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BP Energy Outlook 2030 London, January 2012

BP Energy Outlook 2030

London, January 2012

Disclaimer

Disclaimer This presentation contains forward-looking statements, particularly those regarding global economic growth,

This presentation contains forward-looking statements, particularly those regarding global economic growth, population growth, energy consumption, policy support for renewable energies and sources of energy supply. Forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties because they relate to events, and depend on circumstances, that will or may occur in the future. Actual results may differ depending on a variety of factors, including product supply, demand and pricing; political stability; general economic conditions; legal and regulatory developments; availability of new technologies; natural disasters and adverse weather conditions; wars and acts of terrorism or sabotage; and other factors discussed elsewhere in this presentation.

Contents

Contents   Page Introduction 4 Global energy trends 7 Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 21 Key
 

Page

Introduction

4

Global energy trends

7

Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel

21

Key determinants

43

Risks and unknowns

73

Appendix

83

Welcome to the 2012 edition of BP’s Energy Outlook 2030.

Welcome to the 2012 edition of BP’s Energy Outlook 2030 . This is the second year
Welcome to the 2012 edition of BP’s Energy Outlook 2030 . This is the second year

This is the second year in which BP has made our outlook for global energy available to the public. I am glad to see this decision was endorsed by the response we received to last year’s edition, which was downloaded over 36,000 times from BP’s website.

I was particularly pleased at this response because I strongly believe that sharing the data and analysis of the Energy Outlook – and of our annual Statistical Review of World Energy – is part of our responsibility to inform the discussions on energy that are occurring in companies, governments, and over dinner tables worldwide.

This Energy Outlook contains our projections of future energy trends and key uncertainties, based on our views of the evolution of the world economy, of policy, and technology.This is our view of the most likely outcome for world energy supply and demand to 2030; it is not necessarily the energy world we at BP wish to see.

This year we examine in more detail several important facets of the global energy story:

the pathways for economic development and energy demand in China and India; the factors affecting the energy export prospects of the Middle East; and the “drivers” of energy consumption in road transportation.

As always, the numbers that make up this outlook point to long term trends and highlight potential decision points or “fault lines” in the system; in short, their job is to convey the underlying challenges and opportunities we all face in producing and consuming energy.

Our job is to unlock this story from the numbers. For example, this outlook highlights
Our job is to unlock this story from the numbers. For example, this outlook highlights

Our job is to unlock this story from the numbers. For example, this outlook highlights the critical role that fossil fuels will continue to play in the world’s energy mix, even as

renewable energy sources continue their rapid growth. While this has inescapable implications for the likely path of carbon emissions, the outlook also highlights the opportunities for improving energy efficiency and “lightening the carbon load” by switching to less carbon-intensive fuels such as natural gas.

The outlook also challenges some long-held beliefs. Significant changes in US supply and demand prospects, for example, highlight the likelihood that import dependence (in what is today’s largest energy importer) will decline substantially.

Perhaps most important to me is how the outlook reminds us that we are all connected. Global energy trade continues to grow rapidly, linking the world’s economies and driving a remarkable convergence of the relationship between energy use and economic activity in countries around the world.

These are changes for the better.They are market driven, and while they need the support of well-designed policies, they represent a key reason why I feel optimistic about the world’s ability to meet the challenge of providing energy that is affordable, secure, sustainable and of course safe.

We hope you find the 2012 edition of the BP Energy Outlook 2030 a useful addition to the global energy discussion.

Bob Dudley

Group Chief Executive

Note on method and assumptions

Note on method and assumptions This edition updates our view of the likely path of global

This edition updates our view of the likely path of global energy markets to 2030, taking account of developments over the past year. The underlying methodology remains unchanged – we make assumptions on changes in policy, technology and the economy, based on extensive internal and external consultations, and use a range of analytical tools to build a “to the best of our knowledge” view.Note on method and assumptions We focus on the “most likely” base case numbers, to provide

We focus on the “most likely” base case numbers, to provide a basis for discussion. Of course the future is uncertain, and in the process of building the Outlook we explore the impact of alternative assumptions. While we do touch on some of the key uncertainties, the treatment of energy market risks here is by no means exhaustive.tools to build a “to the best of our knowledge” view. Unless noted otherwise, data definitions

Unless noted otherwise, data definitions are based on the BP Statistical Review of World Energy, and historical energy data through 2010 is consistent with BP Statistical Review of World Energy, and historical energy data through 2010 is consistent with the 2011 edition of the Review . Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is expressed in real Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. All data sources are listed on page 88.

Contents

Contents   Page Introduction 4 Global energy trends 7 Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 21 Key
 

Page

Introduction

4

Global energy trends

7

Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel

21

Key determinants

43

Risks and unknowns

73

Appendix

83

Key assumptions are population and GDP growth…

Key assumptions are population and GDP growth… Global growth rates % p.a. 4% 3% GDP 2%

Global growth rates

% p.a.

4%

3%

GDP

2%

Population

Energy

1%

Energy per capita

0%

Energy per GDP

-1%

-2%

1970-1990

1990-2010

2010-2030

…and a key outcome is accelerating energy efficiency

…and a key outcome is accelerating energy efficiency Population and income remain the key drivers of

Population and income remain the key drivers of energy demand.…and a key outcome is accelerating energy efficiency Over the last 20 years the global population

Over the last 20 years the global population has increased by 1.6 billion people, but the growth rate is trending down. We project population growth of 1.4 billion over the next 20 years (or 0.9% p.a.).and income remain the key drivers of energy demand. Global GDP growth is likely to accelerate,

Global GDP growth is likely to accelerate, driven by low and medium income economies. We project GDP growth to rise over the next 20 years, to 3.7% p.a. from 3.2% p.a. between 1990 and 2010. This implies accelerating growth of income per capita.growth of 1.4 billion over the next 20 years (or 0.9% p.a.). Energy efficiency – measured

Energy efficiency – measured broadly as energy per unit of GDP – will continue to improve globally, at an accelerating rate of 2.0% p.a., vs. 1.2% p.a. over the past 20 years. This acceleration restrains the overall growth of primary energy consumption.2010. This implies accelerating growth of income per capita. Primary energy consumption growth to 2030 decelerates

Primary energy consumption growth to 2030 decelerates to 1.6% p.a. (compared to 2.0% p.a. the last 20 years); energy consumption per capita grows at 0.7% p.a., about the same rate as it has since 1970.years. This acceleration restrains the overall growth of primary energy consumption. Energy Outlook 2030 9 ©

Non-OECD economies drive energy consumption growth…

Non-OECD economies drive energy consumption growth… Billion toe 18 15 12 9 Non-OECD Non-OECD 6 3
Billion toe 18 15 12 9 Non-OECD Non-OECD 6 3 OECD OECD 0 1990 2000
Billion toe
18
15
12
9
Non-OECD Non-OECD
6
3
OECD OECD
0
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030
Billion toe 18 15 Renewables 12 Hydro Nuclear 9 Coal 6 Gas Oil 3 0
Billion toe
18
15
Renewables
12
Hydro
Nuclear
9
Coal
6
Gas
Oil
3
0
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030

*

*Includes biofuels

Energy Outlook 2030

10

© BP 2012

…as the fuel mix gradually shifts away from oil and coal

…as the fuel mix gradually shifts away from oil and coal World primary energy consumption is

World primary energy consumption is projected to grow by 1.6% p.a. over the period 2010 to 2030, adding 39% to global consumption by 2030. The growth rate declines, from 2.5% p.a. over the past decade, to 2.0% p.a. over the next decade, and 1.3% p.a. from 2020 to 2030.…as the fuel mix gradually shifts away from oil and coal Almost all (96%) of the

Almost all (96%) of the growth is in non-OECD countries. By 2030 non-OECD energy consumption is 69% above the 2010 level, with growth averaging 2.7% p.a. (or 1.6% p.a. per capita), and it accounts for 65% of world consumption (compared to 54% in 2010).p.a. over the next decade, and 1.3% p.a. from 2020 to 2030. OECD energy consumption in

OECD energy consumption in 2030 is just 4% higher than in 2010, with growth averaging 0.2% p.a. to 2030. OECD energy consumption per capita is on a declining trend (-0.2% p.a. 2010-30).for 65% of world consumption (compared to 54% in 2010). The fuel mix changes slowly, due

The fuel mix changes slowly, due to long gestation periods and asset lifetimes. Gas and non-fossil fuels gain share at the expense of coal and oil.The fastest growing fuels are renewables (including biofuels) which are expected to grow at 8.2% p.a. 2010-30; among fossil fuels, gas grows the fastest (2.1% p.a.), oil the slowest (0.7% p.a.).OECD energy consumption per capita is on a declining trend (-0.2% p.a. 2010-30). Energy Outlook 2030

Fuel substitution is the main story in the OECD…

Fuel substitution is the main story in the OECD… By fuel and country grouping Change 2010

By fuel and country grouping

Change 2010 to 2030, Billion toe

5 4 3 2 1 0 -1 OECD Non-OECD
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
OECD
Non-OECD

Contributions to global growth

% p.a.

