Name: Amit Julka Student ID: 320335 Subject: Government and Politics of Modern South Asia (15PPOC003) Words:

3477

Bullets vs. Ballots The emergence of military as a political heavyweight in Pakistan

This pock-marked daylight, this night bitten dawn, This is not the dawn that we were waiting for

These lines by Faiz probably capture the disappointment felt by many after the creation of Pakistan. Soon after independence, the hope of a new dawn was soon extinguished by rising political chaos and the gradual decline of true democracy in the country. The rise of military in Pakistan and the decline of democratic institutions are two sides of the same coin. The weakness shown by one was complemented by the political opportunism shown by the other. In this essay, I have tried to look at the various causes and circumstances which led to the emergence of military as a dominant player in Pakistani politics.

Background

Birth Pangs

The creation of Pakistan was the result of a campaign by Muslim league to secure the political rights of Muslim community post independence. In 1940, the demand for a separate territorial homeland for the Indian Muslims was clearly articulated by the leadership of the Muslim League. The League demanded, inter alia, that contiguous Muslim majority areas be constituted into autonomous, self governing units within the larger framework of an Indian confederation (Jalal, 2002, 15). The initial tone of the League leadership suggested that this demand was not secessionist per se. Over the next seven years, League stalwarts like Mohammed Ali Jinnah continuously negotiated with the colonial government as well as the Congress over what he thought were adequate safeguards for the Muslim community in any post colonial scenario.

The Congress leadership at that time was dominated by Jawaharlal Nehru and Sardar Patel. Both Nehru and Patel had an uneasy relationship with the Muslim League, and

thus they exhibited great reluctance to any idea that suggested sharing political power with the League leadership. Nehru was of the opinion that any confederational arrangement is predicated upon a weak centre, and this would in turn lead to a weak state. Given the precarious nature of any future Indian union, he opined that a weak centre would prove counterproductive to the unity and territorial integrity of the country (Jalal, 15).

These divergent viewpoints of the League and Congress ultimately resulted in a breakdown of negotiations, and soon partition emerged as the only viable solution. It was decided that India would be bifurcated into two sovereign autonomous dominions, i.e. India and Pakistan. It is worth noting that the decision of partition was announced as late as in June 1947. Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that the League was open to political negotiation till as late as 1946. It was only after the failure of the Cabinet Mission that the League hardened its demands and unequivocally demanded the creation of a separate state for Muslims.

The rushed nature of British withdrawal ensured that the whole affair was a messy one. The business of partition was carried out in such a chaotic fashion that even on the day of independence the territorial frontiers of the new dominions were not clearly demarcated. Naturally, what ensued was disorder and violence.

Decline of Political Institutions and the rise of Centralism

It has been mentioned previously that although the two states of India and Pakistan shared a joint colonial legacy, their colonial inheritance was remarkably different. Let us first take a closer look at the history of the two organizations. The Congress was formed in 1885 by leading members of the Indian intelligentsia of the time, and initially functioned as a platform for articulation of demands voiced by this section of the society. Initially, the nature of the party could be described as fairly elitist, and its demands were ensconced squarely within the constitutional framework. In fact, it was only in the 1920s that the Congress finally emerged as a mass organization. Due to the spectacular leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, the Congress quickly stepped out of its urbane, elitist shell and started to participate in politics at the grassroots level.

With gradual devolution of political power by the colonial state, the Congress gradually acquired the nitty-gritty of electoral politics. As the party expanded its electoral base, it soon felt the need to accommodate people with divergent viewpoints and different political orientations. In order to maintain the unity of such an umbrella organization (Jalal, 5), it soon became apparent that besides practicing democracy externally, the internal practices of Congress had to be subject to processes of consensus building and negotiation (albeit to a limited level). Although the decision making was still dominated by an elite coterie of members, some restricted internalized democracy was introduced on the lower levels.

The All-India Muslim League (AIML) came into existence in the year 1906. At its inception, it was an organization which was dominated by the elite sections of Indian Muslim society. It was initially envisaged as a platform by loyalist Muslims to extract favours from the colonial government. Naturally, its political aims were rather conservative, and for a long time it continued to function as a preserve of the intelligentsia, with no real support base amongst the masses. It was only with the return of Mohammed Ali Jinnah in 1930s that revitalized the organization and increased its political exposure.

The League acquired significant political relevance only in the last few years leading up to independence. At the time of independence in 1947, it was still inexperienced in politics, both at the grassroots level as well as the state level. Its support base was concentrated in Muslim minority areas of United India, such as United Provinces. Paradoxically, its main constituency (the Urdu speaking Muslims) was a minority in the regions that constituted Pakistan. It had no mass base in Punjab or Sindh, the regions which demographically dominated Pakistan. Secondly, the organizational structure of the League was still not developed. The party was more or less propelled by the personal charisma of Jinnah, and to a lesser extent Liaqat Ali Khan. Jinnahs sudden death in 1948, followed by Liaqats assassination in 1951 left the party rudderless (Jalal, 36-8).

