even beyond the age of majority. (124a) D-7 . INV EN TOR Y AN D AP PRA IS AL.

P ROVI SIO N FO R SU PPOR T O F FA MIL Y RULE 83. Inventory and Appraisal. Provision for Support of Family Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. Within three (3) months after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all ...real and ...personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance. Section 2. Certain article not to be inventoried. The wearing apparel of the surviving husband or wife and minor children, the marriage bed and bedding, and such provisions and other articles as will necessarily be consumed in the subsistence of the family of the deceased, under the direction of the court, shall not be considered as assets, nor administered as such, and shall not be included in the inventory. Section 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law. Title IX. - SUPPORT (NCC) Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for ...sustenance, ...dwelling, ...clothing and ...medical attendance, according to the social position of the family. Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his education or training for some ...profession, ...trade or ...vocation, Art. 291. The following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article: (1) The spouses; (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants; (3) Parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate or illegitimate descendants of the latter; (4) Parents and natural children by legal fiction and the legitimate and illegitimate descendants of the latter; (5) Parents and illegitimate children who are not natural. Brothers and sisters owe their legitimate and natural brothers and sisters, although they are only of the half-blood, the necessaries for life, when by a physical or mental defect, or any other cause not imputable to the recipients, the latter cannot secure their subsistence. This assistance includes, in a proper case, expenses necessary for elementary education and for professional or vocational training. (143a) Art. 292. During the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children, shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property. After the final judgment of legal separation, or of annulment of marriage, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, the judgment specifying the terms of such order. (n) Art. 293. In an action for legal separation or annulment of marriage, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation shall be charged to the conjugal partnership property, unless the action fails. (n) Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the following order: (1) From the spouse; (2) From the descendants of the nearest degree; (3) From the ascendants, also of the nearest degree; (4) From the brothers and sisters. Among descendants and ascendants the order in which they are called to the intestate succession of the person who has a right to claim support shall be observed. (144) Art. 295. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them Ch a Mend o za

1|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

B alb astro _by

in proportion to the resources of each. However, in case of ...urgent need and ...by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them. When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, and the latter should not have sufficient means to satisfy all, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the latter shall be preferred. (145) Art. 296. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in the five numbers of article 291, shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. (146a) Art. 297. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the needs of the recipient and the resources of the person obliged to furnish the same. (147) Art. 298. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date it is extrajudicially demanded. Payment shall be made monthly in advance, and when the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance. (148a) Art. 299. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, fulfill his obligation either ...by paying the allowance fixed, or ...by receiving and maintaining in his house the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (149a) Art. 300. The obligation to furnish support ceases upon the death of the obligor, even if he may be bound to give it in compliance with a final judgment. (150) Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced; nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. However, support in arrears may be compensated and renounced, and the right to demand the same may be transmitted by onerous or gratuitous title. (151)

Art. 302. Neither the right to receive legal support nor any money or property obtained as such support or any pension or gratuity from the government is subject to attachment or execution. (n) Art. 303. The obligation to give support shall also cease: (1) Upon the death of the recipient; (2) When the resources of the obligor have been reduced to the point where he cannot give the support without neglecting his own needs and those of his family; (3) When the recipient may engage in a ...trade, ...profession, ...or industry, or has obtained work, or has improved his fortune in such a way ...that he no longer needs the allowance for his subsistence; (4) When the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance; (5) When the recipient is ...a descendant, ...brother ...or sister of the obligor and the need for support is caused ...by his or her bad conduct or ...by the lack of application to work, so long as this cause subsists. (152a) Art. 304. The foregoing provisions shall be applicable to other cases where, in virtue of this Code or of any other law, by will, or by stipulation there is a right to receive support, save what is stipulated, ordered by the testator or provided by law for the special case. (153a) SEBIAL VS. SEBIAL (1975) On R83.1: The 3-month period provided is not mandatory and the court retains jurisdiction even if the inventory is filed after said period, but such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, may be a ground for the removal of the administrator under R82.2 Short summary: child from decedent's second family filed for settlement of estate of her dad and prayed that she be made the administratrix 17 years after death of dad. Child from 1st marriage opposed, saying that the estate was already partitioned among heirs and that they had already disposed of the said properties in favor of 3P and that the estate's value was small that it can be settled amicably. CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner 2nd family child making her the administratrix, even ordering that the 3P and the children of the 1st marriage to deliver the property to the administratrix appointed. Court held that 1st, even if the appointed administratrix filed the inventory more than 3 months from appointment, the court still had jurisdiction. 2nd, it ruled that the trial court should first determine the value of the estate,