2.5%

2.0%

1.5%

1.0%

0.5%

0.0%

Renewables Hydro Nuclear Coal Gas Oil 1970- 1990- 2010- 1990 2010 2030
Renewables
Hydro
Nuclear
Coal
Gas
Oil
1970- 1990- 2010-
1990
2010 2030

*

* Includes biofuels

Energy Outlook 2030

12

© BP 2012

…while the non-OECD sees all fuels expanding

…while the non-OECD sees all fuels expanding OECD total energy consumption is virtually flat, but there

OECD total energy consumption is virtually flat, but there are significant shifts in the fuel mix. Renewables displace oil in transport and coal in power generation; gas gains at the expense of coal in power. These shifts are driven by a combination of relative fuel prices, technological innovation and policy interventions.…while the non-OECD sees all fuels expanding The economic development of non-OECD countries creates an appetite

The economic development of non-OECD countries creates an appetite for energy that can only be met by expanding all fuels. For many developing countries the imperative remains securing affordable energy to underpin economic development.prices, technological innovation and policy interventions. The growth of global energy consumption is increasingly

The growth of global energy consumption is increasingly being met by non-fossil fuels. Renewables, nuclear and hydro together account for 34% of the growth; this aggregate non-fossil contribution is, for the first time, larger than the contribution of any single fossil fuel. Renewables on their own contribute more to world energy growth than oil. The largest single fuel contribution comes from gas, which meets 31% of the projected growth in global energy.imperative remains securing affordable energy to underpin economic development. Energy Outlook 2030 1 3 © BP

The growth of energy consumption by sector…

The growth of energy consumption by sector… By sector and region to 2030 Billion toe 3.0

By sector and region to 2030

Billion toe 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 Transport Industry Other
Billion toe
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
Transport
Industry
Other

2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 Transport Industry Other RoW Middle East China & India OECD

RoW

Middle1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 Transport Industry Other RoW East China & India OECD Final energy

East

China &0.5 0.0 -0.5 Transport Industry Other RoW Middle East India OECD Final energy use Inputs to

India

OECDTransport Industry Other RoW Middle East China & India Final energy use Inputs to power By

Final energy use

Inputs to power

By sector and fuel to 2030

Billion toe 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 Transport Industry Other
Billion toe
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
Transport
Industry
Other

Hydro2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 -0.5 Transport Industry Other Nuclear Renew. Electricity Gas Biofuels Oil Coal

Nuclear

Renew.0.5 0.0 -0.5 Transport Industry Other Hydro Nuclear Electricity Gas Biofuels Oil Coal Final energy use

Electricity0.0 -0.5 Transport Industry Other Hydro Nuclear Renew. Gas Biofuels Oil Coal Final energy use Inputs

GasTransport Industry Other Hydro Nuclear Renew. Electricity Biofuels Oil Coal Final energy use Inputs to power

Industry Other Hydro Nuclear Renew. Electricity Gas Biofuels Oil Coal Final energy use Inputs to power

BiofuelsIndustry Other Hydro Nuclear Renew. Electricity Gas Oil Coal Final energy use Inputs to power Energy

OilOther Hydro Nuclear Renew. Electricity Gas Biofuels Coal Final energy use Inputs to power Energy Outlook

CoalOther Hydro Nuclear Renew. Electricity Gas Biofuels Oil Final energy use Inputs to power Energy Outlook

Final energy use

Inputs to power

…is dominated by power generation and industry

…is dominated by power generation and industry Energy used to generate electricity remains the fastest growing

Energy used to generate electricity remains the fastest growing sector, accounting for 57% of the projected growth in primary energy consumption to 2030 (compared to 54% for 1990-2010).…is dominated by power generation and industry The power sector is also the main driver of

The power sector is also the main driver of diversification of the fuel mix; non-fossil fuels, led by renewables, account for more than half of the growth.energy consumption to 2030 (compared to 54% for 1990-2010). Industry leads the growth of final energy

Industry leads the growth of final energy consumption, particularly in rapidly developing economies. The industrial sector accounts for 60% of the projected growth of final energy demand to 2030.led by renewables, account for more than half of the growth. The transport sector shows the

The transport sector shows the weakest growth, with OECD transport sector demand projected to decline. In transport, we are starting to see diversification: driven by policy and enabled by technology, biofuels account for 23% of transport energy demand growth (with gas contributing 13% and electricity 2%).sector accounts for 60% of the projected growth of final energy demand to 2030. Energy Outlook

Strong growth in power generation continues…

Strong growth in power generation continues… World power generation Growth of fuel inputs to power Thousand
World power generation Growth of fuel inputs to power Thousand TWh Billion toe 40 1.6
World power generation
Growth of fuel inputs to power
Thousand TWh
Billion toe
40
1.6
Renewables
Hydro
30
1.2
Nuclear
20
0.8
Coal
Gas
10
0.4
Oil
0
0.0
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
1990-
2000-
2010-
2020-
2000
2010
2020
2030
-0.4
Energy Outlook 2030
16
© BP 2012

…with lower carbon fuels gaining market share

…with lower carbon fuels gaining market share World electricity demand (2.6% p.a.) is projected to grow

World electricity demand (2.6% p.a.) is projected to grow more rapidly than total energy over the next 20 years, although not as rapidly as GDP (3.7% p.a.). Efficiency gains in power generation mean that the fuel inputs grow less rapidly than power output, averaging 2.1% p.a. 2010-30.…with lower carbon fuels gaining market share Over the next decade coal is still the largest

Over the next decade coal is still the largest contributor to the growth of power fuels, accounting for 39%, but non-fossil fuels are rapidly catching up. In aggregate nuclear, hydro and other renewables contribute as much as coal.less rapidly than power output, averaging 2.1% p.a. 2010-30. The growing role of non-fossil fuels becomes

The growing role of non-fossil fuels becomes even clearer in the following decade to 2030, with 75% of the growth coming from these sources and very little from coal. Meanwhile the contribution of gas remains relatively steady at around 31% through the decades.up. In aggregate nuclear, hydro and other renewables contribute as much as coal. Energy Outlook 2030

Convergence of energy intensity and fuel shares…

Convergence of energy intensity and fuel shares… Energy intensity Toe per thousand $2010 GDP 0.4 0.3

Energy intensity

Toe per thousand $2010 GDP 0.4 0.3 China US 0.2 World 0.1 India 0 1970
Toe per thousand $2010 GDP
0.4
0.3
China
US
0.2
World
0.1
India
0
1970
1990
2010
2030

Shares of world primary energy

50% Oil 40% Coal 30% 20% Gas 10% Hydro Nuclear Renewables * 0% 1970 1990
50%
Oil
40%
Coal
30%
20%
Gas
10%
Hydro
Nuclear
Renewables *
0%
1970
1990
2010
2030

* Includes biofuels

Energy Outlook 2030

18

© BP 2012

…will be dominant trends

…will be dominant trends Energy intensity continues its long term trend of convergence across countries, to

Energy intensity continues its long term trend of convergence across countries, to a lower and lower global level – a process we have discussed in more detail in the 2011 edition of the Energy Outlook . As a result, economic growth will become significantly less energy intensive, especially Energy Outlook. As a result, economic growth will become significantly less energy intensive, especially in non-OECD economies.

Convergence is driven by energy trade, the diffusion of technology, and the standardization of consumption baskets.less energy intensive, especially in non-OECD economies. Fossil fuels are converging on a market share of

Fossil fuels are converging on a market share of 26-28% each and non-fossil fuel groups on a market share of 6-7% each.technology, and the standardization of consumption baskets. Oil follows a long run trend of decline in

Oil follows a long run trend of decline in its market share, while gas continues to gain. Coal’s recent gain in market share will start to reverse soon, with a trend decline evident by 2020. The rate at which renewables penetrate global energy markets bears remarkable similarity to the emergence of nuclear power in the 1970s and 1980s.share of 26-28% each and non-fossil fuel groups on a market share of 6-7% each. Energy

Energy Outlook 2030 2 0 © BP 2012

Contents

Contents   Page Introduction 4 Global energy trends 7 Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 21 Liquid
 

Page

Introduction

4

Global energy trends

7

Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel

21

Liquid fuels

22

Natural gas

30

Coal

36

Non-fossil fuels

38

Key determinants

43

Risks and unknowns

73

Appendix

83

Liquids demand growth from non-OECD countries…

Liquids demand growth from non-OECD countries… M b / d 105 100 95 90 85 80

Mb/d

105

100

95

90

85

80

Demand

Supply

Other S&C Am Mid East India China Other Iraq Saudi Oil Sands Biofuels NGLs Brazil
Other S&C Am Mid East India China Other Iraq Saudi Oil Sands Biofuels NGLs Brazil
Other S&C Am Mid East India China Other Iraq Saudi Oil Sands Biofuels NGLs Brazil
Other S&C Am Mid East India China Other Iraq Saudi Oil Sands Biofuels NGLs Brazil
Other S&C Am Mid East India China Other Iraq Saudi Oil Sands Biofuels NGLs Brazil
Other S&C Am Mid East India China Other Iraq Saudi Oil Sands Biofuels NGLs Brazil
Other S&C Am Mid East India China Other Iraq Saudi Oil Sands Biofuels NGLs Brazil
Other S&C Am Mid East India China
Other
S&C Am
Mid East
India
China
Other

Other

Iraq

Saudi

Other S&C Am Mid East India China Other Iraq Saudi Oil Sands Biofuels NGLs Brazil US

Oil Sands

Biofuels

NGLs

Brazil

US

Other S&C Am Mid East India China Other Iraq Saudi Oil Sands Biofuels NGLs Brazil US
Other S&C Am Mid East India China Other Iraq Saudi Oil Sands Biofuels NGLs Brazil US

2030 level

2010

OECD

Non-

2010

Non-

Non-

OPEC

Declines

OECD

OPEC

OPEC

Growth

Growth

Growth

Declines

…will be met by supply growth from OPEC and the Americas

…will be met by supply growth from OPEC and the Americas Oil is expected to be

Oil is expected to be the slowest-growing fuel over the next 20 years. Global liquids demand (oil, biofuels, and other liquids) nonetheless is likely to rise by 16 Mb/d, exceeding 103 Mb/d by 2030.…will be met by supply growth from OPEC and the Americas Growth comes exclusively from rapidly-growing

Growth comes exclusively from rapidly-growing non-OECD economies. China (+8 Mb/d), India (+3.5 Mb/d) and the Middle East (+4 Mb/d) together account for nearly all of the net global increase. OECD demand has likely peaked (in 2005), and consumption is expected to decline by 6 Mb/d.is likely to rise by 16 Mb/d, exceeding 103 Mb/d by 2030. Rising supply to meet

Rising supply to meet expected demand growth should come primarily from OPEC, where output is projected to rise by nearly 12 Mb/d. The largest increments of new OPEC supply will come from NGLs, as well as conventional crude in Iraq and Saudi Arabia.(in 2005), and consumption is expected to decline by 6 Mb/d. Non-OPEC supply will continue to