After Jinnah and Liaqat, the League was soon engulfed in a crisis of leadership. The ensuing political vacuum ensured a weak political base, which lead to increased bickering and struggles for power. It was during this time that the civil-military arms

of the state began to gain dominance in the affairs of the state. It is no coincidence that senior bureaucrats like Ghulam Mohammed and Iskander Mirza rose to prominent positions like Governor General and President (Waseem, 2002, 2). It was during this period that Ayub Khan, who was the Chief of Army Staff, was appointed as the Defence Minister by Iskander Mirza. This decision set a dangerous precedent, and the stage was set for further politicization of defence forces.

However, this perceived absence of mass based politics during this phase cannot be attributed to the League alone. At the onset, Pakistan faced the mammoth task of managing two separate wings, separated by miles of Indian Territory. Furthermore, the Eastern wing was more populous and politically developed compared to the Western wing. However, it was the West which dominated political power. The fear of losing dominance to the east in a democratic polity increased the reliance of the ruling elite on non elected institutions of the state. The military-bureaucratic nexus which was dominated by Punjabis tried its best to restrict the emergence of true democracy because of its innate fear of Bengali domination (Jalal, 54).

The fear of provincial rivalry also led to a forceful emphasis on a strong centre. The ruling elite were worried that delegation of power to provinces could lead to a breakup of the state. However, this policy proved counter productive, and soon regional separatist movements sprung up in Sindh and East Pakistan (Jalal, 53). Moreover, the gradual erosion of federalism shifted the balance of power and increased the ability of centre to abuse its power in an arbitrary fashion. This was in a direct contrast to India, where gradual devolution of power to states decreased the possibility of centre to exercise authoritarianism whilst at the same time keeping separatist movements in check.

Socio-economic Factors and lack of grassroots mobilization

At its very inception, Pakistan was besieged with glaring social inequalities. Even as late as 1970, 5% of the population controlled 70% of agricultural land. This feudal (not in the strictly European sense) structure of society gave rise to a class of landlords, which exercised great political power in their personal fiefdoms. The tight grip of feudal politics ensured that class based inequalities stayed entrenched and the

peasants were generally averse to collective action (Malik, 2011, 65). The landlords use their influence to political advantage, and thus act as a bottleneck to truly representational politics.

Due to their political weight, the landlords have emerged as a vital component of political support for the states. Since the state is heavily dependent on landlords for political support and neutralizing any kind of local opposition, they have begun to act as local intermediaries of the state. Thus, political power in Pakistan is generally a result of a weak coalition between the ruling entity (whether democratically elected or military) and a narrow support base consisting of landlords and other local elite. Virtually every incumbent leader has to depend on these support structures in order to retain political power. As a consequence, the state becomes less accountable to the general populace, which leads to weakening of democratic institutions at a grass-roots level (Malik, 30).

Apart from the landed class in rural areas, the urban bourgeoisie has also been an active supporter of military regimes in Pakistan. Pakistans industrial class had prospered due to economic policies under Ayub Khans regime. Industrialists also vied for allotment of lucrative contracts with Milbus (Siddiqa, 2007, 112). On the other hand, the socialist bent of Bhutto and his policy of nationalisation had alienated many industrialists from Pakistans political class. Naturally, the urban trading class became one of the most avowed supporters of Zias regime. This deepening of military-industrial nexus has only strengthened the hold of military over Pakistans polity. Along with landlords, Pakistans community of industrialists form an important part of the narrow winning coalition which runs the state directly or indirectly.

The very consequence of this narrow coalition was the weakening of elected institutions of the state. The presence of a large number of intermediaries thus makes it easier for non elected institutions to gain legitimacy (Malik, 34). Political allegiance could be bought for a piece in the distributional coalition known as Milbus (Siddiqa, 2007). According to Malik, National Policies may succeed or fail depending in part whether strongmen acquiesce. This shift from representational

politics to politics of patronage results in loss of accountability and transparency in the democratic process. Hence, the lack of real political mobilization aids the rise of authoritarian regimes at the centre.

