30 Dec 2011, NewAgeIslam.

Com Pakistan's Nuclear Blackmail in Kargil War By Vaidya Gundlupet While the prospect of nuclear escalation ruled out an Indian strategy of total w ar to compel Pakistan to change its behavior, the fear did not directly deter In dia from launching limited nuclear attacks across the LoC and even international border. If India did not launch these limited strikes, it was because their mil itary utility were doubtful The relationship between nuclear threats and conflict in general, particularly d uring the Cold War, and more recently, with respect to South Asia has attracted considerable scholarly attention. As Thomas Schelling perceptibly pointed out, So me threats are inherently persuasive, some have to be made persuasive and some a re bound to look like bluffs. Applied to the nuclear world, this is understood to mean that assuring survival of the homeland is easy (nuclear threat would deter enemy attack), but additional efforts (like trip wire U.S. forces in Europe) were needed to make any extended deterrence credible. However, during the Cold War, nuclear weapons did play a greater role than just to assure territorial security and extended deterrence. Great powers attempted to use nuclear threats to stop conflicts when neither of these conditions was met. For example, nuclear threats were used at the end of the Korean War (1953), Taiwan Straits Crisis (1958), an d the Sino-Soviet conflict (1969). However, regional powers like India and Pakistan have not been able to use nucle ar threats similarly even when significant interests were involved. When a threa t to a states survival is perceived, nuclear threat was definitely conveyed but n ot when other interests were at stake, even in contexts when there was no fear o f nuclear retaliation. Two examples in this context are Israel during the 1973 w ar and United Kingdom in the Falklands War (1984) when they decided to fight the conflict at the level enemy chose limited conventional conflict rather than att empting to reinforce the status quo with a nuclear threat. India, in 1999, did n ot attempt nuclear coercion against Pakistan even though, at this point, it had superiority in numbers but decided to wage a limited conventional war to remove Pakistani forces from its territory. Comparing Israeli behavior between 1973 war and 1990 Gulf War is interesting in this context. Even when Egypt and Syria att acked territory under Israeli control in 1973, Israel did not issue a nuclear th reat (at least to the enemy), but during the lead up to the 1990 Gulf War, Israe l conveyed very clear, public statements implying a nuclear response if Saddam H ussein attacked Israel with chemical weapons. In the latter context, possible Ir aqi use of chemical weapons threatened Israeli survival. Thus, while nuclear blackmail rarely changed status quo, great powers used nucle ar threats to reinforce status quo but regional powers have not been able to. Th is suggests that the political calculus for regional powers contemplating using nuclear threats is different from the factors affecting the decision-making in g reat powers. I argue that another factor affects the political calculus of a reg ional power contemplating using nuclear threats nuclear threats invite internati onal attention even when there is little substantively at stake for outside powe rs. There is a strong interest among major actors in international politics to s ee that states do not use nuclear weapons and this international political envir onment seriously impacts on the decision-making in regional powers. The prospect of international intervention imposes costs as well as provides opp ortunities for gaining benefits for states considering or facing nuclear threats . In a general sense, the international communitys goal is to maintain status quo , and hence any states attempt to change status quo is likely to be constrained a