Non-OPEC supply will continue to rise, growing by 5 Mb/d, due to strong growth in the Americas from US and Brazilian biofuels, Canadian oil sands, Brazilian deepwater, and US shale oil, offsetting continued declines in a number of mature provinces.will come from NGLs, as well as conventional crude in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Energy Outlook

Liquids demand growth is driven by non-OECD transport…

Liquids demand growth is driven by non-OECD transport… Liquids demand by sector Mb/d 105 90 75

Liquids demand by sector

Mb/d

105 90 75 60 45 30 15 0 1990 2010 2030
105
90
75
60
45
30
15
0
1990
2010
2030

Non-OECD Ind. & Othersector Mb/d 105 90 75 60 45 30 15 0 1990 2010 2030 Non-OECD Transport OECD

Non-OECD45 30 15 0 1990 2010 2030 Non-OECD Ind. & Other Transport OECD Ind. & Other

Transport

OECD Ind. & Other2010 2030 Non-OECD Ind. & Other Non-OECD Transport OECD Transport Power Liquids demand by product group

OECDInd. & Other Non-OECD Transport OECD Ind. & Other Transport Power Liquids demand by product group

Transport

PowerNon-OECD Transport OECD Ind. & Other OECD Transport Liquids demand by product group Mb/d 105 Biofuels

Liquids demand by product group

Mb/d

105 Biofuels 90 75 Light distillates 60 Middle 45 distillates 30 Other 15 Fuel Oil
105
Biofuels
90
75
Light
distillates
60
Middle
45
distillates
30
Other
15
Fuel Oil
0
1990
2010
2030

…while OECD demand falls across all sectors

…while OECD demand falls across all sectors Global liquids consumption growth is projected to slow to

Global liquids consumption growth is projected to slow to 0.8% p.a.…while OECD demand falls across all sectors (from 1.4% p.a. in 1990-2010); oil will slow to

(from 1.4% p.a. in 1990-2010); oil will slow to 0.6% p.a

consumption will fall to 40.5 Mb/d, 1 Mb/d below the 1990 level. Non- OECD consumption is likely to overtake the OECD by 2014, and reach 63 Mb/d by 2030 – 2½ times the 1990 level.

OECD

Overall consumption growth will be constrained by stronger crude oil prices seen in recent years, technological advances, a range of new policies, and the continued, gradual reduction of non-OECD subsidies.and reach 63 Mb/d by 2030 – 2½ times the 1990 level. OECD By sector, liquids

By sector, liquids demand growth to 2030 comes from non-OECD transport (nearly 14 Mb/d), with non-OECD industry also contributing (6.5 Mb/d, largely for petrochemicals). Expected OECD declines are initially concentrated outside the transport sector, where oil can be more easily displaced by gas and renewables; post-2015, improved engine efficiency will drive declines in OECD transport demand.and the continued, gradual reduction of non-OECD subsidies. Demand growth is expected to be weighted towards

Demand growth is expected to be weighted towards middle distillates while fuel oil consumption declines.This will continue to put pressure on those refineries with limited upgrading capacity.post-2015, improved engine efficiency will drive declines in OECD transport demand. Energy Outlook 2030 2 5

Energy Outlook 2030

25

© BP 2012

OPEC’s critical position in the oil market grows

OPEC’s critical position in the oil market grows Liquids supply by type Mb/d 105 90 75

Liquids supply by type

Mb/d

105

90

75

60

45

30

15

0

OPEC share (rhs)
OPEC share (rhs)

45%

OPEC NGLsby type Mb/d 105 90 75 60 45 30 15 0 OPEC share (rhs) 45% OPEC

OPEC crudeMb/d 105 90 75 60 45 30 15 0 OPEC share (rhs) 45% OPEC NGLs Biofuels

Biofuels75 60 45 30 15 0 OPEC share (rhs) 45% OPEC NGLs OPEC crude Oil Sands

Oil Sands30 15 0 OPEC share (rhs) 45% OPEC NGLs OPEC crude Biofuels Other non- OPEC Non-OPEC

Other non- OPECOPEC share (rhs) 45% OPEC NGLs OPEC crude Biofuels Oil Sands Non-OPEC conventional 30% 1990 2000

Non-OPEC conventional45% OPEC NGLs OPEC crude Biofuels Oil Sands Other non- OPEC 30% 1990 2000 2010 2020

30%

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

Growth from 2010 to 2030

Mb/d 12 Other 9 Saudi Arabia Brazil 6 US Shale Iraq Oil Biofuels 3 NGLs
Mb/d
12
Other
9
Saudi
Arabia
Brazil
6
US Shale
Iraq
Oil
Biofuels
3
NGLs
Canadian
Oil Sands
0
Other
OPEC
Americas
RoW
-3

…while the Americas also play an expanding role

…while the Americas also play an expanding role Global liquids supply growth will match expected growth

Global liquids supply growth will match expected growth in demand with OPEC accounting for 70% of incremental supply; the group’s market share will approach 45%, a level not reached since the 1970s.…while the Americas also play an expanding role OPEC NGLs will grow by more than 4

OPEC NGLs will grow by more than 4 Mb/d – driven in part by rapid growth of natural gas production. Crude oil output from Iraq is projected to double to nearly 6 Mb/d, while Saudi output expands by nearly 3 Mb/d. Saudi Arabia is assumed to add new capacity as and when required to maintain a cushion of spare capacity.will approach 45%, a level not reached since the 1970s. Supply from the Americas will also

Supply from the Americas will also expand, by 8 Mb/d, as advances in drilling technologies unlock additional resources in the Canadian oil sands (+2.2 Mb/d), Brazilian deepwater (+2 Mb/d), and US shale oil (+2.2 Mb/d). In addition, the US and Brazil contribute over half of total biofuels production growth (of +3.5 Mb/d) expected by 2030.and when required to maintain a cushion of spare capacity. Overall, non-OPEC output is projected to

Overall, non-OPEC output is projected to rise by over 5 Mb/d as these growth areas more than offset declining conventional output elsewhere.over half of total biofuels production growth (of +3.5 Mb/d) expected by 2030. Energy Outlook 2030

The implications for refining are stark…

The implications for refining are stark… Global liquids supply and demand Mb/d 105 90 75 60

Global liquids supply and demand

Mb/d

105

90

75

60

45

Global liquids demand Other NGLs Bio Crude OECD 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Global liquids demand
Other
NGLs
Bio
Crude
OECD
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030

Supply growth 2010-30

Total liquids

16 Mb/d

Other liquids: 1 Non-refined NGLs:

1

3

Biofuels:

3

=> Refined crude:

9

China crude runs: 2

7

=> Runs ex-China

2

1 includes processing gains

2 if self-sufficient in products

…with refinery throughputs likely to grow only modestly

…with refinery throughputs likely to grow only modestly Growth in the call on refinery throughput to

Growth in the call on refinery throughput to 2030 will be constrained by the growth of liquids which do not need refining: biofuels (+3.5 Mb/d) and non-refined NGLs (+3 Mb/d).…with refinery throughputs likely to grow only modestly Increases in processing gains and growth in supplies

Increases in processing gains and growth in supplies of liquids derived from gas and coal are likely to add another 1 Mb/d to product supplies.biofuels (+3.5 Mb/d) and non-refined NGLs (+3 Mb/d). All of these supply sources will compete directly

All of these supply sources will compete directly with refineries to meet total liquids demand growth of 16 Mb/d from 2010, limiting the growth in the call on refinery throughput to only 9 Mb/d over the next 20 years.coal are likely to add another 1 Mb/d to product supplies. Existing spare capacity will accommodate

Existing spare capacity will accommodate some of the future growth in refinery throughput.refinery throughput to only 9 Mb/d over the next 20 years. More than half of global

More than half of global liquids demand growth is in China, and that country’s refinery expansion plans will affect product balances globally. A continuation of its stated strategy to be self-sufficient in refined products would severely curtail crude run increases for refiners outside of China.spare capacity will accommodate some of the future growth in refinery throughput. Energy Outlook 2030 2

Natural gas demand growth is concentrated in the non-OECD…

Natural gas demand growth is concentrated in the non-OECD… B c f / d 470 420

Bcf/d

470

420

370

320

270

Demand

Supply

Other India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other
Other India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other
Other India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other
Other India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other
Other India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other

Other

India

China

Other

Mid East

N. America

Other India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other Africa
Other India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other Africa
Other India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other Africa
Other India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other Africa
Other India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other Africa
Other India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other Africa

2030 level

Other

Other

N. America

FSU

Other

Africa

Australia

Mid East

Mid East

India China Other Mid East N. America 2030 level Other N. America FSU Other Africa Australia

2010

OECD

Non-OECD

2010

LNG

Pipeline

…with LNG playing a growing role in supply

…with LNG playing a growing role in supply Natural gas is projected to be the fastest

Natural gas is projected to be the fastest growing fossil fuel globally (2.1% p.a.). The non-OECD accounts for 80% of global gas demand growth, averaging 2.9% p.a. growth to 2030. Demand grows fastest in non-OECD Asia (4.6% p.a.) and the Middle East (3.7% p.a.).…with LNG playing a growing role in supply Gas grows rapidly in China (7.6% p.a.) to

Gas grows rapidly in China (7.6% p.a.) to a level of gas use in 2030 (46 Bcf/d) equal to that of the European Union in 2010. China contributes 23% to the global demand increase. The share of gas in China’s primary energy consumption expands from 4.0% to 9.5%.non-OECD Asia (4.6% p.a.) and the Middle East (3.7% p.a.). On the supply side the main

On the supply side the main regional contributors to growth are the Middle East (26% of global growth) and FSU (19%). Significant incremental supply (11-12% of global growth each) is also expected from Australia, China, and the US.primary energy consumption expands from 4.0% to 9.5%. LNG represents a growing share of gas supply.

