Sociological Forum, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 2008 ( 2008) DOI: 10.1111/j.1573-7861.2008.00094.

Navigating Globalization: Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia, 194520071

James Walsh2

Scholarship on immigration and globalization has failed to adequately analyze the nation-states regulatory capacities, insisting instead that contemporary patterns of migration jeopardize national sovereignty and territoriality. While recognized that states possess the legitimate authority to control their territorial and membership boundaries, recent transformations of these capacities remain largely unanalyzed. This articles historical analysis of Australia and Canadas postwar immigration policies demonstrates that the contours of state regulation are intimately connected to the exigencies of state administration and nation building andin contrast to the expectations of dominant theorieshave intensied and expanded within the globalization context. The literatures inattention to the fundamentally political nature of immigration has obscured the critical effects of national policies within both the migratory and globalization process. Australias and Canadas contemporary policies constitute a unique model of migration control and reect attempts by both countries to strategically position their societies within the global system and resolve a number of economic, political, cultural, and demographic transitions associated with globalization. KEY WORDS: Australia; Canada; globalization; immigration; nation-state; policy.

INTRODUCTION Humans are not a sedentary species and regularly relocate across national boundaries. With the dissolution of colonial and multiethnic states, the globalization of economic activity and human rights doctrines, and advances in communications and transport, the scope, intensity, and consequences of such migrations have been drastically amplied.
1

This article has beneted greatly from the comments of Karen Cerulo and three anonymous reviewers. I also thank Richard Appelbaum, Howard Winant, and, especially, William I. Robinson for their intellectual guidance and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. Department of Sociology, University of California Santa Barbara: Santa Barbara, California, 93106-9430; e-mail: jwalsh@umail.ucsb.edu. 786
0884-8971/08/0300-0031/0 2008 Eastern Sociological Society

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

787

Migrations present magnitude and complexity has rendered it a profound force of local and global social transformation and an emergent research eld requiring further investigation. Since migration disturbs the nationstates administrative borders and the purported linkage between territory, people, and identity, many scholars have argued that its current dynamics jeopardize the modern nation-states sovereignty, territoriality, and cultural signicance and that national borders are uncontrollable. This article renes these existing theoretical perspectives by examining the historical development of immigration policy in Canada and Australia. Left out of contemporary discussions of migration and globalization is an appreciation of the impact of national regulations and migrations political dimensions. Through the inclusion and exclusion of foreigners, states exercise their territorial sovereignty and communal rights to selfdetermination. In proclaiming what national members should look like, migration policies perpetuate dominant visions of society and nationhood. Many authors have discussed these features (Brubaker, 1992; Torpey, 2000; Walzer, 1983; Zolberg, 2000) and several recent works have demonstrated that state regulations and national borders remain relevant and continue to have signicant social consequences (Joppke, 1999; Newman, 2006; Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004; Walsh, 2008). None, however, have linked the management of human ows to the unfolding exigencies of statecraft and nation building and new programs of societal regulation found under globalization. This article contributes to existing theories by analyzing migration policies as institutional lenses that mirror and sensitively reect the shifting requirements and dynamics of social reproduction. Such policies thus provide a strategic research site through which globalizations impact on state sovereignty becomes salient. Although no state can claim to effectively control all migration, all states continues to claim the legitimate authority to do so andas will be further elucidatedin the Canadian and Australian contexts this formal authority has been matched by a deep level of substantive control. Taking these two settler societies as its cases for analysis, this article compares shifts in immigration policies over the last 60 years given larger transitions in national programs of social regulation. In both cases, policies of large-scale planned migration have served as vital forms of population management or macro-social engineering and have been central to national development. The particular focus is on the movement from mass-industrial and Keynesian to postindustrial and neoliberal socioeconomic formations. As will be demonstrated, immigration policy played a pivotal regulatory role in each period. Currently, attempts at ordering and modifying the national population through tightly controlled and selective immigration policies exist as critical, yet neglected, elements in

788

Walsh

the positioning of both countries within the global system. The analysis presented thereby provides a unique account of immigration policy under intensied globalization and how it continues to enhance the nation-states sovereignty and administrative reach over territory and population. Accepted orthodoxies that states are unable to effectively control migration fail to account for such experiences. As a caveat, the subsequent ndings are unique to the cases and cannot be generalized. However, this studys mode of analysis or inquirythat migration policies are fundamentally political and are connected to statecraft and societal managementcould be fruitfully applied to a number of other contexts, a point that will be further addressed in the conclusion. This article is divided into two main sections. The rst reviews current theories of transnationalism and corrects the dominant view that states have been hamstrung by the forces of international migration and globalization. The second investigates these issues empirically, analyzing the postwar migration policies of Canada and Australia. Together they seek to answer the following questions. (1) How do migratory regulations render globalizations impact on national sovereignty and borders more intelligible? (2) What substantive ndings are established by examining the cases of Canada and Australia and how do these contribute to a more complex account of migration and its political regulation?

WITHER THE NATION-STATE? TRANSNATIONALISM AND MIGRATION SCHOLARSHIP In establishing global systems of labor supply and translocal social formations, many scholars argue that migration now constitutes a core transnational ow and instance of boundary transgression (Faist, 2000; Potts, 1990). Contemporary patterns of migration and settlement thereby augur the diminished relevance of the nation-state as both a territorially bounded administrative, economic, and cultural container and domain for generating a durable sense of identity and community (Basch et al., 1994). In what follows I will briey summarize existing theories of migrant and institutional transnationalism and related claims that nation-states no longer exert the capacity to control their borders. In conclusion, their shortcomings will be addressed. New theories of migrant transnationalism assert that globalizationaided by a series of disembedding technologieshas expanded the capacity of migrants to construct regularized ties and facilitate dense nancial, symbolic, and informational exchanges between sending and receiving societies. As a result, migration is now more circular and

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

789

itinerant; it can no longer be understood as the unidirectional movement and assimilation of individuals from one nation-state to another (Castles, 2002; Portes et al., 1999). Migrants are thereby allowed to situate themselves within spatially complex and alternative forms of afliation and claim making, whether transnational communities (Portes et al., 1999), social spaces (Faist, 2000), or postnational (Appadurai, 1996; Soysal, 1994) forms of identity and membership. Theories of institutional transnationalism cite the emergence of worldlevel normative and institutional structures, whether universal human rights or supra-national political and regulatory bodies, that purportedly govern immigration and citizenship. In assuming that all individuals are endowed with certain rights regardless of their nationality, human rights de-territorialize forms of legal personhood and challenge the particularity of national models of membership (Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1994). International agreements and instruments, whether the United Nations 1991 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers, the Dublin and Schengen Agreements of the European Union, or actions by the WTO to ease political barriers governing the transfer of highly-skilled service workers, all reect attempts by the international community to develop common norms, standards, and practices related to border controls and labor migration (OECD, 2004; Sassen, 1998; Soysal, 1994). Human rights and other global agreements lend credence to arguments of a world polity and corresponding institutional isomorphism with the emergence of common normative, associational, and regulatory complexes (Meyer et al., 1997). However, without a global state possessing legitimate juridical and executive authority, human and migrant rightscontra national citizenshiplack an identiable guarantor and remain loosely enforced (Brysk and Shar, 2004). Additionally, the nation-states sovereign control over who enters its territory or joins its society is enshrined in these very same world-level institutions (Meyer et al., 1997; Soysal, 1994). Institutional transnationalism is therefore de-facto; fragmented, incipient, and not fully captured at the most formal levels of international public law nor in national representations of the sovereign state (Sassen, 1998:6). The dismissive stance of transnationalists toward national borders and regulatory measures is unsurprising given that theories of migration have traditionally ignored the agency of the state in the process. Causal and explanatory privilege has instead been given to push and pull generated by psychic, social, and economic factors, whether individual motivations and desires, familial and communal networks, or segmented labor markets and a global division of labor (see, e.g., Borjas, 1989; Boyd, 1989; Piore, 1979; Sassen, 1988). These perspectives have ensured that