2|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

B alb astro _by

Ch a Mend o za

receiving evidence for it, and the ownership of the said properties covered by the estate, it being argued that 3P already own it. It being unsure of WON the properties still belonged to the heirs of the decedent, it was improper for the TC to order the delivery of said properties to the administratrix. Facts: Intestate decedent: Gelacio Sebial (1943) -2 wives 1st marriage: w/ Leoncia Manikis (died 1919) -Had 3 children: y Roberta y Balbina y Juliano 2nd marriage: w/ Dolores Enad (allegedly married, 1927) -had 6 children: y Benjamina y Valentina y Ciriaco y Gregoria y Esperanza y Luciano 1960: BENJAMINA filed verified petition for settlement of Gelacio's estate -prayed that she be made Administratrix >>ROBERTA OPPOSED: 1. Gelacio's estate already partitioned 2. If ever administration proceedings necessary, Roberta was qualified and not Benjamina Roberta 1st family Resident of Guimbawian, remote town of Pinamungajan where the decedent's estate was supposedly located Benjamina 2nd family Housemade working at Talisay, Cebu (70km from Pinamungajan)

MAY 1961: administratrix filed MOTION to require Rematado, Demetrio Camillo and Roberta Sebial and spouse to deliver some of the parcels of land covered in the inventory JUNE 1961: PROBATE court suspended action for possibility of amicable settlement, ordered parties to submit own inventories NOV 1961: OPPOSITORS filed own inventory -Gelacio and Leoncia (1st wife) acquired 2 parcels of land in 1912 and 1915 -the conjugal estate of Gelacio and Dolores consisted only of 1 parcel of land of 7 hectares, and this property was even bought from the conjugal assets of the 1st marriage. This land was also already bought by Cortado -2 parcels of land already partitioned among children: 3/4 to children of 1st marriage while 1/4 to children of 2nd marriage -3P already bought some of the portions of land in the estate -TC required administratrix to submit new inventory NOVEMBER 17, 1961 >>>amended inventory: included 2 houses allegedly valued at P8k - approved: prima facie evidence that 7 parcels of land and the 2 houses belonged to the decedent's estate then later ordered the delivery of certain parcels of land to the administratrix and the claimants should not disturb her in possession and administration of the same -the oppositors filed a motion for revision of partition but was not granted -ROBERTA filed for MR: 1. Court had NO JURISDICTION: inventory filed beyond 3-m period fixed in R84.1 2. Inventory is not supported by documentary evidence 3. The 2 houses included in the amended inventory were already demolished during the Japanese invasion and the materials for it were already appropriated by the children of 2nd marriage 4. Valuation in the inventory was fake (it should be P3,080 instead of P17k) 5. Since value of estate is small, it should be settled summarily as provided in R74.2 6. Ordinary action to recover lands in possession of 3P should be resorted to by child of 2nd marriage but w/o waiting for resolution of the MR, they filed a notice of appeal w/ CA CA: certified case to SC because it involves legal issues 1. WON COURT LOST ITS JURISDICTION TO APPROVE THE INVENTORY WHICH WAS FILED MORE THAN 3 MONTHS FROM DATE OF APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATRIX? NO -here: 2nd inventory was filed November 17 but administratrix appointed January 19. *The three-month period prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule 84) of the Rules of Court is not mandatory. After the filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and the publication of the notice of hearing, the proper Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedent's estate and retains that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was filed after the three-month period would not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction to approve it. However, an administrator's unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a ground for his removal (Sec. 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court). WON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE SHOULD BE DONE SUMMARILY IN ACCORDANCE W/ R74.2? Not yet sure -here, the lower court FAILED TO ASCERTAIN by preponderance of evidence THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE ESTATE, and if there is still an estate to be administered

3. Benjamina's only remedy was to rescind the partition TC: appointed BENJAMINA (so granted the petition of Benjamina) 1. Decedent left an estate consisting of lands21 ha, valued at more than P6k 2. The alleged partition was invalid and ineffective >>>letters of administration issued to BENJAMINA (January 19, 1961) >>>notice to creditors issued >>>Roberta et. Al filed MR: 1. Estate already partitioned on August 1945 2. Action to rescind the partition already prescribed >>>MR denied -Roberta filed MOTION TO TERMINATE ADMIN PROCEEDING 1. Estate valued at less than P6k 2. Estate already partitioned so no necessity for administration proceeding APRIL 27, 1961: BENJAMINA filed inventory and appraisal of decedent's estate -7 unregistered parcels of land w/ total value of P9k, all located in Guimbawian, Pinamungajan OPPOSITORS: registered opposition to inventory: 7 parcels of land enumerated NO LONGER formed part of decedent's estate 3|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n B alb astro _by Ch a Mend o za

2.

