REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SUPREME COURT MANILA

BULACAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, represented by CHIEF RIZALINA D. BONFACIO, Petitioner, CASE NO. 1234 FOR: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45

-versus-

JUAN SANT0S, Respondent. x----------------------------------------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM RESPONDENT JUAN SANTOS, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:

PREFATORY STATEMENT The truth is incontrovertible, malice may attack it, ignorance may deride it, but in the end; there it is. -Winston Churchill It may be true that the Municipality of Malolos, which allegedly bought the disputed land from Pedro in 1940, had continually occupied it openly and publicly in the concept of an owner until 1988 when the Municipality donated the school site to petitioner Bulacan School District. Such claim was even corroborated by Tax Declarations from 1940 until 1988. However, to our minds, and to the minds of the appellate courts, these exhibits are of no consequence. These exhibits have not matched,
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nor outweighed the respondent s evidence, which is a title covering the land in question registered in his name. The respondent has the Torrens Title over the land in question, and as a registered owner thereof, he has the exclusive right to use, enjoy and possess the same because these rights are undeniably attributes of ownership. Hence, the evidence on record preponderates in favor of the respondent. STATEMENT OF FACTS For the Court s Resolution is the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, declaring as null and void the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Malolos in favor of petitioner, Bulacan School District (BSD) and directing the latter to return to respondent Juan Santos (Santos) the possession of the portion of land occupied by the school site of the Malolos Central Elementary School. The case stemmed from the following antecedents: Spouses Pedro and Maria owned Lot No. 6849 (disputed lot) with an area of around 27, 907 square meters registered under the Torrens System of land registration under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2563. They had three children, namely: Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco, all surnamed Santos. Respondent Juan is the grandson of Pedro, being the son of Francisco. In 1940, Malolos Elementary School was constructed on a portion of the disputed lot. The school was eventually renamed Malolos Central Elementary School. The Municipality of Malolos leveled the area with petitioner BSD developed and built various school buildings and facilities on the disputed lot.

Sometime in 1991, respondent filed a reconstitution proceeding of OCT No. 2563, which was granted by the Obando RTC, Branch V after due notice, publication, and hearing. Consequently, OCT No. RO-18971 was issued in the name of spouses Pedro and Maria. On August 26, 1991, a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession was executed by respondent and his three sisters, namely: Melba, Cielo and Maria Visia, who waived their successional rights in favor of respondent Juan. Asserting that the disputed lot was inherited by his father, Francisco, from the latter s father, Pedro, by virtue of a prior partition among the three sons of Pedro and Maria, respondent in turn claimed ownership of said lot through extrajudicial settlement. Meanwhile, the issue of whether respondent s father, Francisco, truly acquired the disputed lot through a prior partition among Pedro s three children had been passed upon in another case, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition, Reconveyance and Damages filed by the heirs of Rafael before the Obando RTC, Branch IX. In said case, respondent Juan, the defendant, prevailed and the case was dismissed by the trial court. Thereafter, respondent caused Lot No. 6849 to be subdivided into five lots, all under his name, except Lot No. 6849-B which is under the name of Mariano M. Lim. On October 26, 1992, the subdivided lots were issued Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCTs): (1) Lot No. 6849-A (13,072 square meters) under TCT No. T-83946; (2) Lot No. 6849-B (3,100 square meters) under TCT No. T-84049; (3) Lot No. 6849-C (10,000 square meters) under TCT No. T-83948; (4) Lot No. 6849-D (1,127 square meters) under TCT No. T-83949; and (5) Lot No. 6849-E (608 square meters) under TCT No. T-83950.