790

Walsh

political understandings of the process are at best fragmentary and limited (Castles and Miller, 2003:95). Most contemporary discussions of migration policy view the state as either a dependent variable constrained by societal interests and pressures or as a passive unit that has lost control of its borders given rising levels of legal and undocumented migration. Analysis of the majority of advanced capitalist societiesbut particularly the United Statesis instructive in these regards. On the one hand, pluralist or democratic theories of migration policy argue that the interaction of societal interests and valueswhether ethnic and business lobbies or liberal norms of nondiscrimination and public neutralityhave limited the capacities of states to effectively regulate migration and implement restrictive controls (Freeman, 1995; Joppke, 2005; Massey, 1999). In the second instance, it is observed that even as the majority of afuent states have placed increased emphasis on restriction and border security, levels of undocumented migration have grown in tandem with globalization. This has created a purported control gap in receiving societies, where the gap between stated policy objectives and outcomes seems to be growing wider (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004:5). Cases such as the United States, in which a classical strong state with extensive military, administrative, and scal power is unable to effectively control its borders and stem unwanted migration, are viewed as testaments to a more general decline in the effective power and executive capacity of the modern state. Both perspectives raise a number of valid points, but when read in isolation their central propositions are unsatisfactory and incomplete. Pluralist theories of migration policy reveal that states are never wholly autonomous and are inuenced and mediated by societal mobilization and collective action. However, they ignore that states are also self-interested entities and pursue objectives and programs meant to legitimate and extend their sovereignty over territory and population. Pluralist perspectives also lack a sufcient conceptualization of how state actions actively condition state-society relations and capacities of political inuence (Skocpol et al., 1985). The second set of claimswhich are more relevant for the discussion at handcan also be critiqued. Claims that illegal migration represents a widening control gap and provides an instance of policy failure belie the complexity of the current situation. On the one hand, states may not be able to prevent unauthorized entries, but they still exert the capacity to construct and enforce categories of illegality,which have very real social consequences. Additionally, equating such outcomes with policy failure ignores two underlying issues: (1) policy goals and objectives are often ambiguous and or unenforceable, in which case gaps are impossible to quantify, and (2) weak and ineffective enforcement may actually serve as a desired policy outcome (Zolberg, 2000). In these regards, cases such as the United States

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

791

may actually represent a policy success. In ensuring access to a surplus of exible labor with little or no political and legal rights, current policies are vital for the functioning of the lower tiers of the service economy. The U.S. experience therefore amount[s] to a purposefully weak regulatory system that allows a relatively stable informal guestworker program to stay in place (Zolberg, 2000:76). Most problematic, however, is that for both perspectives, analysis centers on external constraints that undermine national regulation, without ever commenting on contours of state regulation and their actual impact on migratory patterns. Although such regulations are acknowledged as contextual factors in the migration process, they remain undertheorized. The administration of national boundaries is more than simply background noise or a residual component, but is constitutive of the process itself (Torpey, 2000; Zolberg, 2000). International migration is tightly linkedconceptually and historicallyto the nation-state as a political community, institutional ensemble, and sociocultural complex. As argued by Aristide Zolberg: International migration is an inherently political process, which arises from the organization of the world in a congeries of mutually exclusive sovereign states, commonly referred to as the Westphalian system (Zolberg, 2000:81). Even when disjunctures exist between policy on the books and policy in action, national borders and regulatory controls remain linked to the administrative and symbolic dimensions of the nation-state. Since migration impacts the makeup of the national population, its regulation has important demographic, social, and economic consequences, whether in terms of population growth, economic accumulation, the division of labor and taxation, or social expenditure. Additionally, all nation-states proclaim a specic political and historicalif not explicitly culturalidentity. Migration policies often play a central role in perpetuating such identities. In distinguishing between the political subject and the foreign other, admission policies serve as institutional mechanisms for producing societal and communal boundaries. Noting this connection, political theorists have argued that migration and naturalization are preeminent expressions of national sovereignty and self-determination (Arendt, 1973; Isin and Turner, 1999; Walzer, 1983). For these reasons, migration policies are inevitably forms of social engineering and provide a window into the internal life of the state as it determines the favored attributes of the national population. Finally, admission policies not only delimit the social order, but often seek to strategically incorporate foreigners in the interests of reproducing that order. The aim of state policies is not to obstruct human movement but, rather, to regulate it and dene the conditions under which it may legitimately occur. Instead of entryways that are either

792

Walsh

open or closed, borders are better conceived of as lters that welcome those deemed culturally or economically desirable, while excluding those classed as undesirable.

POST-1945 IMMIGRATION POLICIES OF CANADA AND AUSTRALIA So far my argument has remained conceptual and abstract, stressing the linkage of immigration policies to the nation-states administrative and communal dimensions. This section situates these dynamics historically. With the transition to a postindustrial society, the Canadian and Australian states have revised and deepened their management of migrant intake. Utilizing skills-based points systems dedicated to targeting economic migrants and gauging their human capital, both states have heightened their recognition that immigration is a reality and that it should be controlled and harnessed by the state. Canada and Australia may appear as weak states and minor nodes within broader migratory networks; however, two features demonstrate their worth as cases for analysis: rst, their exceptional historical experiences as planned mass migration has remained a key component of national development and, second, their reputation as model countries whose policies are increasingly emulated under globalization. In regard to the rst, as classical countries of immigration, both have been built, founded, and dened by mass migration. In place of exclusionary policies meant to obstruct migration and settlement, both governments have remained committed to carefully managing inows on their own terms and in line with programs of nation building. Most importantly, since the 1970s, both have steadily expanded their efforts in carefully selecting and managing the composition of incoming migrants. In contrast to claims of a control gap, these outcomes indicate that in a broad historical perspective this purported gap has narrowed rather than widened. Neither country is immune to illegal migration, nor unauthorized entries, butdue to both policy choice and geographylevels of both are rather low (Castles et al., 1998; Reitz, 2004). In Australia, it is estimated that at present there are 50,000 undocumented migrants. Although no reliable statistics exists, estimates range from 60,000 to 200,000 persons for Canada. Proportionally, these rates are signicantly lower than most other advanced capitalist societies and minute when compared to extreme cases such as the United States and Greece (OECD, 2006). In fact, for both states, the only major policy gap would be consistent shortfalls in the actual number of migrants admitted versus the target level set by each government. If this is taken as a gap, it is the opposite of other countries