approval of the amended inventory is not such administration: such a determination is only PROVISIONAL in character and w/o prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on the issue of title or ownership probate court should proceed summarily and expeditiously to terminate the proceedings should strive for an AMICABLE SETTLEMENT (using Article 222, NCC: note however that in the case of Vda de Manalo vs. CA, it was held that there was no need for effort to settle in settlement of estate because said condition precedent was only needed for ordinary civil actions 3. WON THE ORDER TO DELIVER PROPERTIES IN QUESTION TO ADMINISTRATRIX WAS PROPER? NO -lower court did not receive evidence to determine who really owns the properties in question! *GR: if parties are ALL HEIRS, optional to submit to probate question of ownership and so probate may pass judgment on said question X: if 3P would be prejudiced -if fraudulent conveyance: these 3P may be examined under oat as to how they came into possession BUT still, a separate action would be necessary to recover said assets here, there are 3P who allegedly already bought the said parcels of land

matters offered and received but also as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose

issue or points controverted upon the determination of wich the finding or judgment was rendered

HERE: (1) While there is no identity between the plaintiff in the former case and the plaintiffs in the present case, there is the relation of representation between them; (2) there is identity of cause of action; (3) there is identity of subject matter; and (4) there is identity of issue, upon which depends the granting or denial of the relief sought in each of said cases, and this issue has been impliedly decided in the former case. Therefore, all the elements of res judicata in accordance with the aforecited legal provisions are present. 1st case Identity of parties Plaintiff: Benedicta Santa Juana (judicial administratrix of intestate estate of Chua Piaco) Defendant: Lucia del Rosario (administratrix of intestate estate of Chua Toco) Rendering of an accounting of certain FUNDS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN DELIVERED IN TRUST by the father to the adopted son Allegation of trust Render an accounting 2nd case Plaintiff: Presumptive heirs of Chua Piaco Defendant: Lucia del Rosario (same capacity)

CHUA TAN V. DEL ROSARIO (1932) Short summary: there are 2 cases involved, the first being a suit by the administratrix of the father against the administratrix of the adoptive son for the accounting of certain funds alleged to have been delivered IN TRUST to the adopted sun, and the 2nd suit by the presumptive heirs of the father against the same administratrix of the adoptive son for partition of the same funds. SC held that since there was substantial identity of parties, identity of subject matter and COA, there was res judicata so the second proceeding was alredy barred. Facts: -allegedly, Chua Piaco (father) delivered in trust to the adoptive son Chua Toco, funds. These funds were allegedly used by the adoptive son to purchase a land in Antonio Rivera Street w/c Manila Railroad Co expropriated. FIRST CASE -apparently the adoptive son died first so that during the settlement of the estate of the father, the administratrix was being impleaded to account for the funds allegedly belonging partly to the father. -1st case held that the funds were exclusively owned by the adoptive son. SECOND CASE -now the PRESUMPTIVE HEIRS of the father, the surviving spouse and other heirs of Chua Piaco, sues the administratrix of the adoptive son for partition of the funds, arguing that the same set of funds were partly of the estate of the father. The court dismissed it based on res judicata. -presumptive heirs appealed the case. WON THERE WAS RES JUDICATA HERE? YES BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT VS. RES JUDICATA Res judicata Same parties Same COA Same issues which was heard on the merits Bar by prior judgment Same parties Same issue actually and directly passed upon and determined by a competent court Even if COA are totally different Estoppel only as to those matters in

Identity of Subject Matter

Partition of the SAME FUNDS AND FRUITS

Identity of COA Relief sought

Allegation of trust Partition

Absolute bar to a subsequent action, not only as to

-As to identity of parties: Court held that since the administratrix of the estate of Chua Piaco was the legal representative not only of the estate but also of its creditors and heirs, and that the 1st case was rendered against her, the said judgment is binding upon the heirs who are suing in the 2nd case It is the duty of the administrator of the testate or intestate estate of a deceased to present an inventory of the real estate of a deceased to present an inventory of the real estate and all goods, chattels, rights, and credits of the deceased which have come into his possession or knowledge, in accordance with the provisions of section 668 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to manage them according to section 643 of the same Code; and in order that he may have in his power and under his custody all such property, section 702 of the aforesaid Code authorizes him to bring such actions for the purpose as he may deem necessary. Section 642 in providing for the appointment of an administrator where there is no will or the will does not name an executor, seeks to protect not only the estate of the deceased but also the rights of the creditors in order that they may be able to collect their credits, and of the heirs and legatees in order that they may receive the portion of the inheritance or legacy appertaining to them after all the debts and expenses chargeable against the deceased's estate have been paid. Under the provisions of the law, therefore, the judicial administrator is the legal representative not only of the testate or intestate estate, but also of the creditors, and heirs and legatees, inasmuch as he represents their interest in the estate of the deceased. -As to identity of subject matter: same - As to identity of COA: Same, predicted on one and the same alleged right to action arising out of an alleged trust, and the same general denial and special defense.