The control of the Army in context of securitization

In this section, I shall try to explain the rise of the military in Pakistan within the conceptual framework of securitization. Securitization is defined as a process which takes politics beyond the regular rules of the game and frames the issue as a special kind of politics or above politics (Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, 2010, 23). When an issue is securitized, it implies that the issue is presented as an existential threat which requires emergency measures, thus placing it outside the realms of regular political procedure (Buzan, Weaver and Wilde, 24). The entity which is securitized is referred to as a referent object. For the military, the referent object is usually the state itself. This is especially true of newly formed states, where a premium is placed on the survival of the state. Normally, as a state advances, other priorities take precedence, implying the gradual consolidation of the state and its accompanying apparatus.

Besides the state, securitization can be applied to other referent objects too. Politically, ideology is an essentially securitized item, as ideology is usually the raison detre for a newly formed state. A states ideology is usually securitized by constitutional means, and thus securitization acts as a tool to enhance the legitimacy of the state. Securitization of ideology also serves as a check against other competing ideologies which may seek to undermine the legitimacy of the state. In case of states with a weak political base, the military can take control of political securitization too, which leads to the emergence of military as a custodian of state ideology.

Securitization in context of threat from India

Although both Pakistan and India shared a common colonial legacy, their colonial inheritances were markedly different. After partition, India was at a position of advantage, financially as well as militarily. After independence, India retained

roughly 65% of troops. Seen in context of its geographical expanse, this could not be viewed as a specific advantage vis--vis Pakistan. However, the Pakistani Army faced a serious resource crunch. All 16 ordnance factories of the British Army were located in India. Moreover, India gained the lions share of military equipment. The transfer of supplies of such equipment from India to Pakistan was erratic and irregular. Pakistan maintained that it did not receive its due share of defence supplies (Rizvi, 2000, 56) and cited this as evidence of Indias hostile attitude towards it.

Secondly, the dismissive attitude of Indias Congress led government towards Pakistan added to its fears. Pakistans establishment was convinced that India would try its best to keep reverse the partition and jeopardize its existence (Farooqi, 2003, 43). The hostile attitude displayed by leaders like Acharya Kripalani and Sardar Patel convinced Pakistan that India would do its very best to destabilize Pakistan. However, what confirmed Pakistans fears towards Indias supposed hegemonic designs was the eruption of hostilities in Kashmir. In 1948, the Maharaja of Kashmir decided in favour of acceding Jammu and Kashmir (a province with a sizeable Muslim majority) to India. Since the area of Kashmir was geographically contiguous to Pakistan, it denounced this accession as illegitimate. Hostilities soon broke out and both countries soon faced each other in an indirect conflict (Nawaz, 35-38).

The conflict over Kashmir increased Pakistans unease with its Eastern neighbour. Not only did Kashmir symbolize a loss of territorial integrity, but it was also perceived as a threat to Pakistans ideological integrity. Pakistan viewed itself as a homeland to the Muslims of the subcontinent. The loss of Kashmir to India was thus viewed as a direct threat to this claim. The deep impact of this loss on Pakistans psyche can be seen from the fact that one of the primary motives of the 1965 war was the settlement of the Kashmir issue (Nawaz, 219).

The perceived threat from India ensured that survival of the state remained the top priority of the country. Thus the state was treated as the referent object, and thus the state as an entity was securitized. Thus, defence of the state was an issue of paramount importance, which in turn consolidated the role of the army as the custodians of the state, and thus made it immune from all accountability and scrutiny. Even the parliament shirked away from serious criticism of spending and allocations

for defence (Rizvi, 76). To this day, Pakistans defence budget is not open to public scrutiny and there is no reliable account of internal utilization of monetary resources allocated for defence (Aziz, 2008, 28). Moreover, Pakistans politics of that era were marked by bitter internal feuds and struggle for power. This gave a veneer of credibility to the military-bureaucratic apparatus vis--vis the politicians.

Soon, the influence of military began to spread to other areas of governance. With a view to counterbalancing Indias superiority in matters of defence, Pakistan entered into security arrangements with the United States. Pakistan became the only state which was a signatory to both SEATO and CENTO. This decision was taken at the behest of the Army (Rizvi, 77). Ayub Khan, who was then the Chief of Army Staff accompanied Governor General Ghulam Mohammed as well as Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bogra to their respective visits to the US. Since Pakistans foreign policy was viewed as a continuation of Pakistans internal policy, the Army it within its range of influence. The appointment of Ayub Khan as defence minister only reconfirmed the paramountcy of defence in Pakistans polity.

Thus, in view of an existential threat from India, the army essentially securitized the issue of national sovereignty and thus increased its influence from the state. At the same time, it made itself immune to any scrutiny or accountability from civil institutions. In order to consolidate its position, it allied itself with other non elected institutions of the state i.e. the bureaucracy and the judiciary. While the bureaucracy played the role of a junior partner which was in charge of execution of state policy, the judiciary was used to legitimize armys rule (Jalal, 52). For there part, the judiciary made liberal use of the doctrine of necessity to validate the armys position.