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

793

where numerical targets tend to be lower than the actual immigration ow (Reitz, 2004:103). Additionally, Canada and Australia exhibit two of the highest rates of migration in the world as 18% and 25% of their populations, respectively, are foreign born; Saudi Arabia is the only other major receiving society with equivalent levels (OECD, 2004). In a world dened by restrictive policies and heightened border controls, commitments to large-scale migration and settlementalbeit tightly regulatedare exceptional. Second, when crafting their immigration policies, governments frequently analyze and borrow from the policies of other countries. Academics and policymakers are often surprised to nd that the policies of Canada and Australia are watched with increasing interest by other states (Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004). This is because both have been consistently successful in coordinating the admission and incorporation of large migrant cohorts. Additionally, their current skills-based systems, which allow states to allude to principles of both control and fairness, are more palatable in a domestic and international context. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the increasing attention directed toward their policies is due to the fact that as globalization expands, the questions that face multinational and settler societiesprincipally, coordinating the entrance and integration of foreign populationshave now become the questions that face states that originally saw themselves as ethnically homogenous (Isin and Turner, 1999:5) or immune to immigration. Countries that have either pursued or implemented models of selection based on Canadas and Australias contemporary policies include the United Kingdom, Germany, France, the Netherlands, the United States, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Iceland, Italy, Finland, Ireland, and Japan (Favell and Hansen, 2002; Isin and Turner, 1999; Ruddock, 2002).

Consolidating the Mass Society: Migration Policy During the Postwar Years As settler colonies, immigration has been pivotal in Canadas and Australias economic, cultural, and demographic development. However, only since the conclusion of World War II has planned mass migration been a continuous phenomenon and a signicant component of social regulation. During this period, the economic and regulatory orders of mass industrialization and Keynesianism ensured that both countries experienced secular trends in economic growth, employment, and real wages. Migration policies, however, have been consistently left out of such discussions. This is unfortunate as large-scale planned migration served as the

794

Walsh

centerpiece in both governments attempts at fullling the economic and social objectives of self-sufciency, growth, and full employment. Controlled migration was intended to enlarge the population and stimulate production and demand without sacricing cultural homogeneity or the status of the domestic working class. Such policies impacts are demonstrated on three levels: demographic, economic, and cultural. The Australian government, recognizing the strategic importance of migration, founded the Department of Immigration in 1945. Its rst minister, Aurthur Calwell, quickly proclaimed the need to populate or perish and sought to increase Australias population by 1% per annum without upsetting its racial and ethnic homogeneity (Jordens, 1997). In 1947, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King advocated a major immigration program, noting the danger that lies in a small population attempting to hold so great a heritage as ours (quoted in Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002:40) Immediately after World War II, intake was expanded over tenfold in both countries (CIC, 2004; DIEA, 1981). The quest for demographic expansion was underpinned primarily by economic motives. During postwar reconstruction, the biggest economic dilemma facing both countries was absolute labor shortages. Migrants were to alleviate bottlenecks in productive capacity and provide the necessary labor for both countries emergent industrial economies (Castles and Miller, 2003; Pendakur, 2000). In place of agricultural and rural settlement, migrants were clustered in urban areas and unskilled industrial occupations. Native Canadians were twice as likely to work in higher-end service occupations, while migrants were a third and two-thirds more likely to work in manufacturing and construction, respectively (Pendakur, 2000). In Australia, migrants were incorporated into the manufacturing sector at double the rate of the native population, resulting in their labeling as factory fodder (Jordens, 1997). Planned mass migration was to broker economic growth in three ways: it would (1) help both countries fully exploit their resources, (2) establish scale economies by expanding labor and consumer markets, and (3) establish a nationally aggregated economy insulated from external factors and competition. As stated within the Canadian governments 1966 White Paper on Immigration: A bigger population means increased domestic markets [which] permits manufacturing rms to undertake longer, lower cost production runs, and broadens the range of industry we can undertake economically improv[ing] our competitive position in world markets (DMI, 1966:8). Like the majority of advanced capitalist societies at the time, both Canada and Australia recruited foreign workers to fuel industrial expansion. However, unlike the guestworker programs of Europe and the United States, migrants were sought out as settlers rather than denizens or temporary

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

795

residents. Migrants did not, therefore, represent an institutionally subordinate segment of the working class. Both countries prioritized protecting the status of the domestic working class and rejected temporary guestworkers because by lowering the costs of production they would also disrupt aggregate levels of demand (DMI, 1966; Markus, 1994). Migrants were also selected based on their closeness to the ideals of the mass citizen embraced during the postwar years. Migrants were to receive extensive government support for both travel and settlement, assuming they were willing to engage in industrial labor and assimilate to British political and cultural norms (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002; Jupp, 2002). Forms of social citizenshipembodied in state-welfarismwere to fuse the nation and establish a collective or generalized sense of reciprocity. However, often ignored and equally important was maintaining the monocultural fabric of both societies. In addition to common material conditions, shared cultural traits were viewed as necessary in supplanting divisions of class, status, and region and maintaining a unied and cohesive national society (Birrell, 1995; McBride and Shields, 1993). Reecting these concerns, migration policies were pursued with the intent of preserving both countries ethnic and cultural distinctiveness. Nationality was given precedence in the selection process; British were preferred and were actively recruited, Europeans were accepted, assuming they were willing to assimilate, and non-Europeans were largely restricted (Hawkins, 1988). These restrictions were justied by appeals to each countrys historical, ethnic, and cultural particularity. As Arthur Calwell stated in 1947, I do not think that an Occidental mind can follow the mental processes of an Oriental mind (Markus, 1994:168). In Canada, Prime Minister King proclaimed, the people of Canada do not wish to make a fundamental alteration in the character of our population considerable Oriental migration would give rise to social and economic problems (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002:40). Despite migrations links to macroeconomic expansion, ethnicity and nationality constituted the primary axes for excluding, ordering, and ranking foreign populations. Aside from excluding unassimiable migrants, neither country implemented clear mechanisms for screening or categorizing potential migrants.

BORDER CONTROL AND GLOBALIZATION: CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION POLICIES In light of a number of economic, political, and cultural developments commonly associated with globalization, both countries found that the dominant modes of government rationality and border control utilized

796

Walsh

during the early postwar years were anachronistic and required substantial modication. In response, both countries began to stress neoliberal models of migration policy and social regulation that emphasized the ideals of enterprise, skills, autonomy, and exibility. At the level of migration policy, the primary result has been the adoption of point systems for evaluating and enumerating the economic potential of individual migrants. These systems constitute numerical indexes of desirability in which individuals are subjected to insurantial evaluations based on their risk and probable contribution to society. The extensively managerial point systems have been instrumental in allowing both countries to rigorously calculate and control the effects of migration in line with their larger interests of governance and legitimation. With their allocative and regulatory capacities deated by neoliberal deregulation and market discipline, controls over mobility and membership have become increasingly vital forms of social regulation. In what follows, I trace the emergence and evolution of the point systems and link their development to new state programs of neoliberal regulation.