4|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

B alb astro _by

Ch a Mend o za

-As to difference in relief sought: the relief sought in the 2nd proceeding necessarily involves the main question of ownership of the funds and its fruits, which , in the first case, was already ruled to be the property of the adoptive son DE LEON VS. CA (2002) Short summary: One of the children of the decedent contests the inventory made by his sister who is also the administratrix of the estate, saying that some properties of the decedent were excluded from the inventory and should thus be collated. The TC ordered the collation of said properties, but the owners (the administratrix and other siblings) contested, saying that these properties were sold to them by their father during the latter's lifetime for a consideration. CA held that the order of including these properties in the collation is already final and unappealable. SC held that the said order was merely an interlocutory order, which does not touch upon the issue of ownership of the said properties, and thus, collation is still premature. The said order is merely an order for inclusion in the inventory of the decedent's estate of the properties in question and not the final order contemplated in R90.2. Facts: Father: Rafael (+) Mother: Salud (+) Children: *Teresita de leon (administratrix of estate of father, Rafael) *Estrellita Vizconde *Antonio Nicolas (+) - represented by surviving spouse Zenaida Nicolas and the heirs) *RAMON NICOLAS: oppositor -RAMON filed MOTION FOR COLLATION: Rafael Nicolas given some of the properties to his children (including him) during his lifetime by gratuitous title and administratrix Teresita failed to include it in the inventory >RTC: ORDER directing Ramon to submit pertinent documents of the alleged transfer , set his motion for hearing w/ notice to present registered owners to show cause why their properties should not be included in the collation -Ramon filed amended motion for collation, adding several other lands that were allegedly not included in the inventory (additional lots allegedly received by Antonio) >RTC (Nov11, 1994 order): granted that some of the properties be included in the collation and the inventory >>Teresita filed MR: Properties subject to the Order were already titled in the names of the children a few years ago (for a consideration) and may not be collaterally attacked in a motion for collation >>>DENIED >>>Teresita filed MR of the denial, opposed by Ramon >>>TC: ordered Ramon to prove that the disposition made by Rafael during his lifetime was gratuitously made and not for consideration -TC ordered (Nov4, 1996 Order) Teresita's removal as administratrix: CONFLICT of INTEREST -Teresita contested order: a. Prayed that she be maintained as administratrix b. Properties that Ramon wanted for collation be declared as exclusive properties of registered owners and not subject to collation >>>TC denied; appealed to CA CA: Affirmed WON THE NOVEMBER 11, 1994 ORDER ORDERING THE INCLUSION OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATRIX IS FINAL? NO -it's merely an interlocutory order, not final and ultimate in nature as to ownership of said properties; Any aggrieved party, or a third person for that matter, may bring an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims 5|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n B alb astro _by Ch a Mend o za

-Garcia vs. Garcia: The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court s attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court s duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties -Probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally, because: (1) limited jurisdiction (2) questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action -JIMENEZ V. CA: All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. WON R90.2 MAKES THE DETERMINATION OF THE COURT AS TO ADVANCEMENTS MADE BINDING ON PERSON RAISING THE QUESTION AND ON THE HEIR? The order involved here is merely an interlocutory order so merely provisional. The order merely includes subject properties to the inventory -VDA DE RODRIGUEZ VS. CA: the order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties. Ruling on inclusion or exclusion in the inventory is not the same as collation, which is premature at that time -R90.2 should be interpreted in context of R90.1 -the order allegedly including properties for collation is merely an ORDER OF INCLUSION IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE which is merely an interlocutory order -issue on collation still premature: no indication that the debts of the decedents spouses have been paid and the net remainder of the conjugal estate have already been determined, and the estates of the deceased spouses at the time filing of the motion for collation were ready for partition and distribution. EVEN GRANTING THAT THE ORDER WAS FOR COLLATION, IS IT STILL APPEALABLE FOR FAILING TO STATE THE LAW AND THE FACTS UPON WHICH IT WAS BASED? YES -Consti (ArtVIII.14) provides that the decision should be rendered expressly stating the law and the facts upon which it was based. Since the decision here did not comply with the consti provision, it should be appeable -what TC forgot: No reasons for ordering collation Did not declare the properties enumerated were given gratuitously to the children Even if Ramon presented his witnesses, their testimonies were not even mentioned in the assailed order -making it unappealable is a violation of DUE PROCESS: A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. Petitioner would have been deprived of due process as they would be divested of the opportunity of being able to point out in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal, any errors of facts and/or law considering that there were no facts or laws cited in support of the assailed Order of collation.