On December 15, 1992, through his counsel, respondent sent a letter to petitioner apprising it about the facts and circumstances affecting the elementary school and its occupancy of Lot No. 6849-A with an area of 13,072 square meters. Respondent proposed to petitioner BSD that it purchase Lot No. 6849-A at the Fair Market Value (FMV) of PhP 400 per square meter and also requested for reasonable rentals from 1960. The records show that then BSD Director Ramos subsequently referred the matter to BSD Chief Rizalina D. Bonifacio for investigation. On February 24, 1993, through his counsel, respondent likewise wrote to Engr. Orlando Roces, District Engineer, Bulacan Engineering District, about the on-going construction projects in the school. Engr. Roces then informed respondent s counsel that petitioner BSD is the owner of the school site having acquired the disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan in favor of petitioner. Consequently, on March 18, 1993, respondent instituted a Complaint for Annulment of Donation and/or Quieting of Title with Recovery of Possession of Lot No. 6849 located at Barrio Bagumbayan, Malolos, Bulacan before the Obando RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 8715, against petitioner BSD, represented by Mrs. Rizalina D. Bonifacio; and the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, represented by the Municipal Mayor, Honorable Cicero Triunfante. In its April 28, 1993 Answer, the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, through Mayor Cicero Triunfante, denied respondents ownership of the disputed lot as it alleged that sometime in 1940, the Municipality bought said lot from Pedro, respondent s grandfather, and since then it had continually occupied said lot openly and publicly in the concept of an
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owner until 1988 when the Municipality donated the school site to petitioner BSD; thus asserting that it could also claim ownership also through adverse possession. Moreover, it claimed that the disputed lot had been declared in the name of defendant municipality in the Municipal Assessors Office under Tax Declaration No. 31954 from 1940 until 1988 for purposes of exemption from real estate taxes. Further, defendant Municipality contended that respondent was guilty of laches and was estopped from assailing ownership over the disputed lot. Similarly, petitioner s April 29, 1993 Answer reiterated in essence the defenses raised by the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan and further contended that respondent had no cause of action because it acquired ownership over the disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed on December 21, 1988 in its favor; and that respondents claim was vague as it was derived from a void Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession disposing of the disputed lot which was already sold to the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan in 1940. Petitioner likewise assailed the issuance of a reconstituted OCT over Lot 6849 when the lower court granted respondents petition for reconstitution without notifying petitioner. During the ensuing trial where both parties presented documentary and testimonial evidence, respondent testified that he came to know of the disputed lot in 1973 when he was 23 years old; that he took possession of the said lot in the same year; that he came to know that the elementary school occupied a portion of the said lot only in 1991; and that it was only in 1992 that he came to know of the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan. Also, Felix Armas, a tenant cultivating a portion of disputed Lot 6849, testified that respondent indeed owned said lot and the share of the crops cultivated were paid to respondent.
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However, after respondent testified, defendants in said case filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss on the ground that respondents suit was against the State which was prohibited without the latter s consent. Respondent countered with his Opposition to Joint Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, the trial court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss, ruling that the State had given implied consent by entering into a contract. Aside from the reconstituted OCT No. RO-18971, respondent presented the TCTs covering the five (5) portions of the partitioned Lot 6849, Tax Declaration No. 04-006-00681 issued for said lot, and the April 20, 1992 Certification from the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan attesting to respondents payment of realty taxes for Lot 6849 from 1980 to 1990. After respondent rested his case, the defense presented and marked their documentary exhibits of Tax Declaration No. 30235 issued in the name of the late Pedro, which was cancelled in 1938; Tax Declaration 31954, which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 30235, in the name of Municipality of Malolos with the annotation of Ex-Officio Deputy Assessor Naty Gracia attesting to the purchase by the Municipality under Municipal Voucher No. 69, August 1940 accounts and the issuance of TCT No. 4812 in favor of the Municipality; Tax Declaration No. 8926 in the name of the Municipality which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 31954; and the subsequent Tax Declaration Nos. 22184, 332, and 04-006-00068. The defense presented the testimony of Mr. Jose Adriano, the Principal of Malolos North Central Elementary School, who testified on the Municipality s donation of disputed Lot 6849 to petitioner and the improvements on said lot amounting to more than PhP 11 million; and Mrs. Antonio Millar, a retired government employee and resident of
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Bagumbayan, Malolos, Bulacan since 1955, who testified on the Municipality s continuous and adverse possession of the disputed lot since 1940. As mentioned earlier, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition,

Reconveyance and Damages was instituted by the heirs of Rafael in Obando City RTC, Branch IX against Spouses Juan and Alice, involving the same disputed lot. Petitioner and co-defendant Municipality of Malolos, Bulacan were about to file a complaint for intervention in said case, but it was overtaken by the resolution of the case on August 14, 1995 with the trial court dismissing the complaint. ISSUES The grounds for which this Petition is filed and issues material for the resolution thereof are as follows: I. Whether or not the court should accord great weight on

respondent s reconstituted original certificate of title covering the subject property II. Whether or not the respondent s recovery of possession of the