The Emergence of the Point Systems Ethnicity and nationality constituted the central criteria of migrant selection for several decades. However, with the codication of human rights regimes and increasing pressure from the international community, both governments pledged to practice nondiscrimination by dismantling their Eurocentric policies. Canada led the way with a number of policy reforms in 1962, while Australia followed in 1973. Multiculturalism and substantive commitments to liberal-democratic principles have generally been touted by academics and policymakers as the ofcial rationale behind such shifts (Joppke, 2005; Kymlicka, 1995). Such perspectives ignore that alongside the easing of ethnic and national restrictiveness was the institution of sophisticated mechanisms for sorting migrants based on economic attributes. In this manner, instead of more open and inclusive, over time, the dispersal of territorial access has, in certain respects, become signicantly more stringent. After ending their discriminatory policies, both countries initially placed almost exclusive emphasis on humanitarian migration and family reunication. However, this phase was short lived (Hawkins, 1988). Recognizing the increasing importance of advanced manufacturing and specialized services as critical economic sectors, both governments began to emphasize the economic signicance of migration policy, an emphasis that has expanded with parallel increases in globalization. As stated within the Canadian governments 1966 White

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

797

Paper on Immigration, Canada has become a highly complex industrialized and urban society if [migrants] entering the workforce do not have the training to do the kinds of jobs available, they will be burdens rather than assets (DMI, 1966:78). Similar concerns were echoed in Australia: Many [migrants] lack the skills to succeed in Australia. The new approach to migrant selection will ensure that the migrant intake remains consistent with Australias absorptive capacity and that those accepted settle successfully (DIEA, 1978:56). In 1967, the Canadian government established its rst comprehensive system of migrant selection, the point system. In 1979, Australia, modeling the Canadian system, adopted its own version, titled the Numerical Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS) (Hawkins, 1988). These systems sorted migrants into three distinct groups or classes: the independent or skilled class, the family class, and the humanitarian class. Familial and humanitarian migrants were granted entrance without extensive government scrutiny. However, independent migrants were subjected to this new administrative device. The point systems created a numerical scale in which the presence of a number of different attributes predetermined by the state, whether age, occupational demand, education, work experience, language ability, or adaptability, would produce a specic score for each migrant. If awarded a high enough score, individuals would be assigned a pass mark and granted entry and potential citizenship. This established an algorithmic index of admittance based on statistical modeling and risk minimization. In both countries, the pass mark was initially set at 50or halfof the total points possible. Although eliminating overt discrimination and racial bias, the point systems havemore signicantlyexpanded government control and placed greater emphasis on human capital. This shift has been informed by the structural transformation of the global economy and institutional capacities of both nation-states. Before examining exactly how these new policy regimes have pursued these objectives, it is rst necessary to place them within their larger structural and historical context.

From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism; Socioeconomic Transformation By the early 1970s, mass industrialism and Keynesianism were no longer effective at stabilizing economic crises and securing full employment within advanced capitalist societies. In response, new growth strategies emerged, founded on global economic integration, the dismantling of social-welfarism, and the emergence of the new entrepreneurial or

798

Walsh

Schumpeterian workfare state (Jessop, 1994). With these transformations, rms and governments throughout the developed world entered into a period of experimentation in which economic and regulatory strategies were reorganized to render capital and economic activity more exible and competitive in a transnational context (Harvey, 1990). In their attempt to reduce costs, rms in Canada and Australiaparticularly within manufacturing and heavy industrybegan to offshore production, underwent organizational restructuring, and introduced labor-saving technologies. As manufacturing was outsourced, both countries found their economies increasingly reliant on international trade and investment, knowledge-based production, and advanced producer, business, and nancial services (McBride and Shields, 1993; Moran, 2005). Responding to these deep economic changes, both countries adopted extensive neoliberal reforms in the 1980s. Pursuing policies of socioeconomic nonintervention, both governments drastically lowered tariff and other trade barriers, deregulated capital and nancial markets, implemented regressive tax structures, and, nally, withdrew their commitments toward public enterprise. As the Canadian and Australian welfare states experienced crises related to economic and demographic transitions, the principles of redistribution and social collectivism were displaced by those of market rationalism and individualism. In place of national institutions, the market was posited as the most effective means of organizing societies and coordinating social relations. As a result, a number of social programs traditionally administered at the national level, whether healthcare, education, unemployment insurance, pensions, or public transportation, were eliminated or transferred to either regional or local governments, the private sphere, or civil society (Anderson, 2001; Sears, 1999).

THE EXPANSION, INTENSIFICATION, AND MODIFICATION OF THE POINT SYSTEMS Reecting the realignment of the capitalist world economy and new national programs of regulation, both Canada and Australia further rened their migration policies. New administrative techniques were employed to (1) forestall the shrinking and graying of both countries populations, (2) establish cross-national systems of labor circulation for afuent and highly-skilled migrants, and (3) cohere to models of neoliberal state management. Unable and unwilling to substantively regulate their economies or provide for their societies, both countries employed their migration policies to manage their human infrastructures and maintain a highly-qualied, competitive, and self-reliant population.

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

799

Managing the Global Demographic Divide: Migration Policy as Population Policy With declines in fertility and increases in life expectancy, both countries have been dened by rapidly graying populations. In 1968 and 1972, Australia and Canada, respectively, saw birthrates fall below the replacement level of 2.1 births per household (Castles et al., 1998; Stein, 2003). In combination with falling mortality rates and rising median ages, these trends have threatened to amplify a number of societal contradictions, including the shrinking of the labor force and tax base, increases in social expenditure dedicated to the elderly, and declines in state legitimacy given its inability to secure the necessary levels of social goods or economic growth. Policies of large-scale planned migration have therefore remained critical strategies of state management. Within the last 20 years, migrants have accounted for the majority of labor force and population growth and may soon serve as the sole expansionary factor (Beaujot, 2003; DIMIA, 2004b). Although demographic expansion has served as a continuous policy objective, the dynamics of such practices have shifted from generic to targeted forms of population growth. With the emergence of postindustrial societies, economically selective measures have ensured that the quality, rather than quantity, of migrants became the primary focus of state policy. Absolute population growth remains a concern of state planners, but has been integrated into a more tailored approach focused on incorporating those of specic social and occupational backgrounds. In their attempts at achieving these objectives, both governments have expanded, intensied, and modied the point systems: expanded, as an additional point system has been added for attracting the nomadic members of an emergent transnational investor and capitalist class; intensied, as the proportion of skilled migrants has increased dramatically at the expense of noneconomic migrants; and modied, as migration policy has been pursued under a user-pay model in which government expenditure is offset by signicantly increasing fees for migrants. All three developments have ensured that economic utility has become the primary criterion of selection and that migration policy occupies an elevated position within neoliberal models of governmental regulation. Multiculturalism and diversity have continued to contribute to policy discourse but have been integrated into a more economically rationalist agenda. The current diversity of migrant origins has been viewed by both countries as providing the cultural and economic links necessary for facilitating cross-national ows of trade, investment, and capital. As stated by the Canadian government:

800

Walsh

Our multilingual, multiethnic workforce provides us with a distinct comparative advantage in the global marketplace (CIC, 2000:2). Additionally, Australia has pursued multicultural policies with the full realization of the benets they contribute to Australias increasingly global economy (DIMIA, 2004a:25). It is therefore of little surprise that in the present postindustrial period, alongside ethnic lobbies and migrant advocacy groups, business has been a consistent supporter of expansive and nondiscriminatory migration policies (Collins, 1995; Reitz, 2004; Skeldon, 1995).