LNG represents a growing share of gas supply. Global LNG supply is projected to grow 4.5% p.a. to 2030, more than twice as fast as total global gas production (2.1% p.a.) and faster than inter-regional pipeline trade (3.0% p.a.). LNG contributes 25% of global supply growth 2010-30, compared to 19% for 1990-2010.(11-12% of global growth each) is also expected from Australia, China, and the US. Energy Outlook

Energy Outlook 2030

31

© BP 2012

Natural gas demand growth is supported by fuel substitution…

gas demand growth is supported by fuel substitution… D e m a n d b y

Demand by sector

Bcf/d 500 400 300 200 100 0 1990 2010 2030
Bcf/d
500
400
300
200
100
0
1990
2010
2030

Transportt o r Bcf/d 500 400 300 200 100 0 1990 2010 2030 Non-OECD Power Non-OECD

Non-OECD500 400 300 200 100 0 1990 2010 2030 Transport Power Non-OECD Ind. & Other OECD

Power

Non-OECD Ind. & Other300 200 100 0 1990 2010 2030 Transport Non-OECD Power OECD Power OECD Ind. & Other

2030 Transport Non-OECD Power Non-OECD Ind. & Other OECD Power OECD Ind. & Other Gas demand

OECD

Power

OECD Ind. & OtherNon-OECD Power Non-OECD Ind. & Other OECD Power Gas demand growth 2010-30 Bcf/d 60 50 40

Gas demand growth 2010-30

Bcf/d

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

-10

Growth at constant fuel shares Effect of changing fuel mix Power Industry Power Industry OECD
Growth at
constant
fuel shares
Effect of
changing
fuel mix
Power
Industry
Power
Industry
OECD
Non-OECD

…as gas gains market share against coal and oil

…as gas gains market share against coal and oil Of the major sectors globally, growth is

Of the major sectors globally, growth is fastest in power (2.4% p.a.) and industry (2.1% p.a.) – consistent with historical patterns. Natural gas use in transport is confined to 2% of global gas demand in 2030, despite growing four times from today’s level.…as gas gains market share against coal and oil In the OECD, growth is concentrated in

In the OECD, growth is concentrated in the power sector (1.6% p.a.). Efficiency gains and low population growth keep industrial (0.9% p.a.) and other sector (<0.1% p.a.) gas growth low.in 2030, despite growing four times from today’s level. Non-OECD gas use is driven by industrialisation,

Non-OECD gas use is driven by industrialisation, the power sector and the development of domestic resources. Gas consumption expands most strongly in power (2.9% p.a.) and industry (2.8% p.a.).p.a.) and other sector (<0.1% p.a.) gas growth low. Growth in gas demand is supported by

Growth in gas demand is supported by fuel substitution, especially in the OECD, triggered by regulatory changes and lower relative prices. About half of all incremental gas demand in the OECD power sector and 75% of incremental demand in OECD industry is substitution for other fuels.most strongly in power (2.9% p.a.) and industry (2.8% p.a.). Substitution is much less pronounced in

Substitution is much less pronounced in the non-OECD, where rapidly expanding energy demand creates room for all fuels to grow.and 75% of incremental demand in OECD industry is substitution for other fuels. Energy Outlook 2030

Unconventional gas will play a growing role…

Unconventional gas will play a growing role… Sources of gas supply, by region North America Bcf/d

Sources of gas supply, by region

North America

Bcf/d

100 80 60 40 20 0 1990 2010 2030
100
80
60
40
20
0
1990
2010
2030
Europe China Bcf/d Bcf/d 100 100 Net pipeline imports 80 80 Net LNG imports Syngas
Europe
China
Bcf/d
Bcf/d
100
100
Net pipeline
imports
80
80
Net LNG
imports
Syngas from
coal
60
60
Shale gas and
CBM
40
40
Conventional
(inc. tight gas)
20
20
Domestic
production
0
0
1990
2010
2030
1990
2010
2030

…especially in North America and Asia

…especially in North America and Asia The world had 6,609 Tcf of proved gas reserves in

The world had 6,609 Tcf of proved gas reserves in 2010, sufficient for 59 years of production at current levels. Unconventionals remain to be appraised in detail globally, but current estimates suggest they could double this R/P ratio.…especially in North America and Asia Shale gas and coal bed methane (CBM) will account for

Shale gas and coal bed methane (CBM) will account for 63% of North American production by 2030. Sustained growth of shale gas raises the prospect of LNG exports from North America by 2030 (5 Bcf/d).current estimates suggest they could double this R/P ratio. Outside North America, unconventionals are in their

Outside North America, unconventionals are in their infancy, but likely to play a growing role in the long term as current technical and regulatory hurdles recede. In Europe we do not expect major unconventional production before 2020. The decline in conventional supply implies a growing import requirement for Europe, up by more than 60%, from 26 Bcf/d in 2010 to 42 Bcf/d in 2030.of LNG exports from North America by 2030 (5 Bcf/d). In China gas production is expected

In China gas production is expected to grow at 6.1% p.aby more than 60%, from 26 Bcf/d in 2010 to 42 Bcf/d in 2030. CBM and

CBM and shale

gas are likely to contribute 46% to growth, but still leave a rising need for

imports, which are met by expansion of LNG and pipeline projects.

Coal consumption levels off after 2020…

Coal consumption levels off after 2020… Coal demand by region Billion toe 5 4 China 3

Coal demand by region

Billion toe

5 4 China 3 2 India Other Non-OECD 1 OECD 0 1990 2010 2030
5
4
China
3
2
India
Other Non-OECD
1
OECD
0
1990
2010
2030

Coal demand by sector

Billion toe

5 Oil Other 4 Industry 3 2 Power 1 0 1990 2010 2030
5
Oil
Other
4
Industry
3
2
Power
1
0
1990
2010
2030

…as China shifts to a less coal-intensive economy

…as China shifts to a less coal-intensive economy Coal consumption declines in the OECD (-1.1% p.a.

Coal consumption declines in the OECD (-1.1% p.a. 2010-30), offset by growth in the non-OECD (2.1% p.a.). In China, rapid coal consumption growth ends after 2020. This will bend the global trend: Growth is set to decline from 4.0% p.a. in 2000-2010 to just 0.5% p.a. in 2020-2030.…as China shifts to a less coal-intensive economy Efficiency gains and structural shifts dramatically reduce coal

Efficiency gains and structural shifts dramatically reduce coal intensity in China – coal consumed per unit of GDP is almost 60% lower in 2030 than today. Still, China accounts for 67% of global coal growth to 2030 and remains the largest coal consumer, increasing its share of global consumption from 48% to 53%.from 4.0% p.a. in 2000-2010 to just 0.5% p.a. in 2020-2030. India’s continuing growth only partially

India’s continuing growth only partially offsets the slow-down of coal in China. India contributes 33% of global growth to 2030, and its share of global coal consumption climbs from today's 8% to 14% in 2030. India and China together account for all the global net growth to 2030.increasing its share of global consumption from 48% to 53%. Both China and India face challenges

Both China and India face challenges in growing domestic production fast enough to keep up with demand. Their growing import requirements drive further expansion and integration of the global coal trade.in 2030. India and China together account for all the global net growth to 2030. Energy

Non-fossil fuels growth is led by renewables in the OECD…

Non-fossil fuels growth is led by renewables in the OECD… OECD Billion toe 2.0 Renewables Biofuels

OECD

Billion toe 2.0 Renewables Biofuels 1.5 Hydro Nuclear 1.0 0.5 0.0 1990 2000 2010 2020
Billion toe
2.0
Renewables
Biofuels
1.5
Hydro
Nuclear
1.0
0.5
0.0
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030

Non-OECD

Billion toe 2.0 1.5 1.0 Renewables in power 0.5 Biofuels 0.0 1990 2000 2010 2020
Billion toe
2.0
1.5
1.0
Renewables in power
0.5
Biofuels
0.0
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030

…while all sources grow rapidly in the non-OECD

…while all sources grow rapidly in the non-OECD Non-fossil fuels grow strongly in both the OECD

Non-fossil fuels grow strongly in both the OECD (2.0% p.a.) and non-OECD (5.1% p.a.). OECD growth is concentrated in renewable power. Nuclear output is restored to pre-Fukushima levels by 2020, but thereafter shows only modest growth. Hydro continues to grow slowly, constrained by the availability of suitable sites.…while all sources grow rapidly in the non-OECD In the non-OECD growth is more evenly split

In the non-OECD growth is more evenly split between renewables, nuclear and hydro, as rapidly growing economies call on all available sources of energy supply. Nuclear output grows rapidly, averaging 7.8% p.a. 2010-30, as China, India and Russia pursue ambitious expansion programmes.slowly, constrained by the availability of suitable sites. Renewables growth is initially led by the EU,

Renewables growth is initially led by the EU, but from 2020 the US and China are the largest sources of growth. Over the 2020-30 period the non-OECD adds more renewable power than the OECD. The non-OECD increases its share of renewable power from 22% today to 43% by 2030.7.8% p.a. 2010-30, as China, India and Russia pursue ambitious expansion programmes. Energy Outlook 2030 39

The increasing share of renewables in power and transport…

The increasing share of renewables in power and transport… 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Share of power generation EU Other OECD World Non-OECD 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Share of power generation
EU
Other
OECD
World
Non-OECD
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030

Share of transport sector

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030

…is constrained primarily by the cost of scaling up

…is constrained primarily by the cost of scaling up Renewables are generally more costly than other

Renewables are generally more costly than other energy sources, although in some cases they are competitive already (e.g. Brazilian biofuels, US onshore wind in the best locations). Policy support is assumed to remain in place to help the industry deploy new technologies and drive down costs. A key constraint on the pace of renewables penetration is the willingness and ability to meet the rapidly expanding cost of policy support as renewables scale up.…is constrained primarily by the cost of scaling up By 2030 renewables supply 11% of world

By 2030 renewables supply 11% of world electricity. The EU leads the way, with 26% of power coming from renewables by 2030. The rest of the OECD follows with a lag, and then the non-OECD also starts ramping up the share of renewables in power.expanding cost of policy support as renewables scale up. Renewables face a tougher challenge penetrating the

