance into the mainstream: Can lending small amounts of money to poor peasants ever be a mainstream business for institutional investors? By Peter Montagnon. February 1998 31. 32. 33. Emerald City Bank... Banking in 2010: The future of banking by eminent bankers, economists and technologists. March 1998. (Only photostat available). Banking Banana Skins: 1998: The fifth survey of possible shocks to the system. July 1998 Mutuality for the 21st Century: The former Building Societies Commissioner argues the case for mutuality, and proposes a new legislative framework to enable it to flourish. By Rosalind Gilmore. July 1998 The role of macroeconomic policy in stock return predictability: The 1998 ISMA/CSFI prizewinning dissertation analyses how government policies affect stock values in markets in Japan and the Far East. By Nandita Manrakhan. August 1998 Cybercrime: tracing the evidence: A working group paper on how to combat Internet-related crime. By Rosamund McDougall. September 1998 The Internet in ten years time: a CSFI survey: A survey of opinions about where the Internet is going, what the main obstacles are and who the winners/losers are likely to be. November 1998 Le Prix de lEuro Competition between London, Paris and Frankfurt: This report sizes up Europes leading financial centres at the launch of monetary union. February 1999 Psychology and the City: Applications to trading, dealing and investment analysis: A social psychologist looks at irrationality in the financial services sector. By Denis Hilton. April 1999
25/$40
34.
25/$40
35. 36.
6/$10 25/$40
37.
25/$40
38.
25/$40
39. Quant & Mammon: Meeting the Citys requirements for post-graduate research and skills in financial engineering. A study for the EPSRC on the supply of and demand for quantitative finance specialists in the UK, and on potential areas of City/academic collaboration. By David Lascelles. April 1999 40. A market comparable approach to the pricing of credit default swaps. Winner of the 1999 ISMA/CSFI prize for financial innovation. By Tim Townend. November 1999 Europes new banks: The non-bank phenomenon. A report for euro-FIET on the threat posed by new technology to European banks traditional franchise. By David Lascelles. November 1999
25/$40
25/$40
41.
25/$40
42. In and Out: Maximising the benefits/minimising the costs of (temporary or permanent) non-membership of EMU. A look at how the UK can make the best of its ambivalent euro-status. November 1999 43. Reinventing the Commonwealth Development Corporation under Public-Private Partnership. By Sir Michael McWilliam, KCMG. March 2000
25/$40
44. Internet Banking: A fragile flower Pricking the consensus by asking whether retail banking really is the Internets killer app. By Andrew Hilton. April 2000 45. 46. Banking Banana Skins 2000 The CSFIs latest survey of what UK bankers feel are the biggest challenges facing them. June 2000 iX: Better or just Bigger? A sceptical look at the proposed merger between the Deutsche Boerse and the London Stock Exchange. By Andrew Hilton and David Lascelles. August 2000 Bridging the equity gap: a new proposal for virtual local equity markets A proposal for local stock exchanges, combining Internet technology and community investment. By Tim Mocroft and Keith Haarhoff. Waking up to the FSA How the City views its new regulator. By David Lascelles. May 2001
47.
25/$40
48.
25/$40
49. 50.
The Short-Term Price Effects of Popular Share Recommendations Winner of the 2001 ISMA/CSFI Essay Prize. By Bill McCabe. September 2001 Bumps on the road to Basel: An anthology of views on Basel 2 This colleaction of sixteen (very brief) essays offers a range of views on Basel 2. Edited by Andrew Hilton. January 2002 Banana Skins 2002: A CSFI survey of risks facing banks What bankers are worrying about at the beginning of 2002. Sponsored by PricewaterhouseCoopers. By David Lascelles. February 2002 Single stock futures: the ultimate derivative A look at a new product being introduced almost simultaneously on each side of the Atlantic. By David Lascelles. February 2002. Harvesting Technology: Financing technology-based SMEs in the UK DTI Foresight sponsored report, which examines what has been done (and what will be done) on the financing tech-based SMEs. By Craig Pickering. April 2002
25/$40 25/$40
51.
25/$40
52.
25/$40
53.
25/$40
54. Waiting for Ariadne: A suggestion for reforming financial services regulation A new proposal for fund management. By Kevin James. July 2002 55. Clearing and settlement: Monopoly or market? An argument for breaking the monopoly mindset for ACHs. By Tim Jones. October 2002. ISBN 0-9543145-1-4.
56. The future of financial advice in a post-polarisation marketplace A discussion of the structure of financial advice post-CP121 and post-Sandler, with support from Accenture. By Stuart Fowler. November 2002. ISBN 0-9543145-2-2 57. Capitalism without owners will fail: A policymakers guide to reform A comprehensive look at the debate over transatlantic corporate governance, with detailed recommendations. By Robert Monks and Allen Sykes. November 2002. ISBN 0-953145-3-0. Who speaks for the city? Trade associations galore A survey of trade association effectiveness. By David Lascelles and Mark Boleat. November 2002. ISBN 0-9583145-4-9. A new general approach to capital adequacy: A simple and comprehensive alternative to Basel 2 By Charles Taylor. December 2002. ISBN 0-9583145-4-9. Thinking not ticking: Bringing competition to the public interest audit A paper discussing how the system for auditing large company financial statements can be made better. By Jonathan Hayward. April 2003. ISBN 0-9543145-6-5. Basel Lite: recommendations for the European implementation of the new Basel accord By Alistair Milne. April 2003. ISBN 0-954145-8-1.
25/$40/40
61.