Expanding the Point Systems: The Addition of the Business Class One of the initial indicators of the transition to an economically guided policy was the creation of the investor or business class as a subset of the larger skilled category. In 1986, Canada created a separateand signicantly more lenientpoint system for entrepreneurs and investors (Ley, 2003). These actions were driven by the governments desire to attract afuent migrants leaving Hong Kong and to bring more millionaires to Canada (Harrison, 1996:13). Currently, migrants falling in the business investor stream are required to have owned or operated a business prior to migrating, demonstrate assets totaling C$1 million, and, nally, invest more than C$500,000 for 5 years in a Canadian business that preserves domestic jobs (OECD, 2004). During the early 1990s, the business stream contributed close to 15% of all migratory inows (Ley, 2003). In the late 1980s, Australia followed suit, implementing special fast tracks to attract wealthy professionals and entrepreneurs. Those admitted under Australias business-skills program are given provisional visas and, after demonstrating sufcient business and investment activity, are granted permanent residence and citizenship (DIMIA, 2004a).

Intensifying the Importance of Economic Migration Alongside the addition of the business class, both governments have intensied the selectivity of their policies on two fronts: rst, the point systems were made more restrictive and, second, the ratio of skilled to family humanitarian migrants was inverted. Over time, both countries increased the number of points necessary to secure entry from one-half to two-thirds of the total. Additionally, greater importance was attached to human capital and work experience, while noneconomic criteria, whether the presence of relatives or the intended geographic location of settlement,

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

801

were either removed or relaxed in their impact. These actions were undertaken to ensure that migrants would be employable and easily absorbed into the labor market (Richardson and Lester, 2004) (see Table I). In addition to altering the criteria of selection, Canada and Australia also reformulated their intake ceilings. Prior to 1996, the majority of migrants entered through the family and refugee classes, which together
Table I. Points Systems: Australia and Canada, 2004 Maximum Points Australiaa Skill Age English Language Prociency Specic Work Experience Occupational Demand Job Offer Australian Qualications Regional Australia Low Population Spouse Skills Relationship w an Australian Citizen Total* Pass Mark Canadab Education Age Language Ability Work Experience Arranged Employment Adaptability Total** Pass Mark Percent

60 30 20 10 15 15 5 5 15 175 115 25 10 24 21 10 10 100 67

34 17 11 6 9 9 3 3 9 100 66 25 10 24 21 10 10 100 67

a Regional Australia Low Population refers to points awarded for the desire to settle to rural or semi-urban areas. In addition to securing an adequate number of points, the primary applicant must also meet the following requirements: (1) have postsecondary qualications or substantial work experiences in some exceptional cases, (2) must have some knowledge of vocational English, (3) must be under 45 years old when applying, (4) must have recent work experience, requirements vary based on occupation, (5) must nominate an occupation that ts the applicants skills, and (6) have their skills assessed by the relevant authorities. b For Education points range from 5 for the completion of a secondary education to 25 for the completion of a Masters degree or Ph.D. For age maximum points are awarded for those 21 49, points are lost for each year outside of this range. Language ability refers to prociency in either French or English. Adaptability includes education and skill level of the applicants spouse and the ability for skills to be broadly applied throughout the labor market. *Five bonus points are available for possessing any of the following three attributes; capital investment in Australia, Australian skilled work experience, and uency in a trading language (other than English). **In addition to receiving a pass mark, applicants must also meet minimum work experience requirements and prove that they have the funds to support their family 6 months after arrival. Source: Richardson and Lester (2004).

802

Walsh

accounted for upward of 60%, and at times above 75%, of the total entrants. After 1996, responding to growing ethnonationalist sentiments, burgeoning non-European populations, and the increased importance of skills-based policies for national regulatory programs, both governments inverted the ceilings governing admittance and made the skilled or independent class the primary component of entry. By the mid-1990s, nativist and ethnonationalist sentiments began to grow in both societies. Many citizensparticularly white working-class males displaced with the transition to globalizationfeared that increasing numbers of non-European migrants would corrupt their cultural heritage and became disenchanted with expansive migration policies and multicultural initiatives. It was argued that struggles for cultural recognition attenuated national cohesion, identity, and created a society of disparate and conictive parts (Moran, 2005). Additionally, the presence, albeit small in number, of refugees and illegal migrantsparticularly boat people from Asiabecame a contentious political issue. Proclaiming such migrants to be public charges and abusers of generous asylum laws, Canadian and Australian politicians and members of the general public began to call for more restrictive migration policies (Jupp, 2002; Reitz, 2004). Immigration has been an especially divisive issue in Australian politics as key political gures ranging from Prime Minister John Howard to One Nations Pauline Hanson have openly lamented the Asianization of Australia (Jupp, 2002). Although less politically salient, over time, public perceptions of immigration in Canada have become increasingly negative (Reitz, 2004). The growing predominance of ethnonationalism has not, however, resulted in the renewal of ethnically restrictive migration policies. In both countries, nativist sentiments have been balanced by countervailing political coalitions. Asian migrantswho actually constitute a major conservative bloc in many urban areas ranging from Vancouver to Sydneywere quick to voice their objections against this new restrictionist push (Collins, 1995; Skeldon, 1995). Additionally, arguing that restriction and discrimination contradicted each countrys commitment to regional political and economic enmeshment, business interests also mobilized in opposition (Reitz, 2004; Skeldon, 1995). Finally, since Quebecs quiet revolution in the late 1960s and the growing recognition that Canadas identity is bi- if not multinational, Canadian policymakers have feared that any perceived retreat from multicultural platforms could have disastrous political consequences (Cairns, 1999; Kaufman, 2007a,b; Wimmer, 2007). These conicting societal tensions inuenced both governments ultimate decision to place greater emphasis on skilled migration. Acknowledging that cultural and ethnic homogeneity were no longer critical referents of national identity, but still attempting to respond to nativist segments of

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

803

society, both countries remained committed to nondiscriminatory policies while limiting entrance from the most contentious categories of entrance: the familial and humanitarian classes. Since 1996, independent migrants have surpassed the previously dominant familial class, regularly accounting for the majority of both countries total intake (CIC, 2004; DIMIA, 2005) (see Figs. 1 and 2). In doing so, both governments were able to maintain relatively high levels of public consent. Without origins quotas, their policies could still be framed as open and universal. However, by ensuring that the majority of entrants would be subject to evaluation under the point systems, both governments were also able to cite greater control, precision, and economic benets.

Fig. 1. Canada: permanent residents by intake category, 19802004. Source: CIC (2005).

Fig. 2. Australia: distribution of migrant classes, 19902005. Source: DIMIA (2002, 2004, 2005).

