Dialectical materialism

Dialectical materialism is a strand of Marxism, synthesizing Hegels dialectics, which proposes that every economic order grows to a state of maximum efficiency, while simultaneously developing internal contradictions and weaknesses that contribute to its systemic decay. Philosophically, dialectical materialism that Man originates History through active consciousness was originated by Moses Hess, and developed by Karl Marxand Friedrich Engels. Moreover, Joseph Dietzgen developed the hypotheses of dialectical materialism independent of Marx, Engels, and Hess. In Marxist philosophy, the proposition that dialectical materialism is the philosophical basis of Marxism is disputed, regarding the ideological status ofscience and naturalism in the philosophy of Karl Marx.
Contents

1 The term 2 Aspects 3 Hegel 4 Materialism in dialectical materialism 5 Dialectics in dialectical materialism

5.1 Engels' laws of dialectics 5.2 Lenin's elements of dialectics

6 History of dialectical materialism

6.1 Lenin's contributions 6.2 Lukcs' additions

7 Dialectical materialism as a heuristic in biology and elsewhere 8 See also 9 Further reading 10 References

The term
The term dialectical materialism was coined in 1887, by Joseph Dietzgen, a socialist tanner who corresponded with Karl Marx, during and after the failed 1848 German Revolution. As a philosopher, Dietzgen had constructed the theory of dialectical materialism independently of Marx and Friedrich Engels[citation needed]. Casual mention of the term is also found in the biography Frederick Engels, by Karl Kautsky,[1] written in the same year. Marx himself had talked about the "materialist conception of history", which was later referred to as "historical materialism" by Engels. Engels further exposed the "materialist dialectic" not "dialectical materialism" in his Dialectics of Nature in 1883. Georgi Plekhanov, the father of Russian Marxism, later

introduced the term dialectical materialism to Marxist literature.[2] Joseph Stalin further codified it as Diamat and imposed it as the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism. The term was not used by Marx in any of his works, and dialectical marxism is not properly dialectical at all, and the actual presence of "dialectical materialism" within his thought remains the subject of significant controversy, particularly regarding the relationship between dialectics, ontology and nature.[citation needed] For scholars working on these issues from a variety of perspectives see the works of Bertell Ollman, Chris Arthur, Roger Albritton, and Roy Bhaskar.

Aspects
Dialectical materialism originates from two major aspects of Marx's philosophy. One is his transformation of Hegel's idealistic understanding of dialectics into a materialist one, an act commonly said to have "put Hegel's dialectics back on its feet". Marx's materialism developed through his engagement with Ludwig Feuerbach. Marx sought to base human social organization within the context of the material reproduction of their daily lives, which he calls sensous practice in his early works (Marx 1844, 1845). From this material context men and women develop certain ideas about their world, thereby leading to the core materialist conception that social being determines social consciousness. The dialectical aspect retains the Hegelian method within this materialist framework, and emphasizes the process of historical change arising from contradiction and class struggle based in a particular social context.

Hegel
Dialectical materialism is essentially characterized by the thesis that history is the product of class struggles and follows the general Hegelian principle of philosophy of history, that is the development of the thesis into its antithesis which is sublated by the Aufhebung ("synthesis"). The term Aufhebung was not used by Hegel to describe his dialectics.[3] TheAufhebung conserves the thesis and the antithesis and transcends them both (Aufheben this contradiction explains the difficulties of Hegel's thought).[4] Hegel's dialectics aims to explain the development of human history. He considered that truth was the product of history and that it passed through various moments, including the moment of error; error and negativity are part of the development of truth. Hegel's idealism considered history a product of the Spirit (Geist or also Zeitgeist the "Spirit of the Time"). By contrast, Marx's dialectical materialism considers history as a product of material class struggle in society. Thus, theory has its roots in the materiality of social existence.

Materialism in dialectical materialism

Marx's doctoral thesis concerned the atomism of Epicurus and Democritus, which (along with stoicism[citation
needed]

) is considered the foundation of materialist philosophy. Marx was also familiar with Lucretius's theory

of clinamen. Materialism asserts the primacy of the material world: in short, matter precedes thought. Materialism is a realist philosophy of science,[5] which holds that the world is material; that all phenomena in the universe consist of "matter in motion," wherein all things are interdependent and interconnected and develop according to natural

law; that the world exists outside us and independently of our perception of it; that thought is a reflection of the material world in the brain, and that the world is in principle knowable. "The ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Vol. 1. Marx endorsed this materialist philosophy against Hegel's idealism; he "turned Hegel's dialectics upside down." However, Marx also criticized classical materialism as another idealist philosophy due to its transhistorical understanding of material contexts. According to the famous Theses on Feuerbach (1845), philosophy had to stop "interpreting" the world in endless metaphysical debates, in order to start "changing" the world, as was being done by the rising workers' movement observed by Engels in England (Chartist movement) and by Marx in France and Germany. Thus, dialectical materialists tend to accord primacy to class struggle. The ultimate sense of Marx's materialist philosophy is that philosophy itself must take a position in the class struggle based on objective analysis of physical and social relations. Otherwise, it will be reduced to spiritualist idealism, such as the philosophies of Kant or Hegel, which are only ideologies, that is the material product of social existence.

Dialectics in dialectical materialism

Dialectics is the science of the general and abstract laws of the development of nature, society, and thought. Its principal features are: The universe is an integral whole in which things are interdependent, rather than a mixture of things isolated from each other. The natural world or cosmos is in a state of constant motion: "All nature, from the smallest thing to the biggest, from a grain of sand to the sun, from the protista to man, is in a constant state of coming into being and going out of being, in a constant flux, in a ceaseless state of movement and change." --Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature. Development is a process whereby insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes lead to fundamental, qualitative changes. Qualitative changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, as leaps from one state to another. A simple example from the physical world is the heating of water: a one degree increase in temperature is a quantitative change, but between water of 100 degrees and steam of 100 degrees (the effect latent heat) there is a qualitative change. "Merely quantitative differences, beyond a certain point, pass into qualitative changes." --Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1. All things contain within themselves internal dialectical contradictions, which are the primary cause of motion, change, and development in the world. It is important to note that 'dialectical contradiction' is not about simple 'opposites' or 'negation'. For formal approaches, the core message of 'dialectical opposition / contradiction' must be understood as 'some sense' opposition between the objects involved in a directly associated context. For the application of the dialectic to history see Historical materialism.

Engels' laws of dialectics

As mentioned above, Engels determined three laws of dialectics from his reading of Hegel's Science of Logic.[6] Engels elucidated these laws in his work Dialectics of Nature: 1. 2. 3. The law of the unity and conflict of opposites; The law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes; The law of the negation of the negation

The first law was seen by both Hegel and Lenin as the central feature of a dialectical understanding of things[7][8] and originates with the ancient Ionian philosopher Heraclitus.[9] The second law Hegel took from Aristotle[citation needed], and it is equated with what scientists call phase transitions. It may be traced to the ancient Ionian philosophers (particularlyAnaximenes)[citation needed], from whom Aristotle, Hegel and Engels inherited the concept. For all these authors, one of the main illustrations is the phase transitions of water. There has also been an effort to apply this mechanism to social phenomena, whereby population increases result in changes in social structure. The law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes can also be applied to the process of social change and class conflict. .[10] The third law is Hegel's own. It was the expression through which (amongst other things) Hegel's dialectic became fashionable during his life-time. In drawing up these laws, Engels presupposes a holistic approach outlined above and in Lenin's three elements of dialectic below, and emphasizes elsewhere that all things are in motion.[11]

Lenin's elements of dialectics

After reading Hegel's Science of Logic in 1914, Lenin made some brief notes outlining three "elements" of logic.[12] They are:

1.

The determination of the concept out of itself [the thing itself must be considered in its relations and in its development];

2.

The contradictory nature of the thing itself (the other of itself), the contradictory forces and tendencies in each phenomenon;

3.

The union of analysis and synthesis.

Such apparently are the elements of dialectics. Lenin, Summary of dialectics[13]

Lenin develops these in a further series of notes, and appears to argue that "the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa" is an example of the unity and opposition of opposites expressed tentatively as "not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]."

History of dialectical materialism

Lenin's contributions
In Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1908), Lenin explained dialectical materialism as three axes: (i) the materialist inversion of Hegelian dialectics, (ii) the historicity of ethical principles ordered to class struggle, and (iii) the convergence of "laws of evolution" in physics (Helmholtz), biology (Darwin), and in political economy (Marx). Hence, Lenin was philosophically positioned between historicist Marxism (Labriola) and determinist Marxism. A political position close to "social Darwinism" (Kautsky). Moreover, late century discoveries in physics (x-rays, electrons), and the beginning of quantum mechanics, philosophically challenged previous conceptions of matter and materialism, thus Matter seemed to be disappearing. Lenin disagreed: 'Matter disappears' means that the limit within which we have hitherto known matter disappears, and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter are disappearing that formerly seemed absolute, immutable, and primary, and which are now revealed to be relative and characteristic only of certain states of matter. For thesole 'property' of matter, with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up, is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside of the mind. Lenin was developing the work of Friedrich Engels, who said that "with each epoch-making discovery, even in the sphere of natural science, materialism has to change its form."[14] One of Lenin's challenges was distancing materialism, as a viable philosophical outlook, from the "vulgar materialism" expressed in the statement "the brain secretes thought in the same way as the liver secretes bile" (attributed to 18th c. physician Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, 17571808); "metaphysical materialism" (matter composed of immutable particles); and 19th-century "mechanical materialism" (matter as random molecules interacting per the laws of mechanics). The philosophic solution that Lenin (and Engels) proposed was "dialectical materialism", wherein matter is defined as "objective reality", theoretically consistent with (new) developments occurred in the sciences.

Lukcs' additions
Georg Lukcs, minister of Culture in the brief Bla Kun government of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (1919), published History and Class Consciousness (1923), which defineddialectical materialism as the knowledge of society as a whole, knowledge which, in itself, was immediately the class consciousness of the proletariat. The first chapter What is Orthodox Marxism?, defined orthodoxy as fidelity to the "Marxist method", not fidelity to "dogmas": Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marxs investigations. It is not the belief in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a sacred book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical materialism is the road to truth, and that its methods can be developed, expanded, and deepened, only along the lines laid down by its founders. (1)

Lukcs philosophical criticism of Marxist revisionism proposed an intellectual return to Marxist method. As did Louis Althusser, who later defined Marxism and psychoanalysis as "conflictual sciences";[15] that political factions and revisionism are inherent to Marxist theory and political praxis, because dialectical materialism is the philosophic product of class struggle: For this reason, the task of orthodox Marxism, its victory over Revisionism and utopianism can never mean the defeat, once and for all, of false tendencies. It is an everrenewed struggle against the insidious effects of bourgeois ideology on the thought of the proletariat. Marxist orthodoxy is no guardian of traditions, it is the eternally vigilant prophet proclaiming the relation between the tasks of the immediate present and the totality of the historical process. (5) Moreover, "the premise of dialectical materialism is, we recall: 'It is not mens consciousness that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness'. . . . Only when the core of existence stands revealed as a social process can existence be seen as the product, albeit the hitherto unconscious product, of human activity". (5) Philosophically aligned with Marx is the criticism of the individualist, bourgeois philosophy of the subject, which is founded upon the voluntary and conscious subject. Against said ideology is the primacy of social relations. Existence and thus the world is the product of human activity; but this can be seen only by accepting the primacy of social process on individual consciousness. This type of consciousness is an effect of ideological mystification. Yet, at the 5th Congress of the Communist International (July 1924), Grigory Zinoviev formally denounced Georg Lukcss heterodox definition of orthodox Marxism as exclusively derived from fidelity to the Marxist method, and not to Communist party dogmas; and denounced the Marxism developments of the German theorist Karl Korsch.

Dialectical materialism as a heuristic in biology and elsewhere

Some evolutionary biologists, such as Richard Lewontin and the late Stephen Jay Gould have employed dialectical materialism in their approach, playing a precautionary heuristic role in their work. For example, from Lewontin's perspective, Dialectical materialism is not, and never has been, a programmatic method for solving particular physical problems. Rather, a dialectical analysis provides an overview and a set of warning signs against particular forms of dogmatism and narrowness of thought. It tells us, "Remember that history may leave an important trace. Remember that being and becoming are dual aspects of nature. Remember that conditions change and that the conditions necessary to the initiation of some process may be destroyed by the process itself. Remember to pay attention to real objects in time and space and not lose them in utterly idealized abstractions. Remember that qualitative effects of context and interaction may be lost when phenomena are isolated". And above all else, "Remember that all the other caveats

are only reminders and warning signs whose application to different circumstances of the real world is contingent."[16] Stephen Jay Gould shared similar views regarding a heuristic role for dialectical materialism. He wrote "Dialectical thinking should be taken more seriously by Western scholars, not discarded because some nations of the second world have constructed a cardboard version as an official political doctrine."[17] Further when presented as guidelines for a philosophy of change, not as dogmatic percepts true by fiat, the three classical laws of dialectics embody a holistic vision that views change as interaction among components of complete systems, and sees the components themselves not as a priori entities, but as both products and inputs to the system. Thus, the law of "interpenetrating opposites" records the inextricable interdependence of components: the "transformation of quantity to quality" defends a systems-based view of change that translates incremental inputs into alterations of state; and the "negation of negation" describes the direction given to history because complex systems cannot revert exactly to previous states.[18] This heuristic was also applied to the theory of punctuated equilibrium proposed by Niles Eldredge and Gould. They wrote "History, as Hegel said, moves upward in a spiral of negations," and that "puncuated equilibria is a model for discontinuous tempos of change (in) the process of speciation and the deployment of species in geological time." [19] They noted that "the law of transformation of quantity into quality", "holds that a new quality emerges in a leap as the slow accumulation of quantitative changes, long resisted by a stable system, finally forces it rapidly from one state into another," a phenomenon described in some disciplines as a paradigm shift. Apart from the commonly cited example of water turning to steam with increased temperature, Gould and Eldredge noted another analogy in information theory, "with its jargon of equilibrium, steady state, and homeostasis maintained by negative feedback," and "extremely rapid transitions that occur with positive feedback."[20] Lewontin, Gould and Eldredge were thus more interested in dialectical materialism as a heuristic, than a dogmatic form of 'truth' or a statement of their politics. Nevertheless, they found a readiness for critics to "seize upon" key statements[21] and portray punctuated equilibrium, and exercises associated with it, such as public exhibitions, as a "Marxist plot".[22]

Further reading

Dialectical Materialism, Alexander Spirkin Spirkin, Alexander; Translated from the Russian by Sergei Syrovatkin (1990) (DjVu, PDF, etc.). Fundamentals of Philosophy. Moscow: Progress Publishers. ISBN 5-01-002582-5. Retrieved 2011-01-22 This systematic exposition of dialectical and historical materialism was

awarded a prize at a competition of textbooks for students of higher educational establishments; first published in Russian as " ".

Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Friedrich Engels Anti-Dhring, Friedrich Engels Dialectics of Nature, Friedrich Engels Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, V.I. Lenin On the Question of Dialectics, V.I. Lenin Dialectical and Historical Materialism, Joseph Stalin On Contradiction, Mao Zedong On the Materialist Dialectic, Louis Althusser Dialectical Materialism, V.G. Afanasyev Oizerman T.I.; H. Campbell Creighton, M.A. (translator, Oxon) (1988), The main Trends in Philosophy. A Theoretical Analysis of the History of Philosophy., Moscow: Progress Publishers, ISBN 5-01-000506-9, retrieved 30 October 2010 First published in 1971, as [24]

Materialism And Historical Materialism, Anton Pannekoek Grant, Ted; Woods, Alan (1995), Reason in Revolt, Marxist Philosophy and Modern Science, London: Wellred, ISBN 9781900007009 text replication at Marxist.com

Grant, Ted; Woods, Alan (2003), Dialectical Philosophy and Modern Science, Reason in Revolt, Vol.2 (American ed.), Algora Publishing, ISBN 0-87586-158-X, retrieved 26 September 2010

Hollitscher, Walter (March 1953), "Dialectical Materialism and the Physicist", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 9 (2): 5457, retrieved 26 September 2010

Lefebvre, Henri; John Sturrock (translator) (2009), Dialectical Materialism, Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, ISBN 978-0-8166-5618-9, retrieved 26 September 2010 First published 1940 by Presses Universitaires de France, as Le Matrialisme Dialectique. First English translation published 1968 by Jonathan Cape Ltd.

History and Class Consciousness, Georg Lukcs Ioan, Petru "Logic and Dialectics" A.I. Cuza University Press, Iai 1998. Jameson, Fredric. Valences of the Dialectic. London and New York: Verso, 2009. "Dialectical Materialism", Theory and History, Ludwig von Mises The Origins of Dialectical Materialism, Z.A. Jordan Dialectics For Kids

Dialectical Materialism: Its Laws, Categories, and Practice, Ira Gollobin, Petras Press, NY, 1986. Dialectics for the New Century, ed. Bertell Ollman and Tony Smith, Palgrave Macmillan, England, 2008.

Rosa Lichtenstein's criticism of dialectical materialism,

References
1. ^ http://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1887/xx/engels.htm 2. ^ For instance, Plekhanov, The development of the monist view of history, (1895) 3. ^ Walter Kaufmann (1966). " 37". Hegel: A Reinterpretation. Anchor
Books.ISBN 0268010684. OCLC 3168016. "Whoever looks for the stereotype of the allegedly Hegelian dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology will not find it. What one does find on looking at the table of contents is a very decided preference for triadic arrangements. ... But these many triads are not presented or deduced by Hegel as so many theses, antitheses, and syntheses. It is not by means of any dialectic of that sort that his thought moves up the ladder to absolute knowledge."

4. ^ In particular, see Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, chapter II, first observation, where he uses
this formulation. Hegelians tend to attribute this formula to Marx's teacher - Heinrich Moritz Chalybus - a Kantian who conflated Hegel's dialectic with the Fichtean triad thesis, antithesis, synthesis. It is suggested that after Marx's use of the phrase, Hegel has always been associated with the triad, which he rejected (cf Jon Stewart, ed (1996)."Introduction". The Hegel Myths and Legends. North-Western University Press. Retrieved 2007-12-27.). However, one might cite Marx's explanation of the development of the dialectic in the cited passage of The Poverty of Philosophy: "This new [synthesis] unfolds itself again into two contradictory thoughts" which appears to be reaching beyond the limits of this misleading external triad to an inner inherent unfolding, more along the Hegelian lines.

5. ^ Bhaskar 1979 6. ^ Engels, F. (7th ed., 1973). ). Dialectics of nature (Translator, Clements Dutt). New York:
International Publishers. (Original work published 1940). See also Dialectics of Nature

7. ^ "It is in this dialectic as it is here understood, that is, in the grasping of oppositions in their unity,
or of the positive in the negative, that speculative thought consists. It is the most important aspect of dialectic." Hegel, Science of Logic, 69, (p 56 in the Miller edition)

8. ^ "The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts is the essence (one of
the "essentials", one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics. That is precisely how Hegel, too, puts the matter." Lenin's Collected Works VOLUME 38, p359: On the question of dialectics.

9. ^ cf, for instance. 'The Doctrine of Flux and the Unity of Opposites' in the 'Heraclitus' entry in
the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

10. ^ Carneiro, R.L. (2000). The transition from quantity to quality: A neglected causal mechanism in
accounting for social evolution. Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences. Vol 97, No.23, pp.12926 - 12931. http://www.pnas.org/content/97/23/12926.full

11. ^ Biel, R. and Mu-Jeong Kho (2009) "The Issue of Energy within a Dialectical Approach to the
Regulationist Problematique," Recherches & Rgulation Working Papers, RR Srie ID 2009-1, Association Recherche & Rgulation: 1-21. The discovery that heat was actually the movement of atoms or molecules was the very latest science of the period in which Engels was writing in his late period, in which what today we would express in terms of "energy" was just beginning to be grasped.

12. ^ Lenin's Summary of Hegel's Dialectics 13. ^ Lenin's Collected Works Vol. 38 pp 221 - 222, written while reading Book III, Section 3, Chapter
3 of The Science of Logic The Absolute Idea

14. ^ Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy 15. ^ Louis Althusser, "Marx and Freud", in Writings on Psychoanalysis, Stock/IMEC, 1993 (French
edition)

16. ^ Beatty, J. (2009). "Lewontin, Richard". In Michael Ruse & Joseph Travis. Evolution: The First
Four Billion Years. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p. 685. ISBN 978-0-674-03175-3.

17. ^ Gould, Stephen Jay (1990). "Nurturing Nature". In . An Urchin in the Storm: Essays About
Books and Ideas. London: Penguin. p. 153.

18. ^ Gould, S.J. (1990), p.154 19. ^ Gould, Stephen Jay, & Eldredge, Niles (1977). "Punctuated equilibria: the tempo and mode of
evolution reconsidered." Paleobiology 3 (2): 115-151. (p.145)

20. ^ Gould, S.J., & Eldredge, N. (1977) p.146 21. ^ Gould, S.J. (1995). "Stephen Jay Gould: "The Pattern of Life's History"". In Brockman, J..The
Third Culture. New York: Simon and Shuster. p. 60. ISBN 0-684-80359-3.

22. ^ Gould, Stephen Jay (2002). The Structure of Evolutionary Theory. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
The Belknap Press of Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-674-00613-5.In his account of one ad hominem absurdity, Gould states on p.984 "I swear that I do not exaggerate" regarding the accusations of a Marxist plot.

23. ^ http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/09/fidel-to-ahmadinejad-stop-slanderingthe-jews/62566/

24. ^ The author traces the struggle between materialism and idealism on the basis of the dialecticalmaterialist conception of the history of philosophy. The book was in 1979 awarded the Plekhanov prize under the decision of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Materialismul dialectic este un concept de filozofie politic marxist, considerat ca fiind baza gndirii marxiste. Pornete de la dialectica hegelian, ns o reformuleaz. Astfelidealismul hegelian conform cruia istoria uman este rezultatul unei evoluii dialectice a unei idei, a unui spirit care determin cursul istoriei i care este accesibil experienei noastre prin fenomene (fenomenologie), care nu sunt altceva dect reprezentrile ideii n lumea real. Marx consider c ideea nu este nimic altceva dect o reflecie a lumii materiale care este tradus n forme ale gndirii. Deci la Marx, istoria uman nu este rezultatul evoluiei dialectice a ideii, ci a evoluiei luptei dialectice de clas pentru bunurile materiale.

Materialism, orientare fundamental n filozofie, care, n opoziie cu idealismul, consider materia, existena, ca factor primordial, iar contiina, gndirea, ideile, ca factor secund, derivat. Materialismul afirm c lumea este prin natura ei material, c ea constituie o realitate obiectiv, independent de contiina omului, c procesele din univers se desfoar potrivit legilor obiective. Privind contiina, gndirea, ca o nsuire a materiei, iar ideile ca un produs i, totodat, ca o reflectare a lumii materiale, materialismul afirm cognoscibilitatea lumii. Putem deosebi un materialism spontan (sau realism naiv), care const n convingerea proprie tuturor oamenilor i izvort din nsi practica vieii de toate zilele, despre existena obiectiv a realitii nconjurtoare i un materialism filozofic, care presupune i o elaborare raional sistematic, o generalizare a convingerilor materialiste spontane. Prin nsi esena sa, materialismul este legat de tiin. Materialismul s-a dezvoltat de-a lungul istoriei culturii n interaciune cu tiinele; filozofia materialist a generalizat rezultatele tiinelor i, la rndul ei, a favorizat, prin rezolvarea problemelor teoretice i metodologice fundamentale, ridicate de dezvoltarea tiinelor, progresul acestora.

Materialism dialectic
Materialism dialectic, concepie filozofic ntemeiat de Karl Marx i Friedrich Engels; tiina despre raportul dintre materie i contiin, despre legile cele mai generale ale schimbrii i dezvoltrii naturii,societii i gndirii, care este n acelai timp baza filozofic a marxismului. Materialismul dialectic reprezint unitatea dintre metoda dialectic marxist i materialismul filozofic marxist.

"Filozofii n-au fcut dect s interpreteze lumea n diferite moduri; important este ns a o schimba." (Karl Marx: Teze despre Feuerbach)

Materialismul dialectic este o concepie tiinific de ansamblu asupra lumii i, totodat, o metod revoluionar de cunoatere i de transformare a realitii. Apariia materialismului dialectic reprezint o profund revoluie svrit n filozofie. Tezele fundamentale ale materialismului dialectic au fost elaborate ncepnd de la mijlocul deceniului al cincilea al sec. 19. Apariia materialismului dialectic a fost un fenomen determinat de cauze socialeconomice i de ntreaga dezvoltare anterioar a tiinei i filozofiei, Marx i Engels artnd limitarea declas a concepiei burgheze despre lume. n timp ce colile filozofice care au precedat marxismul i puneau ca obiectiv explicarea lumii, materialismul dialectic i pune ca obiectiv transformarea revoluionar a realitii.

Printre premisele naturalist-tiinifice ale constituirii concepiei materialist-dialectice despre lume se numr: elaborarea teoriei celulare, formularea legii conservrii i transformrii energiei i descoperirea principiilor evoluiei (expresia cea mai nchegat a evoluionismului fiind darvinismul). Izvorul teoretic al materialismului dialectic este filozofia clasic german. Precursorii ei direci snt, n primul rnd, G.W.F. Hegel (care, n contextul idealismului su, a elaborat totui, n principiu, multilateral dialectica) i L. Feuerbach (care, n contextul metafizicii sale, a dezvoltat concepia materialist asupra lumii). Materialismul dialectic este prima form pe deplin consecvent a materialismului, nglobnd ntr-o explicaie unitar domeniile naturii, societii i gndirii. Elabornd teoria tiinific materialist pe baza principiilor fundamentale ale dialecticii, materialismul dialectic consider c dezvoltarea are ca izvor contradiciile interne ale obiectelor i proceselor, c schimbrile calitative (salturile) se realizeaz pe temeiul unor acumulri cantitative anterioare, prin negarea strilor calitative vechi de ctre altele noi. Materialismul dialectic a nnoit i a mbogit gnoseologia (teoria cunoaterii) prin tezele sale privind cognoscibilitatea lumii, caracterul activ al procesului de cunoatere, caracterul obiectiv i concret al adevrului, dialectica relativului i absolutului n procesul cunoaterii i, mai ales, prin dezvluirea rolului practicii n cunoatere. Materialismul dialectic arat c principiile dialecticii decurg direct din studiul legilor lumii obiective, c dialectica obiectiv (a lucrurilor) determin dialectica subiectiv (a ideilor) care are ns i legile sale specifice, autonomia sa relativ. Dei concord prin coninutul lor obiectiv cu legile naturii i cu cele sociale, legile gndirii constituie doar o reflectare a celor dinti n contiina oamenilor, aceast reflectare neavnd un caracter mecanic, nemijlocit, automat, ci unul mediat, constructiv, creator. Materialismul dialectic realizeaz, de semenea, unitatea dialecticii, teoriei cunoaterii (gnoseologiei) i logicii. n virtutea acestui fapt, att teoria cunoaterii, ct i logica adopt viziunea dialectic asupra lumii, abordeaz fenomenele sub raportul dezvoltrii lor istorice, interpreteaz corect corelaia dintre istoric i logic, n sensul c logicul reflect n mod sintetic istoricul, de care este, n ultim instan, determinat. Reprezentnd generalizarea multilateral a realizrilor tuturor tiinelor despre natur i societate, reflectnd veridic legile fundamentale ale existenei i cunoaterii, concepia filozofic a lui Marx n ansamblul ei, constituie i o metod tiinific de cunoatere i de transformare revoluionar a lumii i, prin aceasta, a omului nsui. Sprijinindu-se pe datele tiinelor, materialismul dialectic ofer totodat acestora un puternic i eficace instrument teoretic i metodologic, orientat spre noi sinteze creatoare. Apariia materialismului, mpreun cu crearea materialismului istoric i a economiei politice marxiste, a fcut posibil transformarea socialismului din utopie n tiin. Materialismul dialectic este o concepie vie, care se mbogete continuu pe baza generalizrii continue a practicii i a datelor tiinei.

We are publishing the first of what will be a series of Marxist study guides. The purpose is to provide a basic explanation of the fundamental ideas of Marxism with a guide to further reading and points to help organise discussion groups around these ideas. We are starting with dialectical materialism, the philosophy of Marxism. By Rob Sewell Introduction Marxism, or Scientific Socialism, is the name given to the body of ideas first worked out by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895). In their totality, these ideas provide a fully worked-out theoretical basis for the struggle of the working class to attain a higher form of human society - socialism. The study of Marxism falls under three main headings, corresponding broadly to philosophy, social history and economics - Dialectical Materialism, Historical Materialism and Marxist Economics. These are the famous "Three component parts of Marxism" of which Lenin wrote.

The Education for Socialists series was launched to promote the study of Marxism. They are intended to assist the student of Marxism by providing an introduction to the subject matter, with suitable Marxist texts that we hope will whet their appetite for further reading and study. In the first of these Education for Socialists study guides, we provide a selection of material on Dialectical Materialism. The other "component parts", as well as other fundamental questions, will be dealt with in future issues. The guides are suitable for individual study or as the basis of a Marxist discussion group. In beginning this study of Dialectical Materialism the editors are publishing an introductory article by Rob Sewell. While this is a good start to the subject, there is no substitute for proceeding from there to tackle the philosophical works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Plekhanov and others. Unfortunately Marx and Engels never wrote a comprehensive work on dialectical materialism, although they intended to do so. On his death, Engels left a pile of manuscripts, which he intended to work up into an account of dialectics, or the laws of motion of nature, human society and human thought. These were later published as the Dialectics of Nature. Even in their rough, unfinished form these notes give a brilliant insight into the method of Marxism and its relation to the sciences. The newer reader should not be put off by the sometimes difficult and abstract ideas expressed in these writings. Whatever the initial difficulty, a certain perseverance will pay just rewards. Marxism is a science with its own terminology, and therefore makes heavy demands upon the beginner. However, every serious worker and student knows that nothing is worthwhile if attained without a degree of struggle and sacrifice. The theories of Marxism provide the thinking worker with a comprehensive understanding. It is the duty of every worker and student to conquer for himself or herself the theories of Marx and Engels, as an essential prerequisite for the conquest of society by working people.

Contents
Introduction Do we need a philosophy? The Limits of Formal logic Materialism versus idealism Dialectics and Metaphysics The law of quantity into quality (and vice versa) The unity of Opposites The Negation of the Negation Hegel and Marx The ABC of Materialist Dialectics, by Trotsky From 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical Philosophy', by Engels The Three Sources and Components parts of Marxism (extract), by Lenin Lenin's Collected Works: - VOLUME 38, p359: On the Question of Dialectics - VOLUME 38, pp 221 - 222 Summary of Dialectics Questions on Dialectical Materialism: Suggested Reading List We recognise that there are real obstacles in the path of the worker's struggle for theory. A man or woman who is obliged to toil long hours in work, who has not had the benefit of a decent education and

consequently lacks the habit of reading, finds great difficulty in absorbing some of the more complex ideas, especially at the outset. Yet it was for workers that Marx and Engels wrote, and not for "clever" academics. "Every beginning is difficult" no matter what science we are talking about. To the class conscious worker who is prepared to persevere, one promise can be made: once the initial effort is made to come to grips with unfamiliar and new ideas, the theories of Marxism will be found to be basically straight-forward and simple. Once the basic concepts of Marxism are conquered, they open up a whole new outlook on politics, the class struggle, and every aspect of life. As a further introduction to dialectics, we are also republishing in this issue Trotsky's ACB of Materialist Dialectics, also by Trotsky A Triumph of Dialectical Materialism, an extract from Lenin's The Three Sources and Three Components parts of Marxism, Lenin's Elements of Dialectics, and an extract from Engels' Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. For further study, we recommend the following works by Engels, especially chapters 12 and 13 in AntiDuhring, the introduction to the Dialectics of Nature, and Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German Philosophy. Those who wish to go into greater depth should try reading Plekhanov's The Monist View of History, Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, as well as his Philosophical Notebooks (Collected Works, Vol. 38). Although these books are not an easy read, they are nonetheless very rewarding if studied thoroughly. The editors, October 2002

What is Dialectical Materialism?

Do we need a philosophy? Scientific socialism or Marxism is composed of three component parts: Dialectical Materialism, Historical Materialism and Marxist Economics. This pamphlet, the first in this series, is an introduction to the concepts of Dialectical Materialism - the method of Marxism. For those unacquainted with Marxist philosophy, dialectical materialism may seem an obscure and difficult concept. However, for those prepared to take the time to study this new way of looking at things, they will discover a revolutionary outlook that will allow them an insight into and understanding of the mysteries of the world in which we live. A grasp of dialectical materialism is an essential prerequisite in understanding the doctrine of Marxism. Dialectical materialism is the philosophy of Marxism, which provides us with a scientific and comprehensive world outlook. It is the philosophical bedrock - the method - on which the whole of Marxist doctrine is founded.

According to Engels, dialectics was "our best working tool and our sharpest weapon." And for us also, it is a guide to action and our activities within the working class movement. It is similar to a compass or map, which allows us to get our bearings in the turmoil of events, and permits us to understand the underlying processes that shape our world. Whether we like it or not, consciously or unconsciously, everyone has a philosophy. A philosophy is simply a way of looking at the world. Under capitalism, without our own scientific philosophy, we will inevitably adopt the dominant philosophy of the ruling class and the prejudices of the society in which we live. "Things will never change" is a common refrain, reflecting the futility of changing things and of the need to accept our lot in life. There are other such proverbs as "There is nothing new under the sun", and "History always repeats itself", which reflect the same conservative outlook. Such ideas, explained Marx, form a crushing weight on the consciousness of men and women. Just as the emerging bourgeoisie in its revolution against feudal society challenged the conservative ideas of the old feudal aristocracy, so the working class, in its fight for a new society, needs to challenge the dominant outlook of its own oppressor, the capitalist class. Of course, the ruling class, through its monopoly control of the mass media, the press, school, university and pulpit, consciously justifies its system of exploitation as the most "natural form of society". The repressive state machine, with its "armed bodies of men", is not sufficient to maintain the capitalist system. The dominant ideas and morality of bourgeois society serve as a vital defence of the material interests of the ruling class. Without this powerful ideology, the capitalist system could not last for any length of time. "In one way or another," states Lenin, "all official and liberal science defends wage-slavery To expect science to be impartial in a wage-slave society is as foolishly nave as to expect impartiality from manufacturers on the question of whether workers' wages ought not to be increased by decreasing the profits of capital." Official bourgeois ideology conducts a relentless war against Marxism, which it correctly sees as a mortal danger to capitalism. The bourgeois scribes and professors pour out a continual stream of propaganda in an attempt to discredit Marxism - particularly the dialectic. This has especially been the case since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the ferocious ideological offensive against Marxism, communism, revolution, and such like. "Marxism is dead", they repeatedly proclaim like some religious incantation. But Marxism refuses to lie down in front of these witch doctors! Marxism reflects the unconscious will of the working class to change society. Its fate is linked to that of the proletariat. The apologists of capitalism, together with their shadows in the labour movement, constantly assert that their system is a natural and permanent form of society. On the other hand, the dialect asserts that nothing is permanent and all things perish in time. Such a revolutionary philosophy constitutes a profound threat to the capitalist system and therefore must be discredited at all cost. This explains the daily churning out of anti-Marxist propaganda. But each real step forward in science and knowledge serves to confirm the correctness of the dialectic. For millions of people the growing crisis of capitalism increasingly demonstrates the validity of Marxism. The objective situation is forcing working people to seek a way out of the impasse. "Life teaches", remarked Lenin. Today, to use the famous words of the Communist Manifesto, "A spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of communism."

In the fight for the emancipation of the working class, Marxism also wages a relentless war against capitalism and its ideology, which defends and justifies its system of exploitation, the "market economy". But Marxism does more than this. Marxism provides the working class with "an integral world outlook irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction, or defence of bourgeois oppression." (Lenin) It seeks to reveal the real relationships that exist under capitalism and arms the working class with an understanding of how it can achieve its own emancipation. Dialectical materialism, to use the words of the Russian Marxist Plekhanov, is more than an outlook, it is a "philosophy of action." The Limits of Formal logic Men and women attempt to think in a rational manner. Logic (from the Greek logos, meaning word or reason) is the science of the laws of thinking. Whatever thoughts we think, and whatever language they are expressed in, they must satisfy the requirements of reasoning. These requirements give rise to laws of thought, to the principles of logic. It was the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 - 322BC) more than 2,000 years ago who formulated the present system of formal logic - a system that is the basis of our educational establishments to this very day. He categorised the method of how we should reason correctly and how statements are combined to arrive at judgements, and from them, how conclusions are drawn. He laid down three basic laws of logic: the principle of Identity (A = A), of contradiction (A cannot be A and notA), and the excluded middle (A is either A or non-A; there is no middle alternative). Formal logic has held sway for more than two millennia and was the basis of experiment and the great advances of modern science. The development of mathematics was based on this logic. You cannot teach a child to add up without it. One plus one equals two, not three. Formal logic may seem like common sense and is responsible for the execution of a million and one everyday things, but - and this is the big but - it has its limits. When dealing with drawn out processes or complicated events, formal logic becomes a totally inadequate way of thinking. This is particularly the case in dealing with movement, change and contradiction. Formal logic regards things as fixed and motionless. Of course, this is not to deny the everyday usefulness of formal logic, on the contrary, but we need to recognise it limits. "The dialectic is neither fiction or mysticism," wrote Leon Trotsky, "but a science of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar to that between higher and lower mathematics." (The ABC of Materialist Dialectics) With the development of modern science, the system of classification (of Linnaeus) was based on formal logic, where all living things were divided into species and orders. This constituted a great leap forward for biology compared to the past. However, it was a fixed and rigid system, with its rigid categories, which over time revealed its limits. Darwin in particular showed that through evolution it was possible for one species to be transformed into another species. Consequently, the rigid system of classification had to be changed to allow for this new understanding of reality. In effect, the system of formal logic broke down. It could not cope with these contradictions. On the other hand, dialectics - the logic of change - explains that there are no absolute or fixed categories in nature or society. Engels had great fun in pointing to the duck-billed platypus, this transitional form, and asking where it fitted into the rigid scheme of things!

Only dialectical materialism can explain the laws of evolution and change, which sees the world not as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, which go through an uninterrupted transformation of coming into being and passing away. For Hegel, the old logic was exactly like a child's game, which sought to make pictures out of jigsaw pieces. "The fundamental flaw in vulgar thought", wrote Trotsky, "lies in the fact that it wishes to content itself with motionless imprints of reality which consists of eternal motion." Before we look at the main laws of dialectical materialism, let us take a look at the origins of the materialist outlook. Materialism versus idealism "The philosophy of Marxism is materialism", wrote Lenin. Philosophy itself fits into two great ideological camps: materialism and idealism. Before we proceed, even these terms need an explanation. To begin with, materialism and idealism have nothing whatsoever in common with their everyday usage, where materialism is associated with material greed and swindling (in short, the morality of present-day capitalism) and idealism with high ideals and virtue. Far from it! Philosophical materialism is the outlook which explains that there is only one material world. There is no Heaven or Hell. The universe, which has always existed and is not the creation of any supernatural being, is in the process of constant flux. Human beings are a part of nature, and evolved from lower forms of life, whose origins sprung from a lifeless planet some 3.6 billion or so years ago. With the evolution of life, at a certain stage, came the development of animals with a nervous system, and eventually human beings with a large brain. With humans emerged human thought and consciousness. The human brain alone is capable of producing general ideas, i.e., thinking. Therefore matter, which existed eternally, existed and still exists independently of the mind and human beings. Things existed long before any awareness of them arose or could have arisen on the part of living organisms. For materialists there is no consciousness apart from the living brain, which is part of a material body. A mind without a body is an absurdity. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is the highest product of matter. Ideas are simply a reflection of the independent material world that surrounds us. Things reflected in a mirror do not depend on this reflection for their existence. "All ideas are taken from experience, are reflections - true or distorted - of reality," states Engels. Or to use the words of Marx, "Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life." Marxists do not deny that mind, consciousness, thought, will, feeling or sensation are real. What materialists deny is that the thing called "the mind" exists separately from the body. Mind is not distinct from the body. Thinking is the product of the brain, which is the organ of thought. Yet this does not mean that our consciousness is a lifeless mirror of nature. Human beings relate to their surroundings; they are aware of their surroundings and react accordingly; in turn, the environment reacts back upon them. While rooted in material conditions, human beings generalise and think creatively. They in turn change their material surroundings.

On the other hand, philosophical idealism states that the material world is not real but is simply the reflection of the world of ideas. There are different forms of idealism, but all essentially explain that ideas are primary and matter, if it exists at all, secondary. For the idealists, ideas are dissevered from matter, from nature. This is Hegel's conception of the Absolute Idea or what amounts to God. Philosophical idealism opens the road, in one way or another, to the defence of or support for religion and superstition. Not only is this outlook false, it is also profoundly conservative, leading us to the pessimistic conclusion that we can never understand the "mysterious ways" of the world. Whereas materialism understands that human beings not only observe the real world, but can change it, and in doing so, change themselves. The idealist view of the world grew out of the division of labour between physical and mental labour. This division constituted an enormous advance as it freed a section of society from physical work and allowed them the time to develop science and technology. However, the further removed from physical labour, the more abstract became their ideas. And when thinkers separate their ideas from the real world, they become increasingly consumed by abstract "pure thought" and end up with all types of fantasies. Today, cosmology is dominated by complex abstract mathematical conceptions, which have led to all sorts of weird and wonderful erroneous theories: the Big Bang, beginning of time, parallel universes, etc. Every break with practice leads to a one-sided idealism. The materialist outlook has a long history stretching back to the ancient Greeks of Anaxagoras (c.500 428 BC) and Democritus (c.460 - c.370 BC). With the collapse of Ancient Greece, this rational outlook was cut across for a whole historical epoch, and only after the reawakening of thought following the demise of the Christian Middle Ages was there a revival of philosophy and natural science. From the seventeenth century, the home of modern materialism was England. "The real progenitor of English materialism is Bacon," wrote Marx. The materialism of Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626) was then systemised and developed by Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679), whose ideas were in turn developed by John Locke (1632 - 1704). The latter already thought it possible that matter could posses the faculty of thinking. It is no accident that these advances in human thought coincided with the rise of the bourgeoisie and great advances in science, particularly mechanics, astronomy and medicine. These great thinkers in turn provided the breakthrough for the brilliant school of French materialists of the eighteenth century, most notably Ren Descartes (1596 - 1650). It was their materialism and rationalism that became the creed of the Great French Revolution of 1789. These revolutionary thinkers recognised no external authority. Everything from religion to natural science, from society to political institutions, was subjected to the most searching criticism. Reason became the measure of everything. This materialist philosophy, consistently championed by Holbach (1723 - 1789) and Helvetius, was a revolutionary philosophy. "The universe is the vast unity of everything that is, everywhere it shows us only matter in movement," states Holbach. "This is all that there is and it displays only an infinite and continuous chain of causes and actions; some of these causes we know, since they immediately strike our senses; others we do not know since they act on us only by means of consequences, quite remote from first causes." This rational philosophy was an ideological reflection of the revolutionary bourgeoisie's struggle against the church, the aristocracy and the absolute monarchy. It represented a fierce attack on the ideology of

the Old Order. In the end, the kingdom of Reason became nothing more than the idealised kingdom of the bourgeoisie. Bourgeois property became one of the essential rights of man. The revolutionary materialists paved the way for the new bourgeois society and the domination of new private property forms. "Different times, different circumstances, a different philosophy," stated Denis Diderot (1713 - 1784). The new materialism, although a revolutionary advance, tended to be very rigid and mechanical. These new philosophers attacked the church and denied the self-sufficiency of the soul and held that man was simply a material body as all other animals and inorganic bodies. Man was regarded as a more complex and more delicate mechanism than other bodies. According to La Mettrie (1709 - 1751) in his principal work Man the Machine, "We are instruments endowed with feeling and memory." For the French materialists the origin of knowledge - the discovery of objective truth - lay through the action of nature on our senses. The planets and man's place within the solar system and nature itself was fixed. For them, it was a clockwork world, where everything had its logical static place, and where the impulse for movement came from outside. The whole approach, while materialist, was mechanical, and failed to grasp the living reality of the world. It could not grasp the universe as a process, as matter undergoing continuous change. This weakness led to the false dichotomy between the material world and the world of ideas. And this dualism opened the door to idealism. Others held to a monist view that the universe was one system which was not pure spirit or pure matter. Spinoza was the first to work out such a system. While he saw the need for a God, the universe was one system, which was wholly material from end to end. Dialectics and Metaphysics The Marxist view of the world is not only materialist, but also dialectical. For its critics, the dialectic is portrayed as something totally mystical, and therefore irrelevant. But this is certainly not the case. The dialectical method is simply an attempt to understand more clearly our real interdependent world. Dialectics, states Engels in Anti-Duhring, "is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." Put simply, it is the logic of motion. It is obvious to most people that we do not live in a static world. In fact, everything in nature is in a state of constant change. "Motion is the mode of existence of matter," states Engels. "Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be." The earth revolves continually around its axis, and in turn itself revolves around the sun. This results in day and night, and the different seasons that we experience throughout the year. We are born, grow up, grow old and eventually die. Everything is moving, changing, either rising and developing or declining and dying away. Any equilibrium is only relative, and only has meaning in relation to other forms of motion. "When we consider and reflect upon nature at large or the history of mankind or our own intellectual activity, at first we see the picture of an endless entanglement of relations and reactions, permutations and combinations, in which nothing remains what, where, and as it was, but everything moves, changes, comes into being, and passes away," remarks Engels. "We see, therefore, at first the picture as a whole, with its individual parts still more or less kept in the background; we observe the movements, transitions, connections rather than the things that move, combine, and are connected. This primitive, nave but

intrinsically correct conception of the world is that of ancient Greek philosophy, and was first clearly formulated by Heraclitus: everything is and is not, for everything is fluid, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away." The Greeks made a whole series of revolutionary discoveries and advances in natural science. Anaximander made a map of the world, and wrote a book on cosmology, from which only a few fragments survive. The Antikythera mechanism, as it is called, appears to be the remains of a clockwork planetarium dating back to the first century BC. Given the limited knowledge of the time, many were anticipations and inspired guesses. Under slave society, these brilliant inventions could not be put to productive use and were simply regarded as playthings for amusement. The real advances in natural science took place in the mid-fifteenth century. The new methods of investigation meant the division of nature into its individual parts, allowing objects and processes to be classified. While this provided massive amount of data, objects were analysed in isolation and not in their living environment. This produced a narrow, rigid, metaphysical mode of thought that has become the hallmark of empiricism. "The Facts" became the all important feature. "Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life," states the Dickensian character Thomas Gradgrind in Hard Times. "To the metaphysician things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once and for all", states Engels. "He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. 'His communication is "yea, yea; nay, nay"; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.' For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in rigid antithesis one to another. "At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence it forgets the beginning and the end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees." Engels goes on to explain that for everyday purposes we know whether an animal is alive or not. But upon closer examination, we are forced to recognise that is not a simple straightforward question. On the contrary, it is a complex question. There are raging debates even today as to when life begins in the mothers' womb. Likewise, it is just as difficult to say when the exact moment of death occurs, as physiology proves that death is not a single instantaneous act, but a protracted process. In the brilliant words of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, "It is the same thing in us that is living and dead, asleep and awake, young and old; each changes place and becomes the other. We step and we do not step into the same stream; we are and we are not." Not everything is as appears on the surface of things. Every species, every aspect of organic life, is every moment the same and not the same. It develops by assimilating matter from without and simultaneously

discards other unwanted matter; continually some cells die, while others are renewed. Over time, the body is completely transformed, renewed from top to bottom. Therefore, every organic entity is both itself and yet something other than itself. This phenomenon cannot be explained by metaphysical thought or formal logic. This approach is incapable of explaining contradiction. This contradictory reality does not enter the realm of common sense reasoning. Dialectics, on the other hand, comprehends things in their connection, development, and motion. As far as Engels was concerned, "Nature is the proof of dialectics." Here is how Engels described the rich processes of change in his book the Dialectics of Nature: "Matter moves in an eternal cycle, completing its trajectory in a period so vast that in comparison with it our earthly year is as nothing; in a cycle in which the period of highest development, namely the period of organic life with its crowning achievement - self-consciousness, is a space just as comparatively minute in the history of life and self-consciousness; in a cycle in which every particular form of the existence of matter - be it the sun or a nebular, a particular animal or animal-species, a chemical combination or decomposition - is equally in transition; in a cycle in which nothing is eternal, except eternally changing, eternally moving matter and the laws of its movement and change. But however often and pitilessly this cycle may be accomplished in time and space, however many countless suns and earths may arise and fall, however long it may be necessary to wait until in some solar system, on some planet appear conditions suitable for organic life, however many countless beings may fall and rise before, out of their midst, develop animals with a thinking brain that find an environment that permits them to live, be it even only for a short period, we are, nevertheless, assured that matter in all its changes remains eternally one and the same, that not one of its attributes may perish, and that that same iron necessity which compels the destruction of the highest early bloom of matter - the thinking spirit - also necessitates its rebirth at some other place, at some other time." Along with, and following the French philosophy of the eighteenth century, arose a new radical German philosophy. Through Emmanuel Kant, the culmination of this philosophy was epitomised by the system of George F. Hegel, who had greatly admired the French Revolution. Hegel, although an idealist, was the most encyclopaedic mind of his age. The great contribution of this genius was the rescuing of the dialectical mode of thought originally developed by the ancient Greek philosophers some 2,000 years before. "Changes in being consist not only in the fact that one quantity passes into another quantity, but also that quality passes into quantity, and vice versa," wrote Hegel. "Each transition of the latter kind represents an interruption, and gives the phenomenon a new aspect, qualitatively distinct from the previous one. Thus water when cooled grows hard, not gradually but all at once; having already cooled to freezing-point, it can still remain a liquid only if preserves a tranquil condition, and then the slightest shock is sufficient for it suddenly to become hard In the world of moral phenomena there take place the same changes of quantitative into qualitative, and differences in qualities there also are founded upon quantitative differences. Thus, a little less, a little more constitutes that limit beyond which frivolity ceases and there appears something quite different, crime" (Science of Logic)

Hegel's works are full of references and examples of dialectics. Unfortunately, Hegel was not only an idealist, but wrote in the most obscure and abstruse fashion imaginable, making his works very difficult to read. Lenin, while re-reading Hegel in exile during the First World War, wrote: "I am in general trying to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is materialism which has been stood on its head (according to Engels) that is to say, I cast aside for the most part God, the Absolute, the Pure Idea, etc." Lenin was greatly impressed by Hegel, and, despite his idealism, later recommended that young communists study his writings for themselves. The young Marx and Engels were followers of the great Hegel. They learned a colossal amount from this teacher. He opened their eyes to a new outlook on the world epitomised by the dialectic. By embracing the dialectic, Hegel freed history from metaphysics. For the dialectic, there is nothing final, absolute, or sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything. However, Hegel was limited by his knowledge, the knowledge of his age, and the fact he was an idealist. He regarded thoughts within the brain not as more or less abstract pictures of real things and processes, but as realisations of the "Absolute Idea", existing from eternity. Hegel's idealism turned reality on its head. Nevertheless, Hegel systematically outlined the important laws of change, touched upon earlier. The law of quantity into quality (and vice versa) "It has been said that there are no sudden leaps in nature, and it is a common notion that things have their origin through gradual increase or decrease," states Hegel. "But there is also such a thing as sudden transformation from quantity to quality. For example, water does not become gradually hard on cooling, becoming first pulpy and ultimately attaining a rigidity of ice, but turns hard at once. If temperature be lowered to a certain degree, the water is suddenly changed into ice, i.e., the quantity - the number of degrees of temperature - is transformed into quality - a change in the nature of the thing." (Logic) This is the cornerstone of understanding change. Change or evolution does not take place gradually in a straight smooth line. Marx compared the social revolution to an old mole burrowing busily beneath the ground, invisible for long periods, but steadily undermining the old order and later emerging into the light in a sudden overturn. Even Charles Darwin believed that his theory of evolution was essentially gradual and that the gaps in the fossil record did not represent any breaks or leaps in evolution, and would be "filled in" by further discoveries. In this Darwin was wrong. Today, new theories, essentially dialectical, have been put forward to explain the leaps in evolution. Stephen J. Gould and Niles Eldredge termed their dialectical theory of evolution "punctuated equilibria". They explained that there were long periods of evolution where there were no apparent changes taking place, then suddenly, a new life form or forms emerged. In other words, quantitative differences gave rise to a qualitative change, leading to new species. The whole of development is characterised by breaks in continuity, leaps, catastrophes and revolutions. The emergence of single-cellular life in the earth's oceans some 3.6 billion years ago was a qualitative leap in the evolution of matter. The "Cambrian explosion", some 600 million years ago, where complex multicellular life with hard parts exploded onto the scene was a further qualitative leap forward in evolution. In the lower Palaeozoic, some 400 to 500 million years ago, the first vertebrate fish emerged. This revolutionary design became dominant and advanced through the amphibians (which lived both in

water and on land), through reptiles, and finally branched off into warm-blooded creatures: birds and mammals. Such revolutionary leaps culminated in human beings that have the capacity to think. Evolution is a long process whereby an accumulation of changes inside and outside the organism leads to a leap, a qualitatively higher state of development. Just as colossal subterranean pressures that accumulate and periodically break through the earth's crust in the form of earthquakes, so gradual changes in the consciousness of workers lead to an explosion in the class struggle. A strike in a factory is not caused by outside "agitators", but is produced by an accumulation of changes within the factory that finally pushes the workforce to strike. The "cause" of the strike maybe something quite small and incidental, a tea-break for instance, but it has become "the last straw that breaks the camel's back", to use a popular (dialectical) expression. It has become the catalyst whereby quantity changes into quality. Today, a whole series of left wing electoral victories within the British trade unions are a product of a long accumulation of discontent within the union rank and file. Twenty years of bitter attacks on the working class has resulted in these changes at the top of the trade unions. Only those armed with a Marxist philosophy could foresee this development, which is rooted in the changing objective situation. These changes of mood, which are already taking place in the trade unions, will inevitably be reflected within the Labour Party at a certain stage that will result in the demise of the right wing under Blair. The ultra-lefts on the fringes of the Labour movement have continually written off the Labour Party as something that could never be changed. They are incapable of thinking dialectically, and have an empirical and formalistic outlook that only sees the surface of reality. They fail to draw a distinction between appearance and reality - between the immediate appearance evident to observation and the hidden processes, interconnections and laws that underlie the observed facts. In other words, they are blind to the subterranean processes taking place before their very eyes. "Blairism dominates the Labour Party!" they exclaim and throw up their hands in despair. They are under the spell of formal logic, and do not understand the process at work that will inevitably undermine Blairism, and lead to its collapse, as night follows day. As they wrote off the right wing unions in the past, they write off the Labour Party today. On the basis of events and the pressures of the leftward moving trade union movement, the Labour Party, given its roots in the trade unions, will inevitably move in a similar direction. Marx stressed that the task of science is always to proceed from the immediate knowledge of appearances to the discovery of reality, of the essence, of the laws underlying the appearances. Marx's Capital is a fine example of this method. "The way of thinking of the vulgar economists", wrote Marx to Engels, "derives from the fact that it is always only the immediate form in which relationships appear which is reflected in the brain, and not their inner connections." (June 27, 1867) The same could be said of those who in the past wrote off the Soviet Union as "state capitalist". Stalinism had nothing in common with socialism; it was a repressive regime, where workers had less rights than in the west. However, instead of a scientific analysis of the Soviet Union, they simply pronounced it state capitalist. As Trotsky explained the theorists of state capitalism looked at the USSR through the eyes of formal logic. It was either-or, black or white. The USSR was either a wonderful socialist state, as the Stalinists said, or it must be a (state) capitalist state. Such thinking is pure formalism. They never understood the possibility of a degeneration of the workers' state into a chronically deformed variant of proletarian rule, as explained by Trotsky. It is clear that the revolution, due to its isolation in a backward

country, went through a process of degeneration. However, while the nationalised planned economy remained, not everything was lost. The bureaucracy was not a new ruling class, but a parasitic growth on the state, which usurped political power. Only a new political revolution could eliminate the bureaucracy and reintroduce soviets and workers' democracy. The supporters of state capitalism tied themselves in knots, confusing counterrevolution with revolution and vice versa. In Afghanistan, they supported the reactionary fundamentalist mujahideen as "freedom fighters" against Russian "imperialism". With the collapse of the USSR and the move to restore capitalism from 1991 onwards, they remained neutral in face of real capitalist counterrevolution. The unity of Opposites "The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect." (Hegel). "In brief", states Lenin, "dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics" The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finiteinfinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above-below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, salepurchase, and so on. The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world. Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, - being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. "Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time - and it is this which first makes motion possible." (Hegel) To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, - cause can become effect and effect can become cause - is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter. "The negative is to an equal extent positive," states Hegel. Dialectical thought is "comprehending the antithesis in its unity." In fact Hegel goes further: "Contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality, and it is only insofar as it contains a Contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity Something moves, not because it is here at one point of time and there at another, but because at one and the same point of time it is here and not here, and in this here both is and is not. We must grant the old dialecticians the contradictions which they prove in motion; but what follows is not that there is no motion, but rather that motion is existent Contradiction itself." Therefore for Hegel, something is living insofar as it contains contradiction, which provides it with self-movement.

The Greek atomists first advanced the revolutionary theory that the material world was made up of atoms, considered the smallest unit of matter. The Greek word atomos means indivisible. This was a brilliant intuitive guess. Twentieth century science proved that everything was composed of atoms, although it was subsequently discovered that even smaller particles existed. Every atom contains a nucleus at its centre, composed of sub-atomic particles called protons and neutrons. Orbiting around the nucleus are particles known as electrons. All protons carry a positive electrical charge, and would therefore repel each other, but they are bound together by a type of energy known as the strong nuclear force. This shows that everything that exists is based on a unity of opposites and has self-movement of "impulse and activity", to use Hegel's words. In humans, the level of blood sugar is essential for life. Too high a level is likely to result in diabetic coma, too little and the person is incapable of eating. This safe level is regulated by the rate at which sugar is released into the bloodstream by the digestion of carbohydrates, the rate at which stored glycogen, fat or protein is converted into sugar, and the rate at which sugar is removed and utilised. If the blood sugar level rises, then the rate of utilisation is increased by the release of more insulin from the pancreas. If it falls, more sugar is released into the blood, or the person gets hungry and consumes a source of sugar. In this self-regulation of opposing forces, of positive and negative feedbacks, the blood level is kept within tolerable limits. Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, "Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical - under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another - why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." Lenin also laid great stress on the importance of contradiction as the motive force of development. "It is common knowledge that, in any given society, the strivings of some of its members conflict with the strivings of others, that social life is full of contradictions, and that history reveals a struggle between nations and societies, as well as within nations and societies, and, besides, an alternation of periods of revolution and reaction, peace and war, stagnation and rapid progress or decline." (Lenin, Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism). This is best illustrated by the class struggle. Capitalism requires a capitalist class and a working class. The struggle over the surplus value created by the workers and expropriated by the capitalists leads to an irreconcilable struggle that will provide the basis for the eventual overthrow of capitalism, and the resolution of the contradiction through the abolition of classes. The Negation of the Negation The general pattern of historical development is not one of a straight line upward, but of a complex interaction in which each step forward is only achieved at the cost of a partial step backwards. These regressions, in turn, are remedied at the next stage of development. The law of the negation of the negation explains the repetition at a higher level of certain features and properties of the lower level and the apparent return of past features. There is a constant struggle between

form and content and between content and form, resulting in the eventual shattering of the old form and the transformation of the content. This whole process can be best pictured as a spiral, where the movement comes back to the position it started, but at a higher level. In other words, historical progress is achieved through a series of contradictions. Where the previous stage is negated, this does not represent its total elimination. It does not wipe out completely the stage that it supplants. "The capitalist method of appropriation, which springs from the capitalist method of production, and therefore capitalist private property, is the first negation of individual private property based on one's own labour. But capitalist production begets with the inevitableness of a natural process its own negation. It is the negation of the negation," remarked Marx in volume one of Capital. Engels explains a whole series of examples to illustrate the negation of the negation in his book AntiDuhring. "Let us take a grain of barley. Millions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which for it are normal, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture a specific change takes place, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and, as soon as these have ripened, the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten, twenty or thirty fold." The barley lives and evolves by means of returning to its starting point - but at a higher level. One seed has produced many. Also over time, plants have evolved qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Successive generations have shown variations, and become more adapted to their environment. Engels gives a further example from the insect world. "Butterflies, for example, spring from the egg through a negation of the egg, they pass through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, they pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its numerous eggs." Hegel and Marx Hegel, who had a giant intellect, illuminated a great many things. It was a debt that Marx repeatedly recognised. "The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner," states Marx. Nevertheless, Hegel's philosophical system was a huge miscarriage. It suffered from an incurable internal contradiction. Hegel's conception of history is an evolutionary one, where there is nothing final or eternal. However, his system laid claim to being the absolute truth, in complete contradiction to the laws of dialectical thought. While Hegel defended the status quo in Germany, the dialectic embraced a revolutionary view of constant change. For Hegel, all that was real was rational. But using the Hegelian dialectic, all that is real will become irrational. All that exists deserves to perish. In this lay the revolutionary significance of the Hegelian philosophy.

The solution of this contradiction led back to materialism, but not the old mechanical materialism, but one based upon the new sciences and advances. "Materialism rose again enriched by all the acquisitions of idealism. The most important of these acquisitions was the dialectical method, the examination of phenomena in their development, in their origin and destruction. The genius who represented this new direction of thought was Karl Marx," writes Plekhanov. Spurred on by revolutionary developments in Europe in 1830-31, the Hegelian School split into left, right and centre. The most prominent representative of the Hegelian Left was Ludwig Feuerbach who challenged the old orthodoxy, especially religion, and placed materialism at the centre of things again. "Nature has no beginning and no end. Everything in it is in mutual interaction, everything at once effect and cause, everything in it is all-sided and reciprocal" writes Feuerbach, adding that there is no place there for God. "Christians tear out the spirit, the soul, of man out of his body and make this torn-out, disembodied spirit into their God." Despite Feuerbach's limitations, Marx and Engels welcomed the new breakthrough with enthusiasm. "But in the meantime", noted Engels, "the Revolution of 1848 thrust the whole of philosophy aside as unceremoniously as Feuerbach himself was also pushed into the background." It was left to Marx and Engels to consistently apply the dialectic to the new materialism, producing dialectical materialism. For them, the new philosophy was not an abstract philosophy, but directly linked to practice. "Dialectics reduces itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought - two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents." (Engels) Neither Marx nor Engels left behind them a comprehensive book on dialectics as such. Marx was preoccupied with Capital. Engels intended to write such a book, but was overtaken by the need to complete Capital after Marx's death. He nevertheless wrote quite extensively on the subject, especially in Anti-Dhring and the Dialectics of Nature. Lenin commentated, "If Marx did not leave behind him a 'Logic' (with a capital letter), he did leave the logic of Capital, and this ought to be utilised to the full. In Capital, Marx applied to a single science logic, dialectics and the theory of knowledge of materialism (three words are not needed: it is one and the same thing) which has taken everything valuable in Hegel and developed it further." Today, a small number of scientists, mainly from the natural sciences, have become conscious of the dialectic, which has opened their eyes to problems in their specialised fields. This relationship between science and dialectical materialism has been fully discussed in the book by Alan Woods and Ted Grant Reason in Revolt. They showed, along with Engels, that nature is completely dialectical. Apart from Stephen J. Gould and Niles Eldredge, Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, who regard themselves as dialectical materialists, have also written about the application of the dialectic to the field of biology in their book The Dialectical Biologist: "What characterises the dialectical world, in all its aspects, as we have described it is that it is constantly in motion. Constants become variables, causes become effects, and systems develop, destroying the

conditions that gave rise to them. Even elements that appear to be stable are in a dynamic equilibrium of forces that can suddenly become unbalanced, as when a dull grey lump of metal of a critical size becomes a fireball brighter than a thousand suns. Yet the motion is not unconstrained and uniform. Organisms develop and differentiate, then die and disintegrate. Species arise but inevitably become extinct. Even in the simple physical world we know of no uniform motion. Even the earth rotating on its axis has slowed down in geological time. The development of systems through time, then, seems to be the consequence of opposing forces and opposing motions. "This appearance of opposing forces has given rise to the most debated and difficult, yet the most central, concept in dialectical thought, the principle of contradiction. For some, contradiction is an epistemic principle only. It describes how we come to understand the world by a history of antithetical theories that, in contradiction to each other and in contradiction to observed phenomena, lead to a new view of nature. Kuhn's (1962) theory of scientific revolution has some of this flavour of continual contradiction and resolution, giving way to new contradiction. For others, contradiction becomes an ontological property at least of human social existence. For us, contradiction is not only epistemic and political, but also ontological in the broadest sense. Contradictions between forces are everywhere in nature, not only in human social institutions. This tradition of dialectics goes back to Engels (1880) who wrote, in Dialectics of Nature, that 'to me there could be no question of building the laws of dialectics of nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it.'" (The Dialectical Biologist, p.279) Marxists have always stressed the unity of theory and practice. "Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it", as Marx pointed to in his thesis on Feuerbach. "If the truth is abstract it must be untrue," states Hegel. All truth is concrete. We have to look at things as they exist, with a view to understanding their underlying contradictory development. This has very important conclusions, especially for those fighting to change society. Unlike the Utopian socialists who viewed socialism as a wonderful idea, Marxists see the development of socialism as arising out of the contradictions of capitalism. Capitalist society has prepared the material basis for a classless society with its highly developed productive forces and its world division of labour. It has brought into being the working class, whose very life existence brings it into conflict with capitalism. On the basis of experience, it will become fully conscious of its position in society and it will be transformed, in the words of Marx, from a "class in-itself" to a "class for-itself". Dialectics bases itself on determinism, but this has nothing in common with fatalism which denies the existence of accident in nature, society and thought. Dialectical determinism asserts the unity of necessity and accident, and explains that necessity expresses itself through accident. All events have causes, necessary events and accidental ones alike. If there were no causal laws in nature everything would be in a state of utter chaos. It would be an impossible position where nothing could exist. So everything is dependent upon everything else, as in a continuous chain of cause and effect. Particular events always have a chance or accidental character, but these arise only as the result of a deeper necessity. In fact, necessity manifests itself through a series of accidents. Without doubt, accidents have their place, but the essential thing is to discover what laws determine this deeper necessity. From the point of view of superficial observation, everything may appear to be accidental or open to chance. This can appear especially so when we have no knowledge of the laws that govern change and their interconnections. "Where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is always governed by

inner, hidden laws and it is only a matter of discovering these laws," remarked Engels in Ludwig Feuerbach. In nature, the evolution of matter follows a certain path, although how, when, and in what form this is realised, depends upon accidental circumstances. For example, whether life was created or not on earth depended on a whole series of accidental factors, such as the presence of water, different chemical elements, the earth's distance from the sun, an atmosphere, etc. "It is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings", states Engels, "hence, too, this always necessarily occurs whenever the conditions for it (not necessarily identical at all places and times) are presentwhat is maintained to be necessary is composed of sheer accidents, and the so-called accidental is the form behind which necessity hides itself." Superficial historians have written that the First World War was "caused" by the assassination of a Crown Prince at Sarajevo. To a Marxist this event was an historical accident, in the sense that this chance event served as the pretext, or catalyst, for the world conflict which had already been made inevitable by the economic, political and military contradictions of imperialism. If the assassin had missed, or if the Crown Prince had never been born, the war would still have taken place, on some other diplomatic pretext or other. Necessity would have expressed itself through a different "accident". In the words of Hegel, everything which exists, exists of necessity. But, equally, everything which exists is doomed to perish, to be transformed into something else. Thus what is "necessary" in one time and place becomes "unnecessary" in another. Everything begets its opposite, which is destined to overcome and negate it. This is true of individual living things as much as societies and nature generally. Every type of human society exists because it is necessary at the given time when it arises: "No social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it, have been developed: and new higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society. Therefore mankind always takes up only such problems as it can solve, since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or at least are in the process of formation." (Marx, Critique of Political Economy.) Slavery, in its day, represented an enormous leap forward over barbarism. It was a necessary stage in the development of productive forces, culture and human society. As Hegel brilliantly explained it: "It is not so much from slavery as through slavery that man becomes free." Similarly capitalism was originally a necessary and progressive stage in human society. However, like primitive communism, slavery, and feudalism, capitalism has long since ceased to represent a necessary and progressive social system. It has foundered upon the deep contradictions inherent in it, and is doomed to be overcome by the rising forces of the new society within the old, represented by the modem proletariat. Private ownership of the means of production and the nation state, the basic features of capitalist society, which originally marked a great step forward, now serve only to fetter and undermine the productive forces and threaten all the gains made in centuries of human development.

Capitalism is now a thoroughly degenerate social system, which must be overthrown and replaced by its opposite, socialism, if human culture is to survive. Marxism is determinist, but not fatalist. Men and women make history. The transformation of society can only be achieved by men and women consciously striving for their own emancipation. This struggle of the classes is not pre-determined. Who succeeds depends on many factors, and a rising, progressive class has many advantages over the old, decrepit force of reaction. But ultimately, the result must depend upon which side has the stronger will, the greater organisation and the most skilful and resolute leadership. The victory of socialism will mark a new and qualitatively different stage of human history. To be more accurate it will mark the end of the prehistory of the human race, and start a real history. However on the other hand, socialism marks a return to the earliest form of human society - tribal communism - but on a much higher level, which stands upon all the enormous gains of thousands of years of class society. The negation of primitive communism by class society is in turn negated by socialism. The economy of superabundance will be made possible by the application of conscious planning to the industry, science and technique established by capitalism, on a world scale. This in turn will once and for all make redundant the division of labour, the difference between mental and manual labour, between town and countryside, and the wasteful and barbaric class struggle and enable the human race at last to set its resources to the conquest of nature: to use Engels' famous phrase, "the leap of man from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom".

The ABC of Materialist Dialectics

Leon Trotsky The dialectic is neither fiction nor mysticism, but a science of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar to that between higher and lower mathematics. I will here attempt to sketch the substance of the problem in a very concise form. The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that A is equal to A. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of practical human actions and elementary generalisations. But in reality A is not equal to A. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens - they are quite different from each other. But, one can object, the question is not of the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities: for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar - a more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is this true - all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour, etc. They are never equal to themselves.

A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself "at a given moment." Aside from the extremely dubious practical value of this 'axiom,' it does not withstand theoretical criticism either. How should we conceive the word 'moment'? If it is an infinitesimal interval of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that 'moment' to inevitable changes. Or is the 'moment' a purely mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time is consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom A is equal to A signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not exist. At first glance it could seem that these "subtleties" are useless. In reality they are of decisive significance. The axiom A is equal to A appears on one hand to be the point of departure for all our knowledge, on the other hand the point of departure for all the errors in our knowledge. To make use of the axiom A is equal to A with impunity is possible only within certain limits. When quantitative changes in A are negligible for the task at hand, then we can presume A is equal to A. This is, for example, the manner in which a buyer and a seller consider a pound of sugar. We consider the temperature of the sun likewise. Until recently we considered the buying power of the dollar in the same way. But quantitative changes beyond certain limits become converted into qualitative. A pound of sugar subjected to the action of water or kerosene ceases to be a pound of sugar. A dollar in the embrace of a president ceases to be a dollar. To determine at the right moment the critical point where quantity changes into quality is one of the most important and difficult tasks in all the spheres of knowledge, including sociology. Every worker knows that it is impossible to make two completely equal objects. In the elaboration of bearing-brass into cone bearings, a certain deviation is allowed for the cones which should not, however, go beyond certain limits (this is called tolerance). By observing the norms of tolerance, the cones are considered as being equal (A is equal to A). When the tolerance is exceeded, the quantity goes over into quality; in other words, the cone bearings become inferior or completely worthless. Our scientific thinking is only a part of our general practice, including techniques. For concepts there also exists "tolerance" which is established not by formal logic issuing from the axiom A is equal to A but by dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything is always changing. "Common sense" is characterized by the fact that it systematically exceeds dialectical "tolerance." Vulgar thought operates with such concepts as capitalism, morals, freedom, workers' state, etc., as fixed abstractions, presuming that capitalism is equal to capitalism, morals are equal to morals, etc. Dialectical thinking analyses all things and phenomena in their continuous change, while determining in the material conditions of those changes that critical limit beyond which A ceases to be A, a workers' state ceases to be a workers' state.

The fundamental flaw of vulgar thought lies in the fact that it wishes to content itself with motionless imprints of reality, which consists of eternal motion. Dialectical thinking gives to concepts, by means of closer approximations, corrections, concretisations, a richness of content and flexibility, I would even say a succulence, which to a certain extent brings them close to living phenomena. Not capitalism in general but a given capitalism at a given stage of development. Not a workers' state in general, but a given workers' state in a backward country in an Imperialist encirclement etc. Dialectical thinking is related to vulgar thinking in the same way that a motion picture is related to a still photograph. The motion picture does not outlaw the still photograph but combines a series of them according to the laws of motion. Dialectics does not deny the syllogism, but teaches us to combine syllogisms in such a way as to bring our understanding closer to the eternally changing reality. Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws: change of quantity into quality, development through contradictions, conflict of content and form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability, etc., which are just as important for theoretical thought as is the simple syllogism for more elementary tasks. Hegel wrote before Darwin and before Marx. Thanks to the powerful impulse given to thought by the French Revolution, Hegel anticipated the general movement of science. But because it was only an anticipation, although by a genius, it received from Hegel an idealistic character. Hegel operated with ideological shadows as the ultimate reality. Marx demonstrated that the movement of these ideological shadows reflected nothing but the movement of material bodies. We call our dialectic materialist since its roots are neither in heaven nor in the depths of our "free will" but in objective reality, in nature. Consciousness grew out of the unconscious, psychology out of physiology, the organic world out of the inorganic, the solar system out of nebula. On all the rungs of this ladder of development the quantitative changes were transformed into qualitative. Our thought including dialectical thought is only one of the forms of the expression of changing matter. There is place within this system for neither God, nor Devil, nor immortal soul nor eternal norms of laws and morals. The dialectic of thinking, having grown out of the dialectic of nature, possesses consequently a thoroughly materialist character. Darwinism, which explained the evolution of species through quantitative transformations passing into qualitative, was the highest triumph of the dialectic in the whole field of organic matter. Another great triumph was the discovery of the table of atomic weights of chemical elements and further the transformation of one element into another. With these transformations (species, elements, etc.) is closely linked the question of classifications, just as important in the natural as in the social sciences. Linnaeus's system (eighteenth century), utilizing as its starting point the immutability of species, was limited to the description and classification of plants according to their external characteristics. The infantile period of botany is analogous to the infantile period of logic, since the forms of our thought develop like everything that lives. Only decisive repudiation of the idea of fixed species, only the study of the history of the evolution of plants and their anatomy prepared the basis for a really scientific classification.

Marx, who in distinction from Darwin was a conscious dialectician, discovered a basis for the scientific classification of human societies in the development of their productive forces and the structure of the relations of ownership, which constitute the anatomy of society. Marxism substituted for the vulgar descriptive classification of societies and states, which even up to now still flourishes in the universities, a materialistic dialectical classification. Only through using the method of Marx is it possible correctly to determine both the concept of a workers' state and the moment of its downfall. All this, as we see, contains nothing "metaphysical" or "scholastic," as conceited ignorance affirms. Dialectical logic expresses the laws of motion in contemporary scientific thought. The struggle against materialist dialectics on the contrary expresses a distant past conservatism of the petty bourgeoisie, the self-conceit of university routinists and . . . a spark of hope for an afterlife.