WON THE ORDER REMOVING TERESITA AS ADMINISTRATRIX IS APPEALABLE? YES -in fact CA ordered TC to give due course to the notice of appeal WON IT IS PROPER TO ELEVATE THE RECORDS OF THE SPECPRO TO CA FOR APPEAL FROM ORDER REMOVING THE ADMINSITRATRIX IS NECESSARY? No -unnecessary where a record on appeal is allowed under the Rules of Court. The court a quo loses jurisdiction over the subject of the appeal upon the approval of the record on appeal and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties; but retains jurisdiction over the remaining subject matter not covered by the appeal. RUIZ VS. CA (1996) Short Summary: Hilario Ruiz left a holographic will wherein he named as his heirs his only son, his adoptive daughter and his grandchildren from his only son. His only son was also named executor of the will. Upon his death, the only son did not petition for the probate of said will, and even opposed the probate of the will. The probate court ordered that support be given to the grandchildren, and that the titles to the two apartments being rented out be released to the heirs. Court held that as to the support to be given, the rules of court provides that ONLY CHILDREN of the deceased (as well as the surviving spouse) are entitled to support, not the grandchildren. As to the release of the titles, court held that it was too early to release the titles yet as the estate has not yet been inventoried and appraised, the charges upon the estate has not yet been paid, and there is still an issue as to the intrinsic validity of the will which the court should proceed to determine first. Finally, court held that right to possession of Executor is not absolute, only as it is necessary for the payment of debts and expenses of administration. Facts: Hilario Ruiz left holographic will making the ff his heirs: y Edmond Ruiz (ONLY SON) - also named executor y Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes (adopted daughter) y Maria Cathryn (Edmond's daughter) y Candice Albertine (Edmond's daughter) y Maria Angeline (Edmond's daughter) -Hilario died. Cash component of the estate distributed among the heirs in accordance with the will -4 years after Hilario's death, Maria Pilar filed petition for probate and approval of Hilario's will + issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond >>>EDMOND OPPOSED: will was executed under undue influence pending this, the Valle Verde house bequethed to the daughters of Edmond were leased by Edmond to 3Ps -PROBATE COURT JAN 19, 1993 ORDER: Edmond deposit rental deposit and payments for 1 yr lease of Valle Verde property (worth P540k) >>>Edmond turned over only P348,583.56 (deducted expenses for repair and maintenance) -Edmond moved for RELEASE OF P50k to pay the REAL ESTATE TAX - approved only P7,722 -Edmond w/drew Opposition to probate of will MAY 18, 1993 ORDER: 1. WILL ADMITTED TO PROBATE 2. Edmond Ruiz issued letters testamentary (finally issued June 23, 1993), conditioned upon filing of P50k bond EX-PARTE MOTION FOR RELEASE OF FUNDS filed by Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, w/ Edmond as executor: prayed for release of rent payments deposited w/ Branch Clerk >>>OPPOSED by Montes (adopted daughter); filed MOTION FOR RELEASE OF FUNDS TO CERTAIN HEIRS + MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF ALLOWANCE OF PROBATE WILL: prayed for 6|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n B alb astro _by Ch a Mend o za

1. Release of rent payments to the daughters of Edmond (note: the property rented out by Edmond was bequeathed to his daughters) 2. Distribution of testator's properties in accordance w/ the holographic will *PROBATE COURT: 1. Denied Edmond's motion for release of rent payments 2. Granted Montes' motion for release of the rent to the daughters instead 3. Granted the delivery of the titles to and possession of the Valle Verde and Blue Ridge properties to the 3 granddaughters and to Montes, upon filing of P50k bond >>>MR by Edmond PROBATE COURT (DEC 22, 1993 ORDER): 1. Release funds to Edmond only as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support of the testator's 3 granddaughters, subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance 2. Release of titles to respondents held in abeyance until lapse of 6 months from date of first publication of notice to creditors >>>Edmond filed MR for GADALEJ CA: dismissed petition, affirmed Probate court 1. WON IT WAS PROPER FOR THE PROBATE COURT TO GRANT ALLOWANCE FROM THE FUNDS OF THE ESTATE FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE TESTATOR'S GRANDCHILDREN? NO -R83.3 (see CODAL) -Edmond argues: a. Provision only gives the WIDOW and MINOR or INCAPACITATED CHILDREN of deceased the right to receive allowances for support b. 3 GRANDCHILDREN does not qualify i. Not incapacitated ii. Not minors: of legal age, married, and gainfully employed iii. Not the "children" stated in the provision -HELD: a. Children in R83.3 not limited to MINOR or INCAPACITATED CHILDREN, following A188, NCC: during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority. b. GRANDCHILDREN are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of decedent's estate. Law is clear. WON IT WAS PROPER FOR PROBATE COURT TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF THE TITLES TO CERTAIN HEIRS? NO -order releasing titles to properties of the estate = advance distribution of the estate -when advance distribution of estate's properties allowed: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations. -HERE: y probate court only gave NOTICE to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations y Estate tax not yet paid, much less ascertained y Estate has not yet been inventoried and appraised

2.

3.