804

Walsh

These transitions have not only been politically expedient but have also served as adaptive strategies for both governments within the global system. With the recalibration of their selection policies, both states have sought to expand those economic sectors favored by globalization, particularly information technology and advanced business and producer services. In Canada, globalization has been cited as the most signicant trend affecting immigration [policy] today (CIC, 1998:1) and that skilled migration is an essential part of maintaining its competitive position in a knowledge-based and service oriented world economy (CIC, 2000:6). Arguments for the economic benets of migration were also mobilized by the Australian government: Emphasis on attracting highly-skilled migrants reects the importance of having the right skills available at the right time if Australia is to increase its competitiveness within the global marketplace (DIMIA, 2004a:iii). Instead of a distinct segment of the working class subordinate to the larger population, both countries managerial policies have ensured that migrant labor is a superordinate strata. Migrants are signicantly more skilled and educated than the domestic workforce and are increasingly from afuent and middle-class backgrounds (CIC, 2005; DIMIA, 2004a). These outcomes directly contradict the dominant depictions of migrant labor as the structural equivalent of the offshore proletariat (Sassen, 2001:322). Instead of harnessing and incorporating the necessary reserve army of labor from abroad, both countries have sought to attract the itinerant and highly-valued members of an emergent transnational managerial and professional class. In place of agricultural, infrastructural, and industrial occupations, migrants now enter with intended occupations in specialized services and knowledge-based production, whether computer programmers, engineers, accountants, or managers and other professionals (CIC, 2003, 2005; DIMIA, 2004a,b, 2005) (see Tables II and III). Not all migrants have occupied favorable positions within the labor market. NonEnglish-speaking migrants from the humanitarian and family classes remain overrepresented in manufacturing and the service sectors lower rungs (Castles et al., 1998; Reitz, 2004). However, both countries policies have ensured that such instancesin contrast to the majority of receiving societiesare the exception rather than the norm.

Modifying the Point Systems: The Neoliberal Administration of Migration Policy In line with economic deregulation and the rollback of state-welfarism, both states have administered their migration policies in novel ways.

Table II. Australian Settler Arrivals Stating and Occupation, 19951996 to 20042005* Percentage Distribution 199697 13.92 35.56 10.33 14.93 74.74 25.26 100 12.94 36.76 8.38 15.72 73.8 26.2 100 13.55 35.94 8.41 15.35 73.25 26.75 100 13.52 37.14 8.91 13.22 72.8 27.2 100 14 43.69 8.53 11.49 77.72 22.28 100 15.16 46.18 7.43 11 79.78 20.22 100 199798 199899 199900 200001 200102 200203 14.74 45.7 7.41 12.93 80.79 19.21 100 200304 13.19 46.78 8.24 13.18 81.4 18.6 100 200405 13.1 45.88 8.84 11.87 79.69 20.31 100

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

Occupation

199596

Managers and Adminstrators Professionals Associate Professionals Tradespersons Total Skilled Occupations Other Occupations Total

12 35.92 10.15 15.44 73.5 26.5 100

*(1) Managers and Administrators includes nance managers, company secretaries, information technology managers, and other; (2) Professionals includes scientists, engineers, accountants, auditors, computing professionals, statisticians and actuaries, medical professionals, teachers and professors, economists, and other; (3) Associate Professionals includes nancial dealers and brokers, nancial investment advisors, chefs, and other; (4) Tradespersons include mechanical, fabric, automotive, electrical, construction, and other. Source: Birrell et al. (2005).

805

806

Walsh

Table III. Canadian Settlers 15 Years of Age or Older Intending to Work by Occupational Skill Level* Percentage Distribution Skill Category 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Skill Level O Managerial 3 3.1 3 2.9 2.8 3.2 3.7 3.5 3.3 A Professionals 20.2 24.1 28 28.7 32.6 35.1 35.6 35.4 32.2 B Skilled and Technical 19.4 20.3 20.9 17.9 14.4 13.8 13.9 14 11.4 C Intermediate and Clerical 7.6 6.6 6.4 5.8 5 5.5 5.3 5 4.8 D Elemental and Labourers 9.2 4.8 3.8 1.6 1.1 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 Occupational Skill Level Identied 59.4 58.9 62.1 56.9 55.9 58.6 59.4 58.7 52.4 New Workers 37.7 38.4 35.3 41.1 42.2 39.9 39.4 40.3 46.6 Industrial Codes 2.8 2.8 2.6 2 1.7 1.4 1.2 1 1 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 *Skill Level O management occupations; Skill Level A professional occupations requiring university degree in administration and business, natural and applied sciences, health, social science, education, government service, religion and art, and culture; Skill Level B technical or clerical occupations requiring 2 to 5 years of postsecondary education, apprenticeship or on-the-job training, includes occupations in administration and business, natural and applied sciences, health, law, social service, education and religion, art, culture, recreation and sport, sales and service, trades, skilled transport and equipment operators, skilled primary occupation, and processing, manufacturing, and utilities supervisors, and skilled operators; Skill Level C intermediate occupations requiring 1 to 4 years of secondary education including clerical, health services, sales and services, transport, equipment operators, installation and maintenance, primary industries, and processing and manufacturing machine operators and assemblers; Skill Level D occupations requiring no formal education, includes construction, primary industries, processing, manufacturing, and utilities; New Workers migrants intending to work in Canada but without declared occupation; Industrial Codes economic migrants in the business category who have declared their industrial sector of activity in place of intended occupation. Source: CIC (2005).

Demonstrating their new entrepreneurial role, both governments carried out such measures to minimize government expenditure, while maximizing the potential returns of migrants. Under user-pay and cost-free policies, both governments have curtailed expenses related to their migration programswhether language classes or travel and settlement assistanceand have signicantly raised fees for processing visa and citizenship applications. Additionally, migrants are now denied a variety of social entitlements, including access to healthcare and unemployment insurance, during their initial years of residence (Jupp, 2002; Reitz, 2004). Intended to recover the costs of state administration, these measures have also served as devices for attracting employable and self-sufcient migrants who will not be burdens to the state. As they have been expanded, intensied, and modied, the neoliberal point systems have served as mechanisms of

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

807

supply-side regulation for expanding labor and nancial markets and indirectly brokering trade and investment ows. Utilizing migrant labor does ensure that the socially necessary costs of labor force renewal, whether education, healthcare, or other social goods, are externalized to the sending country (Burawoy, 1976). However, the targeting of afuent and highly-skilled migrants has the additional effect of eliminating the need for subsequent government investment. In both countries, the economic contributions of migrants have been widely recognized. In Canada, migrants have invested billions of dollars in the economy and have played a vital role in expanding a number of economic sectors, including housing, information and communications technology, utilities, and business and producer services (Harrison, 1996; Ley, 2003). In Australia, the government has compared its migration policy to other neoliberal strategies, whether tax cuts or trade liberalization. According to government estimates, if the volume and composition of inows persists, migrants should annually raise living standards by $794 per capita: The gain is sizeable. By way of comparison, a large personal income tax cut of about $20 billion would be required to achieve the same gain in living standards. And it dwarfs the projected gains of under $200 per head from the important policy reform of bring down trade barriers (DIMIA, 2004b:31). In sum, the historical trajectories of both cases indicate that two clear regimes of migration policy were instituted during the postwar period (see Table IV). At the level of continuity, both regimes reveal attempts by the Canadian and Australian states to improve their socioeconomic positions by facilitating and managing large migrant inows. However, when examining the dynamics, outcomes, and larger regulatory context attached to each regime, it is apparent that the postwar period was dened

Table IV. Comparison of Models of Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia Model I Policies Under Mass Industrialization Model II Policies Under Globalization 1970Present Points Systems Human Capital Service OrientedAccountants, Engineers, IT-workers, etc. Large-Scale Planned Migration Non-European Asian Neoliberalism and Multiculturalism