Renewables face a tougher challenge penetrating the transport fuels market. By 2030, 7% of world transport fuels come from renewable sources. Brazil has the highest penetration of biofuels (21% in 2010, rising to 39% by 2030), while the US leads the OECD in incentivising biofuels (4% in 2010 to 15% by 2030).and then the non-OECD also starts ramping up the share of renewables in power. Energy Outlook

Energy Outlook 2030 4 2 © BP 2012

Contents

Contents   Page Introduction 4 Global energy trends 7 Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 21 Key
 

Page

Introduction

4

Global energy trends

7

Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel

21

Key determinants China and India

43

Middle East

53

Transport

63

Risks and unknowns

73

Appendix

83

The pace and scale of development in India and China…

The pace and scale of development in India and China… Population Billion 9 8 7 6

Population

Billion

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 Rest of World 2 India 1 China 0
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
Rest of World
2
India
1
China
0
1970
1990
2010
2030

Energy

Billion toe 18 15 12 9 6 3 0 1970 1990 2010 2030
Billion toe
18
15
12
9
6
3
0
1970
1990
2010
2030

GDP

Trillion, $2010 PPP 180 150 120 90 60 30 0 1970 1990 2010 2030
Trillion, $2010 PPP
180
150
120
90
60
30
0
1970
1990
2010
2030

…play a major role in shaping the global outlook

…play a major role in shaping the global outlook By 2030 China and India will be

By 2030 China and India will be the world’s largest and 3rd largest economies and energy consumers, jointly accounting for about 35% of global population, GDP and energy demand.…play a major role in shaping the global outlook Rapid economic development means industrialisation, urbanisation and

Rapid economic development means industrialisation, urbanisation and motorisation. Over the next 20 years China and India combined account for all the net increase in global coal demand, 94% of net oil demand growth, 30% of gas, and 48% of the net growth in non-fossil fuels.for about 35% of global population, GDP and energy demand. The development paths of China and

The development paths of China and India represent a major source of uncertainty for any global outlook, posing two key questions:30% of gas, and 48% of the net growth in non-fossil fuels.  Will China’s energy

Will China’s energy demand continue to grow as rapidly as in the past decade, or will it slow?

Will India replicate China’s pattern of a rapid acceleration of energy consumption growth as GDP rises, or will it follow a different pattern of development?

The surge in China’s energy consumption slows…

The surge in China’s energy consumption slows… Billion toe India 5 Renewables * Hydro 4 Nuclear

Billion toe

India

5 Renewables * Hydro 4 Nuclear Coal 3 Gas Oil 2 1 0 1990 2000
5
Renewables
*
Hydro
4
Nuclear
Coal
3
Gas
Oil
2
1
0
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030

*Includes biofuels

Billion toe

China

5 4 3 2 1 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
5
4
3
2
1
0
1990
2000
2010
2020
2030

Energy Outlook 2030

46

© BP 2012

…and is not repeated in India

…and is not repeated in India China’s energy demand growth is projected to decelerate to 3.0%

China’s energy demand growth is projected to decelerate to 3.0% p.a. over the forecasting period (vs. 6.6% p.a. 1990-2010) due to slowing GDP growth and rapid improvement in energy intensity.…and is not repeated in India India does not follow China’s path; there is no surge

India does not follow China’s path; there is no surge in energy demand as India industrialises. Demand growth slows to 4.5% p.a. (vs. 5.5% p.a. 1990-2010) as improvements in energy efficiency partly offset the energy needs of industrialisation and infrastructure expansion.GDP growth and rapid improvement in energy intensity. India remains on a lower path of energy

India remains on a lower path of energy intensity; by 2030 it consumes only about half the energy that China consumes today, at a similar income per capita level as in China today.needs of industrialisation and infrastructure expansion. Coal remains the main commercial fuel, but its share falls

Coal remains the main commercial fuel, but its share falls from 70% to 55% in China as a result of maturing industrial structure, and from 53% to 50% in India due to domestic resource constraints. Oil’s share is flat at 18% in China and falls to 26% in India, constrained by prices and growing import dependency. Gas gains market share along with nuclear and renewables in both countries.China consumes today, at a similar income per capita level as in China today. Energy Outlook

China and India follow a historical pattern of development…

China and India follow a historical pattern of development… Historical industrialisation Industry as %GDP 50 40

Historical industrialisation

Industry as %GDP 50 40 30 20 20 major countries 1820-2010 10 China 1970-2010 India
Industry as %GDP
50
40
30
20
20 major countries 1820-2010
10
China 1970-2010
India 1945-2010
0
0
10
20
30
40
50

$2010 GDP per capita (000s)

Energy intensity

Toe per thousand $2010 GDP 0.4 China 0.3 0.2 0.1 India 0 1970 1990 2010
Toe per thousand $2010 GDP
0.4
China
0.3
0.2
0.1
India
0
1970
1990
2010
2030

Energy Outlook 2030

48

© BP 2012

…but from different starting points

…but from different starting points A stylised pattern of economic development shows energy intensity rising as

A stylised pattern of economic development shows energy intensity rising as the economic structure shifts from low energy intensive agriculture to intensive activities in industry, and then falling again as the economy shifts to the less energy intensive service sector (see the 2011 edition of the Energy Outlook ). We see this pattern at work in both, China and India, although Energy Outlook). We see this pattern at work in both, China and India, although they start from different places.

As China matures, its share of industry in GDP will decline.The composition of industry also shifts away from heavily energy intensive sub-sectors as the need for infrastructure and urbanisation projects declines.The rate of decline in energy intensity accelerates, constraining the growth of energy demand.China and India, although they start from different places. In India, the share of industry continues

In India, the share of industry continues to grow, as infrastructure development catches up and manufacturing expands to absorb a growing labour force, but it never reaches the Chinese level. India therefore remains significantly less energy intensive, with a relatively high share of the service sector in GDP.in energy intensity accelerates, constraining the growth of energy demand. Energy Outlook 2030 4 9 ©

Industry causes energy demand to decelerate…

Industry causes energy demand to decelerate… China: final energy demand by sector Primary energy growth by

China: final energy demand by sector

Primary energy growth by fuel

Billion toe 3.5 Other 3.0 Transport Industry 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0
Billion toe
3.5
Other
3.0
Transport
Industry
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Billion toe China India 1.4 1.2 Renewables * Hydro 1.0 Nuclear 0.8 Coal 0.6 Gas
Billion toe
China
India
1.4
1.2
Renewables
*
Hydro
1.0
Nuclear
0.8
Coal
0.6
Gas
Oil
0.4
0.2
0.0

1990

2000

*Includes biofuels

2010

2020

2030

90-

00-

10-

20-

90-

00-

10-

20-

 

00

10

20

30

00

10

20

30

Energy Outlook 2030

50

© BP 2012

…as the fuel mix diversifies away from coal

…as the fuel mix diversifies away from coal Our Outlook assumes structural economic transformation in China

Our Outlook assumes structural economic transformation in China will significantly slow industry’s energy demand growth, especially post…as the fuel mix diversifies away from coal 2020. Industrial energy consumption grew by 9.9% p.a.

2020.

Industrial energy consumption grew by 9.9% p.a. in the last decade and accounted for about 80% of the final energy demand growth.industry’s energy demand growth, especially post 2020. The fuel mix implications of this slowdown are most

The fuel mix implications of this slowdown are most notable for coal, the principal fuel in power and heavy industry. The contribution of coal to primary energy growth drops from 48% between 2010-2020 to 13% in 2020-2030. Its use in power generation declines between 2020 and 2030.accounted for about 80% of the final energy demand growth. India’s fuel mix changes more gradually,

India’s fuel mix changes more gradually, with coal remaining the main source of primary energy growth (48%) in the next 20 years.Its use in power generation declines between 2020 and 2030. Non-fossil fuels account for an increasing

Non-fossil fuels account for an increasing share of energy growth in both countries (44% and 16% in China and India respectively over the 2020-2030 period), driven by rising dependence on fossil-fuel imports and environmental challenges related to heavy coal use.remaining the main source of primary energy growth (48%) in the next 20 years. Energy Outlook

Energy Outlook 2030 5 2 © BP 2012

Contents

Contents   Page Introduction 4 Global energy trends 7 Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 21 Key
 

Page

Introduction

4

Global energy trends

7

Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel

21

Key determinants China and India

43

Middle East

53

Transport

63

Risks and unknowns

73

Appendix

83

Resource availability shapes the Middle East

Resource availability shapes the Middle East GDP per capita Index (1970=100) 600 500 400 300 200

GDP per capita

Index (1970=100) 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 1970 1990 2010 2030
Index (1970=100)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1970
1990
2010
2030

500

400

300

200

100

0

Energy per capita * 300 Non-OECD Mid East Other non-OECD OECD 240 180 120 60
Energy per capita
* 300
Non-OECD Mid East
Other non-OECD
OECD
240
180
120
60
0
1970
1990
2010
2030

Energy intensity

1970 1990 2010 2030
1970
1990
2010
2030

*Non-OECD Middle East includes Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria

Energy Outlook 2030

54

© BP 2012

though

gradual adjustments are expected

though gradual adjustments are expected Per capita income growth in the Middle East has lagged other

Per capita income growth in the Middle East has lagged other regions and is likely to continue to do so. Energy consumption, in contrast, has soared. In 1970, energy use per capita was roughly twice the rest of the non-OECD; by 2010, it was more than 3 times as high.though gradual adjustments are expected Energy intensity in 1970 was less than half the level of

Energy intensity in 1970 was less than half the level of other non- OECD; by 2010, it was 50% higher. With the trend in other countries pointing toward continuous improvement, the Middle East region by 2030 is likely to be more than twice as energy intensive as the rest of the non-OECD.of the non-OECD; by 2010, it was more than 3 times as high. The Middle East,

The Middle East, enjoying a comparative advantage in access to cheap energy, will remain energy intensive. However, modest improvements are likely, reversing the long run upward trend.than twice as energy intensive as the rest of the non-OECD. We expect energy intensity to