Though will was already probated (and the probate of the will is conclusive as to its due execution, extrinsic validity, and capacity of testator to make a will, questions as to intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, legality of any devise or legacy may still be raised so it's too early to order the release of the titles. Here, Edmond contests the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees as his father's will included estate of his mother, allegedly impairing his legitime as intestate heir of mother. So probate court could proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases WON THE ORDER OF THE COURT DEPRIVED HIM OF HIS RIGHT TO TAKE POSSESSION AND MANAGEMENT OF ALL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE WILL? NO -The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration (R84.3) -he should first submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before he be released any more money: y he was already granted release of funds for the repair and maintenance expenses and payment of real estate taxes, w/o rendering accounting for the same. y He only deposited a portion of 1-year rental income from the Valle Verde property, but not the succeeding rents. Also no accounting of such funds -Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. *As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. *He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.

Section 2. Executor or administrator to keep buildings in repair. An executor or administrator shall maintain in tenantable repair the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court. Section 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the ...real as well as the ...personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of ...the debts and ...the expenses of administration. INTESTATE ESTATE OF LATE FELIPE BUENAVENTURA V. ILOG AGRICULTURAL CORP ORATION (2006) Short Summary: Encargado of the Administratrix, as a member of the Joint Commission tasked to affect the physical partition of the estate, proposed the swapping of one of the lots already allotted in an approved project of partition to one of the heirs to another lot w/o the latter s consent. Court held that the action of the encargado is still subject to the action of court after due notice to the heir and until and unless all the parties are notified of any report/recommendation, thereafter duly heard by the court, the heirs cannot be bound thereby. [2006V524] INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELIPE BUENAVENTURA, ANACORETA B. FRANCISCO, Judicial Administratrix-Petitioner, versus ILOG AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, Intervenor, NICASIA BUENAVENTURA, Heir-Respondent.2006 Jun 81st DivisionG.R. No. 131614D E C I S I O N

D-8 . G EN ERA L POW ER S AN D D UT IES O F EX EC UT ORS A N D AD MI NI STR ATOR S RULE 84 General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators Section 1. Executor or administrator to have access to partnership books and property. How right enforced. The executor or administrator of the estate of a deceased partner shall at all times ...have access to, ...and may examine ...and take copies of, books and papers relating to the partnership business, ...and may examine ...and make invoices of the property belonging to such partnership; and the surviving partner or partners, on request, shall exhibit to him all such books, papers, and property in their hands or control. On the written application of such executor or administrator, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may order any such surviving partner or partners ...to freely permit the exercise of the rights, and ...to exhibit the books, papers, and property, as in this section provided, and may punish any partner failing to do so for contempt.

CALLEJO, SR., J.: Felipe Buenaventura, who was twice married, died intestate on January 10, 1954. He was survived by his children, one of whom is Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura, a recognized natural son.[1] The inventory of Felipe s estate showed that he owned twenty (20) parcels of land located in Ilog, Negros Occidental and a building of strong materials: INVENTORY LOTS NOS. 1. Lot #238 2. 1809 3. 1863-A LOCATION ASSESSED VALUE

Rizal St., Dancalan, Ilog, Neg. Occ. P 390.00 Vista Alegre, Ilog, Neg. Occ. 2,780.00 4,830.00

7|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

B alb astro _by

Ch a Mend o za

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

1863-B 1869 1871-B 1882 1894 1902 1933 2046 2048 2073 2194 2270 2380 2655 2653 1046 2271

10,360.00 1,590.00 37,460.00 Dancalan, Ilog, Neg. Occ. 110.00 2,240.00 Vista Alegre, Ilog, Neg. Occ. 70.00 6,600.00 5,030.00 Dancalan, Ilog, Neg. Occ. 5,830.00 9,280.00 Calubang, Ilog, Neg. Occ. 5,530.00 1,250.00 Gusa, Calubang, Ilog, Neg. Occ. 110.00 Hda. Rosario, Ilog, Neg. Occ. 650.00 Vista Alegre, Ilog, Neg. Occ. 110.00 Camansi, Ilog, Neg. Occ. 1,280.00 Dancalan, Ilog, Neg. Occ. 200.00

7. Simon Buenaventura, Sr.; who died during the Japanese Occupation; represented by his widow and children, to wit: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) Carmen Meez; widow; aged 66; Center St., Sampaloc, Manila. Simon Buenaventura, Jr.; aged 37; Center St., Sampaloc, Manila. Agnes Buenaventura; aged 36; Center St., Sampaloc, Manila. Teresita Buenaventura; aged 35; Center St., Sampaloc, Manila. Mila Buenaventura; aged 26; Center St., Sampaloc, Manila.[4]

The RTC also listed the children and lawful heirs of the deceased by his second wife: 1. Purisima Buenaventura; aged 38; Dancalan, Ilog, Negros Occidental. 2. Rodolfo Buenaventura; aged 37; Central Bacolod-Murcia, Bacolod City. 3. Thelma Buenaventura; aged 36; Aguisan, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental. 4. Phoebe Buenaventura; aged 35; San Jose, Antique.