From 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' Frederick Engels Out of the dissolution of the Hegelian school, however, there developed still another tendency, the only one which has borne real fruit. And this tendency is essentially connected with the name of Marx. The separation from Hegelian philosophy was here also the result of a return to the materialist standpoint. That means it was resolved to comprehend the real world - nature and history - just as it presents itself to everyone who approaches it free from preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist which could not be brought into harmony with the facts conceived in their own and not in a fantastic interconnection. And materialism means nothing more than this. But here the materialistic world outlook was taken really seriously for the first time and was carried through consistently - at least in its basic features - in all domains of knowledge concerned. Hegel was not simply put aside. On the contrary, a start was made from his revolutionary side, described above, from the dialectical method. But in its Hegelian form, this method was unusable. According to Hegel, dialectics is the self-development of the concept. The absolute concept does not only exist unknown where - from eternity, it is also the actual living soul of the whole existing world. It develops into itself through all the preliminary stages which are treated at length in the Logic and which are all included in it. Then it "alienates" itself by changing into nature, where, unconscious of itself, disguised as a natural necessity, it goes through a new development and finally returns as man's consciousness of himself. This self-consciousness then elaborates itself again in history in the crude form until finally the absolute concept again comes to itself completely in the Hegelian philosophy. According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history - that is, the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all zigzag movements and temporary retrogression - is only a copy [Abklatsch] of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but at all events independently of any thinking human brain. This ideological perversion had to be done away with. We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them as images [Abbilder] of real things instead of regarding real things as images of this or that stage of the absolute concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought - two sets of laws which are identical in

substance, but differ in their expression in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic of Hegel was turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, and placed upon its feet. And this materialist dialectic, which for years has been our best working tool and our sharpest weapon, was, remarkably enough, discovered not only by us but also, independently of us and even of Hegel, by a German worker, Joseph Dietzgen. (2) In this way, however, the revolutionary side of Hegelian philosophy was again taken up and at the same time freed from the idealist trimmings which with Hegel had prevented its consistent execution. The great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of readymade things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently stable no less than their mind images in our heads, the concepts, go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away, in which, in spite of all seeming accidentally and of all temporary retrogression, a progressive development asserts itself in the end - this great fundamental thought has, especially since the time of Hegel, so thoroughly permeated ordinary consciousness that in this generality it is now scarcely ever contradicted. But to acknowledge this fundamental thought in words and to apply it in reality in detail to each domain of investigation are two different things. If, however, investigation always proceeds from this standpoint, the demand for final solutions and eternal truths ceases once for all; one is always conscious of the necessary limitation of all acquired knowledge, of the fact that it is conditioned by the circumstances in which it was acquired. On the other hand, one no longer permits oneself to be imposed upon by the antithesis, insuperable for the still common old metaphysics, between true and false, good and bad, identical and different, necessary and accidental. One knows that these antitheses have only a relative validity; that that which is recognized now as true has also its latent false side which will later manifest itself, just as that which is now regarded as false has also its true side by virtue of which it could previously be regarded as true. One knows that what is maintained to be necessary is composed of sheer accidents and that the socalled accidental is the form behind which necessity hides itself - and so on. The old method of investigation and thought which Hegel calls "metaphysical", which preferred to investigate things as given, as fixed and stable, a method the relics of which still strongly haunt people's minds, had a great deal of historical justification in its day. It was necessary first to examine things before it was possible to examine processes. One had first to know what a particular thing was before one could observe the changes it was undergoing. And such was the case with natural science. The old metaphysics, which accepted things as finished objects, arose from a natural science which investigated dead and living things as finished objects. But when this investigation had progressed so far that it became possible to take the decisive step forward, that is, to pass on the systematic investigation of the changes which these things undergo in nature itself, then the last hour of the old metaphysic struck in the realm of philosophy also. And in fact, while natural science up to the end of the last century was predominantly a collecting science, a science of finished things, in our century it is essentially a systematizing science, a science of the processes, of the origin and development of these things and of the interconnection which binds all these natural processes into one great whole. Physiology, which investigates the processes occurring in plant and animal organisms; embryology, which deals with the development of individual organisms from

germs to maturity; geology, which investigates the gradual formation of the Earth's surface - all these are the offspring of our century.

The Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism (extract) Lenin The philosophy of Marxism is materialism. Throughout the recent history of Europe, and particularly at the end of the eighteenth century in France, which was the scene of the decisive battle against every kind of medieval rubbish, against serfdom in institutions and ideas, materialism proved to be the only consistent philosophy, true to all the teachings of natural science, hostile to superstitions, cant, etc. The enemies of democracy tried, therefore, with all their energy, to "overthrow," undermine and defame materialism, and defended various forms of philosophic idealism, which always leads, in one way or another, to the defence and support of religion. Marx and Engels always defended philosophic materialism in the most determined manner, and repeatedly explained the profound error of every deviation from this basis. Their views are more dearly and fully expounded in the works of Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and Anti-Duhring, which, like the Communist Manifesto, are household books for every conscious worker. However, Marx did not stop at the materialism of the eighteenth century but moved philosophy forward. He enriched it by the achievements of German classical philosophy especially by Hegel's system, which in its turn had led to the materialism of Feuerbach. Of these the main achievement is dialectics, i.e., the doctrine of development in its fuller, deeper form, free from one-sidedness-the doctrine, also, of the relativity of human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing matter. The latest discoveries of natural science-radium, electrons, the transmutation of elements-are a remarkable confirmation of the dialectical materialism of Marx, despite the doctrines of bourgeois philosophers with their "new" returns to old and rotten idealism. While deepening and developing philosophic materialism, Marx carried it to its conclusion; he extended its perception of nature to the perception of human society. The historical materialism of Marx represented the greatest conquest of scientific thought. Chaos and arbitrariness, which reigned until then in the views on history and politics, were replaced by a strikingly consistent and harmonious scientific theory, which shows how out of one order of social life another and higher order develops, in consequence of the growth of the productive forces - how capitalism, for instance, grows out of serfdom. Just as the cognition of man reflects nature (i.e., developing matter) which exists independently of him, so also the social cognition of man (i.e., the various views and doctrines-philosophic, religious, political, etc.) reflects the economic order of society. Political institutions are a superstructure on the economic foundation. We see, for example, that the various political forms of modern European states serve the purpose of strengthening the domination of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat.

The philosophy of Marx completes in itself philosophic materialism which has provided humanity, and especially the working class, with a powerful instrument of knowledge.

Lenin's Collected Works Volume 38, p359: On the Question of Dialectics The splitting of a single whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts is the essence (one of the "essentials", one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristics or features) of dialectics. That is precisely how Hegel, too, puts the matter. The correctness of this aspect of the content of dialectics must be tested by the history of science. This aspect of dialectics (e.g. in Plekhanov) usually receives inadequate attention: the identity of opposites is taken as the sum-total of examples ("for example, a seed", "for example, primitive communism". The same is true of Engels. But it is "in the interests of popularisation ...") and not as a law of cognition (and as a law of the objective world.) In mathematics: + and -, differential and integral, In mechanics: action and reaction, In physics: positive and negative electricity, In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms, In social science: the class struggle. The identity of opposites (it would be more correct, perhaps, to say their "unity", - although the difference between the terms identity and unity is not particularly important here. In a certain sense both are correct) is the recognition (discovery) of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature (including mind and society). The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their "self-movement", in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the "struggle" of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? Or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation)! . In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external - God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of "self"-movement.

The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the "self-movement" of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to "leaps", to the "break in continuity," to the transformation into the opposite", to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new. The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute. NB: The distinction between subjectivism (scepticism, sophistry, etc.) and dialectics, incidentally, is that in (objective) dialectics the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative. For objective dialectics there is an absolute within the relative. For subjectivism and sophistry the relative is only relative and excludes the absolute. In his Capital, Marx first analyses the simplest, most ordinary and fundamental, most common and everyday relation of bourgeois (commodity) society, a relation encountered billions of times, viz., the exchange of commodities. In this very simple phenomenon (in this "cell" of bourgeois society) analysis reveals all the contradictions (or the germs of all contradictions) of modern society. The subsequent exposition shows us the development (both growth and movement) of these contradictions and of this society in the Sum of its individual parts. From its beginning to its end. Such must also be the method of exposition (or study) of dialectics in general (for with Marx the dialectics of bourgeois society is only a particular case of dialectics). To begin with what is the simplest, most ordinary, common, etc., with any proposition: the leaves of a tree are green; John is a man: Fido is a dog, etc. Here already we have dialectics (as Hegel's genius recognised); the individual is the universal. Consequently, the opposites (the individual is opposed to the universal) are identical: the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes) etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. Here already we have the contingent and the necessary, the phenomenon and the essence; for when we say: John is a man, Fido is a dog, this is a leaf of a tree, etc., we disregard a number of attributes as contingent; we separate the essence from the appearance, and counterpose the one to the other. Thus in any proposition we can (and must) disclose as in a "nucleus" (:cell") the germs of all the elements of dialectics, and thereby show that dialectics is a property of all human knowledge in general. And natural science shows us (and here again it must be demonstrated in any simple instance) objective nature with the same qualities, the transformation of the individual into the universal, of the contingent into the necessary, transitions, modulations, and the reciprocal connection of opposites. Dialectics is the theory of knowledge of (Hegel and) Marxism. This is the "aspect" of the matter (it is not "an aspect" but the essence of the matter) to which Plekhanov, not to speak of other Marxists, paid no attention.

Knowledge is represented in the form of a series of circles both by Hegel (see Logic) and by the modern epistemologists" of natural science, the eclectic and foe of Hegelianism (which he did not understand!!), Paul Volkmann. "Circles" in philosophy: [is a chronology of persons - essential? No! Ancient: from Democritus to Plato and the dialectics of Heraclitus. Renaissance: Descartes versus Gassendi (Spinoza?) Modern: Holbach-Hegel (via Berkeley, Hume, Kant). Hegel - Feuerbach - Marx Dialectics as living, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides eternally increasing), with an infinite number of shades of every approach and approximation to reality (with a philosophical system growing into a whole out of each shade) - here we have an immeasurably rich content as compared with metaphysical materialism, the fundamental misfortune of which is its inability to apply dialectics to the theory of reflection, to the process and development of knowledge. Philosophical idealism is only nonsense from the standpoint of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of dialectical materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a one-sided, exaggerated, development (inflation, distension) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge, into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature, apotheosised. Idealism is clerical obscurantism. True. But philosophical idealism is ("more correctly" and "in addition") a road to clerical obscurantism through one of the shades of the infinitely complex knowledge (dialectical) of man. Human knowledge is not (or does not follow) a straight line, but a curve, which endlessly approximates a series of circles, a spiral. Any fragment, segment, section of this curve can be transformed (transformed one-sidedly) into an independent, complete, straight line, which then (if one does not see the wood for the trees) leads into the quagmire, into clerical obscurantism (where it is anchored by the class interests of the ruling classes). Rectilinearity and one-sidedness, woodenness and petrification, subjectivism and subjective blindness - voila the epistemological roots of idealism. And clerical obscurantism (= philosophical idealism), of course, has epistemological roots, it is not groundless; it is a sterile flower undoubtedly, but a sterile flower that grows on the living tree of living, fertile, genuine, powerful, omnipotent, objective, absolute human knowledge.

VOLUME 38, pp 221 - 222 Summary of Dialectics Lenin

1) The determination of the concept out of itself [the thing itself must be considered in its relations and in its development]; 2) the contradictory nature of the thing itself (the other of itself), the contradictory forces and tendencies in each phenomenon; 3) the union of analysis and synthesis. Such apparently are the elements of dialectics. One could perhaps present these elements in greater detail as follows: 1) the objectivity of consideration (not examples, not divergencies, but the Thing-in-itself). 2) the entire totality of the manifold relations of this thing to others. 3) the development of this thing, (phenomenon, respectively), its own movement, its own life. 4) the internally contradictory tendencies (and sides) in this thing. 5) the thing (phenomenon, etc) as the sum andunity of opposites. 6) the struggle, respectively unfolding, of these opposites, contradictory strivings, etc. 7) the union of analysis and synthesis - the breakdown of the separate parts and the totality, the summation of these parts. 8) the relations of each thing (phenomenon, etc.) are not only manifold, but general, universal. Each thing (phenomenon, etc.) is connected with every other. 9) not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]. 10) the endless process of the discovery of new sides, relations, etc. 11) the endless process of the deepening of man's knowledge of the thing, of phenomena, processes, etc., from appearance to essence and from less profound to more profound essence. 12) from co-existence to causality and from one form of connection and reciprocal dependence to another, deeper, more general form. 13) the repetition at a higher stage of certain features, properties, etc., of the lower and 14) the apparent return to the old (negation of the negation). 15) the struggle of content with form and conversely. The throwing off of the form, the transformation of the content. 16) the transition of quantity into quality and vice versa (15 and 16 are examples of 9) In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics, but it requires explanations and development. Questions on Dialectical Materialism 1) Why does the working class need a philosophy? 2) Is "common sense" a philosophy? 3) What is materialism? 4) What is idealism? 5) Is Darwin's theory of evolution correct? 6) What is meant by metaphysical? 7) How would you define dialectics? 8) What was wrong with the old materialism? 9) What is formal logic?

10) Does a pound of sugar equal a pound of sugar? 11) Why do workers sometimes accept major attacks on their terms and conditions, then strike over a tea break, washing up time or other "small" incident? 12) Does history repeat itself? 13) Was the First World War caused by the assassination of a Crown Prince in Sarajevo? What is the role of accident in history? 14) Can you be in one place and another at the same time? 15) What was Hegel's great contribution to philosophy? 16) What was the contribution of Marx and Engels to philosophy? 17) Why can it be said that nature is the proof of dialectics? 18) What is the relevance of dialectical materialism in understanding the future? 19) When did the universe begin? 20) Why are Marxists determinists? Suggested Reading List The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx (4.95) Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx (5.99) Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German Philosophy, Engels (2.00) The German Ideology (Student edition), Marx and Engels (7.99) Anti-Duhring, Engels (out of print) Dialectics of Nature, Engels (out of print) (However, both the above are in the M&E Collected Works, vol 25), (45.00) Socialism Utopian and Scientific Engels (2.95) Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (Collected Works, vol 17), Lenin (20.00) Philosophical Notebooks (Collected Works, volume 38), Lenin (20.00) On Marx and Engels, Lenin (1.20) The Three Sources and Component Parts of Marxism, Lenin (50p) Introduction to the Logic of Marxism, Novack (8.45) Reason in Revolt, Woods and Grant (9.95) The Fundamental Problems of Marxism, Plekhanov (out of print) The Development of the Monist View of History, Plekhanov (out of print) In Defence of Marxism, Trotsky (5.95) Radio, Science, Technology and Society, Trotsky (50p) Works online at Marxist.com or Marxists.org The German Ideology, Marx and Engels Theses on Feuerbach, Marx Development of the Monist View of History, Plekhanov Socialism and Philosophy, Antonio Labriola What is Marxism?, Sewell and Woods Dialectical Materialism, Pickard (with introduction by Rob Sewell) Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin Philosophical Notebooks, volume 38, Collected Works, Lenin History of Philosophy, Alan Woods

You can buy Marxist literature online from our Wellred Books Online Bookshop http://wellred.marxist.com/

Trotsky's 'ABC of Materialist Dialectics' is a brilliant short explanation of Marxist philosophy. It was written as part of a defence of Marxism against a middle class revisionist tendency in the American Trotskyist movement in the late 1930s, which attempted to challenge its basic principles. As opposed to pragmatism and empiricism, Trotsky defended dialectical materialism as a richer, fuller, more comprehensive view of society and life in general. Reprinted in 1994 with a new introduction by Rob Sewell and a short addition summary of the basic points of dialectical materialism by John Pickard. Trotsky's 'ABC of Materialist Dialectics' is a brilliant short explanation of Marxist philosophy. It was written as part of a defence of Marxism against a middle class revisionist tendency in the American Trotskyist movement in the late 1930s, which attempted to challenge its basic principles. As opposed to pragmatism and empiricism, Trotsky defended dialectical materialism as a richer, fuller, more comprehensive view of society and life in general. Reprinted in 1994 with a new introduction by Rob Sewell and a short addition summary of the basic points of dialectical materialism by John Pickard. The dialectic is neither fiction nor mysticism, but a science of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and drawn-out processes. The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar to that between higher and lower mathematics. I will here attempt to sketch the substance of the problem in a very concise form. The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that 'A' is equal to 'A'. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of practical human actions and elementary generalisations. But in reality 'A' is not equal to 'A'. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lens - they are quite different from each other. But, one can object, the question is not of the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of

sugar is never equal to a pound of sugar - a more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is this true - all bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, colour, etc. They are never equal to themselves. A sophist will respond that a pound of sugar is equal to itself 'at any given moment.' Aside from the extremely dubious practical value of this 'axiom,' it does not withstand theoretical criticism either. How should we really conceive the word 'moment'? If it is an infinitesimal interval of time, then a pound of sugar is subjected during the course of that 'moment' to inevitable changes. Or is the 'moment a purely mathematical abstraction, that is, a zero of time? But everything exists in time; and existence itself is an uninterrupted process of transformation; time is consequently a fundamental element of existence. Thus the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' signifies that a thing is equal to itself if it does not change, that is, if it does not exist. At first glance it could seem that these 'subtleties' are useless. In reality they are of decisive significance. The axiom 'A' is equal to 'A appears on the one hand to be the point of departure for all our knowledge, on the other hand the point of departure for all the errors in our knowledge. To make use of the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A' with impunity is possible only within certain limits. When quantitative changes in 'A' are negligible for the task at hand then we can presume that 'A' is equal to 'A'. This is, for example, the manner in which a buyer and a seller consider a pound of sugar. We consider the temperature of the sun likewise. Until recently we considered the buying power of the dollar in the same way. But quantitative changes beyond certain limits become converted into qualitative. A pound of sugar subjected to the action of water or kerosene ceases to be a pound of sugar. A dollar in the embrace of a president ceases to be a dollar. To determine at the right moment the critical point where quantity changes into quality is one of the most important and difficult tasks in all the spheres of knowledge including sociology. Every worker knows that it is impossible to make two completely equal objects. In the elaboration of bearing-brass into cone bearings, a certain deviation is allowed for the cones which should not, however, go beyond certain limits (this is called tolerance). By observing the norms of tolerance, the cores are considered being equal. ( 'A' is equal to 'A'.) When the tolerance is exceeded the quantity goes over into quality; in other words, the cone bearings become inferior or completely worthless. Our scientific thinking is only a part of our general practice including techniques. For concepts there also exist 'tolerance' which is established not by formal logic issuing from the axiom 'A' is equal to 'A', but by dialectical logic issuing from the axiom that everything is always changing. 'Common sense' is characterised by the fact that it systematically exceeds dialectical 'tolerance.'

Vulgar thought operates with such concepts as capitalism, morals, freedom, workers' state, etc. as fixed abstractions, presuming that capitalism is equal to capitalism, morals is equal to morals, etc. Dialectical thinking analyses all things and phenomena in their continuous change, while determining in the material conditions of those changes that critical limit beyond which 'A' ceases to be 'A', a workers' state ceases to be a workers' state. The fundamental flaw of vulgar thought lies in the fact that it wishes to content itself with motionless imprints of a reality which consists of eternal motion. Dialectical thinking gives to concepts, by means of closer approximations, corrections, concretisations, a richness of content and flexibility; I would say even a succulence which to a certain extent brings them close to living phenomena. Not capitalism in general, but a given capitalism at a given stage of development. Not a workers' state in general, but a given workers' state in a backward country in an imperialist encirclement, etc. Dialectical thinking is related to vulgar thinking in the same way that a motion picture is related to a still photograph. The motion picture does not outlaw the still photograph but combines a series of them according to the laws of motion. Dialectics does not deny the syllogism, but teaches us to combine syllogisms in such a way as to bring our understanding closer to the eternally changing reality. Hegel in his Logic established a series of laws: change of quantity into quality, development through contradiction, conflict of content and form, interruption of continuity, change of possibility into inevitability, etc., which are just as important for theoretical thought as in the simple syllogism for more elementary tasks. Hegel wrote before Darwin and before Marx. Thanks to the powerful impulse given to thought by the French Revolution, Hegel anticipated the general movement of science. But because it was only an anticipation, although by a genius, it received from Hegel an idealistic character. Hegel operated with ideological shadows as the ultimate reality. Marx demonstrated that the movement of these ideological shadows reflected nothing but the movement of material bodies. We call our dialectic, materialist, since its roots are neither in heaven nor in the depths of our 'free will', but in objective reality, in nature. Consciousness grew out of the unconscious, psychology out of physiology, the organic world out of the inorganic, the solar system out of nebulae. On all the rungs of this ladder of development, the quantitative changes were transformed into qualitative. Our thought, including dialectical thought, is only one of the forms of the expression of changing matter. There is place within this system for neither God, nor Devil, nor immortal soul, nor eternal norms of laws and morals. The dialectic of thinking, having grown out of the dialectic of nature, possesses consequently a thoroughly materialist character.

Darwinism, which explained the evolution of species through quantitative transformations passing into qualitative, was the highest triumph of the dialectic in the whole field of organic matter. Another great triumph was the discovery of the table of atomic weights of chemical elements and further the transformation of one element into another. With these transformations (species, elements, etc.) is closely linked the question of classification, equally important in the natural as in the social sciences. Linnaeus' system (18th century), utilising as its starting point the immutability of species, was limited to the description and classification of plants according to their external characteristics. The infantile period of botany is analogous to the infantile period of logic, since the forms of our thought develop like everything that lives. Only decisive repudiation of the idea of fixed species, only the study of the history of the evolution of plants and their anatomy, prepared the basis for a really scientific classification. Marx, who in distinction from Darwin was a conscious dialectician, discovered a basis for the scientific classification of human societies in the development of their productive forces and the structure of the relations of ownership which constitute the anatomy of society. Marxism substituted for the vulgar descriptive classification of societies and states, which even up to now still flourishes in the universities, a materialistic dialectical classification. Only through using the method of Marx is it possible correctly to determine both the concept of a workers' state and the moment of its downfall. All this, as we see, contains nothing 'metaphysical' or 'scholastic', as conceited ignorance affirms. Dialectical logic expresses the laws of motion in contemporary scientific thought. The struggle against materialist dialectics on the contrary expresses a distant past, conservatism of the petty bourgeoisie, the self-conceit of university routinists and ... a spark of hope for an after-life. 15th December, 1939.

Introduction to The ABC of Materialist Dialectics

Rob Sewell
Over the past period, especially since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, there has been a systematic and vitriolic attack on the ideas of Marxism. From the citadels of higher learning to the pulpit, from free market institutes to the gutter press, a deafening torrent has rained down on the Marxist viewpoint. In order to confuse and disorient the class conscious worker, nothing is spared by the arch defenders of capitalism to discredit scientific socialism. But given that capitalism has meant the return of mass unemployment and the social ills of the inter-war period, a layer of workers and youth are searching for answers to their problems.

Increasingly they are driven by the harsh realities of life under capitalism to look for a way out. Marxism offers thinking workers and youth a clear understanding of society and their place within it. It offers them a new world outlook. It offers them a future. In the words of Lenin, "The Marxian doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. It is complete and harmonious, and provides men with an integral world conception which is irreconcilable with any form of superstition, reaction or defence of bourgeois oppression." (The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism). The theories of Marxism provide workers with a clear understanding - a thread which is capable of taking him through the confused labyrinth of events, of the turmoil of the class struggle and the complexities of capitalist society. Marxism was not simply plucked ready-made from Marx's head. Its theories represented a great development of the teachings of the greatest representatives of philosophy, economic thought and socialism. In essence, it was the fusion of German philosophy, English classic economic theory, and the best of French socialism. This combination provided the basis for a revolution in understanding. It was the birth of a new world outlook, enriched and deepened by the historical experience of the working class. It transformed the various trends of utopian socialism into a scientific socialism rooted in society and the class struggle. Trotsky's 'ABC of Materialist Dialectics' is a brilliant short explanation of Marxist philosophy. It was written as part of a defence of Marxism against a middle class revisionist tendency in the American Trotskyist movement in the late 1930s, which attempted to challenge its basic principles. (See Trotsky's In Defence of Marxism). As opposed to pragmatism and empiricism, Trotsky defended dialectical materialism as a richer, fuller, more comprehensive view of society and life in general. He explained that the dialectic "is the logic of evolution. Just as a machine shop in a plant supplies instruments for all departments, so logic is indispensable for all spheres of human knowledge... I know of two systems of logic worthy of attention: the logic of Aristotle (formal logic) and the logic of Hegel (the dialectic)." The ancient Greeks, more than 2,000 years ago, made an outstanding contribution to the development of human thought. They sought to understand the universe, society and man's place within it. As Engels explained, "The ancient Greek philosophers were all natural-born dialecticians and Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic intellect among them, had even already analysed the most essential forms of dialectical thought." They began to see things not as fixed and lifeless, but in their real development and movement. In Heraclitus's words: "Everything is and is not, for everything is in flux, is constantly changing, constantly coming into being and passing away." This graphic description is the basic core of dialectics. This corresponded to Engels view: "For dialectical

philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything: nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher." (Anti-Duhring). For the Greeks, however, dialectical thought was simply an anticipation. Their major contribution, especially Aristotle, was the development of formal logic, which has held sway for more than two thousand years. Its three basic laws are: law of identity (a thing is always equal to itself, or A equals A); law of contradiction (if a thing is always identical with itself, it cannot be different from itself, or if A equals A, it can never equal non-A); law of excluded middle (everything must be either one of two things; when two opposing statements confront one another, both cannot be true or false; the correctness of one implies the incorrectness of its contrary). These inseparable laws, which were deduced from argument, were the axioms of Aristotle's system of thought. This conception of reasoning was a huge leap for human thought and understanding and is the basis for our day to day perceptions. On this everyday level, we assume things are static and motionless. And from is point of view, formal logic serves us well. Dialectical understanding, on the other hand, "is not limited to the daily problems of life but attempts to arrive at an understanding of more complicated and drawn-out processes." (Trotsky). For everyday purposes and simple calculations, formal logic, or "common sense" is sufficient. It has its limits, however, and beyond these the application of "common sense" turns truth into its opposite. At bottom, it is incapable of appreciating change and attempts to rid itself of all contradictions (which are inherent in change). If we attempt to understand more than "everyday things", then formal (or vulgar) logic becomes completely inadequate. "The fundamental flaw of vulgar thought lies in the fact that it wishes to content itself with motionless imprints of a reality which consists of eternal motion." (Trotsky). For everyday purposes, it is possible to say whether a thing is alive or dead. But in reality it is not so simple. At what point is it dead? At what pointed did life begin? It is not a single "event", but a protracted process. That is not to say that formal logic is useless. On the contrary, it was historically progressive and necessary. This method permitted enormous advances in science and knowledge. However, it reached its limits. Although subordinate to dialectical thought, it is, nevertheless, out of formal logic that dialectics emerged. "Dialectical thought," explained Trotsky, "is related to vulgar thinking in the same way that a motion picture is related to a still photograph. The motion picture does not outlaw the still photograph but combines a series of them according to the laws of motion." However, the truer, more complete approximation of reality is contained in the movie. These laws of logic, of thought, although used by billions of people, are not necessarily recognised by them as such. For instance, everyone eats according to

the definite laws of physiology, but not everyone knows these laws or how they operate. Likewise, in one of Moliere's plays there is a man who learns about prose for the first time. When they explain to him what it is, he exclaims: "Why, I've been speaking prose all my life!" The limits, however, of formal logic can be clearly seen in relation to evolution. According to the law of identity, a man is essentially a man and nothing else. But we know this not to be the case. According to natural evolution man is an animal. Yet this must be extended to say man is more than an animal; man is a species that is different from all other animals. We are, in reality, two exclusively different things at one and the same time. This is a contradiction that vulgar logic is unable to grasp. Only dialectics can explain this phenomenon. The contribution of Hegel(1770-1831), the outstanding German philosopher, under the impact of the Great French Revolution, was the development of a new higher system of logic known as dialectics. As already mentioned, the original dialectical thinkers were the ancient Greeks who attempted to understand the universe and man's place in it. But given the low level of science and technique, their outlook was more in the nature of inspired guesses, or anticipations of later developments. Hegel studied the great Greek thinkers and drew out and developed their dialectical method, combining it with later knowledge, and producing a comprehensive analysis of the laws of dialectics. The fundamental weakness of Hegelian dialectics was that Hegel combined them with a mystical idealist view of life. It was the great contribution of Marx and Engels that purged the dialectical method from its mystical shell. Hegel's dialectic was on its head, believing that the material world was a reflection of a 'Universal Idea' or God. Marx explained, on the contrary, thoughts and ideas were simply the reflection of the material world. So Hegelian dialectics were fused with modern materialism to produce the higher understanding of dialectical materialism. These laws of dialectical materialism were able to explain things in their development and motion. Whereas formal logic was essentially the logic of lifeless, rigid and static relationships, dialectics was precisely an understanding of real life-processes of motion, contradiction and change. Everything, according to Engels, "has its existence in eternal coming into being and passing away, in ceaseless flux, in unresting motion and change..." (Dialectics of Nature, p130). Dialectics is the logic of evolution, movement, and change. Its starting point is reality itself. A series of general laws of dialectics, outlined by Hegel, centred around the law of quantity into quality (and of quality into quantity), the unity of opposites, and the negation of the negation, which operate throughout the material world. Each one is organically linked to the others. These laws, however, are not all-embracing and eternal. As Trotsky explained: "Dialectical materialism is not of course an eternal and immutable philosophy. To

think otherwise is to contradict the spirit of the dialectic. Further development of scientific thought will undoubtedly create a more profound doctrine into which dialectical materialism will enter merely as structural material."(In Defence of Marxism, p76). We have already noticed that dialectical thought had its basic origins 2,000 years ago, were systematically developed by Hegel, and then further deepened by Marx and Engels. At this time, modern materialist dialectics are the closest understanding and approximation to reality, fully appreciating all its internal contradictions. "Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience," stated Hegel. "Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and turn suddenly into its opposite." (Encyclopaedia, p128) Movement and change results from causes inherent in processes and things, from internal contradictions. These contradictory tendencies within phenomena represent, in reality, a unity of opposites. The opposites are bound together in a relation of mutual dependence, where each is a condition of existence of the other. In class society, for instance, the class antagonisms between the exploiters and exploited is a fundamental aspect. One cannot exist without the other. This contradiction is the driving force of change. However, these contradictions are not static, but in the process of working themselves out. The overthrow of class society will lead to the abolition of classes themselves. New contradictions will inevitably unfold, but will be of a fundamentally different character, on a new higher level. As Lenin remarked that "antagonism and contradiction are utterly different. Under socialism antagonism disappears, but contradiction remains." (Critical Notes on Bukharin's Economics of the Transition Period). The elements of antagonism and conflict between men disappear and give way to conscious and harmonious planning of society. Contradictions remain, but as they no longer take the form of class antagonisms they do not require the forcible domination of one set of material interests over another. Change takes place not in a straight line, and continuous gradual smooth development, but in leaps and revolutions. All change has a quantitative element, but this reaches a certain point, when the gradual changes give rise to a qualitative leap forward. Something new is born, entirely different from before. To explain developments we need to study the facts. "The dialectic is not a magic master key for all questions," explained Trotsky. "It does not replace concrete scientific analysis. But it directs this analysis along the correct road, securing it against sterile wanderings in the desert of subjectivism and scholasticism." (In Defence of Marxism, p52). Change is not simply a repetition of the past. The working out of contradictions does not mean that earlier stages of development are repeated exactly, but

develop on a higher level. This is one of the most general laws of dialectics, the negation of the negation. An "extremely far reaching and important law" says Engels. Motion, change and development move through an uninterrupted series of negations. But the past is not totally obliterated, but overcome and preserved at the same time. Features of the past may reappear, but in a new and enriched form. As Marx explained, capitalism arose through the ruination of pre-capitalist individual producers (its negation). The abolition of capitalism (its negation) is carried through, individual property of producers is restored, but on a higher level. The producer, as a participant in socialised production, then enjoys, as his individual property, a share of the social product. The task of Marxism is to lay bare the real contradictions and processes unfolding in society, economy and politics. To draw a clear distinction between the appearance and the essence of things. To uncover the truth. Only by doing this will the working class, and in particular its advanced layers, see clearly its historic task and mission. Yet, as we explained before, there are obstacles in the path of the worker's struggle for theory and understanding far more intractable than the scribblings of priests and professors. A man or woman who is obliged to toil long hours in industry, who has not had the benefit of a decent education and consequently lacks the habit of reading, finds great difficulty in absorbing some of the more complex ideas, especially at the outset. Yet it was for workers that Marx and Engels wrote, and not for 'clever' students and middle class people. 'Every beginning is difficult' no matter what science we are talking about. Marxism is a science and therefore makes heavy demands upon the beginner. But every worker who is active in the trade unions or Labour Party knows that nothing is worthwhile if attained without a degree of struggle and sacrifice. It is the activists in the Labour Movement at whom the present pamphlet is aimed. To the active worker who is prepared to persevere. One promise can be made: once the initial effort is made to come to grips with unfamiliar and new ideas, the theories of Marxism will be found to be basically straight forward and simple. Moreover and this should be emphasised - the worker who acquires by patient effort an understanding of Marxism will turn out to be a better theoretician than most students, just because he or she can grasp the ideas not merely in the abstract, but concretely, as applied to his or her own life and work. In the final analysis, Marxist philosophy is a guide to action. "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, however, to change it." (Karl Marx, Theses on Feurbach). Rob Sewell, 18 April, 1994.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

John Pickard
When we discuss the method of Marxism, we are dealing with the ideas which provide the basis for our activities in the labour movement, the arguments we raise in the discussions we take part in, and the articles we write. It is generally accepted that Marxism took its form from three main roots. One of those roots was the development of Marx's analysis of French politics, particularly the bourgeois revolution in France in the 1790s, and the subsequent class struggles during the early 19th century. Another of the roots of Marxism is what is called 'English economics', ie., Marx's analysis of the capitalist system as it developed in England. The other root of Marxism, which was its starting point historically, is said to be 'German philosophy', and it is that aspect of it that I want to deal with here. To begin with, we say that the basis of Marxism is materialism. That is to say, Marxism starts from the idea that matter is the essence of all reality, and that matter creates mind, and not vice versa. In other words, thought and all the things that are said to derive from thought artistic ideas, scientific ideas, ideas of law, politics, morality and so on - these things are in fact derived from the material world. The 'mind', ie., thought and thought processes, is a product of the brain; and the brain itself, and therefore ideas, arose at a certain stage in the development of living matter. It is a product of the material world. Therefore, to understand the real nature of human consciousness and society, as Marx himself put it, it is a question "not of setting out from what men say, imagine, conceive... in order to arrive at men in the flesh; but setting out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process demonstrating the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, images of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first (nonmaterialist) method of approach the starting point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second (materialist) method, which conforms to real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness." (The German Ideology, Chapter one). A materialist therefore seeks an explanation not only for ideas, but for material phenomena themselves, in terms of material causes and not in terms of supernatural intervention by gods and the like. And that is a very important

aspect of Marxism, which clearly sets it aside from the methods of thinking and logic which have become established in capitalist society. The development of scientific thought in the European countries in the 17th and 18th centuries displayed some really contradictory characteristics, which still remain typical of the approach of bourgeois theoreticians today. On the one hand there was a development towards a materialist method. Scientists looked for causes. They didn't just accept natural phenomena as god-ordained miracles, they sought some explanation for them. But at the same time these scientists did not yet possess a consistent or worked-out materialist understanding; and very often, behind the explanations for natural phenomena, they also saw, at the end of the chain, the hand of God at work. Such an approach means accepting, or at least leaving open the possibility, that the material world we live in is ultimately shaped by forces from outside it, and that consciousness or ideas come first, in the sense that they can exist independently of the real world. This approach, which is the philosophical opposite of materialism, we call 'idealism'. According to this approach, the development of mankind and of society - of art, science, etc. - is dictated not by material processes but by the development of ideas, by the perfection or degeneration of human thought. And it is no accident that this general approach, whether spoken or unspoken, pervades all the philosophies of capitalism. Bourgeois philosophers and historians in general take the present system for granted. They accept that capitalism is some kind of finished, complete system which is incapable of being replaced by a new and higher system. And they try to present all past history as the efforts of lesser mortals to achieve the kind of 'perfect society' which they believe capitalism has achieved or can achieve. So, when we look at the work of some of the greatest bourgeois scientists and thinkers in the past or even today, we can see how they have tended to jumble up materialist ideas and idealist ideas in their minds. For example Isaac Newton, who examined the laws of mechanics and the laws of motion of planets and planetary bodies, didn't believe that these processes were dictated by mind or thought. But what he did believe was that an original impetus was given to all matter, and that this initial push was provided by some sort of supernatural force, by God. In the same way it is possible today for many biologists to accept the idea that species of plants and animals evolved from one type to another, and that mankind itself is a development from earlier species. And yet many of them cling to the notion that there is a qualitative difference between the human mind and the animal mind, consisting of the 'eternal soul' which leaves the human body after death. Even some of the most eminent scientists jumble up the materialist

method with idealist ideas of this kind, which are really backward, scientifically speaking, and are more related to magic and superstition than to science. Marxism therefore represents a systematic and fundamental break with idealism in all its forms, and the development in it place of a materialist understanding of what is taking place in reality. Materialism in this sense provides one of the basic starting points of Marxism. The other basic starting point is dialectics. DIALECTICS Dialectics is quite simply the logic of motion, or the logic of common sense to activists in the movement. We all know that things don't stand still, they change. But there is another form of logic which stands in contradiction to dialectics, which we call 'formal logic', which again is deeply embodied in capitalist society. It is perhaps necessary to begin by describing briefly what this method implies. Formal logic is based on what is known as the 'law of identity', which says that 'A' equals 'A' - i.e. that things are what they are, and that they stand in definite relationships to each other. There are other derivative laws based on the law of identity; for example, if 'A' equals 'A', it follows that 'A' cannot equal 'B', nor 'C'. On the face of it this method of thinking may again seem like common sense; and in fact it has been a very important tool, a very important device in the development of science and in the industrial revolution which created the present-day society. The development of mathematics and basic arithmetic, for example, was based on formal logic. You couldn't teach a child a table of multiplication or addition without using formal logic. One plus one equals two, and not three. And in the same way, the method of formal logic was also the basis for the development of mechanics, of chemistry, of biology, etc. For example, in the 18th century the Scandinavian biologist Linnaeus developed a system of classification for all known plants and animals. Linnaeus divided all living things into classes, into orders, into families, in the order of primates, in the family of hominids, in the genus of homo, and represents the species homo sapiens. The system of classification represented an enormous step forward in biology. It made possible, for the first time, a real systematic study of plants ad animals, to compare and contrast animal and plant species. But it was based on formal logic. It was based on saying that homo sapiens equals homo sapiens; that musca domestica (the common housefly) equals musca domestica; that an earthworm equals earthworm, and so on. It was, in other words, a fixed and rigid system. It wasn't possible, according to this system, for a species to equal to anything else, otherwise the system of classification would have completely collapsed. The same applies in the field of chemistry, where Dalton's atomic theory meant a huge stride forward. Dalton's theory was based on the idea that matter is made up of atoms, and that each type of atom is completely separate and peculiar to

itself - that its shape and weight is peculiar to that particular element and to none other. After Dalton there was a more or less rigid classification of elements, again based on a rigid formal logic, whereby it was said that an atom of hydrogen was an atom of hydrogen, an atom of carbon was an atom of carbon, etc. And if any atom could have been something else, this whole system of classification, which has formed the basis of modern chemistry, would have collapsed. Now it is important to see that there are limitations to the method of formal logic. It is a useful everyday method, and it gives us useful approximations for identifying things. For example, the Linnaean system of classification is still useful to biologists; but since the work of Charles Darwin in particular we can also see the weaknesses in that system. Darwin pointed out, for instance, that in the Linnaean system some types of plants are given separate names, as separate species, but actually they are very similar to each other. And yet there are other plants with the same name, of the same species, which are said to be different varieties of the same plant, and yet they are very different from each other. So even by the time of Charles Darwin it was possible to look at the Linnaean system of classification and say, 'well, there's something wrong somewhere'. And of course Darwin's own work provided a systematic basis for the theory of evolution, which for the first time said it is possible for one species to be transformed into another species. And that left a big hole in the Linnaean system. Before Darwin it was thought that the number of species on the planet was exactly the same as the number of species created by God in the first six days of his labour - except, of course, for those destroyed by the Flood - and that those species had survived unchanged over the millennia. But Darwin produced the idea of species changing, and so inevitably the method of classification also had to be changed. What applies in the field of biology applies also in the field of chemistry. Chemists became aware, by the late 19th century, that it was possible for one atomic element to become transformed into another. In other words, atoms aren't completely separated and peculiar to themselves. We know now that many atoms, many chemical elements, are unstable. For example, uranium and other radioactive atoms will split in the course of time and produce completely different atoms with completely different chemical properties and different atomic weights. So we can see that the method of formal logic was beginning to break down with the development of science itself. But it is the method of dialectics which draws the conclusions of these factual discoveries, and points out there are no absolute or fixed categories, either in nature or in society.

Whereas the formal logician will say that 'A' equals 'A', the dialectician will say that 'A' does not necessarily equal 'A'. Or to take a practical example that Trotsky uses in his writings, one pound of sugar will not be precisely equal to another pound of sugar. It is a good enough approximation if you want to buy sugar in a shop, but if you look at it more carefully you will see that it's actually wrong. So we need to have a form of understanding, a form of logic, that takes into account the fact that things, and life, and society, are in a state of constant motion and change. And that form of logic, of course, is dialectics. But on the other hand it would be wrong to think that dialectics ascribes to the universe a process of even and gradual change. The laws of dialectics - and here is a word of warning: these concepts sound more intimidating than they really are the laws of dialectics describe the manner in which the processes of change in reality take place. QUANTITY INTO QUALITY Let us take, to begin with, the law of the transformation of quantity into quality'. This law states that the processes of change - motion in the universe - are not gradual, they are not even. Periods of relatively gradual or slight change are interspersed with periods of enormously rapid change - change which cannot be measured in terms of quantity but only in terms of quality. To use an example from natural science again, let us imagine the heating of water. You can actually measure ("quantify"), in terms of degrees of temperature, the change that takes place in the water as you add heat to it. From, let us say, 10 degrees centigrade (which is normal tap water) to about 98 degrees centigrade, the change will remain quantitative; i.e., the water will remain water, although it is getting warmer. But then comes a point where the change in the water becomes qualitative, and the water turns into steam. You can no longer describe the change in the water as it is heated from 98 degrees to 102 degrees in purely quantitative terms. We have to say that a qualitative change (water into steam) has come about as a result of an accumulation of quantitative change (adding more and more heat). And that is what Marx and Engels meant when they referred to the transformation of quantity into quality. The same can be seen in the development of species. There is always a great variety in every species. If we look around this room we can see the degree of variety in homo sapiens. That variety can be measured quantitatively, for example, in terms of height, weight, skin colour, length of nose, etc. But if evolutionary changes progress to a certain point under the impact of environmental changes, then those quantitative changes can add up to a qualitative change. In other words, you would no longer characterise that change

in animal or plant species merely in terms of quantitative details. The species will have become qualitatively different. For example, we as a species are qualitatively different from chimpanzees or gorillas, and they in turn are qualitatively different from other species of mammals. And those qualitative differences, those evolutionary leaps, have come about as a result of quantitative changes in the past. The idea of Marxism is that there will always be periods of gradual change interspersed with periods of sudden change. In pregnancy, there is a period of gradual development, and then a period of very sudden development at the end. The same applies to social development. Very often Marxists have used the analogy of pregnancy to describe the development of wars and revolutions. These represent qualitative leaps in social development; but they come about as a result of the accumulation of quantitative contradictions in society. NEGATION OF THE NEGATION A second law of dialectics is 'the law of the negation of the negation', and again it sounds more complicated than it really is. 'Negation' in this sense simply means the passing away of one thing, the death of one thing as it becomes transformed into another. For example, the development of class society in the early history of humanity represented the negation of the previous classless society. And in future, with the development of communism, we will see another classless society, that would mean the negation of all present class society. So the law of the negation of the negation simply states that as one system comes into existence, it forces another system to pass away. But that doesn't mean that the second system is permanent or unchangeable. That second system itself becomes negated as a result of the further developments and processes of change in society. As class society has been the negation of classless society, so communist society will be the negation of class society - the negation of the negation. Another concept of dialectics is the law of the 'interpenetration of opposite'. This law quite simply states that processes of change take place because of contradictions - because of the conflicts between the different elements that are embodied in all natural and social processes. Probably the best example of the interpenetration of opposites in natural science is the 'quantum theory'. This theory is based on the concept of energy having a dual character - that for some purposes, according to some experiments, energy exists in the form of waves, like electromagnetic energy. But for other purposes energy manifests itself as particles. In other words, it is quite accepted among scientists that matter and energy can actually exist in two different forms at one

and the same time - on the one hand as a kind of intangible wave, on the other hand as a particle with a definite 'quantum' (amount) of energy embodied in it. Therefore the basis of the quantum theory in modern physics is contradiction. But there are many other contradictions known to science. Electromagnetic energy, for example, is set in motion through the effect of positive and negative forces on each other. Magnetism depends on the existence of a north pole and a south pole. These things cannot exist separately. They exist and operate precisely because of the contradictory forces being embodied in one and the same system. Similarly, every society today consists of different contradictory elements joined together in one system, which makes it impossible for any society, any country, to remain stable or unchanged. The dialectical method, in contrast to the method of formal logic, trains us to identify these contradictions, and thereby get to the bottom of the changes taking place. Marxists are not embarrassed to say that there are contradictory elements within every social process. On the contrary, it is precisely by recognising and understanding the opposite interests embodied within the same process that we are able to work out the likely direction of change, and consequently to identify the aims and objectives which it is necessary and possible in that situation to strive for from the working class point of view. At the same time, Marxism doesn't abandon formal logic altogether. But it is important to see, from the point of view of understanding social developments, that formal logic must take second position. We all use formal logic for everyday purposes. It gives us the necessary approximations for communication and conducting our daily activities. We wouldn't be able to lead normal lives without paying lip service to formal logic, without using the approximation that one equals one. But, on the other hand, we have to see the limitations of formal logic - the limitations that become evident in science when we study processes in more depth and detail, and also when we examine social and political processes more closely. Dialectics is very rarely accepted by scientists. Some scientists are dialecticians, but the majority even today muddle up a materialist approach with all sorts of formal and idealistic ideas. And if that's the case in natural science, it is much, much more the case as far as the social sciences are concerned. The reasons for this are fairly obvious. If you try to examine society and social processes from a scientific point of view, then you cannot avoid coming up against the contradictions of the capitalist system and the need for the socialist transformation of society.

But the universities, which are supposed to be centres of learning and study, are under capitalism far from being independent of the ruling class and the state. That is why natural science can still have a scientific method which leans towards dialectical materialism; but when it comes to the social sciences you will find in the colleges and universities some of the worst kinds of formalism and idealism possible. That is not unrelated to the vested interests of the professors and academics who are highly paid. It is obvious and unavoidable that their privileged position in society will have some reflection, some effect on what they're supposed to teach. Their own views and prejudices will be contained in the 'knowledge' which they pass on to their students, and so on down to the level of the schools. Bourgeois historians, in particular, are among the most shortsighted of all social scientists. How many times have we seen examples of bourgeois historians who imagine that history ended yesterday! Here in Britain they all seem to admit the horrors of British imperialism as far as the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries are concerned; that British imperialism engaged in slave traffic; that it was responsible for some of the most bloody subjugation of colonial peoples; that it was also responsible for some of the worst exploitation of British workers, including women and children, in the coal mines, the cotton mills, and so on. They will accept all these iniquities - up until yesterday. But when it comes to today, of course, then British imperialism suddenly becomes democratic and progressive. And that is completely one-sided, a completely lopsided view of history, which is diametrically opposed to the method of Marxism. The attitude of Marx and Engels was to view social processes from the same dialectical standpoint from which they viewed nature - from the standpoint of the processes that are actually taking place. In our everyday discussions and debates in the labour movement, we will often come across people who are formalists. Even many on the left will look at things in a completely rigid and formal way, without understanding the direction in which things are moving. The right wing in the labour movement, and also some on the left, believe that Marxist theory is a dogma, that 'theory' is like a 600 lb weight on the back of an activist, and the quicker you get rid of that weight, the more active and effective you can be. But that is a complete misconception of the whole nature of Marxist theory. In point of fact Marxism is the opposite of a dogma. It is precisely a method for coming to grips with the processes of change that are taking place around us. Nothing is fixed and nothing remains unchanged. It is the formalists who see society as a still photograph, who can get overawed by the situations they are

faced with because they don't see how and why things will change. It is this kind of approach that can easily lead to a dogmatic acceptance of things as they are or as they have been, without understanding the inevitability of change. Marxist theory is therefore an absolutely essential device for any activity within the labour movement. We need to be consciously attuned to the contradictory forces at work in the class struggle, in order to orient ourselves to the way in which events are developing. Of course it isn't always easy to free ourselves from the prevailing framework of thinking in capitalist society and absorb the Marxist method. As Karl Marx said, there is no royal road to science. You have to treat the hard path sometimes in grappling with new political ideas. But the discussion and study of Marxist theory is an absolutely essential part of the development of every activist. It is that theory alone that will provide comrades with a compass and a map amidst all the complexities of the struggle. It is all very well to be an activist. But without a conscious understanding of the processes you are involved in, you are no more effective than an explorer without a compass and a map. And if you try to explore without scientific aids, you can be as energetic as you like but sooner or later you will fall into a ravine or a bog and disappear, as so many activists over the years have unfortunately done. The idea of having a compass and a map is that you can take your bearings. You can judge where you are at any particular time, where you are going and where you will be. And that is the fundamental reason why we need to get to grips with Marxist theory. It provides us with an absolutely invaluable guide to action as far as our activities in the labour movement are concerned.

MATERIALISMUL DIALECTIC
de Phil Bartle, Dr. traducere de Lavinia Loredana Beria

Noiunile lui Karl Marx despre schimbare au avut ca fundament scrierile filosofului GWF Hegel, care a dezvoltat conceptul de dialect. Aceast noiune se bazeaz pe ideea c orice lucru conine in interorul su smna audodistrugerii, si ca o nou form va lua natere din rmiele acestei distrugeri. Ciclul a fost descris ca tez, antitez i sintez .

Unii consider c aceast idee se aseamn cu miturile clasice latine i greceti despre pasrea Phoenix, care zboar prea aproape de soare i se arde, i cu miturile despre creaie ale poporului Athapaskan din Marile Cmpii din America. Marx a preluat aceast idee a dialecticii i a aplicat-o societii, spunnd c originile schimbrii sunt materiale. n termenii notri acest lucru nseamn c ele aparin sferei tehnologiei i a economiei. Pe msur ce tehnologia oamenilor a evoluat de la stadiul de vntor/culegtor la agricultur (horticultur, creterea animalelor), apoi la revoluia industrial, schimbrile n domeniul tehnologiei au condus la schimbri n organizarea social, n credine i valori. Societile primitive de vntori-culegtori, spune Marx, aveau un comunism primitiv. n societile agrare, pe care el le numete feudale, conflictul principal exista ntre proprietarii de pmnturi (aristocraii) i cei care munceau pe aceste pmnturi (erbii). n era industrial, sursa major de conflict s-a aflat ntre muncitori, pe care el i-a numit proletariat (din latin), care supravieuiau din munca prestat, i proprietarii de fabrici, pe care i-a numit burghezie, cuvnt ce i are originile in burgh i burger, care aveau nevoie de munca prestat pentru a obine profituri. Clasa exploatat a fost favorabil schimbrii i a beneficiat de pe urma schimbrii ce a condus spre egalitate, n timp ce clasa exploatatoare a artat rezisten schimbrii. Deoarece societatea conine seminele autodistrugerii n interiorul su, comunismul primitiv s-a prbuit fcnd loc feudalismului, care la rndul su a czut facnd loc capitalismului. Marx s-a ateptat ca sistemul capitalist s se prbueascdin cauza tensiunii dinamice dintre muncitori i proprietari, iar revoluia ce urmeaz acestei prbuiri s aib ca rezultat comunismul, unde statul s dispar treptat, iar economia s fie bazat pe sloganul De la fiecare n funcie de posibilitile sale, pentru fiecare n funcie de nevoile sale. Aceast abordare este numit materialism dialectic. Marx, care a murit in 1883, s-a ateptat ca o revoluie comunist sa ia loc ca rezultat al tensiunilor dintre proletariat i proprietarii de fabrici. n mod ironic, cele dou mari revoluii comuniste ale timpului au avut loc n Rusia (1917) i China (1949), amndou fiind societi feudal-agrare n acea perioad.

An Introduction to Dialectical Materialism

Robin Clapp

Why have a Philosophy?

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is, however, to change it." (Marx:Theses on Feuerbach)

AT THE dawn of the 21st century, one-fifth of the worlds population lives in absolute poverty on one US dollar a day or less, while the assets of the 200 richest people are larger than the combined income of the poorest 2.4 billion on the planet. Yet material prosperity has increased by more in the past 100 years than in all the rest of human history. Thus the basis already exists potentially for undreamed-of progress of human society, provided the contradictions created by capitalism itself can be swept away by the worlds working class. The capitalists through their control of the judiciary, the military, education and the media are always seeking to prevent workers and youth from drawing the conclusion that capitalism can be changed. In the popular press, commentators occasionally rail against this or that symptom of the systems sickness while drumming home the mantra that market economics represents the only show in town. At the same time more serious justifications for capitalism are produced. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-1992 gave a massive boost to this branch of literary lies, allowing bourgeois philosophers to claim that capitalism had emerged triumphant in its historic struggle with socialism. Every ruling class throughout history has sought to give its regime the stamp of permanence. Never mind that there have been many forms of class rule including slavery and feudalism, todays smug apologists for capitalism believe their way of running society is best and represents the Everest of achievement. Tony Blair has sneeringly denounced Marxism as "an outmoded sectarian dogma." His sole contribution to philosophy has been to bestow credit on Anthony Giddens Third Way theory the very old and discredited idea that there can be a middle way between the market and a planned economy. Most capitalist leaders believe they dont require a philosophy. Making money is all that matters and they embrace the idea that if it works, its good. They are largely empirical in their approach, responding pragmatically to new challenges and rarely bothering to understand the relationship and connections between policies and events, cause and effect. In the spheres of politics and economics, theirs is the complacent philosophy of thinking that what has gone on before will continue largely unchanged into the future.

In the 1990s they were sure the dotcom boom would just keep on growing. When it crashed they were astonished, but learning nothing, scratched their heads, said theyd predicted it all along, then went back to the comfort-blanket of believing capitalism would get better again. This pamphlet will show that having a philosophy that correctly interprets the world and provides a compass for changing it is indispensable. Dialectical materialism, the basis of Marxist philosophy is still the most modern method of thought that exists. As Leon Trotsky observed in Marxism in our Time: "if the theory correctly estimates the course of development and foresees the future better than other theories, it remains the most advanced theory of our time, be it even scores of years old." Marxism is the science of perspectives - looking forward to anticipate how society will develop - using its method of dialectical materialism to unravel the complex processes of historical development. It endeavors to teach the working class to know itself and be conscious of itself as a class. Dialectical Materialism the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought was and remains a revolutionary philosophy, challenging capitalism in every sphere and substituting science for dreams and prejudice.

Materialism versus Idealism.

"It is not consciousness that determines existence, but social existence that determines consciousness." (Marx & Engels: The German ideology.) People have always sought to understand the world they lived in through observing nature and generalising their day-to-day experiences. The history of philosophy shows a division into two camps Idealism and Materialism. The Idealists argue that thought (consciousness) is paramount and that peoples actions stem from abstract thought, devoid of history and material conditions. It was Marx and Engels who first fully challenged this conception, explaining that an understanding of the world has to start not from the ideas which exist in peoples heads in any particular historical period, but from the real, material conditions in which these ideas arise. Nature is historical at every level. No aspect of nature simply exists; it has a history, comes into being, changes and develops, is transformed, and, finally ceases to exist. Aspects of nature may appear to be fixed, stable, in a state of equilibrium for a shorter or longer time, but none is permanently so. For Trotsky: "Consciousness grew out of the unconscious, psychology out of physiology, the organic world out of the inorganic, the solar system out of the nebulae."

Marx and Engels based their materialism upon the ideas and practice of the great materialist philosophers of the 18th century. The renaissance in the 16th century with its spread of cultural and scientific enquiry was both a cause of and an effect of the early growth of capitalism. InEngels words: "Science rebelled against the Church; the bourgeoisie could not do without science, and therefore had to join the rebellion." Astronomy, mechanics, physics, anatomy and physiology were feverishly developed as separate disciplines, with the consequence that age-old beliefs in an inviolable god were rocked. Galileo for instance began to discover some of the physical properties of the universe and revealed that the planets revolved around the sun. Later, Newtons theories of gravity and laws of physical motion uncovered the mysteries of movement and mechanics. The philosopher Hobbes declared that it was impossible to separate thought from matter that thinks. Marx observed that this enlightenment had "cleared mens minds" for the great French revolution and the age of reason. But Engels added that "The specific limitation of this materialism lay in its inability to comprehend the universe as a process, as matter undergoing uninterrupted development." He and Marx were to fuse the brilliant scientific advances of materialism with dialectical thought, creating the most revolutionary and far-reaching theory for explaining and changing our world. The German philosopher Hegel, who resurrected dialectics from ancient Greek learning in the early 19th century, was a proponent of the Idealist approach. To him the thoughts within his brain were not the more or less abstract images of actual things and processes, but on the contrary, things and their development were only the realised images of the Idea/God existing somewhere from eternity before the world existed. Marx turned this confusion on its head. "To me the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected in the human mind." Marxism therefore bases itself upon a materialist view of history. The material world is real and develops through its own natural laws. Thought is a product of matter, without which there are no separate ideas. Flowing from this it is clear that Marxism must reject universal truths, religions and spirits. All theories are relative, grasping one side of reality. Initially they are assumed to possess universal validity and application. But at a certain point, deficiencies in the theory are found. These have to be explained and at a certain point new theories are developed which can account for the exceptions. But the new theories not only supercede the old, but also incorporate them in a new form. For example, in the field of biological evolution, Marxists are neither biological nor cultural determinists. There is a dialectical interaction between our genes and our environment.

Recently the human genome project has enabled the complete mapping out of the structure of the genes which are passed on from one human generation to the next. Some biologists have asserted that this would reveal individual genes shaping behaviour patterns ranging from sexual preference to criminality and even political preference! A consequence would be that a persons position in society would be largely pre-determined and unalterable. However, any attempt to tag individual genes for intelligence has failed and the attempt to define social position as genetically determined has been exposed as a pure consequence of the ideology of the biologists involved. A breakthrough that has revolutionised our understanding of human behaviour, scientists recently discovered we possess far fewer genes than previously thought, revealing that environmental influences must be vastly more powerful in shaping the way humans act.

What is dialectical thinking?

" Men thought dialectically long before they knew what dialectics was, just as they spoke prose long before the term prose existed." (Engels: Anti-Duhring.) Dialectics is the philosophy of motion. The dialectical method of analysis enables us to study natural phenomena, the evolution of society and thought itself, as processes of development based upon motion and contradiction. Everything is in a constant state of flux and change; all reality is matter in motion. The roots of dialectical thought can be traced back to the ancient Greeks who, just because their civilisation was not yet advanced enough to dissect and analyse nature in its separate parts, viewed nature as a whole, in its connections, dialectically. Nothing in life is static. In the words of the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus: "All things flow, all change." Around us in the natural world are illustrations of the dialectical development of our Earth and space itself. Astronomers are transfixed as super-telescopes allow us to witness the birth and death of distant stars, while no geologist or vulcanologist can function without having an understanding of the basic and interlinked laws of the dialectic the law of quantity into quality, the interpenetration of opposites and the negation of the negation. In mathematics a dialectical approach is indispensable. In everyday life we often need to distinguish between curved and straight lines. But mathematically a straight line is merely a special sort of curve. Both can be treated using a single general mathematical equation. We also learn how at a specific temperature, solid ice changes to liquid water then at a higher temperature to steam a gas and that the three apparently

different substances are actually different manifestations of the motion of the same water molecules. But though capitalist or bourgeois society uses the dialectical method in its pursuit of scientific advance, in the fields of philosophy and economy it stubbornly seeks to refute dialectics, clothing itself in the straightjacket of metaphysics (formal logic). Metaphysics translated into politics becomes a justification for the status quo, the idea that evolution proceeds unchangingly at a snails pace. It is not hard to see why. Explained in a Marxist manner, the development of all past and present forms of society would show that at certain periods in history when the mode of production has come into acute conflict with the mode of exchange, wars and revolutionary movements have followed. The forms of class struggle have changed through different historical epochs, but the fundamental struggle over the division of the surplus value between exploiter and exploited forms a continuous line from the early slave societies to the present day. The capitalist class or bourgeoisie (as Marx described it) must therefore hide the materialist conception of history from us, extolling instead the acts of great men (and occasionally women!) who it is claimed have changed history. Great social revolutions are attributed not to the struggle between classes, but to the mistakes of tyrant kings and tsars and the bloodthirsty ambitions of ruthless men like Cromwell, Robespierre and Lenin to name three of their special bete noirs. Metaphysical thought is often described as the science of things, not of motion. Basing itself upon rigid classification techniques and seeing things as static entities, it is a useful tool in our day to day lives, but does not let us see things in their connections. The formal logician operates within the limitation of three laws: The Law of Identity where A is equal to A The Law of Contradiction where A cannot be equal to non-A The Law of Excluded Middle where A must be equal to A, or must not be equal to A. Formal logic sees cause and effect as opposites, but for Marxists the two categories merge, mix and melt into each other all the time. Trotsky compared formal logic to dialectics using the analogy of a photograph and a moving film. The former has its uses, but as soon as we go into complex questions formal logic proves inadequate. For instance we can say ours is a capitalist society and all will agree. But viewing it dialectically as a bourgeois society in an advanced stage of development, we have to add that it still possesses remnants of feudalism, while more importantly it contains in its technological potential, the seeds for a Socialist planned economy. This example is not abstract.

Marxists use the dialectical method in order to clarify perspectives. All realities have more than one side to them. What stage has British capitalism reached, what character will the recession have, how powerful is the working class, what is the role of New Labour, where and when do we expect big industrial struggles to break out all these questions and many more can only be answered by analysing society dialectically.

The laws of the dialectic

"Dialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." (Engels: Anti-Duhring.) BASED UPON the laws of motion, dialectics enables us to see things in their connection. Our bodies and our thoughts are continually changing. From conception to death there is never a moment when our physical development is still. Neither are our thoughts and mental growth. We are always evolving our ideas. But how specifically do dialectics apply in relation to a study of society? What are the general laws of dialectical materialism beyond the primary idea that everything changes? If dialectics is the theoretical toolkit of Marxists, what do the tools look like and how do they assist us in challenging capitalism and changing society? Marx and Engels elaborated three broad and interconnected laws of dialectics, each of which is continually at work and give us the insight into how society develops and what theoretical and practical tasks confront us as revolutionaries seeking to build the forces to overthrow capitalism. The law of quantity and quality Just as a scientist is familiar with the concept of things altering their quality at certain quantitative points (water into steam at boiling point), so too an observation of the evolution of class societies illustrates the same law. Society does not develop in a slow, evolutionary manner. The friction between the classes can and does create episodic periods of sharpened struggle leading to political and social crises, wars and revolutions. For a whole period the class struggle may appear to be at a low-ebb, low levels of industrial action, apparent disinterest in political struggle, etc. Marxists however view events in an all-sided manner. On the surface there can be apparent stability, but a quantitative build-up of frustration and antagonism towards capitalism can break out suddenly, creating entirely new conditions for struggle and catching the bosses and their New Labour echoes completely by surprise. This law is vulgarly recognised by even some bourgeois philosophers who, usually after the event, refer sadly to "the straw that broke the camels back."

It has enormous consequences for Marxists. We analyse the build-up of class conflict and at all times intervene in the workers movement to build the ideas of Socialism to take advantage of these sudden changes and sharp turns. The law does not always denote a progression of course. For many years we characterised the Stalinist bureaucracy in the former Soviet Union as a relative fetter upon the growth of the planned economy. By this we meant that despite the waste and corruption of the bureaucrats, there was still a potential for the planned economy to grow, albeit less efficiently than had the working class been in charge. By the 1960s command-style rule from the Kremlin was struggling to cope with the fresh challenges of a more technically advanced form of economy. Trotskys maxim that a planned economy needs workers control as a body needs oxygen became more relevant than ever. We observed this change and concluded that the bureaucracy had gone from being a relative fetter to an absolute fetter. Quantity had turned into quality. From a study of all the declining economic statistics coming out of the USSR we began to draw theoretical rounded-out conclusions. A society in economic, political and social crisis where the bureaucratic caste has become absolutely incapable of further playing any progressive role cannot stay in absolute stasis. A point was being rapidly reached where either the working class would have to overthrow the incubus of bureaucracy and carry through a political revolution, or there would occur a social counterrevolution leading to the restoration of capitalism; this possibility was predicted by Trotsky over 50 years earlier. The triumph of the latter with Yeltsin undoing all the remaining gains of the 1917 revolution marked a qualitative defeat for the working class in Russia and everywhere else. The Interpenetration of Opposites Dialectics applied to the class struggle does not have the same degree of precision as it does in the science laboratory. The role of individuals, political parties and social movements is not scientifically pre-ordained. A trade union leader might be a repected left-winger, but may capitulate when faced with a determined onslaught from the bosses. A moderate trade union leader may surprise himself or herself however and become much more "militant" than intended, when faced with mass pressure from below. There are no absolutes in the class struggle! We often stress for instance that boom and slump are not antithetical categories as crude GCSE textbooks proclaim. Within every economic growth of capitalism are the seeds of future recession and vice versa. It is not slump alone, which causes workers to rebel against the class system. The very opposite may be the case, with workers feeling intimidated by the threat of widespread unemployment. In a boom, workers can go on the offensive not only in order to recapture past gains that have been lost, but to win new victories around pay and conditions. Trotsky illustrated this law in his analysis of the forces which made the Russian Revolution in 1917: "In order to realise the Soviet State, there was

required a drawing together and mutual penetration of two factors belonging to completely different economic species; a peasant war that is, a movement characteristic of the dawn of bourgeois development and a proletarian insurrection, the movement signaling its decline. That is the essence of 1917". (History of the Russian Revolution.) This "combined and uneven development" illustrates the complex manner in which societies develop. Application of the law of interpenetrating opposites is crucial in our clarification of the stage at which capitalism has reached, its future direction and our responses. The Negation of the Negation Described by Engels as "an extremely general, and for this very reason extremely far-reaching and important, law of development of nature, history and thought", the negation of the negation deals with development through contradictions which appear to annul, or negate a previous fact, theory, or form of existence, only to later become negated in its turn. Capitalisms economic cycle illustrates this law. Great wealth is created in the boom, only to become partially destroyed by episodic crises of overproduction. These in turn create afresh the conditions for new booms, which assimilate and build upon previously acquired methods of production, before once again coming into contact and being partially negated by the limits of the market economy. Everything, which exists, does so out of necessity. But everything perishes, only to be transformed into something else. Thus what is necessary in one time and place becomes unnecessary in another. Everything creates its opposite, which is destined to overcome and negate it. The first human societies were classless societies based on the co-operation of the tribe. These were negated by the emergence of class societies basing themselves upon the developing material levels of wealth. Modern private ownership of the means of production and the nation state, which are the basic features of class society and originally marked a great step forward, now serve only to fetter and undermine the productive forces and threaten all the previous gains of human development. The material basis exists now to replace the bosses system with socialism, the embryo of which is already contained in class society, but can never be realised until the working class negates capitalism.

Dialectical Materialism as a revolutionary theory

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature.." (Engels: Dialectics of Nature.)

In the realm of science, explicitly or implicitly, the dialectical method continues to vindicate itself as a vital tool for progress. Apparently unrelated scientific disciplines have come to share visions and methodologies reflecting the real connectedness of our living universe. Even the idealist philosopher Kant, writing before the time of Marx and Engels and who believed in a supreme being, was forced by experience to arrive unconsciously at a dialectical position. He argued that if the earth was something that had come into being, then its present geological, geographical and climatic states, its plants and animals too, must be something that had come into being. If this was the case, then earth must have had a history not only of co-existence in space but also a succession in time. In particular, Darwins theory of evolution, the revolutionary significance of which was immediately understood by Marx and Engels, has itself become enriched and a more profound confirmation of dialectics of nature as a result of further study and practice. Darwin demonstrated how evolution develops through natural selection, creating outrage among those for whom "God" determined all. But while he argued that "nature does not make a leap", the debates now raging among neo-Darwinists are about whether or not leaps take place and the nature of them. Incorporating the science of genetics, new concepts such as MUTATION (the spontaneous formation of new variations in genetic make-up), GENE FLOW (the introduction of new genes into a population by immigration of breeding individuals) and GENETIC DRIFT (random gene changes in a population due to its limited size) as well as natural selection, have begun to be studied. In a brilliant endorsement of dialectics as the science of sharp turns and sudden changes as opposed to gradualist development, it is now widely accepted that rate of evolutionary change can vary enormously. The theory of PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA takes this idea a stage forward, maintaining that the development or appearance of a new species can be, in terms of geological time, instantaneous breaking an apprarently stable equilibrium. This theory deals with rapid and sudden speciation and mass extinction of species, in the same way as Darwin spoke of the struggle for existence of individual varieties within a single species. Modern scientific theories rest on a dialectic view of nature. Quantum mechanics, the theory on which all modern technology is based, rests on a unification of the two classical (apparently contradictory) concepts of wave motion and particle motion to produce a new deeper understanding of the nature of reality. Theories of fundamental particles find themselves working on concepts which bridge the contradiction between matter and the space-time in which matter moves.

Towards a Socialist World.

" the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in mens brains, not in mans better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch." (Engels: Socialism: Utopian & Scientific.) DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM is not a dull theory to be pondered over by erudite academics in their studies. It is a guide to action. For young workers and students seeking to understand capitalism and more importantly change it, it is an indispensable tool. The so-called New World Order is daily proving to be less harmonious than the old one. Of the six billion people on Earth, almost 3.6 billion have neither cash nor credit to buy much of anything. A majority of people on the planet remain, at best, window shoppers. Although the development of giant corporations straddling continents and the existence of computer technologies underline the potential for the world planning of production and trade, capitalism remains a system based on wasteful competition between nation states where rival multinationals fight to improve market share, productivity and profit at our expense. Great social revolutions in the past have been carried out by emerging minorities who best articulated the new economic and political needs of the rising class. History is made by conscious men and women, each driven by definite motives and desires. The struggle for Socialism is qualitatively different as it involves the conscious participation of the majority the worlds working class and oppressed masses. Standing in our way is diseased capitalism. Our task is to harness the indefatigable energy of the workers worldwide to throw off our exploitation, through the building of a mighty Socialist force. The dialectical method applied to every stage of the class struggle, illuminates our path, assists us in turning our ideas into a material force and brings closer the day when men and women can pass over from the realm of necessity into the realm of human freedom. Reading List
1. The ABC of Materialist Dialectics (15/12/1939) from "A Bourgeois Opposition in the Socialist Workers' Party" and An Open Letter to Comrade Burnham (07/01/1940) both included in Trotsky's collection " In Defence of Marxism." 2. "On

the question of Dialectics" - Lenin. 3. "An introduction to the Logic of Marxism" - George Novack. 4. "The part played by Labour in the transition from ape to man" - Engels. 5. "Anti-Duhring" - Engels.

6. "Materialism

and Empirio-Criticism" - Lenin. 7. "Dialectics of Nature" - Engels. 8. "Fundamental Problems of Marxism" - Plekhanov
MATERIALSM s. n. 1. Concepie filozofic potrivit creia materia este factorul prim, iar contiina factorul derivat; spec. filozofiemarxist. Materialism dialectic = tiina despre raportul dintre materie i contiin, despre legile cele mai generale ale micrii i dezvoltrii naturii, societii i cunoaterii, care este n acelai timp baza filozofic a marxism-leninismului. Materialism istoric = parte integrant a filozofiei marxist-leniniste, al crei obiect l constituie societatea n unitatea i interaciunea laturilor ei, legile generale i forele motrice ale dezvoltrii istorice. 2. (Depr.) Interes exagerat manifestat de cineva pentru problemele materiale. [Pr.: -ri-a-] Din fr. matrialisme, germ. Materialismus.
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MATERIALSM n. Concepie filozofic care consider materia, natura, existena n genere, ca fiind factor primordial, determinant, iar contiina, spiritul, gndirea ca fiind factor secund, derivat. [Sil. -ria-] /<fr. matrialisme, germ. Materialismus
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MATERIALSM s.n. 1. Orientare n filozofie, opus idealismului, care soluioneaz problema fundamental a filozofiei, afirmnd primordialitatea materiei, a existenei i caracterul secund, derivat, al spiritului, al contiinei. Materialism dialectic = concepie filozofic a marxism-leninismului, care mbin organic rezolvarea consecvent materialist a problemei fundamentale a filozofiei cu dialectica; materialism istoric = parte integrant a marxism-leninismului, avnd ca obiect societatea, legile generale i forele motrice ale dezvoltrii istorice; materialism mecanicist = filozofie materialist care explic toate fenomenele prin analogie cu cele mecanice;materialism vulgar = curent din sec. XIX care, n esen, reduce ntreaga realitate, inclusiv contiina, la materie. 2. (Depr.) Interes exagerat pentru problemele materiale. [Pron. -ri-a-. / cf. fr. matrialisme, germ. Materialismus].
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MATERIALSM s. n. 1. orientare fundamental n filozofie, opus idealismului, potrivit creia lumea este, n esen, material i cognoscibil. ~ dialectic = concepie care mbin organic rezolvarea consecvent materialist a problemei fundamentale a filozofiei cu dialectica; ~ istoric = concepie filozofic avnd ca obiect societatea, legile generale i forele motrice ale dezvoltrii istorice; ~ economic = concepie unilateral, metafizic, despre societate, care absolutizeaz rolul determinant al factorului economic n dezvoltarea social; ~ tiinific-naturalist = concepie exprimnd convingerea spontan a naturalitilor c lumea exterioar este o realitate obiectiv; ~ vulgar = curent care, n esen, reduce ntreaga realitate, inclusiv contiina, la materie. 2. interes exagerat pentru problemele materiale. (< fr. matrialisme, germ. Materialismus)
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materialsm s. n. (sil. -ri-a-)

Dialectical Materialism
Dialectical Materialism, official philosophy of Communism, based on the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, as elaborated by G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Lenin, and Joseph Stalin. In theory dialectical materialism is meant to provide both a general world view and a specific method for the investigation of scientific problems. The basic tenets are that everything is material and that change takes place through the struggle of opposites. Because everything contains different elements that are in opposition, selfmovement automatically occurs; the conflict of opposing forces leads to growth, change, and development, according to definite laws. Communist scientists were expected to fit their investigations into this pattern, and official approval of scientific theories in the USSR was determined to some extent by their conformity to dialectical materialism (see Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich). Use of these principles in history and sociology is sometimes called historical materialism. Under these doctrines the social, political, and intellectual life of society reflect only the economic structure, since human beings create the forms of social life solely in response to economic needs. Men are divided into classes by their relations

to the means of productionland and capital. The class that controls the means of production inevitably exploits the other classes in society; it is this class struggle that produces the dynamic of history and is the source of progress toward a final uniformity. Historical materialism is deterministic; that is, it prescribes that history inevitably follows certain laws and that individuals have little or no influence on its development. Central to historical materialism is the belief that change takes place through the meeting of two opposing forces (thesis and antithesis); their opposition is resolved by combination produced by a higher force (synthesis). Historical materialism has had many advocates outside the Communist world. See G. Wetter, Dialectical Materialism (1958, repr. 1973); A. Spirkin, Dialectical Materialism (1983); I. Yurkovets, Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism (1984).

Read more: dialectical materialism Infoplease.com http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/society/A0815402.html#ixzz1hmoVp6x1

An Introduction to Marx's Materialist Dialectic

This is excellent introduction to Marx's materialist dialectical method, originally found onhttp://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/04/02/marxist-materialism/ . It outlines a nondeterministic understanding of Marx's materialism ie. the mode of production does notdetermine our thought, although it does strongly influence it. This writing touches upon teachings from David Harvey's video lectures on Marx's Capital. Responding to Grahams talk at Dundee, Reid has a terrific post up discussing the manner in which Marxist materialism differs from reductive materialisms that trace back to the atomism of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. In many respects, Reids remarks come very close to a number of the central intuitions of OOO and onticology where social and political thought are concerned. These intuitions revolve around hoisting social and political thought from its almost exclusive focus on what I call the semiotic, to take into account other domains of collectives and the role they play in social formations. Thus Reid writes:

Materialism in Marxs sense is neither a metaphysical nor an epistemological doctrine; it is not a philosophical doctrine or theory in any ordinary sense. Rather, it is a meta-philosophical doctrine about the relation between philosophy and its material conditions of possibility. In this regard, both the content of philosophical discourse and the methodological form of that discourse must be referred to the conditions under which philosophical practice occurs. Material conditions in this regard can begin quite narrowly: philosophy requires various material and institutional supports, from universities and publishing houses down to brains and paper. But these conditions, of course, never exist in isolation, and depend upon a certain mode of production that not only conditions their genesis, but their distribution, maintenance, etc. Ultimately, philosophical practice depends upon a broad economic, political, and social condition that enables it to occur, whatever its function within society may be. The point here is that we cant focus on the discursive or ideological alone, but must take into account the role that nonhumans play in the collectives within which we find ourselves. Reid drives this point home a moment later when he writes: Because philosophy always operates under a specific material condition, materialist philosophy must be attentive to the specificity of its relation to this condition. This relation is not necessarily manifest in theoretical content, but it certainly is in the practice through which this content is produced. For example, as a graduate student at a university, I have a specific relation to the political-economic mode conditioning my philosophical work: I take out loans, I pay tuition, I work, I have limited resources whose use is determined by administrators with whom I have limited contact, etc. The central concern of materialism in this regard is not the content of ones position, which becomes relatively equivocal, but the practical form of its production. The content would become a concern if it were used to justify a particular practice of philosophy. It is on this basis that Marx so strongly condemns all varieties of philosophical idealism, especially Hegel, which in his eyes amount to an apologetics for idealism about philosophy, or the thesis that the practices conditioning philosophical thought are either no concern for philosophy, or must necessarily be as they are for philosophical activity to proceed (Hegel would advocate a variant of the latter). Theres a lot more there (some of which Im not entirely in agreement, but which is nonetheless very good), so read the rest

All of this brings to mind a beautiful diagram I came across in David Harveys sublime Companion to Marxs Capital. There Harvey seeks to diagram the relations involved in those collectives that involve humans (its also important to recall that there are collectives that dont involve humans at all). The

powerful feature of Harveys diagram is that in mapping the interrelations between elements that belong to collectives in which humans participate, he expands that field of relations well beyond an obsessive focus on representation, the semiotic, the ideological, or the linguistic. The domain of representation is one element in these collectives, but only one. In addition representation we get nature, technology, modes of production, social relations, and the reproduction of daily life. read on! If this is important, then this is because Continental social and political theory has focused almost obsessively on the domain of representation for the last few decades. Whether were talking about Adorno and his focus on the culture machine, or thinkers like Zizek, Badiou, Ranciere, and Laclau, the question of politics gets restricted to questions of representation or ideological in the domain of language and signs. As a consequence, these other five elements become almost entirely invisible and social and political engagement comes to be conceived as an engagement with representation. And here I think this is an effect of commodity fetishism and the rise of the new communications technologies, where the non-semiotic becomes invisible and we experience the world as composed of representations alone. While it is certainly true that representation plays an important role in capitalist collectives especially inn the reproduction of daily life overall I think that role is somewhat minor compared to the role played by the other five domains. Capitalist relations function quite well in the absence of ideological apologetics and are congenial to a wide variety of ideological formations to continue in their functioning. And a big reason for this is that the sorts of dynamics that generate capitalist social relations are not simply of an ideological nature. We can imagine, for example, a capitalist that is passionately devoted to Marxist thought and that deplores the system within which he finds himself that nonetheless obeys all the dynamics of capitalism in the pursuit and production of surplus-value. And the reason for this is not that hes being dishonest with himself, but rather that the immanent relations of production characterizing a capitalist system require him to produce surplus-value, modernize technologically, cut costs of production, etc., if his company is to maintain itself and continue to exist. Such a capitalist knows very well whats going on, but finds himself caught in the midst of a forced decision like the sort described by Lacan: Your money or your life! If he doesnt obey these dynamics not only he, but all of his employees lose their subsistence. This is not a matter of ideology, but of immanent relations in the social field. The consequence here is that modes of social and political analysis that focus on the representational alone are very likely to be completely impotent with respect to the possibility of producing any change. Here I find myself disagreeing with Reid (if Im reading him right). He pitches the problem of capitalism as one of ideology. Ideology is certainly part of the problem, but a very minor one in the grand scheme of things. Rather, the more significant issues are to be located at the level of the means of production, technology, and the relations to nature; all of which require careful analysis of the role played by nonhuman actors in human collectives. The critic that places all his eggs in the basket will find himself encountering two problems: First, he will wonder why nothing changes despite the fact that hes revealed the insidious ideology at the root of contemporary social relations. And here the reason nothing changes is that because many of the relations indeed the lions share of relations organizing contemporary social relations are not of a representational nature at all. Second, the critic that focuses on representation alone will, as Reid nicely points out, become blind to the conditions of their own representations, failing to see the manner in which these are imbricated with reigning relations of production. This can have massive detrimental theoretical consequences as I argued in a recent post. Yet another attractive feature of Harveys diagram is that the six domains he outlines here are more or lessautonomous from one another. Often we get a picture of Marx where the base determines the

superstructure. While the base certainly affords and constrains the superstructure, things are far more complex than this. Each of these domains interpenetrate yet develop at different rhythms and in different ways. Thus, for example, when you get electricity and the electric light in the domain of technology, this impacts modes of production, social relations, and representation. The working day becomes longer, you get new groupings of people afforded by the possibility of lighting at night, and the nature of representation undergoes shifts as a result of being able to read and write late into the evening. The point here is that change can come from many domains beyond the domain of representation. We cripple our thought if we focus on representation alone to the detriment of these other spheres.