We expect energy intensity to start declining before 2020, due to a slowdown in the expansion of energy intensive industries (especially petrochemicals), a gradual reduction in subsidies and other policies to improve efficiency, as well as gas for oil substitution.However, modest improvements are likely, reversing the long run upward trend. Energy Outlook 2030 55 ©

Gas will play a key role in domestic demand

Gas will play a key role in domestic demand Regional demand by fuel Billion toe 1.5

Regional demand by fuel

Billion toe 1.5 Renewables Hydro Nuclear 1.0 Coal Gas Oil 0.5 0.0 1970 1990 2010
Billion toe
1.5
Renewables
Hydro
Nuclear
1.0
Coal
Gas
Oil
0.5
0.0
1970
1990
2010
2030

2010-30 growth by sector and fuel

Billion toe 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 Transport Industry Other
Billion toe
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
Transport
Industry
Other

HydroBillion toe 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 Transport Industry Other Nuclear Renew. Electricity Gas Oil Coal Final

Nucleartoe 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 Transport Industry Other Hydro Renew. Electricity Gas Oil Coal Final energy

Renew.0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 Transport Industry Other Hydro Nuclear Electricity Gas Oil Coal Final energy use

Electricity0.1 0.0 Transport Industry Other Hydro Nuclear Renew. Gas Oil Coal Final energy use Inputs to

GasTransport Industry Other Hydro Nuclear Renew. Electricity Oil Coal Final energy use Inputs to power Energy

OilIndustry Other Hydro Nuclear Renew. Electricity Gas Coal Final energy use Inputs to power Energy Outlook

CoalIndustry Other Hydro Nuclear Renew. Electricity Gas Oil Final energy use Inputs to power Energy Outlook

Final energy use

Inputs to power

in

power generation and industry

in power generation and industry The region continues to rely on oil and natural gas for

The region continues to rely on oil and natural gas for nearly all of its energy demand. The continuation of long-standing efforts to displace oil consumption with gas (to sustain oil exports) will continue to boost gas’ market share from 21% in 1970, to 48% in 2010, and 55% in 2030.in power generation and industry Energy consumption growth slows to 3.0% p.a. for 2010-30, from 5.9%

Energy consumption growth slows to 3.0% p.a. for 2010-30, from 5.9% 1970-2010; oil demand growth is expected to slow to 2.0% p.a. and gas to 3.8% p.a. (compared to 4.8% and 8.1% in 1970-10).share from 21% in 1970, to 48% in 2010, and 55% in 2030. Energy growth is

Energy growth is driven by industry and power generation. The industrial sector needs oil and gas for petrochemicals and the expansion in energy-intensive LNG production. The power sector increasingly replaces oil with gas, with oil’s share dropping from 41% in 1990, to 33% in 2010, and 20% in 2030.and gas to 3.8% p.a. (compared to 4.8% and 8.1% in 1970-10). The pace of oil

The pace of oil displacement and the associated efficiency improvement is predicated on regional gas supply growth. If the development of gas resources fails to materialise, additional oil will be required to fill the void.with oil’s share dropping from 41% in 1990, to 33% in 2010, and 20% in 2030.

High subsidies contribute to elevated energy intensity

High subsidies contribute to elevated energy intensity Retail gasoline prices (Nov 2010) Oil intensity vs prices

Retail gasoline prices (Nov 2010)

Oil intensity vs prices

$/litre Toe per thousand $2010 GDP 2.0 0.4 subsidy tax Iran 1.6 0.3 Saudi 1.2
$/litre
Toe per thousand $2010 GDP
2.0
0.4
subsidy
tax
Iran
1.6
0.3
Saudi
1.2
2011 increase
0.2
0.8
tax
Kuwait
subsidy
UAE
India
0.4
0.1
Brazil
China
0.0
US
Germany
0.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Gasoline price (Nov 2010), $/litre
Iran
Saudi
Kuwait
UAE
US
China
India
Brazil
Germany

but

policy changes should drive gradual improvement

but policy changes should drive gradual improvement Many Middle Eastern countries heavily subsidise oil products and

Many Middle Eastern countries heavily subsidise oil products and natural gas, contributing to the region’s high energy intensity. Our outlook assumes that the region’s governments slowly introduce measures to improve energy efficiency.but policy changes should drive gradual improvement A number of countries have already reduced subsidies and

A number of countries have already reduced subsidies and there is widespread interest in other measures to boost fuel efficiency. Iran substantially increased fuel prices last year in the face of international sanctions – and oil consumption fell. Iraq has reduced oil subsidies under an agreement with the IMF, and Saudi Arabia committed to a G20 agreement in 2010 to end fossil fuel subsidies.slowly introduce measures to improve energy efficiency. The region’s energy intensity gradually improves (-1.0%

The region’s energy intensity gradually improves (-1.0% p.a.) after 2020 due to eventual subsidy reduction and other efficiency measures. A lack of progress and/or delays on the assumed new policies is a key risk to this outlook: If oil intensity did not decline, for example, oil demand would be 3 Mb/d higher in 2030.Saudi Arabia committed to a G20 agreement in 2010 to end fossil fuel subsidies. Energy Outlook

The region’s role in global oil markets is set to continue

The region’s role in global oil markets is set to continue Mid East Oil and Gas

Mid East Oil and Gas Supply

Billion toe 2.5 Gas Oil 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1970 1990 2010 2030
Billion toe
2.5
Gas
Oil
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
1970
1990
2010
2030
Exports as share of global demand (excl. Mid East) 40% Oil Gas 30% 20% 10%
Exports as share of
global demand (excl. Mid East)
40%
Oil
Gas
30%
20%
10%
0%
1970
1990
2010
2030

as

gas supply growth meets domestic needs

as gas supply growth meets domestic needs Oil constitutes 74% of the region’s energy production, but

Oil constitutes 74% of the region’s energy production, but will drop to 67% by 2030 as gas production expands. Nonetheless, from 2010 to 2030 oil supply is expected to expand by 10 Mb/d and gas production by 41 Bcf/d, both higher increments than over the past two decades.as gas supply growth meets domestic needs Saudi Arabia (+3.7 Mb/d) and Iraq (+3.5 Mb/d) will

Saudi Arabia (+3.7 Mb/d) and Iraq (+3.5 Mb/d) will dominate oil supply growth while Qatar (+11 Bcf/d), Iran (+9 Bcf/d), and Saudi Arabia (+9 Bcf/d) drive gas production. The region’s share of global supply will increase to 34% for oil and to 18% for gas (from 29% and 14% today).both higher increments than over the past two decades. While there are large supply increases in

While there are large supply increases in both oil and gas, the impact on the region’s exports differs between the two fuels. Middle East oil exports currently supply 22% of global demand (excl. Middle East), rising to 25% by 2030. Gas exports, only 2% of global demand today, rise to just 3% in 2030, as incremental growth is consumed locally.to 34% for oil and to 18% for gas (from 29% and 14% today). Failure to

Failure to develop gas resources and/or to improve oil intensity will weigh on the region’s ability to deliver the expected supplies to global oil markets.demand today, rise to just 3% in 2030, as incremental growth is consumed locally. Energy Outlook

Energy Outlook 2030 6 2 © BP 2012

Contents

Contents   Page Introduction 4 Global energy trends 7 Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 21 Key
 

Page

Introduction

4

Global energy trends

7

Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel

21

Key determinants China and India

43

Middle East

53

Transport

63

Risks and unknowns

73

Appendix

83

Vehicle numbers are set to grow rapidly in the Non-OECD…

Vehicle numbers are set to grow rapidly in the Non-OECD… Total number of vehicles Millions 1,600

Total number of vehicles

Millions

1,600

1,200

800

400

0

Non-OECD

OECD

1930 1950 1970 1990 2010 2030

Vehicles per thousand people

(1970-2030)

Vehicles

US 800 Germany 600 Japan 400 200 China India 0 1970 2000 2030
US
800
Germany
600
Japan
400
200
China
India
0
1970
2000
2030

…while OECD growth slows due to saturation

…while OECD growth slows due to saturation The global vehicle fleet (commercial vehicles and passenger cars)

The global vehicle fleet (commercial vehicles and passenger cars) grows rapidly – by 60% from around 1 billion today to 1.6 billion by 2030. Most of the growth is in the developing world with some mature markets at saturation levels.…while OECD growth slows due to saturation More than three quarters of the total fleet growth

More than three quarters of the total fleet growth occurs in the non- OECD, where the vehicle population rise from 340 million to 840 million over the next 20 years – a 2 ½ fold increase.world with some mature markets at saturation levels. Between 2010 and 2030, vehicle density per 1000

Between 2010 and 2030, vehicle density per 1000 population grows from approximately 50 to 140 in China (5.7% p.a.) and from 20 to 65 in India (6.7% p.a.).840 million over the next 20 years – a 2 ½ fold increase. China is expected

China is expected to follow a slower path to vehicle ownership than seen historically in other countries. This reflects the impact of current and assumed future policies, designed to limit oil import dependency and congestion, including rising fuel taxation, widespread mass transportation options and relatively uneven income distribution.50 to 140 in China (5.7% p.a.) and from 20 to 65 in India (6.7% p.a.).