BUILDING 5. Jose Buenaventura; aged 34; Central Bacolod-Murcia, Bacolod City. 1. House of strong materials situated in Dancalan, Ilog, Neg. Occ. 7,000.00 COLLECTIBLE ACCOUNT From Alcibiades Mombay, La Carlota, Neg. Occ. Total P104,125.00[2] ========= 1,425.00 6. Antonio Buenaventura; aged 33; c/o Rodolfo Buenaventura, Bacolod-Murcia, Bacolod City. 7. Sally Buenaventura; aged 26; San Jose, Antique.[5] In the meantime, some of the heirs sold their undivided shares in the estate. One of the vendees was the Ilog Agricultural Corporation (IAC) which acquired an undivided 18/29 portion in the share of nine of the heirs, including Lot Nos. 2194 and 2380.[6] Another assignee, Manuel A. Gomez, who, along with IAC, intervened in the case, and the intestate court ordered the substitution of parties.[7] Appointed as Joint Special Administrators were Arnulfo Nono and Angel Gabriel, who submitted a Project of Partition[8] of the estate dated October 9, 1972 indicating the respective share of each heir: 1. To NICASIA BUENAVENTURA 2/29 shares 2. To FLORA BUENAVENTURA 2/29 shares 3. To ANACOR[E]TA BUENAVENTURA 2/29 shares 4. To LUZ BUENAVENTURA 2/29 shares 5. To EMILIA BUENAVENTURA 2/29 shares 6. To PEDRO BUENAVENTURA 2/29 shares from which shall be taken 4 has. of sugar land and 2 has. of rice land he sold to intervenor, Manuel A. Gomez, and which shall go to the latter. 7. To BEETHOVEN BUENAVENTURA 1/29 share 8. To the intervenor MANUEL A. GOMEZ 16/29 shares to which shall be added 4 has. of sugar land and 2 has. of rice land to be taken from the 2/29 shares of Pedro Buenaventura.[9] On March 6, 1973, the RTC issued an Order[10] approving the Project of Partition, subject to the submission of the report of accounts of said special administrators. In an Order dated December 21, 1990, the RTC appointed Michael B. Francisco, Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura, and Atty. Nilo Sorbito, the counsel of the IAC, as Commissioners or Special Administrators for the purpose of preparing a physical partition of the estate based on the already approved project of partition.

Lot No. 2194 was being cultivated by two agricultural tenants. Anacoreta B. Francisco, one of the children of the deceased by his first wife, filed a Petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, for the settlement of the estate and for appointment as administratrix. In due course, the intestate court appointed her as administratrix. She, in turn, appointed her son, Michael Francisco, as her encargado. [3] Anacoreta left for the United States in 1987. On October 24, 1966, the RTC issued an Order listing and declaring the children and lawful heirs of the deceased by his first wife, namely: 1. Pedro Buenaventura; aged 57; Dancalan, Ilog, Negros Occidental. 2. Nicasia Buenaventura; aged 55; Dancalan, Ilog, Negros Occidental. 3. Flora Buenaventura; aged 54; Dancalan, Ilog, Negros Occidental. 4. Anacor[e]ta Buenaventura; aged 53; 2-B, Urma Drive, Baltao Subdiv., Paraaque, Rizal. 5. Luz Buenaventura; aged 52; Dancalan, Ilog, Negros Occidental. 6. Emilia Buenaventura; aged 51; Dancalan, Ilog, Negros Occidental.

8|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

B alb astro _by

Ch a Mend o za

On November 27, 1991, Attys. Sorbito and Buenaventura submitted a Joint Motion for the approval of the physical partition of the estate as shown in the sketch plan appended thereto, where Nicasia Buenaventura was allotted Lot No. 1871-B, while Lot No. 2194 was allotted to the IAC: REAL PROPERTIES TOTAL AREA NAME OF HEIR 1. Nicasia Buenaventura 2/29th shares 2/29th shares (per deed of sale executed by her late sister, Flora, while yet alive) 98.6676 hectares, more or less. SHARE IN HECTARES

latter s share in Lot No. 1863-B. He also claimed that IAC had already harvested the produce therefrom. The pleading contained the following prayer: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that the Order of December 20, 1991 be set aside and that the special administrators be ordered to submit a new project of partition as reflected in a new sketch plan after all the foregoing grounds for objection as enumerated in this COMPLIANCE are threshed and ironed out.[14] In view of this objection, Attys. Sorbito and Buenaventura submitted a new parcellary map for the physical partition of the estate. On October 30, 1992, a conference was held among the parties, during which Francisco manifested to the court that the share of Nicasia Buenaventura in Lot No. 1871-B, with an area of 7 hectares, was to be swapped with Lot No. 2194 which IAC had assigned to Anacoreta and Beethoven. The conferees agreed to partition the estate as follows: Lot No. 1871-A, originally allotted to Nicasia Buenaventura, to be swapped for an equivalent area in Lot No. 2194; a portion of Lot No. 1871-A and the residue of Lot No. 2194 to be allotted to Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura; and Lot No. 1871-B to be assigned to the IAC. Portion of Lot No. 2073, colored BLUE, is assigned to EMILIA VAIL. Portion of Lot No. 2073, colored BLACK, which is supposed to be share of Luz Buenaventura who is already dead, goes to the HEIRS OF LUZ BUENAVENTURA.