Dialectical and Historical Materialism

Joseph Stalin (September 1938)

Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the MarxistLeninist party. It is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is dialectical, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is materialistic. Historical materialism is the extension of the principles of dialectical materialism to the study of social life, an application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the phenomena of the life of society, to the study of society and of its history. When describing their dialectical method, Marx and Engels usually refer to Hegel as the philosopher who formulated the main features of dialectics. This, however, does not mean that the dialectics of Marx and Engels is identical with the dialectics of Hegel. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels took from the Hegelian dialectics only its "rational kernel," casting aside its Hegelian idealistic shell, and developed dialectics further so as to lend it a modern scientific form. "My dialectic method," says Marx, "is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, ... the process of thinking which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even

transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos (creator) of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought." (Marx, Afterword to the Second German Edition of Volume I of Capital .) When describing their materialism, Marx and Engels usually refer to Feuerbach as the philosopher who restored materialism to its rights. This, however, does not mean that the materialism of Marx and Engels is identical with Feuerbach's materialism. As a matter of fact, Marx and Engels took from Feuerbach's materialism its "inner kernel," developed it into a scientific-philosophical theory of materialism and cast aside its idealistic and religious-ethical encumbrances. We know that Feuerbach, although he was fundamentally a materialist, objected to the name materialism. Engels more than once declared that "in spite of" the materialist "foundation," Feuerbach "remained... bound by the traditional idealist fetters," and that "the real idealism of Feuerbach becomes evident as soon as we come to his philosophy of religion and ethics." (Marx and Engels, Vol. XIV, pp. 652-54.) Dialectics comes from the Greek dialego, to discourse, to debate. In ancient times dialectics was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions. There were philosophers in ancient times who believed that the disclosure of contradictions in thought and the clash of opposite opinions was the best method of arriving at the truth. This dialectical method of thought, later extended to the phenomena of nature, developed into the dialectical method of apprehending nature, which regards the phenomena of nature as being in constant movement and undergoing constant change, and the development of nature as the result of the development of the contradictions in nature, as the result of the interaction of opposed forces in nature. In its essence, dialectics is the direct opposite of metaphysics. 1) The principal features of the Marxist dialectical method are as follows: a) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which

things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other. The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena, inasmuch as any phenomenon in any realm of nature may become meaningless to us if it is not considered in connection with the surrounding conditions, but divorced from them; and that, vice versa, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by surrounding phenomena. b) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that nature is not a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away. The dialectical method therefore requires that phenomena should be considered not only from the standpoint of their interconnection and interdependence, but also from the standpoint of their movement, their change, their development, their coming into being and going out of being. The dialectical method regards as important primarily not that which at the given moment seems to be durable and yet is already beginning to die away, but that which is arising and developing, even though at the given moment it may appear to be not durable, for the dialectical method considers invincible only that which is arising and developing. "All nature," says Engels, "from the smallest thing to the biggest. from grains of sand to suns, from protista (the primary living cells - J. St.) to man, has its existence in eternal coming into being and going out of being, in a ceaseless flux, in unresting motion and change (Ibid., p. 48.) Therefore, dialectics, Engels says, "takes things and their perceptual images essentially in their interconnection, in their concatenation, in their movement, in their rise and disappearance." (Marx and Engels, Vol. XIV,' p. 23.) c) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard the process of development as a simple process of growth, where quantitative changes do not lead to qualitative changes, but as a development which passes from insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes to open' fundamental changes' to qualitative changes; a development in which the qualitative changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another; they occur not accidentally but as the natural result of an accumulation of imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes.

The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development should be understood not as movement in a circle, not as a simple repetition of what has already occurred, but as an onward and upward movement, as a transition from an old qualitative state to a new qualitative state, as a development from the simple to the complex, from the lower to the higher: "Nature," says Engels, "is the test of dialectics. and it must be said for modern natural science that it has furnished extremely rich and daily increasing materials for this test, and has thus proved that in the last analysis nature's process is dialectical and not metaphysical, that it does not move in an eternally uniform and constantly repeated circle. but passes through a real history. Here prime mention should be made of Darwin, who dealt a severe blow to the metaphysical conception of nature by proving that the organic world of today, plants and animals, and consequently man too, is all a product of a process of development that has been in progress for millions of years." (Ibid., p. 2.) Describing dialectical development as a transition from quantitative changes to qualitative changes, Engels says: "In physics ... every change is a passing of quantity into quality, as a result of a quantitative change of some form of movement either inherent in a body or imparted to it. For example, the temperature of water has at first no effect on its liquid state; but as the temperature of liquid water rises or falls, a moment arrives when this state of cohesion changes and the water is converted in one case into steam and in the other into ice.... A definite minimum current is required to make a platinum wire glow; every metal has its melting temperature; every liquid has a definite freezing point and boiling point at a given pressure, as far as we are able with the means at our disposal to attain the required temperatures; finally, every gas has its critical point at which, by proper pressure and cooling, it can be converted into a liquid state.... What are known as the constants of physics (the point at which one state passes into another - J. St.) are in most cases nothing but designations for the nodal points at which a quantitative (change) increase or decrease of movement causes a qualitative change in the state of the given body, and at which,

consequently, quantity is transformed into quality." (Ibid., pp. 527-28.) Passing to chemistry, Engels continues: "Chemistry may be called the science of the qualitative changes which take place in bodies as the effect of changes of quantitative composition. his was already known to Hegel.... Take oxygen: if the molecule contains three atoms instead of the customary two, we get ozone, a body definitely distinct in odor and reaction from ordinary oxygen. And what shall we say of the different proportions in which oxygen combines with nitrogen or sulphur, and each of which produces a body qualitatively different from all other bodies !" (Ibid., p. 528.) Finally, criticizing Dhring, who scolded Hegel for all he was worth, but surreptitiously borrowed from him the well-known thesis that the transition from the insentient world to the sentient world, from the kingdom of inorganic matter to the kingdom of organic life, is a leap to a new state, Engels says: "This is precisely the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations in which at certain definite nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap, for example, in the case of water which is heated or cooled, where boiling point and freezing point are the nodes at which - under normal pressure - the leap to a new aggregate state takes place, and where consequently quantity is transformed into quality." (Ibid., pp. 45-46.) d) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes.

The dialectical method therefore holds that the process of development from the lower to the higher takes place not as a harmonious unfolding of phenomena, but as a disclosure of the contradictions inherent in things and phenomena, as a "struggle" of opposite tendencies which operate on the basis of these contradictions. "In its proper meaning," Lenin says, "dialectics is the study of the contradiction within the very essence of things." (Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks, p. 265.) And further: "Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." (Lenin, Vol. XIII, p. 301.) Such, in brief, are the principal features of the Marxist dialectical method. It is easy to understand how immensely important is the extension of the principles of the dialectical method to the study of social life and the history of society, and how immensely important is the application of these principles to the history of society and to the practical activities of the party of the proletariat. If there are no isolated phenomena in the world, if all phenomena are interconnected and interdependent, then it is clear that every social system and every social movement in history must be evaluated not from the standpoint of "eternal justice" or some other preconceived idea, as is not infrequently done by historians, but from the standpoint of the conditions which gave rise to that system or that social movement and with which they are connected. The slave system would be senseless, stupid and unnatural under modern conditions. But under the conditions of a disintegrating primitive communal system, the slave system is a quite understandable and natural phenomenon, since it represents an advance on the primitive communal system The demand for a bourgeois-democratic republic when tsardom and bourgeois society existed, as, let us say, in Russia in 1905, was a quite understandable, proper and revolutionary demand; for at that time a bourgeois republic would have meant a step forward. But now, under the conditions of the U.S.S.R., the demand for a bourgeois-democratic republic would be a senseless and counterrevolutionary demand; for a bourgeois republic would be a retrograde step compared with the Soviet republic. Everything depends on the conditions, time and place. It is clear that without such a historical approach to social phenomena, the existence and development of the science of history is impossible; for only such an approach saves the science of history from becoming a jumble of accidents and an agglomeration of most absurd mistakes.

Further, if the world is in a state of constant movement and development, if the dying away of the old and the upgrowth of the new is a law of development, then it is clear that there can be no "immutable" social systems, no "eternal principles" of private property and exploitation, no "eternal ideas" of the subjugation of the peasant to the landlord, of the worker to the capitalist. Hence, the capitalist system can be replaced by the socialist system, just as at one time the feudal system was replaced by the capitalist system. Hence, we must not base our orientation on the strata of society which are no longer developing, even though they at present constitute the predominant force, but on those strata which are developing and have a future before them, even though they at present do not constitute the predominant force. In the eighties of the past century, in the period of the struggle between the Marxists and the Narodniks, the proletariat in Russia constituted an insignificant minority of the population, whereas the individual peasants constituted the vast majority of the population. But the proletariat was developing as a class, whereas the peasantry as a class was disintegrating. And just because the proletariat was developing as a class the Marxists based their orientation on the proletariat. And they were not mistaken; for, as we know, the proletariat subsequently grew from an insignificant force into a first-rate historical and political force. Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must look forward, not backward. Further, if the passing of slow quantitative changes into rapid and abrupt qualitative changes is a law of development, then it is clear that revolutions made by oppressed classes are a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon. Hence, the transition from capitalism to socialism and the liberation of the working class from the yoke of capitalism cannot be effected by slow changes, by reforms, but only by a qualitative change of the capitalist system, by revolution. Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must be a revolutionary, not a reformist. Further, if development proceeds by way of the disclosure of internal contradictions, by way of collisions between opposite forces on the basis of these contradictions and so as to overcome these contradictions, then it is clear that the class struggle of the proletariat is a quite natural and inevitable phenomenon. Hence, we must not cover up the contradictions of the capitalist system, but disclose and unravel them; we must not try to check the class struggle but carry it to its conclusion. Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must pursue an uncompromising proletarian class policy, not a reformist policy of harmony of the interests of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, not a compromisers' policy of the "growing" of capitalism into socialism.

Such is the Marxist dialectical method when applied to social life, to the history of society. As to Marxist philosophical materialism, it is fundamentally the direct opposite of philosophical idealism. 2) The principal features of Marxist philosophical materialism are as follows: a) Contrary to idealism, which regards the world as the embodiment of an "absolute idea," a "universal spirit," "consciousness," Marx's philosophical materialism holds that the world is by its very naturematerial, that the multifold phenomena of the world constitute different forms of matter in motion, that interconnection and interdependence of phenomena as established by the dialectical method, are a law of the development of moving matter, and that the world develops in accordance with the laws of movement of matter and stands in no need of a "universal spirit." "The materialistic outlook on nature," says Engels, "means no more than simply conceiving nature just as it exists, without any foreign admixture." (Marx and Engels, Vol. XIV, p. 651.) Speaking of the materialist views of the ancient philosopher Heraclitus, who held that "the world, the all in one, was not created by any god or any man, but was, is and ever will be a living flame, systematically flaring up and systematically dying down"' Lenin comments: "A very good exposition of the rudiments of dialectical materialism." (Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks, p. 318.) b) Contrary to idealism, which asserts that only our consciousness really exists, and that the material world, being, nature, exists only in our consciousness' in our sensations, ideas and perceptions, the Marxist philosophical materialism holds that matter, nature, being, is an objective reality existing outside and independent of our consciousness; that matter is primary, since it is the source of sensations, ideas, consciousness, and that consciousness is secondary, derivative, since it is a reflection of matter, a reflection of being; that thought is a product of matter which in its development has reached a high degree of perfection, namely, of the brain, and the brain is the organ of thought; and that therefore one cannot separate thought from matter without committing a grave error. Engels says: "The question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature is the paramount question of the whole of philosophy.... The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature ... comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary,

belong to the various schools of materialism." (Marx, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 329.) And further: "The material, sensuously perceptible world to which we ourselves belong is the only reality.... Our consciousness and thinking, however supra-sensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is merely the highest product of matter." (Ibid., p. 332.) Concerning the question of matter and thought, Marx says: "It is impossible to separate thought from matter that thinks. Matter is the subject of all changes." (Ibid., p. 302.) Describing Marxist philosophical materialism, Lenin says: "Materialism in general recognizes objectively real being (matter) as independent of consciousness, sensation, experience.... Consciousness is only the reflection of being, at best an approximately true (adequate, perfectly exact) reflection of it." (Lenin, Vol. XIII, pp. 266-67.) And further: - "Matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation; matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation.... Matter, nature, being, the physical-is primary, and spirit, consciousness, sensation, the psychical-is secondary." (Ibid., pp. 119-20.) - "The world picture is a picture of how matter moves and of how 'matter thinks.'" (Ibid., p. 288.) - "The brain is the organ of thought." (Ibid., p. 125.) c) Contrary to idealism, which denies the possibility of knowing the world and its laws, which does not believe in the authenticity of our knowledge, does not recognize objective truth, and holds that the world is full of "things-in-themselves" that can never be known to science, Marxist philosophical materialism holds that the world and its laws are fully

knowable, that our knowledge of the laws of nature, tested by experiment and practice, is authentic knowledge having the validity of objective truth, and that there are no things in the world which are unknowable, but only things which are as yet not known, but which will be disclosed and made known by the efforts of science and practice. Criticizing the thesis of Kant and other idealists that the world is unknowable and that there are "things-in-themselves" which are unknowable, and defending the well-known materialist thesis that our knowledge is authentic knowledge, Engels writes: "The most telling refutation of this as of all other philosophical crotchets is practice, namely, experiment and industry. If we are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable 'thing-in-itself.' The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained such 'things-inthemselves' until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the 'thing-in-itself' became a thing for us, as, for instance, alizarin, the coloring matter of the madder, which we no longer trouble to grow ill the madder roots in the field, but produce much more cheaply and simply from coal tar. For 300 years the Copernican solar system was a hypothesis with a hundred, a thousand or ten thousand chances to one in its favor, but still always a hypothesis. But when Leverrier, by means of the data provided by this system, not only deduced the necessity of the existence of an unknown planet, but also calculated the position in the heavens which this planet must necessarily occupy, and when Galle really found this planet, the Copernican system was proved." (Marx, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 330.) Accusing Bogdanov, Bazarov, Yushkevich and the other followers of Mach of fideism (a reactionary theory, which prefers faith to science) and defending the well-known materialist thesis that our scientific knowledge of the laws of nature is authentic knowledge, and that the laws of science represent objective truth, Lenin says:

"Contemporary fideism does not at all reject science; all it rejects is the 'exaggerated claims' of science, to wit, its claim to objective truth. If objective truth exists (as the materialists think), if natural science, reflecting the outer world in human 'experience,' is alone capable of giving us objective truth, then all fideism is absolutely refuted." (Lenin, Vol. XIII, p. 102.) Such, in brief, are the characteristic features of the Marxist philosophical materialism. It is easy to understand how immensely important is the extension of the principles of philosophical materialism to the study of social life, of the history of society, and how immensely important is the application of these principles to the history of society and to the practical activities of the party of the proletariat. If the connection between the phenomena of nature and their interdependence are laws of the development of nature, it follows, too, that the connection and interdependence of the phenomena of social life are laws of the development of society, and not something accidental. Hence, social life, the history of society, ceases to be an agglomeration of "accidents", for the history of society becomes a development of society according to regular laws, and the study of the history of society becomes a science. Hence, the practical activity of the party of the proletariat must not be based on the good wishes of "outstanding individuals." not on the dictates of "reason," "universal morals," etc., but on the laws of development of society and on the study of these laws. Further, if the world is knowable and our knowledge of the laws of development of nature is authentic knowledge, having the validity of objective truth, it follows that social life, the development of society, is also knowable, and that the data of science regarding the laws of development of society are authentic data having the validity of objective truths. Hence, the science of the history of society, despite all the complexity of the phenomena of social life, can become as precise a science as, let us say, biology, and capable of making use of the laws of development of society for practical purposes. Hence, the party of the proletariat should not guide itself in its practical activity by casual motives, but by the laws of development of society, and by practical deductions from these laws. Hence, socialism is converted from a dream of a better future for humanity into a science. Hence, the bond between science and practical activity, between theory and practice, their unity, should be the guiding star of the party of the proletariat.

Further, if nature, being, the material world, is primary, and consciousness, thought, is secondary, derivative; if the material world represents objective reality existing independently of the consciousness of men, while consciousness is a reflection of this objective reality, it follows that the material life of society, its being, is also primary, and its spiritual life secondary, derivative, and that the material life of society is an objective reality existing independently of the will of men, while the spiritual life of society is a reflection of this objective reality, a reflection of being. Hence, the source of formation of the spiritual life of society, the origin of social ideas, social theories, political views and political institutions, should not be sought for in the ideas, theories, views and political institutions themselves, but in the conditions of the material life of society, in social being, of which these ideas, theories, views, etc., are the reflection. Hence, if in different periods of the history of society different social ideas, theories, views and political institutions are to be observed; if under the slave system we encounter certain social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, under feudalism others, and under capitalism others still, this is not to be explained by the "nature", the "properties" of the ideas, theories, views and political institutions themselves but by the different conditions of the material life of society at different periods of social development. Whatever is the being of a society, whatever are the conditions of material life of a society, such are the ideas, theories political views and political institutions of that society. In this connection, Marx says: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness." (Marx Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 269.) Hence, in order not to err in policy, in order not to find itself in the position of idle dreamers, the party of the proletariat must not base its activities on abstract "principles of human reason", but on the concrete conditions of the material life of society, as the determining force of social development; not on the good wishes of "great men," but on the real needs of development of the material life of society. The fall of the utopians, including the Narodniks, anarchists and SocialistRevolutionaries, was due, among other things to the fact that they did not recognize the primary role which the conditions of the material life of society play in the development of society, and, sinking to idealism, did not base their practical activities on the needs of the development of the material life of society, but, independently of and in spite of these needs, on "ideal plans" and "all-embracing projects", divorced from the real life of society.

The strength and vitality of Marxism-Leninism lies in the fact that it does base its practical activity on the needs of the development of the material life of society and never divorces itself from the real life of society. It does not follow from Marx's words, however, that social ideas, theories, political views and political institutions are of no significance in the life of society, that they do not reciprocally affect social being, the development of the material conditions of the life of society. We have been speaking so far of the origin of social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, of the way they arise, of the fact that the spiritual life of society is a reflection of the conditions of its material life. As regards the significance of social ideas, theories, views and political institutions, as regards their role in history, historical materialism, far from denying them, stresses the important role and significance of these factors in the life of society, in its history. There are different kinds of social ideas and theories. There are old ideas and theories which have outlived their day and which serve the interests of the moribund forces of society. Their significance lies in the fact that they hamper the development, the progress of society. Then there are new and advanced ideas and theories which serve the interests of the advanced forces of society. Their significance lies in the fact that they facilitate the development, the progress of society; and their significance is the greater the more accurately they reflect the needs of development of the material life of society. New social ideas and theories arise only after the development of the material life of society has set new tasks before society. But once they have arisen they become a most potent force which facilitates the carrying out of the new tasks set by the development of the material life of society, a force which facilitates the progress of society. It is precisely here that the tremendous organizing, mobilizing and transforming value of new ideas, new theories, new political views and new political institutions manifests itself. New social ideas and theories arise precisely because they are necessary to society, because it is impossible to carry out the urgent tasks of development of the material life of society without their organizing, mobilizing and transforming action. Arising out of the new tasks set by the development of the material life of society, the new social ideas and theories force their way through, become the possession of the masses, mobilize and organize them against the moribund forces of society, and thus facilitate the overthrow of these forces, which hamper the development of the material life of society. Thus social ideas, theories and political institutions, having arisen on the basis of the urgent tasks of the development of the material life of society, the development of social being, themselves then react upon social being, upon the material life of society, creating the conditions necessary for completely carrying out the urgent tasks of the material life of society, and for rendering its further development possible. In this connection, Marx says:

"Theory becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses." (Marx and Engels, Vol. I, p. 406.) Hence, in order to be able to influence the conditions of material life of society and to accelerate their development and their improvement, the party of the proletariat must rely upon such a social theory, such a social idea as correctly reflects the needs of development of the material life of society, and which is therefore capable of setting into motion broad masses of the people and of mobilizing them and organizing them into a great army of the proletarian party, prepared to smash the reactionary forces and to clear the way for the advanced forces of society. The fall of the "Economists" and the Mensheviks was due, among other things, to the fact that they did not recognize the mobilizing, organizing and transforming role of advanced theory, of advanced ideas and, sinking to vulgar materialism, reduced the role of these factors almost to nothing, thus condemning the Party to passivity and inanition. The strength and vitality of Marxism-Leninism is derived from the fact that it relies upon an advanced theory which correctly reflects the needs of development of the material life of society, that it elevates theory to a proper level, and that it deems it its duty to utilize every ounce of the mobilizing, organizing and transforming power of this theory. That is the answer historical materialism gives to the question of the relation between social being and social consciousness, between the conditions of development of material life and the development of the spiritual life of society. 3) Historical Materialism. It now remains to elucidate the following question: What, from the viewpoint of historical materialism, is meant by the "conditions of material life of society" which in the final analysis determine the physiognomy of society, its ideas, views, political institutions, etc.? What, after all, are these "conditions of material life of society," what are their distinguishing features? There can be no doubt that the concept "conditions of material life of society" includes, first of all, nature which surrounds society, geographical environment, which is one of the indispensable and constant conditions of material life of society and which, of course, influences the development of society. What role does geographical environment play in the development of society? Is geographical environment the chief force determining the physiognomy of society, the character of the social system of man, the transition from one system to another, or isn't it?

Historical materialism answers this question in the negative. Geographical environment is unquestionably one of the constant and indispensable conditions of development of society and, of course, influences the development of society, accelerates or retards its development. But its influence is not the determining influence, inasmuch as the changes and development of society proceed at an incomparably faster rate than the changes and development of geographical environment. in the space of 3000 years three different social systems have been successively superseded in Europe: the primitive communal system, the slave system and the feudal system. In the eastern part of Europe, in the U.S.S.R., even four social systems have been superseded. Yet during this period geographical conditions in Europe have either not changed at all, or have changed so slightly that geography takes no note of them. And that is quite natural. Changes in geographical environment of any importance require millions of years, whereas a few hundred or a couple of thousand years are enough for even very important changes in the system of human society. It follows from this that geographical environment cannot be the chief cause, the determining cause of social development; for that which remains almost unchanged in the course of tens of thousands of years cannot be the chief cause of development of that which undergoes fundamental changes in the course of a few hundred years Further, there can be no doubt that the concept "conditions of material life of society" also includes growth of population, density of population of one degree or another; for people are an essential element of the conditions of material life of society, and without a definite minimum number of people there can be no material life of society. Is growth of population the chief force that determines the character of the social system of man, or isn't it? Historical materialism answers this question too in the negative. Of course, growth of population does influence the development of society, does facilitate or retard the development of society, but it cannot be the chief force of development of society, and its influence on the development of society cannot be the determining influence because, by itself, growth of population does not furnish the clue to the question why a given social system is replaced precisely by such and such a new system and not by another, why the primitive communal system is succeeded precisely by the slave system, the slave system by the feudal system, and the feudal system by the bourgeois system, and not by some other. If growth of population were the determining force of social development, then a higher density of population would be bound to give rise to a correspondingly higher type of social system. But we do not find this to be the case. The density of population in China is four times as great as in the U.S.A., yet the U.S.A. stands higher than China in the scale of social development; for in China a semi-feudal system still prevails, whereas the U.S.A. has long ago reached the highest stage of development of capitalism. The density of population in

Belgium is I9 times as great as in the U.S.A., and 26 times as great as in the U.S.S.R. Yet the U.S.A. stands higher than Belgium in the scale of social development; and as for the U.S.S.R., Belgium lags a whole historical epoch behind this country, for in Belgium the capitalist system prevails, whereas the U.S.S.R. has already done away with capitalism and has set up a socialist system. It follows from this that growth of population is not, and cannot be, the chief force of development of society, the force which determines the character of the social system, the physiognomy of society. a) What, then, is the chief force in the complex of conditions of material life of society which determines the physiognomy of society, the character of the social system, the development of society from one system to another? This force, historical materialism holds, is the method of procuring the means of life necessary for human existence, the mode of production of material values - food, clothing, footwear, houses, fuel, instruments of production, etc. which are indispensable for the life and development of society. In order to live, people must have food, clothing, footwear, shelter, fuel, etc.; in order to have these material values, people must produce them; and in order to produce them, people must have the instruments of production with which food, clothing, footwear, shelter, fuel, etc., are produced, they must be able to produce these instruments and to use them. The instruments of production wherewith material values are produced, the people who operate the instruments of production and carry on the production of material values thanks to a certainproduction experience and labor skill - all these elements jointly constitute the productive forces of society. But the productive forces are only one aspect of production, only one aspect of the mode of production, an aspect that expresses the relation of men to the objects and forces of nature which they make use of for the production of material values. Another aspect of production, another aspect of the mode of production, is the relation of men to each other in the process of production, men's relations of production. Men carry on a struggle against nature and utilize nature for the production of material values not in isolation from each other, not as separate individuals, but in common, in groups, in societies. Production, therefore, is at all times and under all conditions social production. In the production of material values men enter into mutual relations of one kind or another within production, into relations of production of one kind or another. These may be relations of co-operation and mutual help between people who are free from exploitation; they may be relations of domination and subordination; and, lastly, they may be transitional from one form of relations of production to another. But whatever the character of the relations of production may be, always and in every system they constitute just as essential an element of production as the productive forces of society.

"In production," Marx says, "men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place." (Marx and Engels, Vol. V, p. 429.) Consequently, production, the mode of production, embraces both the productive forces of society and men's relations of production, and is thus the embodiment of their unity in the process of production of material values. b) The first feature of production is that it never stays at one point for a long time and is always in a state of change and development, and that, furthermore, changes in the mode of production inevitably call forth changes in the whole social system, social ideas, political views and political institutions - they call forth a reconstruction of the whole social and political order. At different stages of development people make use of different modes of production, or, to put it more crudely, lead different manners of life. In the primitive commune there is one mode of production, under slavery there is another mode of production, under feudalism a third mode of production and so on. And, correspondingly, men's social system, the spiritual life of men, their views and political institutions also vary. Whatever is the mode of production of a society, such in the main is the society itself, its ideas and theories, its political views and institutions. Or, to put it more crudely, whatever is man's manner of life such is his manner of thought. This means that the history of development of society is above all the history of the development of production, the history of the modes of production which succeed each other in the course of centuries, the history of the development of productive forces and of people's relations of production. Hence, the history of social development is at the same time the history of the producers of material values themselves, the history of the laboring masses, who are the chief force in the process of production and who carry on the production of material values necessary for the existence of society. Hence, if historical science is to be a real science, it can no longer reduce the history of social development to the actions of kings and generals, to the actions of "conquerors" and "subjugators" of states, but must above all devote itself to the history of the producers of material values, the history of the laboring masses, the history of peoples. Hence, the clue to the study of the laws of history of society must not be sought in men's minds, in the views and ideas of society, but in the mode of production

practiced by society in any given historical period; it must be sought in the economic life of society. Hence, the prime task of historical science is to study and disclose the laws of production, the laws of development of the productive forces and of the relations of production, the laws of economic development of society. Hence, if the party of the proletariat is to be a real party, it must above all acquire a knowledge of the laws of development of production, of the laws of economic development of society. Hence, if it is not to err in policy, the party of the proletariat must both in drafting its program and in its practical activities proceed primarily from the laws of development of production from the laws of economic development of society. c) The second feature of production is that its changes and development always begin with changes and development of the productive forces, and in the first place, with changes and development of the instruments of production. Productive forces are therefore the most mobile and revolutionary element of production. First the productive forces of society change and develop, and then, depending on these changes and in conformity with them, men's relations of production, their economic relations, change. This, however, does not mean that the relations of production do not influence the development of the productive forces and that the latter are not dependent on the former. While their development is dependent on the development of the productive forces, the relations of production in their turn react upon the development of the productive forces, accelerating or retarding it. In this connection it should be noted that the relations of production cannot for too long a time lag behind and be in a state of contradiction to the growth of the productive forces, inasmuch as the productive forces can develop in full measure only when the relations of production correspond to the character, the state of the productive forces and allow full scope for their development. Therefore, however much the relations of production may lag behind the development of the productive forces, they must, sooner or later, come into correspondence with - and actually do come into correspondence with - the level of development of the productive forces, the character of the productive forces. Otherwise we would have a fundamental violation of the unity of the productive forces and the relations of production within the system of production, a disruption of production as a whole, a crisis of production, a destruction of productive forces. An instance in which the relations of production do not correspond to the character of the productive forces, conflict with them, is the economic crises in capitalist countries, where private capitalist ownership of the means of production is in glaring incongruity with the social character of the process of production, with the character of the productive forces. This results in economic crises, which lead to the destruction of productive forces. Furthermore, this incongruity itself constitutes the economic basis of social revolution, the purpose of which IS to destroy the existing relations of

production and to create new relations of production corresponding to the character of the productive forces. In contrast, an instance in which the relations of production completely correspond to the character of the productive forces is the socialist national economy of the U.S.S.R., where the social ownership of the means of production fully corresponds to the social character of the process of production, and where, because of this, economic crises and the destruction of productive forces are unknown. Consequently, the productive forces are not only the most mobile and revolutionary element in production, but are also the determining element in the development of production. Whatever are the productive forces such must be the relations of production. While the state of the productive forces furnishes the answer to the question with what instruments of production do men produce the material values they need? - the state of the relations of production furnishes the answer to another question - who owns the means of production (the land, forests, waters, mineral resources, raw materials, instruments of production, production premises, means of transportation and communication, etc.), who commands the means of production, whether the whole of society, or individual persons, groups, or classes which utilize them for the exploitation of other persons, groups or classes? Here is a rough picture of the development of productive forces from ancient times to our day. The transition from crude stone tools to the bow and arrow, and the accompanying transition from the life of hunters to the domestication of animals and primitive pasturage; the transition from stone tools to metal tools (the iron axe, the wooden plow fitted with an iron coulter, etc.), with a corresponding transition to tillage and agriculture; a further improvement in metal tools for the working up of materials, the introduction of the blacksmith's bellows, the introduction of pottery, with a corresponding development of handicrafts, the separation of handicrafts from agriculture, the development of an independent handicraft industry and, subsequently, of manufacture; the transition from handicraft tools to machines and the transformation of handicraft and manufacture into machine industry; the transition to the machine system and the rise of modern large-scale machine industry - such is a general and far from complete picture of the development of the productive forces of society in the course of man's history. It will be clear that the development and improvement of the instruments of production was effected by men who were related to production, and not independently of men; and, consequently, the change and development of the instruments of production was accompanied by a change and development of men, as the most important element of the productive forces, by a change and development of their production experience, their labor skill, their ability to handle the instruments of production.

In conformity with the change and development of the productive forces of society in the course of history, men's relations of production, their economic relations also changed and developed. Five main types of relations of production are known to history: primitive communal, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist. The basis of the relations of production under the primitive communal system is that the means of production are socially owned. This in the main corresponds to the character of the productive forces of that period. Stone tools, and, later, the bow and arrow, precluded the possibility of men individually combating the forces of nature and beasts of prey. In order to gather the fruits of the forest, to catch fish, to build some sort of habitation, men were obliged to work in common if they did not want to die of starvation, or fall victim to beasts of prey or to neighboring societies. Labor in common led to the common ownership of the means of production, as well as of the fruits of production. Here the conception of private ownership of the means of production did not yet exist, except for the personal ownership of certain implements of production which were at the same time means of defense against beasts of prey. Here there was no exploitation, no classes. The basis of the relations of production under the slave system is that the slaveowner owns the means of production, he also owns the worker in production the slave, whom he can sell, purchase, or kill as though he were an animal. Such relations of production in the main correspond to the state of the productive forces of that period. Instead of stone tools, men now have metal tools at their command; instead of the wretched and primitive husbandry of the hunter, who knew neither pasturage nor tillage, there now appear pasturage tillage, handicrafts, and a division of labor between these branches of production. There appears the possibility of the exchange of products between individuals and between societies, of the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few, the actual accumulation of the means of production in the hands of a minority, and the possibility of subjugation of the majority by a minority and the conversion of the majority into slaves. Here we no longer find the common and free labor of all members of society in the production process - here there prevails the forced labor of slaves, who are exploited by the non-laboring slaveowners. Here, therefore, there is no common ownership of the means of production or of the fruits of production. It is replaced by private ownership. Here the slaveowner appears as the prime and principal property owner in the full sense of the term. Rich and poor, exploiters and exploited, people with full rights and people with no rights, and a fierce class struggle between them - such is the picture of the slave system. The basis of the relations of production under the feudal system is that the feudal lord owns the means of production and does not fully own the worker in production - the serf, whom the feudal lord can no longer kill, but whom he can buy and sell. Alongside of feudal ownership there exists individual ownership by the peasant and the handicraftsman of his implements of production and his

private enterprise based on his personal labor. Such relations of production in the main correspond to the state of the productive forces of that period. Further improvements in the smelting and working of iron; the spread of the iron plow and the loom; the further development of agriculture, horticulture, viniculture and dairying; the appearance of manufactories alongside of the handicraft workshops - such are the characteristic features of the state of the productive forces. The new productive forces demand that the laborer shall display some kind of initiative in production and an inclination for work, an interest in work. The feudal lord therefore discards the slave, as a laborer who has no interest in work and is entirely without initiative, and prefers to deal with the serf, who has his own husbandry, implements of production, and a certain interest in work essential for the cultivation of the land and for the payment in kind of a part of his harvest to the feudal lord. Here private ownership is further developed. Exploitation is nearly as severe as it was under slavery - it is only slightly mitigated. A class struggle between exploiters and exploited is the principal feature of the feudal system. The basis of the relations of production under the capitalist system is that the capitalist owns the means of production, but not the workers in production - the wage laborers, whom the capitalist can neither kill nor sell because they are personally free, but who are deprived of means of production and) in order not to die of hunger, are obliged to sell their labor power to the capitalist and to bear the yoke of exploitation. Alongside of capitalist property in the means of production, we find, at first on a wide scale, private property of the peasants and handicraftsmen in the means of production, these peasants and handicraftsmen no longer being serfs, and their private property being based on personal labor. In place of the handicraft workshops and manufactories there appear huge mills and factories equipped with machinery. In place of the manorial estates tilled by the primitive implements of production of the peasant, there now appear large capitalist farms run on scientific lines and supplied with agricultural machinery The new productive forces require that the workers in production shall be better educated and more intelligent than the downtrodden and ignorant serfs, that they be able to understand machinery and operate it properly. Therefore, the capitalists prefer to deal with wage-workers, who are free from the bonds of serfdom and who are educated enough to be able properly to operate machinery. But having developed productive forces to a tremendous extent, capitalism has become enmeshed in contradictions which it is unable to solve. By producing larger and larger quantities of commodities, and reducing their prices, capitalism intensifies competition, ruins the mass of small and medium private owners, converts them into proletarians and reduces their purchasing power, with the result that it becomes impossible to dispose of the commodities produced. On the other hand, by expanding production and concentrating millions of workers in huge mills and factories, capitalism lends the process of

production a social character and thus undermines its own foundation, inasmuch as the social character of the process of production demands the social ownership of the means of production; yet the means of production remain private capitalist property, which is incompatible with the social character of the process of production. These irreconcilable contradictions between the character of the productive forces and the relations of production make themselves felt in periodical crises of over-production, when the capitalists, finding no effective demand for their goods owing to the ruin of the mass of the population which they themselves have brought about, are compelled to burn products, destroy manufactured goods, suspend production, and destroy productive forces at a time when millions of people are forced to suffer unemployment and starvation, not because there are not enough goods, but because there is an overproduction of goods. This means that the capitalist relations of production have ceased to correspond to the state of productive forces of society and have come into irreconcilable contradiction with them. This means that capitalism is pregnant with revolution, whose mission it is to replace the existing capitalist ownership of the means of production by socialist ownership. This means that the main feature of the capitalist system is a most acute class struggle between the exploiters and the exploited. The basis of the relations of production under the socialist system, which so far has been established only in the U.S.S.R., is the social ownership of the means of production. Here there are no longer exploiters and exploited. The goods produced are distributed according to labor performed, on the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." Here the mutual relations of people in the process of production are marked by comradely cooperation and the socialist mutual assistance of workers who are free from exploitation. Here the relations of production fully correspond to the state of productive forces; for the social character of the process of production is reinforced by the social ownership of the means of production. For this reason socialist production in the U.S.S.R. knows no periodical crises of over-production and their accompanying absurdities. For this reason, the productive forces here develop at an accelerated pace; for the relations of production that correspond to them offer full scope for such development. Such is the picture of the development of men's relations of production in the course of human history. Such is the dependence of the development of the relations of production on the development of the productive forces of society, and primarily, on the development of the instruments of production, the dependence by virtue of

which the changes and development of the productive forces sooner or later lead to corresponding changes and development of the relations of production. "The use and fabrication of instruments of labor," says Marx, "although existing in the germ among certain species of animals, is specifically characteristic of the human laborprocess, and Franklin therefore defines man as a tool-making animal. Relics of bygone instruments of labor possess the same importance for the investigation of extinct economical forms of society, as do fossil bones for the determination of extinct species of animals. It is not the articles made, but how they are made that enables us to distinguish different economical epochs. Instruments of labor not only supply a standard of the degree of development to which human labor has attained, but they are also indicators of the social conditions under which that labor is carried on." (Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1935, p. 121.) And further: - "Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist." (Marx and Engels, Vol. V, p. 564.) - "There is a continual movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction in social relations, of formation in ideas; the only immutable thing is the abstraction of movement." (Ibid., p. 364.) Speaking of historical materialism as formulated in The Communist Manifesto, Engels says: "Economic production and the structure of society of every historical epoch necessarily arising therefrom constitute the foundation for the political and intellectual history of that epoch; ... consequently (ever since the dissolution of the primeval communal ownership of land) all history has been a history of class struggles, of struggles between exploited and exploiting, between dominated and dominating classes at various stages of social development; ... this struggle,

however, has now reached a stage where the exploited and oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppresses it (the bourgeoisie), without at the same time for ever freeing the whole of society from exploitation, oppression and class struggles...." d) The third feature of production is that the rise of new productive forces and of the relations of production corresponding to them does not take place separately from the old system, after the disappearance of the old system, but within the old system; it takes place not as a result of the deliberate and conscious activity of man, but spontaneously, unconsciously, independently of the will of man It takes place spontaneously and independently of the will of man for two reasons. Firstly, because men are not free to choose one mode of production or another, because as every new generation enters life it finds productive forces and relations of production already existing as the result of the work of former generations, owing to which it is obliged at first to accept and adapt itself to everything it finds ready-made in the sphere of production in order to be able to produce material values. Secondly, because, when improving one instrument of production or another, one clement of the productive forces or another, men do not realize, do not understand or stop to reflect what social results these improvements will lead to, but only think of their everyday interests, of lightening their labor and of securing some direct and tangible advantage for themselves. When, gradually and gropingly, certain members of primitive communal society passed from the use of stone tools to the use of iron tools, they, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect whatsocial results this innovation would lead to; they did not understand or realize that the change to metal tools meant a revolution in production, that it would in the long run lead to the slave system. They simply wanted to lighten their labor and secure an immediate and tangible advantage; their conscious activity was confined within the narrow bounds of this everyday personal interest. When, in the period of the feudal system, the young bourgeoisie of Europe began to erect, alongside of the small guild workshops, large manufactories, and thus advanced the productive forces of society, it, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect what social consequences this innovation would lead to; it did not realize or understand that this "small" innovation would lead to a regrouping of social forces which was to end in a revolution both against the power of kings, whose favors it so highly valued, and against the nobility, to

whose ranks its foremost representatives not infrequently aspired. It simply wanted to lower the cost of producing goods, to throw larger quantities of goods on the markets of Asia and of recently discovered America, and to make bigger profits. Its conscious activity was confined within the narrow bounds of this commonplace practical aim. When the Russian capitalists, in conjunction with foreign capitalists, energetically implanted modern large-scale machine industry in Russia, while leaving tsardom intact and turning the peasants over to the tender mercies of the landlords, they, of course, did not know and did not stop to reflect what social consequences this extensive growth of productive forces would lead to; they did not realize or understand that this big leap in the realm of the productive forces of society would lead to a regrouping of social forces that would enable the proletariat to effect a union with the peasantry and to bring about a victorious socialist revolution. They simply wanted to expand industrial production to the limit, to gain control of the huge home market, to become monopolists, and to squeeze as much profit as possible out of the national economy. Their conscious activity did not extend beyond their commonplace, strictly practical interests. Accordingly, Marx says: "In the social production of their life (that is. in the production of the material values necessary to the life of men - J. St.), men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces." (Marx, Selected Works, Vol. I, p 269). This, however, does not mean that changes in the relations of production, and the transition from old relations of production to new relations of production proceed smoothly, without conflicts, without upheavals. On the contrary such a transition usually takes place by means of the revolutionary overthrow of the old relations of production and the establishment of new relations of production. Up to a certain period the development of the productive forces and the changes in the realm of the relations of production proceed spontaneously independently of the will of men. But that is so only up to a certain moment, until the new and developing productive forces have reached a proper state of maturity After the new productive forces have matured, the existing relations of production and their upholders - the ruling classes - become that "insuperable" obstacle which can only be removed by the conscious action of

the new classes, by the forcible acts of these classes, by revolution. Here there stands out in bold relief the tremendous role of new social ideas, of new political institutions, of a new political power, whose mission it is to abolish by force the old relations of production. Out of the conflict between the new productive forces and the old relations of production, out of the new economic demands of society, there arise new social ideas; the new ideas organize and mobilize the masses; the masses become welded into a new political army, create a new revolutionary power, and make use of it to abolish by force the old system of relations of production, and to firmly establish the new system. The spontaneous process of development yields place to the conscious actions of men, peaceful development to violent upheaval, evolution to revolution. "The proletariat," says Marx, "during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of circumstances, to organize itself as a class...by means of a revolution, it makes itself the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions of production...." (Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1938, p. 52.) And further: - "The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible." (Ibid., p. 50 ) - "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one." (Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1955, p. 603.) Here is the formulation - a formulation of genius - of the essence of historical materialism given by Marx in 1859 in his historic Preface to his famous book, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: "In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total

of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself. Therefore mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation." (Marx, Selected Works, Vol. I, pp. 269-70.)

Such is Marxist materialism as applied to social life, to the history of society. Such are the principal features of dialectical and historical materialism.

SOCIALISM 1. Conceptie social-politica cu privire la construirea unei societati bazate pe egalitate i dreptate sociala, lipsita de exploatare.Formulata initial de socialitii utopici din sec. 16-18, conceptia, ca i termenul de socialism, au fost larg raspndite n Franta i Anglia, din primele decenii ale sec. 19 (v. socialism utopic). n lucrarile lui Marx i Engels, socialismul a dobndit un continut consecvent tiintific, calitativ deosebit de socialismul utopic i de alte variante de socialism. (v. socialism tiintific). 2. Ornduire sociala bazata pe exercitarea puterii politice de catre clasa muncitoare n alianta cu celelalte clase i categorii sociale de oameni ai muncii, pe proprietatea sociala asupra mijloacelor de producie, care genereaza relatii de colaborare i ajutor reciproc ntre membrii societatii i pe realizarea retributiei potrivit principiului de la fiecare dupa capacitati, fiecaruia dupa munca depusa Este considerat prima faza a ornduirii comuniste. n socialism se realizeaza egalitatea oamenilor n domeniul proprietatii asupra mijloacelor de productie, dar se mentine, n anumite limite, inegalitatea repartitiei produsului social ca rezultat al faptului ca n socialism se folosete o parte din legile economice ale ornduirii capitaliste din care s-a structurat (de ex., legea valorii). Socialismul asigura nsa premisele realizarii treptate a egalitatii reale ntre oameni din punctul de vedere al drepturilor lor economice, politice, sociale i culturale, egalitate care se desvrete n comunism.

Socialism tiintific,una dintre cele trei pricipii constitutive ale marxismului; teorie (doctrina) socialpolitica al carei obiect l reprezinta structura i dinamica proceselor trecerii de Ia ornduirea capitalist la ornduirea comunista, aratnd legile generale ale revolutiei i constructiei socialismului, principiile organizarii i conducerii societatii socialiste, pe temeiul carora fundamenteaza strategia i tactica luptei revolutionare a clasei muncitoare, reprezentnd astfel ideologia politica a clasei muncitoare, tiinta constructiei socialiste. Socialismul tiintific a fost elaborat de Karl Marx i Friedrich Engels n conditiile maturizarii capitalismului i dezvoltarii luptei de clasa a proletariatului, care ncepea sa se opuna burgheziei ca o forma de independenta. Spre deosebire de socialismul utopic, care considera socialismul ca o cerinta a ratiunii i ca un simplu ideal moral, socialismul tiintific demonstreaza, pe baza legilor obiective ale progresului social, a analizei tiintifice a ornduirii capitaliste i a evolutiei acesteia, necesitatea obiectiva a socialismului. n acest fel, socialismul s-a transformat dintr-o utopie ntr-o tiinta.Un rol hotartor n transformarea socialismului din utopie n tiinta l-a avut crearea materialismului istoric. Unirea socialismul tiintific cu micarea muncitoreasca a dus la transformarea clasei muncitoare ntr-o clasa revolutionara contienta. Marx i Engels au formulat tezele fundamentale ale socialismului tiintific, au aratat rolul proletariatului i au demonstrat ca lupta de clasa revolutionara a clasei muncitoare constituie singura cale de instaurare a ornduirii socialiste.Lenin a dezvoltat teoria socialismului tiintific prin prezentarea trasaturilor specifice stadiului monopolist al capitalismului, prin descoperirea legii dezvoltarii economice i politice inegale i n salturi a tarilor capitaliste n imperialism.Teoria socialismului tiintific are, n esenta, un caracter general-valabil, un continut unic pentru toate tarile, deoarece legile dezvoltarii sociale snt n esenta aceleai pentru toate tarile. Aceste legi se realizeaza nsa n forme i cu metode specifice fiecarei tari, corespunztor stadiului dezvoltarii ei economice i sociale, raportului fortelor de clasa, traditiilor istorice etc.

Marxism,conceptie revolutionara unitara despre lume, societate, om i gndire, fondata n sec. 19 de Karl Marx i Friedrich Engels; ideologia clasei muncitoare. Cele trei principii constitutive ale marxismului

Teorie filozofic: Materialism dialectic -> Teorie economica: Mod de productie Teorie social-politic: Socialism tiintific

Materialism istoric

Marx i Engels au preluat critic ceea ce era valoros n gndirea filozofica, economica i social-politica anterioara i contemporana lor i au creat o conceptie noua care a revolutionat gndirea. Fundamentul filozofic al marxismului n ansamblul sau, al teoriei sale economice i al celei politice (socialismul tiintific) este materialismul dialectic i istoric. Principalele parti componenete ale marxismului snt: filozofia marxist, economia politica marxista i teoria socialismului tiintific. mbinnd n mod armonios obiectivitatea cu partinitatea, spiritul tiintific cu cel revolutionar, marxismul constituie ideologia partidelor comuniste i muncitoreti. Lenin i alti militanti de seama ai micarii muncitoreti au continuat opera lui Marx i Engels, dezvoltnd-o creator, n noi conditii istorice. Teorie deschisa, aflata n continua devenire, marxismul se dezvolta i se mbogatete permanent - n raport cu schimbarile ce se produc n viata social-economica, n practica revolutionara, n cunoaterea universala.

Materialism dialectic, conceptie filozofica ntemeiata de Karl Marx i Friedrich Engels; tiinta despre raportul dintre materie i contiinta, despre legile cele mai generale ale schimbarii i dezvoltarii naturii, societatii i gndirii, care este n acelai timp baza filozofica a marxismului. Materialismul dialectic reprezinta unitatea dintre metoda dialectic marxist i materialismul filozofic marxist.Materialismul dialectic este o concepie tiintifica de ansamblu asupra lumii i, totodata, o metoda revoluionara de cunoatere i de transformare a realitatii. Aparitia materialismului dialectic reprezinta o profunda revolutie savrita n filozofie. Tezele fundamentale ale materialismului dialectic au fost elaborate ncepnd de la mijlocul deceniului al cincilea al sec. 19. Aparitia materialismului dialectic a fost un fenomen determinat de cauze social-economice i de ntreaga dezvoltare anterioara a tiintei i filozofiei, Marx i Engels aratnd limitarea de clasa a conceptiei burgheze despre lume. n timp ce colile filozofice care au precedat marxismul i puneau ca obiectiv explicarea lumii, materialismul dialectic i pune ca obiectiv transformarea revolutionara a realitatii. Printre premisele naturalist-tiintifice ale constituirii conceptiei materialist-dialectice despre lume se numara: elaborarea teoriei celulare, formularea legii conservarii i transformarii energiei i descoperirea principiilor evolutiei (expresia cea mai nchegata a evolutionismului fiind darwinismul). Izvorul teoretic al materialismului dialectic este filozofia clasica germana. Precursorii ei directi snt, n primul rnd, G.W.F. Hegel (care, n contextul idealismului sau, a elaborat totui, n principiu,

multilateral dialectica) i L. Feuerbach (care, n contextul metafizicii sale, a dezvoltat concepia materialist asupra lumii). Materialismul dialectic este prima forma pe deplin consecventa a materialismului, nglobnd ntr-o explicatie unitar domeniile naturii, societatii i gndirii Elabornd teoria tiintifica materialista pe baza principiilor fundamentale ale dialecticii, materialismul dialectic consider ca dezvoltarea are ca izvor contradictiile interne ale obiectelor i proceselor, ca schimbarile calitative (salturile) se realizeaza pe temeiul unor acumulari cantitative anterioare, prin negarea starilor calitative vechi de catre altele noi. Materialismul dialectic a nnoit i a mbogatit gnoseologia (teoria cunoaterii) prin tezele sale privind cognoscibilitatea lumii, caracterul activ al procesului de cunoatere, caracterul obiectiv i concret al adevarului, dialectica relativului i absolutului n procesul cunoaterii i, mai ales, prin dezvaluirea rolului practicii n cunoatere. Materialismul dialectic arata ca principiile dialecticii decurg direct din studiul legilor lumii obiective, ca dialectica obiectiva (a lucrurilor) determina dialectica subiectiva (a ideilor) care are nsa i legile sale specifice, autonomia sa relativa. Dei concorda prin continutul lor obiectiv cu legile naturii i cu cele sociale, legile gndirii constituie doar o reflectare a celor dinti n contiinta oamenilor, aceasta reflectare neavnd un caracter mecanic, nemijlocit, automat, ci unul mediat, constructiv, creator.Materialismul dialectic realizeaza, de asemenea, unitatea dialecticii, teoriei cunoaterii (gnoseologiei) i logicii. n virtutea acestui fapt, att teoria cunoaterii, ct i logica adopta viziunea dialectic asupra lumii, abordeaza fenomenele sub raportul dezvoltarii lor istorice, interpreteaza corect corelatia dintre istoric i logic, n sensul ca logicul reflecta n mod sintetic istoricul, de care este, n ultima instanta, determinat. Reprezentnd generalizarea multilaterala a realizarilor tuturor tiintelor despre natura i societate, reflectnd veridic legile fundamentale ale existentei i cunoaterii, conceptia filozofica a lui Marx n ansamblul ei, constituie i o metoda tiintific de cunoatere i de transformare revoluionara a lumii i, prin aceasta, a omului nsui. Sprijinindu-se pe datele tiintelor, materialismul dialectic ofera totodata acestora un puternic i eficace instrument teoretic i metodologic, orientat spre noi sinteze creatoare.Aparitia materialismului, mpreuna cu crearea materialismului istoric i a economiei politice marxiste, a facut posibil transformarea socialismului din utopie n tiinta. Materialismul dialectic este o conceptie vie, care se mbogete continuu pe baza generalizarii continue a practicii i a datelor tiintei.

Materialism istoric,parte integrant a filozofiei ntemeiate de Karl Marx i Friedrich Engels, reprezentnd conceptia filozofica materialist-dialectic despre societate, despre structura sistemului social, legile generale i fortele motrice ale dezvoltarii sociale; materialismul dialectic extins la studiul vietii sociale. Spre deosebire de tiintele sociale particulare, care studiaza domenii limitate ale vietii sociale, materialismul istoric trateaza societatea n unitatea i interactiunea laturilor ei, procesul istoric n ansamblul sau. De aceea materialismul istoric constituie un ndreptar teoretic i metodologic pentru toate tiintele sociale particulare i, n acelai timp, generalizeaza datele furnizate de acestea. Creat n deceniul al cincilea al sec. 19, materialismul istoric a constituit o schimbare revoluionara n conceptiile despre societate. Pna la Marx i Engels aceste conceptii erau dominate de idealismul istoric, chiar daca unii gnditori premarxili (Aristotel, Helvtius, J.-J. Rousseau, istoricii francezi din perioada Restauratiei .a.) s-au apropiat de o interpretare materialista a unor procese i fenomene sociale. nsuindu-i critic intuitiile i previziunile socialitilor utopici, ca i unele descoperiri ale economiei clasice engleze, situndu-se pe poziiile proletariatului modern, clasa revoluionara, Marx i Engels au extins consecvent, pentru prima oar n istoria gndirii, materialismul la interpretarea vieii sociale. Crearea materialismului istoric a permis ntelegerea istoriei societatii ca un proces care se desfaoara legic, a permis transformarea studierii societatii ntr-o tiina.Problema fundamentala a filozofiei, raportul dintre existenta i contiinta, capt n cadrul materialismului istoric forma particular a raportului dintre existenta social ti contiinta sociala. Nu contiinta oamenilor le determint existena, ci, dimpotrivt, existenta lor sociala le determina contiinta (K. Marx) este teza fundamentala a materialismului istoric.Potrivit materialismul istoric, latura determinanta a vietii sociale este procesul productiei bunurilor materiale. Productiei materiale i snt

proprii doau feluri de relatii: raporturile oamenilor cu natura, care se exprima n fortele de productie, i relatiile dintre oamenii nii, relatiile de productie. n reteaua complexa a relaitilor sociale, materialismul istoric distinge relatiile de productie ca relatii materiale, obiective, ca relatii fundamentale care determina ntr-un fel sau n altul, de cele mai multe ori, mijlocit, relatiile spirituale, ideologice. Fortele de productie i relatiile de productie alctuiesc modul de produtctie i determina procesele vietii sociale, politice i spirituale.Sistemul relatiilor de productie constituie structura economica, baza unei societati determinate, pe care se nalta o suprastructura corespunzatoare juridica i politica i careia i corespund anumite forme ale contiintei sociale. n timp ce gnditorii premarxiti se limitau n explicarea vietii sociale la mobilurile ideale ale activitatii oamenilor (scopuri, nazuine, idei), Marx i Engels au artat ca n spatele mobilurilor ideale ale actiunii istorice a maselor, a claselor sociale, stau interesele lor materiale, determinate, la rndul lor, de situatia acestor clase n sistemul dat de relatii de productie. Aceasta a permis prezentarea evolutiei societatii ca un proces istoric-natural (Marx), adica guvernat, ca i natura, de legi fara cunoaterea carora nu poate fi vorba de vreo tiinta sociala. Totodata, desprinderea relatiilor de productie ca relatii sociale fundamentale care le determina pe toate celelalte, a permis ntemeietorilor materialismul istoric sa elaboreze categoria de formatiune sociala.Procesul istoric este succesiunea formatiunilor sociale, nlocuirea unei formatiuni inferioare cu alta superioara, determinata de dialectica interna a modului de productie i a ntregii formatiuni socio-economice. n societatile ntemeiate pe proprietatea privata asupra mijloacelor de productie contradiciile inerente modului de productie se manifesta n lupta politica dintre clasele sociale, a carei dezvoltare duce la revolutia social-politica, forma de trecere de la o formatiune social-economica la alta. Pe o anumit treapta de dezvoltare, fortele de productie intra n contradictie cu relatiile de productie existente, n cadrul carora s-au dezvoltat pna atunci. Atunci ncepe o epoca de revoluaie sociala, care nlocuiete relatiile de productie nvechite cu altele noi, corespunzatoare fortelor de productie care s-au dezvoltat. O data cu schimbarea bazei economice, se produce, mai mult sau mai putin repede, schimbarea ntregii suprastructuri. Materialismul istoric este metoda i teoria pentru studierea procesului de aparitie, dezvoltare i declin al formatiunilor social-economice. Sursa contradictiilor din formatiunile bazate pe clase antagoniste este deosebirea de situatie i de conditii de trai ce exista ntre clasele n care se mparte societatea respectiva.Materialismul istoric subliniaza, de asemenea, independenta relativa a ideilor, al institutiilor i organizatiilor n dezvoltarea sociala, i mai ales actiunea lor inversa asupra vietii materiale a societatii. ntruct baza dezvoltarii sociale este modul de productie, rolul hotartor n istorie l au productorii directi ai bunurilor materiale - masele populare.Aratnd caracterul obiectiv al structurii societatii i al dinamicii acesteia, materialismul istoric constituie, mpreuna cu materialismul dialectic, fundamentul teoretic al socialismului tiintific.

Materialism,orientare fundamentala n filozofie, care, n opozitie cu idealismul, considera materia, existenta, ca factor primordial, iar contiinta, gndirea, ideile, ca factor secund, derivat.

Materialismul afirma ca lumea este prin natura ei materiala, ca ea constituie o realitate obiectiva, independenta de contiina omului, ca procesele din univers se desfaoarat potrivit legilor obiective. Privind contiina, gndirea, ca o nsuire a materiei, iar ideile ca un produs i, totodat, ca o reflectare a lumii materiale, materialismul afirma cognoscibilitatea lumii.

Putem deosebi un materialism spontan (sau realism naiv), care consta n convingerea proprie tuturor oamenilor i izvort din nsai practica vietii de toate zilele, despre existenta obiectiva a

realitatii nconjurtoare i un materialism filozofic, care presupune i o elaborare rationala sistematica, o generalizare a convingerilor materialiste spontane.

Prin nsai esenta sa, materialismul este legat de tiinta. Materialismul s-a dezvoltat de-a lungul istoriei culturii n interactiune cu tiintele; filozofia materialista a generalizat rezultatele tiintelor i, la rndul ei, a favorizat, prin rezolvarea problemelor teoretice i metodologice fundamentale, ridicate de dezvoltarea tiintelor, progresul acestora.

Mod de productie, mod istoricete determinat n care oamenii produc bunurile materiale necesare existentei i dezvoltarii societatii; reprezinta unitatea dialectica a fortelor de productie (care exprima continutul material al productiei) i a relatiilor de productie (care constituie forma sociala n care ea se realizeaza).

Mod de productie 1. Forte de productie (raporturile oamenilor cu natura, relatiile oamenilor fata de obiectele i de fortele naturii, pe care le folosesc pentru producerea bunurilor materiale) 1.1 Munca 1.2 Mijloace de productie (baza materiala a procesului de productie) 1.2.1 Obiectele muncii [pamntul, padurile, minereurile, apele, materiile prime etc.] 1.2.2 Mijloacele de munca [unelte, mijloace de transport, instalatii, cladiri etc.] 2. Relatii de productie (relatiile care se stabilesc ntre oameni n procesul de productie al bunurilor materiale)

Modul de productie reprezinta temelia unei ornduiri sociale, baza ntregii vieti sociale, schimbarea lui determinnd transformarea ntregii formatiuni sociale. Dezvoltarea istorica a societatii omeneti este constituita, de aceea, de succesiunea modului de productie: al comunei primitive, sclavagist, asiatic (tributal), feudal, capitalist, socialist i comunist. Aceasta dezvoltare are drept cauza fundamentala dialectica intern a modului de productie exprimat n legea concordantei relatiilor de productie cu caracterul fortelor de productie. Materialismul istoric pune la baza explicarii dezvoltarii societatii omeneti schimbarile care au loc n modul de productie, acestea determinnd schimbari n toate celelalte nivele de structurare a vietii sociale: n domeniul formelor de comunitate uman, al structurii grupale i de clasa, al ntregii suprastructuri, n planul vieii spirituale, n cele din urma la nivelul naturii umane, al modului de viata i al personalitatii. Orice nou mod de productie reprezinta o etapa calitativ superioara n dezvoltarea societii; schimbarea unui mod de productie cu altul este un proces necesar i legic, o noua perioada istorica n progresul societatii.

Marxist Philosophy Dialectical Materialism The notion of dialectical process was modified and polished into a broad-based philosophy by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who died when Marx was thirteen years old. The dialectical process is not a creation of Marxist philosophy. Instead, Marxists combine the theory with materialism, creating a hybrid philosophydialectical materialism. Marx and Engels simply adopted Hegels ideas (which were built on an idealistic foundationthat is, the dialectic was thought to be a mental construct) and redesigned them to fit into a materialistic scheme of reality. Thus Lenin could write of the great Hegelian dialectics which Marxism made its own, having first turned it right side up.1 Gustav A. Wetter summarizes the Hegelian dialectic: In Hegels sense of the term, dialectic is a process in which a starting-point [a thesis, e.g., Being] is negated [the antithesis, e.g., NonBeing], thereby setting up a second position opposed to it. This second position is in turn negated i.e., by negation of the negation, so as to reach a third position representing a synthesis [e.g., Becoming] of the two preceding, in which both are transcended, i.e., abolished and at the same time preserved on a higher level of being. This third phase then figures in turn as the first step in a new dialectical process [i.e., a new thesis], leading to a new synthesis, and so on.2 Frederick Engels best sums up the fundamental perspective with regard to dialectics: The world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made [created] things, but as a complex of [evolutionary] processes.3 This notion is inherent to the dialectic, which views all of life as a constantly evolving process resulting from the clash of opposing forces. Marxist Philosophy The Dialectical Process In the dialectical process, the thesis must always attract an antithesis, and this tension must always result in a synthesis, which in turn becomes a new thesis. This new thesis is always more advanced than the last thesis, because dialectics perceives the developmental process as an upward spiral. Simply stated, dialectics sees change or process due to conflict or struggle as the only constant, and this change and conflict always lead to a more advanced level. Marxists believe the proof for dialectics is all around us. Engels notes, When we reflect on Nature, or the history of mankind, or our own intellectual activity, the first picture presented to us is an endless maze of relations and interactions.4 These interactions are always in the process of thesis/antithesis/ synthesis. This constant development or process of evolution implies that the world (indeed, the universe) is always in motionalways moving, always changing. Now we can begin to see how dialectics affects the materialist view. In Marxist philosophy, we can understand matter only when we understand that it is constantly involved in an eternal process of change. The evolutionary process best illustrates this idealife on earth has been undergoing changes throughout time, beginning with simple living forms and evolving onward and upward to more advanced states. Engels says, Nature is the proof of dialectics.5 Marxist philosophy fixes evolutionary theory as a universal law for both organic and inorganic matter, as Engels makes clear: All nature, from the smallest thing to the biggest, from a grain of sand to the sun, from the protista [the primary living cell] to man, is in a constant state of coming into being and going out of being, in a constant flux, in a ceaseless state of movement and

change.6 Notes: Rendered with permission from the book, Understanding the Times: The Collision of Todays Competing Worldviews(Rev. 2nd ed), David Noebel, Summit Press, 2006. Compliments of John Stonestreet, David Noebel, and the Christian Worldview Ministry at Summit Ministries. All rights reserved in the original.
1 2

V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, 45 vols. (Moscow, USSR: Progress Publishers, 1977), 7:409. Gustav A. Wetter, Dialectical Materialism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977), 4. 3 Frederick Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1974), 44. 4 Lenin, The Teachings of Karl Marx, 27. 5 Frederick Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1935), 48. 6 Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1976), 13.

1. Dialectics and Marxism DIALECTICAL MATERIALISMas taught by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels is the most popular metaphysical doctrine of our age. It is today the official philosophy of the Soviet empire and of all the schools of Marxism outside of this empire. It dominates the ideas of many people who do not consider themselves Marxians and even of many authors and parties who believe they are anti-Marxians and anti-communists. It is this doctrine which most of our contemporaries have in mind when they refer to materialism and determinism. When Marx was a young man, two metaphysical doctrines whose teachings were incompatible with one another dominated German thought. One was Hegelian spiritualism, the official doctrine of the Prussian state and of the Prussian universities. The other was materialism, the doctrine of the opposition bent upon a revolutionary overthrow of the political system of Metteruich and of Christian orthodoxy as well as of private property. Marx tried to blend the two into a compound in order to prove that socialism is bound to come "with the inexorability of a law of nature." In the philosophy of Hegel logic, metaphysics, and ontology are essentially identical. The process of real p. 102

becoming is an aspect of the logical process of thinking. In grasping the laws of logic by aprioristic thinking, the mind acquires correct knowledge of reality. There is no road to truth but that provided by the study of logic. The peculiar principle of Hegel?s logic is the dialectic method. Thinking takes a triadic way. It proceeds from thesis to antithesis, i.e., the negation of the thesis, and from antithesis to synthesis, i.e., the negation of the negation. The same trinal principle of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis manifests itself in real becoming. For the only real thing in the universe is Geist (mind or spirit). Matter has its

substance not in itself. Natural things are not for themselves (fur sich selber). But Geist is for itself. What -- apart from reason and divine action -- is called reality is, viewed in the light of philosophy, something rotten or inert (ein Faules) which may seem but is not in itself real.[1] No compromise is possible between this Hegelian idealism and any kind of materialism. Yet, fascinated by the prestige Hegelianism enjoyed in the Germany of the 1840's, Marx and Engels were afraid to deviate too radically from the only philosophical system with which they and their contemporary countrymen were familiar. They were not audacious enough to discard Hegelianism entirely as was done a few years later even in Prussia. They preferred to appear as continuators and reformers of Hegel, not as iconoclastic dissenters. They boasted of having transformed and improved Hegelian dialectics, of having turned it upside down, or rather, ----------[1]. See Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Weltgeschicte, ed. Lasson (Leipzig, 1917), pp. 31-4, 55. p. 103

of having put it on its feet.[2] They did not realize that it was nonsensical to uproot dialectics from its idealistic ground and transplant it to a system that was labeled materialistic and empirical. Hegel was consistent in assuming that the logical process is faithfully reflected in the processes going on in what is commonly called reality. He did not contradict himself in applying the logical apriori to the interpretation of the universe. But it is different with a doctrine that indulges in a naive realism, materialism, and empiricism. Such a doctrine ought to have no use for a scheme of interpretation that is derived not from experience but from apriori reasoning. Engels declared that dialectics is the science of the general laws of motion, of the external world as well as of human thinking; two series of laws which are substantially identical but in their manifestation different insofar as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature, and hitherto also to a great extent in human history, they assert themselves in an unconscious way as external necessity in the midst of an infinite series of apparently contingent events.[3] He himself, says Engels, had never had any doubts about this. His intensive preoccupation with mathematics and the natural sciences, to which he confesses to have devoted the greater part of eight years, was, he declares, obviously prompted only by the desire to test the validity of the laws of dialectics in detail in specific instances.[4] --------

[2]. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie (5th ed. Stuttgart, 1910), pp. 36-9. [3]. Ibid., p. 38 [4]. Preface, Engels, Herrn Eugen Duhrings Umwalzung der Wissenschaft (7th ed. Stuttgart, 1910), pp. xiv and xv. p. 104

These studies led Engels to startling discoveries. Thus he found that "the whole of geology is a series of negated negations." Butterflies "come into existence from the egg through negation of the egg . . . they are negated again as they die," and so on. The normal life of barley is this: "The barleycorn . . . is negated and is supplanted by the barley plant, the negation of the corn. . . . The plant grows . . . is fructified and produces again barleycorns and as soon as these are ripe, the ear withers away, is

negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have again the original barleycom, however not plainly single but in a quantity ten, twenty, or thirty times larger."[5] It did not occur to Engels that he was merely playing with words. It is a gratuitous pastime to apply the terminology of logic to the phenomena of reality. Propositions about phenomena, events, and facts can be affirmed or negated, but not the phenomena, events, and facts themselves. But if one is committed to such inappropriate and logically vicious metaphorical language, it is not less sensible to call the butterfly the affirmation of the egg than to call it its negation. Is not the emergence of the butterfly the self-assertion of the egg, the maturing of its inherent purpose, the perfection of its merely passing existence, the fulfillment of all its potentialities? Engels' method consisted in substituting the term negation" for the term "change." There is, however, no need to dwell longer upon the fallacy of integrating Hegelian dialectics into a philosophy that does not endorse Hegel?s fundamental principle, ------[5]. Ibid., pp. 138-9. p. 105

the identity of logic and ontology, and does not radically reject the idea that anything could be learned from experience. For in fact dialectics plays a merely ornamental part in the constructions of Marx and Engels without substantially influencing the course of reasoning.[6] 2. The Material Productive Forces The essential concept of Marxian materialism is "the material productive forces of society." These forces are the driving power producing all historical facts and changes. In the social production of their subsistence, men enter into certain relations-production relations which are necessary and independent of their will and correspond to the prevailing stage of development of the material productive forces. The totality of these production relations forms "the economic structure of society, the real basis upon which there arises a juridical and political superstructure and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond." The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political, and spiritual (intellectual) life process in general (in each of its manifestations). It is not the consciousness (the ideas and thoughts) of men that determines their being (existence) but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development the material productive forces of society come into contradiction with the existing ------[6]. E. Hammacher, Das philosophisch-okonomische System des Marxismus (Leipzig, 1909), pp. 506-11. p. 106

production relations, or, what is merely a juridical expression for them, with the property relations (the social system of property laws) within the frame of which they have hitherto operated. From having been forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into fetters of them. Then comes an epoch of social revolution. With the change in the economic foundation the whole

immense superstructure slowly or rapidly transforms itself.[1] In reviewing such a transformation,[1] one must always distinguish between the material transformation[1] of the economic conditions of production, which can be precisely ascertained with the methods of the natural sciences, and the juridical, political, religious, artistic[2], or philosophical, in short ideological, forms in which men become conscious (aware) of this conflict and fight it out. Such an epoch of transformation can no more be judged according to its own consciousness than an individual can be judged according to what he imagines himself to be; one must rather explain this consciousness out of the contradictions of the material life, out of the existing conflict between social productive forces and production relations. No social formation ever disappears before all the productive forces have been developed for which its frame is broad enough, and new, higher production relations never appear before the material conditions of their existence have been hatched out in the womb of the old society. ---------

[1]. The term used by Marx, umwalzen, Umwalzung, is the German-language equivalent of ? revolution.? [2]. The German term Kunst includes all branches of poetry, fiction, and palywriting. p. 107

Hence mankind never sets itself tasks other than those it can solve, for closer observation will always discover that the task itself only emerges where the material conditions of its solution are already present or at least in the process of becoming.[3] The most remarkable fact about this doctrine is that it does not provide a definition of its basic concept, material productive forces. Marx never told us what he had in mind in referring to the material productive forces. We have to deduce it from occasional historical exemplifications of his doctrine. The most outspoken of these incidental examples is to be found in his book, The Poverty of Philosophy, published in 1847 in French. It reads: The hand mill gives you feudal society, the steam mill industrial capitalism.[4] This means that the state of practical technological knowledge or the technological quality of the tools and machines used in production is to be considered the essential feature of the material productive forces, which uniquely determine the production relations and thereby the whole "superstructure." The production technique is the real thing, the material being that ultimately determines the social, political, and intellectual manifestations of human life. This interpretation is fully confirmed by all other examples provided by Marx and Engels and by the response every new technological advance roused in their minds. They welcomed it enthusiastically because they --------[3]. K. Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, ed. Kautsky (Stuttgart, 1897), Preface, pp. xxii. [4]. ?Le Moulin a bras vous donnera la societe avec le souzerain; le moulin a vapeur, la societe avec le capitaliste industriel.? Marx, La Misere de la philosophie (Paris and Brussels, 1847), p. 100 p. 108

were convinced that each such new invention brought them a step nearer the realization of their hopes, the coming of socialism.[5] There have been, before Marx and after Marx, many historians and philosophers who emphasized the prominent role the improvement of technological methods of production has played in the history of civilization. A glance into the popular textbooks of history published in the last one hundred and fifty years shows that their authors duly stressed the importance of new inventions and of the changes they brought about. They never contested the truism that material well-being is the indispensable condition of a nation's moral, intellectual, and artistic achievement. But what Marx says is entirely different. In his doctrine the tools and machines are the ultimate thing, a material thing, viz., the material productive forces. Everything else is the necessary superstructure of this material basis. This fundamental thesis is open to three irrefutable objections. First, a technological invention is not something material. It is the product of a mental process, of reasoning and conceiving new ideas. The tools and machines may be called material, but the operation of the mind which created them is certainly spiritual. Marxian materialism does not trace back ? superstructural? and ---------[5]. Marx and some of his followers at times also included natural resources in the notion of material productive forces. But these remarks were made only incidentally and were never elaborated, obviously because this would have led them into the doctrine that explains history as determined by the structure of the people?s geographical environment. p. 109

"ideological" phenomena to "material" roots. It explains these phenomena as caused by an essentially mental process, viz., invention. It assigns to this mental process, which it falsely labels an original, nature-given, material fact, the exclusive power to beget all other social and intellectual phenomena. But it does not attempt to explain how inventions come to pass. Second, mere invention and designing of technologically new implements are not sufficient to produce them. What is required, in addition to technological knowledge and planning, is capital previously accumulated out of saving. Every step forward on the road toward technological improvement presupposes the requisite capital. The nations today called underdeveloped know what is needed to improve their backward apparatus of production. Plans for the construction of all the machines they want to acquire are ready or could be completed in a very short time. Only lack of capital holds them up. But saving and capital accumulation presuppose a social structure in which it is possible to save and to invest. The production relations are thus not the product of the material productive forces but, on the contrary, the indispensable condition of their coming into existence. Marx, of course, cannot help admitting that capital accumulation is ?one of the most indispensable conditions for the evolution of industrial production.?[6] Part of his most voluminous treatise, Das

Kapital, provides --------[6]. Marx, La Misere de la philosophie, English trans., The Poverty of Philosophy<="" p=""> p. 110

a history-wholly distorted-of capital accumulation. But as soon as he comes to his doctrine of materialism, he forgets all he said about this subject. Then the tools and machines are created by spontaneous generation, as it were. Furthermore it must be remembered that the utilization of machines presupposes social cooperation under the division of labor. No machine can be constructed and put into use under conditions in which there is no division of labor at all or only a rudimentary stage of it. Division of labor means social cooperation, i.e., social bonds between men, society. How then is it possible to explain the existence of society by tracing it back to the material productive forces which themselves can only appear in the frame of a previously existing social nexus? Marx could not comprehend this problem. He accused Proudhon, who had described the use of machines as a consequence of the division of labor, of ignorance of history. It is a distortion of fact, he shouted, to start with the division of labor and to deal with machines only later. For the machines are "a productive force," not a "social production relation," not an "economic category."[7] Here we are faced with a stubborn dogmatism that does not shrink from any absurdity. We may summarize the Marxian doctrine in this way: In the beginning there are the "material productive forces," i.e., the technological equipment of human productive efforts, the tools and machines. No question concerning their origin is permitted; they are, that is -------[7]. Ibid., pp. 112-13. p. 111

all; we must assume that they are dropped from heaven. These material productive forces compel men to enter into definite production relations which are independent of their wills. These production relations farther on determine society's juridical and political superstructure as well as all religious, artistic, and philosophical ideas. 3. The Class Struggle As will be pointed out below, any philosophy of history must demonstrate the mechanism by means of which the supreme agency that directs the course of all human affairs induces individuals to walk in precisely the ways which are bound to lead mankind toward the goal set. In Marx's system the doctrine of the class struggle is designed to answer this question. The inherent weakness of this doctrine is that it deals with classes and not with individuals. What has to be shown is how the individuals are induced to act in such a way that mankind finally reaches the point the productive forces want it to attain. Marx answers that consciousness of the interests of their

class determines the conduct of the individuals. It still remains to be explained why the individuals give the interests of their class preference over their own interests. We may for the moment refrain from asking how the individual learns what the genuine interests of his class are. But even Marx cannot help admitting that a conflict exists between the interests of an individual and those of the p. 112

class to which he belongs.[1] He distinguishes between those proletarians who are class conscious, i.e., place the concerns of their class before their individual concerns, and those who are not. He considers it one of the objectives of a socialist party to awake to class consciousness those proletarians who are not spontaneously class conscious. Marx obfuscated the problem by confusing the notions of caste and class. Where status and caste differences prevail, all members of every caste but the most privileged have one interest in common, viz., to wipe out the legal disabilities of their own caste. All slaves, for instance, are united in having a stake in the abolition of slavery. But no such conflicts are present in a society in which all citizens are equal before the law. No logical objection can be advanced against distinguishing various classes among the members of such a society. Any classification is logically permissible, however arbitrarily the mark of distinction may be chosen. But it is nonsensical to classify the members of a capitalistic society according to their position in the framework of the social division of labor and then to identify these classes with the castes of a status society. In a status society the individual inherits his caste membership from his parents, he remains through all his life in his caste, and his children are born as members ------[1]. Thus we read in the Communist Manifesto: ?The organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is at every instant again shattered by the competition between the workers themselves.? p. 113

of it. Only in exceptional cases can good luck raise a man into a higher caste. For the immense majority birth unalterably determines their station in life. The classes which Marx distinguishes in a capitalistic society are different. Their membership is fluctuating. Class affiliation is not hereditary. It is assigned to each individual by a daily repeated plebiscite, as it were, of all the people. The public in spending and buying determines who should own and run the plants, who should play the parts in the theater performances, who should work in the factories and mines. Rich men become poor, and poor men rich. The heirs as well as those who themselves have acquired wealth must try to hold their own by defending their assets against the competition of already established firms and of ambitious newcomers. In the unhampered market economy there are no privileges, no protection of vested interests, no barriers preventing anybody from striving after any prize. Access to any of the Marxian classes is free to everybody. The members of each class compete with one another; they are not united by a common class interest and not opposed to the members of other classes by being allied either in the defense of a common privilege which those wronged by it want to see abolished or in the attempt to abolish an institutional disability which those deriving advantage from it want to preserve.