Army as a defender of ideology In the context of securitization, an issue which has been securitized cannot remain in a securitized state forever; constant propaganda needs to be generated to sustain the paramountcy of the issue amongst the general public. Hence, if the army has to maintain its position in the affairs of the state, it cannot rely on short term existential threats like armed conflicts; rather a sustained campaign of propaganda has to be organized. In order to do so, the army moves beyond its traditional roles and fashions a new identity for itself.

Consequently, apart from maintaining its role as the guardian of territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Army has also tried to fashion itself as a custodian of ideology of Pakistan. In fact, the rivalry with India was not only on a political or territorial level, it was portrayed as a matter of ideology itself. This veneer of ideology was also important in legitimizing armys position in state polity. Although the army was initially reluctant to indulge in outward display of religiosity, it gradually became more Islamised in nature. This Islamic nature of the army was often contrasted with the infidel Hindu army in order to score ideological brownie points (Cohen, 1982, 86-88).

Over the years, the Army has made judicious rule of Islamic symbols to bolster its image as saviour of the nation. The image of the soldier as a Ghazi is frequently used; As Ayesha Siddiqa writes, the popular Pakistani image of the soldier as a crusader in the path of Allah, a deeply motivated, dedicated and selfless warrior with an eternal image (Siddiqa, 20). Furthermore, some of Pakistans missiles are named after Muslim conquerors like Mahmud Ghaznavi. The use of such symbols gives rise to what is known as the saviour complex, where the army is portrayed as a saviour of the nation (Rizvi, 23). The professional and organized nature of the army, coupled with its apparent religious fervour is contrasted with the indecisiveness and corrupt nature of politicians.

Thus, in the context of securitization, one can see that the army manages to sustain its position by a variety of tactics. It uses existential threats to justify its super ordinate nature to other institutions of the state; thus pushing it out of the pale of accountability and scrutiny. Second of all, it fashions itself as a defender of the states identity. In doing so, it acquires a sense of legitimacy and credibility.

Conclusion

The dominance of the military in Pakistan is a complex phenomenon and the result of interplay between many factors. The congenital defects that plagued Pakistan no doubt led to a weakening of democracy. As years passed by, a variety of existential

threats, both internal and external led to the prioritization of state survival. In addition to this, Pakistans failure to implement land redistribution has ensured that only a small segment of the population has a real stake in the politics of the country. For the country peasant who is under suzerainty of his local landlord, the presence of an elected or a non elected government at the centre makes little difference.

Secondly, although state survival could be justified as an issue of relevance during Pakistans initial years, the continuous reference to the perceived threat from India has often been misused to justify armys grip over the affairs of the state. This constant state of securitization of state reflects poorly on Pakistans polity. It is a sign of weakness and lack of maturity of Pakistans political institutions. According to Mazhar Aziz, there is a good chance that militarys monopoly will continue unabated unless some strong political force deflects it from its present course (Aziz, 32). Ultimately, what is needed is large scale political reforms which will transfer power to local institutions. The path to democracy lies not in the corridors of power at Islamabad, but in the by-lanes and mud lined streets of those innumerable villages where Pakistan truly lies

Bibliography Ali, Tariq, Pakistan: Military Rule or Peoples Power, London: Jonathan Cape, 1970 Aziz, Mazhar Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, London: Routledge, 2008 Buzan, B, Waevar, O and Wilde, J, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998 Cohen, Stephen, The Pakistani Army, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982 Constable, Pamela, 2001, Pakistans Predicament. Journal of Democracy, 12:1, pp. 15-29. Faruqui, Ahmad, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2002 Jalal, Ayesha, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 Malik, Anas, Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology, London: Routledge, 2011 Nawaz, Shuja, Crossed Swords, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008 Rizvi, Hasan A., Military, State and Society in Pakistan, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002 Sattar, Babbar, Pakistan: Return to Praetorianism, in Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Stanford: Stanford, 2001 Shah, Aqil 2003, Pakistan's Armored Democracy, Journal of Democracy, 14:4, pp. 26-40. Siddiqa, Ayesha Military Inc.: Inside Pakistans Military Economy, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007 Siddiqa, Ayesha-Agha, Political Economy of National Security, Economic and Political Weekly, 37:44-45, pp. 4545-4549. Taylor, David The Military as a Political Fixture in Peter Burnell and Vicky Randall eds., Politics in the Developing World, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Waseem, Mohammad, Pakistans Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy, Asian Survey, 32:7, pp. 617-634. Waseem, Mohammad 2002, Causes of Democratic Downslide, Economic and Political Weekly, 37:44-45, pp. 4532-4538