subject property is barred by laches ARGUMENTS I. Weight of the Reconstituted Original Certificate of Title Petitioner likewise assails the issuance of a reconstituted original certificate of title over the disputed lot on the ground that when the lower court granted the petition, the petitioner was not then notified. The respondent begs to disagree. There was no jurisdictional defect in the reconstitution proceeding even if no notice was sent to petitioner. Judicial reconstitution of title partakes of land registration proceeding and

is perforce a proceeding in rem.1 As such, it binds all persons known and unknown, and the title issued as a result thereof is binding and conclusive upon the whole world.2 All persons who may be adversely affected by the proceedings are so bound by the proceedings, innocent factually as they might have been of the publication of the said notice of initial hearing.3 The respondent concurs with the observation of the court a quo that even granting arguendo that petitioner was not notified, such deficiency is not jurisdictional as to nullify and prevail over the final disposition of the trial court in a proceeding in rem. As in fact, the respondent was able to establish all the jurisdictional requisites for a valid reconstitution notice, publication, and hearing due

before the trial court granted the

petition. Since the petitioner failed to prove the existence of a jurisdictional defect, the issuance of OCT No. RO-18971 based on the destroyed or lost OCT No. 2563 should be upheld by this Court. II. Laches has not set in It should be made clear on this point that the ownership of the respondent should not be put in doubt. It is clear right from the outset that the disputed lot is covered by OCT No. 2563 registered under the name of Spouses Pedro and Maria, respondent s grandparents. The respondent later on inherited the same and claimed ownership of it through the deed of extrajudicial settlement where respondent s sisters waived their successional right in his favor. Jurisprudence defined laches as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which- by the
Republic vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 62, 66 (1988). Garcia vs. Bello, 13 SCRA 769 (1965). 3 Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 22, 33 (1980).
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exercise of due diligence- could or should have been done earlier. Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks to remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant s rights, the complainant having knowledge or notice of the defendant s conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. It was established that the school was constructed in 1940 on the portion of the lot and that the said school was continuously used for public education. The second element, however, does not exist. There was no delay on respondent s part to assert his right because when he learned of the school and the donation, he immediately took actions to recover the property. As in fact, he instituted the necessary actions, among others, is the annulment of the deed of donation and quieting of title. Assuming that his predecessors-in-interest did not undertake activities to contest the occupation of the portion of the lot such inaction should not be imputed to the respondent who, in good faith, relied on the certificates of title in his possession. All the while the respondent knew that he still owns the disputed lot because of the certificate of title that is in his possession. Furthermore, it was an established fact that the respondent has been paying the realty taxes of the disputed lot from 1980 to 1990 as evidenced by the certification from the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality. From that time then, the Municipality should have informed or advised the respondent to stop making payments of the taxes as the lot
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was already under the name of the Municipality. An advice from it could have enabled the respondent to take the necessary actions earlier. The Municipality, however, did not and has even enriched itself at the expense of the respondent because of the realty taxes paid. On the third element, the Municipality has knowledge on the part of the petitioner that respondent would assert his right. Whenever the respondent pays the realty taxes of the disputed lot, such payment partakes the nature of a notice. The Municipality should have been cautious and prudent enough to inquire why the respondent keeps on paying the taxes for the lot if it knows that lot is already owned by the municipality. The Municipality should have found it absurd to let the respondent pays taxes for a lot that the latter doesn t own. Lastly, where its usage would result in manifest wrong or injustice, such cannot be utilized. Besides, laches could not defeat the rights of a registered owner. No Deed of Conveyance to prove transfer of ownership In its April 28, 1993 Answer, the Municipality of Malolos, through Mayor Cicero Trias, denied respondent s ownership of the disputed lot as it alleged that sometime in 1940, the Municipality bought said lot from Pedro, and since then it had continually occupied said lot openly and publicly in the concept of an owner until 1988 when it donated the school site to petitioner. Petitioner s claim of ownership became more doubtful when it failed to present the TCT and the Deed of Conveyance both in the name of the Municipality of Malolos. The doubt even increased when it neglected to
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explain in their pleadings and evidence their error in not presenting those two documents. It is interesting to also note that the Municipality embarked on the argument that it could ALSO claim ownership through adverse possession. Respondent disputes why the Municipality should embark on this kind of argument when all it has to do is to adduce evidence of conveyance. The Municipality set up a clear and affirmative defense, it is therefore incumbent upon them to present these documents. The petitioner,