The laissez-faire liberals asserted: If the old laws establishing status privileges and disabilities are repealed and no new practices of the same character-such as tariffs, subsidies, discriminatory taxation, indulgence granted for non-governmental agencies like churches, p. 114

unions, and so on to use coercion and intimidation-are introduced, there is equality of all citizens before the law. Nobody is hampered in his aspirations and ambitions by any legal obstacles. Everybody is free to compete for any social position or function for which his personal abilities qualify him. The communists denied that this is the way capitalistic society as organized under the liberal system of equality before the law, is operating. In their eyes private ownership of the means of production conveys to the owners-the bourgeois or capitalists in Marx's terminology-a privilege virtually not different from those once accorded to the feudal lords. The "bourgeois revolution" has not abolished privilege and discrimination against the masses; it has, says the Marxian, merely supplanted the old ruling and exploiting class of noblemen by a new ruling and exploiting class, the bourgeoisie. The exploited class, the proletarians, did not profit from this reform. They have changed masters but they have remained oppressed and exploited. What is needed is a new and final revolution, which in abolishing private ownership of the means of production will establish the classless society. This socialist or communist doctrine fails entirely to take into account the essential difference between the conditions of a status or caste society and those of a capitalistic society. Feudal property came into existence either by conquest or by donation on the part of a conqueror. It came to an end either by revocation of the donation or by conquest on the part of a more powerful conqueror. It was property by "the grace of God," p. 115

because it was ultimately derived from military victory which the humility or conceit of the princes ascribed to special intervention of the Lord. The owners of feudal property did not depend on the market, they did not serve the consumers; within the range of their property rights they were real lords. But it is quite different with the capitalists and entrepreneurs of a market economy. They acquire and enlarge their property through the services they have rendered to the consumers, and they can retain it only by serving daily again in the best possible way. This difference is not eradicated by metaphorically calling a successful manufacturer of spaghetti "the spaghetti king." Marx never embarked on the hopeless task of refuting the economists' description of the working of the market economy. Instead he was eager to show that capitalism must in the future lead to very unsatisfactory conditions. He undertook to demonstrate that the operation of capitalism must inevitably result in the concentration of wealth in the possession of an ever diminishing number of capitalists on the one hand and in the progressive impoverishment of the immense majority on the other hand. In the execution of this task he started from the spurious iron law of wages according to which the average wage rate is that quantum of the means of subsistence which is absolutely required to enable the laborer to barely survive and to rear progeny.[2] This alleged law has long since been

entirely --------[2]. Of course, Marx did not like the German term ?das eherne Lohngesetz? because it had been devised by his rival Ferdinand Lassalle. p. 116

discredited, and even the most bigoted Marxians have dropped it. But even if one were prepared for the sake of argument to call the law correct, it is obvious that it can by no means serve as the basis of a demonstration that the evolution of capitalism leads to progressive impoverishment of the wage earners. If wage rates under capitalism are always so low that for physiological reasons they cannot drop any further without wiping out the whole class of wage earners, it is impossible to maintain the thesis of the Communist Manifesto that the laborer "sinks deeper and deeper" with the progress of industry. Like all Marx's other arguments this demonstration is contradictory and self-defeating. Marx boasted of having discovered the immanent laws of capitalist evolution. The most important of these laws he considered the law of progressive impoverishment of the wage-earning masses. It is the operation of this law that brings about the final collapse of capitalism and the emergence of socialism. [3] When this law is seen to be spurious, the foundation is pulled from under both Marx's system of economics and his theory of capitalist evolution. Incidentally we have to establish the fact that in capitalistic countries the standard of living of the wage earners has improved in an unprecedented and undreamt-of way since the publication of the Communist Manifesto and the first volume of Das Kapital. Marx misrepresented the operation of the capitalist system in every respect. The corollary of the alleged progressive impoverishment ---------[3]. Marx, Das Kapital, 1, 728. p. 117

of the wage earners is the concentration of all riches in the hands of a class of capitalist exploiters whose membership is continually shrinking. In dealing with this issue Marx failed to take into account the fact that the evolution of big business units does not necessarily involve the concentration of wealth in a few hands. The big business enterprises are almost without exception corporations, precisely because they are too big for single individuals to own them entirely. The growth of business units has far outstripped the growth of individual fortunes. The assets of a corporation are not identical with the wealth of its shareholders. A considerable part of these assets, the equivalent of preferred stock and bonds issued and of loans raised, belong virtually, if not in the sense of the legal concept of ownership, to other people, viz., to owners of bonds and preferred stock and to creditors. Where these securities are held by savings banks and insurance companies and these loans were granted by such banks and companies, the virtual owners are the people who have claims against them. Also the common stock of a corporation is as a rule not concentrated in the hands of one man. The bigger the corporation, as a rule, the more widely its shares are distributed. Capitalism is essentially mass production to fill the needs of the masses. But Marx always labored under the deceptive conception that the workers are toiling for the sole benefit of an upper class of idle parasites. He did not see that the workers themselves consume by far the greater part of all the consumers' goods turned out. The millionaires consume an almost negligible part of what p. 118

is called the national product. All branches of big business cater directly or indirectly to the needs of the common man. The luxury industries never develop beyond small-scale or medium-size units. The evolution of big business is in itself proof of the fact that the masses and not the nabobs are the main consumers. Those who deal with the phenomenon of big business under the rubric "concentration of economic power" fail to realize that economic power is vested in the buying public on whose patronage the prosperity of the factories depends. In his capacity as buyer, the wage earner is the customer who is "always right." But Marx declares that the bourgeoisie "is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery." Marx deduced the excellence of socialism from the fact that the driving force of historical evolution, the material productive forces, is bound to bring about socialism. As he was engrossed in the Hegelian brand of optimism, there was to his mind no further need to demonstrate the merits of socialism. It was obvious to him that socialism, being a later stage of history than capitalism, was also a better stage.[4] It was sheer blasphemy to doubt its merits. What was still left to show was the mechanism by means of which nature brings about the transition from capitalism to socialism. Nature's instrument is the class struggle. As the workers sink deeper and deeper with the progress of capitalism, as their misery, oppression, slavery, and degradation increase, they are driven to revolt, and their rebellion establishes socialism. ----[4]. On the fallacy implied in this reasoning, see below pp. 175 ff. p. 119

The whole chain of this reasoning is exploded by the establishment of the fact that the progress of capitalism does not pauperize the wage earners increasingly but on the contrary improves their standard of living. Why should the masses be inevitably driven to revolt when they get more and better food, housing and clothing, cars and refrigerators, radio and television sets, nylon and other synthetic products? Even if, for the sake of argument, we were to admit that the workers are driven to rebellion, why should their revolutionary upheaval aim just at the establishment of socialism? The only motive which could induce them to ask for socialism would be the conviction that they themselves would fare better under socialism than under capitalism. But Marxists, anxious to avoid dealing with the economic problems of a socialist commonwealth, did nothing to demonstrate the superiority of socialism over capitalism apart from the circular reasoning that runs: Socialism is bound to come as the next stage of historical evolution. Being a later stage of history than capitalism, it is necessarily higher and better than capitalism. Why is it bound to come? Because the laborers, doomed to progressive impoverishment under capitalism, will rebel and establish socialism. But what other motive could impel them to aim at the establishment of socialism than the conviction that socialism is better than capitalism? And this preeminence of socialism is deduced by Marx from the fact that the coming of socialism is inevitable. The circle is closed.

In the context of the Marxian doctrine the superiority of socialism is proved by the fact that the proletarians are aiming at socialism. What the philosophers, the p. 120

utopians, think does not count. What matters is the ideas of the proletarians, the class that history has entrusted with the task of shaping the future. The truth is that the concept of socialism did not originate from the "proletarian mind." No proletarian or son of a proletarian contributed any substantial idea to the socialist ideology. The intellectual fathers of socialism were members of the intelligentsia, scions of the "bourgeoisie." Marx himself was the son of a well-to-do lawyer. He attended a German Gymnasium, the school all Marxians and other socialists denounce as the main offshoot of the bourgeois system of education, and his family supported him through all the years of his studies; he did not work his way through the university. He married the daughter of a member of the German nobility; his brother-in-law was Prussian minister of the interior and as such head of the Prussian police. In his household served a maid, Helene Demuth, who never married and who followed the Marx menage in all its shifts of residence, the perfect model of the exploited slavery whose frustration and stunted sex life have been repeatedly depicted in the German "social" novel. Friedrich Engels was the son of a wealthy manufacturer and himself a manufacturer; he refused to marry his mistress Mary because she was uneducated and of "low" descent; [5] he enjoyed the amusements of the British gentry such as riding to hounds. The workers were never enthusiastic about socialism. -----[5]. After the death of Mary, Engels took her sister Lizzy as mistress. He married her on her deathbed ? in order to provide her a last pleasure.? Gustav Mayer, Frederick Engels (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1934), 2, 329. p. 121

They supported the union movement whose striving after higher wages Marx despised as useless.[6] They asked for all those measures of government interference with business which Marx branded pettybourgeois nonsense. They opposed technological improvement, in earlier days by destroying new machines, later by union pressure and compulsion in favor of feather-bedding. Syndicalismappropriation of the enterprises by the workers employed in them-is a program that the workers developed spontaneously. But socialism was brought to the masses by intellectuals of bourgeois background. Dining and wining together in the luxurious London homes and country seats of late Victorian "society," ladies and gentlemen in fashionable evening clothes concocted schemes for converting the British proletarians to the socialist creed. 4. The Ideological Impregnation of Thought From the supposed irreconcilable conflict of class interests Marx deduces his doctrine of the ideological impregnation of thought. In a class society man is inherently unfit to conceive theories which are a substantially true description of reality. As his class affiliation, his social being, determines his

thoughts, the products of his intellectual effort are ideologically tainted and distorted. They are not truth, but ideologies. An ideology in the Marxian sense of the term is a false doctrine which, however, precisely on account of its falsity, -------[6]. Marx, Value, Price, and Profit, ed. E. Marx Aveling (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr & Co. Cooperative), pp. 125-6. See below p. 137. p. 122

serves die interests of the class from which its author stems. We may omit here dealing with many aspects of this ideology doctrine. We need not disprove anew the doctrine of polylogism, according to which the logical structure of mind differs in the members of various classes.[1] We may furthermore admit that the main concern of a thinker is exclusively to promote the interests of his class even if these clash with his interests as an individual. We may finally abstain from questioning the dogma that there is no such thing as the disinterested search for truth and knowledge and that all human inquiry is exclusively guided by the practical purpose of providing mental tools for successful action. The ideology doctrine would remain untenable even if all the irrefutable objections that can be raised from the point of view of these three aspects could be rejected. Whatever one may think of the adequacy of the pragmatist definition of truth, it is obvious that at least one of the characteristic marks of a true theory is that action based on it succeeds it attaining the expected result. In this sense truth works, while untruth does not work. Precisely if we assume, in agreement with the Marxians, that the end of theorizing is always success in action, the question must be raised why and how an ideological (that is, in the Marxian sense, a false) theory should be more useful to a class than a correct theory? There is no doubt that the study of mechanics was motivated, at least to some extent, by practical considerations. People wanted to make use of the theorems of mechanics -----[1]. Mises, Human Action, pp. 72-91. p. 123

to solve various problems of engineering. It was precisely the pursuit of these practical results that impelled them to search for a correct, not for a merely ideological (false) science of mechanics. No matter how one looks at it, there is no way in which a false theory can serve a man or a class or the whole of mankind better than a correct theory. How did Marx come to teach such a doctrine? To answer this question we must remember the motive that impelled Marx to all his literary ventures. He was driven by one passion-to fight for the adoption of socialism. But he was fully aware of his inability to oppose any tenable objection to the economists' devastating criticism of all socialist plans.

He was convinced that the system of economic doctrine developed by the Classical economists was impregnable, and remained unaware of the serious doubts which essential -theorems of this system had already raised in some minds. Like his contemporary John Stuart Mill he believed "there is nothing in the laws of value which remains for the present or any future writer to clear up; the theory of the subject is complete."[2] When in 1871 the writings of Carl Menger and William Stanley Jevons inaugurated a new epoch of economic studies, Marx's career as a writer on economic problems had already come to a virtual end. The first volume of Das Kapital had been published in 1867; the manuscript of the following volumes was well along. There is no indication that Marx ever grasped the meaning of the new theory. Marx's economic teachings are essentially a garbled rehash of --[2]. Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Bk. III, ch. 1, 1. p. 124

the theories of Adam Smith and, first of all, of Ricardo. Smith and Ricardo had not had any opportunity to refute socialist doctrines, as these were advanced only after their death. So Marx let them alone. But he vented his full indignation upon their successors who had tried to analyze the socialist schemes critically. He ridiculed them, calling them "vulgar economists" and "sycophants of the bourgeoisie." And as it was imperative for him to defame them, he contrived his ideology scheme. These "vulgar economists" are, because of their bourgeois background, constitutionally unfit to discover truth. What their reasoning produces can only be ideological, that is, as Marx employed the term "ideology," a distortion of truth serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie. There is no need to refute their chains of argument by discursive reasoning and critical analysis. It is enough to unmask their bourgeois background and thereby the necessarily "ideological" character of their doctrines. They are wrong because they are bourgeois. No proletarian must attach any importance to their speculations. To conceal the fact that this scheme was invented expressly to discredit the economists, it was necessary to elevate it to the dignity of a general epistemological law valid for all ages and for all branches of knowledge. Thus the ideology doctrine became the nucleus of Marxian epistemology. Marx and all his disciples concentrated their efforts upon the justification and exemplification of this makeshift. They did not shrink from any absurdity. They interpreted all philosophical systems, physical and biological theories, all literature, p. 125

music, and art from the "ideological" point of view. But, of course, they were not consistent enough to assign to their own doctrines merely ideological character. The Marxian tenets, they implied, are not ideologies. They are a foretaste of the knowledge of the future classless society which, freed from the fetters of class conflicts, will be in a position to conceive pure knowledge, untainted by ideological blemishes.

Thus we can understand the thymological motives that led Marx to his ideology doctrine. Yet this does not answer the question why an ideological distortion of truth should be more advantageous to the interests of a class than a correct doctrine. Marx never ventured to explain this, probably aware that any attempt to would entangle him in an inextricable jumble of absurdities and contradictions. There is no need to emphasize the ridiculousness of contending that an ideological physical, chemical, or therapeutical doctrine could be more advantageous for any class or individual than a correct one. One may pass over in silence the declarations of the Marxians concerning the ideological character of the theories developed by the bourgeois Mendel, Hertz, Planck, Heisenberg, and Einstein. It is sufficient to scrutinize the alleged ideological character of bourgeois economics. As Marx saw it, their bourgeois background impelled the Classical economists to develop a system from which a justification of the unfair claims of the capitalist exploiters must logically follow. (In this he contradicts himself, as he drew from the same system just the opposite conclusions.) These theorems of the Classical p. 126

economists from which the apparent justification of capitalism could be deduced were the theorems which Marx attacked most furiously: that the scarcity of the maternal factors of production on which man's well-being depends is an inevitable, nature-given condition of human existence; that no system of society's economic organization could create a state of abundance in which to everybody could be given according to his needs; that the recurrence of periods of economic depressions is not inherent in the very operation of an unhampered market economy but, on the contrary, the necessary outcome of government's interfering with business with the spurious aim of lowering the rate of interest and making business boom by inflation and credit expansion. But, we must ask, of what use, from the very Marxian point of view, could such a justification of capitalism be for the capitalists? They themselves did not need any justification for a system which-according to Marx-while wronging the workers was beneficial to themselves. They did not need to quiet their own consciences since, again according to Marx, every class is remorseless in the pursuit of its own selfish class interests. Neither is it, from the point of view of the Marxian doctrine, permissible to assume that the service which the ideological theory, originating from a "false consciousness" and therefore distorting the true state of affairs, rendered to the exploiting class was to beguile the exploited class and to make it pliable and subservient, and thereby to preserve or at least to prolong the unfair system of exploitation. For, according to Marx, the p. 127

duration of a definite system of production relations does not depend on any spiritual factors. It is exclusively determined by the state of the material productive forces. If the material productive forces change, the production relations (i.e., the property relations) and the whole ideological superstructure must change too. This transformation cannot be accelerated by any human effort. For as Marx said, no social formation ever disappears before all the productive forces are developed for which it is broad enough, and new higher production relations never appear before the material conditions of their existence have been hatched out in the womb of the old society."[3]

This is by no means merely an incidental observation of Marx. It is one of the essential points of his doctrine. It is the theorem on which he based his claim to call his own doctrine scientific socialism as distinguished from the merely utopian socialism of his predecessors. The characteristic mark of the utopian socialists, as he saw it, was that they believed that the realization of socialism depends on spiritual and intellectual factors. You have to convince people that socialism is better than capitalism and then they will substitute socialism for capitalism. In Marx's eyes this utopian creed was absurd. The coming of socialism in no way depends on the thoughts and wills of men; it is an outgrowth of the development of the material productive forces. When the time is fulfilled and capitalism has reached its maturity, socialism will come. It can appear neither earlier nor -------[3]. Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie, p. xii (see above pp. 107 f.). p. 128

later. The bourgeois may contrive the most cleverly elaborated ideologies-in vain; they cannot delay the day of the breakdown of capitalism. Perhaps some people, intent upon salvaging the Marxian "ideology" concept, would argue this way: The capitalists are ashamed of their role in society. They feel guilty at being "robber barons, usurers, and exploiters" and pocketing profits. They need a class ideology in order to restore their self-assertion. But why should they blush? There is, from the point of view of the Marxian doctrine, nothing in their conduct to be ashamed of. Capitalism, in the Marxian view, is an indispensable stage in the historical evolution of mankind. It is a necessary link in the succession of events which finally results in the bliss of socialism. The capitalists, in being capitalists, are merely tools of history. They execute what, according to the preordained plan for mankind's evolution, must be done. They comply with the eternal laws which are independent of the human will. They cannot help acting the way they do. They do not need any ideology, any "false consciousness," to tell them that they are right. They are night in the light of the Marxian doctrine. If Marx had been consistent, he would have exhorted the workers: Don't blame the capitalists; in "exploiting" you they do what is best for yourselves; they are paving the way for socialism. However one may turn the matter, one cannot discover any reason why an ideological distortion of truth should be more useful to the bourgeoisie than a correct theory. p. 129

5. The Conflict of Ideologies Class consciousness, says Marx, produces class ideologies. The class ideology provides the class with an interpretation of reality and at the same time teaches the members how to act in order to benefit their class. The content of the class ideology is uniquely determined by the historical stage of the development of the material productive forces and by the role the class concerned plays in this stage

of history. The ideology is not an arbitrary brain child. It is the reflection of the thinker's material class condition as mirrored in his head. It is therefore not an individual phenomenon conditional upon the thinker's fancy. It is enjoined upon the mind by reality, i.e., by the class situation of the man who thinks. It is consequently identical with all members of the class. Of course, not every class comrade is an author and publishes what he has thought. But all writers belonging to the class conceive the same ideas and all other members of the class approve of them. There is no room left in Marxism for the assumption that the various members of the same class could seriously disagree in ideology. There exists for all members of the class only one ideology. If a man expresses opinions at variance with the ideology of a definite class, that is because he does not belong to the class concerned. There is no need to refute his ideas by discursive reasoning. It is enough to unmask his background and class affiliation. This settles the matter. p. 130

But if a man whose proletarian background and membership in the workers' class cannot be contested diverges from the correct Marxian creed, he is a traitor. It is impossible to assume that he could be sincere in his rejection of Marxism. As a proletarian he must necessarily think like a proletarian. An inner voice tells him in an unmistakable way what the correct proletarian ideology is. He is dishonest in overriding this voice and publicly professing unorthodox opinions. He is a rogue, a Judas, a snake in the grass. In fighting such a betrayer all means are permissible. Marx and Engels, two men of unquestionable bourgeois background, hatched out the class ideology of the proletarian class. They never ventured to discuss their doctrine with dissenters as scientists, for instance, discuss the pros and cons of the doctrines of Lamarck, Darwin, Mendel, and Weismann. As they saw it, their adversaries could only be either bourgeois idiots[1] or proletarian traitors. As soon as a socialist deviated an inch from the orthodox creed, Marx and Engels attacked him furiously, ridiculed and insulted him, represented him as a scoundrel and a wicked and corrupt monster. After Engels' death the office of supreme arbiter of what is and what is not correct Marxism devolved upon Karl Kautsky. In 1917 it passed into the hands of Lenin and became a function of the chief of the Soviet government. While Marx, Engels, and Kautsky had to content themselves with assassinating the character of their ------[1]. E.g., ?bourgeois stupidity? (about Bentham, Das Kapital, 1, 574), ?bourgeois cretinism? (about Destutt de Tracy, ibid., 2, 465), and so on. p. 131

opponents, Lenin and Stalin could assassinate them physically. Step by step they anathematized those who once were considered by all Marxians, including Lenin and Stalin themselves, as the great champions of the proletarian cause Kautsky, Max Adler, Otto Bauer, Plechanoff, Bukharin, Trotsky, Riasanov, Radek, Sinoviev, and many others. Those whom they could seize were imprisoned, tortured,

and finally murdered. Only those who were happy enough to dwell in countries dominated by "plutodemocratic reactionaries" survived and were permitted to die in their beds. A good case can be made, from the Marxian point of view, in favor of decision by the majority. II a doubt concerning the correct content of the proletarian ideology arises, the ideas held by the majority of the proletarians are to be considered those which truthfully reflect the genuine proletarian ideology. As Marxism supposes that the immense majority of people are proletarians, this would be tantamount to assigning the competence to make the ultimate decisions in conflicts of opinion to parliaments elected under adult franchise. But although to refuse to do this is to explode the whole ideology doctrine, neither Marx nor his successors were ever prepared to submit their opinions to majority vote. Throughout his career Marx mistrusted the people and was highly suspicious of parliamentary procedures and decisions by the ballot. He was enthusiastic about the Paris revolution of June 1848, in which a small minority of Parisians rebelled against the government supported by a parliament elected under universal manhood suffrage. The Paris Commune of the spring of 1871, in which again Parisian socialists fought against the p. 132

regime duly established by the overwhelming majority of the French people's representatives, was still more to his liking. Here he found his ideal of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship of a self-appointed band of leaders, realized. He tried to persuade the Marxian parties of all countries of Western and Central Europe to base their hopes not upon election campaigns but upon revolutionary methods. In this regard the Russian communists were his faithful disciples. The Russian parliament elected in 1917 under the auspices of the Lenin government by all adult citizens had, in spite of the violence offered to the voters by the ruling party, less than 25 per cent communist members. Threequarters of the people had voted against the communists. But Lenin dispersed the parliament by force of arms and firmly established the dictatorial rule of a minority. The head of the Soviet power became the supreme pontiff of the Marxian sect. His title to this office is derived from the fact that he had defeated his rivals in a bloody civil war. As the Marxians do not admit that differences of opinion can be settled by discussion and persuasion or decided by majority vote, no solution is open but civil war. The mark of the good ideology, i.e., the ideology adequate to the genuine class interests of the proletarians, is the fact that its supporters succeeded in conquering and liquidating their opponents. 6. Ideas and Interests Marx assumes tacitly that the social condition of a class uniquely determines its interests and that there p. 133

can be no doubt what kind of policy best serves these interests. The class does not have to choose between various policies. The historical situation enjoins upon it a definite policy. There is no alternative. It follows that the class does not act, since acting implies choosing among various possible ways of procedure. The material productive forces act through the medium of the class members.

But Marx, Engels, and all other Marxians ignored this fundamental dogma of their creed as soon as they stepped beyond the borders of epistemology and began commenting upon historical and political issues. Then they not only charged the non-proletarian classes with hostility to the proletarians but criticized their policies as not conducive to promoting the true interests of their own classes. The most important of Marx's political pamphlets is the Address on the Civil War in France (1871). It furiously attacks the French government which, backed by the immense majority of the nation, was intent upon quelling the rebellion of the Paris Commune. It recklessly calumniates all the leading members of that government, calling them swindlers, forgers, and embezzlers. Jules Favre, it charges, was "living in concubinage with the wife of a dipsomaniac," and General de Gallifet profited from the alleged prostitution of his wife. In short, the pamphlet set the pattern for the defamation tactics of the socialist press which the Marxians indignantly chastised as one of the worst excrescences of capitalism when the tabloid press adopted it. Yet all these slanderous lies, however reprehensible, may be interpreted p. 134

as partisan strategems in the implacable war against bourgeois civilization. They are at least not incompatible with Marxian epistemological principles. But it is another thing to question the expediency of the bourgeois policy from the standpoint of the class interests of the bourgeoisie. The Address maintains that the policy of the French bourgeoisie has unmasked the essential teachings of its own ideology, the only purpose of which is "to delay the class struggle"; henceforth it will no longer be possible for the class rule of the bourgeoisie "to hide in a nationalist uniform." Henceforth there will no longer be any question of peace or armistice between the workers and their exploiters. The battle will be resumed again and again and there can be no doubt about the final victory of the workingmen.[1] It must be noted that these observations were made with regard to a situation in which the majority of the French people had only to choose between unconditional surrender to a small minority of revolutionaries or fighting them. Neither Marx nor anybody else had ever expected that the majority of a nation would yield without resistance to armed aggression on the part of a minority. Still more important is the fact that Marx in these observations ascribes to the policies adopted by the French bourgeoisie a decisive influence upon the course of events. In this he contradicts all his other writings. In theCommunist Manifesto he had announced the implacable and relentless class struggle without any ----[1]. Marx, Der Burgerkrieg in Frankreich, ed. Pfemfert (Berlin, 1919), p. 7 p. 135

regard to the defense tactics the bourgeois may resort to. He had deduced the inevitability of this struggle from the class situation of the exploiters and that of the exploited. There is no room in the Marxian system for the assumption that the policies adopted by the bourgeoisie could in any way affect the emergence of the class struggle and its outcome.

If it is true that one class, the French bourgeoisie of 1871, was in a position to choose between alternative policies and through its decision to influence the course of events, the same must be true also of other classes in other historical situations. Then all the dogmas of Marxian materialism are exploded. Then it is not true that the class situation teaches a class what its genuine class interests are and what kind of policy best serves these interests. It is not true that only such ideas as are conducive to the real interests of a class meet with approval on the part of those who direct the policies of the class. It may happen that different ideas direct those policies and thus get an influence upon the course of events. But then it is not true that what counts in history are only interests, and that ideas are merely an ideological superstructure, uniquely determined by these interests. It becomes imperative to scrutinize ideas in order to sift those which are really beneficial to the interests of the class concerned from those which are not. It becomes necessary to discuss conflicting ideas with the methods of logical reasoning. The make-shift by means of which Marx wanted to outlaw such dispassionate weighing of the pros and cons of definite ideas breaks down. The way toward an examination of p. 136

the merits and demerits of socialism which Marx wanted to prohibit as "unscientific" is reopened. Another important address of Marx was his paper of 1865, Value, Price and Profit. In this document Marx criticizes the traditional policies of the labor unions. They should abandon their ? conservative motto, A fair day's wages for a fair day's work! and ought to inscribe on their banner the revolutionary watchword, Abolition of the wages system!?[2] This is obviously a controversy about which kind of policy best serves the class interests of the workers. Marx in this case deviates from his usual procedure of branding all his proletarian opponents traitors. He implicitly admits that there can prevail dissent even among honest and sincere champions of the class interests of the workers and that such differences must be settled by debating the issue. Perhaps on second thought he himself discovered that the way he had dealt with the problem involved was incompatible with all his dogmas, for he did not have printed this paper which he had read on June 26, 1865, in the General Council of the International Workingmen's Association. It was first published in 1898 by one of his daughters. But the theme we are scrutinizing is not Marx's failure to cling consistently to his own doctrine and his lapses into ways of thinking incompatible with it. We have to examine the tenability of the Marxian doctrine and must therefore turn to the peculiar connotation the term "interests" has in the context of this doctrine. Every individual, and for that matter every group of --------[2]. Marx, Value, Price and Profit, pp. 126-7. p. 137

individuals, aims in acting at the substitution of a state of affairs that suits him better for a state of affairs that he considers less satisfactory. Without any regard to the qualification of these two states of affairs from any other point of view, we may say in this sense that he pursues his own interests. But the question of what is more desirable and what is less is decided by the acting individual. It is the outcome of choosing among various possible solutions. It is a judgment of value. It is determined by the individual's ideas about the effects these various states may have upon his own well-being. But it ultimately depends upon the value he attaches to these anticipated effects. If we keep this in mind, it is not sensible to declare that ideas are a product of interests. Ideas tell a man what his interests are. At a later date, looking upon his past actions, the individual may form the opinion that he has erred and that another mode of acting would have served his own interests better. But this does not mean that at the critical instant in which he acted he did not act according to his interests. He acted according to what he, at that time, considered would serve his interests best. If an unaffected observer looks upon another man's action, he may think: This fellow errs; what he does will not serve what he considers to be his interest; another way of acting would be more suitable for attaining the ends he aims at. In this sense a historian can say today or a judicious contemporary could say in 1939: In invading Poland Hitler and the Nazis made a mistake; the invasion harmed what they considered to be their interests. p. 138

Such criticism is sensible so long as it deals only with the means and not with the ultimate ends of an action. The choice of ultimate ends is a judgment of value solely dependent on the judging individual's valuation. All that another man can say about it is: I would have made a different choice. If a Roman had said to a Christian doomed to be lacerated by wild beasts in the circus: You will best serve your interests by bowing down and worshipping the statue of our divine Emperor, the Christian would have answered: My prime interest is to comply with the precepts of my creed. But Marxism, as a philosophy of history claiming to know the ends which men are bound to aim at, employs the term "interests" with a different connotation. The interests it refers to are not those chosen by men on the ground of judgments of value. They are the ends the material productive forces are aiming at. These forces aim at the establishment of socialism. They use the proletarians as a means for the realization of this end. The superhuman material productive forces pursue their own interests, independently of the will of mortal men. The proletarian class is merely a tool in their hands. The actions of the class are not its own actions but those which the material productive forces perform in using the class as an instrument without a will of its own. The class interests to which Marx refers are in fact the interests of the material productive forces which want to be freed from "the fetters upon their development." Interests of this kind, of course, do not depend upon the ideas of ordinary men. They are determined p. 139

exclusively by the ideas of the man Marx, who generated both the phantom of the material productive forces and the anthropomorphic image of their interests.

In the world of reality, life, and human action there is no such thing as interests independent of ideas, preceding them temporally and logically. What a man considers his interest is the result of his ideas. If there is any sense in the proposition that the interests of the proletarians would be best served by socialism, it is this: the ends which the individual proletarians are aiming at will be best achieved by socialism. Such a proposition requires proof. It is vain to substitute for such a proof the recourse to an arbitrarily contrived system of philosophy of history. All this could never occur to Marx because he was engrossed by the idea that human interests are uniquely and entirely determined by the biological nature of the human body. Man, as he saw it, is exclusively interested in the procurement of the largest quantity of tangible goods. There is no qualitative, only a quantitative, problem in the supply of goods and services. Wants do not depend on ideas but solely on physiological conditions. Blinded by this preconception, Marx ignored the fact that one of the problems of production is to decide what kind of goods are to be produced. With animals and with primitive men on the verge of starvation it is certainly true that nothing counts but the quantity of edible things they can secure. There is no need to point out that conditions are entirely different for men, even for those in the earliest stages of civilization. Civilized man is faced with the problem of p. 140

choosing among the satisfactions of various needs and among various modes of satisfying the same need. His interests are diversified and are determined by the ideas that influence his choosing. One does not serve the interests of a man who wants a new coat by giving him a pair of shoes or those of a man who wants to hear a Beethoven symphony by giving him admission to a boxing match. It is ideas that are responsible for the fact that the interests of people are disparate. Incidentally it may be mentioned that this misconstruing of human wants and interests prevented Marx and other socialists from comprehending the distinction between freedom and slavery, between the condition of a man who himself decides how to spend his income and that of a man whom a paternal authority supplies with those things which, as the authority thinks, he needs. In the market economy the consumers choose and thereby determine the quantity and the quality of the goods produced. Under socialism the authority takes care of these matters. In the eyes of Marx and the Marxians there is no substantial difference between these two methods of want satisfaction; it is of no consequence who chooses, the ?paltry" individual for himself or the authority for all its subjects. They fail to realize that the authority does not give its wards what they want to get but what, according to the opinion, of the authority; they ought to get. If a man who wants to get the Bible gets the Koran instead, he is no longer free. But even if, for the sake of argument, we were to admit that there is uncertainty neither concerning the kind of goods people are asking for nor concerning the p. 141

most expedient technological methods of producing them, there remains the conflict between interests in the short run and those in the long run. Here again the decision depends on ideas. It is judgments of value that determine the amount of time preference attached to the value of present goods as against that of future goods. Should one consume or accumulate capital? And how far should capital depletion or accumulation go? Instead of dealing with all these problems Marx contented himself with the dogma that socialism will be an earthly paradise in which everybody will get all he needs. Of course, if one starts from this dogma, one can quietly declare that the interests of everybody, whatever they may be, will be best served under socialism. In the land of Cockaigne people will no longer need any ideas, will no longer have to resort to any judgments of value, will no longer think and act. They will only open their mouths to let the roast pigeons fly in. In the world of reality, the conditions of which are the only object of the scientific search for truth, ideas determine what people consider to be their interests. There is no such thing as interests that could be independent of ideas. It is ideas that determine what people consider as their interests. Free men do not act in accordance with their interests. They act in accordance with what they believe furthers their interests. 7. The Class Interests of the Bourgeoisie One of the starting points of the thinking of Karl Marx was the dogma that capitalism, while utterly p. 142

detrimental to the working class, is favorable to the class interests of the bourgeoisie and that socialism, while thwarting only the unfair claims of the bourgeoisie, is highly beneficial to the whole of mankind. These were ideas developed by the French communists and socialists and disclosed to the German public in 1842 by Lorenz von Stein in his voluminous book Socialism and Communism in Present-Day France. Without any qualms Marx adopted this doctrine and all that was implied in it. It never occurred to him that its fundamental dogma might require a demonstration, and the concepts it employs a definition. He never defined the concepts of a social class and of class interests and their conflicts. He never explained why socialism serves the class interests of the proletarians and the true interests of the whole of mankind better than any other system. This attitude has been up to our time the characteristic mark of all socialists. They simply take it for granted that life under socialism will be blissful. Whoever dares to ask for reasons is by this very demand unmasked as a bribed apologist of the selfish class interests of the exploiters. The Marxian philosophy of history teaches that what brings about the coming of socialism is the operation of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself. With the inexorability of a law of nature, capitalistic production begets its own negation.[1] As no social formation ever disappears before all the productive forces are developed for which it has room[2], capitalism must run its full course before the time comes for the emergence ------[1]. Marx, Das Kapital, 1, 728. [2]. See above, pp. 107 and 128. p. 143

of socialism. The free evolution of capitalism, not upset by any political interference, is therefore, from the Marxian point of view, highly beneficial to the-we would have to say "rightly understood" or long-term-class interests of the proletarians. With the progress of capitalism on the way to its maturity and consequently to its collapse, says the Communist Manifesto, the laborer "sinks deeper and deeper," he "becomes a pauper." But seen sub specie aeternitatis, from the point of view of mankind's destination and the long-run interests of the proletariat, this "mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, and exploitation" is in fact to be regarded as a step forward on the road toward eternal bliss. It appears therefore not only vain but manifestly contrary to the-rightly understood-interests of the working class to indulge in-necessarily futile-attempts to improve the wage earners' conditions through reforms within the framework of capitalism. Hence Marx rejected labor union endeavors to raise wage rates and to shorten the hours of work. The most orthodox of all Marxian parties, the German Social-Democrats, voted in the eighties in the Reichstag against all measures of Bismarck's famous Sozialpolitik, including its most spectacular feature, social security. Likewise in the opinion of the communists the American New Deal was just a foredoomed scheme to salvage dying capitalism by postponing its breakdown and thereby the appearance of the socialist millennium. If employers oppose what is commonly called pro-labor legislation, they are consequently not guilty of fighting what Marx considered to be the true interests p. 144

of the proletarian class. On the contrary. In virtually freeing economic evolution from the fetters by means of which ignorant petty bourgeois, bureaucrats, and such utopian and humanitarian pseudo socialists as the Fabians plan to slow it down, they are serving the cause of labor and socialism. The very selfishness of the exploiters turns into a boon for the exploited and for the whole of mankind. Would not Marx, if he had been able to follow his own ideas to their ultimate logical consequences, have been tempted to say, with Mandeville, "private vices, public benefits," or, with Adam Smith, that the rich "are led by an invisible hand" in such a way that they "without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society?"[3] However, Marx was always anxious to bring his reasoning to an end before the point beyond which its inherent contradictions would have become manifest. In this regard his followers copied their master's attitude. The bourgeois, both capitalists and entrepreneurs, say these inconsistent disciples of Marx, are interested in the preservation of the laissez-faire system. They are opposed to all attempts to alleviate the lot of the most numerous, most useful, and most exploited class of men; they are intent upon stopping progress; they are reactionaries committed to the-of course, hopeless-task of turning history's clock back. Whatever one may think of these passionate effusions, repeated daily by newspapers, politicians, and governments, one cannot deny that they are incompatible with the essential tenets of ----[3]. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Pt. IV, ch.1 (Edinburgh, 1813), 1, 419 ff. p. 145

Marxism. From a consistent Marxian point of view the champions of what is called pro-labor legislation are reactionary petty bourgeois, while those whom the Marxians call labor-baiters are progressive harbingers of the bliss to come. In their ignorance of all business problems, the Marxians failed to see that the present-day bourgeois, those who are already wealthy capitalists and entrepreneurs, are in their capacity as bourgeois not

selfishly interested in the preservation of laissez faire. Under laissez faire their eminent position is daily threatened anew by the ambitions of impecunious newcomers. Laws that put obstacles in the way of talented upstarts are detrimental to the interests of the consumers but they protect those who have already established their position in business against the competition of intruders. In making it more difficult for a businessman to reap profit and in taxing away the greater part of the profits made, they prevent the accumulation of capital by newcomers and thus remove the inducement that impels old firms toward the utmost exertion in serving the customers. Measures sheltering the less efficient against the competition of the more efficient and laws that aim at reducing or confiscating profits are from the Marxian point of view conservative, nay, reactionary. They tend to prevent technological improvement and economic progress and to preserve inefficiency and backwardness. If the New Deal had started in 1900 and not in 1933, the American consumer would have been deprived of many things today provided by industries which grew in the first decades of the century from insignificant beginnings to national importance and mass production. p. 146

The culmination of this misconstruction of industrial problems is the animosity displayed against big business and against the efforts of smaller concerns to become bigger. Public opinion, under the spell of Marxism, considers "bigness" one of the worst vices of business and condones every scheme devised to curb or to hurt big business by government action. There is no comprehension of the fact that it is solely bigness in business which makes it possible to supply the masses with all those products the present-day American common man does not want to do without. Luxury goods for the few can be produced in small shops. Luxury goods for the many require big business. Those politicians, professors, and union bosses who curse big business are fighting for a lower standard of living. They are certainly not furthering the interests of the proletarians. And they are, precisely also from the point of view of the Marxian doctrine, ultimately enemies of progress and of improvement of the conditions of the workers. 8. The Critics of Marxism The materialism of Marx and Engels differs radically from the ideas of classical materialism. It depicts human thoughts, choices, and actions as determined by the material productive forces-tools and machines. Marx and Engels failed to see that tools and machines are themselves products of the operation of the human mind. Even if their sophisticated attempts to describe all spiritual and intellectual phenomena, which they call superstructural, as produced by the material productive forces had been successful, they would only have traced p. 147

these phenomena back to something which in itself is a spiritual and intellectual phenomenon. Their reasoning moves in a circle. Their alleged materialism is in fact no materialism at all. It provides merely a verbal solution of the problems involved.

Occasionally even Marx and Engels were aware of the fundamental inadequacy of their doctrine. When Engels at the grave of Marx summed up what he considered to be the quintessence of his friend's achievements, he did not mention the material productive forces at all. Said Engels: "As Darwin discovered the law of evolution of organic nature, Marx discovered the law of mankind's historical evolution, that is the simple fact, hitherto hidden beneath ideological overgrowths, that men must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing before they can pursue politics, science, art, religion, and the like, that consequently the production of the immediately required foodstuffs and therewith the stage of economic evolution attained by a people or an epoch constitute the foundation out of which the governmental institutions, the ideas about right and wrong, art, and even the religious ideas of men have been developed and by means of which they must be explained-not, as hitherto had been done, the other way round.[1] Certainly no man was more competent than Engels to provide an authoritative interpretation of dialectic materialism. But if Engels was right in this obituary, then the whole of Marxian materialism fades p. 148

away. It is reduced to a truism known to everybody from time immemorial and never contested by anybody. It says no more than the worn-out aphorism: Primum vivere, deinde philosophari. As an eristic trick Engels' interpretation turned out very well. As soon as somebody begins to unmask the absurdities and contradictions of dialectical materialism, the Marxians retort: Do you deny that men must first of all eat? Do you deny that men are interested in improving the material conditions of their existence? Since nobody wants to contest these truisms, they conclude that all the teachings of Maixian materialism are unassailable. And hosts of pseudo philosophers fail to see through this non sequitur. The main target of Marx's rancorous attacks was the Prussian state of the Hohenzollern dynasty. He hated this regime not because it was opposed to socialism but precisely because it was inclined to accept socialism. While his rival Lassalle toyed with the idea of realizing socialism in cooperation with the Prussian government led by Bismarck, Marx's International Workingmen's Association sought to supplant the Hohenzollern. Since in Prussia the Protestant Church was subject to the government and was administered by government officials, Marx never tired of vilifying the Christian religion too. AntiChristianism became all the more a dogma of Marxism in that the countries whose intellectuals first were converted to Marxism were Russia and Italy. In Russia the church was even more dependent on the government than in Prussia. In the eyes of the Italians of the nineteenth century anti-Catholic bias was p. 149

the mark of all who opposed the restoration of the Pope's secular rule and the disintegration of the newly won national unity.

The Christian churches and sects did not fight socialism. Step by step they accepted its essential political and social ideas. Today they are, with but few exceptions, outspoken in rejecting capitalism and advocating either socialism or interventionist policies which must inevitably result in the establishment of socialism. But, of course, no Christian church can ever acquiesce in a brand of socialism which is hostile to Christianity and aims at its suppression. The churches are implacably opposed to the anti-Christian aspects of Marxism. They try to distinguish between their own program of social reform and the Marxian program. The inherent viciousness of Marxism they consider to be its materialism and atheism. However, in fighting Marxian materialism the apologists of religion have entirely missed the point. Many of them look upon materialism as an ethical doctrine teaching that men ought only to strive after satisfaction of the needs of their bodies and after a life of pleasure and revelry, and ought not to bother about anything else. What they advance against this ethical materialism has no reference to the Marxian doctrine and no bearing on the issue in dispute. No more sensible are the objections raised to Marxian materialism by those who pick out definite historical events - such as the rise of the Christian creed, the crusades, the religious wars - and triumphantly assert that no materialist interpretation of them could be provided. p. 150

Every change in conditions affects the structure of demand and supply of various material things and thereby the short-run interests of some groups of people. It is therefore possible to show that there were some groups who profited in the short run and others who were prejudiced in the short run. Hence the advocates of Marxism are always in a position to point out that class interests were involved and thus to annul the objections raised. Of course, this method of demonstrating the correctness of the materialist interpretation of history is entirely wrong. The question is not whether group interests were affected; they are necessarily always affected at least in the short run. The question is whether the striving after lucre of the groups concerned was the cause of the event under discussion. For instance, were the short-run interests of the munitions industry instrumental in bringing about the bellicosity and the wars of our age? In dealing with such problems the Marxians never mention that where there are interests pro there are necessarily also interests con. They would have to explain why the latter did not prevail over the former. But the "idealist" critics of Marxism were to dull to expose any of the fallacies of dialectical materialism. They did not even notice that the Marxians resorted to their classinterest interpretation only in dealing with phenomena which were generally condemned as bad, never in dealing with phenomena of which all people approve. If one ascribes warring to the machinations of munitions capital and alcoholism to machinations of the liquor trade, it would be consistent to ascribe cleanliness to the designs of the soap manufacturers and the flowering

p. 151

of literature and education to the maneuvering of the publishing and printing industries. But neither the Marxians nor their critics ever thought of it. The outstanding fact in all this is that the Marxian doctrine of historical change has never received any judicious critique. It could triumph because its adversaries never disclosed its fallacies and inherent contradictions.

How entirely people have misunderstood Marxian materialism is shown in the common practice of lumping together Marxism and Freud's psychoanalysis. Actually no sharper contrast can be thought of than that between these two doctrines. Materialism aims at reducing mental phenomena to material causes. Psychoanalysis, on the contrary, deals with mental phenomena as with an autonomous field. While traditional psychiatry and neurology tried to explain all pathological conditions with which they were concerned as caused by definite pathological conditions of some bodily organs, psychoanalysis succeeded in demonstrating that abnormal states of the body are sometimes produced by mental factors. This discovery was the achievement of Charcot and of Josef Breuer, and it was the great exploit of Sigmund Freud to build upon this foundation a comprehensive systematic discipline. Psychoanalysis is the opposite of all brands of materialism. If we look upon it not as a branch of pure knowledge but as a method of healing the sick, we would have to call it a thymological branch (geisteswissenschaftlicher Zweig) of medicine. Freud was a modest man. He did not make extravagant p. 152

pretensions regarding the importance of his contributions. He was very cautious in touching upon problems of philosophy and branches of knowledge to the development of which he himself had not contributed. He did not venture to attack any of the metaphysical propositions of materialism. He even went so far as to admit that one day science may succeed in providing a purely physiological explanation of the phenomena psychoanalysis deals with. Only so long as this does not happen, psychoanalysis appeared to him scientifically sound and practically indispensable. He was no less cautious in criticizing Marxian materialism. He freely confessed his incompetence in this field.[2] But all this does not alter the fact that the psychoanalytical approach is essentially and substantially incompatible with the epistemology of materialism. Psychoanalysis stresses the role that the libido, the sexual impulse, plays in human life. This role had been neglected before by psychology as well as by all other branches of knowledge. Psychoanalysis also explains the reasons for this neglect. But it by no means asserts that sex is the only human urge seeking satisfaction and that all psychic phenomena are induced by it. Its preoccupation with sexual impulses arose from the fact that it started as a therapeutical method and that most of the pathological conditions it had to deal with are caused by the repression of sexual urges. The reason some authors linked psychoanalysis and Marxism was that both were considered to be at [1]. Engels, Karl Marx, Rede an seinem Grab, many editions. Reprinted in Franz Mehring, Karl Marx (2d ed. Leipzig, 1919, Leipziger Buchdruckerei Aktiengesellschaft), p. 535. p. 153

variance with theological ideas. However, with the passing of time theological schools and groups of various denominations are adopting a different evaluation of the teachings of Freud. They are not merely dropping their radical opposition as they have already done before with regard to modern astronomical and geological achievements and the theories of phylogenetic change in the structure of organisms. They are trying to integrate psychoanalysis into the system and the practice of pastoral theology. They view the study of psychoanalysis as an important part of the training for the ministry. [3]

As conditions are today, many defenders of the authority of the church are guideless and bewildered in their attitude toward philosophical and scientific problems. They condemn what they could or even should endorse. In fighting spurious doctrines, they resort to untenable objections which in the minds of those who can discern the fallaciousness of the objections rather strengthen the tendency to believe that the attacked doctrines are sound. Being unable to discover the real flaw in false doctrines, these apologists for religion may finally end by approving them. This explains the curious fact that there are nowadays tendencies in Christian writings to adopt Marxian dialectical materialism. Thus a Presbyterian theologian, Professor Alexander Miller, -----[2]. Freud, Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einfuhrung in die Psychoanalyse (Vienna, 1933), pp. 246-53. [3]. Of course, few theologians would be prepared to endorse the interpretation of an eminent Catholic historian of medicine, Professor Petro L. Entraglo, according to which Freud has ?brought to full development some of the possibilities offered by Christianity.? P. L. Entraglo, Mind and Body, trans. by A. M. Espinosa, Jr. (New York, P. J. Kennedy and Sons, 1956), p. 131. p. 154

believes that Christianity "can reckon with the truth in historical materialism and with the fact of classstruggle." He not only suggests, as many eminent leaders of various Christian denominations have done before him, that the church should adopt the essential principles of Marxian politics. He thinks the church ought to "accept Marxism" as "the essence of a scientific sociology."[4] How odd to reconcile with the Nicene creed a doctrine teaching that religious ideas are the superstructure of the material productive forces! 9. Marxian Materialism and Socialism Like many frustrated intellectuals and like almost all contemporary Prussian noblemen, civil servants, teachers, and writers, Marx was driven by a fanatical hatred of business and businessmen. He turned toward socialism because he considered it the worst punishment that could be inflicted upon the odious bourgeois. At the same time he realized that the only hope for socialism was to prevent further discussion of its pros and cons. People must be induced to accept it emotionally without asking questions about its effects. In order to achieve this, Marx adapted Hegel's philosophy of history, the official creed of the schools from which he had graduated. Hegel had arrogated to himself the faculty of revealing the Lord's hidden plans to the public. There was no reason why Doctor Marx should stand back and withhold from the people the ------[4]. Alexander Miller, The Christian Significance of Karl Marx (New York, Macmillan, 1947), pp. 801. p. 155

good tidings that an inner voice had communicated to him. Socialism, this voice announced, is bound to come because this is the course that destiny is steering. There is no use indulging in debate about the blessings or ills to be expected from a socialist or communist mode of production. Such debates would be reasonable only if men were free to choose between socialism and some alternative. Besides, being later in the succession of stages of historical evolution, socialism is also necessarily a higher and better stage, and all doubts about the benefits to be derived from it are futile.[1] The scheme of philosophy of history that describes human history as culminating and ending in socialism is the essence of Marxism, is Karl Marx's main contribution to the prosocialist ideology. Like all similar schemes including that of Hegel, it was begot by intuition. Marx called it science, Wissenschaft, because in his day no other epithet could give a doctrine higher prestige. In pre-Marxian ages it was not customary to call philosophies of history scientific. Nobody ever applied the term "science" to the prophecies of Daniel, the Revelation of St. John, or the writings of Joachim of Flora. For the same reasons Marx called his doctrine materialistic. In the environment of left-wing Hegelianism in which Marx lived before he settled in London, materialism was the accepted philosophy. It was taken for granted that philosophy and science admit of no treatment of the mind-body problem but that taught by materialism. Authors who did not want to be anathematized by their set had to avoid being suspected of any -----[1]. See below, pp. 175 ff. p. 156

concession to "idealism." Thus Marx was anxious to call his philosophy materialistic. In fact, as has been pointed out above, his doctrine does not deal at all with the mind-body problem. It does not raise the question of how the "material productive forces" come into existence and how and why they change. Marx's doctrine is not a materialist but a technological interpretation of history. But, from a political point of view, Marx did well in calling his doctrine scientific and materialistic. These predicates lent it a reputation it would never have acquired without them. Incidentally it must be noted that Marx and Engels made no effort to establish the validity of their technological interpretation of history. In the earlier days of their careers as authors they enunciated their dogmas in clear-cut, challenging formulations such as the above-quoted dictum about the hand mill and the steam mill.[2] In later years they became more reserved and cautious; after the death of Marx Engels occasionally even made remarkable concessions to the "bourgeois" and "idealistic" point of view. But never did Marx or Engels or any of their numerous followers try to give any specifications about the operation of a mechanism which would out of a definite state of the material productive forces bring forth a definite juridical, political, and spiritual superstructure. Their famous philosophy never grew beyond the abrupt enunciation of a piquant apercu. The eristic tricks of Marxism succeeded very well and enrolled hosts of pseudo intellectuals in the ranks of revolutionary socialism. But they did not discredit what ----

[2]. See above, p. 108. p. 157

economists had asserted about the disastrous consequences of a socialist mode of production. Marx had tabooed the analysis of the operation of a socialist system as utopian, that is, in his terminology, as unscientific, and he as well as his successors smeared all authors who defied this taboo. Yet these tactics did not alter the fact that all Marx contributed to the discussion on socialism was to disclose what an inner voice had told him, namely that the end and aim of mankind's historical evolution is expropriation of the capitalists. From the epistemological point of view it must be emphasized that Marxian materialism does not accomplish what a materialist philosophy claims to do. It does not explain how definite thoughts and judgments of value originate in the human mind. The exposure of an untenable doctrine is not tantamount to confirmation of a doctrine conflicting with it. There is need to state this obvious fact because many people have forgotten it. The refutation of dialectical materialism implies, of course, invalidation of the Marxian vindication of socialism. But it does not demonstrate the truth of the assertions that socialism is unrealizable, that it would destroy civilization and result in misery for all, and that its coming is not inevitable. These propositions can be established only by economic analysis. Marx and all those who sympathize with his doctrines have been aware that an economic analysis of socialism will show the fallacy of the prosocialist arguments. The Marxists cling to historical materialism and stubbornly refuse to listen to its critics because they want socialism for emotional reasons. p. 158 Materialismul dialectic este o concepie filozofic exprimat n scrierile lui Karl Marx i Friedrich Engels, iar mai trziu ale lui Gheorghi Plehanov, Vladimir Ilici Lenin i Iosif Stalin; este filozofia oficial a comunismului. Conform tezei sale principale, mprumutate din hegelianism, orice schimbare, dezvoltare sau evoluie istoric este un rezultat al luptei contrariilor. n termeni filozofici: unei teze i se opune o antitez, ceea ce duce la o sintez. Mai exact, dinamica istoriei este creat de lupta ntre clasa deintorilor de capital i a proprietarilor de pmnt, pe de o parte, i proletariat i rnime, pe de alta. Legile dialecticii istorice sunt considerate att de puternice, nct liderii individuali au o influen istoric minim. Conceput iniial cu privire la domeniul social, economic i politic, n secolul XX acest principiu a fost aplicat i n domeniul tiinific, avnd un mare efect asupra tiinei sovietice. Marx i Engels i-au expus, n general, ideile filozofice n cuprinsul unor texte polemice i n scurte studii istorice; nu exist nici o expunere sistematic a materialismului dialectic.

In Defense of Dialectical Materialism

(Young Spartacus pages)

We print below a class given by Spartacist League Central Committee member Don Alexander to the New York Spartacus Youth Club in June 2009. It has been edited for publication.

This class is just to get our feet wet, to begin to absorb the history of Marxismit wasnt born in a vacuum. The purpose of the class is to uphold dialectical and historical materialism against all forms of subjective idealism. Now, Ill make some basic assertions, just so were all on the same page, as they say. Idealism proceeds from the premise that the material world is dependent on the spiritual. It asserts that the spirit, our mind and our ideas can and do exist in separation from matter. The most extreme form of this assertion is subjective idealism. Subjective idealism asserts that matter does not exist at all, but is pure illusion. Idealism asserts that there exists a realm of the mysterious and unknowable thats above or behind what can be ascertained and known by perception, experience and science. Science is thrown out the window. Materialism, in direct contradiction, states that the world is, by its very nature, composed of matter, and that everything that exists comes into being on the basis of material causes. Everything arises and develops in accordance with the laws of motion of matter. Materialism teaches that matter is objective reality, existing outside of and independent of ideas, and that, far from the mental existing in separation from the material, ideas, including spiritual ones, are a product of material processes. Materialism also teaches that the world and its laws are knowable and that, while much in the material world might not be known, there is no unknowable sphere that lies outside of the material world. Our social consciousness reflects and is determined by our social being. I want to start with that because its not a commonplace, particularly in a period of great religiosity. Thats why the quote from the German Marxist Franz Mehring in the current Workers Vanguard is so timely [see Franz Mehring: On Historical Materialism, WV No. 938, 5 June 2009]. Mehring proceeds from the understanding that material economic conditions are primary in shaping any given society. In his pamphlet On Historical Materialism (1893), he also remarks that the human mind is not the father of the mode of production, but the mode of production is the mother of the human mind. I think this is a really good quote because it says what is. Our discussions do not take place in a vacuum. Nothing exists in isolation, either in nature or in society. Contradiction, the unity and struggle of mutually opposed forces and tendencies, is inherent within things. Change and movement operate on the basis of contradictions. Contradictions constitute the foundation of movement. In Anti-Dhring [Herr Eugen Dhrings Revolution in Science (1877-78)], Engels succinctly remarked, Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be. So in other words, comrades, there is no supreme being, there is no god setting in motion the eternal universe. I dont have to tell people here that.
Climbing Out of Obscurantism

The dialectical materialist conception is that all processes of nature and society are in a constant and uninterrupted process of change and development, of eternal becoming. Marx referred to this as a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up (Afterword to the Second German Edition, Capital, Vol. I [1873]). Its not the case that Marx is saying that all previous philosophical inquiries were rubbish. He just makes the point that the materiality of the world is demonstrated by the long and laborious development of the natural sciences. The ancient materialists anticipated modern materialism, asserting the priority of nature over consciousness and ideas. The mechanical materialists of the 17th and 18th centuries directed their fire against the medieval theologians, and they maintained that material particles in the universe are constantly bombarding each other somewhat at random. They basically viewed human beings as machines. This was materialist, but it was also mechanical. Human consciousness includes ones sensations and ideas as active factors in molding ones environment to procure the means of subsistence. (The actual conditions and methods through which this occurs vary, of course, throughout the course of history.)

Youre familiar with Ren Descartes, the early 17th-century rationalist who believed that there are certain indubitable, self-evident propositions, for instance, the famous one, cogito ergo sumI think, therefore I am. He figured out that you couldnt doubt your existence if you didnt exist. So, that almost exhausts my Latin. Another profound statement of subjective idealism was from Bishop George Berkeley, who remarkedit was in the 18th centuryesse is percipito be is to be perceived. So if you didnt see a man slipping on a piece of ice in Central Park during a day in the winter, or if you werent present when somebody turned off the light to go to sleep, then it didnt happen. Now, Im going to let Berkeley speak for himself, because unlike most of the professional philosophers defending idealism, he rarely beat around the bush. In his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) he alleged that: All the choir of heaven and the furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind...that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit. As you can see, we have been climbing our way out of obscurantism and idealist flights of fancy for a long time.
The Dialectical Method

The 1939-40 factional struggle within the then-Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is documented in Trotskys In Defense of Marxism. Trotsky wrote powerfully against the cliquist, antiSoviet opposition of Max Shachtman, James Burnham and Martin Abern. He characterized them as a petty-bourgeois opposition. They maintained that dialectical materialism didnt have anything to do with working out a concrete political position. I want to read you the opening to A Petty-Bourgeois Opposition in the Socialist Workers Party: It is necessary to call things by their right names. Now that the positions of both factions in the struggle have become determined with complete clearness, it must be said that the minority of the National Committee is leading a typical petty-bourgeois tendency. Like any petty-bourgeois group inside the socialist movement, the present opposition is characterized by the following features: a disdainful attitude toward theory and an inclination toward eclecticism; disrespect for the tradition of their own organization; anxiety for personal independence at the expense of anxiety for objective truth; nervousness instead of consistency; readiness to jump from one position to another; lack of understanding of revolutionary centralism and hostility toward it; and finally, inclination to substitute clique ties and personal relationships for party discipline. Not all the members of the opposition of course manifest these features with identical strength. Nevertheless, as always in a variegated bloc the tinge is given by those who are most distant from Marxism and proletarian policy. A prolonged and serious struggle is obviously before us. Following Engels, Trotsky pointed out that, just as Darwin revealed the laws of development of living species of organic matter, so Marx revealed the laws of development of human history. (Darwin was not a conscious dialectician.) The economic forces of production play an indispensable role: they are the ultimate determining factor in social and economic life. The relationships between human beings producing their means of material survival determine the actual relations of production. Seeyou have to be able to eat and have clothing and shelter, to cooperate in some form or fashion, in order to be able to wrest a living from nature. Upon this rests the entire superstructure of societythe art and the politics and religion and the philosophy and the morality. This doesnt rule out, of course, the effects of the superstructure upon the economic base. The father of Russian Marxism, Georgi Plekhanov, had the highest praise for Antonio Labriola, the Italian Marxist, a great materialist thinker. But in The Materialist Conception of History (1897), Plekhanov pointed out

that one of the weaknesses of Labriola was his tendency to isolate racial factors, explaining the development of human societies in terms of their norms of beauty and their rituals, etc. Its not that these things shouldnt be studied. Plekhanov gives the example of why women among the Ishavs in the Caucasus cut off their braids on the death of a brother, but not on the death of their husbandswhat does this mean? Well, this stuff is interesting, but ultimately you have to look at how people procure their means of subsistence. Thats whats dominant. Comrades, the dialectical method is not merely a question of development in the abstract. Theres a bourgeois-liberal doctrine of development, of gradualness, that ignores the fact that there are leaps in nature and society, that one form of matter transforms into another through a sudden change. The dialectical method posits that everything in nature and society can only be understood in its fundamental connections with everything else and in its constant movement from simpler forms to higher forms, from quantity into quality. Trotsky gave many examples about formal logic and its use and its limitations in this superb book, In Defense of Marxism. You know: The Aristotelian logic of the simple syllogism starts from the proposition that A is equal to A. This postulate is accepted as an axiom for a multitude of practical human actions and elementary generalizations. But in reality A is not equal to A. This is easy to prove if we observe these two letters under a lensthey are quite different from each other. But, one can object, the question is not of the size or the form of the letters, since they are only symbols for equal quantities, for instance, a pound of sugar. The objection is beside the point; in reality a pound of sugar is never equal to a pound of sugara more delicate scale always discloses a difference. Again one can object: but a pound of sugar is equal to itself. Neither is this trueall bodies change uninterruptedly in size, weight, color, etc. Every worker knows that it is impossible to make two completely equal objects. In the elaboration of bearing-brass into cone bearings, a certain deviation is allowed for the cones which should not, however, go beyond certain limits (this is called tolerance). By observing the norms of tolerance, the cones are considered as being equal. (A is equal to A.) When the tolerance is exceeded the quantity goes over into quality; in other words, the cone bearings become inferior or completely worthless. Trotsky succinctly describes dialectical thought as the following: Dialectical thinking is related to vulgar thinking in the same way that a motion picture is related to a still photograph. The motion picture does not outlaw the still photograph but combines a series of them according to the laws of motion.... We call our dialectic, materialist, since its roots are neither in heaven nor in the depths of our free will, but in objective reality, in nature.
Successive Approximations

The German philosopher Georg Hegel was an absolute idealist who was very critically assimilated by Marxists, Lenin especially, and many others. He viewed history as the unfolding of the absolute idea. However, he also recognized that everything that exists changes uninterruptedly; everything comes into being and then passes out of existence. Marx and Engels stood his dialectical idealism, as they said, right side up and extracted its rational kernel from its mystical shell. In the aftermath of the defeat of the 1905 Revolution in Russia, Lenin had to fight for dialectical materialism against those known as the god seekers of his party, the Lunacharskys and the Bogdanovs. He forcefully defended the materialist dialectic against its detractors. The article Lenin as Philosopher (Labour Review, September-October 1957) by Peter Fryer is just incredibly good, and Ill get back to that. The Healyites, pseudo-Trotskyist political bandits who in 1959 formed the British Socialist Labour League, threw away a very valuable cadre. With characteristic modesty, Fryer wanted to know why we had such praise of him in the issue of Spartacist with our

article Healyism Implodes (Spartacist [English-language edition] No. 36-37, Winter 1985-86). He didnt think what he wrote was such a big deal, but he was certainly happy about the truthful account we gave of life in the Healyite jungle. That organization abused dialectics very regularly in the service of opportunist politics. As we explained in Healyism Implodes, they resolved the contradiction between a formally correct program and a corrupt internal regime: by sharp programmatic departures from Trotskyism: principally, their embrace of the Maoist Cultural Revolution, which was at bottom nothing but an unusually degrading and violent falling out between sections of the Chinese Stalinist bureaucracy; and their line on the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Day War when, in the name of fighting Zionist racism and expansionism, they embraced a totally classless concept of an Arab Revolution consisting of the despotic nationalist regimes which have cravenly colluded with imperialism and Zionism to dismember the Palestinian nation. Now, in Lenin as Philosopher, Peter Fryer writes about E.P. Thompson, who was a preeminent British Marxoid historian. Thompsons The Making of the English Working Class (1963) is still worth the readI learned a lot from that. But Thompson claimsand Fryer refutes himthat Marxism is a form of economic reductionism that negates the subjective factor, or what he calls the human agency. In other words, Marxism ignores, allegedly, the role of human consciousness as an active factor. Thompson accuses Lenin of viewing consciousness as nothing but a passive mirror reflection of social reality. That is just exactly the opposite of the truth. Fryer uses two really wonderful quotes from Leninthese come from Lenins Philosophical Notebooks (1914)which sum up dialectical knowledge as an endless process of the deepening of mens knowledge of things, phenomena, processes, etc., proceeding from appearance to essence and from essence less profound to essence more profound. And, When human intelligence grapples with a particular thing, draws from it an image (= a concept), that is not a simple, direct, dead act, it is not a reflection in a mirror, but a complex, twofold, zigzag act.
Scientific Investigation of History

The International Communist League intervened in the unfolding political revolution in East Germany in 1989-90 based upon a program for proletarian political revolution in the East and socialist revolution in the West [see For the Communism of Lenin and Trotsky! Spartacist (English-language edition) No. 47-48, Winter 1992-93]. We didnt win, but we fought, and thats key. Afterwards, we had extensive discussion to try to grasp the various aspects of what had happened in that very complex, rapidly developing incipient revolution. Jan Norden, who in 1996 would defect from our organization to co-found the Internationalist Group (IG), belittled and denied the ICLs role as the conscious revolutionary vanguard. He repeatedly claimed, the key element was missing, revolutionary leadership. The polemical reply, that we were the revolutionary leadership in Germany, has a core of truth but is still insufficient. Science proceeds through successive approximations. What happened was not simply determined by what we did, although what we did was very important. To say otherwise ignores the actual balance of forces and is radically false, both politically and theoretically. While imprisoned under Mussolini, the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci wrote in The Modern Prince about the formation of what he called a collective will, that is, a compact group struggling for power. As Gramsci put it: The active politician is a creator, an awakener, but he neither creates from nothing nor moves in the turbid void of his own desires and dreams. He bases himself on effective reality, but what is this effective reality? Is it something static and immobile or is it not rather a relationship of forces in continuous movement and change of equilibrium? To apply the will to the creation of a new balance of the really existing and operating forces, basing oneself on that particular force which one considers progressive, giving it the means to triumph, is still to move within the sphere of effective reality, but in order to dominate and overcome it (or contribute to this).

Heres what Fryer says: sometimes there are unforeseen consequences of what one struggles for. He says that: The materialist recognition of the objectivity of being and its laws is, not yet freedom, but the requisite for all real freedom. It is of course perfectly true that men act with conscious aims and intentions. But no attempt to explain human history in terms of the conscious aims and intentions, wills and desires of men will advance our understanding very far. Mans aims clash, and something happens which no one had intended, desired or foreseen. Therefore any scientific understanding of social development has to start from the inner general laws which ultimately govern both the development of human society and the aims and intentions, ideas and theories, in peoples heads. So mens aims clash. There were also forces that were active in East Germany in 1989-90 that tried to stop this process of incipient political revolution cold. One was Gorbachevs Stalinist bureaucracy. After the January 3 demonstration against the fascist desecration of a memorial to Soviet soldiers at East Berlins Treptow Park, the German imperialists launched a furious anti-communist campaign. Then we saw the Stalinists driving full steam with the anti-Soviet, pro-capitalist West German Social Democratic Partywhich we called the Trojan horse of capitalist counterrevolutionfor capitalist reunification. [See Workers Soviets Must Rule in All Germany! WV No. 948, 4 December 2009.] Marxism is a scientific investigation of history that places the acts of individuals in their concrete historical context. So comrade Bert Masons article in the current Workers Vanguard was a fine contribution on the role of Lincoln in the American Civil War [Honor Abraham Lincoln! WV No. 938, 5 June 2009]. Lenin as Philosopher is superb; its a masterful analysis of dialectical contradictions. I especially appreciated that Fryer put his analysis in the context of World War I, when Lenin was studying Hegel and grappling with the betrayal by the German Social Democrats who had deserted to the side of their own bourgeoisie during the first imperialist world war. How did such a formidable workers party, with vast influence in the German proletariat, come to that state of opportunist degeneration? What was the process of economic and political and social development that led to their social-patriotic capitulation? Well, thats what Lenin dealt with in his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916). He examined all the phases of the development of an opportunist layer within the working class. Without this, one couldnt understand how quantity turned into quality. Mutually opposed, contradictory tendencies are inherent in all phenomena of nature and society. Lenin explained how the unity and conflict of oppositions, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in this case, worked themselves out. Lenin assiduously studied Hegel, and we have to, too. I wrote a short note about an article in Workers Vanguard that was uncritical of the American philosopher John Dewey, that quoted Dewey approvingly without criticizing him philosophically (On John Dewey, WV No. 924, 7 November 2008). The same Dewey who had a role in fighting the frameup of Trotsky by the Stalinist epigones was an opponent of Marxism and of the October Revolution. Dewey was a pragmatist, not any kind of dialectical materialist. Trotsky scathingly denounced pragmatism as a mixture of rationalism and empiricismempiricism means ones own sense impressions are the ultimate source of knowledge. It doesnt mean that empiricists completely say that theres no independently existing objective world out there. Trotsky denounced pragmatism as the curse of American thought and insisted that an unpostponable task of the SWPthis was in 1939-40 was to educate its cadres in the philosophy of dialectical materialism.
Against Philosophical Idealism

This talk wouldnt be complete without a short exposition on the manifestations of the various forms of subjective idealism. Lenin argued that, ultimately, idealism is clericalism. In popular terms, its sort of like thinking makes it so. You have probably heard the vulgar version of it: if a tree crashes in the forest and I wasnt present, then it didnt crash. That, ultimately, logically, leads to what is called

solipsismthat the only things that are real are ones own subjective impressions and thoughts and sensations. Many years ago, through a rather laborious process, I studied some of the idealists, who are important to understand. Immanuel Kant, the German idealist, was very interesting, but difficult to read in many ways. His key work, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), sought to reconcile idealism and materialism. Kant didnt deny the existence of things in themselves, just our ability to know them. He formulated this along the following lines: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? How do we arrive at truth independent of human experience and scientific experimentation? Essentially, what he argues for are the propositions of what is known as common sense, which is really unsystematized and pre-scientific. Kant also studied astronomy, which made him very interesting. But he tried to reconcile materialism and idealism. In Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1886), Engels had to deal with such thinkers. Of course, he made his way through Ludwig Feuerbach, who rightly criticized Hegel for his absolute idealism. Marx, in his Theses on Feuerbach (1845), characterized Feuerbachs materialism as contemplative, noting that for Feuerbach, things, reality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. In A Petty-Bourgeois Opposition in the Socialist Workers Party, Trotsky referred to a conversation he had with a certain British political economist who echoed the liberal economist John Maynard Keynes. Keynes was a proponent of priming the pump, and deficit spending to stimulate demand, and government investment in order to arrest the endemic financial and economic crises of capitalism some of the stuff that Obama and his administration are tinkering with. On the basis of his discussion with this political economist, with his praise for Keynes and his hatred of Marx, Trotsky concluded that he was an opponent of materialist dialectics in his general outlook. Trotsky says: If it is possible to place a given persons general type of thought on the basis of his relation to concrete practical problems, it is also possible to predict approximately, knowing his general type of thought, how a given individual will approach one or another practical question. That is the incomparable educational value of the dialectical method of thought.
Marxism: A Guide to Action

We have applied this dialectical materialist methodology to many questions. You can look at Cuba and Marxist Theory (Marxist Bulletin No. 8) where we applied our dialectic, materialist methodology in assessing the formation of a bureaucratically deformed workers state in Cuba. A petty-bourgeois-led, guerrillaist movement led to the destruction of capitalism in Cuba without the leadership of a Trotskyist party. Developing that understanding required the application of a dialectical materialist methodology. It was part of the preservation and extension of our fundamental Marxist program. This is the same thing as with the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA)you have to appreciate the role of actual contradictions. The EFCA was a referendum on unionization, with the National Association of Manufacturers and other bosses organizations waging a major campaign against it while the AFL-CIO and Change to Win union federations campaigned for its passage. While warning the workers against any reliance on any government-prescribed mechanisms of class collaboration, we would support the EFCA in its original form because the card-check provision would make it somewhat easier to organize unions. We drew the class line without hiding our criticism of the role of the defeatist, class-collaborationist union bureaucrats. We examined the concretes of the EFCA with its living contradictions, not on the basis of speculation, but on the basis of scientific investigation of history. Our investigation included what the Socialist Workers Party, the Trotskyists of the time, wrote about the 1935 Wagner Act, which contributed to more comrades doing research on the history of the Marxist movement. [See Why Marxists Support the EFCA, WV No. 929, 30 January 2009.]

Dialectics is not a master key for all questions; you have to make a concrete, scientific analysis. I want to end with a quote from Lenin as Philosopher, which I think is really apropos of what were talking about: Mens power to change their world progressively crystallizes out and perfects the scientific element in their concepts; their relative helplessness on the other hand gives rise to the tendency of abstract ideas to fly away from reality and weave themselves into marvelous, internally consistent systems of myth and illusion, from which the real world and real relationships of men to nature and men to men are then deduced. A comrade asked why do we need to read anything by this Gramsci guy? Wasnt Gramsci antiTrotsky, and so on. Definitely on the Trotsky-Stalin question, Gramsci went not for Trotsky but for Stalin. So that was his contradiction. But he had some very penetrating observations about consciousness, the relationship between the subjective and the objective, and how an objective, concrete analysis of the relationship of forces in the national and international context is critical to deciding how to apply ones program. Its very helpful. Its a terrible waste to dismiss somebody like that. Just like dismissing Plekhanov, whose renegacy is well known. Following the defeat of the 1905 Revolution, Plekhanov denounced the December Moscow insurrection as an adventure, and in 1917 he opposed the seizure of power by the Bolshevik-led workers. Importantly, however, he never joined hands with those Mensheviks and others who tried to mobilize against the revolution. In the course of the Civil War following the 1917 Revolution, Lenin concluded that theres no way that you could be a genuine communist without understanding Hegels logic, Plekhanovs philosophical works, and Marxs Capital. Thats a challenge to us to rise to a higher theoretical level, because thats the only way to prepare ourselves for the tasks of the struggle for a communist future. Its a laborious, worthwhile, lifelong process.