Dimension

Time Period 194570 Central Mechanism of Selection Informal Origins Quotas Primary Criteria of Selection Culture, Nationality, Ethnicity Migrant Occupational IndustrialManufacturing Background and Construction Nature of Migration Large-Scale Planned Migration Origins of Migrants European British Links to Larger Regulatory Keynesianism, Economic Strategies Cultural Protectionism

808

Walsh

by a drastic policy shift. Initially, migration policies played a central role in the transition to a mass industrial society. Throughout the early postwar period, they were employed to maintain homogenous, protected, and selfsufcient economies and societies. European migrants were incorporated into industrial occupations, whether in manufacturing, construction, or other secondary industries. Reecting larger Keynesian strategies of regulation, such migration was meant to establish nationally integrated scale economies in which production and consumption were linked in stable equilibrium. In providing two of the central components of accumulationlabor power and demandmigrants ensured that the dominant economic arrangements were realizable. In spite of the economic components of large-scale migration, selection itself was determined by nationality. Fearing that cultural and ethnic heterogeneity would produce social tension and conict, both governments employed extensive origins quotas to control the admission of non-European migrants. With the twin forces of economic and cultural globalization, both countries reformulated their policies. Although this shift has often been reduced to a new political ethic of multiculturalism and nondiscrimination, careful analytic scrutiny reveals that the increasing diversity of migrants has been matched by more rigorous economic models of selection. In fact, both countries skills-based point systems have come to occupy an elevated position within neoliberal programs of social regulation. Immigration policies have served as institutional ensembles for enabling economic growth, competitiveness, and global integration by targeting those individualsparticularly highlyskilled service workerswho will improve each countrys position within the global economic hierarchy and advance the norms of free enterprise. These programs demonstrate how the nation-state plays an active role in managing and brokering the space of ows, of which migration, while often neglected, is a constitutive element (Hannerz, 1996). By catering to afuent professionals, investors, and entrepreneurs, Canada and Australia have attempted to weather the inherent risk and volatility of a deregulated global economy by attracting its central human agents. Rather than members of a global working class, the targets of contemporary policies are largely members of an emergent transnational capitalist and professional class (see, e.g., Robinson, 2004; Sklair, 1995). Although in the past, migration policies were aligned with narratives of economic and cultural insularity, differences in customs and origins are presently overlooked so long as one reects the ideals of homo economicus, or the rational actor who adopts and is well versed in the logic and idioms of the market. These changes demonstrate that despite appeals to multiculturalism, for Canada and Australia the selection of migrants has ultimately been reduced to their potential economic contributions.

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

809

CONCLUSION By way of conclusion, this article has traced the recent trajectories of Canadas and Australias migration policies to rmly situate the nationstate within the processes of globalization and international migration. The general argument that globalization has altered the volume, patterns, and political perceptions of international migration is clearly supported by the Canadian and Australian cases. State ofcials and policymakers in both countries have routinely identied the process as the central force shaping migration policy. However, the essential argument of received theoriesthat exogenous transnational factors, ranging from human rights regimes, illegal migration, global economic arrangements, and crossborder ethnoscapes, have undermined state sovereignty and territoriality (Appadurai, 1996; Cornelius and Tsuda, 2004; Soysal, 1994)fail to account for the experiences of both cases. In place of a control gap or deated borders, both countries have remained committed to policies of controlled mass migration as components of societal regulation. An analysis of both cases suggests that the nation-state remains a constituent within the processes of international migration and globalization. Presently, migration policies represent vital mechanisms of state management and highlight the articulation and pursuit of new programs and rationalities of government under globalization. While remaining committed to large-scale planned migration, attracting highly-skilled knowledge workers, capitalists, entrepreneurs, and investors, instead of industrial workers of European descent, has become the dominant policy objective. In expanding government control over the migration process and placing greater emphasis on the economic potential of migrants, skills-based point systems have ensured that with the onset of globalization migration controls have actually become more tightly linked to the exigencies of nation building and statecraft. In both instances, the state cannot be viewed solely as a passive observer or receptor of migratory ows, but must be seen as a central mediator, manager, and intervening variable that tightly denes and limits the admissible paths of movement. Both cases thereby challenge accepted beliefs that national sovereignty is being undermined by international migration and other postnational forces and that states are losing control of their borders (Sassen, 1996; Soysal, 1994). In addition to providing an empirical account of immigration and state management, this investigation has also claried a broader substantive issues related to the sociology of migration, the nation-state, and globalization. Through its analysis this study has demonstrated that the sovereignty, territoriality, and general efcacy of the nation-state and

810

Walsh

globalization are not mutually exclusive and, in certain instances, are mutually enabling. Immigration policies have been utilized by both governments in managing, negotiating, and navigating their positions within an increasingly exible and volatile world order. Through their migration policies, Canada and Australia have attempted to manage the composition of their populations and resolve new scal and structural crises and facilitate globalization while advancing their positions within it. These actions demonstrate that nation-states may be less able to maintain cultural homogeneity and engage in economic redistribution and regulation, but their territorial borders and associated regulations continue to have very real human and material consequences. As a nal admonition, while I have striven to be comprehensive, space constraints prevent a full discussion of the theoretical and analytical implications of the issues at hand. The propositions advanced within this investigation are intended to generate discussion, reorient debates, and suggest new directions for subsequent research. Further empirical work is both desirable and necessary. The managerial stance of both countries is exceptional and their experiences represent a distinct model of policy under globalization. Future research could expand the scope of inquiry and apply this articles analytic approach to other national contexts. Doing so would help construct a broader typology of border control under globalization and help account for further diversity. Other policy types could include those of receiving societies who face high levels of undocumented migration and those of major sending societies. The rst includes countries ranging from the United States to South Africa and demonstrates how state policy has been instrumental in criminalizing undocumented populations and creating segmented and exible labor pools. The second includes countries of emigration, whether India, the Philippines, or Mexico, that have attempted to manage and coordinate large outows of their populations. Although distinct from the Canadian and Australian model, both types reinforce the larger argument that states have proactively adjusted their migration policies in the face of globalization, whether to secure exploitable labor for the lower tiers of the service economy or to govern mobile and de-bounded citizenries. REFERENCES
Abu-Laban, Yasmeen, and Christina Gabriel. 2002. Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity, and Globalization. Peterborough, ONT: Broadview Press. Anderson, Kym. 2001. Australia in the International Economy, In P. J. Lloyd, J. Nieuwenhuysen, and M. Mead (eds.), Reshaping Australias Economy: pp. 3949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