Transport fuel demand is met predominantly by oil…

Transport fuel demand is met predominantly by oil… By energy type Billion toe 3 Electricity 2

By energy type

Billion toe

3 Electricity 2 Gas Coal Biofuels 1 Oil - road Oil - non-road 0 1990
3
Electricity
2
Gas
Coal
Biofuels
1
Oil - road
Oil - non-road
0
1990
2010
2030

Projected car efficiency

Litres per 100 km 10 EU US light vehicles 8 China 6 4 2 2000
Litres per 100 km
10
EU
US light vehicles
8
China
6
4
2
2000
2010
2020
2030

…with fuel growth slowing as vehicle efficiency improves

…with fuel growth slowing as vehicle efficiency improves Transport fuel in 2030 remains dominated by oil

Transport fuel in 2030 remains dominated by oil (87%) and biofuels (7%). Other fuels gain share, such as natural gas and electricity (4% and 1% respectively in 2030) are constrained by limited policy support combined with a general lack of infrastructure in all but a handful of markets.…with fuel growth slowing as vehicle efficiency improves Despite the projected 60% increase in vehicles over

Despite the projected 60% increase in vehicles over the next 20 years, energy consumption in total transport is forecast to grow only 26% (1.2% p.a. – down from 1.9% p.a. between 1990 and 2010).lack of infrastructure in all but a handful of markets. The growth rate of energy used

The growth rate of energy used for transport declines due to accelerating improvements in fuel economy and the impact of high oil prices on driving behaviour. Vehicle saturation in the OECD and likely increases in taxation (or subsidy reduction) and development of mass transportation in the non-OECD are other factors.(1.2% p.a. – down from 1.9% p.a. between 1990 and 2010). Vehicle fuel economy improvements are

Vehicle fuel economy improvements are driven by tightening policy (CO 2 emissions limits in Europe and CAFE standards in the US) and enabled by improving 2 emissions limits in Europe and CAFE standards in the US) and enabled by improving technology. Prices also play a role, since high fuel costs provide an additional incentive to improve vehicle efficiency.

Policy and technology enable efficiency improvements…

Policy and technology enable efficiency improvements… Passenger car sales by type 100% 80% 60% 40% 20%

Passenger car sales by type

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

2010

2020

2030

Plug-ins incl. BEVs

Full hybrid

Mild hybrid

Conventional incl. stop-start

Global vehicle fleet in 2030

69%

4%

11%

16%

…as the vehicle fleet gradually shifts to hybrids

…as the vehicle fleet gradually shifts to hybrids The efficiency of the internal combustion engine is

The efficiency of the internal combustion engine is likely to double over the next 20 years. The improvement come initially from engine stop-start technologies, downsizing, boosting and lower vehicle weight followed by the gradual penetration of the vehicle fleet by hybrid cars.…as the vehicle fleet gradually shifts to hybrids By 2030, sales of conventional passenger vehicles (accounting

By 2030, sales of conventional passenger vehicles (accounting for nearly 100% today) fall to a third of total sales, while hybrids dominate (full hybrids 22%, mild hybrids 34%). Sales of plug-in vehicles, including full battery electric vehicle (BEVs), are forecast to be 8% of sales in 2030.the gradual penetration of the vehicle fleet by hybrid cars. Plug-in vehicles, with the capability to

Plug-in vehicles, with the capability to switch to oil for longer distances, are likely to be preferred to BEVs, based on current economics and consumer attitudes towards range limitations.vehicle (BEVs), are forecast to be 8% of sales in 2030. Hybridisation of the total vehicle

Hybridisation of the total vehicle fleet takes much longer because of relatively long vehicle lifetimes and because we assume that heavy commercial vehicles are unlikely to use this technology. By 2030 our outlook shows that approximately 30% of conventional vehicles have been replaced by advanced technologies.based on current economics and consumer attitudes towards range limitations. Energy Outlook 2030 6 9 ©

Efficiency gains have the biggest impact on oil demand…

Efficiency gains have the biggest impact on oil demand… Mb/d Oil demand in road transport 60
Mb/d Oil demand in road transport 60 Non-OECD 50 Non-OECD OECD Biofuels Other* 40 OECD
Mb/d
Oil demand in road transport
60
Non-OECD
50
Non-OECD
OECD
Biofuels
Other*
40
OECD
30
2010
Increased
Reduced
Improved
average
vehicle
vehicles
usage
efficiency
Increased
use of
alternatives
2030
number of

* Includes GTL, CTL, CNG, LNG and electricity

Energy Outlook 2030

70

© BP 2012

…but alternative fuels may play a greater role post 2030

…but alternative fuels may play a greater role post 2030 Assuming no changes to vehicle usage,

Assuming no changes to vehicle usage, efficiency and the use of alternatives, oil demand in road transport would increase by a massive 23 Mb/d over the next 20 years, more than our total projected oil demand growth (16 Mb/d), due mostly to more vehicles in the non-OECD. Instead we project oil demand growth for road transport to be 6 Mb/d.…but alternative fuels may play a greater role post 2030 Vehicle fuel economy is forecast to

Vehicle fuel economy is forecast to improve by 1.1% p.a. in both the OECD and non-OECD. These efficiency gains are equivalent to 11 Mb/d by 2030 – saving approximately half of the incremental oil demand that would otherwise be required under the above “no change” case.project oil demand growth for road transport to be 6 Mb/d. Average miles driven per vehicle

Average miles driven per vehicle is expected to fall (saving 2.4 Mb/d) as high fuel prices (partly due to rising taxes or reduced subsidies), congestion and mass transit outweigh the impact of rising incomes.otherwise be required under the above “no change” case. Biofuels make up more than half of

Biofuels make up more than half of the incremental demand for alternative fuels in transport. Use of electric vehicles and CNG/LNG is growing, but there are still barriers delaying the scale-up. Alternative fuels therefore are not expected to have a material impact by 2030.subsidies), congestion and mass transit outweigh the impact of rising incomes. Energy Outlook 2030 7 1

Energy Outlook 2030 7 2 © BP 2012

Contents

Contents   Page Introduction 4 Global energy trends 7 Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 21 Key
 

Page

Introduction

4

Global energy trends

7

Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel

21

Key determinants

43

Risks and unknowns

73

Appendix

83

Quantifying and benchmarking “business as usual” trends…

and benchmarking “business as usual” trends… Implications of business as usual trends for China, and its

Implications of business as usual trends

for

China, and its global fuel impact

…and in oil markets

Billion toe

7 Business as usual (at trend intensity) 6 5 4 3 2 Base case 1
7
Business as usual
(at trend intensity)
6
5
4
3
2
Base case
1
0
1970
1990
2010
2030
% of world demand in 2030 Mb/d in 2030 35% 10 30% 8 25% 6
% of world demand in 2030
Mb/d in 2030
35%
10
30%
8
25%
6
20%
15%
4
10%
2
5%
0%
0
Coal
Oil
Gas CO2
China
Trans. M.East

…helps to illustrate the uncertainties around any outlook

…helps to illustrate the uncertainties around any outlook One way to explore the range of uncertainty

One way to explore the range of uncertainty around any energy outlook is to extrapolate past trends to examine the implications of “business as usual”.…helps to illustrate the uncertainties around any outlook We illustrate this here for China (the market

We illustrate this here for China (the market with the greatest potential to change the global outlook), by assuming that energy intensity will continue to decline at the same trend rate as over the last 10 years (less than half the decline rate in our base case projection) to 2030.to examine the implications of “business as usual”. Compared to our base case, the resulting higher

Compared to our base case, the resulting higher Chinese demand would increase global coal demand in 2030 by 32%, oil by 8% and gas by 2%. Global CO 2 emissions would also be 18% higher in 2030. Inevitably, this would trigger repercussions elsewhere 2 emissions would also be 18% higher in 2030. Inevitably, this would trigger repercussions elsewhere in the system.

The implications of the Chinese “business as usual” case on oil markets are roughly on par with two similar illustrations: Keeping oil exports from the Middle East flat 2010-30, and benchmarking the improvement of fuel efficiency in transport to the rate achieved over the past ten years.in 2030. Inevitably, this would trigger repercussions elsewhere in the system. Energy Outlook 2030 7 5

Energy imbalances improve in the Americas…

Energy imbalances improve in the Americas… Europe FSU N. America Key: Billion toe 1 0 -1

Europe

FSU

N. America

imbalances improve in the Americas… Europe FSU N. America Key: Billion toe 1 0 -1 Gas
imbalances improve in the Americas… Europe FSU N. America Key: Billion toe 1 0 -1 Gas
imbalances improve in the Americas… Europe FSU N. America Key: Billion toe 1 0 -1 Gas
imbalances improve in the Americas… Europe FSU N. America Key: Billion toe 1 0 -1 Gas
imbalances improve in the Americas… Europe FSU N. America Key: Billion toe 1 0 -1 Gas
imbalances improve in the Americas… Europe FSU N. America Key: Billion toe 1 0 -1 Gas
imbalances improve in the Americas… Europe FSU N. America Key: Billion toe 1 0 -1 Gas
imbalances improve in the Americas… Europe FSU N. America Key: Billion toe 1 0 -1 Gas
imbalances improve in the Americas… Europe FSU N. America Key: Billion toe 1 0 -1 Gas
imbalances improve in the Americas… Europe FSU N. America Key: Billion toe 1 0 -1 Gas

Key:

Billion toe

1

0

-1

Gas  

Gas

 

Oil

Coal

1990 2010 2030

Net importerstoe 1 0 -1 Gas   Oil Coal 1990 2010 2030 Net exporters S. & C.