Dialectical materialism BIBLIOGRAPHY Dialectical materialism was the name given by the doctrinaires and political stalwarts of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to official Soviet philosophy. Others regarded it more as an ideology, but either way dialectical materialism was a constituent part of the major political innovation of the twentieth-century, official Soviet Marxism. Whether or not dialectical materialism was well formed enough to give adequate or appropriate support to the Soviet experiment is, of course, another question, and a much-debated one. Because CPSU officials and stalwarts were powerful enough to impose their definitions on a captive audience, dialectical material-ismwhich was commonly given the acronymic form DiaMatenjoyed a remarkable shelf life during the mid-twentieth century. But, as a concept, its sellby date is by now long past. Dialectical was often confused with historical materialism. (In Dialectical and Historical Materialism, a book supposedly written by Joseph Stalin during the 1930s, it is unclear whether the author wishes to separate the two or run them together.) Their conflation was and is mistaken: Historical materialisms register is historiographicalit is a mode of historical and sociopolitical analysiswhereas dialectical materialism, whose register is philosophical and scientific, throws nature and its laws, along with the supposed laws of thought, into the mix. One might say that whereas dialectical encompasses historical materialism, the latter can and did flourish among thinkers to whom dialectical materialism was an embarrassmentWestern Marxists and critical theorists prominent among them. The addition of nature and thought, which was first and foremost the contribution of Friedrich Engels (18201895), did nothing to make DiaMat philosophically coherent. DiaMat was, rather, a hodgepodge of philosophy and science that confused the pursuit or advance of (mainly scientific) knowledge in the world with the attainment of truth about the world.

At a basic level, DiaMat regarded historical or social evolution as an aspect or facet of natural evolution, and as being subject to the same laws as those that govern natural evolutionlaws that are said but not shown to be dialectical in character. (Engels was as uncomfortable as many other Victorian gentlemen with the aleatory, non-teleological character of Darwins principle of natural selection.) When we ask who was the first to run together natural laws, historical laws, and the laws of thought, it is Engels, not Marx, who instantly snaps into focus. (Marx, for the record, never even used the term historical materialism, though he did not protest when Engels in a review designated Marxs method as an instance of the materialist interpretation of history.) While it was Georgi Plekhanov, the father of Russian Marxism, who coined the term dialectical materialism, the concept was first authoritatively enacted by V. I. Lenin (18701924), who regarded Engelss and Plekhanovs legacy as giving intellectual ballast to the copy-theory of perception he advanced in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1908). In fact, Lenins theory of perception involved a divergence from Engelss account, since materialism to Engels was not the same as epistemological realism. [Engelss] medley of metaphysical materialism and Hegelian dialectics was conserved by Lenin, but [Lenins] own theory of cognitionwhich was all that really mattered to himwas not strictly speaking dependent on it. Matter as an absolute substance, or constitutive element of the universe, is not required for a doctrine which merely postulates that the mind is able to arrive at universally true conclusions about the external world given to the senses (Lichtheim 1974, pp. 7071). (As an aside, the contemporary philosopher Donald Davidson argues that the question whether an accurate representation of reality in thought is possible, let alone desirableLenin thought it was bothis undecidable and should be discarded from philosophy altogether.) The compatibility of Lenin with Engels (or Marx, for that matter) was in the event eclipsed by Russian Marxist notables need to establish orthodoxy, to produce a canon, a continuous, unbroken line of succession stretching from Hegel through Marx through Engels through Plekhanov through Lenin through Stalin (and whoever else was la page at the time). Engels of course could have had no foreknowledge of what Soviet stalwarts would do with his doctrine. His sights had been set, not on a nonexistent CPSU, but on German social democracy and, by extension, the Second International (18851914). Engels cannot be held directly responsible for the transformation of his speculations into a state dogma imposed on a captive audience. Even so, at a less direct level Engels has much to answer for. He did much to make the sorry Soviet sequence of DiaMat luminaries possible. These swiftly awarded Engels canonical status, and presented him as enjoying a status he had never claimed, as someone coeval and on an equal footing with Marx. There can be no doubt that Engelss presentation of his intellectual partnership with Marx, second fiddle or no second fiddle, aided and abetted the spurious continuity between Marx and Stalin that DiaMat required. (This continuity was celebrated by cold warriors in the West as well as the East, for it provided the former with an easy arguably, too easytarget). Such continuity depended throughout on an idea Engels encouraged after Marxs death in 1883: that in writing about (and conflating) the laws of nature, history, and thought, Engels was faithfully fulfilling his part in an agreed-upon division of labor, according to which Engels produced texts that were interchangeable with Marxs texts on some subjects and supplementary to, but always compatible with, and true to Marxs works on others. Without this supposition DiaMat would not and could not have taken the seamless form it took; but there is no evidence that the supposition itself could withstand serious, critical examination. The disservice done to Marx by the later Engels was a disservice to philosophy at large: It turned Marxism at the official level into the kind of universal weltanschauung or worldview that Marx never intended to provide. Marxism-Leninism constructed around Marxs writings, to the extent that these were made available (and they were not rushed into print as Engelss were), a key to unlock every door, a grand theory concerned with the ultimate laws and constituents of the universe. Marx himself had maintained discretion on such cosmic questions. Naturalism and cosmology were domains distant from the critique of political economy that was Marxs lifework. Worse still, it was in a sense precisely because Marx had remained reticent on these issues that his self-styled Soviet epigonesto whom such silence seemed unnervingfelt the need to fill in nonexistent gaps and construct a coherent, comprehensive system of materialist metaphysics. Marxs considered reticence, it could be (and was) argued, constituted not a failure of scholarly nerve but a well-judged reluctance to extend his arguments into areas where they could have no meaningful application.

Even though Engelss interpretation of Marxism is in significant respects at variance with what Marx had bequeathed him (and us), Engels took care to advance it in Marxs name. This immeasurably helped DiaMat set the tone for more than a generation of official Soviet Marxists. While DiaMat did not pass unquestioned in the West, particularly among Western Marxists and critical theorists, it ruled the roost and attained canonical status in the USSR, its satellites, and China. There was throughout its elaboration an inbuilt, fatal flaw: If nature is conceived materialistically, it does not lend itself to dialectical method, and if, conversely, the dialectic (a category that Hegel had confined within logic, and that was to be of no real use to Marx) is read back into nature, there is no real place or need for materialism. The misapplication of the dialectic into natural processes then either endows the structure of reality with a purposive, teleological striving (which would fly in the face of Darwin, if not of Darwinism), or it stretches the concept of dialectical change to the point of tautology: Anything that happens is said to be a development involving qualitative as well as quantitative change (see Lichtheim 1965, p. 254; cf. 247248). Paid positions for philosophers who accepted the precepts of DiaMat (or who said they did) came into existence as the fledgling Soviet rgime consolidated itself. But, unsurprisingly, between 19301955, philosophical discussions among (Soviet) Marxists were stifled, the publication of books and articles became virtually nonexistent, and the teaching of philosophy in the USSR was greatly reduced (Loone 1993, p. 158). Engelss third law of dialectics (the negation of the negation) was unceremoniously jettisoned by Stalin, and Engelss first law (the transformation of quantity into quality) was relegated by Chairman Mao to the status of a special instance of Engelss second law (the interpenetration of opposites). These doctrinal modifications could be regarded as refinements, or as signs that DiaMat was beginning to collapse beneath its own weighteven before the political system it was said to uphold imploded at the institutional level. Lichtheim has called DiaMat an intellectual disaster, and it is not hard to see why. It was also, after all, a kind of politically charged quodlibet for the philosophically tone-deaf. Marxism BIBLIOGRAPHY Bhaskar, Roy. 1993. Dialectic. In The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought, ed. William Outhwaite and Tom Bottomore, 154157. Oxford: Blackwell. Graham, Loren R. 1972. Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union. New York: Knopf. Jordan, Z. A. 1967. The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism: A Philosophical and Sociological Analysis. London and New York: Macmillan. Kuusinen, O. W., et al. 1960. Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. Trans. and ed. Clemens Dutt. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House. Lichtheim, George. 1965. Dialectical Materialism. In his Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study, 244 248. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Praeger. Lichtheim, George. 1974 (1971). On the Interpretation of Marxs Thought. In his From Marx to Hegel, 63 79. New York: Seabury. Loone, Eero. 1993. Dialectical Materialism. In The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth Century Social Thought, ed. William Outhwaite and Tom Bottomore, 157158. Oxford: Blackwell. Marcuse, Herbert. 1958. Soviet Marxism. London and New York: Columbia University Press. Thomas, Paul. 1999. Engels and Scientific Socialism. In Engels after Marx, ed. Manfred B. Steger and Terrell Carver, 215231. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Wetter, Gustav A. 1958. Dialectical Materialism: A Historical and Systematic Survey of Philosophy in the Soviet Union. Trans. Peter Heath. Rev. ed. London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Paul Thomas

Dialectical materialism

Is the philosophical basis of Marxism as defined by later Communists and their Parties (sometimes called "orthodox" Marxism). As the name signals, it is an outgrowth of both Hegel's dialecticsand Ludwig Feuerbach's and Karl Marx's philosophical materialism, and is most directly traced to Marx's fellow thinker, Friedrich Engels. Dialectical materialism may be defined as the philosophical doctrine which claims to "put Hegel's dialectics back on its feet" (Marx) and asserts that "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." (The Communist Manifesto, 1848). It is contrasted with historical materialism, which rather designs Marx's methodological approach to the study of society, economics and history. Dialectical materialism is essentially characterized by the belief that history is the product of class struggle and obeys to the general hegelian principle of philosophy of history, that is the development of the thesisinto its antithesis which is sublated by the synthesis which conserves the thesis and the antithesis while at the same time abolishing it (Aufheben this contradiction explains the difficulties of Hegel's thought). Hegel's dialectics aims at explaining the growth and development of human history. He considered thattruth was the product of history and passed through various moments, including the moment of error error, or also negativity, is part of the development of truth Marx's dialectical materialism considers, against Hegel's idealism, that history is not the product of the Spirit (Geist or also Zeitgeist the "Spirit of the Time") but the effect of material class struggle in society. Theory thus has its roots in the materiality of social existence. However, "dialectical materialism" also refers to diamat (an abbreviation for "dialectical materialism"), that is the orthodox Marxism imposed by Stalin on the Comintern and onCommunist states. Marx, however, never used the term of "dialectical materialism" itself, which was probably invented in 1887 by Joseph Dietzgen, a socialist tanner whom corresponded with Marx. Georgi Plekhanov, the father of Russian socialism, later used it and it thus entered Marxist theory. Marx had talked about the "materialist conception of history", which was later shortened to "historical materialism" by Engels. Engels exposed the "materialist dialectic" not "dialectical materialism" in his Dialectics of Nature (1883). Diamat was debated and criticized by many Marxist philosophers, which led to various political and philosophical struggles in the Marxist movement in general and in the Comintern in particular.

Contents

A brief history of dialectical materialism thought

Lenin's Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1908) and the 1917 October Revolution
Dialectical materialism was first elaborated by Lenin in Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1908) around three axes: the "materialist inversion" of Hegelian dialectics, the historicity of ethical principles ordered to class struggleand the convergence of "laws of evolution" in physics (Hemlholtz), biology (Darwin) and in political economics (Marx). Lenin hence took position between a historicist Marxism (Labriola) and a determinist Marxism, close to "social darwinism" (Kautsky). Following the 1917 October

Revolution, Soviet philosophydivided itself between "dialecticians" (Deborine) and "mechanists" (Bukharin).

Georg Lukcs' History and Class Consciousness (1921-23) and the Vth Comintern Congress (1924)
Georg Lukcs, who had been minister of Culture in Bela Kun's short-livedHungarian Soviet Republic (1919), published History and Class Consciousness in 1923, in which he defined dialectical materialism as the knowledge of society as a whole, knowledge which in itself was immediately the class consciousness of the proletariat. In the first chapter, "What is Orthodox Marxism?", Lukcs defined orthodoxy as the fidelity to the "Marxist method", and not to the "dogmas": "Orthodox Marxism, therefore, does not imply the uncritical acceptance of the results of Marxs investigations. It is not the belief in this or that thesis, nor the exegesis of a sacred book. On the contrary, orthodoxy refers exclusively to method. It is the scientific conviction that dialectical materialism is the road to truth and that its methods can be developed, expanded and deepened only along the lines laid down by its founders." (1)

Joseph Dietzgen, the inventor of the term "dialectical materialism".

Lukcs criticized revisionist attempts by calling to the return to this Marxist method. In much the same way that Althusser would latter define Marxism and psychoanalysis as "conflictual sciences" [1], Lukcs conceives "revisionism" and political splits as inherent to Marxist theory and praxis, insofar as dialectical materialism is, according to him, the product of class struggle: "For this reason the task of orthodox Marxism, its victory over Revisionism andutopianism can never mean the defeat, once and for all, of false tendencies. It is an ever-renewed struggle against the insidious effects of bourgeois ideology on the thought of the proletariat. Marxist orthodoxy is no guardian of traditions, it is the eternally vigilant prophet proclaiming the relation between the tasks of the immediate present and the totality of the historical process." (end of 5) Furthermore, he stated that "The premise of dialectical materialism is, we recall: 'It is not mens consciousness that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness.'... Only when the core of existence stands revealed as a social process can existence be seen as the product, albeit the hitherto unconscious product, of human activity." (5) In line with Marx's thought, he thus criticized the individualist bourgeois philosophy of the subject, which founds itself on the voluntary andconscious subject. Against this ideology, he asserts the primacy of social relations. Existence and thus the world is the product of human activity; but this can be seen only if the primacy of social process on individual consciousness, which is but the effect of ideological

mystification, is accepted. This doesn't entails that Lukcs restrains human liberty on behalf of some kind of sociological determinism: to the contrary, this production of existence is the possibility of praxis. This heterodox definition, however, which he maintained by asserting that "orthodox Marxism" is fidelity to the Marxist "method", and not to "dogmas", was condemned, along with Karl Korsch's work, in July 1924, during the Vth Comintern Congress, by Grigory Zinoviev.

Stalin's codification of diamat

In 1931, Stalin decided of the issue of the debate between dialecticians and mechanists by publishing a decreewhich identified dialectical materialism to Marxism-Leninism. He then codified it in Dialectical and Historical Materialism (1938) by enumerating the "laws of dialectics", which are the grounds of particular disciplines and in particular of the science of history, and which guarantees their conformity to the "proletarian conception of the world". Thus, diamat imposed itself on most Communist parties.

Marxist criticisms of dialectical materialism

However, the doctrine of dialectical materialism has been criticized by many Marxist theorists, including Marxist philosophers such as Antonio Gramsci, who opposed a Marxist "philosophy of praxis", or Louis Althusser. Other thinkers in Marxist philosophy have had recourse to the original texts of Marx and Engels and have created other Marxist philosophical projects and concepts which are rival alternatives to dialectical materialism. As soon as1937, Mao Zedong had opposed another interpretation in his essay On Contradiction, in which he rejected the "laws of dialectics" and insisted on the complexity of the contradiction, a text from which Althusser would inspire himself in For Marx (1965). Althusser would also complexify the Marxist concept of "contradiction" by borrowing to psychoanalysis its concept of "overdetermination". Althusser would criticize the teleological reading of Marx, which he criticized as a return to Hegel's idealism, and developped a conception of "random materialism" (matrialisme alatoire), which cut away from the "philosophy of the subject" which had been in force in the Western world for several centuries. Another school of thought, led by Italian philosopher Ludovico Geymonat, constructed a historical epistemology from dialectical materialism .

Materialism in dialectical materialism

Marx's thesis concerned Epicurus and Democritus' atomism, considered as the founder, along with stoicism, ofmaterialism philosophy. He was thus familiar with Lucretius' theory of clinamen, etc. Materialism asserts the primacy of the material world: in short, matter precedes thought. Additionally, materialism holds that the world is material; that all phenomena in the universe consist of "matter in motion", wherein all things are interdependent and interconnected and develop in accordance with natural law; that the world exists outside us and independently of our perception of it; that thought is a reflection of the material world in the brain, and that the world is in principleknowable.

"The ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." --Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Vol. 1. Marx thus endorsed a materialist philosophy against Hegel's idealism; he "turned Hegel's dialectics upside down". However, Marx's materialist position is not to be confused with simple materialism: in fact, he criticized classic materialism as another idealist philosophy. According to the famous Theses on Feuerbach (1845), philosophy had to stop "interpreting" the world in endless metaphysical debates, in order to start "transforming" the world. Which the rising workers' movement, observed by Engels in England (Chartist movement) and by Marx in France and Germany, was precisely doing. Historical materialism is therefore the primacy accorded to class struggle. The ultimate sense of Marx's materialism philosophy is that philosophy itself must take position in the class struggle, if it is not to be reduced to spiritualist Idealism (such as Kant or Hegel's philosophies) which are, in fact, onlyideologies, that is the material product of social existence. Marx's materialism thus latter opened up the way forFrankfurt School's critical theory, which combined philosophy with the social sciences in an attempt to diagnosticize the ailments of society. Dialectical materialism itself would however be reduced to the diamatorthodox theory.

Dialectics in dialectical materialism

For formal approaches, the main predication of 'dialectical opposition or contradiction' must be understood as 'some sense' opposition between the objects involved in a directly associated context. 'Dialectical contradiction' is not reducible to simple 'opposites' or 'negation'. Dialectics is the science of the general and abstract laws of the development of nature, society, and thought. Its principal features are: 1) The universe is not a disconnected mix of things isolated from each other, but an integral whole, with the result that things are interdependent. 2) Nature - the natural world or cosmos - is in a state of constant motion: "All nature, from the smallest thing to the biggest, from a grain of sand to the sun, from the protista to man, is in a constant state of coming into being and going out of being, in a constant flux, in a ceaseless state of movement and change." --Friedrich Engels, Dialectics of Nature. 3) Development is a process whereby insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes lead to fundamental, qualitative changes. The latter occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, in the form of a leap from one state to another. A simple example from the physical world might be the heating of water: a one degree increase in temperature is a quantitive change, but at 100 degrees there is a qualitative change - water to steam.

"Merely quantitative differences, beyond a certain point, pass into qualitative changes." --Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1. 4) All things contain within themselves internal dialectical contradictions, which are the primary cause of motion, change, and development in the world.

Laws of dialectics

The three laws of dialectics are: The law of the unity and conflict of opposites; The law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes; The law of the negation of the negation

The application of the dialectic to history is covered more in Historical materialism.

Quotations
"The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is apractical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the thisworldliness of his thinking in practice." --Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach

Endnotes
1. Louis Althusser, "Marx and Freud", in Writings on Psychoanalysis, Stock/IMEC, 1993 (French
edition) 2.

Selected readings on dialectical materialism

Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Friedrich Engels

Anti-Dhring, Friedrich Engels Dialectics of Nature, Friedrich Engels Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, V.I. Lenin On the Question of Dialectics, V.I. Lenin Dialectical and Historical Materialism, Joseph Stalin On Contradiction, Mao Tse-tung On the Materialist Dialectic, Louis Althusser Dialectical Materialism, V.G. Afanasyev Materialism And Historical Materialism, Anton Pannekoek Reason in Revolt, Marxist Philosophy and Modern Science, Ted Grant and Alan Woods History and Class Consciousness, Georg Lukacs Ioan, Petru "Logic and Dialectics" AI CUZA University Press, IASI 1998.

Joseph Dietzgen Friedrich Engels Karl Marx Ludovico Geymonat

Dialectical materialism Is the philosophical expression of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism. The name refers to the notion that Marxism is a materialist worldview with a dialectical method. It was developed by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in the mid-late eighteenth century and further elaborated by later Marxist theorists. Dialectical materialism holds that the world, including human beings, is "matter in motion" and that progress occurs through struggle. It follows the Hegelian principle of thephilosophy of history, namely the development of the thesis into its antithesis, which is in turn superseded by a synthesis that conserves aspects of the thesis and the antithesis while at the same time abolishing them. While retaining Hegel's dialectical method, however, Marx and Engels reacted against Hegel's idealism. Thus, history is not the result of the progressive unfolding of the Spirit, but of class struggle in society, in which economics is the determining factor. Moreover, while quantitative change may be gradual, qualitative change involves an abrupt, violent leap to a higher stage. In society, this means that only violent revolution can bring about the shift from private ownership to socialism andcommunism which Marx and Engels envisioned. Dialectical materialism was debated and criticized by various Marxist philosophers, which led to a number of political and philosophical struggles in the Marxist movement in general and in the Comintern in particular. After the success of the Russian Revolution in 1917, the proper interpretation of dialectical materialism became a subject of state policy. The official Soviet version of dialectical materialism, as codified by Josef Stalin was known as diamat. It became the official philosophy of the Soviet state and had a major influence on Soviet intellectual tradition, which was required to adhere to its teachings as official dogma. Hundreds of millions of people were indoctrinated in the principles of dialectical materialism in theSoviet Union and China during the twentieth century.
Contents

1 Marxist materialism 2 Marxist dialectics 3 Historical materialism 4 Soviet dialectical materialism

4.1 Lenin's contributions 4.2 Stalin's codification of diamat

5 Marxist criticisms of dialectical materialism 6 Legacy 7 See also

8 Notes 9 References 10 External links 11 Credits

Marxist materialism

Like other materialists of their day, Marx and Engels asserted the primacy of the material world: in short, matter precedes thought. Thus, there is no God who conceived the world, but rather humans, who are essentially material beings, conceived God. In addition, there is no spiritual world, heaven, or hell, beyond the material world. All phenomena in the universe consist of "matter in motion." All things are interconnected and develop in accordance with natural law. The physical world is an objective reality and exists independently of our perception of it. Perception is thus a reflection of the material world in the brain, and the world is truly knowable, when objectively perceived. The ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought (Karl Marx, Das Kapital, Vol. 1).

Marx thus endorsed a materialist philosophy against Hegel's idealism. However, he also criticized classical materialism as type idealist philosophy. According to his and Engels'Theses on Feuerbach (1845), philosophy had to stop "interpreting" the world in endless metaphysical debates, in order to start "transforming" the world. The rising workers' movement, observed by Engels in England and by Marx in France and Germany, was engaging in precisely that transformational revolution. Historical materialismthe application of dialectical materialism to the analysis of historythus affords primacy to class struggle over philosophy per se. Philosophy, in fact, is not an objective science but a partisan political act. In this sense, classical materialismwhich tended to justify the social status quo was no better than the outright Idealism of Kant orHegel's philosophies. "True" philosophy must take the correct position in the class struggle, and the function of Marxist philosophy is to do exact that. The materialism of Marx and Engels later opened up the way for the Frankfurt School's critical theory, which combined philosophy with the social sciences in an attempt to diagnose the ailments of society. In the later Marxist movement centering on the Soviet Union, however, dialectical materialism would be reduced to the orthodox Marxist theory known as diamat.

Marxist dialectics
Engels observed three laws of dialectics. They are: The law of the unity and conflict of opposites The law of the passage of quantitative changes into qualitative changes

The law of the negation of the negation

The first of these laws was also seen by both Hegel and Lenin as the central feature of a dialectical understanding of things. It has been traced to the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus. The second is taken by Hegel from Aristotle, and may be traced to the ancient Ionian philosophers (particularly Anaximenes), from whom Aristotle inherited the concept. The third, the negation of the negation, is Hegel's distinct expression. It refers to the idea a thesis generating its antithesis or negation, which is in turn negated by a synthesis. The principal features of Marxist dialectics are: 1. The universe is not a disconnected mix of things isolated from each other, but an integral whole, with the result that things are interdependent. 2. The natural world, from its smallest to its largest component, is in a state of constant motion. 3. All things contain within themselves internal contradictions, which are the primary cause of motion, change, and development in the world. 4. Development is a process whereby insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes lead to fundamental, qualitative changes. Qualitative changes, however, do not change gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, in the form of a leap from one state to another 5. .

Historical materialism
Being concerned primarily with history and society rather than philosophy per se, Marx and Engels were particularly concerned with the application of their philosophy to historical and political reality. The result came to be known as historical materialism. According to this theory, the primitive communism of tribal societies represented the original "thesis" of human development. This generated the antithesis of private ownership and class society. The synthesis emerging after various stages of historical development such as slavery, feudalism, mercantilism, and capitalismwill be advanced communism, in which the workers own the means of production in an advanced industrialized society. However, just as a chick must break out of the shell which both protects and encases it, the working class must break free from the institutions of repression which capitalist society has created in order to perpetuate itself. Because such qualitative changes are always sudden and violent, this necessitates a violent revolution and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat as a first step to achieving first socialism, and then the gradual withering away of the state into advanced communism. According to the Marxist principle of the "partisanship of philosophy," the avowed purpose of this intellectual exercise for Marx and Engels was to create an ideology as a catalyst toward developing revolutionary class consciousness. Indeed, Marx and Engels saw themselves not so much as philosophers but as the voices of a historical inevitability: It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness (Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy) .

Soviet dialectical materialism

Lenin's contributions

Lenin first formally addressed dialectical materialism in Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1908) around three axes: The "materialist inversion" of Hegelian dialectics Ethical principles ordered to class struggle The convergence of the "laws of evolution" in physics (Helmholtz), biology (Darwin), and in political economics (Marx)

Lenin based his work on that of Engels, and also addressed the writings of more recent philosophers, often in biting and satirical form. He took on the task of distancing Marxist materialism from several other forms of materialist philosophy: "Vulgar materialism" expressed in statements like "the brain secretes thought in the same way as the liver secretes bile" (attributed to eighteenth century physician Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, 17571808) "Metaphysical materialism" (matter is composed of immutable, unchanging particles) Nineteenth century "mechanical materialism" (matter was like little molecular billiard balls interacting according to simple laws of mechanics)

He also took on several Marxist thinkers whom he deemed to have improperly understood the implications of dialectical and historical materialism, resulting in their adopting an insufficient revolutionary outlook based on gradual change and "bourgeois-democratic" socialism. Lenin insisted that gradualism could never achieve qualitative change in the economic base of society .

Stalin's codification of diamat

Following the 1917 October Revolution, the Soviet philosophy divided itself between "dialecticians" (Deborin) and "mechanists" (Bukharin).Stalin ultimately decided the outcome of the debate by publishing a decree which identified dialectical materialism as pertaining solely to Marxism-Leninism rather than any other form of materialism. Stalin would also use diamat as a justification for the establishment of the totalitarian state. In June 1930, he told the Soviet party congress: We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strongest state power that has ever existed Is this contradictory? Yes, it is contradictory. But this contradiction fully reflects Marxs dialectics. Stalin then established the official Soviet version of dialectical materialism in his work, Dialectical and Historical Materialism (1938).[1] Here, he enumerated the "laws of dialectics," which are to serve as the grounds of particular scientific disciplines, especially sociology and the "science" of history, thus guaranteeing their conformity with what he called the "proletarian conception of the world." Thus, the official Soviet philosophy of diamat was imposed on most Communist parties affiliated to the Third International. Under the Stalinist regime and its successors, academic discussion in Soviet intellectual institutions and journals would be constrained to stay within the line of Stalinist philosophical orthodoxy.

Marxist criticisms of dialectical materialism

Nevertheless, the doctrine of dialectical materialism, especially the official Soviet version of diamat, has been criticized by numerous Marxist thinkers. Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, for example, proposed a "philosophy of praxis" in its stead. Other thinkers in Marxist philosophy have pointed to the original texts of Marx and Engels, pointing out that traditional dialectical materialism was much more a product of Engels than of Marx. This has resulted in various "Marxist" philosophical projects which present alternatives to traditional dialectical materialism. As early as 1937, Mao Zedong proposed yet another interpretation, in his essay On Contradiction, in which he rejected Engels' "laws of dialectics" as oversimplified and insisted on the complexity of thecontradiction. Mao's text inspired Louis Althusser's work on contradiction, which was a driving theme in his well-known essay For Marx (1965). Althusser attempted to nuance the Marxist concept of contradiction by borrowing the concept of "overdetermination" from psychoanalysis. He criticized the Stalinist "teleological" reading of Marx as a return to Hegel's idealism in which philosophy supersedes reality. Another school of thought, led by Italian philosopher Ludovico Geymonat, constructed a "historical epistemology" from dialectical materialism.

Legacy
For more than 70 years in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, dialectical materialism was the official guiding philosophy of state. It attempted to deal with all questions of existence, from atoms to historyand economics. It became them most important atheistic ideology of the twentieth century, absolutely denying even the possibility of God's existence and affirming the need for violent revolution that would do away with religion, which it insisted was merely the "opiate" of the masses. More than a billion young people in the former Soviet Union, China, and many other countries were indoctrinated into the worldview of dialectical materialism in schools from kindergarten through college. In the context of the totalitarian societies which it spawned, dialectical materialism stifled the creative spirit of two entire generations who grew up under Soviet-style rule. The former Communist world even today is still struggling to recover from dialectical materialism's tragic legacy, a philosophy designed to liberate the workers of the world but which itself ended up in the dust bin of history .

Notes
1. Josef Stalin, Dialectical and Historical Materialism. Retrieved November 5, 2008.
2.

References

Ollman, Bertell, and Tony Smith. Dialectics for the New Century. Basingstoke:: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. ISBN 9780230535312. Rigby, S. H. Engels and the Formation of Marxism: History, Dialectics and Revolution. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2007. ISBN 9780719077746. Yi, Sang-hn. Communism; a Critique & Counterproposal. Washington: Freedom Leadership Foundation, 1973. OCLC 741232.

External links
All links retrieved November 12, 2008.

Friedrich Engels. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy Friedrich Engels. Anti-Dhring Friedrich Engels. Dialectics of Nature V.I. Lenin. Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, V.I. Lenin. On the Question of Dialectics Joseph Stalin. Dialectical and Historical Materialism Mao Tse-tung. On Contradiction Louis Althusser. On the Materialist Dialectic Georg Lukacs. History and Class Consciousness

Dialectical materialism
Dialectical materialism, official philosophy of Communism, based on the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, as elaborated by G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Lenin, and Joseph Stalin. In theory dialectical materialism is meant to provide both a general world view and a specific method for the investigation of scientific problems. The basic tenets are that everything is material and that change takes place through the struggle of opposites. Because everything contains different elements that are in opposition, self-movement automatically occurs; the conflict of opposing forces leads to growth, change, and development, according to definite laws. Communist scientists were expected to fit their investigations into this pattern, and official approval of scientific theories in the USSR was determined to some extent by their conformity to dialectical materialism (see Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich). Use of these principles in history and sociology is sometimes called historical materialism. Under these doctrines the social, political, and intellectual life of society reflect only the economic structure, since human beings create the forms of social life solely in response to economic needs. Men are divided into classes by their relations to the means of productionland and capital. The class that controls the means of production inevitably exploits the other classes in society; it is this class struggle that produces the dynamic of history and is the source of progress toward a final uniformity. Historical materialism is deterministic; that is, it prescribes that history inevitably follows certain laws and that individuals have little or no influence on its development. Central to historical materialism is the belief that change takes place through the meeting of two opposing forces (thesis and antithesis); their opposition is resolved by combination produced by a higher force (synthesis). Historical materialism has had many advocates outside the Communist world. See G. Wetter, Dialectical Materialism (1958, repr. 1973); A. Spirkin, Dialectical Materialism (1983); I. Yurkovets,Philosophy of Dialectical Materialism (1984).

Materialism dialectic

Materialism dialectic, concepie filozofic ntemeiat de Karl Marx i Friedrich Engels; tiina despre raportul dintre materie i contiin, despre legile cele mai generale ale schimbrii i dezvoltrii naturii,societii i gndirii, care este n acelai timp baza filozofic a marxismului. Materialismul dialectic reprezint unitatea dintre metoda dialectic marxist i materialismul filozofic marxist.

"Filozofii n-au fcut dect s interpreteze lumea n diferite moduri; important este ns a o schimba." (Karl Marx: Teze despre Feuerbach). Materialismul dialectic este o concepie tiinific de ansamblu asupra lumii i, totodat, o metod revoluionar de cunoatere i de transformare a realitii. Apariia materialismului dialectic reprezint o profund revoluie svarit n filozofie. Tezele fundamentale ale materialismului dialectic au fost elaborate ncepnd de la mijlocul deceniului al cincilea al sec. 19. Apariia materialismului dialectic a fost un fenomen determinat de cauze social-economice i de ntreaga dezvoltare anterioar a tiinei i filozofiei, Marx i Engels artand limitarea de clasa concepiei burgheze despre lume. n timp ce colile filozofice care au precedat marxismul i puneau ca obiectiv explicarea lumii, materialismul dialectic i pune ca obiectiv transformarea revoluionar a realitii. Printre premisele naturalist-tiinifice ale constituirii concepiei materialist-dialectice despre lume se numr: elaborarea teoriei celulare, formularea legii conservrii i transformrii energiei i descoperirea principiilor evoluiei (expresia cea mai nchegat a evoluionismului fiind darvinismul). Izvorul teoretic al materialismului dialectic este filozofia clasic german. Precursorii ei direci snt, n primul rnd, G.W.F. Hegel (care, n contextul idealismului su, a elaborat totui, n principiu, multilateral dialectica) i L. Feuerbach (care, n contextul metafizicii sale, a dezvoltat concepia materialist asupra lumii). Materialismul dialectic este prima form pe deplin consecvent a materialismului, ngloband ntr-o explicaie unitar domeniile naturii, societii i gandirii. Elaborand teoria tiinific materialist pe baza principiilor fundamentale ale dialecticii, materialismul dialectic consider c dezvoltarea are ca izvor contradiciile interne ale obiectelor i proceselor, c schimbrile calitative (salturile) se realizeaz pe temeiul unor acumulri cantitative anterioare, prin negarea strilor calitative vechi de ctre altele noi. Materialismul dialectic a nnoit i a mbogit gnoseologia (teoria cunoaterii) prin tezele sale privind cognoscibilitatea lumii, caracterul activ al procesului de cunoatere, caracterul obiectiv i concret al adevrului, dialectica relativului i absolutului n procesul cunoaterii i, mai ales, prin dezvluirea rolului practicii n cunoatere.

Materialismul dialectic arat c principiile dialecticii decurg direct din studiul legilor lumii obiective, c dialectica obiectiv (a lucrurilor) determin dialectica subiectiv (a ideilor) care are ns i legile sale specifice, autonomia sa relativ. Dei concord prin coninutul lor obiectiv cu legile naturii i cu cele

sociale, legile gandirii constituie doar o reflectare a celor dintai n contiina oamenilor, aceast reflectare neavnd un caracter mecanic, nemijlocit, automat, ci unul mediat, constructiv, creator.Reprezentnd generalizarea multilateral a realizrilor tuturor tiinelor despre natur i societate, reflectnd veridic legile fundamentale ale existenei i cunoaterii, concepia filozofic

a lui Marx n ansamblul ei, constituie i o metod tiinific de cunoatere i de transformare revoluionar a lumii i, prin aceasta, a omului nsui. Sprijinindu-se pe datele tiinelor, materialismul dialectic ofer totodat acestora un puternic i eficace instrument teoretic i metodologic, orientat spre noi sinteze creatoare.Apariia materialismului, mpreun cu crearea materialismului istoric i a economiei politice marxiste, a fcut posibil transformarea socialismului din utopie n tiin. Materialismul dialectic este o concepie vie, care se mbogete continuu pe baza generalizrii continue a practicii i a datelor tiinei. Materialismul dialectic este un concept de filozofie politic marxist, considerat ca fiind baza gndirii marxiste. Pornete de la dialectica hegelian, ns o reformuleaz. Astfelidealismul hegelian conform cruia istoria uman este rezultatul unei evoluii dialectice a unei idei, a unui spirit care determin cursul istoriei i care este accesibil experienei noastre prin fenomene (fenomenologie), care nu sunt altceva dect reprezentrile ideii n lumea real. Marx consider c ideea nu este nimic altceva dect o reflecie a lumii materiale care este tradus n forme ale gndirii. Deci la Marx, istoria uman nu este rezultatul evoluiei dialectice a ideii, ci a evoluiei luptei dialectice de clas pentru bunurile materiale. Marx i Engels au preluat critic ceea ce era valoros n gndirea filozofica, economica i socialpolitica anterioara i contemporana lor i au creat o conceptie noua care a revolutionat gndirea. Fundamentul filozofic al marxismului n ansamblul sau, al teoriei sale economice i al celei politice (socialismul tiintific) este materialismul dialectic i istoric. Materialismul dialectic reprezinta unitatea dintre metoda dialectic marxist i materialismul filozofic marxist.Materialismul dialectic este o concepie tiintifica de ansamblu asupra lumii i, totodata, o metoda revoluionara de cunoatere i de transformare a realitatii. Aparitia materialismului dialectic reprezinta o profunda revolutie savrita n filozofie. Tezele fundamentale ale materialismului dialectic au fost elaborate ncepnd de la mijlocul deceniului al cincilea al sec. 19. Aparitia materialismului dialectic a fost un fenomen determinat de cauze social-economice i de ntreaga dezvoltare anterioara a tiintei i filozofiei, Marx i Engels aratnd limitarea de clasa a conceptiei burgheze despre lume.

Socialism tiinific
Socialism tiinific, una dintre cele trei pri constitutive ale marxismului; teorie (doctrin) social-politic al crei obiect l reprezint structura i dinamica proceselor trecerii de Ia ornduirea capitalist la ornduirea comunist, artnd legile generale ale revoluiei i construciei socialismului, principiile organizrii i conducerii societii socialiste, pe temeiul crora fundamenteaz strategia i tactica luptei revoluionare aclasei muncitoare, reprezentnd astfel ideologia politic a clasei muncitoare, tiina construciei socialiste. Socialismul tiinific a fost elaborat de Karl Marx i Friedrich Engels n condiiile maturizrii capitalismului i dezvoltrii luptei de clas a proletariatului, care ncepea s se opun burgheziei ca o for independent. Spre deosebire de socialismul utopic, care considera socialismul ca o cerin a raiunii i ca un simplu ideal moral, socialismul tiinific demonstreaz, pe baza legilor obiective ale progresului social, a analizei tiinifice a ornduirii capitaliste i a evoluiei acesteia, necesitatea obiectiv a socialismului. n acest fel, socialismul s-a transformat dintr-o utopie ntr-o tiin. Un rol hotrtor n transformarea socialismului din utopie n tiin l-a avut crearea materialismului istoric. Unirea socialismul tiinific cu micarea muncitoreasc a dus la transformarea clasei muncitoare ntr-o clas revoluionar contient. Marx i Engels au formulat tezele fundamentale ale socialismului tiinific, au artat rolul proletariatului i au demonstrat c lupta de clas revoluionar a clasei muncitoare constituie singura cale de instaurare a ornduirii socialiste. Lenin a dezvoltat teoria socialismului tiinific prin prezentarea trsturilor specifice stadiului monopolist al

capitalismului, prin descoperirea legii dezvoltrii economice i politice inegale i n salturi a rilor capitaliste n imperialism. Teoria socialismul tiinific are, n esen, un caracter general-valabil, un coninut unic pentru toate rile, deoarece legile dezvoltrii sociale snt n esen aceleai pentru toate rile. Aceste legi se realizeaz ns n forme i cu metode specifice fiecrei ri, corespunztor stadiului dezvoltrii ei economice i sociale, raportului forelor de clas, tradiiilor istorice etc.

I
Prin coninutul su, socialismul contemporan este nainte de toate rezultatul sesizrii, pe de o parte, a contradiciilor de clas care domnesc n societatea modern ntre avui i neavui, ntre capitaliti i muncitorii salariai, iar pe de alta parte a anarhiei care domnete n producie. Ct privete ns forma sa teoretic, el apare la nceput ca o dezvoltare, ca s spunem aa, mai consecvent a principiilor enunate de marii iluminiti francezi din secolul al XVIII-lea. Ca orice teorie nou, socialismul a trebuit s valorifice mai nti materialul ideologic existent, dei el i avea rdcinile n faptele economice materiale. Marii brbai care n Frana au luminat minile pentru revoluia care se apropia s-au manifestat ei nii n modul cel mai revoluionar. Ei nu recunoteau nici un fel de autoritate exterioar. Religia, concepia despre natur, societate, ornduirea de stat, toate au fost supuse celei mai necrutoare critici; toate trebuiau s-i justifice existena n faa scaunului de judecat al raiunii sau s renune la existen. Raiunea devenise unica msur a tot ce exist. Pe atunci, dup expresia lui Hegel, lumea a fost aezat pe cap[*], mai nti n sensul c creierul omenesc i principiile descoperite cu ajutorul gndirii au pretins s fie recunoscute drept baz a oricrei aciuni omeneti i a oricror relaii sociale, iar apoi i n sensul mai larg c

realitatea, care contrazicea aceste principii, a fost de fapt complet rsturnat. Toate formele societii i ale statului de pn atunci, toate concepiile tradiionale au fost aruncate la lada cu vechituri ca iraionale; lumea se lsase condus pn atunci numai de prejudeci; tot trecutul nu merita dect comptimire i dispre. Abia acum se revrsa ilumina zilei asupra lumii, ncepea imperiul raiunii; de acum nainte superstiia, nedreptatea, privilegiile i asuprirea trebuiau s cedeze locul adevrului etern, dreptii eterne i egalitii rezultate din natura nsi, precum i drepturilor inalienabile ale omului. tim acum c acest imperiu al raiunii nu a fost altceva dect imperiul idealizat al burgheziei, c dreptatea etern i-a gsit ntruchiparea n justiia burghez, c egalitatea sa redus la egalitatea cetenilor n faa legii, c proprietatea burghez a fost proclamat unul din drepturile fundamentale ale omului i c statul raiunii, contractul social al lui Rousseau[1], a fost tradus n via, i nu putea fi tradus n via altfel dect ca republic democratic burghez. ntocmai ca i predecesorii lor, marii cugettori ai secolului al XVIII-lea nu puteau s depeasc limitele n care i ngrdea propria lor epoc. Dar pe lng contradicia dintre nobilimea feudal i burghezie, care se erija n reprezentant a tot restului societii, exist i contradicia general dintre exploatatori i exploatai, dintre trntorii bogai i srcimea muncitoare. Tocmai aceast mprejurare a dat reprezentanilor burgheziei posibilitatea s se erijeze n reprezentani nu ai unei anumite clase, ci ai ntregii omeniri n suferin. Ba mai mult. De la bun nceput, burghezia purta in sine propriul ei contrariu: capitalitii nu pot exista fr muncitori salariai, i, pe msur ce meterul bresla din evul mediu se transforma n burghezul din zilele noastre, se transformau i calfa din cadrul breslei i zilerul din afara breslei n proletari. i dei, n linii generale, burghezia putea s pretind c n lupta mpotriva nobilimiireprezint i interesele diferitelor clase muncitoare din vremea aceea, totui, cu prilejul fiecrei

mari micri burgheze izbucneau micri de sine stttoare ale clasei care era precursorul mai mult sau mai puin dezvoltat al proletariatului modern. Aa au fost n timpul Reformei i al Rzboiului rnesc german micarea anabaptitiior i a lui Thomas Mnzer, n marea revoluie englez - levellerii[2], n marea revoluie francez - Babeuf. Aceste aciuni revoluionare ale unei clase care nu se maturizase nc au fost nsoite de manifestri teoretice corespunztoare: descrieri utopice ale unei ornduiri sociale ideale[3] n seco]ele al XVI-lea i al XVII-lea, iar n secolul al XVIII-lea teorii de-a dreptul comuniste (Morelly i Mably). Revendicarea egalitii nu se mai limita la drepturile politice, ea a fost extins i asupra situaiei sociale a indivizilor; nu numai privilegiile de clas trebuiau s fie lichidate, ci nsei deosebirile de clas. Prima form n care i-a gsit expresie noua doctrin a fost un comunism ascetic, care respinge toate plcerile vieii, un comunism de tip spartan. Au urmat apoi cei trei mari utopiti: Saint-Simon, la care orientarea burghez i-a mai pstrat o oarecare pondere alturi de orientarea proletar, Fourier i Owen. Owen, care tria n ara celei mai dezvoltate producii capitaliste i se afla sub impresia contradiciilor generate de aceasta, a elaborat, pornind de la materialismul francez, un ntreg sistem, cuprinznd propunerile sale pentru desfiinarea deosebirilor de clas. O trstur comun a celor trei utopiti este c ei nu se manifest ca reprezentani ai intereselor proletariatului, aprut ntre timp ca rezultat al dezvoltrii istorice. Ca i iluminitii, ei nu vor s elibereze mai nti o anumit clas, ci dintr-o dat ntreaga omenire. Ca i acetia, ei vor s instaureze imperiul raiunii i al dreptii eterne; dar imperiul lor se deosebete de cel al iluminitilor ca cerul de pmnt. Lumea burghez, ornduit dup principiile acestor iluminiti, este i ea iraional i nedreapt, prin urmare, nu mai puin dect feudalismul i toate rnduielile sociale anterioare merit s fie aruncat la gunoi. Dac pn acum nu au domnit n lume adevrata raiune i adevrata dreptate, aceasta se datorete numai faptului c ele nu au

fost nc cunoscute aa cum se cuvine. Lipsea omul genial, care i-a fcut acum apariia i care a cunoscut adevrul. Faptul c el a aprut acum, c adevrul a, fost cunoscut tocmai acum nu este rezultatul necesar, inevitabil al dezvoltrii istorice, ci o simpl ntmplare fericit. El s-ar fi putut nate tot att de bine cu 500 de ani n urm, i atunci ar fi scutit omenirea de 5 secole de erori, de lupte i de suferine. Am vzut cum filozofii francezi din secolul al XVIIIlea, care au pregtit revoluia, fceau apel la raiune ca la unicul judector a tot ce exist. Ei cereau instaurarea unui stat raional, a unei societi raionale; tot ce contrazicea raiunea etern trebuia nlturat fr mil. Am vzut, de asemenea, c aceast raiune etern nu era n realitate nimic altceva dect raiunea idealizat a brgerului de mijloc, pe atunci tocmai pe cale de a se transforma n burghez. Or, cnd revoluia francez a nfptuit aceast societate a raiunii i acest stat al raiunii, noile instituii, orict de raionale erau ele n comparaie cu vechile rnduieli, nu se dovedir nicidecum absolut raionale. Statul raiunii euase complet. Contractul social al lui Rousseau i gsise ntruchiparea n Teroare, din care burghezia, pierznd ncrederea n propria ei capacitate politic, a cutat o salvare mai nti n corupia Directoratului[4] i, n cele din urm, sub scutul despotismului napoleonian. Pacea venic fgduit se transformase ntr-un nesfrit rzboi de cuceriri. Nici societatea raiunii nu o nimerise mai bine. Opoziia dintre bogai i sraci, n loc s-i gseasc rezolvarea ntr-o prosperitate general, se accentuase i mai mult prin nlturarea privilegiilor de breasl i a altor privilegii, care aruncau o punte peste aceast opoziie, i prin nlturarea aezmintelor de binefacere bisericeti, care o mai atenuau. Eliberarea proprietii de ctuele feudale, devenit acum o realitate, s-a dovedit a fi pentru micul burghez i ran libertatea de a vinde aceast mic proprietate, zdrobit de concurena atotputernic a marelui capital i a marii proprieti funciare, tocmai acestor magnai;

eliberarea proprietii s-a transformat astfel pentru micul burghez i ran n eliberarea de proprietate. Rapida dezvoltare a industriei pe baze capitaliste a fcut din srcia i mizeria maselor muncitoare o condiie necesar a existenei societii. Plata n bani pein a devenit din ce n ce mai mult, dup expresia lui Carlyle, singurul element de legtur al acestei societi. Numrul crimelor a crescut din an n an. Dac viciile lumii feudale, afiate altdat fr jen n vzul tuturor, dei n-au fost suprimate, au fost totui mpinse pentru moment pe planul al doilea, n schimb, viciile lumii burgheze, practicate pn atunci numai pe ascuns, au nflorit cu att mai din plin. Comerul s-a transformat tot mai mult ntr-o neltorie. Fraternitatea proclamat de deviza revoluionar[5] i-a gsit realizarea n icanele i n invidia generate de lupta de concuren. Corupia a luat locul asupririi prin violen, iar banii, ca principal prghie a puterii sociale, au luat locul spadei. Dreptul primei nopi a trecut de la stpnul feudal la fabricantul burghez. Prostituia a luat proporii nemaipomenite. Cstoria nsi a continuat s rmn forma legal recunoscut, paravanul oficial al prostituiei, completat pe deasupra cu adulterul practicat pe scar larg. Pe scurt, comparate cu emfaticele fgduieli ale iluminitilor, instituiile sociale i politice instaurate n urma triumfului raiunii s-au dovedit a fi nite caricaturi care produceau o decepie amar. Lipseau doar oamenii care s constate aceast decepie, i acetia i-au fcut apariia o dat cu noul veac. n 1802 au vzut lumina tiparului Scrisorile din Geneva ale lui Saint-Simon; n 1808 a aprut prima lucrare a lui Fourier, dei bazele teoriei sale dateaz nc din 1799; la 1 ianuarie 1800, Robert Owen a preluat conducerea New Lanarkului[6]. Pe vremea aceea ns, modul de producie capitalist i, mpreun cu el, contradicia dintre burghezie i proletariat erau nc foarte puin dezvoltate. Marea industrie, care tocmai atunci lua natere n Anglia, era nc necunoscut n Frana. Dar abia marea industrie dezvolt, pe de o parte, conflictele care fac ca revoluionarea modului de

producie, nlturarea caracterului lui capitalist s devin o necesitate stringent - conflicte nu numai ntre clasele crora marea industrie le-a dat natere, dar i ntre forele de producie i formele de schimb create de ea; pe de alt parte, prin dezvoltarea nsei a acestor uriae fore de producie, marea industrie creeaz i mijloacele pentru rezolvarea acestor conflicte. Dac, prin urinare, pe la 1800 conflictele izvorte din noua ornduire social abia luau natere, acest lucru este cu att mai valabil n ceea ce privete mijloacele pentru rezolvarea lor. Cu toate c n timpul Terorii masele neavute din Paris au putut s cucereasc pentru un moment puterea i s duc astfel la biruin revoluia burghez chiar mpotriva burgheziei, ele n-au fcut dect s dovedeasc c n mprejurrile de atunci o dominaie a lor de durat era cu neputin. Proletariatul care abia ncepea s se desprind din aceste mase neavute, ca embrion al unei clase noi, nc absolut incapabil de o aciune politic independent - se prezenta ca o stare social asuprit i obidit, care, dat fiind neputina ei de a se ajuta singur, putea primi un ajutor cel mult din afar, de sus. Aceast situaie istoric a determinat i concepiile ntemeietorilor socialismului. Stadiului nematur al produciei capitaliste, relaiilor de clas nematurizate le-au corespuns teorii lipsite de maturitate. Soluia problemelor sociale, care era nc ascuns n relaiile economice nedezvoltate, trebuia inventat de mintea omeneasc. Ordinea social nu prezenta dect neajunsuri; nlturarea ei era sarcina raiunii. Se punea deci problema de a se nscoci un sistem nou, mai desvrit, de ornduire social i de a-1 impune din afar societii, prin propagand i, pe ct posibil, prin exemplul unor experiene model. Aceste noi sisteme sociale erau din capul locului sortite s ramn simple utopii; i cu ct erau mai minuios elaborate, cu att mai mult trebuiau s se reduc la pure fantezii. Acestea odat stabilite, nu ne vom mai ocupa nici un moment de acest aspect, care aparine acum n ntregime trecutului. Lsm pe seama tarabagiilor literari plcerea de

a diseca cu solemnitate aceste fantezii, care astzi nu fac dect s amuze, i de a opune unor asemenea aiureli superioritatea propriei lor gndiri lucide. Noi preferm s ne bucurm de germenii de idei geniale i de ideile geniale care rzbesc pretutindeni de sub nveliul fantastic i pe care aceti filistini nu snt n stare s le vad. Saint-Simon a fost un fiu al marii revoluii franceze, la izbucnirea creia el nu mplinise nc 30 de ani. Revoluia a reprezentat victoria repurtat de starea a treia, adic de marea mas a naiunii, activ n producie i n comer, asupra strilor privilegiate i trndave de pn atunci nobilimea i clerul. Dar victoria strii a treia s-a dovedit curnd a nu fi dect victoria exclusiv a unei mici pri a acestei stri, dect cucerirea puterii politice de ctre ptura privilegiat din punct de vedere social a acestei stri burghezia avut. Aceast burghezie se dezvoltase rapid nc n timpul revoluiei, pe de o parte, prin specula fcut cu moiile, confiscate i apoi vndute, ale nobililor i ale bisericii, i, pe de alt parte, prin escrocarea naiunii de ctre furnizorii armatei. Tocmai domnia acestor escroci a fost aceea care pe vremea Directoratului a adus Frana i revoluia pe marginea prpastiei, oferind astfel lui Napoleon pretextul pentru lovitura sa de stat. Astfel, n mintea lui Saint-Simon, contradicia dintre starea a treia i strile privilegiate a luat forma contradiciei dintre muncitori i trn-tori. Trntorii erau nu numai reprezentanii vechilor stri privilegiate, ci i toi cei care triau din rent, fr a participa la producie i comer. Iar muncitorii erau nu numai muncitorii salariai, ci i fabricanii, comercianii, bancherii. C trntorii nu mai erau capabili s dein conducerea spiritual i dominaia politic era un lucru cert i definitiv pecetluit de revoluie. C cei neavui nu aveau aceast capacitate era, dup prerea lui Saint-Simon, un lucru dovedit prin experiena din timpul Terorii. Cine urma deci s conduc i s domine? Dup prerea lui Saint-Simon, tiina i industria, unite printr-o nou legtur religioas, menit s restabileasc unitatea concepiilor religioase, sfrmat de

la Reform ncoace, adic un nou cretinism, n mod necesar mistic i riguros ierarhic. Dar tiina o reprezentau belferii, iar industria - n primul rnd burghezii activi, fabricanii, comercianii, bancherii. Ce-i drept, aceti burghezi urmau s se transforme ntr-un fel de funcionari publici, un fel de oameni de ncredere ai societii, dar care trebuiau totui s pstreze fa de muncitori o poziie de comand, privilegiat din punct de vedere economic. Mai ales bancherii erau chemai s reglementeze ntreaga producie social prin reglementarea creditului. Aceast concepie corespundea ntru totul unor vremuri cnd, n Frana, marea industrie i, o dat cu ea, contradicia dintre burghezie i proletariat erau abia n curs de formare. Dar Saint-Simon subliniaz ndeosebi faptul urmtor: ceea ce l intereseaz pretutindeni i n permanen este soarta clasei celei mai numeroase i mai srace (la classe la plus nombreuse et la plus pauvre). Saint-Simon formuleaz nc n Scrisorile din Geneva teza c
toi oamenii trebuie s munceasc.

n aceeai lucrare el subliniaz c Teroarea fusese dominaia maselor neavute.

Privii - exclam el adresndu-se acestora - ce s-a petrecut n Frana pe vremea cnd acolo tovarii votri au pus mina pe putere; ei au adus foametea[7].

Dar a concepe revoluia francez ca o lupt ntre clase, i anume nu numai ntre nobilime i burghezie, ci i ntre nobilime, burghezie i cei neavui era n 1802 o descoperire dintre cele mai geniale. n 1816, Saint-Simon definete politica drept tiina despre producie i prezice dizolvarea total a politicii n economie[8]. Dac ideea c situaia economic este baza instituiilor politice apare aici numai n germene, ideea transformrii guvernrii politice asupra oamenilor ntr-o administrare a lucrurilor i conducere a proceselor de producie, deci ideea desfiinrii statului, n jurul creia s-a fcut n ultima vreme atla vlv, e deja limpede exprimat. Cu aceeai

superioritate n raport cu contemporanii si, Saint-Simon proclam n 1814, imediat dup intrarea aliailor n Paris, i apoi n 1815, n timpul rzboiului de 100 de zile, c aliana dintre Frana i Anglia i, n al doilea rnd, aliana acestor dou ri cu Germania constituie unica garanie a dezvoltrii prospere i a pcii n Europa[9]. Pentru a propovdui francezilor n 1815 o alian cu nvingtorii de la Waterloo[10] era ntr-adevr nevoie att de curaj, ct i de clarviziune istoric. Dac la Saint-Simon gsim o genial perspicacitate, datorit creia aproape toate ideile socialitilor de mai trziu, n afar de cele strict economice, exist la el n germene, la Fourier gsim o critic a ordinii sociale existente pe ct de autentic francez de spiritual, pe att de ptrunztoare. Burgheziei, profeilor ei entuziati dinainte de revoluie i apologeilor ei interesai de dup revoluie, Fourier le opune propriile lor cuvinte. El dezvluie fr cruare mizeria imaterial i moral a lumii burgheze i o confrunt att cu fgduielile ademenitoare ale iluminitilor anteriori de instaurare a unei societi n care va domni numai raiunea, a unei civilizaii care va ferici pe toi, ct i cu declaraiile lor despre capacitatea nelimitat de perfecionare a omului; el demasc frazeologia ideologilor burghezi din vremea lui care nfiau realitatea n culori trandafirii, artnd c frazelor lor grandilocvente le corespunde pretutindeni cea mai jalnic realitate, i ironizeaz caustic iremediabilul fiasco al acestei frazeologii. Fourier nu este numai un critic; firea lui de o nealterat voioie face din el un satiric, i anume unul dintre cei mai mari satirici ai tuturor timpurilor. El zugrvete, pe ct de magistral, pe att de savuros, speculaiile i escrocheriile care au nflorit o dat cu declinul revoluiei, ca i spiritul de dughean al ntregului comer francez de atunci. i mai magistral este critica pe care el o face formei burgheze a relaiilor dintre sexe i situaiei pe care o are femeia n societatea burghez. El este primul care a artat c gradul de emancipare a femeii ntr-o societate dat este msura fireasc a emanciprii

generale[11]. Mreia lui Fourier se manifest ns cel mai pregnant n concepia sa despre istoria societii. El mparte ntreaga desfurare de pn acum a istoriei n patru trepte de dezvoltare: slbticia, patriarhatul, barbaria i civilizaia, aceasta din urm coinciznd cu ceea ce numim astzi societatea burghez, prin urmare cu ornduirea social care se dezvolt din secolul al XVI-lea, i arat
c ordinea civilizat d fiecrui viciu, pe care barbaria l practica cu simplicitate, o form complex, ambigu, echivoc i ipocrit,

c civilizaia se mic ntr-un cerc vicios, n contradicii, pe care le reproduce necontenit fr a le putea nvinge, astfel nct ajunge ntotdeauna la un rezultat opus aceluia pe care vrea sau pretinde c vrea s-l obin[12]. Astfel, de pild,
n civilizaie srcia e generat de nsi abunden[13].

Dup cum se vede, Fourier mnuiete dialectica cu aceeai miestrie ca i contemporanul su Hegel. n acelai chip dialectic el scoate n eviden, n opoziie cu vorbria despre capacitatea nelimitat de perfecionare a omului, c fiecare faz istoric are linia ei ascendent, dar i linia ei descendent[14], i aplic aceast concepie i la viitorul ntregii omeniri. Dup cum Kant a introdus n tiinele naturii ideea viitoarei dispariii a pmntului, tot aa Fourier introduce n concepia despre istorie ideea viitoarei dispariii a omenirii. n timp ce Frana era bntuit de uraganul revoluiei, n Anglia avea loc o revoluie mai puin zgomotoas, dar nu mai puin grandioas. Aburul i noile maini-unelte au transformat manufactura n marea industrie modern, revoluionnd astfel ntreaga baz a societii burgheze. Dezvoltarea lent din timpul manufacturii s-a transformat ntr-o adevrat perioad de Sturm undDrang al produciei. Cu o rapiditate mereu crescnd se nfptuia mprirea societii n mari capitaliti i n proletari neavui, iar ntre acetia, n locul strii de mijloc stabile de altdat, se afla

acum o mas nestabil de meteugari i de mici comerciani, partea cea mai fluctuant a populaiei, avnd o existen nesigur. Noul mod de producie se afla abia la nceputul liniei ascendente a evoluiei sale: el era nc modul de producie normal, reglementar, singurul cu putin n mprejurrile date. Dar nc de pe atunci el genera anomalii sociale flagrante: ngrmdirea unei populaii dezrdcinate n vgunele cele mai mizerabile ale marilor orae - destrmarea tuturor legturilor tradiionale, a subordonrii patriarhale, a familiei; prelungirea excesiv a zilei de munc, mai ales pentru femei i copii; degradarea moral n proporie de mas a pturilor muncitoare, aruncate brusc n condiii cu totul noi, de la ar la ora, din agricultur n industrie, din condiii de via stabile n altele nesigure, zilnic schimbtoare. Atunci a aprut ca reformator un fabricant de 29 de ani, un om cu un caracter de o simplicitate copilreasc, dus pn la sublim, dar n acelai timp un conductor de oameni nscui, cum nu se ntlnesc muli. Robert Owen i insuisc doctrina iluminitilor materialiti, potrivit creia caracterul omului este produsul, pe de o parte, al structurii sale nnscute i, pe de alt parte, al condiiilor mediului n care triete n tot timpul vieii sale, dar mai ales n timpul perioadei sale de formare. Majoritatea celor de o seam cu el nu vedeau n revoluia industrial dect confuzie i haos, prielnice pentru pescuitul n ap tulbure i pentru mbogire rapid. Owen vedea n revoluia industrial prilejul de a aplica n practic teza sa favorit i de a face astfel ordine n haos. ncercase i mai nainte - i nc cu succes - s aplice aceast tez la Manchester, ca director al unei fabrici cu 500 de muncitori. Din 1800 pn n 1829 a condus n acelai spirit, ca director i asociat, marea filatur de bumbac din New Lanark n Scoia, dar cu o mai mare libertate de aciune i cu un succes care i-a adus un renume european. El a transformat populaia New Lanarkului, care s-a ridicat treptat la 2.500 de suflete i era compus la neeput din elementele cele mai eterogene, n majoritatea lor deczute

moralmente, ntr-o desvrit colonie model, n care beia, poliia, justiia penal, procesele, caritatea public erau lucruri necunoscute, iar filantropia inutil. i toate acestea le-a realizat prin simplul fapt c i-a pus pe oameni n condiii mai potrivite cu demnitatea omeneasc i mai ales educnd cu grij tnra generaie. El este creatorul grdinielor de copii, pe care le-a introdus pentru prima oar la New Lanark. De la vrsta de doi ani copiii mergeau la grdini, unde i petreceau timpul att de plcut, nct abia mai puteau fi adui napoi acas. n timp ce concurenii lui Owen cereau muncitorilor lor s lucreze 1314 ore pe zi, la New Lanark se lucra numai 10 ore i jumtate. Cnd o criz n industria bumbacului a impus ncetarea produciei timp de 4 lumi, muncitorilor li s-a pltit n continuare integral salariul, dei nu lucraser n cursul acestor luni. Totui valoarea ntreprinderii a crescut de mai bine de dou ori, aducnd pn la urm proprietarilor beneficii mari. Toate acestea nu-l satisfceau ns pe Owen. El considera c condiiile de existen create muncitorilor si nu erau nc nici pe departe condiii pe msura demnitii omeneti.
Oamenii erau sclavii mei - spunea el;

condiiile relativ prielnice pe care le crease muncitorilor din New Lanark erau nc departe de a permite o dezvoltare raional i multilateral a caracterului i a inteligenei, fr a mai vorbi de o activitate vital liber.
i totui partea laborioas a acestor 2.500 de oameni producea pentru societate tot atta avuie real ct putea produce, cu abia o jumtate de secol nainte, o populaie de 600.000 de oameni. M ntrebam: ce se ntmpl cu diferena dintre avuia consumat de 2.500 de persoane i aceea pe care ar fi trebuit s-o consume cele 600.000 de persoane?

Rspunsul era limpede. Aceast diferen a fost folosit pentru a se asigura proprietarilor ntreprinderii 5% dobnd la capitalul investit i n plus un profit de peste

300.000 1. st. (6.000.000 de mrci). i ceea ce era valabil pentru New Lanark era valabil n i mai mare msur pentru toate fabricile din Anglia.
Fr aceast avuie nou, creat cu ajutorul mainilor, nu s-ar fi putut duce rzboaiele pentru rsturnarea lui Napoleon i pentru meninerea principiilor aristocratice ale societii. i totui aceast for nou era creat de clasa muncitoare.[**]

Ei trebuia s-i revin i roadele. Noile i colosalele fore de producie, care pn atunci nu serviser dect la mbogirea ctorva i la nrobirea maselor, constituiau pentru Owen baza unei transformri sociale, ele fiind menite s funcioneze numai pentru bunstarea tuturor, ca proprietate comun a tuturor. Pe baza unor asemenea considerente pur practice, ca rod, ca s zicem aa, al unui calcul comercial, s-a nscut comunismul lui Owen. El a pstrat mereu acest caracter practic. Astfel, n 1823, pentru nlturarea mizeriei din Irlanda, Owen a propus nfiinarea de colonii comuniste, alturnd proiectului su un calcul complet al investiiilor de capital necesare, al cheltuielilor anuale i al veniturilor previzibile[15]. n planul definitiv al ordinii sociale viitoare[16] alctuit de el, elaborarea tehnic a amnuntelor, inclusiv schia, elevaia i perspectiva din nlime, este executat cu atta competen, nct, odat admis metoda reformei sale sociale, ar rmine puine obiecii de fcut cu privire la organizarea n amnunt, chiar din punctul de vedere al specialistului n materie. Trecerea la comunism a fost punctul de cotitur n viaa lui Owen. Atta timp ct se manifestase doar ca filantrop, el recoltase bogii, elogii, onoruri i glorie. Era omul cel mai popular din Europa. Nu numai cei de o seam cu el, dar chiar i oameni de stat i capete ncoronate l aplaudau. Dar de ndat ce a venit cu teoriile sale comuniste, lucrurile s-au schimbat. Trei mari piedici stteau, dup prerea sa, nainte de toate n calea reformei sociale: proprietatea privat, religia i forma existent a cstoriei. El tia ce-l ateapt dac le atac: ostracizare

din partea societii oficiale, pierderea ntregii sale situaii sociale. Dar el n-a ezitat s le atace fr cruare, i ceea ce a prevzut s-a ntmplat. Ostracizat de societatea oficial, trecut sub tcere de pres, srcit de pe urma experienelor comuniste din America, pentru care i sacrificase ntreaga avere, dar care euaser, el s-a adresat direct clasei muncitoare, n mijlocul creia a activat nc 30 de ani. Toate micrile sociale, toate progresele efective care s-au realizat n Anglia n interesul muncitorilor snt legate de numele lui Owen. Astfel, n 1819, datorit eforturilor depuse de el timp de 5 ani, a fost adoptat cea dinti lege cu privire la limitarea muncii femeilor i copiilor n fabrici[17]. El a prezidat primul congres n cadrul cruia trade-unionurile din ntreaga Anglie s-au unit ntr-o singur mare uniune sindical[18]. Tot el a introdus ca msuri de trecere la ornduirea social pe deplin comunist, pe de o parte, asociaiile cooperatiste (cooperative de consum i de producie), care cel puin ulterior au fcut dovada practic c att comerciantul ct i fabricantul snt persoane de care societatea se poate foarte bine lipsi; pe de alt parte, bazarurile de munc[19], instituii pentru schimbul produselor muncii prin mijlocirea unor bani-munc de hrtie, a cror unitate o constituia ora de munc. Aceste instituii, care trebuiau n mod inevitabil s dea gre, dar care anticipau pe de-a-ntregul banca de schimb (creat de Proudhon[20] cu mult mai trziu), se deosebeau ns de aceasta tocmai prin faptul c ele nu reprezentau panaceul universal mpotriva tuturor relelor sociale, ci numai un prim pas spre o transformare mult mai radical a societii. Felul de a gndi al utopitilor a dominat mult timp concepiile socialiste ale secolului al XIX-lea i le mai domin n parte i acum. Acest fel de a gndi a fost mbriat pn nu de mult de toi socialitii francezi i englezi, precum i de comunismul german din trecut, inclusiv Weitling. Pentru ei toi, socialismul este expresia adevrului absolut, a raiunii i dreptii i, de ndat ce este descoperit, cucerete lumea prin propria sa for;

adevrul absolut fiind independent de timp, de spaiu i de dezvoltarea istoric a omenirii, simpla ntmplare decide cnd i unde va fi descoperit. Totodat, la fiecare ntemeietor de coal adevrul absolut, raiunea i dreptatea difer; i cum la fiecare dintre ei forma specific pe care o mbrac adevrul absolut, raiunea i dreptatea este determinat la rndul ei de judecata lui subiectiv, de condiiile lui de via, de erudiia i formaia lui spiritual, n acest conflict dintre adevrurile absolute nu este posibil o alt soluie dect tocirea contradiciilor lor. De aici nu putea s rezulte dect un socialism eclectic, intermediar, ca cel care domin de fapt pn astzi minile celor mai muli muncitori socialiti din Frana i din Anglia, un amestec de consideraii critice moderate, de teze economice i de reprezentri ablonarde de toate nuanele ale diferiilor ntemeietori de secte privind viitorul societii, un amestec la care se ajunge cu att mai uor cu ct n vltoarea discuiilor diferitelor lui elemente componente li se tocesc mai repede colurile ascuite ale preciziunii, aa cum se ntmpl cu prundiul dintr-un pru. Pentru a face din socialism o tiin, el trebuia mai nti situat pe un teren real.

[*]. Iat pasajul despre revoluia francez:

Ideea de drept, noiunea de drept, s-a impus dintr-o dat, i vechiul eafodaj al nedreptii nu i-a putut opune nici o rezisten. Ideea de drept a fost pus acum la baza constituiei, i de aici nainte toate urmau s fie ntemeiate pe aceast baz. De cnd soarele strlucete pe cer i planetele se rotesc n jurul lui nc nu s-a pomenit ca omul s stea pe cap, adic s se sprijine pe idee i s construiasc realitatea n conformitate cu ideea. Anaxagoras a spus cel dinti c Ns, adic raiunea, guverneaz lumea; abia acum ns omul a

ajuns s recunoasc c ideea trebuie s guverneze realitatea spiritual. Aceasta a fost un minunat rsrit de soare. Toate fiinele cugettoare au srbtorit aceast epoc. O emoie sublim a domnit n acel timp, un entuziasm al spiritului a nfiorat lumea, ca i cnd abia acum s-ar fi nfptuit mpcarea dintre divinitate i lume (Hegel. Filozofia istoriei, 1840, p. 535).

N-ar fi oare, n sfrit, timpul ca mpotriva acestor doctrine periculoase are rposatului profesor Hegel s se recurg la legea mpotriva socialitilor? (Nota lui Engels.) [**]. Citat din The Revolution in Mind and Practice - memoriu adresat tuturor republicanilor roii, comunitilor i socialitilor din Europa i naintat guvernului provizoriu francez din 1848, dar i reginei Victoria i consilierilor ei responsabili.(Nota lui Engels.)