62. Pensions in crisis? Restoring confidence: A note on a conference held on February 26, 2003 May 2003. ISBN 0-954145-7-3. 63. The global FX industry: coping with consolidation Sponsored by Reuters. By Christopher Swann. May 2003. ISBN 0-9545208-0-7. Banana Skins 2003 What bankers were worrying about in the middle of 2003. Sponsored by PricewaterhouseCoopers. By David Lascelles. September 2003. ISBN 0-9545208-1-5. The curse of the corporate state: Saving capitalism from itself: A proposal, by a leading US corporate activist, for winning back control of the political process from big corporations, and for giving stakeholders a real say in how business is run. By Bob Monks. January 2004. ISBN 0-9545208-2-3. Companies cannot do it alone: An investigation into UK management attitudes to Company Voluntary Arrangements A survey into why CVAs (the UKs equivalent of the US Chapter XI) have failed to take off. By Tim Mocroft (with Graham Telling and Roslyn Corney). July 2004. ISBN 0-9545208-3-1.
64.
25/$45/40
65.
25/$45/40
66.
25/$45/40
67. Regulation of the non-life insurance industry: Why is it so damn difficult? A serious look at the problems of regulating insurance by a senior practitioner. It is not like banking. By Shirley Beglinger. November 2004. ISBN 0-9545208-4-X. 68. Betting on the future: Online gambling goes mainstream financial A look at the future of online gambling and its convergence with conventional finance - particularly insurance. By Michael Mainelli and Sam Dibb. December 2004. ISBN 0-9545208-5-8. 69. Banana Skins 2005 Our latest survey of where bankers, regulators and journalists see the next problems coming from. Sponsored by PricewaterhouseCoopers. By David Lascelles. February 2005. ISBN 0-9545208-6-6. Not waving but drowning: Over-indebtedness by misjudgement A former senior banker takes an iconoclastic look at the bottom end of the consumer credit market. By Antony Elliott. March 2005. ISBN 0-9545208-7-4. Surviving the dogfood years: Solutions to the pensions crisis New thinking in the pensions area (together with a nifty twist by Graham Cox). By John Godfrey (with an appendix by Graham Cox). April 2005. ISBN 0-9545208-8.
25/$45/40
25/$45/40
25/$45/40
70.
25/$45/40
71.
25/$45/40
72. The perversity of insurance accounting: In defence of finite re-insurance An industry insider defends finite re-insurance as a rational response to irrational demands. By Shirley Beglinger. September 2005. ISBN 0-9545208-9-0.
25/$45/40
73.
Banking Banana Skins 2006 The latest survey of risks facing the banking industry. Sponsored by PricewaterhouseCoopers. By David Lascelles. April 2006. ISBN 0-9551811-0-0. Big Bang: Two decades on City experts who lived through Big Bang discuss the lasting impact of the de-regulation of Londons securities markets. Sponsored by Clifford Chance. February 2007. ISBN 978-0-9551811-1-5. Insurance Banana Skins 2007 A survey of the risks facing the insurance industry. Sponsored by PricewaterhouseCoopers. By David Lascelles. May 2007. ISBN 978-0-9551811-3-9. Principles in Practice An antidote to regulatory prescription. The report of the CSFI Working Group on Effective Regulation. June 2007. ISBN 978-0-9551811-2-2. Web 2.0: How the next generation of the Internet is changing financial services. By Patrick Towell, Amanda Scott and Caroline Oates. September 2007. ISBN 978-0-9551811-4-6. A tough nut... Basel 2, insurance and the law of unexpected consequences. By Shirley Beglinger. September 2007. ISBN 978-0-9551811-5-3. Informal money transfers: Economic links between UK diaspora groups and recipients back home. By David Seddon. November 2007. ISBN 978-0-9551811-5-3.
25/$45/40
74.
25/$45/40
75.
25/$45/40
76.
25/$50/40
Sponsorship
The CSFI receives general support from many public and private institutions, and that support takes different forms. In 2007 and the first quarter of 2008, we received unrestricted financial support from:
Barclays Group Citigroup JPMorgan Chase Abbey Aberdeen Asset Management Accenture Alliance & Leicester AVIVA plc AXA Bank of England BT Global Building Societies Association City of London Euroclear SA/NV Deloitte DTCC DTI Ernst & Young Euronext.liffe Eversheds Fidelity Investments Finance and Leasing Association Financial Services Authority Fitch Ratings Futures & Options Association Halifax plc 1776 Consulting Association of Corporate Treasurers Bank of Italy Banking Code Standards Board Brigade Electronics Chown Dewhurst LLP FSA Solutions International Financial Services, London Morgan Stanley International PricewaterhouseCoopers HM Treasury HSBC Holdings plc International Capital Market Association KPMG Law Debenture Corporation plc Lloyds of London Lloyds TSB LogicaCMG London Stock Exchange Man Group plc McKinsey & Co Monitise Moodys Investors Service Ltd Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research PA Consulting Prudential plc Record Currency Management Reuters Royal Bank of Scotland Standard & Poors Swiss Re Z/Yen Zurich Financial Services LandesBank Berlin Lombard Street Research NM Rothschild & Sons The Housing Finance Corporation The Share Centre Threadneedle Investments Watson Wyatt Winterflood Securities Limited
We also received important support in kind from, inter alia: EFG Private Bank Financial Times GISE AG Linklaters The CSFI also received special purpose support during 2007/08 from, inter alia: Bank of America BVCA Brunswick Group CGAP Citigroup Cityforum Clifford Chance Edgar Miller Farrer & Co FOA ifs School of Finance International Capital Market Association JPMorgan Martin Hall Morgan Stanley Open Europe Optimum Population Trust PricewaterhouseCoopers
CSFI
Registered Charity Number 1017353 Registered Office: North House, 198 High Street, Tonbridge, Kent TN9 1BE Registered in England and Wales limited by guarantee. Number 2788116