however, did not and did not even give any cogent explanation why the deeds of conveyances were not presented. Their argument that the Municipality has been declared owner of the disputed property to exempt it from paying real estate taxes from 1940-1988 does not prove the ownership of the property. It has been a settled jurisprudence tax declaration or exemption is not in itself sufficient to prove ownership.4 There exists an unmistakable inference that there was indeed no sale and conveyance. Given these facts, all the more that petitioner s claim of ownership should be put in doubt. Since no title in the name of the Municipality ever existed, it could not have validly donated the subject property to petitioner. The Deed of Donation should therefore be nullified since the Municipality cannot donate something which it does not own. Corollary to this, petitioner s claim of adverse possession could not now prevail over respondent s registered title. The law provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.5 Prescription is unavailing
4 5

Republic vs Court of Appeals, GR. No. 108926, 12 July 1996, 258 SCRA 712. Sec. 47, P.D 1529.

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not only against the registered owner but also equally against the latter hereditary successors.6 Thus, even adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens title.7 This is in line with the principle of incontrovertibility and indefeasibility of registered titles. Respondent s ownership is also supported, not only by the reconstituted OCT No. RO-18971, but also by the different transfer certificates of title covering the five (5) portions of the partitioned Lot 6849, Tax Declaration No. 04-006-00681 issued for the lot, and the April 20, 1992 Certification from the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of Malolos attesting to respondent s payment of realty taxes for the lot from 1980 to 1990. Registered Title cannot be attacked collaterally When the respondent instituted Civil Case No. 8715, the petitioner made a collateral attack on the title s respondent which is strongly prohibited by law and jurisprudence. Petitioner collaterally attacked the title when it averred that it owns the disputed lot. Section 48 of P.D 1529 provides that certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. This proscription has long been enshrined in Philippine jurisprudence. In Widows and Orphans Assoc. Inc. vs. CA8, the Supreme Court held that the judicial

6 7

Jose vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 735. Vda. De Recinto vs. Inciong, 77 SCRA 196. 8 GR No. 91797, 28 August 1991

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action requires to challenge the validity of title is a direct attack, not a collateral one. No Legal Easement Exists Petitioner avers that there exists legal easement in its favor as the dominant estate. Respondent is not convinced, however, of its existence. Easement as defined under Article 613 of the Civil Code means an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. By the mere definition of easement, it can be deduced already that no easement exists. Easement presupposes the existence of two immovable properties, namely the immovable property of the dominant estate and the immovable property of the servient estate. It also assumes the existence of different owners as when the law uses the phrase belonging to different owner. This does not hold true in this case since the disputed lot is owned solely by one person the respondent. This line of thinking, the respondent believes,

does not have any legal basis to stand on and as in fact, incredibly unfounded in reality. All the more that legal easement exists since such easement should be imposed by law and have for their object either public use or the interest of private persons. The elements are: 1) it must be imposed by law 2) it must be for public use or the interests of private persons. Although the second element is present as the school was built for public use, the first element is lacking since no law exists imposing upon the respondent s property whatever kind of easement.

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CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, respondent reiterates the following arguments: I. The State can be sued in this case since it has impliedly given

its consent when it entered into a contract with the petitioner. As such, it relinquished and forfeited its armor of non-suability of the State. II. The Court should give great weight to reconstituted title since it was issued in accordance with the requirements set forth by law. The petitioner need not be notified since the proceeding was in rem. III. Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound

discretion of this Court as its application is controlled by equitable considerations. However, the respondent maintains that laches does not apply, because there was no inaction on the part of the respondent. IV. There is no legal easement simply because no law imposes

upon the property any burden. The properties are owned solely by the respondent. PRAYER In view of the foregoing, it most respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in favor of the respondent. Particularly, it prayed that a judgment be rendered: I. Declaring the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality

of Malolos, Bulacan in favor of petitioner Bulacan School District as null and void; II. Declaring the respondent as the owner in fee simple the disputed lots which are registered in his name;
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III.

Commanding the petitioner either to return the possession of the land occupied by the school to the respondent, or buy the land at its fair market value.

IV.

Declaring that BSD is not entitled to the legal easement of the Right of Way from respondent s land, and therefore ordering the annotation of such exemption on the TCT. Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise

prayed for.

Dianne Gandeza-Landicho Krisandra Ann D. Malaluan Ismael T. Serrano, Jr. Counsels for the Respondent

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