[1]. Potrivit teoriei lui Jean-Jacques Rousseau, oamenii triau iniial ntr-o stare natural, n care toi erau egali. Apariia proprietii private i dezvoltarea inegalitii de avere au condiionat trecerea oamenilor de la starea natural la starea de cetean i au dus la formarea statului, care se bazeaz pe un contract social. Accentuarea inegalitii politice a dus totui la violarea contractului social i la apariia unei noi stri naturale. Aceast din urm situaie trebuia s-o nlture statul raiunii, bazat pe un nou contract social. Aceast teorie este dezvoltat n lucrrile lui Rousseau: Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'ingalit parmi les hommes (Discurs asupra originii i fundamentelor inegalitii dintre oameni), Amsterdam 1755, i Du contract social; ou Principes du droit politique (Despre contractul social sau Principii de drept politic), Amsterdam 1762. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [2]. Levelleri - Engels se refer aici la adevraii levelleri (adevraii egalitariti) sau diggeri (sptori), reprezentanii curentului de extrem stng n timpul revoluiei burgheze engleze din secolul al XVII-lea. Diggerii exprimau interesele pturilor celor mai srace de la sate i orae, revendicau desfiinarea proprietii private asupra pmntului, propagau ideile comunismului egalitar primitiv i ncercau s le nfptuiasc prin cultivarea n colectiv a pmnturilor comunale. - Nota red. Editurii Politice

[3]. Engels se refer n primul rnd la lucrrile reprezentanilor comunismului utopic - Thomas Morus (Utopia, aprut n 1516) i Tommaso Campanella (Civitas solis (Cetatea soarelui), aprut n 1623). - Nota red. Editurii Politice [4]. Teroarea - perioada dictaturii revoluionar-democratice a iacobinilor (iunie 1793-iulie 1794), cnd, ca rspuns la teroarea contrarevoluionar a girondinilor i monarhitilor, iacobinii au recurs la teroarea revoluionar. Directoratul (compus din 5 directori; dintre care unul era ales n fiecare an) - organul suprem al puterii executive n Frana, instituit n conformitate cu Constituia din 1795, adoptat dup cderea, n 1794, a dictaturii revoluionare a iacobinilor. Pn la lovitura de stat a lui Bonaparte din 1799, Directoratul a promovat un regim de teroare mpotriva forelor democratice i a aprat interesele marii burghezii. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [5]. Este vorba de lozinca revoluiei burgheze franceze de la sfritul secolului al XVIII-lea: Libertate, Egalitate, Fraternitate. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [6]. Lettres d'un habitant de Genve ses contemporains (Scrisori ale unui locuitor din Geneva ctre contemporanii si) - prima lucrare a lui Saint-Simon; a fost scris la Geneva n 1802 i publicat anonim la Paris n 1803, fr s se indice locul i data apariiei. Lucrnd la AntiDhring, Engels a folosit ediia G. Hubbard Saint-Simon. Sa vie et ses travaux. Suivi de fragments des plus celebres crits de Saint-Simon, Paris 1857. n aceast ediie exist unele inexactiti n roca ce privete data apariiei diferitelor lucrri ale lui Saint-Simon. Prima lucrare important a lui Fourier a fost Thorie des quatre mouvements et des destines gnrales... (Teoria celor patru micri i a destinelor generale), scris n primii ani ai secolului al XIX-lea i editat anonim la Lyon n 1808 (pe copert era indicat ca loc de apariie, probabil din cauza cenzurii, Leipzig). New Lanark - filatur de bumbac n apropierea oraului Lanark din Scoia, nfiinat n 1784 mpreun cu o mic colonie. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [7]. Engels citeaz scrisoarea a doua din lucrarea lui Saint-Simon Lettres d'un habitant de Genve ses contemporains. n ediia Hubbard, aceste citate se gsesc la p. 143 i 135. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [8]. Engels se refer la un fragment din Lettres de Saint-Simon un amricain (scrisoarea a opta). Aceste scrisori au fost publicate n culegerea: H. Saint-Simon. L'industrie, ou discussion politiques, morales et philosophiques, dans l'intrt de tous les hommes livrs des travaux utiles et indepndants (Industria, sau consideraii politice, morale i filozofice n interesul tuturor oamenilor care se consacr muncilor utile i independente), T. II, Paris 1817. n ediia Hubbard acest fragment se gsete la p. 155-157. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [9]. Engels se refer la dou lucrri scrise de Saint-Simon mpreun cu elevul su Augustin Thierry: De la rorganisation de la socit

europenne ou de la ncessit et des moyens de rassembler les peuples de l'Europe en un seul corp politique, en conservant chacun son indpendance naionale (Despre reorganizarea societii europene...) i Opinion sur les mesures prendre contre la coalition de 1815 (Opinii cu privire la msurile care trebuie luate mpotriva coaliiei din 1815); ambele lucrri au fost editate la Paris, prima n octombrie 1814, a doua n 1815. n ediia Hubbard, fragmentele din prima lucrare se afl la p. 149-154, iar coninutul celor dou brouri este expus la p. 68-76. Armatele aliate ale rilor participante la cea de-a asea coaliie antifrancez (Rusia, Austria, Anglia, Prusia i alte state) au intrat n Paris la 31 martie 1814. Imperiul lui Napoleon s-a prbuit i Napoleon a fost silit s abdice i s plece n exil pe insula Elba. n Frana a avut loc prima Restauraie. Cele o sut de zile - perioada restaurrii, de scurt durat, a dominaiei lui Napoleon I, care a durat de la 20 martie 1815, din momentul cnd Napoleon, venind de pe insula Elba, a sosit la Paris, pn la a doua abdicare a sa, la 28 iunie 1815, cnd, dup nfrngerea de la Waterloo, a trebuit s abdice definitiv. -Nota red. Editurii Politice [10]. La Waterloo (Belgia) armata lui Napoleon a fost nfrnt la 18 iunie 1815 de trupele anglo-olandeze de sub comanda lui Wellington i de armata prusian comandat de Blcher. Aceast btlie a jucat un rol hotrtor n campania din 1815 i a contribuit la victoria definitiv a celei de-a aptea coaliii anti-napoleoniene (Anglia, Rusia, Austria, Prusia, Suedia, Spania i alte state) i la cderea imperiului lui Napoleon. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [11]. Aceast idee a fost dezvoltat nc n prima lucrare a lui Fourier, intitulat Thorie des quatre mouvements..., care conine mai ales urmtoarea tez general: Progresul social i transformrile care au loc n societate merg mn n mn cu emanciparea progresiv a femeilor, iar regresul ordinii sociale duce la o ngrdire a libertii femeilor. Fourier rezum aceast tez astfel: Lrgirea drepturilor femeilor este principiul fundamental al oricrui progres social (Ch. Fourier. Oeuvres compltes, t. I, Paris 1841, p. 195- 196). - Nota red. Editurii Politice [12]. Comp. Charles Fourier. Thorie de l'unit universelles (Teoria unitii universale), vol. I i IV; Oeuvres compltes, t. II, Paris 1843, p. 78-79, i ed. V, Paris 1841, p. 213-214. n ceea ce privete cercul vicios n care se nvrtete societatea civilizat, vezi Ch. Fourier. Le nouveau monde industriel et socitaire, ou invention du procd d'industrie attrayante et naturelle distribue en sries passionnes (Noua lume industrial i societar...); Oeuvres compltes, t. VI, Paris 1845, p. 27-46, 390. Prima ediie a acestei lucrri a aprut la Paris n 1829. Comp. i Ch. Fourier. Oeuvres compltes, t. I, Paris 1841, p. 202. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [13]. Ch. Fourier. Oeuvres compltes, t. VI, Paris 1845, p. 35. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [14]. Ch. Fourier. Oeuvres compltes, t. I, Paris 1841, p, 50 i urm. - Nota red. Editurii Politice

[15]. Vezi R. Owen. Report of the proceedings at the several public meetings, held in Dublin. On the 18th March - 12th April - 19th April and 3rd May (Raport prezentat la cteva ntruniri publice inute la Dublin la 18 martie, 12 i 19 aprilie i 3 mai), Dublin 1823, p. 110 i urm. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [16]. Robert Owen a expus acest plan al ordinii sociale viitoare n lucrarea sa The book of the new moral world, containing the raional system of society, founded on demonstrable facts, developing the constitution and laws of human nature and of society (Cartea despre noua lume moral, coninnd sistemul raional al societii...), London 1842-1844. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [17]. n ianuarie 1812, n cadrul unei mari ntruniri publice inute la Glasgow, Owen a propus o serie de msuri n vederea mbuntirii situaiei copiilor i a muncitorilor aduli n fabrici. Bill-ul prezentat din iniiativa lui Owen n iunie 1815 a fost adoptat de parlament abia n iulie 1819, i atunci ntr-o form ciuntit. Bill-ul care reglementa munca n manufacturile de bumbac interzicea munca copiilor sub 9 ani, limita la 12 ore ziua de munc pentru persoanele sub 18 ani i stabilea pentru toi muncitorii dou pauze: pentru micul dejun i pentru prnz, n total o or i jumtate. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [18]. n octombrie 1833 la Londra a avut loc Congresul asociaiilor cooperatiste i al trade-unionuriior prezidat de Owen, la care a fost formal nfiinat uniunea Grand national consolidated Trades' Union; statutul uniunii a fost adoptat n februarie 1834. Dup prerea lui Owen, aceast uniune trebuia s ia n minile ei conducerea produciei i s nfptuiasc pe cale panic transformarea total a societii. Dar acest plan utopic a euat. ntmpinnd o mpotrivire puternic din partea societii burgheze i a statului, uniunea s-a destrmat n august 1834. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [19]. Equitable Labour Exchange Bazaars (Bazare pentru schimbul echitabil al produselor muncii) au fost nfiinate n mai multe orae din Anglia de ctre asociaiile cooperatiste muncitoreti; primul bazar de acest fel a fost nfiinat de Robert Owen la Londra n septembrie 1832 i a durat pn la jumtatea anului 1834. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [20]. Proudhon a ncercat s nfiineze o banc de schimb n timpul revoluiei din 1848-1849. Banque du peuple a sa a fost nfiinat la Paris, la 31 ianuarie. 1849. Banca a funcionat circa dou luni, i atunci numai pe hrtie; ea a dat faliment nainte de a ncepe s funcioneze normal, iar la nceputul lunii aprilie a fost nchis. - Nota red. Editurii Politice

ntre timp, alturi de filozofia francez a secolului al XVIII-lea i n urma ei, se nscuse filozofia german modern, care i-a gsit desvrirea la Hegel. Cel mai mare merit al ei a fost c s-a rentors la dialectic ca la cea mai nalt form de gndire. Filozofii greci din antichitate

erau toi dialecticieni nnscui, spontani, iar Aristotel, mintea cea mai universal dintre ei, a i cercetat formele eseniale ale gndirii dialectice. Filozofia modern ns, cu toate c i aici dialectica a avut reprezentani strlucii (de pild Descartes i Spinoza), s-a mpotmolit din ce n ce mai mult, mai ales sub influena englez, n aa-numitul mod de gndire metafizic, care predomina aproape exclusiv i printre francezii secolului al XVIII-lea, cel puin n lucrrile lor pur filozofice. n afara filozofiei propriu-zise ns, ei au fost n stare s creeze capodopere ale dialecticii; ajunge s menionm Nepotul lui Rameau de Diderot[1] i Disertaie despre originea inegalitii dintre oameni de Rousseau. - Redm aici pe scurt esena celor dou metode de gndire. Dac supunem examenului gndirii natura sau istoria omenirii, sau propria noastr activitate intelectual, la prima vedere ni se nfieaz imaginea unei mpletiri infinite de conexiuni i interaciuni, n care nimic nu rmne ceea ce a fost, unde i cum a fost, ci n care totul se mic, se schimb, se nate i piere. Vedem, aadar, mai nti imaginea de ansamblu, n care amnuntele trec nc, mai mult sau mai puin, pe al doilea plan; ne ndreptm mai mult atenia asupra micrii, asupra trecerilor i legturii lor, dect asupra a ceea ce se mic, se transform i se nlnuie. Acest mod primitiv, naiv, dar corect n fond de a vedea lumea este propriu filozofiei antice greceti i a fost pentru prima oar exprimat limpede de Heraclit: totul este i n acelai timp nu este, cci totul curge, totul se afl n permanent schimbare, n permanent proces de natere i de pieire. Dar acest mod de a vedea, orict de bine ar sesiza el caracterul general al imaginii de ansamblu a fenomenelor, nu este totui suficient pentru a explica amnuntele din care se compune aceast imagine de ansamblu; i atta timp ct nu cunoatem aceste amnunte, nu ne putem face o idee clar nici asupra imaginii de ansamblu. Pentru a cunoate aceste amnunte, trebuie s le desprindem din conexiunea lor natural sau istoric i s le cercetm pe fiecare n parte, potrivit naturii lor, cauzelor i

efectelor lor particulare etc. Aceasta este n primul rnd sarcina tiinelor naturii i a istoriografiei, discipline care, din motive foarte ntemeiate, nu au ocupat la grecii din epoca clasic dect un loc subordonat, pentru c grecii trebuiau s strng mai nti materialul necesar pentru aceasta. Abia dup ce acest material este ntr-o oarecare msur adunat, se poate pi la trierea lui critic, la compararea lui, respectiv la mprirea n clase, ordine i specii. nceputurile cercetrii exacte a naturii au fost dezvoltate de aceea abia de ctre grecii perioadei alexandrine[2] i mai trziu, n evul mediu, de ctre arabi; o adevrat tiin a naturii dateaz ns abia din a doua jumtate a secolului al XV-lea, i de atunci ncoace ea a progresat cu o rapiditate tot mai mare. Descompunerea naturii n prile ei componente, separarea diferitelor procese i obiecte din natur n clase determinate, cercetarea structurii interne a corpurilor organice potrivit multiplelor lor forme anatomice, toate acestea au constituit condiia fundamental a uriaelor progrese care au fost nregistrate n domeniul cunoaterii naturii n ultimii 400 de ani. Dar acest mod de cercetare ne-a lsat i obiceiul de a concepe lucrurile i procesele din natur izolate unele de altele, n afara marii conexiuni generale, deci nu n micarea, ci n nemicarea lor, nu ca realiti schimbtoare prin nsi esena lor, ci ca lucruri fixe, imuabile, nu ca ceva viu, ci ca ceva mort. Transpus de Bacon i Locke din tiinele naturii n filozofie, acest fel de a vedea a dat natere mrginirii specifice a ultimelor secole, modului de gndire metafizic. Pentru metafizician, lucrurile i imaginile lor mintale, adic noiunile, snt obiecte izolate, imuabile, rigide, date o dat pentru totdeauna, care trebuie cercetate unul dup altul i independent unul de altul. El gndete numai n antiteze directe, fr nici un termen intermediar; felul lui de a vorbi este da-da, nu-nu; tot ce e n plus vine de la necuratul. Pentru el un lucru ori exist, ori nu exist; i tot att de puin un lucru poate s fie el nsui i totodat un altul. Pozitivul i negativul se exclud n mod absolut; ntre

cauz i efect exist de asemenea o opoziie rigid. La prima vedere, acest mod de gndire ni se pare foarte evident, pentru c este modul de gndire al aa-numitului bun-sim. Numai ca bunul-sim, orict de respectabil ar fi el n cadrul vieii de toate zilele, trece prin cele mai ciudate aventuri de ndat ce cuteaz s porneasc n lumea vast a cercetrii, iar modul de gndire metafizic, orict de justificat i chiar necesar ar fi el n anumite domenii, mai mult sau mai puin vaste, dup natura obiectului, se lovete totui de fiecare dat, mai curnd sau mai trziu, de o limit dincolo de care devine unilateral, mrginit, abstract i se ncurc n contradicii de nerezolvat, pentru c n faa lucrurilor izolate uit de legtura dintre ele, n faa existenei lor uit de devenirea lor, de naterea i pieirea lor, din cauza nemicrii lor uit de micarea lor, pentru c din cauza copacilor nu vede pdurea. n viaa de toate zilele tim, de pild, i putem spune cu certitudine dac un animal exist sau nu; la o cercetare mai exact vedem ns c aceasta este cteodat o problem foarte complicat, lucru pe care-l tiu foarte bine juritii, care s-au strduit n zadar s gseasc limita raional dincolo de care suprimarea copilului n pntecele mamei devine un omor; tot att de imposibil este s stabileti momentul morii, ntruct fiziologia dovedete c moartea nu este un act care survine dintr-o dat, instantaneu, ci un proces foarte ndelungat. Tot aa orice fiin organic este n fiecare clip aceeai i nu este aceeai; n fiecare clip ea asimileaz materii aduse din afar i elimin altele, n fiecare clip mor celule ale corpului su i se formeaz altele noi; dup un timp mai mult sau mai puin ndelungat, substana acestui corp s-a rennoit complet, a fost nlocuit prin ali atomi, astfel c orice fiin organic este mereu aceeai i totui alta. La o examinare mai atent vedem de asemenea c cei doi poli ai unei opoziii, cel pozitiv i cel negativ, snt tot att de inseparabili pe ct snt de opui i c, n pofida opoziiei lor totale, ei se ntreptrund; vedem de asemenea c reprezentrile de cauz i efect snt valabile ca atare numai cnd snt aplicate la un caz

particular, dar c, de ndat ce privim cazul particular n conexiunea sa general cu lumea n ntregul ei, ele se contopesc, se dizolv n reprezentarea interaciunii universale, n care cauzele i efectele i schimb mereu locul; ceea ce este acum sau aici efect devine dincolo sau apoi cauz, i invers. Toate aceste procese i metode de gndire nu ncap n limitele gndirii metafizice. Pentru dialectic ns, care prin nsi esena sa concepe lucrurile i imaginile lor mintale n conexiunea lor, n nlnuirea lor, n micarea lor, n naterea i pieirea lor, procese ca cele de mai sus snt tot attea confirmri ale propriului su mod de a proceda. Natura constituie piatra de ncercare a dialecticii, i trebuie s recunoatem tiinei moderne a naturii meritul de a ne fi furnizat pentru aceast verificare un material extrem de bogat, care sporete pe zi ce trece, dovedind astfel c n natur toate se petrec, n ultim instan, n mod dialectic, i nu n mod metafizic, c ea nu se mic cu uniformitatea etern a unui cerc ce se repet continuu, ci parcurge o adevrat istorie. Aici trebuie s-l menionm, n primul rnd, pe Darwin, care a dat cea mai puternic lovitur concepiei metafizice despre natur, dovedind c ntreaga natur organic de astzi, plantele i animalele, prin urmare i omul, snt produsul unui proces de dezvoltare care a durat milioane de ani. ntruct ns pn acum cercettorii naturii care au nvat s gndeasc dialectic pot fi numrai pe degete, acest conflict dintre rezultatele obinute i modul de gndire tradiional explic nemrginita confuzie care domnete n prezent n tiinele teoretice ale naturii i care duce la desperare pe dascli ca i pe discipoli, pe autori ca i pe cititori. Prin urmare, o prezentare exact a universului, a dezvoltrii sale i a dezvoltrii omenirii, precum i a reflectrii acestei dezvoltri n capetele oamenilor nu poate fi realizat dect pe cale dialectic, innd mereu seama de interaciunea universal dintre natere i pieire, dintre schimbrile progresive i cele regresive. i tocmai n acest sens s-a afirmat de la nceput filozofia german modern.

Kant i-a nceput cariera tiinific reducnd sistemul solar imuabil al lui Newton i durata sa etern - o dat ce i-a fost dat faimosul prim impuls - la un proces istoric: procesul naterii soarelui i a tuturor planetelor dintr-o mas nebuloas n rotaie. i n acelai timp el a tras concluzia c o dat cu apariia sistemului solar este dat n mod necesar i viitoarea lui dispariie. O jumtate de secol mai trziu, Laplace a fundamentat din punct de vedere matematic punctul de vedere al lui Kant, iar dup alt jumtate de secol, spectroscopul a dovedit existena n spaiul cosmic a unor asemenea mase gazoase incandescente n diferite stadii de condendare[3]. Aceast filozofie german modern i-a gsit desvrirea n sistemul lui Hegel, care are marele merit de a fi prezentat pentru prima oar ntreaga lume, natural, istoric i spiritual, ca un proces, adic n continu micare, schimbare, transformare i dezvoltare, i de a fi ncercat s dezvluie legtura intern a acestei micri i dezvoltri. Privit din acest punct de vedere, istoria omenirii nu mai aprea ca o nclcire haotic de acte de violen lipsite de sens, care, n faa scaunului de judecat al raiunii filozofice, ajuns acum la maturitate, snt toate la fel de condamnabile i pe care e bine s le uitm ct mai repede posibil, ci ca nsui procesul de dezvoltare a omenirii, gndirea avnd acum sarcina de a urmri mersul progresiv, ascendent al acestui proces de-a lungul tuturor cilor sale ntortocheate i de a dezvlui legitatea sa intern, care guverneaz tot ceea ce aparent este ntmpltor. Faptul c sistemul lui Hegel nu a rezolvat aceast problem nu prezint importan aici. Meritul su epocal este c a pus-o. Aceasta este o problem pe care niciodat nu o va putea rezolva un singur om. Cu toate c Hegel a fost, alturi de Saint-Simon, mintea cea mai universal a timpului su, el era totui ngrdit, n primul rnd, de propriile sale cunotine, inevitabil limitate, i, n al doilea rnd, de cunotinele i concepiile epocii sale, limitate i ele ca volum i profunzime. La acestea se mai adaug ns

i o a treia mprejurare. Hegel era idealist, cu alte cuvinte, pentru el, ideile din mintea lui nu erau imagini mai mult sau mai puin abstracte ale lucrurilor i proceselor reale, ci, invers, lucrurile i dezvoltarea lor nu erau dect imaginile ntruchipate ale ideii existente ntr-un mod oarecare nc nainte de a exista lumea. n felul acesta totul era aezat cu capul n jos, conexiunea real a fenomenelor lumii era complet inversat. i de aceea, orict de just i de genial a neles Hegel unele legturi particulare ale fenomenelor, era inevitabil ca, din motivele artate, sistemul lui s fie i sub raportul amnuntelor n multe privine ciupit, artificial, nscocit, ntr-un cuvnt fals. Sistemul hegelian ca atare a fost un colosal avorton, dar i ultimul n felul lui. Cci el mai suferea de o iremediabil contradicie intern: pe de o parte avea drept premis esenial concepia istoric potrivit creia istoria omenirii este un proces de dezvoltare care, prin nsi natura lui, nu poate s ajung la o desvrire pe plan intelectual prin descoperirea unui aazis adevr absolut, iar pe de alt parte sistemul hegelian susine c este tocmai summum-ul acestui adevr absolut. Un sistem de cunoatere a naturii i a istoriei, atotcuprinztor i ncheiat o dat pentru totdeauna, este n contradicie cu legile fundamentale ale gndirii dialectice; ceea ce nu exclude nicidecum, ci, dimpotriv, implic faptul, c din generaie n generaie, cunoaterea sistematic a ntregii lumi exterioare poate s fac progrese uriae. Sesizarea caracterului complet fals al idealismului german de pn acum a dus n mod inevitabil la materialism, dar, s reinem, nu la materialismul metafizic, exclusiv mecanicist al secolului al XVIII-lea. n opoziie cu simpla condamnare naiv revoluionar a ntregii istorii anterioare, materialismul modern vede n istorie procesul de dezvoltare a omenirii, proces ale crui legi de micare i propune s le descopere. n opoziie cu concepia despre natur care domin nu numai la francezii din secolul al XVIII-lea, dar nc i la Hegel, potrivit creia natura este un tot care se mic n cicluri restrnse, rmnnd mereu

identic cu sine nsui, cu corpuri cereti eterne - cum le-a conceput Newton - i cu specii imuabile de fiine organice - cum le-a conceput Linne -, materialismul modern sintetizeaz progresele cele mai noi ale tiinelor naturii, potrivit crora natura are i ea istoria ei n timp, corpurile cereti ca i speciile de organisme care le populeaz, atunci cnd gsesc condiii favorabile, se nasc i pier, iar ciclurile, n msura n care n genere rmn admisibile, capt dimensiuni infinit mai grandioase. n ambele cazuri materialismul modern este prin excelen dialectic i nu mai are nevoie de o filozofie care s stea deasupra celorlalte tiine. Din moment ce fiecare tiin n parte este pus n faa cerinei de a se edifica asupra locului pe care l ocup in conexiunea de ansamblu a lucrurilor i a cunotinelor despre lucruri, orice tiin special despre aceast conexiune de ansamblu devine de prisos. Ceea ce rmne ca element de sine stttor din toat filozofia de pn acum este tiina despre gndire i despre legile ei logica formal i dialectica. Tot restul se dizolv n tiina pozitiv despre natur i istorie. Dar pe cnd aceast revoluionare n concepia despre natur s-a putuit nfptui numai n msura n care cercetrile puneau la dispoziie materialul pozitiv necesar cunoaterii, i fcuser simit influena o serie de evenimente istorice care au provocat o cotitur hotrtoare n concepia despre istorie. n 1831 avusese loc la Lyon prima rscoal a muncitorilor; ntre 1838 i 1842 a ajuns la apogeu prima micare muncitoreasc pe scar naional, micarea cartitilor englezi. Lupta de clas dintre proletariat i burghezie trecea pe primul plan al istoriei celor mai avansate ri din Europa, pe msur ce n aceste ri se dezvolta, pe de o parte, marea industrie i, pe de alt parte, dominaia politic de curnd cucerit a burgheziei. Teoriile economiei politice burgheze despre identitatea de interese dintre capital i munc, despre armonia general i bunstarea general ca urmare a liberei concurene erau tot mai categoric dezminite de fapte. Toate acestea nu mai puteau fi ignorate, tot aa cum nu putea fi ignorat nici

socialismul francez i englez, care era expresia lor teoretic, dei foarte imperfect. Dar vechea concepie idealist despre istorie, care nu fusese nc nlturat, nu cunotea luptele de clas bazate pe interese materiale i, n genere, nici un fel de interese materiale; producia i toate relaiile economice erau pomenite numai n treact, ca elemente de importan secundar ale istoriei culturii. Faptele noi au impus o nou cercetare a ntregii istorii anterioare, i atunci s-a vzut c ntreaga istorie anterioar, cu excepia strilor primitive, a fost istoria unor lupte de clas, c aceste clase sociale n lupt unele cu altele snt de fiecare dat produsul relaiilor de producie i de schimb, ntr-un cuvnt al relaiilor economice din epoca respectiv; c, prin urmare, structura economic a societii din fiecare perioad istoric dat constituie baza real care explic, n ultim instan, ntreaga suprastructur - instituiile juridice i politice, precum i concepiile religioase, filozofice i de alt natur din perioada istoric respectiv. Hegel eliberase de metafizic concepia despre istorie, fcnd-o dialectic, dar concepia sa despre istorie era n esen idealist. Acum idealismul fusese izgonit din ultimul su refugiu, din concepia despre istorie, se crease o concepie materialist despre istorie i se gsise calea pentru a explica contiina oamenilor prin existena lor, n loc s se explice, ca pn acum, existena lor prin contiina lor. n consecin, socialismul nu mai aprea acum ca o descoperire ntmpltoare a cutrei sau cutrei mini geniale, ci ca un produs necesar al luptei dintre dou clase aprute ca urmare a dezvoltrii istorice, proletariatul i burghezia. Sarcina lui nu mai consta n a elabora un sistem ct mai perfect al societii, ci n a cerceta procesul istoriceconomic din care au rezultat n mod necesar aceste clase i antagonismul dintre ele i n a descoperi, n situaia economic creat de acest proces, mijloacele pentru rezolvarea conflictului. Dar socialismul de pn acum era tot att de incompatibil cu aceast concepie materialist pe ct era de incompatibil concepia despre natur a materialismului francez cu dialectica i cu tiinele

moderne ale naturii. Socialismul de pn acum, dei a criticat modul de producie capitalist existent i consecinele lui, n-a putuit s-l explice i deci nici s-i vin de hac; el n-a putut dect s-l resping pur i simplu ca pe ceva ru. Cu ct se indigna mai mult mpotriva exploatrii clasei muncitoare, inseparabil de acest mod de producie, cu att mai puin era n stare s arate limpede n ce const aceast exploatare i modul n care ia natere. Se punea ns problema, pe de o parte, de a prezenta modul de producie capitalist n conexiunea lui istoric i de a arta necesitatea lui ntr-o perioad istoric determinat, deci i necesitatea pieirii lui, iar pe de alt parte de a dezvlui i caracterul lui intern, nc neexplorat. Aceasta s-a realizat datorit descoperirii plusvalorii. S-a demonstrat c nsuirea muncii nepltite este forma fundamental a modului de producie capitalist i a exploatrii muncitorului care rezult din acest mod de producie; c chiar dac capitalistul cumpr fora de munc a muncitorului su la valoarea integral pe care aceasta o are ca marf pe piaa de mrfuri el scoate totui din ea o valoare mai mare dect aceea cu care a pltit-o -, i c aceast plusvaloare formeaz, n ultim instan, suma de valoare din care se acumuleaz n minile claselor avute masa de capital n continu cretere. Astfel a fost explicat felul n care decurge producia capitalist i n care se produce capitalul. Aceste dou mari descoperiri - concepia materialist despre istorie i dezvluirea secretului produciei capitaliste cu ajutorul plusvalorii - le datorm lui Marx. Prin aceste descoperiri socialismul a devenit o tiin, care urmeaz acum s fie elaborat n continuare n toate amnuntele i conexiunile ei.

[1]. Dialogul lui Denis Diderot Le neveu de Rameau (Nepotul lui Rameau) a fost scris aproximativ la 1762 i revzut ulterior de dou ori

de ctre autor. A aprut pentru prima oar n 1805 la Leipzig, n traducerea german a lui Goethe. n limba francez a fost publicat pentru prima oar- n Oeuvres indites de Diderot, Paris 1821, aprut de fapt n 1823. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [2]. Perioada alexandrin n dezvoltarea tiinei ine din secolul al IIIlea .e.n. pn n secolul al VII-lea e.n. -, denumirea ei vine de la oraul egiptean Alexandria (situat pe rmul Mrii Mediterane), care era unul dintre cele mai importante centre ale legturilor economice internaionale din acea vreme. n perioada alexandrin au cunoscut o mare dezvoltare o serie de tiine: matematicile i mecanica (Euclid i Arhimede), geografia, astronomia, anatomia, fiziologia .a. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [3]. Ipoteza despre nebuloas a lui Kant potrivit creia sistemul solar s-a format dintr-o nebuloas primar este expus n lucrarea sa Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels, oder Versuch von der Verfassung und dean mechanischen Ursprunge des ganzen Weltgebudes, nach Newton'schen Grundstzen abgehandelt, Knigsberg und Leipzig, 1755. Lucrarea a fost editat fr a se meniona numele autorului. Ipoteza lui Laplace cu privire la formarea sistemului solar a fost expus pentru prima oar n ultimul capitol al lucrrii sale Exposition du systme du monde, t. I-II, Paris, l'an IV de la Rpublique Francaise (1796). n ultima ediie, a asea, a acestei lucrri, pregtit n timpul vieii lui Laplace, dar aprut n 1835, dup moartea autorului, aceast ipotez a fost expus n nota VII. - Nota red. Editurii Politice

Concepia materialist despre istorie pornete de la teza c producia, i alturi de producie schimbul produselor ei, constituie baza oricrei ornduiri sociale; c, n fiecare societate care apare n istorie, repartiia produselor, i o dat cu ea mprirea social n clase sau stri sociale, este determinat de ce anume se produce, cum se produce i de felul n care se face schimbul acestor produse. Prin urmare, cauzele ultime ale oricror prefaceri sociale i revoluii politice nu trebuie cutate n mintea oamenilor, n nelegerea tot mai mare a adevrului etern i a dreptii, ci n schimbrile care au loc n modul de producie i de schimb; ele nu trebuie cutate n filozofia, ci n economia epocii respective. Dac oamenii ajung s-i dea seama c instituiile sociale existente snt iraionale i nedrepte, c nonsens devine raiunea i binefacerea o plag[1], aceasta nu este dect un indiciu c n metodele de

producie i n formele de schimb s-au produs pe nesimite transformri cu care ornduirea social, croit pe msura condiiilor economice anterioare, nu se mai potrivete. De aici rezult de asemenea c i mijloacele pentru nlturarea racilelor descoperite trebuie s existe - mai mult sau mai puin dezvoltate - tot n relaiile de producie schimbate. Aceste mijloace nu trebuie inventate, nscocite din minte, ci trebuie descoperite, cu ajutorul minii, n faptele materiale existente ale produciei. Cum stau din acest punct de vedere lucrurile cu socialismul contemporan? Este un lucru acum aproape ndeobte recunoscut c ornduirea social existent a fost creat de ctre actuala clas dominant, de ctre burghezie. Modul de producie propriu burgheziei, care de la Marx ncoace este numit modul de producie capitalist, era incompatibil cu privilegiile locale, feudale i cu legturile personale reciproce ale ornduirii feudale; burghezia a sfrmat ornduirea feudal, i pe ruinele ei a ridicat ornduirea social burghez, imperiul liberei concurene, al libertii de deplasare i de domiciliere, al egalitii n drepturi a posesorilor de mrfuri, ntr-un cuvnt toate splendorile burgheze. Modul de producie capitalist se putea dezvolta acum nestnjenit. De cnd aburul i noile maini-unelte au transformat vechea manufactur n marea industrie, forele de producie create sub conducerea burgheziei s-au dezvoltat cu o repeziciune i n proporii nemaipomenite pn atunci. Dar dup cum la timpul lor manufactura i meteugurile, perfecionate sub influena acesteia, intraser n conflict cu ctuele feudale ale breslelor, tot aa marea industrie, ajuns la o treapt mai nalt a dezvoltrii ei, intr n conflict cu barierele n care o ine ngrdit modul de producie capitalist. Forma burghez n care snt folosite noile fore de producie a devenit nencptoare pentru ele, iar acest conflict dintre forele de producie i modul de producie nu este un conflict nscut n mintea oamenilor, ca, de pild, conflictul dintre pcatul originar al omului i justiia divin, ci slluiete n

faptele reale, exist n mod obiectiv, n afara noastr, independent de voina sau de aciunea chiar a acelor oameni care i-au dat natere. Socialismul contemporan nu este altceva dect reflectarea n gndire a acestui conflict real, oglindirea lui n primul rnd n mintea clasei care sufer direct de pe urma lui, a clasei muncitoare. Dar n ce const acest conflict? naintea apariiei produciei capitaliste, adic n evul mediu, pretutindeni exista mica producie bazat pe proprietatea privat a celor ce muncesc asupra mijloacelor lor de producie; la ar - agricultura practicat de micii rani liberi sau dependeni, la orae - meteugul. Mijloacele de munc - pmntul, uneltele agricole, atelierul, sculele - erau mijloace de munc individuale, destinate folosinei individuale, prin urmare, n mod necesar srccioase, mrunte, reduse. Dar tocmai de aceea ele aparineau, de regul, productorului nsui. A concentra, a dezvolta aceste mijloace de producie frmiate i mrunte, a le preface n puternicele prghii de producie din zilele noastre - iat rolul istoric al modului de producie capitalist i al purttoarei lui, burghezia. Felul n care burghezia a ndeplinit acest rol de-a lungul istoriei, ncepnd din secolul al XV-lea, trecnd prin cele trei trepte: cooperaia simpl, manufactura i marea industrie, a fost descris n amnunime de Marx n seciunea a patra a Capitalului[2]. Dar burghezia, dup cum a demonstrat Marx n aceeai seciune, nu putea s transforme aceste mijloace de producie reduse n fore de producie gigantice fr a le transforma din mijloace de producie individuale n mijloace de producie sociale, care pot fi folosite numai de o colectivitate de oameni. n locul roatei de tors, al rzboiului de esut manual i al ciocanului fierarului au aprut maina de filat, rzboiul de esut mecanic, ciocanul cu aburi; locul atelierului l-a luat fabrica, care reclam cooperarea a sute i mii de muncitori. i ntocmai ca i mijloacele de producie, producia nsi s-a transformat dnitr-un ir de acte individuale ntr-un ir de acte sociale, iar produsele din produse ale unor indivizi

n produse sociale. Firul, estura, obiectele de metal care ieeau acum din fabric erau produsul muncii colective a numeroi muncitori, prin minile crora trebuiau s treac pe rnd pn s fie gata. Nici unul dintre muncitori nu mai putea spune despre ele: eu le-am fcut, snt produsul meu. Acolo ns unde forma fundamental a produciei este diviziunea spontan a muncii, care a aprut treptat i fr nici un plan n cadrul societii, ea imprim produselor forma de mrfuri, al cror schimb reciproc, cumprarea i vnzarea, d diferiilor productori posibilitatea s-i satisfac variatele lor nevoi. Aa stteau lucrurile n evul mediu. ranul, de pild, vindea meteugarului produse agricole i cumpra n schimb de la acesta produse meteugreti. n aceast societate de productori individuali, de productori de mrfuri, ptrunse acum noul mod de producie. n mijlocul diviziunii muncii, care s-a format n mod spontan, fr nici un plan i care domnea n ntreaga societate, el a introdus diviziunea muncii pe baz de plan n fiecare fabric n parte; alturi de producia individual a aprut producia social. Produsele amndurora se vindeau pe aceeai pia, aadar la preuri cel puin aproximativ egale. Dar organizarea pe baz de plan era mai puternic dect diviziunea spontan a muncii; datorit muncii sociale, fabricile produceau mai ieftin dect micii productori individuali. Producia individual a fost nvins rnd pe rnd n toate domeniile, producia social a revoluionat n ntregime vechiul mod de producie. Dar acest caracter revoluionar al produciei sociale a fost att de puin neles, nct, dimpotriv, ea a fost introdus ca un mijloc pentru ridicarea i stimularea produciei de mrfuri. Producia social a fost nemijlocit determinat de anumite prghii deja existente ale produciei de mrfuri i ale schimbului de mrfuri: capitalul comercial, meteugurile, munca salariat. Prin faptul c ea nsi a aprut ca o form nou a produciei de mrfuri, formele de nsuire caracteristice produciei de mrfuri au rmas ntru totul valabile i pentru ea.

n forma specific a produciei de mrfuri din evul mediu nici nu se putea pune problema: cui trebuie s-i aparin produsul muncii. Productorul individual l producea, de regul, din materia prim care-i aparinea i pe care o producea adesea el nsui, cu propriile lui mijloace de munc i prin munc manual efectuat de el nsui sau de familia sa. Astfel, productorul nici nu avea nevoie s-i nsueasc produsul, acesta i aparinea de la sine. Proprietatea asupra produselor se baza, aadar, pe munca proprie. Chiar i atunci cnd se recurgea la ajutor strin, acesta juca, de regul, numai un rol secundar, i adesea, n afar de salariu, primea i alt retribuie; ucenicul i calfa din cadrul breslelor lucrau nu att pentru ntreinere i salariu, ct mai ales n vederea propriei lor calificri ca meteri. Au urmat concentrarea mijloacelor de producie n mari ateliere i n manufacturi, transformarea lor n mijloace de producie ntr-adevr sociale. Dar mijloacele de producie i produsele sociale tot mai erau privite ca mijloace de producie i produse ale unor indivizi izolai. Dac pn atunci posesorul mijloacelor de munc i nsuise produsul pentru c, de regul, era propriul su produs, iar ajutorul dat de munca strin constituia numai o excepie, acum posesorul mijloacelor de munc continua s-i nsueasc produsul, dei acesta nu mai era produsul su, ci exclusiv produsulmuncii altuia. Astfel, produsele muncii sociale nu mai erau nsuite acum de ctre aceia care puseser realmente n micare mijloacele de producie i care fabricaser realmente produsele, ci de ctre capitalist. Mijloacele de producie i producia au devenit n esen sociale. Dar ele rmn subordonate unei forme de nsuire care are ca premis producia privat a unor indivizi izolai, n cadrul creia deci fiecare este proprietarul propriului su produs i l duce la pia. Modul de producie este subordonat acestei forme de nsuire, cu toate c el suprim premisele ei[*]. n aceast contradicie, care imprim noului mod de producie caracterul lui capitalist, se afl n germene toate conflictele epocii contemporane. Pe msur ce noul mod

de producie a nceput s domine n toate ramurile hotrtoare ale produciei i n toate rile care joac un rol economic hotrtor, nlturnd prin aceasta producia individual cu excepia ctorva rmie nensemnate, trebuia s ias mai mult la iveal incompatibilitatea dintre producia social i nsuirea capitalist. Primii capitaliti au gsit, dup cum am artat, forma muncii salariate deja existent. Dar munca salariat exista doar ca excepie, ca ndeletnicire auxiliar, secundar, ca o stare tranzitorie. ranul care se ducea pentru un timp s munceasc cu ziua avea cele cteva pogoane de pmnt ale sale, de pe urma crora putea s triasc la nevoie. Regulamentul breslelor prevedea ca cei care astzi snt calfe mine s devin meteri. Dar, de ndat ce mijloacele de producie s-au transformat n mijloace de producie sociale concentrate n minile capitalitilor, situaia s-a schimbat. Mijloacele de producie, ca i produsul micului productor individual, s-au depreciat din ce n ce mai mult; acestuia din urm nu-i rmnea alt ieire dect s munceasc n schimbul unui salariu la capitalist. Munca salariat, altdat o excepie i o ndeletnicire auxiliar, a devenit o regul i forma fundamental a ntregii producii; dintr-o ndeletnicire secundar ca pn acum, ea a devenit activitatea exclusiv a muncitorului. Muncitorul care efectua munc salariat numai n mod sporadic s-a transformat n muncitor salariat pe via. Numrul muncitorilor salariai pe via a sporit totodat enorm i datorit faptului c simultan s-a prbuit ornduirea feudal, au fost desfiinate suitele seniorilor feudali, au fost izgonii ranii de pe pmnturile lor etc. Se svrise separarea dintre mijloacele de producie concentrate n minile capitalitilor, pe de o parte, i productorii care nu posedau altceva dect fora lor de munc, pe de alt parte. Contradicia dintre producia social i nsuirea capitalist se manifest ca antagonism ntre proletariat i burghezie.

Am vzut c modul de producie capitalist a ptruns ntr-o societate de productori de mrfuri, de productori individuali, ale cror legturi sociale erau mijlocite prin schimbul produselor lor. Dar ceea ce caracterizeaz orice societate la baza creia st producia de mrfuri este faptul c, n cadrul ei, productorii nu mai snt stpni pe propriile lor relaii sociale. Fiecare produce fr s in seama de alii, cu mijloacele de producie pe care le posed ntmpltor i pentru nevoia sa special de schimb. Nimeni nu tie ce cantitate din articolul pe care-l produce el se afl pe pia i ce cantitate din acest produs este n genere necesar; nimeni nu tie dac exist o cerere real pentru produsul su individual, dac i va scoate cheltuielile sau dac n genere l va putea vinde. n producia social domnete anarhia. Dar producia de mrfuri, ca oricare alt form de producie, are legile ei specifice, inerente, inseparabile de ea; i aceste legi se impun, n pofida anarhiei, n cadrul ei i prin ea. Ele se manifest n singura form de legturi sociale care subzist, schimbul, impunndu-ise productorilor individuali ca legi coercitive ale concurenei. Ele le snt deci necunoscute la nceput nii acestor productori i trebuie s fie descoperite de ei treptat, pe baza unei experiene ndelungate. Ele i croiesc drum, aadar, fr productori i mpotriva productorilor, ca legi naturale ale formei lor de producie i care acioneaz orbete. Produsul i domin pe productori. n societatea medieval, mai ales n primele secole, producia era destinat mai cu seam consumului propriu. Ea satisfcea n mod precumpnitor nevoile productorului i ale familiei sale. Acolo unde, cum era cazul la ar, existau relaii de dependen personal, producia servea i la satisfacerea nevoilor seniorului feudal. Aici nu avea loc, prin urmare, nici un schimb, i de aceea produsele nici nu cptau caracterul de mrfuri. Familia ranului producea aproape tot ce-i trebuia - unelte i mbrcminte, ca i produse alimentare. Abia atunci cnd ea a ajuns s produc un surplus peste propriile ei nevoi i peste drile n natur datorate seniorului feudal, abia atunci a produs i mrfuri;

acest surplus aruncat n procesul schimbului social i oferit spre vnzare a devenit marf. Meteugarii de la orae au trebuit, desigur, s produc de la bun nceput n vederea schimbului. Dar i ei i acopereau cea mai mare parte a nevoilor lor personale prin munc proprie; ei aveau grdini i mici ogoare; i trimiteau vitele la pscut n pdurea comunal, care le mai furniza, pe deasupra, lemne de construcie i de foc; femeile torceau in, ln etc. Producia n vederea schimbului, producia de mrfuri, abia lua natere. De aici - schimb limitat, pia limitat, mod de producie stabil, izolare local fa de lumea exterioar, unire local n interior: marca[**] la ar, breslele la ora. Dar o dalt cu extinderea produciei de mrfuri i mai ales cu apariia modului de producie capitalist au intrat n aciune, mai fi i mai puternic, i legile, pn atunci latente, ale produciei de mrfuri. Vechile legturi au fost slbite, vechile bariere sfrmate, iar productorii s-au transformat din ce n ce mai mult n productori de mrfuri independeni, izolai. Anarhia produciei sociale a ieit la iveal i s-a accentuat tot mai mult. Dar instrumentul principal cu ajutorul cruia modul de producie capitalist a sporit aceast anarhie din producia social era tocmai opusul anarhiei, i anume organizarea crescnd a produciei ca producie social n fiecare ntreprindere n parte. Cu ajutorul acestei prghii, modul de producie capitalist a pus capt tihnitei stabiliti de altdat. Oriunde era introdus ntr-o ramur industrial oarecare, el nu mai rbda alturi de el nici o alt metod de producie mai veche. Oriunde punea stpnire pe vreun meteug, vechiul meteug era distrus. Cmpul de munc deveni un cmp de lupt. Marile descoperiri geografice i colonizrile care leau urmat au sporit numrul pieelor de desfacere i au grbit transformarea meteugului n manufactur. Lupta a izbucnit nu numai ntre diferiii productori locali; luptele locale au luat, la rndul lor, proporiile unor lupte naionale, ajungndu-se la rzboaiele comerciale din secolele al XVII-lea i al XVIII-lea[4]. n sfrit, marea industrie i formarea pieei mondiale au dat acestei lupte un caracter

universal i n acelai timp, o violen nemaintlnit, n relaiile dintre capitaliti, ca i dintre ramuri industriale ntregi i ri ntregi, problema existenei este hotrt n funcie de gradul n care condiiile naturale sau artificiale ale produciei snt mai mult sau mai puin favorabile. Cel nvins este nlturat fr mil. Este lupta darvinist pentru existena individual transpus cu o nverunare nzecit din natur n societate. Starea natural a animalului apare ca apogeu al dezvoltrii omeneti. Contradicia dintre producia social i nsuirea capitalist se prezint acum ca o contradicie ntre organizarea produciei nuntrul fiecrei fabrici i anarhia n producie din ntreaga societate. Modul de producie capitalist se mic n cadrul acestor dou forme de manifestare ale contradiciei care-i este imanent prin nsi originea lui, descriind fr posibilitate de ieire acel cerc vicios descoperit nc de Fourier. Ceea ce ns Fourier nu a putut nc s vad pe atunci, firete, este faptul c acest cerc se micoreaz treptat, c micarea reprezint mai curnd o spiral i c, asemenea micrii planetelor, ea trebuie s se ncheie, ciocnindu-se de centru. Fora motrice a anarhiei sociale n producie transform tot mai mult marea majoritate a oamenilor n proletari, iar masele proletare, la rndul lor, vor pune n cele din urm capt anarhiei n producie. Fora motrice a anarhiei sociale n producie transform posibilitatea nelimitat de perfecionare a mainilor folosite n marea industrie ntr-un imperativ pentru fiecare capitalist industrial n parte, silindu-l s-i perfecioneze tot mai mult mainile, dac nu vrea s piar. Dar a perfeciona mainile nseamn a face de prisos o anumit cantitate de munc omeneasc. Dac introducerea i sporirea numrului mainilor nseamn nlturarea a milioane de muncitori manuali i nlocuirea lor printr-un numr mic de muncitori care lucreaz la main, perfecionarea mainilor nseamn nlturarea, n numr tot mai mare, a nii muncitorilor care lucreaz la main i, n ultim instan, crearea unui numr de muncitori salariai disponibili, care

depete nevoile medii de brae de munc ale capitalului. Masa de muncitori neocupai formeaz o adevrat armat industrial de rezerv, cum am numit-o nc n 1845[***], disponibil pentru perioadele n care industria lucreaz din plin i aruncat n strad de crahul care urmeaz n mod necesar, o ghiulea care atrn ntotdeauna de picioarele clasei muncitoare n lupta ei pentru existen mpotriva capitalului, un regulator care menine salariul la nivelul sczut corespunztor nevoilor capitalului. Aa se face c maina, ca s folosim cuvintele lui Marx, devine cea mai puternic arm de lupt a capitalului mpotriva clasei muncitoare, c mijlocul de munc smulge n permanen din mna muncitorului mijlocul de subzisten, c propriul produs al muncitorului se transform ntr-o unealt de nrobire a muncitorului[6]. Aa se face c din capul locului economisirea mijloacelor de munc devine totodat cea mai necrutoare risip de for de munc i un jaf fa de condiiile normale de exercitare a muncii[7]; c maina, cel mai puternic mijloc pentru scurtarea timpului de munc, se transform n mijlocul cel mai infailibil pentru a preface ntreaga via a muncitorului i a familiei sale n timp de munc disponibil pentru valorificarea capitalului; aa se face c munca excesiv a unei pri a clasei muncitoare determin omajul celeilalte pri i c marea industrie, care cutreier tot globul pmntesc n goan dup noi consumatori, restrnge la ea acas consumul maselor muncitoare la un minim egal cu nfometarea, subminndui astfel propria ei pia intern. Legea care menine ncontinuu echilibrul dintre suprapopulaia relativ, adic armata industrial de rezerv, i proporiile i energia acumulrii l intuiete pe muncitor de capital mai zdravn dect l intuiau de stnc pe Prometeu piroanele lui Hefaistos. Ea determin o acumulare de mizerie corespunztoare acumulrii de capital. Acumularea de bogie la un pol este deci, n acelai timp, acumulare de mizerie, de munc istovitoare, de sclavie, de ignoran, de abrutizare i de degradare moral la cellalt pol, adic la clasa care produce propriul ei produs sub form de

capital (Marx, Capitalul, p. 671[8]). Or, a atepta de la modul de producie capitalist o alt repartiie a produselor e tot una cu a cere electrozilor unei baterii s nu descompun apa ct timp snt legai cu bateria i s nu dezvolte oxigen la polul pozitiv i hidrogen la polul negativ. Am vzut c posibilitatea de perfecionare a mainilor moderne, mpins la extrem, se transform, datorit anarhiei din producie care domnete n societate, ntr-un imperativ pentru fiecare capitalist industrial n parte, silindu-l s-i perfecioneze necontenit mainile, s sporeasc necontenit fora lor productiv. Tot aa se transform pentru el ntr-un imperativ i simpla posibilitate existent de fapt de a lrgi sfera produciei sale. Enorma for de extindere a marii industrii, fa de care fora de dilataie a gazelor este un adevrat joc de copil, se manifest acum ca o nevoie de extindere calitativ i cantitativ, care desfide orice rezisten. Aceast rezisten o constituie consumul, posibilitatea de desfacere, pieele pentru produsele marii industrii. Dar posibilitatea de lrgire, att extensiv ct i intensiv a pieelor este supus n primul rnd cu totul altor legi, care acioneaz mult mai puin energic. Lrgirea pieelor nu poate ine pasul cu extinderea produciei. Conflictul devine inevitabil, i, deoarece nu poate s duc la o rezolvare atta timp ct nu sfrm nsui modul de producie capitalist, el devine periodic. Producia capitalist creeaz un nou cerc vicios. ntr-adevr, ncepnd din 1825, cnd a izbucnit prima criz general, ntreaga lume industrial i comercial, producia i schimbul tuturor popoarelor civilizate i ale anexelor lor mai mult sau mai puin barbare deraiaz cam o dat la zece ani. Comerul stagneaz, pieele snt supraaglomerate de cantiti imense de produse care zac nefolosite i nu pot fi vndute, banii numerar dispar din circulaie, creditul nceteaz, fabricile i suspend activitatea, masele muncitoare duc lips de mijloace de subzisten pentru c au produs prea multe mijloace de

subzisten, falimentele i vnzrile silite se in lan. Stagnarea dureaz ani de zile, forele de producie i produsele snt irosite i distruse n mas, pn cnd stocurile de mrfuri ngrmdite snt, n sfrit, plasate la un pre mai mult sau mai puin sczut, pn cnd producia i schimbul pornesc treptat din nou. ncetul cu ncetul, ritmul se accelereaz, pasul devine trap, trapul industrial devine galop, care se nteete, la rndul lui, pn devine goana nebun a unei adevrate steeplechase[9] a industriei, comerului, creditului i speculaiei, pentru a ajunge n cele din urm, dup salturile cele mai primejdioase, din nou n groapa crahului. i mereu la fel. Din 1825 pn acum am trecut de cinci ori prin asemenea crize, i n momentul de fa (1877) avem parte de a asea. Iar caracterul acestor crize se contureaz att de precis, nct Fouorier le-a definit pe toate cnd a caracterizat-o pe cea dinti drept crise plthorique, criz din cauza abundenei[10]. n crize, contradicia dintre producia social i nsuirea capitalist se manifest n mod violent. Circulaia mrfurilor nceteaz temporar; mijlocul de circulaie, banii, devine o piedic pentru circulaie; toate legile produciei i circulaiei de mrfuri snt rsturnate. Conflictul economic a atins punctul culminant: modul de producie se rzvrtete mpotriva modului de schimb. Faptul c organizarea social a produciei nuntrul fabricii s-a dezvoltat ntr-att, nct a devenit incompatibil cu anarhia n producie din societate, care exist paralel cu ea i deasupra ei, - acest fapt devine evident pentru capitalitii nii datorit concentrrii forate a capitalurilor care are loc n timpul crizelor, n urma ruinrii multor mari capitaliti i a i mai multor mici capitaliti, ntregul mecanism al modului de producie capitalist nu mai poate face fa presiunii forelor de producie pe care el nsui lea generat. Modul de producie capitalist nu mai poate transforma ntreaga mas de mijloace de producie n capital, ele zac nefolosite, i tocmai de aceea st nefolosit i armata industrial de rezerv. Mijloace de producie, mijloace de subzisten, muncitori disponibili, toate

elementele produciei i ale avuiei generale exist din abunden. Dar abundena devine izvor de mizerie i de lipsuri (Fourier), pentru c tocmai ea este aceea care mpiedic transformarea mijloacelor de producie i a mijloacelor de subzisten n capital. Cci n societatea capitalist mijloacele de producie nu pot intra n funciune dac nu s-au transformat mai nti n capital, n mijloace de exploatare a forei de munc omeneti. Ca o fantom se interpune ntre muncitori, de o parte, i mijloacele de producie i mijloacele de subzisten, de alt parte, necesitatea ca ele s capete caracterul de capital. Numai aceast necesitate mpiedic unirea prghiilor materiale cu prghiile umane ale produciei; numai aceasta oprete mijloacele de producie s funcioneze i pe muncitori s munceasc i s triasc. Pe de o parte, aadar, modul de producie capitalist, se dovedete incapabil s mai administreze aceste fore de producie. Pe de alt parte, nsei aceste fore de producie tind tot mai impetuos spre desfiinarea acestei contradicii, spre eliberarea lor de caracterul de capital, spre recunoaterea n fapt a caracterului lor de fore de producie sociale. Reacia forelor de producie n uria cretere mpotriva caracterului lor de capital, necesitatea tot mai mare de a se recunoate natura lor social silesc nsi clasa capitalitilor s le trateze tot mai mult ca fore de producie sociale, n msura n care acest lucru este n genere cu putin n cadrul relaiilor capitaliste. Att perioada de maxim activitate industrial, cu creditul ei umflat peste msur, ct i crahul nsui, prin ruinarea unor mari ntreprinderi capitaliste, duc la acea form de socializare a unor mase mari de mijloace de producie, pe care o ntlnim la diferitele feluri de societi pe aciuni. Unele din aceste mijloace de producie i de comunicaie snt din capul locului att de colosale, nct exclud, ca, de pild, cile ferate, orice alt form de exploatare capitalist. Dar pe o anumit treapt de dezvoltare, nici aceast form nu mai este suficient; marii productori dintr-o ramur industrial a unei ri se unesc ntr-un

trust, ntr-o uniune avnd ca scop reglementarea produciei; ei hotrsc cantitatea total care trebuie produs, o repartizeaz ntre ei i impun astfel preul de vnzare fixat dinainte. Cum ns asemenea trusturi se destram n majoritatea cazurilor la prima conjunctur defavorabil, ele duc tocmai prin aceasta la o i mai mare concentrare a socializrii; ntreaga ramur industrial se transform ntr-o unic mare societate pe aciuni, iar concurena din interiorul rii face loc monopolului acestei societi unice pe ar. Aa s-au petrecut lucrurile nc n 1890 cu producia englez de alcalii, care acum, dup fuziunea celor 48 de fabrici mari, este concentrat n mna unei singure societi, cu o conducere unic avnd un capital de 120.000.000 de mrci. n trusturi, libera concuren se transform n monopol, producia neplanificat a societii capitaliste capituleaz n faa produciei planificate a viitoarei societi socialiste. Ce-i drept, la nceput numai spre folosul i binele capitalitilor. Dar n aceast form exploatarea devine att de evident, nct trebuie s se prbueasc. Nici un popor n-ar tolera timp ndelungat o producie condus de trusturi, o exploatare att de fi a colectivitii de ctre o mic band de indivizi care triesc din tierea cupoanelor. ntr-un fel sau altul, cu sau fr trusturi, n cele din urm reprezentantul oficial al societii capitaliste, statul, este nevoit[****] s preia conducerea produciei. Necesitatea transformrii n proprietate de stat apare n primul rnd la marile ntreprinderi de comunicaie: pot, telegraf, ci ferate. Dac crizele au dezvluit incapacitatea burgheziei de a mai administra forele de producie moderne, transformarea marilor ntreprinderi de producie i de comunicaie n societi pe aciuni, trusturi i proprietate de stat dovedete c burghezia este de prisos n acest scop. Toate funciunile sociale ale capitalistului snt ndeplinite acum de funcionari salariai. Capitalistul nu mai are alt activitate social dect s ncaseze venituri, s taie cupoane

i s joace la burs, unde diferiii capitaliti i smulg unii altora capitalurile. Dac mai nainte modul de producie capitalist nltura pe muncitori, acum el nltur i pe capitaliti, trecndu-i, ntocmai ca pe muncitori, n rndurile populaiei excedentare, chiar dac nu-i trece nc, deocamdat, n rndurile armatei industriale de rezerv. Dar nici transformarea n societi pe aciuni i trusturi, nici transformarea n proprietate de stat nu nltur caracterul de capital al forelor de producie. La societile pe aciuni i trusturi, acest lucru este evident. Iar statul modern nu este, la rndul lui, dect organizaia pe care i-o creeaz societatea burghez pentru a menine condiiile exterioare generale ale modului de producie capitalist mpotriva unor nclcri att din partea muncitorilor, ct i din partea unor capitaliti. Statul modern, oricare ar fi forma sa, este prin nsi esena sa o main capitalist, statul capitalitilor, ntruchiparea capitalistului colectiv. Cu ct preia n proprietatea sa mai multe fore de producie, cu att mai mult devine el realmente capitalist colectiv, cu att exploateaz mai muli ceteni. Muncitorii rmn muncitori salariai, proletari. Relaiile capitaliste nu snt suprimate, ci, dimpotriv, snt mpinse la limita extrem. Dar odat atins aceast limit extrem, se produce o rsturnare. Proprietatea de stat asupra forelor de producie nu constituie o rezolvare a conflictului; ea conine ns n sine mijlocul formal, posibilitatea rezolvrii lui. Aceast rezolvare nu poate consta dect n recunoaterea efectiv a caracterului social al forelor de producie moderne, prin urmare n punerea n concordan a modului de producie, de nsuire i de schimb cu caracterul social al mijloacelor de producie. Iar aceasta se poate nfptui numai dac societatea ia n stpnire deschis i nu pe ci ocolite forele de producie, care au depit orice alt conducere n afar de aceea exercitat de societatea nsi. Astfel productorii deschid n mod pe deplin contient caracterului social al mijloacelor de producie i al produselor, care se ntoarce astzi mpotriva productorilor nii, care sparge periodic cadrul modului

de producie i de schimb i se impune numai ca o lege a naturii, care acioneaz orbete, n mod violent i distrugtor, cmp liber de aciune, transformndu-l dintr-o surs de tulburri i de crahuri periodice n cea mai puternic prghie a produciei nsi. Forele sociale, la fel ca i forele naturii, acioneaz orbete, violent i distructiv atta timp ct nu le cunoatem i nu inem seama de ele. Dar o dat ce le-am cunoscut, o dat ce am neles aciunea, direcia i efectele lor, nu mai depinde dect de noi ca s le supunem tot mai mult voinei noastre i s ne atingem cu ajutorul lor scopurile. Aceasta este valabil mai ales pentru uriaele fore de producie de astzi. Atta timp ct refuzm cu ncpnare s nelegem natura i caracterul lor - i acestei nelegeri i se mpotrivesc modul de producie capitalist i apologeii lui -, atta timp aceste fore de producie acioneaz n pofida noastr, mpotriva noastr, ele ne domin, dup cum am artat amnunit mai sus. Dar o dat ce am neles natura lor, ele pot fi transformate n minile productorilor asociai, din stpni demonici, n servitori docili. Este aceeai deosebire ca ntre fora distructiv a electricitii din fulgerul furtunii i electricitatea mblnzit a telegrafului i a arcului voltaic, aceeai deosebire ca ntre incendiu i focul pus n slujba omului. Cnd actualele fore de producie vor fi folosite potrivit naturii lor, n sfrit, cunoscute, anarhia social n producie va fi nlocuit cu reglementarea social, planificat a produciei potrivit nevoilor colectivitii, ca i ale fiecrui membru al ei n parte. n felul acesta, modul de nsuire capitalist - n care produsul l nrobete mai nti pe productor, iar apoi i pe acela care i-l nsuete - va fi nlocuit prin acel mod de nsuire a produselor care se bazeaz pe nsi natura mijloacelor de producie moderne: pe de o parte, nsuire social direct a produselor, ca mijloc de ntreinere i de extindere a produciei, pe de alt parte, nsuire individual, direct a lor n calitate de mijloace de existen i de desftare.

Transformnd tot mai mult majoritatea covritoare a populaiei n proletari, modul de producie capitalist creeaz fora care este silit s nfptuiasc aceast revoluie, dac nu vrea s piar. mpingnd tot mai mult la transformarea marilor mijloace de producie sociale in proprietate de stat, modul de producie capitalist indic el nsu calea spre nfptuirea acestei revoluii.Proletariatul cucerete puterea de stat i transform mijloacele de producie mai nti n proprietate de stat. Dar prin aceasta el se desfiineaz pe sine nsui ca proletariat, desfiineaz toate deosebirile de clas i toate contradiciile de clas, i, o dat cu aceasta, desfiineaz i statul ca stat. Societatea de pn acum, care s-a dezvoltat n cadrul unor contradicii de clas, avea nevoie de stat, adic de o organizaie a clasei exploatatoare din epoca dat, pentru a menine condiiile ei exterioare de producie, aadar mai ales pentru a ine prin for clasa exploatat n condiiile de oprimare determinate de modul de producie dat (sclavie, iobgie sau dependen feudal, munc salariat). Statul era reprezentantul oficial al ntregii societi, sintetizarea ei ntr-un organism vizibil, dar aceasta numai n msura n care era statul acelei clase care reprezenta n epoca dat ntreaga societate: n antichitate stat al cetenilor proprietari de sclavi, n evul mediu stat al nobilimii feudale, n vremurile noastre stat al burgheziei. Devenind, n sfrit, realmente reprezentant al ntregii societi, el se face pe sine nsui de prisos. De ndat ce nu mai exist nici o clas social care trebuie oprimat, de ndat ce mpreun cu dominaia de clas i cu lupta pentru existena individual, generat de anarhia de pn acum a produciei, snt nlturate i conflictele i excesele care izvorsc de aici, nu mai este nimic de reprimat, nimic care s fac necesar o for special de represiune, un stat. Primul act prin care statul se manifest realmente ca reprezentant al ntregii societi - luarea n stpnire a mijloacelor de producie n numele societii este, n acelai timp, i ultimul su act independent ca stat. Intervenia unei puteri de stat n relaiile sociale devine, rnd pe rnd, de prisos n toate domeniile i nceteaz apoi

de la sine. n locul guvernrii asupra persoanelor apar administrarea lucrurilor i conducerea proceselor de producie. Statul nu este desfiinat, el dispare treptat. Prin aceast prism trebuie apreciat frazeologia cu privire la statul popular liber[12], frazeologie care o anumit perioad de timp era justificat ca mijloc de agitaie, dar care, n ultim instan, este inconsistent din punct de vedere tiinific. Tot prin aceast prism trebuie apreciat i revendicarea aa-numiilor anarhiti ca statul s fie desfiinat de la o zi la alta. Din momentul n care modul de producie capitalist ia fcut apariia pe scena istoriei, luarea n stpnire de ctre societate a tuturor mijloacelor de producie se contura adesea, mai mult sau mai puin nebulos, n faa unor indivizi, ct i a unor secte ntregi ca un ideal de viitor. Dar ea a devenit posibil, a devenit o necesitate istoric abia atunci cnd s-au ivit condiiile efective pentru nfptuirea ei. Ca orice alt progres social, ea devine realizabil nu datorit convingerii c existena claselor este n contradicie cu dreptatea, egalitatea etc., nu datorit simplei voine de a desfiina clasele, ci datorit apariiei unor condiii economice noi. Scindarea societii ntr-o clas exploatatoare i o clas exploatat, ntr-o clas dominant i o clas oprimat, a fost consecina necesar a slabei dezvoltri a produciei n trecut. Atta timp ct din munca social total se obine un produs care depete doar cu puin strictul necesar pentru existena tuturor, atta timp ct munca reclam tot timpul sau aproape tot timpul marii majoriti a membrilor societii, societatea se mparte n mod necesar n clase. Alturi de marea majoritate, silit exclusiv s salahoreasc, se formeaz o clas eliberat de munca direct productiv, care se ngrijete de treburile obteti ale societii: conducerea muncii, treburile de stat, justiia, tiina, artele etc. La baza mpririi societii n clase st, aadar, legea diviziunii muncii, ceea ce nu nseamn ns c aceast mprire n clase nu a fost nfptuit prin violen i jaf, prin viclenie i nelciune, i c clasa dominant, odat ajuns la putere,

ar fi pierdut vreun prilej pentru a-i ntri dominaia pe seama clasei care muncea i pentru a transforma conducerea societii ntr-o exploatare sporit a maselor. Dar dac mprirea societii n clase are, prin urmare, o anumit justificare istoric, ea o are numai pentru o perioad de timp dat, pentru condiii sociale date. La baza acestei mpriri n clase a stat faptul c producia era nendestultoare; ea va fi lichidat de dezvoltarea deplin a forelor de producie moderne. ntr-adevr, desiiinarea claselor sociale presupune un grad de dezvoltare istoric la care existena nu numai a cutrei sau cutrei clase dominante, ci a unei clase dominante n genere, deci a nsei deosebirilor de clas, s fi devenit un anacronism, ceva perimat. Desfiinarea claselor presupune, aadar, un asemenea grad de dezvoltare a produciei la care nsuirea mijloacelor de producie i a produselor de ctre o anumit clas social i, o dat cu aceasta, concentrarea dominaiei politice, a monopolului culturii i a conducerii spirituale n minile acestei clase au devenit nu numai de prisos, ci i o piedic n calea dezvoltrii economice, politice i spirituale. Acest grad este acum atins. Falimentul politic i spiritual al burgheziei aproape c nu mai este un secret nici pentru ea nsi, iar falimentul ei economic se repet regulat din zece n zece ani. n cursul fiecrei crize, societatea se sufoc sub povara propriilor sale fore de producie i produse, pe care ea nu le poate folosi, i st neputincioas n faa contradiciei absurde c productorii nu pot consuma pentru c lipsesc consumatorii. Fora de extindere a mijloacelor de producie sfrm ctuele pe care i le-a pus modul de producie capitalist. Eliberarea lor de aceste ctue este singura condiie prealabil a unei dezvoltri nentrerupte i din ce n ce mai rapide a forelor de producie i, n consecin, a creterii practic nelimitate a produciei nsi. Dar nu numai att. Trecerea mijloacelor de producie n proprietate social nltur nu numai actuala frnare artificial a produciei, ci i irosirea i distrugerea efectiv a forelor de producie i a produselor, care nsoesc astzi n mod inevitabil producia i care

ating punctul culminant n timpul crizelor. n afar de aceasta, ea elibereaz i pune la dispoziia colectivitii o mare mas de mijloace de producie i de produse, prin nlturarea risipei stupide pe care o implic luxul actualelor clase dominante i al reprezentanilor lor politici. Posibilitatea de a asigura tuturor membrilor societii, cu ajutorul produciei sociale, condiii materiale de existen nu numai pe deplin ndestultoare i pe zi ce trece mai mbelugate, dar care s le garanteze i o dezvoltare i manifestare deplin i liber a aptitudinilor lor fizice i spirituale, aceast posibilitate exist acum pentru prima oar, dar ea exist[*****]. Prin luarea n stpnire a mijloacelor de producie de ctre societate, producia de mrfuri este nlturat i, o dat cu aceasta, este nlturat i dominaia produsului asupra productorului. Anarhia din cadrul produciei sociale este nlocuit prin organizarea planificat, contient. Lupta pentru existena individual ia sfrit. Abia prin aceasta omul se desparte, ntr-un anumit sens, definitiv de regnul animal i trece, de la condiii de existen animalice, la condiii cu adevrat omeneti. Condiiile de via nconjurtoare, care i-au dominat pn acum pe oameni, trec acum sub dominaia i controlul oamenilor, care devin, pentru prima oar, stpnii contieni, adevrai ai naturii, pentru c devin stpnii propriei lor viei sociale. Legile propriei lor activiti sociale, care pn acum li se opuneau oamenilor ca nite legi naturale strine de ei i care i dominau, vor fi folosite de acum nainte de oameni n deplin cunotin de cauz i, prin aceasta, vor fi dominate de ei. Viaa social a oamenilor, care pn acum li se opunea, ca ceva impus de natur i istorie, devine acum un act liber al lor. Forele obiective, strine, care dominau pn acum istoria, trec sub controlul oamenilor nii. Abia din acest moment oamenii i vor furi, pe deplin contieni, propria lor istorie, abia din acest moment cauzele sociale puse n micare de ei vor avea n chip precumpnitor i n msur tot mai mare

efectele voite de ei. Este saltul omenirii din imperiul necesitii n imperiul libertii. n concluzie, s rezumm pe scurt expunerea noastr: I. Societatea medieval: mic producie individual. Mijloace de producie destinate uzului individual, de aceea primitive, greoaie, mrunte i de o eficacitate foarte redus. Producie destinat consumului nemijlocit, fie al productorului nsui, fie al stpnului su feudal. Numai acolo unde producia realizeaz un surplus de produse peste acest consum, acest surplus este pus n vnzare i ia calea schimbului: producia de mrfuri se afl, prin urmare, abia in faza incipient, dar ea poart deja n sine, n germene, anarhia din producia social. II. Revoluia capitalist: transformarea industriei mai nti prin mijlocirea cooperaiei simple i a manufacturii. Concentrarea mijloacelor de producie, pn acum risipite, n mari ateliere; i, n consecin, transformarea lor din mijloace de producie individuale n mijloace de producie sociale - o transformare care n linii generale nu afecteaz forma schimbului. Vechile forme de nsuire rmn n vigoare. Apare capitalistul: n calitatea sa de proprietar al mijloacelor de producie, el i nsuete i produsele, transformndu-le n mrfuri. Producia a devenit un act social; schimbul ns i o dat cu el i nsuirea produselor rmn acte individuale, acte ale unor indivizi izolai: produsul muncii sociale este nsuit de capitalist. Aceasta constituie contradicia fundamental, din care izvorsc toate celelalte contradicii n care se mic societatea actual i pe care marea industrie le scoate la iveal. A. Separarea productorului de mijloacele de producie. Condamnarea muncitorului la munc salariat pe via.Contradicia dintre proletariat i burghezie. B. Manifestare tot mai puternic i aciune sporit a legilor care domin producia de mrfuri. Concuren acerb.Contradicia dintre organizarea social din

fiecare fabric n parte i anarhia social din producie luat n ansamblul ei. C. Pe de o parte, perfecionarea mainilor, care devine, din cauza concurenei, un imperativ pentru fiecare fabricant i nseamn totodat punerea n disponibilitate a unui numr tot mai mare de muncitori: apariia armatei industriale de rezerv. Pe de alt parte, extinderea nelimitat a produciei, de asemenea devenit un imperativ impus de concuren fiecrui fabricant. De ambele pri - o dezvoltare nemaipomenit a forelor de producie, ofert care depete cererea, supraproducie, suprasaturare a pieelor, crize care se repet din zece n zece ani, un cerc vicios: de o parte - surplus de mijloace de producie i de produse; de alta - surplus de muncitori rmai fr lucru i fr mijloace de existen; dar aceste dou prghii ale produciei i ale bunstrii sociale nu se pot reuni, deoarece forma capitalist a produciei nu permite forelor de producie s acioneze i produselor s circule dect cu condiia transformrii lor prealabile n capital; or, tocmai acest lucru este mpiedicat de propria lor supraabunden. Aceast contradicie a luat proporiile unei aberaii: modul de producie se rzvrtete mpotriva formei de schimb. Burghezia se dovedete incapabil de a mai conduce propriile ei fore de producie sociale. D. Recunoaterea parial a caracterului social al forelor de producie, impus capitalitilor nii. Luarea n stpnire a marilor organisme de producie i de comunicaie, mai nti de ctre societi pe aciuni, apoi de ctre trusturi i n cele din urm de ctre stat. Burghezia se dovedete a fi o clas de prisos; toate

funciunile ei sociale snt ndeplinite acum de funcionari salariai. III. Revoluia proletar, rezolvarea contradiciilor: proletariatul cucerete puterea politic i n virtutea acestei puteri transform mijloacele de producie sociale, care scap din minile burgheziei, n proprietate a ntregii societi. Prin acest act el elibereaz mijloacele de producie de caracterul de capital pe care-l aveau pn acum i d caracterului lor social libertate deplin de a se afirma. Acum devine posibil o producie social dup un plan dinainte stabilit. Dezvoltarea produciei face ca existena pe viitor a diferitelor clase sociale s devin un anacronism. n msura n care dispare anarhia n producia social dispare treptat i autoritatea politic a statului. Astfel, oamenii, n sfrit stpni pe propria lor existen social, devin totodat stpnii naturii, propriii lor stpni, devin liberi. A nfptui acest act de eliberare a omenirii este menirea istoric a proletariatului contemporan. A cerceta condiiile istorice i, prin aceasta, nsi natura acestui act, a face astfel din clasa chemat s nfptuiasc acest act, azi asuprit, o clas contient de condiiile i natura propriei ei aciuni este sarcina socialismului tiinific, care este expresia teoretic a micrii proletare.

Scris n ianuarie-martie 1880 Se tiprete dup K. Marx i F. Engels. Opere, vol. 19, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1964, p. 195-235 Nota red. Editurii Politice

[*]. Nu este nevoie s artm aici c, chiar dac forma de nsuire rmne aceeai, totui caracterul nsuirii, datorit procesului descris mai sus, a fost n aceeai msur revoluionat ca i producia. Dac-mi nsuesc propriul meu produs sau mi nsuesc produsul altora, acestea snt, firete, dou feluri foarte diferite de nsuire. n treact fie spus: munca salariat, n care exist deja n germene ntregul mod de producie capitalist, este foarte veche; ca fenomen izolat i sporadic, ea a existat timp de secole alturi de sclavie. Dar acest germene a putut s se dezvolte i s devin modul de producie capitalist abia atunci cnd au fost create condiiile istorice necesare. (Nota lui Engels.) [**]. Vezi anexa de la sfrit[3]. (Nota lui Engels.). [***]. Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England, p. 109[5]. (Nota lui Engels.) [****]. Spun este nevoit, cci numai n cazul cnd mijloacele de producie sau de comunicaie vor crete ntradevr prea mult pentru a mai fi conduse prin societi pe aciuni, cnd, prin urmare, etatizarea va deveni inevitabil din punct de vedere economic, numai n acesst caz etatizarea va nsemna - chiar dac va fi nfptuit de statul actual - un progres economic, un nou pas spre luarea n stpnire a tuturor forelor de producie de ctre societatea nsi. Dar n ultima vreme, de cnd Bismarck sa lansat pe calea etatizrii, s-a ivit un anumit fals socialism care a i degenerat pe alocuri n servilism i care declar din capul locului socialist, orice etatizare, chiar i cea fcut de Bismarck. ntr-adevr, dac crearea monopolului de stat al tutunului ar avea un caracter socialist, atunci Napoleon i Metternich s-ar numra i ei printre ntemeietorii socialismului. Dac statul belgian, din considerente politice i financiare foarte banale, i-a construit singur principalele sale linii de cale ferat, dac, fr nici o necesitate economic, Bismarck a etatizat principalele linii de cale ferat din Prusia numai pentru a le putea organiza i folosi mai bine n caz de rzboi, pentru a face din funcionarii de la calea ferat o turm de alegtori

care s voteze pentru guvern, i mai ales pentru a-i procura o nou surs de venituri independent de hotrrile parlamentului, - acestea n-au fost nicidecum msuri socialiste, nici directe i nici indirecte, nici contiente i nici incontiente. Altminteri ar fi instituii socialiste i societatea regal Seehandlung[11] i manufactura regal de porelanuri i croitoria companiei n armat, ba chiar i etatizarea bordelurilor, propus cu toat seriozitatea de un mucalit cam prin 1830, sub domnia lui Frederic Wilhelm al III-lea. (Nota lui Engels.) [*****]. Cteva cifre ne pot da o idee aproximativ despre enorma for de extindere a mijloacelor de producie moderne, chiar i n condiiile asupririi capitaliste. Dup calcule fcute de Giffen[13], avuia total a Marii Britanii i a Irlandei atingea n cifre rotunde: n 1814 ........ 2 200 de milioane l. st. = miliarde mrci. " 1865 ........ 6 100 " " " " 122 " " " 1875 ........ 8 500 " " " " 170 " " 44 = =

Ct privete distrugerea de mijloace de producie i de produse n timpul crizelor, la Congresul al doilea al industriailor germani, inut la Berlin la 21 februarie 1878, s-a stabilit c pierderea total suferit n timpul ultimului crah numai de industriagerman a fierului se ridic la 455.000.000 de mrci. (Nota lui Engels.)

[1]. Cuvintele lui Mefistofel din opera lui Goethe Faust, partea nti, Bucureti, E.S.P.L.A., 1955, p. 107. - Nota trad. Editurii Politice [2]. Vezi K. Marx i F. Engels. Opere, vol. 23, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1966, p. 323-512. - Nota trad. Editurii Politice [3]. Vezi K. Marx i F. Engels. Opere, vol. 19, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1964, p. 339-357. - Nota trad. Editurii Politice

[4]. Rzboaiele comerciale din secolele al XVII-lea i al XVIII-lea. Este vorba de seria de rzboaie purtate n secolele al XVII-lea i al XVIIIlea de cele mai mari state europene pentru hegemonie n comerul cu India i cu America i pentru acapararea de piee coloniale. Iniial, principalele ri rivale au fost Anglia i Olanda (rzboaie tipic comerciale au fost rzboaiele anglo-olandeze din 1652-1654, 1664-1667 i 16721674), ulterior lupta hotrtoare s-a dat ntre Anglia i Frana. Din toate aceste rzboaie a ieit nvingtoare Anglia, n minile creia s-a concentrat, spre sfritul secolului al XVIII-lea, aproape ntregul comer mondial. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [5]. Vezi K. Marx i F. Engels. Opere, vol. 2, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1962, ed. a II-a, p 332. - Nota trad. Editurii Politice [6]. Vezi K. Marx i F. Engels. Opere, vol. 23, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1966, p. 444 i 495. - Nota trad. Editurii Politice [7]. Op. cit., p. 470-471. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [8]. Op. cit., p. 655. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [9]. - curs cu obstacole. - Nota trad. Editurii Politice [10]. Vezi Charles Fourier. Oeuvres compltes, T. 6, Paris 1845, p. 393-394. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [11]. Seehandlung - societate de comer i de credit fondat n 1772 n Prusia; aceast societate, care se bucura de o serie de privilegii importante din partea statului, acorda guvernului credite mari, ndeplinind, de fapt, rolul de bancher i de samsar al statului. n 1810, aciunile i obligaiunile ei au fost transformate n efecte de stat, societatea fiind astfel desfiinat. Prin ordinul ministerial din 17 ianuarie 1820 a fost transformat n instituie de credit i banc a Prusiei; n felul acesta, guvernul a avut posibilitatea s eludeze legea cu privire la datoriile de stat promulgat concomitent. n 1904 a fost n mod oficial transformat n banc de stat a Prusiei. - Nota red. Editurii Politice [12]. Statul popular liber era n deceniul al 8-lea revendicarea programatic i lozinca la ordinea zilei a social-democrailor germani. Marx a criticat aceast lozinc n seciunea a IV-a a lucrrii sale Critica Programului de la Gotha, iar Engels n scrisoarea sa ctre Bebel din 1828 martie 1875 (vezi volumul de fa, p. 9-27 i 28-34). Vezi i lucrarea lui Lenin Statul i revoluia, cap. I, 4, i cap. IV, 3 (V. I. Lenin. Opere complete, vol. 33, Bucureti, Editura politic, 1964, ed. a doua, p. 15-22 i 63-66). - Nota red. Editurii Politice [13]. Datele publicate aici cu privire la valoarea total a bogiilor Marii Britanii i Irlandei snt luate din raportul lui R. Giffen Recent accumulations of capital in the United Kingdom, prezentat n cadrul Societii statistice la 15 ianuarie 1878 i publicat n numrul din martie al revistei londoneze Journal of the Statistical Society. - Nota red. Editurii Politice

Scientific socialism

Scientific socialism is the term used by Friedrich Engels[1] to describe the social-political-economic theory first pioneered by Karl Marx. The purported reason why this socialism is "scientific socialism" (as opposed to "utopian socialism") is because its theories are held to an empirical standard, observations are essential to its development, and these can result in changes/falsification of elements of theory. Although Marx denounced "utopian socialism", he never referred to his own ideas as "scientific socialism". Similar methods for analyzing social and economic trends and involving socialism as a product of socioeconomic evolution have also been used by non-Marxist theoreticians, such as Joseph Schumpeter and Thorstein Veblen.
Contents

1 Methodology 2 Similar perspectives 3 Critique of the notion of socialism as a science

3.1 Critique of scientific socialist methodology

4 See also 5 References

Methodology

Scientific socialism refers to a method for understanding and predicting social, economic and material phenomena by examining their historical trends through the use of the scientific method in order to derive probable outcomes and probable future developments. It is in contrast to what later socialists referred to as "utopian socialism"; a method based on establishing seemingly rational propositions for organizing society and convincing others of their rationality and/or desirability. It also contrasts with classical liberal notions of natural law, which are grounded in metaphysical notions of morality rather than a dynamic materialist or physicalist conception of the world. [2] Scientific socialists view social and political developments as being largely determined by economic conditions as opposed to ideas in contrast to utopian socialists and classical liberals, and thus understand that social relations and notions of morality are context-based relative to their specific stage of economic development. Therefore as economic systems, socialism and capitalism are not social constructs that can be established at any time based on the subjective will and desires of the population, but instead are products of social evolution. An example of this was the advent of agriculture which enabled human communities to produce a surplus; this change in material and economic development led to a change in social relations and rendered the old form of

social organization based on subsistence-living obsolete and a hindrance to further material progress. Changing economic conditions necessitated a change in social organization.[3]

Similar perspectives
Thorstein Veblen, the founder of evolutionary economics, believed that technological developments would eventually lead toward a socialistic organization of economic affairs. However, his views regarding socialism and the nature of the evolutionary process of economics differed sharply from that of Karl Marx; while Marx saw socialism as the ultimate goal for civilization and saw the working-class as the group that would establish it, Veblen saw socialism as one immediate phase in an ongoing evolutionary process in society that would be brought about by the natural decay of the business enterprise system and by the inventiveness of engineers.[4] Veblen's methodology for analyzing economic developments is similar to that of scientific socialism and also contrast to neoclassical/classical political economy and utopian socialism; he understood that society and economics was constantly evolving and that this process affected the fundamental basis of established social relations.