811

Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Arendt, Hannah. 1973. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Random House. Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Christina Szanton Blanc. 1994. Nations Unbound. Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach. Beaujot, Roderic. 2003. The Effect of Immigration on Demographic Structure, In Charles M. Beach, Alan G. Green, and Jeffrey G. Reitz (eds.), Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century: pp. 4991. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Birrell, Robert. 1995. A Nation of Our Own: Citizenship and Nation-Building in Federation Australia. Melbourne: Longman. Birrell, Robert, Virginia Rapson, and T. Fred Smith. 2005. Immigration in a Time of Domestic Skilled Shortages. Canberra: DIMIA. Borjas, George. 1989. Economic Theory and International Migration, International Migration Review 23: 457485. Boyd, Monica. 1989. Family and Personal Networks in International Migration, International Migration Review 23: 638670. Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Brysk, Allison, and Gershon Shar. 2004. People Out of Place: Globalization, Human Rights, and the Citizenship Gap. New York: Routledge. Burawoy, Michael. 1976. The Functions and Reproduction of Migrant Labor, American Journal of Sociology 81: 10501078. Cairns, Alan. 1999. Introduction, In Alan Cairns, John Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans Michelmann, and David Smith (eds.), Citizenship, Diversity, and Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Castles, Stephen. 2002. Migration and Community Formation Under Conditions of Globalization, International Migration Review 36: 11431168. Castles, Stephen, William Foster, Robyn Iredale, and Glenn Withers. 1998. Immigration and Australia: Myths and Realities. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. Castles, Stephen, and Mark J. Miller. 2003. The Age of Migration. New York: Guilford Press. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 1998. Building on a Strong Foundation for the 21st Century. Ottawa: CIC. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 2000. Trends in International Labour Flows. Ottawa: CIC. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 2003. Immigrant Occupations. Ottawa: CIC. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 2004. Facts and Figures 2003. Ottawa: CIC. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 2005. Facts and Figures 2004. Ottawa: CIC. Collins, Jock. 1995. Asian Migration to Australia, In Robin Cohen (ed.), The Cambridge Survey of World Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cornelius, Wayne, and Takeyuki Tsuda. 2004 Controlling Immigration, In Wayne Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip Martin, and James Hollield (eds.), Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA). 1978. Australias Immigration Policy. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA). 1981. Consolidated Statistics. Canberra: DIEA. Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA). 2004a. Population Flows: Immigration Aspects, 2004. Canberra: DIMIA. Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA). 2004b. The Impact of Migration and Humanitarian Programs on State and Territory Economies. Canberra: DIMIA. Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA). 2005. Immigration Update 200405. Canberra: DIMIA.

812

Walsh

Department of Manpower and Immigration (DMI). 1966. White Paper on Immigration. Ottawa: DMI. Faist, Thomas. 2000. Transnationalization in International Migration, Ethnic and Racial Studies 23: 188222. Favell, Adrian, and Randall Hansen. 2002. Markets Against Politics: Migration, EU Enlargement and the Idea of Europe, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28: 581 601. Freeman, Gary. 1995. Modes of Immigration Policies in Liberal Democratic States, International Migration Review 29: 881902. Hannerz, Ulf. 1996. Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places. New York: Routledge. Harrison, Trevor. 1996. Class, Citizenship and Global Migration: The Case of the Canadian Business Immigration Program, 19781992, Canadian Public Policy 22: 729. Hawkins, Freda. 1988. Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Isin, Engin, and Bryan Turner. 1999. Citizenship Studies: An Introduction, In Bryan Turner and Engin Isin (eds.), Citizenship Studies. London: Sage. Jessop, Bob. 1994. Post-Fordism and the State, In Ash Amin (ed.), Post-Fordism: A Reader: pp. 251279. Oxford: Blackwell. Joppke, Christian. 1999. Immigration and the Nation-State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Joppke, Christian. 2005. Exclusion and the Liberal State: The Case of Immigration and Citizenship Policy, European Journal of Social Theory 8: 4361. Jordens, Ann-Mari. 1997. Alien to Citizen: Settling Migrants in Australia, 194575. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. Jupp, James. 2002. From White Australia to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kaufman, Jason. 2007a. Sacralizing Separatism, Sociological Forum 22: 4: 584587. Kaufman, Jason. 2007b. Et tu, Professor Wimmer? Sociological Forum 22: 4: 591593. Kymlicka, William. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ley, David. 2003. Seeking Homo Economicus: The Canadian State and the Strange Story of the Business Immigration Program, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 93: 426441. Markus, Andrew. 1994. Australian Race Relations, 17881993. St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin. Massey, Douglas. 1999. International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State, Population and Development Review 25: 303322. McBride, Stephen, and John Shields. 1993. Dismantling a Nation: Canada and the New World Order. Halifax: Fernwood. Meyer, John, John Boli, George Thomas, and Francisco Ramirez. 1997. World Society and the Nation-State, American Journal of Sociology 103: 144181. Moran, Anthony. 2005. Australia: Nation, Belonging, and Globalization. New York: Routledge. Newman, David. 2006. Borders and Bordering, European Journal of Social Theory 9: 171 186. Organization for Economic Cooperation, Development (OECD). 2004. Trends in International Migration. Paris: OECD. Organization for Economic Cooperation, Development (OECD). 2006. International Migration Outlook. Paris: OECD. Pendakur, Ravi. 2000. Immigrants and the Labour Force: Policy, Regulation, and Impact. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Piore, Michael. 1979. Birds of Passage. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Portes, Alejandro, Luis Guarnizo, and Patricia Landolt. 1999. The Study of Transnationalism, Ethnic and Racial Studies 22: 217237. Potts, Lydia. 1990. The World Labour Market: A History of Migration. London: Zed Books.

Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia

813

Reitz, Jeffrey. 2004. Canada: Immigration and Nation-Building in the Transition to a Knowledge Economy, In Wayne Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip Martin, and James Hollield (eds.), Controlling Immigration: pp. 97133. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Richardson, Sue, and Laurence Lester. 2004. A Comparison of Australian and Canadian Immigration Policies and Labour Market Outcomes: Report to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. Robinson, William. 2004. A Theory of Global Capitalism. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. Ruddock, Philip. 2002. Australian Immigration: Grasping the New Reality, In Mary Crock and Kerry Lyon (eds.), Nation Skilling: Migration, Labour and the Law: pp. 1217. Sydney: Desert Pea Press. Sassen, Saskia. 1988. The Mobility of Labor and Capital. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sassen, Saskia. 1996. Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia University Press. Sassen, Saskia. 1998. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: New Press. Sassen, Saskia. 2001. The Global City. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sears, Alan. 1999. The Lean State and Capitalist Restructuring, Studies in Political Economy 59: 91114. Skeldon, Ronald. 1995. The Emergence of Trans-Pacic Migration, In Robin Cohen (ed.), The Cambridge Survey of World Migration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sklair, Leslie. 1995. Sociology of the Global System. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. Skocpol, Theda, Peter Evans, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 1985. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Soysal, Yasemin. 1994. Limits of Citizenship. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Stein, Janice Gross. 2003. The Global Context of Immigration, In Charles M. Beach, Alan G. Green, and Jeffrey G. Reitz (eds.), Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century: pp. 2732. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Torpey, John. 2000. The Invention of the Passport. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Waldinger, Roger, and David Fitzgerald. 2004. Transnationalism in Question, American Journal of Sociology 109: 11771195. Walsh, James. 2008. Community, Surveillance and Border Control: The Case of the Minuteman Project, In Mathieu Deam (ed.), Surveillance and Governance: Crime Control and Beyond: vol. 10 of Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Walzer, Michael. 1983. Spheres of Justice. New York: Basic. Wimmer, Andreas. 2007. Institutions or Power Sharing: Making Sense of Canadian Peace, Sociological Forum 22: 4: 588590. Zolberg, Aristide. 2000. Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy, In C. Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind (eds.), The Handbook of International Migration. New York: Russell Sage.