Net exportersGas   Oil Coal 1990 2010 2030 Net importers S. & C. America Mid-East China India

S. & C. America

2010 2030 Net importers Net exporters S. & C. America Mid-East China India Africa Other Asia
2010 2030 Net importers Net exporters S. & C. America Mid-East China India Africa Other Asia
2010 2030 Net importers Net exporters S. & C. America Mid-East China India Africa Other Asia
Mid-East China India Africa
Mid-East
China
India
Africa
exporters S. & C. America Mid-East China India Africa Other Asia Pacific Energy Outlook 2030 7
exporters S. & C. America Mid-East China India Africa Other Asia Pacific Energy Outlook 2030 7

Other Asia Pacific

exporters S. & C. America Mid-East China India Africa Other Asia Pacific Energy Outlook 2030 7
exporters S. & C. America Mid-East China India Africa Other Asia Pacific Energy Outlook 2030 7
exporters S. & C. America Mid-East China India Africa Other Asia Pacific Energy Outlook 2030 7

…but worsen in Europe and in Asia Pacific

…but worsen in Europe and in Asia Pacific Europe’s energy deficit remains roughly at today’s levels

Europe’s energy deficit remains roughly at today’s levels for oil and coal but increases by 65% for natural gas. This is matched by gas production growth in the FSU and trade.…but worsen in Europe and in Asia Pacific Among energy importing regions, North America is an

Among energy importing regions, North America is an exception, with growth in biofuel supplies and unconventional oil and gas turning today’s energy deficit (mainly oil) into a small surplus by 2030.is matched by gas production growth in the FSU and trade. In aggregate, today’s energy importers

In aggregate, today’s energy importers will need to import 40% more in 2030 than they do today, with deficits in Europe and Asia Pacific met by supply growth in the Middle East, the FSU, Africa and S & C America.energy deficit (mainly oil) into a small surplus by 2030. China’s energy deficit increases by 0.8

China’s energy deficit increases by 0.8 Btoe (spread across all fuels) while India’s import requirement grows by 0.4 Btoe (mainly oil and coal). The rest of Asia Pacific remains a big oil importer at similar levels to today.in the Middle East, the FSU, Africa and S & C America. Asian energy requirements are

Asian energy requirements are partially met by increased Middle East and African production but the rebalancing of global energy trade as a result of the improved net position in the Americas is also a key factor.The rest of Asia Pacific remains a big oil importer at similar levels to today. Energy

Import dependency rises in Asia and Europe…

Import dependency rises in Asia and Europe… India China EU27 US Billion toe Gas 1.2 Oil
India China EU27 US Billion toe Gas 1.2 Oil 1.0 Import share of respective fuel
India
China
EU27
US
Billion toe
Gas
1.2
Oil
1.0
Import share of
respective fuel
Coal
42%
80%
0.8
0.6
47%
0.4
91%
80%
94%
0.2
32%
40%
6%
57%
0.0
-0.2

1990 2010 2030

1990 2010 2030

1990 2010 2030

1990 2010 2030

…and falls in the US

…and falls in the US Import dependency, measured as the share of demand met by net

Import dependency, measured as the share of demand met by net imports, increases for most major energy importers except the US.…and falls in the US The import share of oil demand and the volume of oil

The import share of oil demand and the volume of oil imports in the US will fall below 1990s levels, largely due to rising domestic shale oil production and ethanol displacing crude imports. The US also becomes a net exporter of natural gas.increases for most major energy importers except the US. In China, imports of oil and natural

In China, imports of oil and natural gas rise sharply as demand growth outpaces domestic supply. Oil continues to dominate China's energy imports, although gas imports increase by a factor of sixteen. China also becomes a major importer of coal.imports. The US also becomes a net exporter of natural gas. India will increasingly have to

India will increasingly have to rely on imports of all three – oil, coal and natural gas – to supply its growing energy needs.of sixteen. China also becomes a major importer of coal. European net imports (and imports as

European net imports (and imports as a share of consumption) rise significantly due to declining domestic oil and gas production and rising gas consumption. Virtually all of the growth in net imports is from natural gas.all three – oil, coal and natural gas – to supply its growing energy needs. Energy

Carbon emission growth slows, but more action is needed…

Carbon emission growth slows, but more action is needed… Global CO 2 emissions from energy use

Global CO 2 emissions from energy use

Billion tonnes CO 2 40 30 Non-OECD 20 10 OECD 0 1990 2010 2030
Billion tonnes CO 2
40
30
Non-OECD
20
10
OECD
0
1990
2010
2030

Billion tonnes CO 2

Base 40 Case Policy Case 30 Coal IEA “450 20 Scenario” Gas 10 Oil 0
Base
40
Case
Policy
Case
30
Coal
IEA “450
20
Scenario”
Gas
10
Oil
0
2000
2010
2020
2030

…to get emissions falling by 2030

…to get emissions falling by 2030 We assume continued tightening in policies to address climate change.

We assume continued tightening in policies to address climate change. Carbon abatement policies in the OECD, including carbon pricing, succeeds in reducing emissions in 2030 (by 10% versus 2010). Non-OECD countries do make significant progress in reducing the carbon intensity of their economies, but this is outweighed by carbon increases due to rapid economic growth. The net result is a projected increase in global emissions of 28% by 2030.…to get emissions falling by 2030 This leaves the world well above the required emissions path

This leaves the world well above the required emissions path to stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases at the level recommended by scientists (around 450 ppm).is a projected increase in global emissions of 28% by 2030. Our “Policy Case” (discussed in

Our “Policy Case” (discussed in more detail in last year’s Outlook ) assumes a step-change in the political commitment to action on carbon emissions. Even Outlook) assumes a step-change in the political commitment to action on carbon emissions. Even in this case, the path to reach 450 ppm remains elusive. However, a declining emissions path by 2030 is achievable, given the political will to shoulder the cost.

Conclusion

Conclusion GDP, Energy and CO 2 Index (1970=100) 800 700 GDP 600 Coal 500 400 Gas

GDP, Energy and CO 2

Index (1970=100) 800 700 GDP 600 Coal 500 400 Gas Energy 300 CO 2 200
Index (1970=100)
800
700
GDP
600
Coal
500
400
Gas
Energy
300
CO 2
200 Oil
OECD
100
1970
1990
2010
2030

Energy can be available and affordable300 CO 2 200 Oil OECD 100 1970 1990 2010 2030  Competition  Innovation 

Competition

Innovation

Regulation harnessing market forces

Energy security will remain an issue Innovation  Regulation harnessing market forces CO 2 emissions not on track Energy Outlook 2030

CO 2 emissions not on track 2 emissions not on track

Contents

Contents   Page Introduction 4 Global energy trends 7 Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel 21 Key
 

Page

Introduction

4

Global energy trends

7

Outlook 2030: Fuel by fuel

21

Key determinants

43

Risks and unknowns

73

Appendix

83

Key changes versus last year’s Outlook

Key changes versus last year’s Outlook Changes in 2030 levels versus the 2011 Outlook Revised down

Changes in 2030 levels versus the 2011 Outlook

Revised down

Revised up

Nuclear output Biofuels supply Renewables in power Biofuels India total energy demand N. America oil
Nuclear output
Biofuels supply
Renewables in power
Biofuels
India total energy demand
N. America oil & gas supply
Oil
Gas
-100
-50
0
50
100
150

Mtoe

…result in little net change in total energy

…result in little net change in total energy Our projection for world energy demand and supply

Our projection for world energy demand and supply is little changed since our last outlook (up about 1% by 2030). A slightly higher base year, due to strong global consumption growth in 2010, has been offset by a slightly slower annual growth rate.…result in little net change in total energy Nuclear prospects have been revised down after Fukushima

Nuclear prospects have been revised down after Fukushima and the resulting policy changes in Japan and Europe.has been offset by a slightly slower annual growth rate. Biofuels growth (while still very robust)

Biofuels growth (while still very robust) has been reduced due to more modest expectations of penetration of next generation fuels.and the resulting policy changes in Japan and Europe. Renewables in power generation have been revised

Renewables in power generation have been revised higher due to improved prospects for cost reductions. They also play a part in replacing the lost nuclear output in Japan and Europe.modest expectations of penetration of next generation fuels. Indian energy consumption has been revised upwards on

Indian energy consumption has been revised upwards on a reassessment of the country’s economic development path.in replacing the lost nuclear output in Japan and Europe. North American oil and natural gas

North American oil and natural gas supply outlooks have been revised higher due to evolving expectations for shale plays.revised upwards on a reassessment of the country’s economic development path. Energy Outlook 2030 8 5

Differences with other outlooks are mostly due to…

Differences with other outlooks are mostly due to… World energy consumption Billion toe 20 External range

World energy consumption

Billion toe 20 External range BP 15 10 5 0
Billion toe
20
External range
BP
15
10
5
0

Growth of energy consumption

2010-2030

Billion toe 6 Non-OECD 5 OECD 4 3 2 1 0
Billion toe
6
Non-OECD
5
OECD
4
3
2
1
0

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

XOM IEA

XOM

IEA

EIA EIA

BP BP

OPEC OPEC IEA IEA

 

NPS NPS

CPS CPS

Energy Outlook 2030

86

© BP 2012

…differing views on OECD vs. non-OECD prospects

…differing views on OECD vs. non-OECD prospects Our outlook is within the range of publicly-available forecasts,

Our outlook is within the range of publicly-available forecasts, initially lying near the upper end of the range but moving toward the centre by…differing views on OECD vs. non-OECD prospects 2030. Many forecasters expect higher growth in OECD energy

2030.

Many forecasters expect higher growth in OECD energy demand than we do, while our projections for non-OECD growth are stronger than most.upper end of the range but moving toward the centre by 2030. Our outlook lies between

Our outlook lies between the IEA’s “New Policies Scenario”, which assesses demand prospects on the assumption that announced national policy objectives are fully implemented, and their “Current Policies Scenario”, which assumes current policies remain in place through 2030. In contrast to the IEA scenarios, our outlook does not take policies as given but makes judgments about the likelihood of future policy developments and their impacts.than we do, while our projections for non-OECD growth are stronger than most. Energy Outlook 2030

Data sources

Data sources BP p.l.c., BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London, United Kingdom, June 2011 Cedigaz,

BP p.l.c., BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London, United Kingdom, June 2011

Cedigaz, Paris, France

Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, Heston, A., Summers, R., Aten, B., Penn World Table Version 7.0, May 2011.

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, Eschborn, Germany

Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook , Washington, D.C., United States, September 2011

Energy Information Administration, World Shale Gas Resources: An Initial Assessment of 14 Regions outside the United States, Washington, D.C., United States, April 2011

International Energy Agency, CO 2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, Paris, France, 2011

International Energy Agency, Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, Paris, France, 2011

International Energy Agency, Energy Balances of OECD Countries, Paris, France, 2011

International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2011, Paris, France, 2011

Mitchell, B.R., International Historical Statistics 1750-2005, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, United States, 2007

Oxford Economics Ltd, Oxford, UK

United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, New York, United States,

2009

United Nations Statistics Division, National Accounts Statistics, New York, United States, 2011

Waterborne Energy, Inc., Houston, Texas, United States

Plus various official sources