Critique of the notion of socialism as a science

The philosophy of science basis of the claim of Marxism, and in the Soviet Union, Marxism-Leninism, to be a science is based its conceptions of dialectical materialism and historical materialism.[5] Although the influence of Marxist thought especially in the social sciences is great, there are no communities of theoretical or applied scientists or technicians based on Marxism. This contrasts with those for disciplines which do have established and credible claims to being theoretical sciences or engineering disciplines, the planning functions of thecurrent communist states notwithstanding. The most one could say is that socialism, e.g. Marxism, has, at least historically, been a current which finds expression in various scientific disciplines such as mathematical economics, sociology, etc. Socialism and Marxism are thus better described as theoretical frameworks for understanding and analyzing the social, economic and political world.

Critique of scientific socialist methodology

The term also refers to an important philosophical difference between proponents of natural law, static human nature and static equilibrium (such as classical liberals, libertarians, social liberals and some early socialist thought). Specifically, these philosophies are based on metaphysical conceptions of a "natural" order of liberty that exists irrespective of civilizations' material, technological and productive capabilities. While scientific socialists see economic laws and various forms of social arrangements as context-based (relative to their specific stage of human development), and thus relative to specific material conditions, these critics view them as static and absolute moral values. Attempts to engineer a new society via methods for doing so such as those proposed by B.F. Skinner (1949), and others with scientifically informed and inspired creators such as the early Israeli Kibbutzim and others on a

small scale are known but in practice communist states of the 20th century did not and do not use scientific methods in a substantive way for this purpose. The era slogan of the current CCP leader, Hu Jintao, "Scientific Development" does not so far appear to be an exception to this.[citation needed] Contributions such as those ofLeontief and others were made at a high macroeconomic level or within fields such as Operations Research on a microeconomic level but within a capitalist context. The philosopher of science Karl Popper in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies characterized Scientific Socialism as a pseudoscience. He argues that its method is what he calls "historicism": the method of analyzing historical trends and deriving universal laws from them. He criticizes this approach as unscientific as its claims cannot be tested and, in particular, are not subject to being disproven.

References
1. ^ Frederick Engels - Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. 1880 Full Text 2. ^ Socialism and Modern Science, by Ferri, Enrico. 1912. From "Evolution and Socialism" (P.79): "Upon
what point are orthodox political economy and socialism in absolute conflict? Political economy has held and holds that the economic laws governing the production and distribution of wealth which it has established are natural laws ... not in the sense that they are laws naturally determined by the condition of the social organism (which would be correct), but that they are absolute laws, that is to say that they apply to humanity at all times and in all places, and consequently, that they are immutable in their principal points, though they may be subject to modification in details. Scientific socialism holds, on the contrary, that the laws established by classical political economy, since the time of Adam Smith, are laws peculiar to the present period in the history of civilized humanity, and that they are, consequently, laws essentially relative to the period of their analysis and discovery."

3. ^ http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/soc-utop/index.htm 4. ^ The life of Thorstein Veblen and perspectives on his thought, Wood, John (1993) (in English). The life of
Thorstein Veblen and perspectives on his thought. introd. Thorstein Veblen. New York: Routledge. ISBN 0415074878. "The decisive difference between Marx and Veblen lay in their respective attitudes on socialism. For while Marx regarded socialism as the ultimate goal for civilization, Veblen saw socialism as but one stage in the economic evolution of society."

5. ^ ibid. Part III Historical Materialism

Joseph Dietzgen (1873)

Scientific Socialism
First published: Volksataat, 1873; Source: Philosophical Essays, 1917;

Scanned and marked up: Andy Blunden Proofread: Andy Carloff,

2010 A considerable number of readers of the Volksstaat are opposed to elaborate and searching essays in these columns. I doubted therefore whether the following would be suitable for publication. Let the editor decide. Yes I beg to consider whether it is not as valuable to engage the more advanced minds and to gain qualified thoroughgoing comrades as to strive for great numbers by publishing popular articles. Both these aims, I think, should be kept in view. If the party is really of opinion that the emancipation from misery cannot be accomplished by mending particular evils but by a fundamental revolution of society, it necessarily follows that an agitation on the surface is inadequate and that it is moreover our duty to undertake an enquiry into the very basis of social life. Let us now proceed: Contemporary socialism is communistic. Socialism and communism are now so near each other that there is hardly any difference between them. In the past they differed from each other as does liberalism from democracy, the latter being in both cases the consistent and radical application of the former. From all other political theories communistic socialism is distinguished by its principle that the people can only be free when they free themselves from poverty, when their struggle for freedom is fought out on the social, i. e., on the economic, field. There is this difference between the modern and the older socialistic and communistic theories: in the past it was the feeling, the unconscious rebellion, against the unjust distribution of wealth, which constituted the basis of socialism; to-day it is based on knowledge, on the clear recognition of our historic development. In the past socialists and communists were able only to find out the deficiencies and evils of existing society. Their schemes for social reconstruction were fantastic. Their views were evolved not from the world of realities, not from the concrete conditions surrounding them, but from their mental speculations, and were therefore whimsical and sentimental. Modern socialism, on the other hand, is scientific, just as scientists arrive at their generalizations not by mere speculation, but by observing the phenomena of the material world, so are the socialistic and communistic theories not idle schemes, but generalizations drawn from economic facts. We see for instance that the communistic mode of work is being

more and more organized by the bourgeoisie itself. Only the distribution still proceeds on the old lines and the product is withheld from the people. The small production is disappearing while production on a large scale takes its place. Those are facts resulting from the economic development of history and not from any conspiracy of communistic socialists. If we define work as an industrial undertaking whose products the worker uses for his own consumption, and an industrial undertaking as the work, whose products go to the market, then it is not difficult to perceive how the development of industry must finally result in an organization of productive work. On the material organization of society scientific socialism is based. Scientific socialists apply the inductive method. They stick to facts. They live in the real world and not in the spiritualist regions of scholasticism. The society we are striving for differs from the present but by formal modifications. Indeed, the society of the future is contained in the present society as the young bird is in the egg. Modern socialism is as yet more of a scientific doctrine than of a political party creed, though we are also rapidly approaching this stage. And strange to say, the international is of purely national descent: it proceeds from the German philosophy. If there be a grain of truth in the prating of German science, then the scientific German can only be found in his philosophic speculation. This speculation is on the whole an adventurous journey, yet at the same time a voyage of discovery. As the clumsy musket of our forefathers represents a necessary stage to the Prussian needle gun of the present time, so the metaphysical speculations of a Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel are the. inevitable paths leading up to the scientific proposition, that the idea, the conception, the logic or the thinking are not the premise, but the result of material phenomena. The interminable discussions between idealism and materialism, between nominalists and spiritualists on the one hand, and the realists or sensualists on the other hand, as to whether the idea was produced by the world or the world by the idea, and which of the two was the cause or the effect this discussion, I say, forms the essence of philosophy. Its mission was to solve the antithesis between thought and being, between the ideal and the material. A proof of this view I find in the fortnightly review Unsere Zeit for the second half of January, 1873, in an essay on intoxicating articles of consumption, as wine, tobacco,

coffee, brandy, opium, etc. The author, after having stated that the use of intoxicants was to be found among all nations at all times and under all conditions of human society, proceeds to declare that the cause of that fact must be looked for there, where the cause of all religion and philosophy lies, in the antithesis of our being, in the partly divine, partly animal nature of man. This antagonism between divinity and animality in human nature is in other words the antithesis between the ideal and the material. Religion and philosophy work towards a reconciliation of those conflicting principles. Philosophy proceeded from religion and began to rebel against its conception of life. In religion the idea is the primary element which creates and regulates matter. Philosophy, the daughter of religion, naturally inherited a good deal of her mothers blood. She needed ages of growth to generate the antireligious, scientific result, the apodictically safe proposition, that the world is not the attribute of spirit, but, on the contrary, that spirit, thought, idea is only one of the attributes of matter. Hegel, it is true, did, not carry science to that height, yet so near was he to it that two of his followers, Feuerbach and Marx, scaled the summit. The clearing up of speculation helped Feuerbach to give us his wonderful analysis of religion, and enabled Marx to penetrate the deepest recesses of law, politics and history. When, we see, however, Herbart, Schopenhauer, Hartman, etc., still going on speculating and philosophizing, we cannot regard them as more than stragglers, lost in the phantastic depth of their own thoughts, lagging behind in the back-woods and not knowing that the speculative fire has been overcome in the front. On the other hand, Marx, the leader of scientific socialism, is achieving splendid success by applying inductive logic to branches of knowledge which have hitherto been maltreated by speculation. As far back as the year, 1620 Francis Bacon declared in his Novum Organon the inductive method as the saviour from unfruitful scholasticism and as the rock on which modern science was to be built. Indeed, where we have to deal with concrete phenomena, or, as it were, with palpable things, the method of materialism has long since reigned supremely. Yet, it needed more than practical success: it needed the theoretical working-out in all its details in order to completely rout its enemy, the scholastic speculation or deduction. In his famous History of Civilization in England Thomas Buckle speaks at great length of the difference between the deductive and inductive mind,

without, as it seems, having grasped the essence of the matter; he but proves what he admits himself in the introduction to his work that, though having made German philosophy a serious study, he did not fully penetrate it. If this happens to ripe and ingenious scholarship, what shall become of immature and superficial general knowledge which deals not with specialties but with the general results of science? In order to indicate clearly the scientific basis of socialism, I venture to enter more fully into the general result of philosophy, into the solution of the antithesis between the deductive and inductive method. But I fear lest the result of metaphysics, so ostentatiously announced, may appear to the reader as somewhat insignificant and commonplace. I beg, therefore, to remind you of Columbus who by means of an egg once for all furnished the proof that great discoveries resolve themselves into an ingenious, yet simple, idea. When we retire to the solitude of our cell to search there in deep contemplation, or, as it were, in the inner-most of our brains, for the right way we want to follow the next morning, we must remember that our mental effort can be successful only because of our previous, if involuntary, experiences and adventures which we, by help of our memory, have taken along into our cell. That tells the whole story of philosophic speculation or deduction. These philosophers imagine they have drawn their theories, not from concrete material, but from the innermost of their brains, while, as a matter of fact, they have but performed an unconscious induction, a process of thought, of argument not without material, but with indefinite and therefore, confused material. Conversely, the inductive method is distinguished only by this that its deduction is done consciously. Scientific laws are deductions drawn by human thinking from empiric material. The spiritist needs material just as the materialist needs spirit. This thesis, when brought out with mathematical precision, is the result of philosophic speculation. That may appear simple enough, yet even a cursory examination of any of our reviews will teach us how little familiar that truth is not only to our journalists and writers but also to our historians and statesmen who are untiring in their attempts to evolve views and theses not from the existing conditions but from their heads, hearts, consciences, categorical imperatives or from some other unreal, mystical and spiritual corner. The concrete questions of the day are, as a rule, solved by, or

with the help of, given material. But in the discussion with Bismarck whether might goes before right or conversely; in the squabbles of theology whether the gods are made by the world or the world by the gods; whether catechisms or natural sciences enlighten the mind; whether history moves upward to a higher stage or goes down to the Day of judgment; in political and economic questions: whether capital or labor creates value, whether aristocracy or democracy is the right form of government, whether we have to work on conservative, liberal or revolutionary lines; in short, in abstract categories, in matters of philosophy, religion, politics and social life, our leaders of science find themselves in the most unscientific confusion. They test human institutions by such principles or ideas as the idea of justice, of liberty, of truth, etc. We, says Frederick Engels, describe things as they are. Proudhon, on the other hand, wants our present society to arrange itself, not according to the laws of its economic development, but in conformity with the precepts of justice. Proudhon is in this respect the prototype of all unscientific doctrinairism. A far superior guide in half such questions is modern socialism. Owing to its philosophical foundation it stands out prominently as a unanimous, firm and compact, method amidst the endless and shifting dissensions of its political opponents of every shade and opinion. What the dogma is to the religious belief, material facts are to the science of inductive socialism, while the views of liberalism are as whimsical and elusive as the ideal conceptions, as the ideas of eternal justice or liberty on which the liberals believe to be safely based. The fundamental proposition of inductive socialism may be thus formulated: there is no eternal principle or an a priori idea of the divine, just and free; there is no revelation or a chosen people, but there are material factors which govern human society. Far from bewailing that fact, we acknowledge it as absolutely necessary and reasonable, as something which may be denied by power of imagination, but which cannot be altered, nor, indeed, ought it to be altered. By granting that society is dominated by material interests we do not deny the power of the ideals of the heart, mind, science and art. For we have no more to deal with the absolute antithesis between idealism and materialism, but with their higher synthesis which has been found in the knowledge that the ideal depends on the material, that divine justice and liberty depend on the production and distribution of

earthly goods. In the wide range of human needs the bodily ones are the most indispensable; our physical needs must first be satisfied before we are able even to think of our mental ones and those of our heart, eye and ear. The same holds good in the life of nations and parties. Their abstract conceptions depend on the way they make their living. Tribes living by warfare and booty have not the same heaven, the same sense of justice or of liberty as our patriarchs are supposed to have had who, as is well known, were living on cattle-breeding. Knights and monks had notions of righteousness, of virtue and honour which were decidedly illiberal and anti-bourgeois, because their means of life were not supplied by factory labor and financial transactions. Of course, the defenders of Christianity strongly object to those views. In order to prove the independence of spirit from matter and of philosophy from economics they make, the assertion that the same Christian truth is invariably taught to all sorts and conditions of men and under all climes. They forget, however, how they trimmed the sails to the wind. They forget likewise that the love preached by the apostles and church fathers the love which gave away the second coat is no more the many-coated love under the overcoat which strips the poor to the skin of course, rightfully. To the diverse modes of property and trade correspond diverse Christianties. The institution of slavery in U. S. A. was Christian, and Christianity was slave-holding there. The religious reformation of the sixteenth century was not the cause, but the effect, of the social reformation that followed upon the shifting of the economic center from the manor to the city. And that was preceded by the rise of navigation and the discovery of the New World and new trade-routes, which indicate the rise of manufacture. Industrial life having no use for ascetic bodies introduced the protestant doctrine of grace that abolished religious exercises in favor of stern industrial work. That the materialist conception of history is scientific induction and not idle speculation manifests itself even more clearly when we apply it to political party problems. With its help the tangled mass of party struggles can be easily unravelled into a clear, running thread. The squire is enthusiastic over the absolute monarchy as the absolute monarchy cared for the squirearchy. Manufacturers, merchants, bankers, in short, capitalists liberal or constitutional, for constitutionalism is the call expression of capitalism, which liberalizes bad trade commerce, supplies the factories with free labor, promotes banking and financial

transactions, and, in general of the interests of industrial life. Philistines, small tradesmen and peasants join party or the other according to the promises made with regard to the promotion of their well-being and to the relief from the effects of competition with big capital. The familiar accusation of political hypocrisy which Parliamentary parties throw at each other was suggested to Bismarck by one of the renegades of our camp whom he likes to employ. That accusation is based on the recognition that the aristocratic and middle class consciousness was formed by the material requirements of the landed and manufacturing and trading classes, and that behind their idealistic watchwords of religion, patriotism, freedom and progress lurks the concrete interest as the motor power. I cannot deny that many of their followers are not conscious of their real motives, and that they sincerely believe their political work to be purely idealistic. But I should like to remark that it is with recognitions as with epidemics, they are in the air and people feel them somehow. Indeed, the political hypocrisy of our time is half conscious, half unconscious. There are many people who take the ideological phrases as gospel truth, but also the artful are by no means rare who want them to be taken as such. The matter can be easily explained. Different classes, distinguished by their different material conditions succeed each other to political power. The interests of the ruling class are always for a certain time in harmony with the interests of the community, that is with the progressive forces of civilization. And it is that harmony which justifies the ruling class in regarding itself as the spring of social welfare. However, the onward march of history changes everything, also the justification for ruling power. When the economic interests of the ruling class cease to be in harmony with the general welfare, when the ruling class loses its functions and falls into decay, then its leaders can only save their predominant position by hypocrisy; their phraseology has been emptied of all reality. It is no doubt true that some individuals rise above class interests and join the new social power which represents the interest of the community. So did Abb Sieys and Count de Mirabeau in the French Revolution, who, though belonging to the ruling classes, became the advocates of the third Estate. Still, these are exceptions proving only the inductive rule that, in social as in natural science, the material precedes the ideal. It may appear rather contradictory to make the Hegelian system of philosophy with its pronounced idealism the starting point of the

materialist conception of history yet, the Hegelian Idea is striving for realization; it is indeed a materialism in disguise. Conversely, the Hegelian reality appears in the mask of the Idea, or of the logical conception. In one of the latest issues of Bltter fr Unterhaltung Herr J. Volkelt makes the following remark: Our modem thinkers have to submit to the crucial test of empiricism. The Hegelian principle has no reason to be afraid of such a test. Consistently followed up it means that the spirit of history can only be conceived through the existing material. Gleams of truth like these we can find now here and there in the periodical literature, but for a consistent and systematic application of the theory we must to scientific socialism. The inductive method draws its mental conclusion from concrete facts. Scientific socialism considers our views dependent upon our material needs, and our political standpoint dependent upon the economic position of the class we belong to. Moreover, this conception corresponds with the aspirations of the masses whose needs are in the first place material, while the ruling class must necessarily base itself on the deductive principle, on the preconceived unscientific notion that the spiritual salvation and the mental training of the masses are to precede the solution of the social question.

The term scientific socialism was used by Friedrich Engels to characterize the doctrines that he and Karl Marx developed and distinguish them from other socialist doctrines, which he dismissed as utopian socialism. Engels regarded the Marx-Engels doctrines as scientific in that they laid bare the secret of capitalism through the discovery of surplus value, and explained (with a theory known in the USSR as historical materialism) how capitalism would inevitably be overthrown and replaced by socialism. The concept "scientific socialism" made Marxist doctrines more attractive to many than rival socialist doctrines by suggesting that equality and the end of exploitation were not only desirable but also inevitable. Scientific socialism was introduced to Russia in the late ninenteenth century. After the Bolshevik victory in the civil war, scientific socialism became part of the official ideology of the USSR. The term itself was frequently used loosely to designate a doctrine concerning the development of a Soviet type of society. Much of the actual content of the doctrine varied over time in accordance with the concrete policies of the Soviet state. Socialism as a comprehensive social system failed to spread to the advanced capitalist countries (although "pension fund socialism," the growth of government welfare and regulatory programs, the expansion of employee rights, state-owned industries, public education, and universal suffrage, were widespread and important). This failure, along with other developments such as the collapse of the USSR, indicated that scientific socialism was an imperfect guide to the future. By the end of the twentieth century, the term was mainly of historical interest.

Bibliography
Engels, Frederick. (1880). Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. <http://csf.colorado.edu/psn/marx/Archive/1880SUS>. Lichtheim, George. (1962). Marxism. New York: Praeger.

THE ceaseless clash of contradictions which formed the foundation of economic life in the middle of the nineteenth century was bound to find theoretical expression,

especially from members of those classes victimized by those contradictory forces and which had an interest in changing the direction of society. In the works of Karl Marx and of Frederick Engels the interests of the working class found their best expression. In their life activities they symbolize the best of German philosophy, French politics, and British economics, synthesizing all three elements to bring forth "Scientific Socialism." Scientific Socialism has three principal divisions, namely, philosophy, economics, and politics. In philosophy, Marx took the theory of dialectics which he found in Hegel, and, casting out its idealism, placed it on its feet as a theory of dialectical materialism which, when applied to human society, became a theory of historical materialism. In the field of economics Marx based himself upon the theory of value as labor which had already been suggested by the Classical School of British economists before him, and thereby worked out a theory of surplus value and the laws of accumulation of capital, analyzing adequately for the first time both the structure and evolutionary functioning of the capitalist system. In politics, both Marx and Engels grasped the principles of the class struggle which already had been stated by working class elements, and developed them into a thesis leading to a new system of society, Socialism or Communism, through the institution of a Dictatorship of the Proletariat. As Marx put it: "And now as to myself, no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society nor yet the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes. What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular, historic phases in the development of production; (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the Proletariat; (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society. (*1) To sum up, Scientific Socialism was both a method as well as a content or body of scientific conclusions, later becoming both a theory and a practice. Just as it is impossible to separate program from strategy, and both from tactics, so it is impossible to divide the philosophical from the political and economic, or the method from the data. All are bound up together by the monist materialism of life. We turn first to the philosophy. From the days of ancient society, two principal camps have existed in philosophy, the camp of the materialist and that of the idealist. To the materialist, nature is primary, spirit secondary; thinking is a process of the brain and thought, basically, is but a reflection of the action of matter which exists outside and independent of man. The universality of all things consists in their materiality; that is, outside of the philosophic category of "matter" there is nothing. The opposite to this is the position of the idealist, whose Right Wing consists of religionists of all sorts and whose Left is made up of the pure metaphysicians. Stripping aside theosophical aspects, both religion and metaphysical idealism agree, contrary to the materialists, that things are but a collection of images, matter is only the realization of an idea. It is the idea, the spirit, that is primary and real, and nature is but a reflection of the spirit.

From the earliest times the battle has raged fiercely. In ancient Greek society, the materialists were represented by Democritus and Heraclitus. The idealist position was represented principally by Plato and Socrates. According to Democritus and the early Atomists, nothing could be destroyed, nor could anything arise from nothing. All change was but a combination and separation of atoms. No change occurred of itself, but only through cause and necessity. Both teleology and religion had to be explained by efficient causes. Nothing existed save atoms and empty space. All else was but opinion. The philosophy of these Greek materialists who lived in a stagnant slave society could not but take on a static character. The fact that matter could not be destroyed meant for them that all becoming and perishing was denied (Parmanides), or that all motion was denied, change being considered as phenomenal only (the Eleatics), or finally, where change did occur, it was believed the changing world would return to its old position (Heraclitus). (*2) With Epicurus and the development of the Roman State, materialism took on a sensationalist guise. The sensationalist school accorded well with the Hedonists, who affirmed that desire is the moving principle of all human action, and that the true aim of life is not happiness but sensual pleasure alone; physical pleasure is better than mental, just as physical pain is worse. There was no consciousness without sensation. However, this sort of sensationalism could be a bridge to idealism also; since sensations are the basis of knowledge and depend on the individual, it is easy to reach the conclusion that man is the measure of all change, and thus, that contradictory assertions are equally true. In this way, the material reality is forgotten in the stress on the sensations to which it gives rise. The opposing idealism of Socrates and Plato took the form of insisting that name and thing are identical and that whatever proposition is most general is the most nearly correct. Like the materialists, all these idealists also built their closed systems. In the Middle Ages, the fight between materialism and idealism assumed the nature of a conflict between nominalists and realists, and also, within the Catholic Church, of a struggle against various heresies. The theologians of the day argued the question regarding the creation of the world --- whether God created the world from nothing, or whether the matter had existed for God to create it into a world. They also argued about the relation of God to the world --- whether God existed in every particle of matter and thus was pantheistic, etc. The question of how many angels can stand on the point of a pin was important precisely from the point of view of materialism or idealism. The eighteenth-century development of the factory system and of science led to the creation of a new school of mechanical materialists who were non-historical and nondialectical, and who regarded human nature abstractly. These materialists theorized on how to interpret the world; they made no efforts to change it. They belonged to the upper aristocratic classes rather than to the rebellious lower orders. (*3) Nineteenth-century reaction returned to idealism. As it idealized the past and bemoaned the changes that the revolutions had brought from the age of the romantic, it elaborated the dialectic method of which the best exponent was the German, Hegel.

With Hegel, "in the beginning was the word." Analyzing the working of his own mind, Hegel found that thesis constantly gave way to antithesis and both were resolved in a synthesis. No sooner did we have one than we had the other, and the whole, only to start all over again. The same process occurred in nature, which apparently was but the realization of the idea unfolded in history. The start was logic, the thesis; nature was the reflection of this logic, or the antithesis; the synthesis lay in the philosophy of Hegel, the acme of world's thought. (*4) Thus Hegel, whose dialectic method of incessant contradiction might have led to a revolutionary attitude, ends his theory with the conservatism of a closed system. To Hegel, all that was real was reasonable, that is, necessary; thus could the status quo eternally be justified. At the same time Hegel also could say, all that was reasonable was real. Therefore if the masses found it reasonable to protest against a given system, the reasonableness would compel them to realize their aim. In this way, in spite of the fact that Hegel himself created a closed system, his really implied method was eternal and perpetual flux. For the reactionary idealistic dialectic of Hegel, Marx substituted his own materialistic dialectic. Dialectic materialism is at least materialism, and materialism to the Marxist is the texture of all science. Testing the positions of materialism and science through an examination of the basic questions of philosophy, he finds them identical. This is the reason why the Marxist boasts that he is scientific. The first philosophical question is one of ontology-the nature of being. Does matter exist independently and outside us, or is it but a reflection of our ideas? This question is put by the Scientific Socialists in another way; did nature exist prior to man? Science of course answers, yes. The whole theory of evolution is evidence of the opinion of the scientist that nature, the earth, existed before man and before the ideas of man came into being. Man is but a part of nature, a product of natural forces, of the material elements. The second basic philosophical question is one of epistomology-the nature of ratiocination, of the cognitive process. What is the relation of thinking to flesh? The Scientific Socialist puts the question in another way: Does man think with the help of his brain? Here, too, of course, science answers, yes. Thinking is a process of the material brain, just as the light from the electric lamp is the result of a material process. The third basic philosophic question has to do with whether causation, the relation of cause and effect, really exists in nature, or whether the laws of science which have to do with the analysis of cause and effect are merely ideas of man. To this question is related another. Is there a necessity in nature? Must things happen? Can we predict them? Again, in answer to these questions, science supports materialism and affirms that the laws of science are really the expressions of actual relations in nature. Furthermore, the objectivity of scientific law applies not only to causality but to the laws of space and time. Space and time are not mere ideas of man, but are a real part of the dimensional materiality of the universe. Of course, our ideas about things are approximate. We are always learning more and more about the qualities and functions of this or that form of matter. All science,

dealing as it does with a becoming, deals with constant change. To the scientist there is no line to be drawn between matter and its functions. In proportion as we know more about the functions of a particular object it loses its mysterious character of being a "thing-in-itself" and becomes increasingly a "thing-for-us." (*5) In that sense, all of the laws of science are relative. Nevertheless, these relative laws are absolute within the definite framework of relationships that may be under consideration. What is true today may be false tomorrow, but only when the frame of conditions has changed. The idea of relativity early was expressed by the Scientific Socialists and became a part of the basic understanding of the dialectical process of nature. To the dialectician, all unity is the combination of contradictions, the result of diverse strains. Society, rocks, cabbages, ether waves, chemical solutions, buildings, and the macrocosm itself, all these, large and small, are the resultant of opposing forces. Each unity is composed of opposites and will break up into opposites. To view things in constant movement, to see them as the result of constant movement, to mark the movements as contrary and conflicting, this is the dialectic method. The dialectician tries to see the relation of each part to every other part, and of each part to the whole, as their mutual relations evolve from moment to moment. The Scientific Socialist adopted the dialectic manner of approaching things in nature, not because of his willfulness, but solely because this method of approach accurately reflects the actual contradictory processes of nature where everything is eternally posed, opposed, and composed. However, it is not enough to say that the only thing changeless is change. The materialist must also add that the materiality of the universe is absolute. Here, then, is the dogma of the Scientific Socialists, their "absolute truth" so to speak. While the Marxist materialists are constantly on the alert for changes, trying to find out within what patterns a proposition is correct and where it becomes error, they are at the same time persistently resisting the spiritualists and bewildered idealists of all kinds who insist that the idea of change and relativity includes the concept of the materiality of the universe itself and that we must bow to the possibility that the universe might be made up of "accidental varia," God, luck, chance, spirits, etc., which have nothing to do with materiality. (*6) This dogma of the materialists, incidentally, forms the axiom of all scientific work. When applied to history, the dialectical method of approach becomes historical materialism attempting to obviate the two chief defects in early historical theories, namely, their idealism and their neglect of the activities of masses. ". . . historical materialism first made it possible to study with scientific accuracy the social conditions of the life of the masses and the changes in these conditions." (*7) The materialistic conception of history starts with the proposition that the mode of production, which itself is based upon the given level of technique prevailing at the time, is the prime mover of all social forces. (*8) In trying to understand the laws of motion of a given society, its evolution and its direction, the Marxist begins first of all with a study of the technique of that society, the level of its productive forces. These productive forces include not merely the means of production, the instruments and subject of labor, but the laborer as well. The whole is to be analyzed concretely. Such

a concretization does not overlook national, racial, or psychological traits or other secondary features of society. (*9) On the contrary, an adequate study must also trace the interconnection between these factors and their mutual development from the primary sources. Starting from this foundation, the Marxist examines those economic relations between persons which have been rendered necessary by the technical plane of production. Upon these economic relations which constitute the given mode of production, there is erected the whole texture of political and social relations. Politics, family life, customs, ideology, thus flow fundamentally from the relations of the production and distribution of wealth. In other terms, one must never lose sight of the reciprocal action of economics to politics and social life. A careful study of this interaction led Marx to the conclusion that the laws of motion involved in the capitalist mode of production would lead to the throttling of the forces of production by the social relations inherent in capitalism. As Marx put it, "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or, --- what is but a legal expression for the same thing --- with the property relationships within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the productive forces, these relationships turn into their fetters. Then comes the period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed." (*10) The fetters of capitalism could be broken only by the class representing the new technique; such a class was the proletariat. It was the destiny of this class to erect a new system of production, Communism, of which the first transitional phase was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. 2 Between the two camps of materialism and idealism lies agnosticism. The groups adhering to this last are as variegated as the rainbow. Some of these middle-of-theroad elements are closer to the Right Wing idealists, others to the Left Wing materialists. Like the petty bourgeois who hesitates to take sides between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, like the Liberal who tries to harmonize the class struggle and to bring together both the conservative-reactionary and the revolutionary elements, the agnostic camp borrows now from one group, now from the other, feels itself superior to either, but in reality is inferior to both. Its ultimate wisdom consists in the phrase, "I don't know." Modern agnosticism has had several principal schools: the classic school of the English sensationalists starting with Locke and Hume, the German continental school of Kant and the neo-Kantians of all varieties, and the American school of pragmatism, to which we may connect the French school of voluntarism. As we have dealt somewhat, with the European schools, we pause here to deal with pragmatism and its relation to dialectical materialism.

If dialectical materialism is Marxism, pragmatism is Americanism. While it has become a trite matter to contrast Marxism with Americanism, few have endeavored to show the full relationship between the two. At one time it certainly appeared as though the Liberalism of unlimited American opportunity would prove an effective substitute for orthodox Socialism. Certainly if Socialism stood for permanent prosperity, peace and plenty for all, and for the largest individual liberty, coupled with the absence of State and classes, then America has been the nearest approach to that land of milk and honey yet discovered. Americanism could pose as the sure way to defeat European methods of class warfare embraced by Marxism. The relationship of pragmatism to Marxist philosophy is all the more important since, of all significant industrial countries, America alone has not yet entered into its full political life of conscious class struggles. At the present moment, America is at a transition point from classlessness to open classfulness; it is precisely now that Americanism can foist itself as a substitute for revolutionary Socialism, and pragmatism appears as efficacious as dialectical materialism. That pragmatism is not materialism can be well illustrated by contrasting America and Soviet Russia. Both are young countries, but how different are their youths! America is but the newest edition of the old. It has provided the glands to rejuvenate Europe. It itself fosters a cult of youth. The men go clean shaven; the women make up like girls; the youth are told they are the best and most important part of the race; comics furnish the universal entertainment; there are no more popular film artists than children who draw fabulous salaries; and so forth. But the Fountain of Youth is rapidly drying up and America will find herself suddenly old. There will be no prolonged period of maturity for her. Childhood will turn into the childish senility associated with dementia praecox. Pragmatism can start out with jazzing up God; it will end up with the table rappings of spiritualism. The youth of "old Russia" is on an entirely different plane. It is not the latest edition of the old but the first edition of the new. Not the luck or chance of pragmatism is its belief, but its trust lies in the hard materiality of its superior technique. Yet a close historical connection does exist between Americanism and Marxism as the comparison with Soviet Russia shows. If it is true that the Soviet Union is the lowest socialistic country and the United States is the highest developed capitalist country, and if it is also true that Socialism begins where capitalism ends, then it would naturally follow that much in common exists between the two, one leading into the other. In Russia today there is a craze for American experts, for American goods and machinery, jazz and chewing gum. At least industrially, and perhaps even politically, Russia is becoming Americanized with the object of overtaking and surpassing its teacher. In America there is a growing appreciation of Russian achievements. Both America and Russia stress action, the creative faculty in man, practical activity. Both stand for a philosophy catering to humanitarianism, that is, posing as treating man not as a means but as an end. Both declare that the system extant in the country benefits not a class but the entire community. The people of both America and the Soviet Union act as though they had "a cause," the Russian living for his Marxism, the American, at least in the period of prosperity, absorbed in and living for his work. In both cases it is production and not consumption that is the dominant aim of life; in

Russia, the production of a better control over nature and higher social standards, in America, the production of profit. Pragmatism, as an American product, would necessarily carry forward into its philosophy precisely these aspects of American life. Stressing empiricism or inductive analysis of the data around it, without prejudgments, emphasizing practical experiential activity, pragmatism but reflected the general utilitarianism of bourgeois life. Pragmatism preached that change was constant but this embraced the theory that luck and chance, too, were factors in an indeterminate and unpredictable universe. Combined with these views went a revolt against all absolutisms, and just as the Liberal talked of democracy and every man counting for one, each having the right to his own point of view, so pragmatism invented a sort of philosophic democracy in which all causes, all opinions, all ideas counted for the same and had the same justification. One idea, one vote. The real founder of pragmatism was William James (who gives credit, however, to Pierce as his forerunner). We may learn something of his philosophy when we say that James himself was a very pessimistic man, (*11) " the kind of "sick soul" who he himself had declared needed religion to prevent insanity. James justified his religion by the pragmatic result it had upon his mental health. "God is real since he produces real effects." (*12) To James nothing existed save experience. But here it is well to stress that the term "experience" as used by James has little to do with the term "practice," as used by the materialists. Experience may mean a great many things. We "experience," for example, an apple. This can mean that the apple is really there or that it is our "experience." In all experience there must be both the objective factor, material reality, and the mental factor, subjective sensibility. In the sense that James uses the word, materiality depends on mentality; there can be no object without our "experience" of it. That is as much as to say, for example, on the question of whether the earth existed before the appearance of mankind or of organic life, that since we cannot affirm that the earth was "experienced" by anyone then, we cannot really say that the earth existed before organic life. This is but an idea on our part. Here we see that James' pretending to develop a scientific method flies in the face of all science. "Experience was regarded by earlier empiricists as a method for making real discoveries, a safer witness than reasoning to what might exist in nature; but now experience is taken to be in itself the only real existence, the ultimate object that all thought and theory must regard. This empiricism does not look to the building up of science, but rather to a more thorough criticism and disintegration of conventional beliefs, those of empirical science included. It is in the intrepid prosecution of this criticism and disintegration that American philosophy has won its wings." (*13) James could not state, as did the materialist, that matter existed independently of man's "experience" of it. To James, the mind was equally important as the object conceived and felt. If the mind was outside and independent of materiality, then the question arises. how does thought itself arise? Does thinking come from the brain? Here again James broke down on a most fundamental and yet simple scientific question.

Pragmatism asserted that science was "our" science; that is, the laws of science, since they were relative, since they were discovered by the human mind, were purely mental laws. Time did not exist outside of us; it was a mental concept. Further, as James wrote: ". . . we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will." (*14) "Pure" reality outside of us did not exist since we ourselves helped to make the reality that we knew. As for truth, this was not an expression of the actions of nature outside of us, but was merely something which works. "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons.'' (*15) The idea that truth was merely a question of cash value and convenience, was one which naturally flowed from the theory that truth was part of our own creation, a figment of our mind. Thus, while on the one hand pragmatism was constantly affirming that it was not related directly to idealism (though its founder, James, was a religionist, as we have seen), essentially it made matter dependent upon mental activity and so led back eventually to idealism. However, instead of doing this openly and frankly, pragmatism tried to avoid the entire question of whether matter is primary by stressing the necessity of avoiding dogma and too great intellectualization. As anti-intellectualist, pragmatism was to have "no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method." (*16) "The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be indeterminable. Is the world one or many? --- fated or free? --- material or spiritual? ... The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?" (*17) Pragmatism turned away from theological solutions to the day-to-day facts around it, but not in the same manner that science did so. Pragmatism indeed wanted to scoop out the monist materialism of empirical science, and to replace it with the pluralism of pragmatism. Both idealism and materialism were monistic philosophies; that is, they identified matter and spirit, the first in order to make spirit dominant, the latter in order to make matter the prius. The older agnostics had adopted a dualist position, agreeing that both matter and spirit existed, but denying that we could know either through ordinary cognitive processes. The pluralistic approach of James, however, affirmed that truth was not concrete but discrete; that is, each event was to be judged by itself. "Reality may exist in distributive form, in the shape not of an all but of a set of caches, just as it seems to." (*18) Was not pragmatism, in truth, but "common sense"? Phenomena constantly appeared on our horizon; later they disappeared. Whence did they come? Where did they go? This was not for us to answer, said James. Each event must be separate. No objective necessity and causality existed in nature. The world was not determinate but indeterminate. Chance luck (and God) existed. We must stop searching for first causes, supposed necessities, and must turn our attention to last results, fruits, consequences. We lived only and eternally in the present. Given man as a creative factor in an indeterminate world, the world handed over to luck, accident, and chance, it was no accident that James should stress will, man's will,

as the essence of that creative factor. Here James showed himself really a part of the Kantian School of Free Will which he himself was willing to adopt as a "doctrine of relief." Both schools believed phenomena had no existence apart from our consciousness of them. To both, time was nothing but the form of our own internal intuition and space was a necessary, a priori idea. Both denied the value of neumena, absolutes. (*19) Both held that teleology and mechanism do not necessarily conflict. To mechanical laws, Kant added free will; James fought fatalism with his doctrine of chance. The difference between the Kantians and the pragmatists is that the latter wiped away the transcendentalist scaffolding of German mysticism and replaced it with an urge of striving and a conviction to create and change the world, a conviction that the world is in the making and the making is in our hands. Nor would the pragmatist admit, with Kant, that things exist outside our experience. James was thus far closer to religion and to the French School of voluntarists. James openly declared his agreement with Henri Bergson, chief of the voluntarist school, and Bergson his with James, although Bergson's school of philosophy opened wide the door to abstract idealism. Following the line of Rousseau and Comte, the voluntarist stressed the need of action for its own sake, the method of intuition, and the value of feelings and affections. Pragmatism accepted voluntarism and combined it with empiricism and the scientific attitude. (*20) The voluntarist school of Henri Bergson declared we could apprehend only immobility, and that space alone is its representative; reality, on the contrary, was change represented by time, itself a continual flux. From this Bergson deduced that the most fundamental conception of all was that of duration. Duration was an immediate datum of consciousness; matter was momentary mind, mind was memory, condensed vibrations. Duration was the life force --- the creative activity that was reality itself. (*21) The philosophy of Bergson was well attuned to the transition period from the throes of which science was emerging. Researches in electro-dynamics had seemed to prove that matter had disappeared into motion; the laws of mass and of the conservation of energy no longer applied; the only thing permanent was rhythmic time. The speculations of the mathematical physicists and their laws of relativity lent specious color to all sorts of spiritualisms. (*22) In this direction French voluntarism increasingly turned toward mysticism and monist idealism. Only spiritual existence counted; matter was the stream which checked the ascent of life. To achieve freedom, one must follow the life stream blindly, guided only by intuition. Pursuing this mystic path, French Voluntarism was bound to diverge from practical utilitarian pragmatism. (*23) From all this we can gather how little pragmatism has in common with materialism. James himself pointed out why he could not be a materialist. "Materialism means simply the denial that the moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate hopes; spiritualism means the affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of hope." (*24) Furthermore, materialism signified struggle and discontent, pragmatism connoted comfort, and James advocated social compromise, the epicurean life.

In the twentieth century, pragmatism is continued by John Dewey, who restyles it instrumentalism, while others rename it experimentalism. (*25) Instrumentalism does not differ much from the pragmatism of James. All the essential points are carried forward. Dewey, too, believes in pluralism because "pluralism . . . leaves room for contingence," (*26) and is indeed harmonious to the American philosophy of "give us a break." According to Dewey, instrumentalism generally carries on the work of James and, indeed, stresses even more strongly than James the experience of the individual. The attitude of Dewey towards materialism can be seen by his consistent struggle against Marxism, his nationalistic chauvinism during the last war, his counterposing to labor his own instrument, the new "Third Liberal Party." To Dewey, Marx "had no conception, moreover, of the capacity of expanding industry to develop new inventions so as to develop new wants, new forms of wealth, new occupations; nor did he imagine that the intellectual ability of the employing class would be equal to seeing the need for sustaining consuming power by high wages in order to keep up production and its profit." (*27) Having displayed this profound knowledge of the works of Marx, the instrumentalist, Dewey, was convinced that high wages bring high profits, and that the intellectual superiority of the capitalist class would see to it, for the good of the class and to prevent revolution, that the workers always get high wages. We now turn from the modifications of pragmatism to the historical and social views of the pragmatists. The Right Wing again may be seen as embodied in the position of James. For example, it is noted in his argument for peace: "But I do not believe that peace either ought to be or will be permanent on this globe, unless the states pacifically organized preserve some of the old elements of army discipline .... Martial virtues must be the enduring cement ... obedience to command, must still remain the rock upon which states are built." (*28) This is then the ascetic and ethical way of doing away with war. But it is a theory that not only the pacifist James, but also Hitler and Mussolini themselves, may hail. Here is how James, the neurotic, James constantly on the verge of suicide and afraid to go out alone in the dark, (*29) could console himself. In history, the pragmatist condescended to include economics as "also one of the efficient causes of why things 'happen to happen' in society." These historians invented the term "economic interpretation" of history, which looked almost as efficacious as Marx's materialist conception of history, but in reality was offered as a substitute. (*30) The economic interpretation of history differed from Marx's dialectics in that the former adhered to a pluralistic approach. Economics was but one cause; there were other active forces in history just as great, such as psychology, religion, ethics, ideals, biology, individuals, etc, etc., and we must not be so intolerant as not to allow all cases to have equal weight or to deny the right of anyone to explain events by one cause rather than another. This approach enabled the Liberal historians of the economic interpretation school to interpose in full their arrant eclecticism, borrowing now from the idealists the right to view history as the unfolding of an idea, and now from the materialists the idea that perhaps we should pay attention to the

materialist needs of the masses, needs based upon their economic relations and a given mode of production. (*31) The difference between the two methods showed itself clearly in their treatment of the labor movement. All these people of the "economic interpretation" school declaimed against the class struggle as the driving force in politics, declaring that social forces do not have to clash, and that the evolutionary gradual processes of reform are far more likely to result in the amelioration of workers' conditions than the road of insurrection, leading to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. The pragmatist historians and sociologists never were weary of proclaiming that there is no "must" in history, that everything is an "ought," and that truth is but one aspect of "the good"; that is, ethics covers the entire field of life. If socialism was to come --and some adhering to the Welfare School of Liberalism began to concede some of the good points of a sort of socialism --- then it would be adopted because of its inherent justice, because moral people would decide that it "ought" to come, rather than that it would come as a matter of historic inevitability, such as Marx predicted. There was no inevitability in history. Just as America offered itself as a substitute for European socialism, counterposing its unlimited individual opportunity in a new country, where forces were unknown and indeterminate, and where luck and chance played a large part in individual lives, to the crass reality of the class struggle and to socialism via the rough road of civil war, so pragmatism became a substitute philosophy for Marxism among many of the intellectuals who operated on the fringe of the working class movement. Some of these intellectuals tried to harmonize Marxism with pragmatism and to affirm fervently that, after all, a Marxist was a pragmatists. (*32) In many respects, pragmatism does run parallel to dialectical materialism. Both believe, for instance, in the necessity of action. But whereas, to the materialist, action is bound up with theory, with the testing out and the correcting of our theoretical beliefs by the events outside of us to the pragmatist, action takes the place of all theory, the action of the individual replacing the existence of materiality. Both philosophies believe in change, but, to the pragmatist, change is mere perpetual motion; to the materialist, change is movement. And there is an enormous difference between mere motion and movement. Movement means evolution. It signifies that there are basic starting points from which events move; there is an orientation and direction which events take; there are unfoldings of events which may be predicted. Pragmatism flees from such ideas. In both methods, man is seen as a creator, but the materialist also stresses the limitation of man's creating. Man may create, but not out of the whole cloth. (*33) Man is limited by his material environment. Not so with the pragmatist, who is restricted only by will, and who is so indispensable to environment that neither could exist without the other. The materialist and the pragmatist place each question on a basis: "Will it work?" To the pragmatist, this is used to defend opportunism and even sophistry, and is made into an apology for the status quo. The pragmatist operates merely from day to day, without any perspective whatsoever, since his truth can be convenience or even whim.

Not so the materialist. Whether a thing will work must depend upon the contradictory laws of motion involved in a given concrete situation; the resultant analysis induced thereby in the mind of man can result in harmonizing man's action to the forces of history, and identifying man's freedom as the consciousness of necessity. (*34) Both schools emphasize that truth is concrete. Not only the pragmatist but the materialist constantly praises empiricism, the necessity to observe the concrete data of the present without prejudice or bias. To the pragmatist, however, life is a mosaic, a picture puzzle, each piece separated from every other piece without the slightest continuity. To him, therefore, there is really no history, just as there is no predictable future. There is only the present with its phenomena juxtaposed together. Like a mole, pragmatism prefers to move with its nose from day to day, rather than to see into the future. Both sets emphasize experience as the best teacher and stress the necessity of going beyond mere verbalisms and of testing everything in action. But the pragmatist does not understand "experience" as only one form of practice, that events occur without any experience of them whatever, while the materialist makes praxis include events of nature even beyond one's "experience." Does space exist? The materialist says: "If you doubt it, step out of a tenth-story window and be convinced for yourself." The pragmatist declares that there can be no laws of space unless we experience them. It is our experience, our sensations, that are real, and not merely space itself. According to the pragmatist, we can learn nothing from history, since all truth arrives de novo with each individual's "experience." This stress on individualism and its denial of the historic forces and of the limited character of man's creative ability, was adopted by some of the Anarchists who could then preach that it was not necessary to wait until capitalism reached a certain level of development before the "militant minority" could storm the governmental buildings and seize the power. To such Anarchists, as to the pragmatists, everything had to be tested out by experience, each time anew; if you failed the first time, all that was necessary was an improved will and another trial. Both pragmatism and materialism deal with the effect of the economic forces of society upon history. The pragmatist treats with idealism as well; to the materialist, the economics of a given society is but part of the material environment which at the same time limits and bounds the making of history and yet compels history to move forward. Pragmatism belonged to that "middle-of-the-road" agnostic school which was willing to compromise and to tolerate all irreconcilable elements with no questions asked. Its Left Wing was a sort of variation of shame-faced materialism. Its Right Wing openly flirted with religion. It could endear itself to both Liberal and Anarchist with its views that there is no "must" in history, that "goodwill" works wonders. To the question of whether the socialist insurrection and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat were inevitable, pragmatism, in all its varieties, shouted "No," although it did later make a change of front. At the time of William James, the idea that socialism was not inevitable, was based on the belief that capitalism would remain forever. To John Dewey, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat was not inevitable, because reform is

better than revolution. In both cases their class desires were hidden by a formula that nothing is inevitable. Their views were advanced in a period when the object of bourgeois politics was to forestall the advancing tide of the workers. Today the pragmatic view that nothing is inevitable has an entirely different function, since it is fascism that is advancing and the proletariat that is retreating. If instrumentalists now say that the Dictatorship of the Proletariat is not inevitable, it is because they conceive that fascism may come, and they trim their sails in advance in order to meet it. The dilettante philosophers who fringe the proletarian movement try to conceal their cowardice by stating that Marxism is fatalism and that fatalism prevents the workers from fighting fascism. Only pragmatism can save the workers from defeat. The workers must abandon the theory of the inevitability of communism; otherwise we may have the annihilation of the human race or a reversion to barbarism through fascism. Pragmatism has certain aspects which can well endear it to fascism. Note the stress of action, the need for change, the importance of man's will, the test of truth as mere convenience, a formula which may justify political trimming, and opportunism. Note the open door to religion, the struggle against Marxism with its theory of ultimate victory. It is no accident that Mussolini has been inspired by William James. Pragmatism fits in exquisitely well with a movement that is born of desperation, that has prevailed through demagoguery, that knows not what will happen from day to day, and that moves convulsively to avoid the ever-increasing conflicts overwhelming capitalism. 3 Having discovered, by the use of the materialist method, that the mode of production in each historical epoch was the foundation of the social life inevitably arising therefrom, Marx proceeded to analyze the mode of production he found around him, the laws of which he elaborated in his Capital. In his method of approach, Marx proceeded from the simple to the complex, from the concrete to the abstract, and from the present to the past. Thus in studying capitalist economy he started from the simple unit in which the wealth of society presents itself, namely, the commodity, and from that point developed the dialectical contradictions inherent in every commodity, the transformation of commodity to money, and money into capital. Incidentally, in the course of his methodology, Marx made a profound analysis of the relation of the simple to the complex, and pointed out that very often the simple becomes known only after it has become developed into the complex of which it remains the core. (*35) Regarding the connection between the present and the past, to Marx, not history was the key to the present, but the present was a key to history. Thus, he rejected the method of previous economists in starting their treatises on political economy with an analysis of the category of rent simply because rent was historically the first category developed. Marx distinctly repudiated the methods of the schools of economy which had preceded him. He understood that it was not a simple matter of stating an economic fact, or of pointing out the conflict of this fact with eternal justice and true morals; it was explaining a fact which was destined to revolutionize the entire political

economy. Ricardo and Adam Smith had written reams about morality and justice. Marx scrupulously refrained from using these concepts and limited his work solely to an exposition of the inexorable contradictions that a capitalist mode of production created in economic, and, therefore, in political and social life generally, as well. In his work against Proudhon, Marx went to great length to combat the methodology of those economists who felt the ills of capitalist society and wanted to find a cure. The dialectical method had nothing to do with propounding cures by experts who stood outside the social system and who called on the will of individuals to adopt their reforms and thus be cured. Equally did Marx repudiate Proudhon's method of hypotheses and theoretical antidotes. It was not a matter of setting before us some hypothetical plan which would serve as an antidote to ills. Quite the contrary, the work of Marx was to show that the contradictory processes which make up the law of motion of capitalism, give rise within themselves to forces which will do away with the contradictions and break the fetters of the productive processes. "For him, M. Proudhon, every economic category has two sides, the one good, the other bad.... The good side and the bad side, the advantage and the inconvenience, taken together, form for M. Proudhon the contradiction in each economic category." "Hegel has no problems to put. He has only dialectic. M. Proudhon has of the dialectic of Hegel nothing but the language. His dialectic movement for him is the dogmatic distinction of good and evil." (*36) To begin with, Marx cleared the ground by an analysis of certain definitions. First, political economy is a science born in an era of capitalism and destined to die with capitalism. It is therefore a subject strictly confined in time and space. Second, Marx broke from the orthodox individualistic and abstract starting point of "What would Robinson Crusoe do?" Third, there is no such thing as production in general. While production has existed from time immemorial, its modes have changed in different periods. This was in opposition to the classic school of political economy which had tried to establish production on an eternal and unchangeable basis so as to prevent society from interfering with business. In a posthumous paper found after his death, Marx analyzed the intimate correlation between production, consumption, distribution, circulation, and exchange, in which he not only distinguished one from the other, but showed their profound interconnections and that they all constitute a complex of processes of which production is the heart and core. "The result we arrive at is not that production, distribution, exchange, and consumption are identical, but that they are all members of one entity, different sides of one unit." (*37) The achievements of Marx in the economic field have been summarized by his coworker Engels, as follows: "Marx analyzed all the economic categories which he found at hand.... In order to understand what surplus value is, Marx had to find what value is. Therefore he had above all to analyze. critically the Ricardian theory of value. Marx also analyzed labor as to its capacity for producing value, and he was the first to ascertain what kind of labor it was that produced value, and why it did so, and by what means it accomplished this. He found that value is nothing but crystallized labor of this kind,.... Marx then analyzed the relation of commodities to money and demonstrated how, and why, thanks to the immanent character of value, commodities

and the exchange of commodities must produce the opposition of money and commodities. His theory of money, founded on this basis, is the first exhaustive treatment of this subject, and it is tacitly accepted everywhere. He analyzed the transformation of money into capital and demonstrated that this transformation is based on the purchase and sale of labor-power. By substituting labor-power, as a value --- producing quality, for labor, he solved with one stroke one of the difficulties which caused the downfall of the Ricardian School, viz.: the impossibility of harmonizing the mutual exchange of capital and labor with the Ricardian law of determining value by labor. By ascertaining the distinction between constant and variable capital, he was enabled to trace the process of the formation of surplus-value in its details and thus to explain it, a feat which none of his predecessors had accomplished. In other words, he found a distinction inside of capital itself ... which nevertheless furnished a key for the solution of the most complicated economic problems, . . . He furthermore analyzed surplus value and found its two forms; absolute and relative surplus value, and he showed that both of them had played a different and each time a decisive role in the historical development of capitalist production. On the basis of this surplus value he developed the first rational theory of wages which we have, and drew for the first time an outline of the history of capitalist accumulation and a sketch of its historical tendencies." (*38) Marx then, in order to find out what is value, had to analyze a commodity. A commodity has two factors, use-value and value; that is, a commodity is something that satisfies a human need or want and is exchanged for something else. The utility or usefulness of a product gives it use-value. Value presents itself first of all in the form of exchange value; that is, a product is known as a commodity, as a value, only when it is exchanged. Exchange value, however, is not value, but the value given in exchange. Thus commodities appear first of all as in a certain relation with other usevalues. But behind the proportion common to millions of exchanges there must be something common to both objects to allow them to be equated one with the other. And what is common to these products is that both are the products of labor, abstract, homogenous, human labor. Thus the production of commodities is a system of social relationships in which different producers produce various products in a social division of labor and in which all of these products are equated to one another in exchange. In this equation not the specific, concrete labor of the tailor or weaver or of any other craftsman is equated, but rather, abstract human labor, human labor in general. This abstract human labor constitutes the source of value when embodied in a commodity. (*39) Marx was not the first to lay down the principle that value is labor. It had been done before him by the physiocrats, who narrowed it down to agricultural labor, and by the British Classical School. These statements of Marx's predecessors, however, had been without adequate proof and were exceedingly vague and contradictory. Nor had they been able to divide the kind of labor that constituted the source of value. Marx clarified all these points. The Classical School of political economy had arisen at a time when the manufacturers, products of the industrial revolution, had to fight the old order and when they did not fear as yet the working class. Naturally, such an industrialist class

found it to its interest to prove that all value came from the factory and consisted in labor to which the owner contributed his part. Later on, when the workers began to see the possibilities of the theory that value is labor, the Classical School became discarded by the bourgeoisie and gave way to schools of apologists, some calling for a change in the distributive system of wealth and philanthropically weeping over the poor. Later on there would arise a psychological school that would attempt to shift the discussion from a physical objective basis to a spiritual basis, in which value was not labor, but was desire --- the same object having different values according to the intensity of the wish and desire on the part of the purchaser. Values thus were created, not in the process of production but by the consumer. In the twentieth century, this psychological school found its center, significantly enough, in defeated Vienna, where the psychopathology of Freud dominated the scene. Here was a fitting setting for the psychological school. According to Marx, value is not a specific physical property of an object; it is a social property, a social relation between persons, maintained as a material exchange of products. We can understand what value is only when we consider it from the point of view of a system of social production relationships which present themselves in a mass form, repeating the phenomenon of exchange millions upon millions of times. As values, then, all commodities are only different quantities of congealed labor time. As society develops, the system of exchanges develops into a regular process of circulation, in the course of which the commodity most fitting takes on the role of contrasting itself with other commodities, becoming the universal equivalent called money. Money, therefore, is a commodity that has the social function of being the measure of all values as well as the medium of exchange. Commodity production and money circulation can appear in societies that produce for use and that are not capitalistic. In such cases, money and exchange play a secondary role in the economic functioning of society. When money and commodity circulation become prominent, already we have a capitalist mode of production, which is one for exchange and not for use. The formula for commodity production is given as C-M-C; that is, a commodity is sold for money and with the money the seller buys another commodity of a different kind. Here money is a medium of circulation and the purpose of the sale is to arrive at a purchase of another kind of commodity, one with a different usefulness. When money becomes capital, however, the formula is changed to M-C-M; that is, with money the owner buys a commodity and later sells the commodity for money, or, in other words, there is a purchase for the purpose of sale and money is no longer a medium but the beginning and end of the transaction. As it stands now, the formula appears ridiculous. Why should a man give away money in order to get back money? In the preceding set-up, C-M-C, he had secured a different article which he wanted in exchange for another which he did not want so badly. There was here the gratification of a different desire or the satisfaction of a different need. Not so in the second case, M-C-M. The explanation, of course, is simple. The M at the end of the formula is really M'; that is, it is a larger sum of money than the original investment, so that the formula stands M-C-M.

The question now arises, how does M become M (that is, M plus increment "m")? This is the question which Ricardo and all the other economists before Marx failed to solve. This increment "m" is called surplus value, or, roughly speaking, profit, and the process of its production is called the process of exploitation. Marx was the first to show that surplus value does not arise in the sphere of circulation, nor does it arise out of mutual cheating, but comes legitimately from the mode of production itself, without anyone's being robbed. If no one is cheated, and yet M becomes M, there must be within the series of exchanges some transformation that increases the value of the commodity bought. On closer examination, it is found that the commodities purchased by the owner of money, turned capitalist, are of two kinds: (1) the means of production, whose value is constant and can be transferred only to the finished product, and (2) labor power, whose value is variable. Thus we come to an analysis of a new kind of commodity, labor power. How this labor power comes onto the scene of history, and why men must sell their energies piecemeal, in the form of labor power, are questions for history to solve. We may remark here that two historical prerequisites were necessary to the genesis of capital --- first, the accumulation of a considerable sum of money in the hands of individuals living under conditions in which there was a comparatively high development of commodity production; and second, the existence of workers who were free in a double sense of the term, free to sell their labor power everywhere (that is, free from serfdom and slavery), and free from property so that they were compelled to sell their labor power in order to exist. In the sixteenth century, with the development of commerce, the discovery of the New World, and the driving off by force of the peasants from the land, these prerequisites were generally realized. Capitalism started with the fact of a commodity, known as labor power, being offered on the labor market. The peculiar character of this commodity is that, when consumed or used, it creates a value greater than its own. In short, labor power is a peculiar commodity that expands its value when consumed. When commodity production has reached the phase of making labor power a commodity, it becomes transformed into capitalism, and money becomes capital. This led Marx to a discussion of what is the value of labor power and how it is determined. Marx thought the value of labor power, like the value of any other commodity, is determined by the socially necessary human labor needed to reproduce it. Therefore, the value of labor power is the equivalent of the value of the means of life which the laborer needs to replenish his lost strength day by day and to breed children to carry on after he is dead. Thus, the laborer in selling his labor power for wages that will merely keep him efficiently alive is getting the full value of the commodity which he is selling and is not cheated by the employer, even though the product which he produces has a far greater value than the value of the means of life to sustain him and his family. The owner of money, having bought labor power, is entitled to use it, that is, to set it to work for the whole day, twelve hours let us suppose. Meanwhile, in the course of perhaps only six hours the laborer can produce enough to pay back the cost of his own maintenance; thereby, in the course of the next six hours, he produces a surplus

product for which the capitalist does not pay him, a surplus product which, in the form of commodities, becomes surplus value. Therefore, it is in the course of production, in which labor power is transformed into active labor, working upon raw materials, that the value of the commodities purchased by the moneyed men increases. Capital, therefore, is self-expanding value and it expands solely because the value of labor power expands in use. We might say, therefore, that it is labor that is capital, since only labor expands values. However, we must note that, as labor, the activity is no longer in the possession of the laborer, but is embedded in the product which is in the possession of the employer. The laborer possesses only labor power and therefore is the owner of that particular commodity, but cannot be a capitalist. When the value of labor power has been transformed through the process of labor into a higher value, it is no longer within the possession of the laborer; it is the owner of the product who is the capitalist. To express the degree of the exploitation of labor by capital, we must compare the surplus value produced by the laborer, not with the whole capital, but with the variable capital or wages. Thus, in the example given above, the rate of surplus value, or of exploitation, will be 6:6, or 100 per cent. There are two fundamental ways in which surplus value can be increased: by an increase in the working day, which creates "absolute surplus value," and by a reduction of the necessary working time, which yields "relative surplus value." Analyzing the former method, Marx told of the struggle of the working class for shorter hours, and of government interference, first, in the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, in order to lengthen the working day, and, subsequently, in the nineteenth century, to shorten it by factory legislation. Analyzing the production of relative surplus value, Marx investigated the three fundamental historical stages of the processes whereby capitalism had increased the productivity of labor and reduced the time necessary to reproduce the means of life. These stages embrace first, simple cooperation; second, division of labor and manufacture; finally, machinery and largescale industry. Of highest importance and originality is Marx's analysis of the accumulation of capital, that is to say, the transformation of a portion of surplus value into capital and the applying of this portion to additional production instead of using it to satisfy the personal needs of the capitalist. This surplus value, when returned to industry, does not, as Adam Smith and others assumed, become transformed entirely into variable capital, but is also apportioned into new means of production, or constant capital. It is this constant capital which consistently grows at the expense of the variable. The more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with either the variable capital alone or the sum total of capital is of immense importance in the process of development of capitalism and in transforming capitalism into socialism. The accumulation of capital accelerates the replacement of workers by machinery, creating wealth at one pole and poverty at the other, giving birth to the so-called reserve army of labor and to a relative overpopulation of workers. Capitalism now has the possibility of expanding production at an exceptionally rapid rate. This possibility, in conjunction with enhanced opportunities for credit and accumulation, furnishes among other things the key to the understanding of crises of overproduction that occur

periodically in capitalist countries, first on an average of about ten years, but subsequently in a more continuous form and with less definite periodicity. The expropriation of the immediate producers is effected with ruthless vandalism, and under the stimulus of the most infamous, the basest, the meanest, and the most odious of passions. What has now to be expropriated is no longer the laborer working on his own account, but the capitalist who exploits many laborers. This expropriation is brought about by the operation of the immanent laws of capitalist production, by the centralization of capital. While there is thus a progressive diminution in the number of the capitalist magnates (who usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this transformative process), there occurs a corresponding increase in the mass of poverty, oppression, enslavement, degeneration, and exploitation; but at the same time there is a steady intensification of the wrath of the working class --- a class which grows ever more numerous, and is disciplined, unified, and organized by the very mechanism of the capitalist method of production. "The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated." (*40) In the second volume of Capital, Marx takes up the reproduction of social capital. Here he deals not with an individual capitalist, but with mass phenomena and with economy as a whole. In this book Marx thoroughly dissects the mechanism and operation of the periodic crises of capitalism. He separates the whole of social production into two great sections, the production of the means of production, and the production of articles for consumption, and shows how maladjustments between these two divisions invariably take place under the capitalist accumulation leading to crises. In the third volume of Capital, Marx solves the problem of how an average rate of profit is formed on the basis of the law of value, something that none of the economists before him had been able to do, and which had placed the classical school of economy, with its theory of value as labor, in an inextricable dilemma. Here Marx divides surplus value into profit, interest, and ground rent. Profit, strictly speaking, is the mass of surplus value which adheres to the industrialist and from which ultimately there is derived interest and ground rent. The rate of profit is the rate of surplus value compared to the capital invested in the undertaking. Capital with a high "organic composition," that is, with a preponderance of constant capital over variable capital to an extent above the social average, yields a below-average rate of profit. Capital with a low "organic composition" yields an above-average rate of profit. It would seem, then, that capitalists would rush to invest their money in the latter type of industry rather than the former. Competition among the capitalists, however, levels the rate of profit in both cases to the average. While the sum total of the values of all commodities in a given society coincides with the sum total of the prices of all commodities, in separate branches of production, as a result of competition, commodities are sold, not in accordance with their values, but in accordance with the prices of production, which are equal to the expended capital plus the average profit.

In this way, the well-known and indisputable fact of the divergence between prices and values, concomitant to the equalization of profits, is fully explained by Marx in conformity with the law of value and makes ridiculous the claim of bourgeois economists that, in Volume III of Capital, Marx wholly negates the laws laid down in Volume 1. However, the adjustment of value, which is a social matter, to price, which is an individual matter, is an exceedingly complex affair. In a society made up of separate purchasers of commodities, linked solely through the market, conformity to law can be only an average, a general manifestation, a mass phenomenon, with individually and mutually compensating deviations to one side and the other. An increase in the productivity of labor means a more rapid growth of constant capital as compared with variable capital. Inasmuch as surplus value is a result of variable capital alone, it is obvious that the rate of profit, that is, the ratio of surplus value to the whole capital, has a tendency to fall. Marx makes a detailed analysis of this tendency, as well as of the circumstances that tend to counteract the fall and its exceedingly important effects. Interesting is Marx's analysis of usurer's capital, commercial capital, and money capital. From first hand study of parliamentary reports, he carefully lays down the limits within which the rate of interest can fluctuate and analyzes the entire superstructure of the credit system. He shows, too, how the industrialist must part with some of his surplus value to the merchants, since the existence of large outlet stores saves the industrialist more money than if he himself went into the operation of circulating his goods. In the theory of ground rent, Marx makes another great contribution. Because the land area is limited and, in the capitalist countries, is occupied entirely by private owners, the. production of agricultural products is determined by the cost of production not on soil of average quality, but on the worst soil needed for productive purposes, and by the cost of bringing goods to the market not under average conditions, but under the worst conditions the market demands. The difference between this price and the price of production on better soil under better conditions constitutes differential rent. Analyzing this differential rent in detail and showing how it rises in proportion to the fertility of the individual plots of land and to the extent to which capital is applied, Marx exposes the error of Ricardo and the Classical School who believed that differential rent is obtained only when there is a continual transition from better to worse land. Advances in agricultural technique, the growth of towns, etc., may on the contrary act inversely and transfer land from one category to the other. Thus, the famous law of diminishing returns, charging Nature with the insufficiency, limitations, and contradictions of capitalism, is shown as erroneous. Moreover, the equalization of profit in all branches of industry, and natural economy in general, presupposes complete freedom of competition while the private ownership of land creates a monopoly. Thanks to this monopoly, the products of agriculture, where low organic compensation of capital prevails and, consequently, individually higher rate of profit can be secured, are not exposed to a perfectly free process of equalization of the rate of profit. The land-owner, being the monopolist, can keep the price of his products above the average; this monopoly price is the source of absolute rent.

Differential rent cannot be done away with so long as capitalism exists; but absolute rent can be abolished even under capitalism, for instance, by nationalization of the land, making all the land State property. Such nationalization would put an end to a monopoly of private land-owners, with the result that free competition would be applied more consistently and fully in the domain of agriculture. Here is the driving source for such movements as the Henry George Movement in the United States, and the motivation of the radical bourgeois in repeatedly advancing demands for land nationalization. In his discussion of rent, Marx also expounds the laws of the evolution of capitalism in agriculture which bring in their trend the impoverishment and ruin of the agricultural population and the transformation of the rural population into an urban proletariat. If the small peasant is able to survive, it is because he is forced to sell his goods far below their value, so that although he is an individual owner, his net income is less than that of the wages of the ordinary worker. In such cases, the lower price of agricultural products is a result of the poverty of the producers and by no means of the productivity of their labor. Peasant proprietorship and the small holding system, which is the normal form of petty production, is bound to degenerate, wither, and perish under capitalism. In agriculture, as in industry, capitalism improves the productive process only at the price of the martyrdom of the producers. 4 It is manifest that Marx deduced the inevitability of the transformation of capitalist society into socialism wholly and exclusively from the economic law of the movement of contemporary society. While the socialization of labor grows apace, those of the ruling class become more and more divorced from the process of production and degenerate into mere parasites. The law, "He whom the gods would destroy he first makes mad" applies to capitalism as well. The proletariat, on the other hand, increases in numbers and maturity. Facing ever-increasing misery and disaster, at the same time it amasses a body of Marxist knowledge that in its hand becomes a terrible weapon of revolution, and takes the lead in the struggle for the emancipation of all humanity. The proletarians become the grave diggers of capitalism. Capitalism forces the workers to connect theory with practice, to wander all over the world, to try their hand at all occupations, to find themselves reduced to a common level, to organize and discipline themselves as a class. All this makes them fit to build a new society. Capitalism hardens them, tests them, wipes out all their illusions, gives them arms, and compels them under penalty of extinction to go forward towards socialism. The contest of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie assumes varied forms, growing continually richer in content and inevitably becoming a political struggle aiming at the conquest of State power by the proletariat. The proletariat, when it seizes power, dictates its will openly to the former ruling classes and establishes then the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. This is the political essence of Marxism. (*41) In the struggle of the workers against their enemy, whatever victories they win in the beginning are but temporary; they seem to take one step forward only to be forced two steps backward. However, this is only apparent. Inevitably they grow stronger and better prepared. As the class struggle nears the decisive hours, even small sections of

the ruling class can cut themselves adrift, see the hand-writing on the wall, and join the revolutionary proletariat. No class gives up power without a struggle. The proletariat cannot hope to dispossess the capitalist from control over the means of production without violence and bloody struggles. The necessity for violent revolution arises not only because this is the sole means to overthrow the bourgeoisie which throttles the progress of society, but also because it is the only way by which mankind can purge itself of bourgeois corruption, can burn out the putrescence of the old order and prepare itself for the new. "Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie." (*42) Nevertheless, at bottom the struggle of the working class must be an international struggle, cutting through all national boundaries, in which the slogan is raised, "Workers of the world, unite. You have nothing to lose but your chains. You have a world to gain!" "All previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority." (*43) "The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation." (*44) The victory of the proletariat, therefore, is the end not only of wage slavery but of all class rule forever. In all this, the proletariat of the city is aided by the uprisings of the colonies. The development of capitalism in the colonies operates to reduce into impotence the native ruling cliques which must resort to standing by their masters, the imperialists, and thus must become thoroughly exposed to the masses of toilers. At the same time, colonial development brings into being a many-headed modernized proletariat that stands on the shoulders of the past, and, skipping intermediate stages of history, marches to challenge the capitalist order. Under such circumstances there occurs one colonial revolution after another, weakening imperialism and hastening the proletarian revolt everywhere. The Dictatorship of the Proletariat is a transition regime whose sole function is to destroy the ruling classes under capitalism throughout the world. It is, therefore, a regime fitted to meet the stress and strain of international civil war. When the exigencies of the civil war are over, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat will give way to socialism, which is the first and lower stage of communism. (*45) The heavy fetters which the capitalist relations have placed on production having been broken, there occurs an immense increase in the productivity of labor, supplanting the old backward technique by perfected socialization. Taking over all the technique prepared by capitalism, socialism begins where capitalism ends. Under socialism, there are no longer a market, commodities, values, prices, wages, in the old sense of the terms. The workers, through their representatives, guide their own destinies and organize themselves so that international production may be purposefully controlled and planfully managed. The allocation of material and workers to a particular industry is made, not according to the hectic fluctuations of the

market, through bankruptcy and frenetic successes, but by social analysis of the needs of man, of the productivity of the workers, and of how much strength is needed to fulfill these needs. For the first time, society rises from the domain of necessity into the realm of freedom. Socialism reunites industry and agriculture upon the basis of the fusion of science and collective labor. The old life of the agrarian population, with its unsociability and idiocy, is liquidated, as is the unhealthy concentration of enormous masses of population in huge cities. The population is entirely redistributed and a new synthesis is obtained. Immense factory farms are established where the agricultural workers can have all the advantages of the city, and industry is wisely decentralized, bringing into realization the dream of garden cities. Under socialism only those who work shall eat, except those who are physically incapacitated. Each one receives according to what he puts in. Socialism being but a transition towards communism, it still contains certain vestiges of the capitalist past, since under socialism not full equality is obtained, but only a mechanical equality. Goods are no longer sold for a market, but are produced for use; the worker receives a labor note to obtain goods, nearly equivalent in labor cost to the cost of the goods which he himself produced. A surplus must remain in order to take care of the dependents of society and in order to make possible necessary replacements, and constantly to extend production. Thus, in no period does the worker get exactly the full amount of the goods which he has created. There being no class struggles, there is now no need for a State, and the State withers away. The army and navy are not necessary. Police disappear. The basis for crime is gone, since labor is so productive that all the wants of life easily can be obtained. The criminal is treated as a diseased person and is given careful hospitalization until he becomes rehabilitated and made again into a social creature. Of course, in the early stage of the new social order, inequalities still persist, since culture is not spread equally, since the gap between the unskilled laborer and the professional still remains, and each one receives only what he produces. Those born weak will not create so much as those born strong. With the abolition of private property in the means of production, there still remain different accumulations of wealth and culture as vestiges of the past. Under socialism there is laid the basis for a new type of family life, the ending of the misery and despotism that mark familial relations. A complete emancipation of women and children occurs with an entirely new upbringing for the younger generation to prepare them for the highest stage of communism. In the home, as in politics, the government over persons is transformed into the administration of things. In the higher stage of social life to which socialism is a transition and which we can call communism in the narrow sense of the term, the transformation is entirely complete. Society has become regenerated. No longer does the rule prevail, "to each according to what he does," but rather the precept, "from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs." Thus the weak and the backward will be given more in order to allow them to develop at the same rate as the others. The gap between theory and practice between the unskilled laborer and the professional

scientist becomes entirely closed. Education will have enabled all to be scientists, at the same time allowing all scientists to use their hands in manual labor. The tremendously increased productivity of mankind will have reduced to a bare minimum the amount of time necessary for each to produce the wants of life. Elimination of all toil in work will enable the worker to become an artist, to find the greatest pleasure in the objective result of his labors, to fuse into one work and recreation, and to combine his constructive relations with nature with the construction and reconstruction of himself. If work becomes a pleasure, pleasure itself is work. Under such highly stimulating conditions, mankind will have raised itself by a full head and will appear as supermen to the poor mortals of the capitalist world who have gone before. Footnotes 1. The Correspondence of Marx and Engels. Marx to Weydemeyer, p. 57. (International Edition.) 2. See, F. A. Lange: History of Materialism. 3. Hobbes is a good example of aristocratic English materialism. As for French materialism, see essay by Karl Marx in Selected Essays, International Publishers. 4. Or, better, the beginning was the Absolute Idea; the end was Absolute Truth. To Hegel "The self-comprehension of Spirit as supreme reality, complete spiritual consciousness, is the necessary demand, the inevitable outcome, and the final consummation of the entire process of experience." (G. W. F. Hegel: The Phenomenology Of Mind, p. 41, J. B. Baillie translation, translator's introduction.) 5. See, F. Engels, Feuerbach, pp. 60 and following; compare J. Dietzgen: Phenomena stand to the thing-in-itself as 20 miles of road is to the road itself. See, J. Dietzgen: Positive Outcome of Philosophy,"The Nature of Human Brain Work." 6. Contrast Hegel's treatment of such concepts as "Being," "Beginning" and "Becoming." (See G. W. F. Hegel: Science of Logic, I, 85, 119, Muirhead edition.) 7. V. I. Lenin (Ulyanov): The Teachings of Karl Marx, pamphlet, p. 16. 8. See, F. Engels: Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, p. 94. (Kerr edition.) 9. See, K. Marx: German Ideology, English translation given in "The Marxist," No. 3 (1926) 10. K. Marx: Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, pp. 1112. 11. See, H. Simons: "Why William James 'Stood By' God," The Open Court XLIII, 80, 81 (1929). 12. WM. James: The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 517. 13. G. Santayana: Philosophical Opinion in America, p. 6. 14. Wm. James: The Will to Believe, p. 29.

15. WM. James: Pragmatism, p. 76. This book is dedicated by James to John Stuart Mill "from whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind and whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive today." 16. WM. James: Pragmatism, p. 54. 17. The same, p. 45. 18. Wm. James: A Pluralistic Universe, p. 129. 19. See, C. E. Witter: Pragmatic Elements in Kant's Philosophy. 20. See, for example, Wm. James: A Pluralistic Universe. 21. See, H. Bergson, Creative Evolution. 22. See, for example, Jeans: The Mysterious Universe; J. S. Haldane: The Sciences and Philosophy, who even goes so far as to criticize Christianity for its materialism in declaring God created the world, when matter does not exist; and, Eddington: The Nature of the Physical World. 23. See, L. S. Stebbing: Pragmatism and French Voluntarism. 24.Wm. James: Pragmatism, p. 107. 25. Professors conduct a bitter rivalry over nomenclature. 26. John Dewey: Philosophy and Civilization, p. 20. 27. J. Dewey: Individualism, Old and New, p. 103. 28. See, Wm. James: "The Moral Equivalent to War" in Memories and Studies, pp. 287-288. 29. See article by M. Baum in The Monist, Vol. 42 (1932). 30. See, E. Seligman: The Economic Interpretation of History; also R. Pound: Interpretations of Legal History. 31. Compare S. H. M. Chang: The Marxian Theory of the State, p. 41. and following. 32. See, for example, S. Hook: Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx. 33. See, K. Marx: Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, pp. 9-10. (Kerr edition.) 34. See, F. Engels: Landmarks of Scientific Socialism, pp. 147-148. 35. See, K. Marx: Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Appendix. 36. K. Marx: The Poverty of Philosophy, pp. 121-122 and following. 37. K. Marx: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, Appendix, p. 291. 38. K. Marx: Capital II, 24-26. 39. In our exposition of Marx's economic views we follow closely V. I. Lenin's pamphlet, The Teachings of Karl Marx. 40. K. Marx: Capital, I, 837. 41. In their Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels point out that the written history of all civilized society is the history of class struggles. See, Communist Manifesto (Kerr Edition), p. 12. 42. The same, p. 28.