nd any states restraint in avoiding a nuclear war is likely to be encouraged. The se costs include loss of diplomatic support and military aid, and support for ri val power. On the other hand, restraint garners international support. This does not mean that regional powers are always punished by great powers with sanction s. These regional powers need international support and many times actively cove t it. Thus, the prospect for international intervention provides an opportunity for the regional states to use international pressure as a means to fulfill thei r political goals. However, since nuclear weapons are mainly instruments of dete rrence rather than compellence and international community is primarily interest ed in avoiding a nuclear war, international political environment acts mainly to reinforce the status quo rather than allow states to change it. Thus, nuclear w eapons are useful to assure survival and territorial security (like avoiding a c apture of a large part of states territory). However, unlike great powers, region al powers cannot use nuclear threats to manage threats not involving survival or territorial security. Similarly, they are not useful for compellence or blackma il. Any attempt to use nuclear threats for compellence or manage lower level sec urity threats is likely to fail. A study of nuclear crisis between India and Pakistan support the above arguments . Two points are particularly noteworthy. First, except during the Kargil War, n uclear weapons did not directly influence Pakistani policy. It was always at the background, but it did not cause Pakistan to do something which otherwise it wo uld not have done. Pakistan would have continued to sponsor insurgency in Kashmi r with or without nuclear weapons and supported insurgency in Punjab from at lea st 1984 even though at that time it did not possess a nuclear deterrent. Second, while the prospect of nuclear escalation ruled out an Indian strategy of total war to compel Pakistan to change its behavior, the fear did not directly deter I ndia from launching limited nuclear attacks across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir and even international border. If India did not launch these limited str ikes, it was because their military utility were doubtful (except during the Kar gil War), and more importantly, the political costs of the threat of nuclear was considerable. Pakistani and Indian behavior during the Kargil War particularly highlight the r ole of international political environment in instigating and limiting a nuclear crisis. During Kargil War, Pakistans goal was to infiltrate and capture some terri tory on Indian side of Kashmir, control Srinagar-Leh highway and cut supplies to Siachen, and finally, by highlighting Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint, induce i nternational intervention. Strikingly, there is no evidence that Pakistan had pl anned or even prepared for a general conventional war. In fact, Pakistan expecte d India not to escalate and considered increased Indian troops in Kashmir and pa rticularly use of air power by India as an overreaction. In fact, even before th e War, Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, Pervez Quershi had advised that the PAF would not be able to support the (conventional) operations in the Kargil sector due to geographic and logistical constraints. Then, when Indian escalation (reso rt to air power) at the theatre level surprised Pakistani Army, it did not push the Air Force to engage with India. Pakistani strategy was to occupy territory a nd buy time to get international intervention that would constrain India. This s eemed a mild form of nuclear blackmail. Thus, while Pakistan occupied territory in India and made some nuclear threats, it was not ready to wage a conventional battle even to retain the territory it had occupied in Kashmir. Pakistan was bas ing itself on a strategy of using international political attention to achieve i ts goals rather than purely military instrument of war or even the threat of nuc lear war. Pakistan thought that international pressure would avoid India from la unching conventional counterattacks thus assuring its surreptitious military gai ns. What made the situation in South Asia very different from that of the Cold W ar Europe is that in the latter, any provocations by either party would have inv ited strong reaction by the other party. In a context of mutually assured destru ction and sufficient interests being at stake, there was no doubting of the comm itment to escalate the conflict. In the case of South Asia, Pakistan doubted Ind

ian capability to escalate because of international political pressure. This raises the question whether the threat of nuclear weapons constrained India . While limited attacks across the Line of Control in the Kargil sector would ha ve been militarily useful, it would have imposed substantive political costs. In dia was receiving support from every important country, a lot of whom including the United States, were counseling India to show restraint and not to cross the LoC. Coming immediately after the 1998 nuclear tests which the whole world conde mned, India welcomed international support. Crossing the LoC in this context wou ld have meant that such support would have to be sacrificed. This acted as a big constraint. Political costs of waging a war in a nuclear environment constraine d India but also provided it with an opportunity to gain international support f or its restraint. For example, even Gen. V.P. Malik, who as the Chief of Army ha d a strong interest in escalating the conflict for operational reasons acknowled ged, The political leaders felt that India needed to make its case and get intern ational support. Similarly, Indias then National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra p osited that everything was on our side ... morality, international support and Ind ia risked losing that if it had escalated. Thus, Pakistani and Indian behavior d uring the Kargil War provide evidence that international political environment p rovides incentives as well as imposes costs for states contemplating to use the threat of nuclear war to achieve political objectives. While Pakistan deliberate ly used a strategy hoping international pressure would constrain India, India wa s forced to conduct war at a higher (military costs) to retain international sup port. More importantly, international political environment emphasized reinstati ng the status quo. For example, the U.S. pressured Pakistan to withdraw and at t he same time counseled India not to escalate. Thus, nuclear weapons can serve only a limited set of purposes for a regional po wer. While historically states possessing nuclear weapons have not considerably behaved more aggressively than other states, the experience from India and Pakis tan provides important insights into what nuclear weapons can do and cannot do. Based on evidence from South Asia, one can suggest that while nuclear weapons ar e very useful for survival, they are not likely to be effective for compellence. What possession of nuclear weapons can do for regional powers is to assure them security and thus escape from coercion of the more powerful states. The author teaches at the University o Texas, San Antonio. Email: Vaidya.Gundlu pet@utsa.edu Source: View Point URL: http://www.newageislam.com/NewAgeIslamIslamAndPolitics_1.aspx?ArticleID=625 6