43. The same, p. 28. 44. The same, pp. 27-28. 45. See, V. I. Lenin (Ulyanov): State and Revolution.
Science and materialism Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) are the creators of what they called "scientific socialism". As you are reading this document try to work out what they thought made their theories scientific, and whether you agree with them. It seems to me that they thought their theory was scientific because of its content, because of the kind of theory it is. This is what they focus on, rather than issues such as empirical method. One feature Marx and Engels stressed was that their theory was materialist, not religious, or idealist. Because they tried to explain history by looking at the material conditions of human existence their theory is called: historical materialism. The religious views of history they criticised were the Jewish and Christian accounts found in the Bible. In the mid 19th century many people saw science as the opponent of religion. The idealism they criticised was mainly Hegel's philosophy of history. Hegel argued that history is not meaningless chance, but a rational process - spirit or mind making itself real in history. Marx and Engels thought the material world determines our ideas rather than our ideas determining the material world. To explore what this means, read the extracts from Hegel that illustrate his idealist view of history and compare them to the summary of historical materialism. Historical materialism was not the only materialist theory developed in the 19th century. The other major one was Darwin's theory of evolution. Marx and Engels thought of their theory as complementary to evolutionary theory. Alienation and class struggle Marx and Engels wrote about an enormous range of subjects including religion, politics, history, housing, economics, marriage, philosophy, sex and law. Some people argue that the key to all their writings is the idea of "alienation". Alienation is separation from what we really are. According to Marx and Engels the social system makes us aliens or strangers to ourselves. They thought people are stopped from being truly human by the stunting effect of a corrupt social system. The present system is called capitalism or the bourgeois order. Like previous systems, it distorts our true being, but our full humanity will flourish in the communist future. Some marxists, notably the followers of Louis Althusser, say that Marx only thought like this in the first part of his life. Others, the Hegelian marxists or humanists, say this kind of thinking runs through all his work. To be human, according to Marx and Engels in The German Ideology (1846) is to be a creative worker. This is the humanity we have been alienated from. The alienation took place very early in human history and was associated with the emergence of economic and social classes. When early societies produced more than they needed to exist on, the surplus was set apart for special communal purposes such as investment, defence or religion. The groups that took charge of this surplus became the ruling class and, since then: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles." (The Communist Manifesto par.1.1).

Look at the chart summarising historical materialism as Engels saw it in one of his last books (1884). It shows how the economy, family structure and government are believed to be interrelated. In the final analysis, the economy is believed to be decisive in determining what happens in history. Different periods of economic history have different classes. In Europe the great "epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society" were "the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois [capitalist] methods of production" (Marx 1859) Under capitalism there are many classes, but according to the The Communist Manifesto, they are polarizing into two: the proletariate (or working class) and the bourgeoisie (or capitalists). The proletariate are the class that own nothing but their labour power, the capitalists are the class who own the means of production. The proletariat are the first class in history that can free everyone from alienation. They have no one beneath them to exploit so the only path they can take to freedom is to set up a classless society in which no one is exploited. This, they thought, would happen after a revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and after an in-between period called the "dictatorship of the proletariate". Engels and Marx in the 1840s The "hungry forties", when a large part of the Irish peasantry starved to death and the condition of the English workers was also miserable, had a strong effect on the ideas about society of people of many different political persuasions. In 1848 two separate publications sought to provide a theoretical and scientific explanation of class: One was the first edition of Principles of Political Economy - With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy by John Stuart Mill, which included an article on On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes originally drafted by Mill's colleague Harriet Taylor. The other was The Communist Manifesto, the first drafts of which were written by Friedrich Engels, and the final version written by his colleague Karl Marx. In the 1840s, Engels and Marx concluded independently that the social order they were living in was doomed. They were both German scholars who lived most of their lives in England. Marx came here as a political refugee in 1849, but Engels arrived in 1842 "at almost the worst period of.. the most catastrophic economic slump of the 19th century.." (Hobsbawm 1969 p.14) Engels was the son of a leading Prussian cotton manufacturer. Having served for a year as an officer in the Guards, his father sent him to work in the office of Erman and Engels in Manchester. On the way Engels and Marx met briefly for the first time - but did not like one another. Manchester. A hundred years ago, Engels wrote, the country around Manchester was chiefly swamp, now it is "the most densely populated strip of country in England" (Engels 1845 p.75). Something very dramatic was happening here - for Manchester was the centre of the world's first industrial revolution. Intellectually and in person, Engels began to explore what was going on. He found that Manchester was the centre of something else. It was: "the seat of the most powerful Unions, the central point of Chartism, the place which numbers

most socialists. The more the factory system has taken possession of a branch of industry, the more the working men employed in it participate in the labour movement." (Engels 1845 p.266). In the meantime, Marx was having a hard time in his first job. From 1842 to 1843 he was editor of a radical Rhineland newspaper called the Rheinische Zeitung. "I found myself embarrassed at first when I had to take part in discussions concerning so-called material interests" (Marx 1859) His education had been in law, philosophy and history, especially Hegel's view of them, but to write about the issues of the day he found he needed economics. Another problem was socialism. Marx was editing articles about French socialism and communism but "had to admit at once...that my previous studies did not allow me to hazard an independent judgement as to the merits of the French schools." (Marx 1859) In 1844 Marx lost his job as an editor and went to Paris to edit a journal and study economics and socialism. It was from his study of French politics and socialism that Marx reached the conclusion that the bourgeois order was doomed. Engels was to show him that he could reach the same conclusion from political economy and from what was happening to the English working class. In Paris Marx received an article from Engels that he described as a work of genius. It was called Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy. Engels and Marx met again in Paris in September 1844 They talked for several days, and it is here that their life long friendship and collaboration dates from. In Manchester Engels had gathered the materials for a book The Conditions of the Working Class in England, which he wrote after his return to Germany and published, in German, in 1845. The book begins with a description of the industrial revolution in Britain. (Despite the title it discusses Ireland and Scotland as well as England.) This revolution, he says, has brought into being a new class of people: the industrial workers or proletariat. (Engels 1845 p.37) Industrialization, he says, was the result of competition. This force, identified by Adam Smith as the root cause of economic growth, was creating wealth for the rich, but, Engels argued, it was making the lives of the working classes a misery. Competition had destroyed the independent producers in the countryside and had driven them into the towns to seek work. Here they lived in insanitary conditions and were prey to appalling diseases. They worked long hours in factories using dangerous machinery. Their children received no worthwhile education, and when they were unemployed, sick or too old to work their only recourse was the Malthusian Poor Law. (Engels 1845 p.108-120) But, because they were brought together there was the possibility of collective action. The workers came into contact with Owenite socialist and Chartist ideas and waves of revolutionary activity were sweeping the country. (Engels 1845 pp 239-266) In 1842, the year that Engels arrived, English workers, striking for the Charter, roamed the Midlands and North of England setting light to rich men's houses and pulling out the plugs of factory boilers. Capitalism, Engels argued, was subject to periodic crises, and one of these would be the occasion for the working class wresting power from the capitalists and establishing a communist society. "The wrath of the whole working class.. against the rich, by whom they are systematically plundered and mercilessly left to their fate...before too long a time goes by.. must break out into a Revolution in comparison with which the French revolution.. will prove to have been child's

play". (Engels 1845 p.53) This revolution would not be "mindless", however. The English workers had set up a network of institutes and established their own newspapers for their own education. "And in how great a measure the English proletariat has succeeded in attaining independent education" Engels says "is shown especially by the fact that the epoch-making products of modern philosophical, political and poetical literature are read by working men almost exclusively" (Engels 1845 p.265) One of the examples he gives refers to the work of Benthamite socialists like Thompson and Wheeler "The two great practical philosophers of latest date, Bentham and Godwin, are.. almost exclusively the property of the proletariat; for though Bentham has a school with the Radical bourgeoisie, it is only the proletariat and the Socialists who have succeeded in developing his teachings a step forward." (Engels 1845 p.266) It was only a short step from this conclusion to a belief that, in the imminent course of industrial history, the proletariat would adopt communism. Marx had arrived independently at the same conclusion. Engels and Marx believed passionately that scientific theory could transform the world if it was linked to the struggles of the working class. This was part of their theory that (according to Engels) Marx was the first to develop. "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is, to change it." Marx wrote in his Theses on Feuerbach. (Marx, March 1845, point 11). In The Communist Manifesto. Marx and Engels described communism as a "spectre haunting Europe". They linked together the widespread popular disturbances of the late 1840s with the idea that the seizure of political power by the workers would lead to the replacement of competitive capitalism by collective ownership and cooperation. This revolutionary overthrow of capitalism did not take place in the middle of the 19th century as Marx and Engels had anticipated. In fact, in France, a dictator (Napoleon 3rd) was elected by the people in a popular election! Disappointed, but not defeated, Marx turned his attention to the economic analysis of the foundations of capitalism, and out of this developed his monumental work: Das Kapital (Capital). Marx's economics Economics for Marx and Engels was not just economics: it was the explanation for everything. In the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) Marx explained how in the late 1840s he reached a "general conclusion" which "once reached, continued to serve as the leading thread in my studies". This is how he describes his conclusion: "In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production." "The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society the real foundations, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness." Marx 1859 In diagrammatic form, he is arguing that society can be divided into an economic base and a superstructure.

SUPERSTRUCTURE ECONOMIC BASE The superstructure consists of everything else apart from the economy (he mentions law, the state and human consciousness). It is the economic base that determines what the superstructure will be. So whatever you are studying: sociology, psychology, law, social policy, urban studies, geography, social work, the family, music, religion, history, politics, sex or pop music, you should, according to Marx, start with economics. Economics, for Marx, is about human relations. In particular it is about class relations. Class relations, for Marx, are economic relations. So another way of saying that the economic base determines the superstructure is to say that "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles" Which is what Marx and Engels said in The Communist Manifesto. This was the Marx-Engels research programme: To reconstruct all past and existing ideas (history, politics, religion, family and sexual codes and everything else) as expressions of the material base of society. The prospect is mind-boggling. But not only did they set out to do it: but they also took it on as a part-time activity! Marx spent most of his academic effort trying to get the economics right (writing Capital), whilst Engels was busy earning the money to keep the Marx family alive. In their different ways they both concentrated on the economic base. Research into how the base determined the superstructure was largely left to later generations of Marxists to develop. According to Marx the three major differences between his analysis, and that of Adam Smith, Ricardo and the other economists were: 1. That Marx treats surplus value as having a general character: it is extracted in different ways at different periods of history. Rent and capital are ways of extracting surplus value that belong to capitalism. They do not exist for all time. 2. That "the economists, without exception have missed the simple point that if the commodity has a double character - use value and exchange value - then the labour represented by the commodity must also have a two-fold character." 3 "That for the first time wages are shown to be the irrational form in which a relation hidden behind them appears" (Marx and Engels/Selected Correspondence. 8.1.1868) Lets us start at point three and work backwards. Marx says the economic system described by Adam Smith appears to be fair - but isn't. Ordinary issues like buying and selling commodities and being paid a wage are superficial appearances that hide (mask) reality. (Marx 1867 pp 7184) Labour is just as much a commodity as Omo or Daz. Under capitalism people buy and sell it. In fact that is part of the Marx's definition of capitalism: Capitalism is the mode of production under which capitalists own the means of production and the workers sell them their labour power. (See Marx 1867 pp 167-169) But here is a problem. Smith, Ricardo and Marx all say that the value of a commodity is determined by how much labour is put into it. So if the capitalist pays the worker the value of the worker's labour, and if the capitalist sells the product for the same value - where is the profit?

To make a profit the: value the worker is paid has to be less than the: value of the product The extra bit is profit, or "surplus value" But if, according to the labour theory of value, the value of the product is the value of the labour put into it, where does the "extra bit" come from. Is it trickery? Is the labourer paid less than her labour is worth? Or is the consumer charged more than the product is worth? No, Marx says. It is the way that surplus product is extracted under capitalism. The extraction of surplus product is exploitation, but it is not trickery, just an illusion of fair exchange created by the market economy. To see what is happening we have to go back to the distinction between use value and exchange value that Adam Smith makes. Water and diamonds have use values and exchange values, so does human labour. It is because they are different that the capitalist gets a surplus from the exchange, Marx says. The exchange value of human labour can be worked out in the same way as the exchange value of any other commodity: it is the labour that it takes to produce. So it's the labour needed to rear, feed, clothe, educate, house and keep a worker in working order. It's her cost of subsistence. Capitalists have to pay this, Marx points out, or there would be no workers. Sometimes they try to economize by overusing the worker so that her health declines or her children are not properly cared for: but this is a short term economy and the sensible Government's stop capitalists doing this (Marx 1867 pp 238-239). This still leaves a surplus. The worker's use value is greater than her exchange value: She can produce more than it takes to maintain her. The consumer pays for the labour value of what the worker produces, not just the cost of producing her. It is this extra bit - the difference between the labour it takes to produce a worker and the labour the worker puts into production that provides the capitalist's surplus value. (Marx 1867 ch.7) Under feudalism surplus value was extracted in clear, open manner: serfs were forced to work on their lord's land, for example. Under capitalism the illusion is created that surplus is no longer extracted: that everyone is paid the price for what they have to sell. But Marx believed he had shown that it was just extracted in a different manner. All class societies involve exploitation: the extraction of surplus from labourers to supply the wants of a ruling class. But Marx did not believe society has to be class society. A classless society is not only possible - history is actually heading that way. The reason (as with all reasons for historical materialism) is economic. Marx argued that revolutionary changes in society take place because the "forces of production" come into conflict with the "relations of production". "At a certain stage of their development the mutual forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or - what is but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property relations within which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into fetters. Than comes the period of social revolution." Marx 1859 BOOKS Easton, L. and Guddat, K, 1967 Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society

Engels 1844. Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy. First published February 1844. English translation in Struik, D. 1970 pp 197-226 Engels 1845 (English translation 1892, Panther edition 1969) The Condition of the Working Class in England. Engels 1884 The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. [321.12 ENG] Firestone, Shulamith, 1971 The Dialectic of Sex [305.42 FIR] Hegel/History. The Philosophy of History [901. HEG] Based on lectures given first in 18221823. Hobsbawm, E.J. 1969 Introduction to Engels 1845 (Panther edition 1969) Jackson, T.A. 1935 A Great Socialist-Frederick Engels. National Council of Labour Colleges pamphlet. Marx, March 1845 Theses on Feuerbach. First published in 1888. Easton and Guddat pp 400402. Marx and Engels 1846 The German Ideology Marx and Engels 1848 The Communist Manifesto. Marx 1859 A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (preface to) Marx 1867 Capital. Vol.1. See pp 71-84: ch.1, s.4, The Fetishism of Commodities; pp 167-176 ch.6 The Buying and Selling of Labour-Power; pp 177-198 ch.7 The Labour-Process and the Process of Producing Surplus Value; pp 231-302 ch.10 The Working Day. Marx and Engels/Selected Correspondence, Letter from Marx to Engels, 8.1.1868 Rex, J. 1967 "Frederick Engels" New Society 5.1.1967 pp 14-16 Founding Fathers of Social Science (New Series) 6. Struik, D. J. (Editor) 1970 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, by Karl Marx. Materialism istoric
Materialism istoric, parte integrant a filozofiei ntemeiate de Karl Marx i Friedrich Engels, reprezentnd concepia filozofic materialist-dialectic despre societate, despre structura sistemului social, legile generale i forele motrice ale dezvoltrii sociale; materialismul dialectic extins la studiul vieii sociale i a istoriei ei. Spre deosebire de tiinele sociale particulare, care studiaz domenii limitate ale vieii sociale, materialismul istoric trateaz societatea n unitatea i interaciunea laturilor ei, procesul istoric n ansamblul su. De aceea materialismul istoric constituie un ndreptar teoretic i metodologic pentru toate tiinele sociale particulare i, n acelai timp, generalizeaz datele furnizate de acestea. Creat n deceniul al cincilea al sec. 19, materialismul istoric a constituit o schimbare revoluionar n concepiile despre societate. Pn la Marx i Engels aceste concepii erau dominate de idealismul istoric, chiar dac unii gnditori premarxiti (Aristotel, Helvtius, J.-J. Rousseau, istoricii francezi din perioada Restauraiei .a.) s-au apropiat de o interpretare materialist a unor procese i fenomene sociale. nsuindu-i critic intuiiile i previziunile socialitilor utopici, ca i unele descoperiri ale economiei clasice engleze, situndu-se pe poziiile proletariatului modern, clas revoluionar, Marx i Engels au extins consecvent, pentru prima oar n istoria gndirii, materialismul la interpretarea vieii sociale. Crearea materialismului istoric a permis nelegerea istoriei societii ca un proces care se desfoar legic, a permis transformarea studierii societii ntr-o tiin. Problema fundamental a filozofiei, raportul dintre existen i contiin, capt n cadrul materialismului istoric forma particular a raportului dintre existena social i contiina social. Nu contiina oamenilor le determin existena, ci, dimpotriv, existena lor social le determin contiina (K. Marx) este teza

fundamental a materialismului istoric. Potrivit materialismul istoric, latura determinant a vieii sociale este procesul produciei bunurilor materiale. Produciei materiale i snt proprii dou feluri de relaii: raporturile oamenilor cu natura, care se exprim nforele de producie, i relaiile dintre oamenii nii, relaiile de producie. n reeaua complex a relaiilor sociale, materialismul istoric distinge relaiile de producie ca relaii materiale, obiective, ca relaii fundamentale care determin ntr-un fel sau n altul, de cele mai multe ori, mijlocit, relaiile spirituale, ideologice. Forele de producie i relaiile de producie alctuiesc modul de producie i determin procesele vietii sociale, politice i spirituale. Sistemul relaiilor de producie constituie structura economic, baza unei societi determinate, pe care se nal o suprastructur corespunztoare juridic i politic i creia i corespund anumite forme ale contiinei sociale. n timp ce gnditorii premarxiti se limitau n explicarea vieii sociale la mobilurile ideale ale activitii oamenilor (scopuri, nzuine, idei), Marx i Engels au artat c n spatele mobilurilor ideale ale aciunii istorice a maselor, a claselor sociale, stau interesele lor materiale, determinate, la rndul lor, de situaia acestor clase n sistemul dat de relaii de producie. Aceasta a permis prezentarea evoluiei societii ca un proces istoric-natural (Marx), adic guvernat, ca i natura, de legi fr cunoaterea crora nu poate fi vorba de vreo tiin social. Totodat, desprinderea relaiilor de producie ca relaii sociale fundamentale care le determin pe toate celelalte, a permis ntemeietorilor materialismul istoric s elaboreze categoria de formaiune social. Procesul istoric este succesiunea formaiunilor sociale, nlocuirea unei formaiuni inferioare cu alta superioar, determinat de dialectica intern a modului de producie i a ntregii formaiuni socioeconomice. n societile ntemeiate pe proprietatea privat asupra mijloacelor de producie contradiciile inerente modului de producie se manifest n lupta politic dintre clasele sociale, a crei dezvoltare duce la revoluia social-politic, forma de trecere de la o formaiune social-economic la alta. Pe o anumit treapt de dezvoltare, forele de producie intr n contradicie cu relaiile de producie existente, n cadrul crora s-au dezvoltat pn atunci. Atunci ncepe o epoc de revoluie social, care nlocuiete relaiile de producie nvechite cu altele noi, corespunztoare forelor de producie care s-au dezvoltat. O dat cu schimbarea bazei economice, se produce, mai mult sau mai puin repede, schimbarea ntregii suprastructuri. Materialismul istoric este metoda i teoria pentru studierea procesului de apariie, dezvoltare i declin al formaiunilor social-economice. Sursa contradiciilor din formaiunile bazate pe clase antagoniste este deosebirea de situaie i de condiii de trai ce exist ntre clasele n care se mparte societatea respectiv. Materialismul istoric subliniaz, de asemenea, independena relativ a ideilor, al instituiilor i organizaiilor n dezvoltarea social, precum i aciunea lor asupra vieii materiale a societii. ntruct baza dezvoltrii sociale este modul de producie, rolul hotrtor n istorie l au productorii direci ai bunurilor materiale masele populare. Artnd caracterul obiectiv al structurii societii i al dinamicii acesteia, materialismul istoric constituie, mpreun cu materialismul dialectic, fundamentul teoretic al socialismului tiinific.

Karl Marx
Karl Marx (5 mai 1818, Trier - 14 martie 1883, Londra), fondator alsocialismului tiinific, al economiei politice tiinifice.nscut la 5 mai 1818 n oraul Trier din Prusia (Germania). A studiat dreptul la Universitatea din Bonn i apoi istoria i filozofia la Universitatea din Berlin. n 1841 i-a susinut teza de doctorat intitulat la Democrit i filozofia naturii la Epicur. n 1842 devine redactorul Gazetei renane (Rheinische Zeitung) din Kln, care se transform sub conducerea lui ntr-un ziar al democraiei revoluionare, dar care este interzis n martie 1843 de guvernul prusac. cu Jenny von Westphalen.

n noiembrie se mut la Paris, unde editeaz (februarie 1844), mpreun cu A. Ruge, Analele germanofranceze (Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbcher). Aici public articolul Contribuii la critica filozofiei hegeliene a dreptului, n care se manifest ca revoluionar i aprtor al intereselor proletariatului. n august 1844, cnd Marx se ntlnete la Paris cu Friedrich Engels, ncepe marea lor colaborare i prietenie. Marx s-a ocupat n mod deosebit de economia politic, dnd o prim i aprofundat analiz critic a economiei politice burgheze n Manuscrise economice-filozofice din 1844. n aceast lucrare abordeaz problema nstrinrii i a dezumanizrii omului n condiiile societii capitaliste. n 1844 Marx i Engels au scris Sfnta familie, n care ncep s pun bazele concepiei materialiste asupra istoriei. n 1845 Marx scrie Tezele despre Feuerbach, n care critic filozofia contemplativ i schieaz o nou concepie despre om, ntemeiat pe noiunea de practic i pe recunoaterea esenei sociale a fiinei umane. n Ideologia german, scris de Marx i Engels n 1845-1846, i n Mizeria filozofiei, publicat de Marx n 1847, snt elaborate fundamentele concepiei materialiste asupra istoriei i ale teoriei socialismului tiinific, odat cu combaterea socialismuluimic-burghez i a concepiilor lui B. Bauer, Stirner, Proudhon etc. Criticnd n toate aceste lucrri dialectica idealist a lui Hegel, Marx dezvolt dialectica ca teorie a realitii i ca metod de gndire, mbinnd-o organic cu interpretarea filozofic materialist a naturii,societii i gndirii. La solicitarea Congresului al II-lea al Ligii Comunitilor, la care aderaser n 1847, Marx i Engels elaboreaz programul acesteia, cunoscut sub numele de Manifestul Partidului Comunist, aprut n februarie 1848. n acest prim documentprogram al partidului revoluionar al proletariatului internaional, Marx i Engels expun concepia comunist despre lume, materialismul consecvent, care cuprinde i domeniul vieii sociale, dialectica, cea mai cuprinztoare i mai profund teorie a dezvoltrii, i fundamenteaz concepia despre rolul istoric al proletariatului.
"Filozofii n-au fcut dect s interpreteze lumea n diferite moduri; important este ns a o schimba."

"Proletarii n-au de pierdut n aceast revoluie dect lanurile. Ei au o lume de ctigat. PROLETARI DIN TOATE RILE, UNII-V!"

Expulzat din Belgia la izbucnirea revoluiei din 1848, Marx pleac la Paris, iar apoi la Kln, unde nfiineaz, mpreun cu Engels, Noua gazet renan (Neue Rheinische Zeitung, iunie 1848 - mai 1849). n paginile acesteia militeaz pentru crearea pe cale revoluionar a unei republici germane democratice i unite. Dup nfrngerea revoluiei din Germania, este expulzat succesiv din Prusia i Frana i se stabilete definitiv la Londra. n emigraie, Marx i Engels continu activitatea revoluionar. n Adresa Organului central ctre Liga comunitilor (1850) ei schieaz perspectivele viitoarei revoluii. Viaa n exil a fost extrem de grea. n aceti ani, Marx primete ajutor i sprijin de la Engels, care din 1850 se stabilise la Manchester i luase asupra sa o bun parte din grija pentru acoperirea nevoilor materiale ale familiei lui Marx. La Londra, Marx scrie Luptele de clas n Frana (1850) i Optsprezece Brumar al lui Ludovic Bonaparte(1851-1852), n care face bilanul experienei revoluiilor burgheze din 1848-1849 i snt abordate probleme teoretice importante cum ar fi: legile dezvoltrii sociale, natura i rolul statului etc. Marx i Engels i continu activitatea revoluionar i, datorit lor, la 28 septembrie 1864 este ntemeiat, la Londra, Asociaia Internaional a Muncitorilor (Internaionala I). Marx a ntocmit Manifestul constitutiv i aproape toate documentele mai importante ale acestei organizaii. n aceeai perioad, Marx lucreaz intens la principala sa oper, Capitalul. n 1859 apare lucrarea saContribuii la critica economiei politice. n celebra Prefa a acestei lucrri, Marx face o expunere sintetic a tezelor fundamentale ale materialismului istoric, iar n Introducere, publicat ca anex la Contribuii..., el fundamenteaz metoda tiinific a economiei politice, caracterizeaz procedeul ridicrii de la abstract la concret, raportul dintre logic i istoric etc. n 1867 apare primul volum al operei fundamentale a lui Marx, Capitalul, consacrat analizei procesului de producie al capitalului. Al doilea i al treilea volum ale acestei opere au aprut dup moartea lui Marx,

fiind pregtite pentru tipar de ctre Engels. Marx desvrete teoria valorii bazat pe munc i elaboreaz teoria plusvalorii, piatra de temelie a economiei politice marxiste. Organizeaz sprijinirea i ajutorarea Comunei din Paris, de a crei importan istoric mondial i d seama imediat. n lucrri caRzboiul civil din Frana (1871) sau Critica programului de la Gotha(1875), Marx dezvolt teze fundamentale ale socialismului tiinific, fcnd o analiz i o generalizare profund a experienei istorice a Comunei din Paris i a perspectivelor luptei de clas a proletariatului, dezvoltnd teoria revoluiei proletare i a statului. La 14 martie 1883, nceteaz din via n exil, la Londra.
"De la fiecare dup posibiliti, fiecruia dup nevoi."

n Romnia, primele traduceri din lucrrile lui Marx au aprut n 1883, iar printre cele dinti lucrri editate se numr: Manifestul Partidului Comunist (1892), Cuvntul despre problema liberuluischimb (1893), Munc salariat i capital (1911). Marx a mbinat munca tiinific cu o intens activitate revoluionar, militnd consecvent pentru unitatea micrii muncitoreti internaionale. A fost creatorul teoriei i tacticii revoluiei proletare. mpreun cu Engels, a elaborat concepia revoluionar despre lume - materialismul dialectic. Extinznd aceast nou concepie despre lume vieii sociale, Marx i Engels au elaborat materialismul istoric - tiina legilor de dezvoltare a societii. Crearea materialismului dialectic i a materialismului istoric a nsemnat o adevrat revoluie n filozofie. Descoperind legile obiective ale dezvoltrii sociale, a creat economia politic tiinific. Pornind de la imposibilitatea de a se mpca interesele de clas ale proletariatului cu cele ale burgheziei, a artat rolul istoric al proletariatului de creator al unei societi noi, fr exploatare uman. Marx a creat teoriasocialismului tiinific, n opoziie cu diferitele teorii ale socialismului utopic, care au existat pn la el.

Lucrri selectate (Marx i Engels) 1845: Teze despre Feuerbach [M.] 1847: Munc salariat i capital [M.] 1848: Manifestul Partidului Comunist [M. i E.] 1859: Prefa la Contribuii la critica economiei politice [M.] 1867: Capitalul, cap. I [M.]
(English)

1871: Rzboiul civil n Frana [M.] 1875: Critica programului de la Gotha [M.] 1880: Dezvoltarea socialismului de la utopie la tiin [E.] 1886: Ludwig Feuerbach i sfritul filozofiei clasice germane [E.]

COMUNISMUL
Comunismul este un termen care se poate referi la una din mai multe notiuni: un anume sistem social, o ideologie care promoveaza acest sistem social, sau o miscare politica care doreste s implementeze acest sistem.

Ca sistem social, comunismul este un tip de societate egalitarista n care nu exista proprietate privata si nici clase sociale. n comunism toate bunurile apartin societatii ca ntreg, si toti membrii acesteia se bucura de acelasi statut social si economic. Probabil cel mai cunoscut principiu al unei societati comuniste este: "Fiecare dupa puteri, fiecaruia dupa nevoi". Ca ideologie, termenul de comunism este un sinonim pentru Marxism si pentru diversele ideologii derivate (cel mai notabil exemplu este al Marxism-Leninismului. Printre altele, Marxismul propune conceptia progresului n istorie, potrivit creia exista patru faze ale dezvoltarii economice: sclavia, feudalismul, capitalismul si comunismul, "conceptia materialist", potrivit creia din sistemul economic deriv toate celelalte sisteme (social, juridic,...) si "conceptia determinismului", potrivit creia fiecare individ dintr-o clas are un gen de comportament indus nu de gndirea acelui individ ci de clasa la care apartine (acest concept determinist este cel care a folosit la justificarea lagrelor de re-educare, n care au murit milioane de oameni n decursul secolului XX, marea majoritate a acestora n Chi 737h77h na). Ca si miscare politica, comunismul este o ramura a miscarii socialiste, de care se diferentiaza n principal prin dorinta comunistilor de a instaura un sistem comunist n locul unuia capitalist, de multe ori prin metode revolutionare. Marxismul este o teorie sociala bazata pe lucrarile lui Karl Marx, un filozof, economist, jurnalist si revolutionar german din secolul al XIX-lea, care a colaborat n elaborarea sus-numitei teorii cu Friedrich Engels. Marx s-a inspirat din filozofia luiGeorg Hegel, din economia politica a lui Adam Smith, din teoria economica Ricardianasi din socialismul francez din secolul al XIX-lea, pentru a dezvolta o cercetare critica a societatii care se dorea att stiintifica ct si revolutionara. Aceasta critica a atins cea mai sistematica expresie (desi neterminata) n lucrarea lui de capati Das Kapital,Capitalul: O cercetare critica a economiei politice. De la moartea lui Marx n 1883, diferite grupuri din toata lumea au apelat la marxism ca baza intelectuala pentru linia politica si tactica lor, care pot fi n mod spectaculos diferite si contradictorii. Una dintre primele mari sciziuni a aparut ntre aparatorii social-democratiei - (care afirmau ca tranzitia la socialism putea aparea ntr-o societate democratica) si comunisti - (care afirmau ca tranzitia la socialism poate fi facuta numai prin revolutie). Social-democratia a aparut n interiorul Partidului Social Democrat German si a avut drept rezultat abandonarea radacinilor marxiste, n vreme ce comunismul a dus la formarea a numeroase partide comuniste.

Desi mai sunt nca multe miscari sociale si partide politice revolutionare marxiste n toata lumea, de la prabusirea Uniunii Sovietice si a statelor ei satelite, mai sunt relativ putine tari care au guverne care se descriu drept marxiste. Desi ntr-un numar de tari occidentale sunt la putere partide social-democrate, ele s-au distantat cu multa vreme n urma de legaturile lor cu Marx si cu ideile lui. n prezent numai Laos, Vietnam, Cuba si Republica Populara Chineza au guverne care se descriu ca fiind marxiste. Coreea de Nord este descrisa n mod inexact drept marxista, atta vreme ct att Kim Il Sung si Kim Jong Il au respins ideile marxiste conventionale n favoarea variantei "comunismului coreean" ,ciuce. De asemena, despre Libia se afirma uneori ca ar fi comunista, dar Muammar al-Qaddafi a cautat sa conduca tara catre socialismul islamic. Unii dintre membrii scolilor de neamestec guvernamental si "individualism" cred ca principiile statelor moderne burgheze sau a marilor guverne pot fi ntelese ca marxiste. Manifestul Comunist al lui Marx si Engels include un numar de pasi pe care societatea trebuie sa i faca pentru ca muncitorii sa se elibereze de societatea capitalista. Unele dintre aceste masuri apar ca fiind introduse n forma Keynesianismului, astatului bunastarii, a noului liberalism si a altor schimbari ale sistemului din unele tari capitaliste. Exista persoane care cred ca unii dintre reformatorii din statele capitaliste sunt, (sau au fost), "marxisti nedeclarati", de vreme ce ei sprijina politici care sunt similare cu pasii pe care credeau Marx si Engels ca trebuie sa-i parcurga o societate capitalista dezvoltata. Alti indivizi vad, n conformitate cu teoria marxista a materialismului istoric, reformele capitaliste ca vestitori ai viitorului comunist. Pentru marxisti, aceste reforme reprezinta raspunsul la presiunea exercitata de partidele si sindicatele clasei muncitoare, ele nsele raspunznd la abuzurile simtite din partea sistemului capitalist. Mai mult, aceste reforme reflecta eforturile de "salvare" sau de "mbunatatire" a capitalismului (fara a l aboli) pentru a face fata prabusirii pietei datorita ineficientei sistemului. Radacinile socialist-utopice ale marxismului - prin socialism utopic definim ansamblul conceptiilor socialiste care se refera la instaurarea ornduirii socialiste ca o cerinta a ratiunii, ca o concretizare a unui ideal moral; ansamblul conceptiilor socialiste si comuniste care preced constituirea teoriei socialiste ca stiinta. Primele teorii comunist-utopice nchegate apar n perioada formarii capitalismului, ca o expresie a aspiratiilor maselor taranesti si ale saracimii oraselor catre o societate echitabila, dreapta si lipsita de exploatare. Principalii socialisti si comunisti utopici au fost, n perioada Renasterii, Th. Morus (termenul socialism utopic provine de la titlul cartii Utopia,

n care Th. Morus descria viitoarea societate ideala) si Campanella, n sec. 17-18, Meslier, Mably, Morelly, Babeuf n Franta, Winstanley n Anglia. Dupa revolutiile burgheze, n perioada postrevolutionara, a evidentierii contradictiilor capitalismului, s-au afirmat cei trei mari socialisti utopisti: Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier si Robert Owen, precum si Dzamy, Cabet etc. Socialistii si comunistii utopisti au facut o critica patrunzatoare societatii bazate pe exploatare si au prevazut unele dintre trasaturile viitoarei societati socialiste si comuniste: desfiintarea proprietatii private asupra mijloacelor de productie, organizarea planificata a productiei, desfiintarea opozitiei dintre oras si sat, a opozitiei dintre munca fizica si cea intelectuala, obligatia tuturor membrilor societatii de a munci si repartitia produsului social dupa munca, respectiv dupa nevoi, emanciparea femeii, raspunderea societatii pentru libera dezvoltare a individului, disparitia claselor etc. Ei au conceput socialismul n mod idealist, nu ca un rezultat necesar al dezvoltarii istorice, impus de cerintele vietii materiale a societatii ci, dupa cum a spus Engels, ca o ntruchipare a "adevarului absolut, a ratiunii si a dreptatii eterne"; ei au elaborat proiecte fictive despre societatea viitoare si au crezut ca socialismul se va putea instaura prin simpla propagare a ideilor socialiste, prin reformele generoase ale claselor posedante sau ale conducatorilor de stat, respectiv prin forta exemplului unor colonii comuniste pe care au ncercat sa le ntemeieze. ntemeietorii socialismului stiintific au prelucrat n mod critic si au preluat elementele valoroase ale socialismului utopic, care a devenit astfel unul dintre izvoarele conceptiei Iui Marx. n tarile romne, ideile socialismului utopic au fost raspndite n prima jumatate a sec. 19 de catre Teodor Diamant, organizatorul falansterului de la Scaieni (1835-1836). Ideile socialismului utopic au influentat si pe unii revolutionari pasoptisti, ca Ion Heliade-Radulescu, Cezar Bolliac etc. Radacinile hegeliene ale marxismului. Hegel a propus o forma a idealismului n care dezvoltarea ideilor n contrariile lor este tema conducatoare a istoriei umane. Acest proces dialectic presupune uneori acumulari treptate dar alte ori cere salturi discontinui, schimbari violente ale status quo-ului existent. Figuri istorice precum Napoleon Bonaparte sunt, conform interpretarilor hegeliene, mai degraba simptome si unelte ale proceselor dialectice impersonale de baza dect modelatoare ale acestora. Marx si membrii grupului Tinerii Hegelieni din care facea si el parte, au pastrat cea mai mare parte a modului de gndire al lui Hegel. Dar Marx "l-a adus pe Hegel cu picioarele pe pamnt", conform propriei viziuni, schimbnd idealismul dialectic n

materialism dialectic. Marx a urmat curentul altui Tnar Hegelian, Ludwig Feuerbach. Ce i deosebeste pe cei doi este parerea lui Marx ca umanismul lui Feuerbach este excesiv de abstract si de aceea nu mai putin idealist dect sistemul pe care l dorea sa-l nlocuiasca, cu alte cuvinte, notiunea concreta de Dumnezeu gasita n crestinismul institutionalizat care legitimiza puterea represiva a statului prusac. n loc de aceasta, Marx dorea sa dea prioritate ontologica la ceea ce el numea "procesul vietii adevarate" a fiintelor umane adevarate, dupa cum el si Friedrich Engels au spus n 1846 n lucrarea "Ideologia germana". Materialismul dialectic, conceptie filozofica ntemeiata de Karl Marx si Friedrich Engels, de definste drept teoria despre raportul dintre materie si constiinta, despre legile cele mai generale ale schimbarii si dezvoltarii naturii, societatii si gndirii, care este n acelasi timp baza filozofica a marxismului. Materialismul dialectic reprezinta unitatea dintre metoda dialectica marxista si materialismul filozofic marxist. Materialismul dialectic este o conceptie stiintifica de ansamblu asupra lumii si, totodata, o metoda revolutionara de cunoastere si de transformare a realitatii. Aparitia materialismului dialectic reprezinta o profunda revolutie savrsita n filozofie. Tezele fundamentale ale materialismului dialectic au fost elaborate ncepnd de la mijlocul deceniului al cincilea al sec. XIX. Aparitia materialismului dialectic a fost un fenomen determinat de cauze social-economice si de ntreaga dezvoltare anterioara a stiintei si filozofiei, Marx si Engels aratnd limitarea de clasa a conceptiei burgheze despre lume. n timp ce scolile filozofice care au precedat marxismul si puneau ca obiectiv explicarea lumii, materialismul dialectic si pune ca obiectiv transformarea revolutionara a realitatii. Printre premisele naturalist-stiintifice ale constituirii conceptiei materialist-dialectice despre lume se numara: elaborarea teoriei celulare, formularea legii conservarii si transformarii energiei si descoperirea principiilor evolutiei (expresia cea mai nchegata a evolutionismului fiind darvinismul). Izvorul teoretic al materialismului dialectic este filozofia clasica germana. Precursorii ei directi sunt, n primul rnd, G.W.F. Hegel (care, n contextul idealismului sau, a elaborat totusi, n principiu, multilateral dialectic) si L. Feuerbach (care, n contextul metafizicii sale, a dezvoltat conceptia materialista asupra lumii). Materialismul dialectic este prima forma pe deplin consecventa a materialismului, nglobnd ntr-o explicatie unitara domeniile naturii, societatii si gndirii. Elabornd teoria stiintifica materialista pe baza principiilor

fundamentale ale dialecticii, materialismul dialectic considera ca dezvoltarea are ca izvor contradictiile interne ale obiectelor si proceselor, ca schimbarile calitative (salturile) se realizeaza pe temeiul unor acumulari cantitative anterioare, prin negarea starilor calitative vechi de catre altele noi. Materialismul dialectic a nnoit si a mbogatit gnoseologia (teoria cunoasterii) prin tezele sale privind cognoscibilitatea lumii, caracterul activ al procesului de cunoastere, caracterul obiectiv si concret al adevarului, dialectica relativului si absolutului n procesul cunoasterii si, mai ales, prin dezvaluirea rolului practicii n cunoastere. Materialismul dialectic arata ca principiile dialecticii decurg direct din studiul legilor lumii obiective, ca dialectica obiectiva (a lucrurilor) determina dialectica subiectiva (a ideilor) care are nsa si legile sale specifice, autonomia sa relativa. Desi concorda prin continutul lor obiectiv cu legile naturii si cu cele sociale, legile gndirii constituie doar o reflectare a celor dinti n constiinta oamenilor, aceasta reflectare neavnd un caracter mecanic, nemijlocit, automat, ci unul mediat, constructiv, creator. Materialismul dialectic realizeaza, de semenea, unitatea dialecticii, teoriei cunoasterii (gnoseologiei) si logicii. n virtutea acestui fapt, att teoria cunoasterii, ct si logica adopta viziunea dialectica asupra lumii, abordeaza fenomenele sub raportul dezvoltarii lor istorice, interpreteaza corect corelatia dintre istoric si logic, n sensul ca logicul reflecta n mod sintetic istoricul, de care este, n ultima instanta, determinat. Aparitia materialismului, mpreuna cu crearea materialismului istoric si a economiei politice marxiste, a facut posibila transformareasocialismului din utopie n stiinta. Materialismul dialectic este o conceptie vie, care se mbogateste continuu pe baza generalizarii continue a practicii si a datelor stiintei. Materialismul istoric este parte integranta a filozofiei ntemeiate de Karl Marx si Friedrich Engels, reprezentnd conceptia filozofica materialist-dialectica despre societate, despre structura sistemului social, legile generale si fortele motrice ale dezvoltarii sociale; materialismul dialectic extins la studiul vietii sociale. Spre deosebire de stiintele sociale particulare, care studiaza domenii limitate ale vietii sociale, materialismul istoric trateaza societatean unitatea si interactiunea laturilor ei, procesul istoric n ansamblul sau. De aceea materialismul istoric constituie un ndreptar teoretic si metodologic pentru toate stiintele sociale particulare si, n acelasi timp, generalizeaza datele furnizate de acestea. Creat n deceniul al cincilea al sec. XIX, materialismul istoric a constituit o schimbare revolutionara n conceptiile despre

societate. Pna la Marx si Engels aceste conceptii erau dominate de idealismul istoric, chiar daca unii gnditori premarxisli (Aristotel, Helvtius, J.-J. Rousseau, istoricii francezi din perioada Restauratiei s.a.) s-au apropiat de o interpretare materialista a unor procese si fenomene sociale. nsusindu-si critic intuitiile si previziunile socialistilor utopici, ca si unele descoperiri ale economiei clasice engleze, situndu-se pe pozitiileproletariatului modern, clasa revolutionara, Marx si Engels au extins consecvent, pentru prima oara n istoria gndirii, materialismul la interpretarea vietii sociale. Crearea materialismului istoric a permis ntelegerea istoriei societatii ca un proces care se desfasoara legic, a permis transformarea studierii societatii ntr-o stiinta. Problema fundamentala a filozofiei, raportul dintre existenta si constiinta, capata n cadrul materialismului istoric forma particulara a raportului dintre existenta sociala si constiinta sociala. "Nu constiinta oamenilor le determina existenta, ci, dimpotriva, existenta lor sociala le determina constiinta" (K. Marx) este teza fundamentala a materialismului istoric. Potrivit materialismul istoric, latura determinanta a vietii sociale este procesul productiei bunurilor materiale. Productiei materiale i sunt proprii doua feluri de relatii: raporturile oamenilor cu natura, care se exprima n fortele de productie, si relatiile dintre oamenii nsisi,relatiile de productie. n reteaua complexa a relatiilor sociale, materialismul istoric distinge relatiile de productie ca relatii materiale, obiective, ca relatii fundamentale care determina ntr-un fel sau n altul, de cele mai multe ori, mijlocit, relatiile spirituale, ideologice. Fortele de productie si relatiile de productie alcatuiesc modul de productie si determina procesele vietii sociale, politice si spirituale. Sistemul relatiilor de productie constituie structura economica, baza unei societati determinate, pe care se nalta o suprastructuracorespunzatoare juridica si politica si careia i corespund anumite forme ale constiintei sociale. n timp ce gnditorii premarxisti se limitau n explicarea vietii sociale la mobilurile ideale ale activitatii oamenilor (scopuri, nazuinte, idei), Marx si Engels au aratat ca n spatele mobilurilor ideale ale actiunii istorice a maselor, a claselor sociale, stau interesele lor materiale, determinate, la rndul lor, de situatia acestor clase n sistemul dat de relatii de productie. Aceasta a permis prezentarea evolutiei societatii ca un proces "istoric-natural" (Marx), adica guvernat, ca si natura, de legi fara cunoasterea carora nu poate fi vorba de vreo stiinta sociala. Totodata, desprinderea relatiilor de productie ca relatii sociale fundamentale care le determina pe toate celelalte, a permis ntemeietorilor materialismul istoric sa elaboreze categoria de formatiune sociala.

Procesul istoric este succesiunea formatiunilor sociale, nlocuirea unei formatiuni inferioare cu alta superioara, determinata dedialectica interna a modului de productie si a ntregii formatiuni socio-economice. n societatile ntemeiate pe proprietatea privata asupramijloacelor de productie contradictiile inerente modului de productie se manifesta n lupta politica dintre clasele sociale, a carei dezvoltare duce la revolutia social-politica, forma de trecere de la o formatiune social-economica la alta. Materialismul istoric subliniaza, de asemenea, independenta relativa a ideilor, a institutiilor si organizatiilor n dezvoltarea sociala, si mai ales actiunea lor inversa asupra vietii materiale a societatii. ntruct baza dezvoltarii sociale este modul de productie, rolul hotartor n istorie l au producatorii directi ai bunurilor materiale - masele populare. Aratnd caracterul obiectiv al structurii societatii si al dinamicii acesteia, materialismul istoric constituie, mpreuna cu materialismul dialectic, fundamentul teoretic al socialismului stiintific Leninismul este o teorie politica si economica avnd la baza marxismul. Este o ramura a marxismului, iar din deceniul al doilea al secolului XX a fost ramura dominanta a sa. Leninismul a fost dezvoltat n principal de liderul bolsevic Vladimir Ilici Lenin[1], care de altfel l-a si pus n practica dupa Revolutia rusa. Teoriile lui Lenin au fost o sursa de controverse nca de la nceput, avnd critici att dinspre stnga (de exemplu: socialdemocratii, anarhistii si chiar alti marxisti), dinspre centru (de exemplu: liberalii) si dinspre dreapta (de exemplu: conservatorii,fascistii, etc). Lenin afirma ca proletariatul nu poate atinge constiinta revolutionara dect prin eforturile unui partid comunist care si asuma rolul de "avangarda revolutionara". Lenin mai credea ca un asemenea partid nu-si putea atinge scopurile dect prin intermediul unei organizari disciplinate cunoscuta drept centralism democratic. n plus, leninismul afirma ca imperialismul este ultima forma a capitalismului, iar capitalismul nu poate fi rasturnat de la putere dect prin mijloace revolutionare (orice ncercare de a "reforma" capitalismul din interior fiind sortita esecului. Lenin credea ca distrugerea statului capitalist se va face prin revolutia proletara si prin nlocuirea democratiei burgheze cudictatura proletariatului (un sistem al democratiei muncitoresti, n care ei ar fi detinut puterea politica prin intermediul unor consilii numitesoviete). Teoria lui Lenin referitoare la imperialism dorea sa mbunatateasca si sa corecteze opera lui Marx, explicnd un fenomen pe care acesta din urma nu-l prevazuse: transformarea capitalismului ntr-un sistem global, (iar nu unul national, asa cum

l descrisese Marx). n centrul teoriei sale despre imperialism se afla ideea conform careia natiunile capitaliste avansate din punct de vedere industrial evita revolutia prin exportarea fortata n pietele coloniiilor nrobite si prin exploatarea resurselor lor naturale. Aceasta ar fi permis natiunilor capitaliste dezvoltate din punct de vedere industrial sa-si mentina muncitorii multumiti, n parte prin cearea unei aristocratii muncitoresti. Ca un rezultat, capitalismul era capabil sa fie condus prin expresia politica a aristocratiei muncitoresti - partidele social-democratice, catre punctul n care revolutia nu mai era posibila n cele mai avansate natiuni (asa cum prevestise Marx), ci mai degraba n cel mai slab stat imperialist, acela fiind Rusia. Oricum, daca revolutuia se putea produce numai ntr-o tara slab dezvoltata, aceasta ridica o mare problema: o asemenea tara subdezvoltata nu era capabila sa dezvolte un sistem socialist, (n teoria marxista, socialismul este stadiul de dezvoltare care ar fi urmat dupa capitalism si ar fi fost precursorul comunismului), deoarece capitalismul nu ar fi fost dezvoltat complet ntr-o asemea tara si deoarece puterile externe ar fi ncercat sa zdrobeasca revolutia cu orice pret. Pentru rezolvarea acestei probleme, Lenin propunea doua solutii posibile: 1. Revolutia din tara subdezvoltata ar aprinde scnteia revolutiei ntr-o tara capitalista dezvoltata (Lenin spera, de exemplu, ca revolutia rusa va aprinde flacarile revolutiei n Germania). ara dezvoltata ar fi instaurat socialismul si ar fi ajutat tara subdezvoltata sa faca la fel. 2. Revolutia ar izbucni n mai multe tari subdezvoltate n acelasi timp sau ntr-o succesiune rapida; aceste tari urmau sa se uneasca ntr-un stat federal capabil sa lupte cu marile puteri capitaliste si mai apoi sa instaureze socialismul. Aceasta o fost ideea originala din spatele formarii Uniunii Sovietice. Oricare ar fi fost calea urmata, socialismul nu ar fi putut supravietui numai ntr-o tara saraca. De aceea leninismul chema la revolutia mondiala ntr-o forma sau alta. Leninistii din ziua de azi vad deseori globalizarea ca pe o forma moderna de imperialism. Catre sfrsitul deceniului al treilea al secolului al XX, Uniunea Sovietica a nceput sa se ndeparteze de linia politica a lui Lenin si sa se apropie de ceea ce este denumit n mod curent "stalinism", cei mai multi dintre tovarasii lui Lenin ("vechii bolsevici") pierind n Marea Epurare. n China, leninismul a fost baza de organizare att a Kuomintangului ct si a Partidului Comunist Chinez. Mai trziu, comunistii chinezi au dezvoltat teoria maoista. Astazi, termenul "Leninism" (sau, mai des, "Marxism-Leninism") este folosit n autocaracterizarea a trei

ideologii separte, care si au radacinile n leninism, dar care altfel sunt foarte diferite una de cealalta: Stalinismul, Maoismul, si Trotkism. Daca maoismul poate fi apreciat ca o subcategorie a stalinismului din multe puncte de vedere, trotkismul si stalinismul sunt adversari de nempacat. (Trotkistii s-au opus a ceea ce ei considerau drept politici nedemocratice ale Uniunii Sovietice sub conducerea lui Stalin, ca si a altor tari care urmasera exemplul acestuia, n vreme ce stalinistii se opuneau a ceea ce ei considerau drept o tradare a marxismului de catre trotkisti ). Stalinismul este o ramura a teoriei politice si un sistem politic si economic introdus de Iosif Vissarionovici Stalin n Uniunea Sovietica.Lev Trotki a descris acest sistem ca fiind totalitar si aceasta caracterizare a ajuns sa fie folosita n mod curent de criticii stalinismului. Termenul "Stalinism" este uneori folosit pentru denumirea unei ramuri a teoriei comuniste, dominanta n Uniunea Sovietica si n tarile din sfera de influenta a URSS-ului, pe timpul vietii si dupa moartea lui Stalin. Termenul folosit n Uniunea Sovietica si de cei mai multi care i-au sustinut mostenirea este de fapt "marxismleninism", denotnd faptul ca Stalin nsusi nu era un teoretician, ci mai degraba un lector care a scris cteva carti ntr-un libaj lesne de nteles si n contrast cu Marx si Lenin, a adus putine contributii teoretice noi. Mai degraba, stalinismul este o interpretare a ideilor celor de mai nainte, un anumit sistem politic aclamnd ca aplica acele idei n moduri potrivite cu nevoile de schimbare ale societatii, asa cum a fost tranzitia de la "socialismul n pas de melc" de la nceputul anilor treizeci la industrializarea fortata aplanurilor cincinale. Uneori, termenul compus marxism-leninismstalinism, (sau nvataturile lui Marx, Engels, Lenin si Stalin), era folosit pentru a demonstra pretinsa mostenire si succesiune. n acelasi timp, multe persoane credincioase marxismului sau leninismului, vedeau stalinismul ca o pervertire a ideilor marilor gnditori de stnga. Trotkistii, n particular, sunt antistalinisti virulenti, considernd stalinismul o politica contrarevolutionara care foloseste marxismul ca scuza. Stalinistii credeau ca Stalin era cea mai nalta autoritate n materie de leninism (dupa moartea fondatorului statului sovietic din 1924), deseori subliniind ca Lev Trotki nu a intrat n partidul bolsevic pna n 1917 si argumentnd ca el nu credea n necesitatea existentei partidului comunist de avangarda. Din 1917 pna n 1924, Lenin, Trotsky, si Stalin apareau deseori uniti dar, de fapt, diferentele ideologice nu disparusera niciodata. n disputa lui cu Trotki, Stalin a micsorat importanta rolului muncitorilor n tarile capitaliste avansate, (de exemplu, el a postulat ca n Statele Unite clasa muncitoare sa mburghezit devenind aristocrati ai muncii). De asemenea, Stalin

s-a contrazis cu Trotki n problema rolului taranilor, precum n China, unde Trotki dorea o insurectie urbana iar nu un razboi de guerila cu baza n zonele rurale Cele mai importante contributii ale lui Stalin la teoria comunista au fost: Socialism ntr-o singura tara ; Teoria "ascutirii luptei de clasa odata cu dezvoltarea socialismului", un fundament teoretic care justifica represiunea politic a oponentilor.

Transformnd si folosindu-se de mostenirea lui Lenin, Stalin a extins sistemul administrativ centralizat din Uniunea Sovietica pe durata anilor douazeci si treizeci. O serie de doua planuri cincinale au dezvoltat masiv economia sovietica. Au aparut cresteri n multe sectoare, n mod special n productia de carbune si de otel. Societatea sovietica a fost adusa de la o situatie de napoiere de zeci de ani fata de occident, la una de egalitate si asta n numai treizeci de ani, (cel putin conform anumitor aprecieri statistice). Unii istorici economici apreciaza azi ca a fost cea mai rapida crestere economica atinsa vreodat. Datorita prestigiului si influentei revolutiei ruse nvingatoare, multe tari, de-a lungul secolului al XX-lea, au cautat o alternativa la sistemul economiei de piata si au urmat modelul politicoeconomic dezvoltat n URSS. Acestea au inclus att regimuri revolutionare ct si post-coloniale din lumea n curs de dezvoltare. Dupa moartea lui Stalin n 1953, succesorul sau, Nikita Hrusciov, a repudiat politicile lui, a condamnat cultul personalitatii lui Stalin n discursul secret la Congresul al XX-lea al partidului n 1956, si a initiat destalinizarea si liberalizarea (n cadrul acelorasi limite politice). Drept consecinta, cea mai mare parte a partidelor comuniste din lume, care mai nainte aderasera la stalinism, l-au abandonat si, n masura mai mare sau mai mica, au adoptat pozitia reformatoare moderata a lui Hrusciov. O exceptie notabila a fost Republica Populara Chineza care, sub conducerea lui Mao Zedong, a intrat n conflict cu "revizionismul" noii conduceri sovietice, ceea ce a dus la ruptura chinosovietica din 1960. Mai trziu, China a urmat n mod independent ideologia maoista. Albania a luat partea partidului comunist chinez n ruptura chino-sovietica si a ramas atasata de stalinism pentru deceniile care au urmat, sub conducerea lui Enver Hoxha. Unii istorici au trasat paralele ntre stalinism si politica tarului Petru cel Mare. Ambii conducatori doreau cu disperare ca Rusia sa ajunga din urma tarile vest-europene. Ambii au reusit sa cucereasca noi teritorii, transformnd Rusia ntr-o putere conducatoare a Europei, chiar daca pentru putin timp. Altii l compara pe Stalin cu Ivan cel Groaznic, cu politica de opresiune

(oprichnina) si de reducere a libertatii oamenilor de rnd. Bibliografie 1.Luis Althusser, Citindu-l pe Marx, Ed. Politica, Bucureti, 1947. 2.Karl Marx, Capitalul, Ed. PCR, Bucuresti, 1947. 3.Karl,Marx, Friederich, Engels, Vladimir Ilici, Despre procesul revolutionar al edificarii socialismului si comunismului, Ed. Politica, Bucuresti, 1979. 4.Vladimir Ilici Lenin, Ce-i de facut, Ed. PCR, Bucuresti, 1946. 5.Vladimir Ilici Lenin, Despre capitalismul de stat: capitalismul de stat n perioada de trecere la socialism, Ed. Politica, Bucuresti, 1962. 6.Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism pentru eternitate, Ed. Polirom, Iasi, 2005. 7.Stalin Iosif, Despre materialismul dialectic si materialismul istoric, Ed PMR, Bucuresti, 1948. 8.Roy Medvedev, Despre Stalin si istorice, Ed. Humanitas, Bucuresti, 1991. Stalinism. Consemnari

Doctrina lui Marx

Materialismul filozofic Dialectica Concepia materialist a istoriei Lupta de clas

Marxismul este sistemul concepiilor i al doctrinei lui Marx. Marx a continuat i a sintetizat n mod genial cele trei curente ideologice principale din secolul al XIX-lea existente n trei dintre cele mai naintate ri din lume: filozofia clasic german, economia politic clasic englez i socialismul francez, legat de doctrinele revoluionare franceze n general. Remarcabila consecven i unitate recunoscut chiar i de adversari a concepiilor sale, care constituie n totalitate materialismul modern i socialismul tiinific modern, ca teorie i program al micrii muncitoreti din toate rile civilizate ale lumii, ne oblig, nainte de a trece la expunerea coninutului principal al marxismului anume doctrina economic a lui Marx , s facem o sumar prezentare a concepiei sale generale despre lume.

Materialismul filozofic ncepnd din 18441845, cnd concepiile sale s-au cristalizat, Marx a devenit materialist, i anume adept al lui Feuerbach, considernd i mai trziu c prile slabe acestuia constau exclusiv n faptul c materialismul lui nu este ndeajuns de consecvent i de atotcuprinztor. Marx vedea nsemntatea istoric universal, epocal a lui Feuerbach tocmai n ruptura hotrt cu idealismul lui Hegel i n proclamarea materialismului, care nc n secolul al XVIII-lea, n special materialismul francez, nu a fost numai o lupt mpotriva instituiilor politice existente, ca i mpotriva

religiei i a teologiei existente, ci, n aceeai msur, i o lupt... mpotriva oricrei metafizici (luat n sensul de beie a speculaiilor, spre deosebire de filozofia treaz) (Sfnta familie n Scrieri postume) [10] . Pentru Hegel scrie Marx , procesul gndirii, pe care, sub denumirea de idee, el l transform chiar ntr-un subiect de sine stttor, este demiurgul (creatorul) realului... La mine, dimpotriv, idealul nu este nimic altceva dect materialul transpus i tradus n capul omului (Capitalul, vol. I, postfa la ediia a 2-a[11]). Expunnd aceast filozofie materialist a lui Marx, F. Engels, n deplin concordan cu ea, scria n Anti-Dhring (vezi) oper cunoscut de Marx nc n manuscris , Unitatea lumii nu const n existena ei..., ci n materialitatea ei, i aceasta este dovedit... printr-o dezvoltare lung i anevoioas a filozofiei i a tiinelor naturii... Micarea este modul de existen a materiei. Niciodat i nicieri n-a existat materie fr micare, i nici nu poate s existe... Dac se pune ns mai departe ntrebarea ce snt gndirea i contiina i care este originea lor, constatm c ele snt produse ale creierului omenesc i c nsui omul este un produs al naturii, care s-a dezvoltat n mediul lui nconjurtor i mpreun cu acesta; astfel stnd lucrurile, se nelege de la sine c produsele creierului omenesc, care n ultim instan snt i ele tot produse ale naturii, nu contrazic restul nlnuirii din natur, ci i corespund. Hegel era idealist, cu alte cuvinte, pentru el, ideile din mintea lui nu erau imagini (n original Abbilder; cteodat Engels le numete cliee) mai mult sau mai puin abstracte ale obiectelor i proceselor reale, ci,

invers, obiectele i dezvoltarea lor nu erau pentru el dect imaginile concretizate ale ideii existente undeva nc naintea lumii[12]. n Ludwig Feuerbach lucrare n care Engels expune prerile sale i ale lui Marx asupra filozofiei lui Feuerbach, i pe care n-a ncredinat-o tiparului dect dup ce a recitit vechiul manuscris al lucrrii asupra lui Hegel, asupra lui Feuerbach i asupra concepiei materialiste a istoriei, scrise mpreun cu Marx n 18441845 Engels scrie: Marea problem fundamental a oricrei filozofii, i ndeosebi a filozofiei moderne, este problema raportului dintre gndire i existen... dintre spirit i natur... Care este elementul primar: spiritul sau natura?... Dup felul cum rspundeau la aceast ntrebare, filozofii se mpreau n dou mari tabere. Cei care susineau c spiritul a existat naintea naturii i care admiteau deci, n ultim instan, crearea lumii n vreun fel oarecare... alctuiau tabra idealismului. Ceilali, care considerau natura ca element iniial, aparineau diferitelor coli ale materialismului. Orice alt utilizare a noiunilor de idealism i materialism (n sens filozofic) duce numai la confuzii. Marx a respins categoric nu numai idealismul, care este ntotdeauna legat ntr-un fel sau altul de religie, dar i punctul de vedere al lui Hume i al lui Kant, deosebit de rspndit n zilele noastre, agnosticismul, criticismul, pozitivismul, sub diferitele lor forme, socotind acest gen de filozofie ca o concesie reacionar fcut idealismului i, n cazul cel mai bun, ca ,,o manier pudic de a primi materialismul pe ua din dos i de a-l tgdui n faa lumii[13]. Vezi n aceast privin, n afar de lucrrile lui Engels

i Marx amintite mai sus, scrisoarea ctre Engels din 12 decembrie 1866, n care Marx artnd c cunoscutul naturalist T. Huxleyi) s-a situat pe poziii mai materialiste dect de obicei i a admis c, atta timp ct observm i gndim n mod real, nu putem prsi niciodat terenul materialismului, i reproa totodat acestuia c deschide o porti agnosticismului i humeismului[14]. Trebuie relevat ndeosebi modul n care concepea Marx raportul dintre libertate i necesitate: ...Libertatea este nelegerea necesitii. Necesitatea este oarb numai n msura n care nu este neleas (Engels n Anti-Dhring). Ceea ce nseamn: recunoaterea dominaiei legilor obiective n natur i recunoaterea transformrii dialectice a necesitii n libertate (concomitent cu transformarea lucrului n sine, necunoscut, dar cognoscibil, n lucru pentru noi, a esenei lucrurilor n fenomen). Marx i Engels considerau c principalele neajunsuri ale vechiului materialism, inclusiv ale celui feuerbachian (i cu att mai mult ale materialismului vulgar al lui Bchneri)-Vogti)Moleschotti)), snt urmtoarele: (1) acest materialism era prin excelen mecanicist i nu inea seama de dezvoltarea chimiei i biologiei moderne (iar pentru zilele noastre ar trebui s adugm: de teoria electric a materiei); (2) vechiul materialism era neistoric, nedialectic (metafizic n sens de antidialectic), nu promova consecvent i nu considera universal punctul de vedere al evoluiei; (3) esena uman era conceput ca abstracie, i nu ca ansamblul relaiilor sociale (determinate din punct de vedere istoric concret); de aceea, acest materialism nu fcea

dect s interpreteze lumea, n timp ce e vorba de a o schimba, cu alte cuvinte nu nelegea nsemntatea activitii revoluionare practice.

Dialectica Marx i Engels considerau dialectica lui Hegel cea mai cuprinztoare, mai bogat n coninut i mai profund teorie a dezvoltrii drept cea mai grandioas cucerire a filozofiei clasice germane. Orice alt formulare a principiului dezvoltrii, evoluiei, ei o socoteau unilateral i fr coninut, o considerau ca o deformare i o denaturare a procesului real al dezvoltrii n natur i n societate (dezvoltare care decurge adesea n salturi, catastrofe i revoluii). Se poate spune c Marx i cu mine am fost singurii care am salvat (de nimicirea de ctre idealism, inclusiv de ctre hegelianism) dialectica contient i am transpus-o n concepia materialist asupra naturii. Natura constituie piatra de ncercare a dialecticii, i trebuie s recunoatem tiinei moderne a naturii meritul de a ne fi furnizat pentru aceast verificare un material extrem de bogat (acestea au fost scrise nainte de descoperirea radiului, a electronilor, a transmutaiei elementelor etc.!), care sporete pe zi ce trece, dovedind astfel c n natur lucrurile se petrec, n ultim instan, n mod dialectic, i nu metafizic[15]. Marea idee fundamental scrie Engels c lumea nu trebuie conceput ca un complex de lucruri definitive, ci ca un complex de procese, n care lucrurile n aparen stabile, ca i reflectarea lor ideal, n mintea noastr,

conceptele parcurg o nentrerupt transformare n cadrul devenirii i al pieirii..., de la Hegel ncoace, aceast mare idee fundamental a intrat ntr-att n contiina social, nct aproape c nu mai este contrazis n aceast form general a ei. Dar ntre a recunoate aceast idee fundamental n cuvinte i a o aplica n realitate n fiecare domeniu al cercetrii tiinifice e o mare deosebire. Pentru filozofia dialectic nimic nu este definitiv, absolut, sacru; ea dezvluie nestatornicia la toate i n toate, n faa ei nu rmne n picioare nimic, n afar de procesul continuu al devenirii i al dispariiei, al ascensiunii infinite de la inferior la superior, a crei ampl reflectare n creierul care gndete este ea nsi. Aadar, dup Marx, dialectica este tiina legilor generale ale micrii, att a lumii exterioare ct i a gndirii omeneti[16]. Aceast latur revoluionar a filozofiei lui Hegel a fost preluat si dezvoltat de Marx. Materialismul dialectic nu mai are nevoie de o filozofie care s stea deasupra celorlalte tiine. Din vechea filozofie nu mai rmne dect tiina despre gndire i despre legile ei logica formal i dialectica[17]. Iar dialectica, n concepia lui Marx, ca i n aceea a lui Hegel, cuprinde ceea ce se numete astzi teoria cunoaterii, gnoseologia, care trebuie s-i considere i ea obiectul din punct de vedere istoric, studiind i sintetiznd originea i dezvoltarea cunoaterii, trecerea de la necunoatere la cunoatere. Astzi, ideea dezvoltrii, a evoluiei, a ptruns aproape n ntregime n contiina social, dar nu prin filozofia lui Hegel, ci pe

alt cale. Dar aceast idee, aa cum au formulat-o Marx i Engels, sprijinindu-pe Hegel, este mult mai cuprinztoare, mult mai bogat n coninut dect ideea curent de evoluie. O dezvoltare care repet treptele strbtute anterior, dar le repet altfel, pe o baz superioar (negarea negaiei), o dezvoltare, ca s spunem aa, n spiral, i nu n linie dreapt; o dezvoltare prin salturi, catastrofe i revoluii; ntreruperi ale continuitii; transformarea cantitii n calitate; impulsuri interne spre dezvoltare, date de antagonismul, de ciocnirea forelor i tendinelor deosebite care acioneaz asupra unui corp dat, n cadrul unui fenomen dat sau al un societi date; interdependen i legtur foarte strns, indisolubil a tuturor laturilor fiecrui fenomen (istoria evideniind n permanen laturi noi), legtur care ne d procesul universal al micrii, unic i legic, iat cteva trsturi ale dialecticii, teorie a dezvoltrii mai bogat n coninut dect cea curent. (Cf. scrisoarea lui Marx ctre Engels din 8 ianuarie 1868 n care el ridiculizeaz trihotomiile rigide ale Stein, care numai prin absurd ar putea fi confundate cu dialectica materialist[18].)

Concepia materialist a istoriei Dndu-i seama de inconsecvena, de imperfeciunea i de unilateralitatea vechiului materialism, Marx ajunge la convingerea c e neaprat necesar ca tiina despre societate... s fie pus n concordan cu baza materialist i reconstruit conform acestei baze[19]. Dac

materialismul explic n general contiina prin existen, i nu invers, materialismul n aplicarea lui la viaa social a omenirii cere explicarea contiinei sociale prin existena social. Tehnologia spune Marx (Capitalul, vol. I) dezvluie atitudinea activ a omului fa de natur, procesul nemijlocit de producie a vieii sale i totodat pe cel al condiiilor sale sociale de via i al reprezentrilor spirituale care decurg din ele[20]. O formulare complet a tezelor fundamentale ale materialismului aplicat la societatea omeneasc i la istoria ei a dat Marx n prefaa la lucrarea sa Contribuii la critica economiei politice prin urmtoarele cuvinte: n producia social a vieii lor, oamenii intr n relaii determinate, necesare, independente de voina lor relaii de producie , care corespund unei trepte de dezvoltare determinate a forelor lor de producie materiale. Totalitatea acestor relaii de producie constituie structura economic a societii, baza real pe care se nal o suprastructur juridic i politic i creia i corespund forme determinate ale contiinei sociale. Modul de producie al vieii materiale determin n genere procesul vieii sociale, politice i spirituale. Nu contiina oamenilor le determin existena, ci, dimpotriv, existena lor social le determin contiina. Pe o anumit treapt a dezvoltrii lor, forele de producie materiale ale societii intr n contradicie cu relaiile de producie existente, sau, ceea ce nu este dect expresia juridic a acestora din urm, cu relaiile de proprietate n cadrul crora ele s-au dezvoltat

pn atunci. Din forme ale dezvoltrii forelor de producie, aceste relaii se transform n ctue ale lor. Atunci ncepe o epoc de revoluie social. O dat cu schimbarea bazei economice are loc, mai ncet sau mai repede, o revoluionare a ntregii uriae suprastructuri. Atunci cnd cercetm asemenea revoluionri, trebuie s facem ntotdeauna o deosebire ntre revoluionarea material a condiiilor economice de producie, care poate fi constatat cu precizie tiinific, i formele juridice, politice, religioase, artistice sau filozofice, ntrun cuvnt formele ideologice, n care oamenii devin contieni de acest conflict i l rezolv prin lupt. Aa cum un individ oarecare nu poate fi judecat dup ceea ce gndete despre sine, tot astfel o asemenea epoc de revoluie nu poate fi judecat prin prisma contiinei sale. Dimpotriv, aceast contiin trebuie explicat prin contradiciile vieii materiale, prin conflictul existent ntre forele de producie sociale i relaiile de producie... n linii generale, modurile de producie asiatic, antic, feudal i burghez-modern reprezentau respectiv epoci de progres ale formaiunii economice a societii[21]. (Cf. formularea concis pe care o d Marx n scrisoarea sa ctre Engels din 7 iulie 1866: Potrivit teoriei noastre organizarea muncii este determinat de mijloacele de producie[22].) Descoperirea concepiei materialiste a istoriei, sau, mai bine zis, extinderea i aplicarea consecvent a materialismului la domeniul fenomenelor sociale, a nlturat dou neajunsuri principale ale teoriilor istorice

anterioare. nti, acestea cercetau, n cazul cel mai bun, numai motivele ideologice ale activitii istorice a oamenilor, i nu ce anume genereaz aceste motive, nu sesizau legile obiective n dezvoltarea sistemului de relaii sociale, nu vedeau c aceste relaii depind de gradul de dezvoltare a produciei materiale; al doilea, n timp ce teoriile de pn atunci nu ineau seama tocmai de aciunile maselor populaiei, materialismul istoric a fcut pentru prima oar posibil studierea, cu o precizie proprie tiinelor istorice-naturale, a condiiilor sociale de via ale maselor i a schimbrii acestor condiii. Sociologia i istoriografia dinainte de Marx nu au fcut, n cazul cel mai bun, dect s acumuleze material faptic brut, strns fragmentar i s evidenieze anumite aspecte ale procesului istoric. Marxismul a deschis calea spre o cercetare multilateral, atotcuprinztoare a procesului apariiei, dezvoltrii i decderii formaiunilor social-economice, mbrind totalitatea tendinelor contradictorii, reducndu-le la condiiile de existen i de producie precis determinabile ale diferitelor clase ale societii, nlturnd subiectivismul i arbitrarul manifestat n alegerea ideilor dominante sau n interpretarea lor, artnd c ideile i tendinele variate i au toate, fr excepie, rdcinile n starea forelor de producie materiale. Oamenii snt furitorii propriei lor istorii. Dar ce determin motivele oamenilor i n special ale maselor de oameni? Ce anume provoac ciocnirile dintre ideile i tendinele contradictorii? Ce reprezint totalitatea acestor conflicte din cadrul tuturor societilor

omeneti? Care snt condiiile obiective ale produciei vieii materiale ce alctuiesc baza ntregii activiti istorice a oamenilor? Care este legea dezvoltrii acestor condiii? Marx a atras atenia asupra tuturor acestor probleme, trasnd calea spre studiul tiinific al istoriei, pe care o concepe ca un proces unitar, guvernat de legi necesare n ntreaga lui varietate de aspecte i contradicii.

Lupta de clas C ntr-o o societate nzuinele unor membri ai ei snt opuse nzuinelor altora, c viaa social este plin de contradicii, c istoria ne nfieaz tabloul unei lupte ntre popoare i ntre societi, precum i n cadrul lor, c ea ne mai arat o alternan a perioadelor de revoluie i de reaciune, de rzboi i de pace, de stagnare i de progres sau de decdere rapid, toate aceste fapte snt ndeobte cunoscute. Marxismul a dat firul cluzitor care permite s se descopere, n acest labirint i haos aparent, existena unor legi necesare; acest fir cluzitor este teoria luptei de clas. Numai studierea totalitii nzuinelor care anim pe toi membrii unei societi sau ai unui grup de societi permite definirea tiinific a rezultatelor acestor nzuine. Iar sursa nzuinelor contradictorii o constituie deosebirea dintre situaia i condiiile de via ale claselor care compun o societate. Istoria tuturor societilor de pn azi scrie Marx n Manifestul Comunist (cu excepia istoriei comunei primitive, adaug mai trziu Engels) este istoria luptelor de clas. Omul liber i sclavul, patricianul i plebeul, nobilul i

iobagul, meterul i calfa, ntr-un cuvnt asupritorii i asupriii se aflau ntr-un permanent antagonism, duceau o lupt nentrerupt, cnd ascuns, cnd fi, o lupt care de fiecare dat se sfrea printr-o prefacere revoluionar a ntregii societi, sau prin pieirea claselor aflate n lupt... Societatea burghez modern, ridicat pe ruinele societii feudale, nu a desfiinat antagonismele de clas. Ea a creat doar clase noi, condiii noi de asuprire, forme noi de lupt, n locul celor vechi. Epoca noastr, epoca burgheziei, se deosebete ns prin faptul c a simplificat antagonismele de clas. Societatea ntreag se scindeaz din ce n ce mai mult n dou mari tabere dumane, n dou mari clase direct opuse una alteia: burghezia i proletariatul. De la marea revoluie francez ncoace, istoria Europei a scos n mod pregnant la iveal ntr-o serie de ri acest substrat real al evenimentelor: lupta de clas. nc n epoca Restauraiei, au aprut n Frana o serie de istorici (Thierryi), Guizoti), Migneti), Thiersi)) care, sintetiznd evenimentele, s-au vzut silii s recunoasc lupta de clas este cheia nelegerii ntregii istorii a Franei. Iar epoca modern, epoca victoriei depline a burgheziei, a instituiilor reprezentative, a dreptului de vot larg (dac nu universal), epoca presei cotidiene ieftine, care ptrunde n mase etc., a unor uniuni muncitoreti puternice i din ce n ce mai largi, ca i a uniunilor patronale etc., a dovedit i mai concret (dei uneori sub o form cu totul unilateral, panic, constituional) ca motorul evenimentelor este lupta de clas. Pasajul de mai jos din Manifestul Comunist al lui Marx ne arat c Marx cerea tiinei

sociale s fac o profund analiz obiectiv a situaiei fiecrei clase n societatea modern, o analiz a condiiilor de dezvoltare a fiecrei clase: Dintre toate clasele care se contrapun n zilele noastre burgheziei, singur proletariatul este o clas cu adevrat revoluionar. Celelalte clase decad i pier o dat cu dezvoltarea marii industrii; proletariatul, dimpotriv, este propriul ei produs. Pturile de mijloc: micul industria, micul negustor, meteugarul, ranul, toi lupt mpotriva burgheziei pentru a salva de la pieire existena lor ca pturi de mijloc. Aadar, ele nu snt revoluionare, ci conservatoare. Mai mult nc, ele snt reacionare, deoarece ncearc s ntoarc napoi roata istoriei. Iar dac acioneaz n chip revoluionar, o fac n vederea trecerii lor apropiate n rndurile proletariatului, nu-i apr interesele actuale, ci interesele lor viitoare, i prsesc propriul lor punct de vedere ca s i-l nsueasc pe acela al proletariatului. ntr-o serie de lucrri istorice (vezi Bibliografia), Marx a dat pilde strlucite i pline de neles adnc de istoriografie materialist, de analiz a situaiei fiecrei clase n parte i adesea a diferitelor grupuri sau pturi din rndurile aceleiai clase, artnd ct se poate de concret de ce i cum orice lupt de clas este o lupt politic[23]. Pasajul citat arat limpede ct de complex este reeaua de relaii sociale i de trepte intermediare ntre o clas i alta, ntre trecut i viitor, pe care Marx o analizeaz pentru a stabili rezultanta ntregii dezvoltri istorice. Cea mai profund, cea mai complet i cea mai amnunit aplicare i confirmare a teoriei lui Marx este doctrina lui economic.

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