7.7247 hectares, more or less. 7.7247 hectares, more or less. _______________________

TOTAL - 15.4494 hectares, more or less. 2. Anacoreta Buenaventura 2/29th shares 7.7247 hectares, more or less. 3. Emilia Buenaventura 2/29th shares 4. Pedro Buenaventura Unsold share

7.7247 hectares, more or less. Lot Nos. 1709, 2655, 1869, 1894, 2270, 1882, 238 and 2653, colored GREEN, are allotted to NICASIA, except for Lot No. 1871-A, colored green, which is supposed to be part of Nicasia s share, will be swapped to Lot No. 2380 and portion of Lot No. 2194, colored RED and YELLOW, equivalent to the share of Nicasia in Lot No. 1871, colored green. Lot Nos. 1863-B, 1871-B, 2048, 2046, 1046-A and 1982, colored ORANGE, are assigned to Ilog Agricultural Corporation. And in exchange for Lot No. 1871, colored GREEN, this will now become the share of ANACORETA B. FRANCISCO, which will be colored RED, together with Lot No. 1933. Portion of Lot No. 1871-A, colored YELLOW, and whatever remains in Lot No. 2194 which is estimated to be not less than one (1) hectare after deducting the share of Nicasia in lieu of Lot No. 1871-A, shall become the share of BEETHOVEN BUENAVENTURA, to be colored YELLOW. mphasis supplied)[15] The Joint Commissioners and the counsels present signed the stenographic notes taken during the conference. However, the parties, through counsel, revised the October 30, 1992 Partition Agreement on December 10, 1992. In this amended project of partition, Nicasia was allotted portions of Lot Nos. 2194 and 2380, consisting of 6.6529 and 1.7050 hectares, respectively. The rest of Lot No. 2194, a tenanted lot with an area of 1.2500 hectares, was allotted to Beethoven.[16] Nicasia later engaged the services of Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura as counsel and told him of her objection to the swapping of the two lots under the revised project of partition. Nicasia, through counsel, filed a Manifestation on January 15, 1993, informing the court of her objection to the physical partition of the property, to wit: xxxx

1.6132 hectares, more or less.

5. Simon, Purisima, Rodolfo, Thelma, Jose, Febe, Sally & Antonio (all surnamed Buenaventura) 1/8th share each (.6132 hectares) (their shares from deceased sister, Luz Buenaventura 4.9051 hectares, more or less. 6. Beethoven Buenaventura 1/29th share

3.8657 hectares, more or less.

7. Ilog Agricultural Corporation 18/29th shares (Shares bought from the nine (9) surviving legal heirs, namely, Simon, Pedro, Purisima, Rodolfo, Thelma, Jose, Febe, Sally & Antonio 57.3840 hectares, more or less.[11] In an Order[12] dated December 20, 1991, the intestate court declared that, while Special Administrator Michael Francisco did not sign the Joint Motion, it was taking judicial notice of the fact that he actively participated in the preparation of the sketch plan. Michael, however, objected to the partition on the ground that it was incomplete and erroneous. In his Compliance[13] to the intestate court s directive to state his objections in writing, he alleged that IAC had occupied Lot No. 2194 long before the approval of the project of partition, and that the agreement was for IAC to cede Lot Nos. 2194 and 2380 in favor of Anacoreta and Beethoven in exchange for the

9|S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

B alb astro _by

Ch a Mend o za

2. That during the hearing of [the] above-entitled case last October 30, 1992, one of the special administrators, Mr. Michael Francisco, manifested that the share of Nicasia Buenaventura which has been colored green in Annex A and within Lot No. 1871-B of the Intestate Estate consisting of about seven and a half (7) hectares, more or less, was to be swapped to the whole of Lot No. 2194. This Lot 2194 supposedly would be the share of the Intervenor but was later assigned by said Intervenor in equal shares in favor of Anacoreta Buenaventura and Beethoven Buenaventura as their compromise agreement; 3. That when this swapping of the share of Nicasia Buenaventura from Lot 1871-B to Lot 2194 was brought to her attention, she vehemently denied that she has ever consented or ever authorized Michael Francisco to swap her share in Lot 1871-B with that of Lot 2194. All what (sic) Nicasia Buenaventura wants is that her share in Lot 1871-B as shown in Annex A (marked Green) of the Joint Motion aforesaid and approved already by this Honorable Court should be the one to prevail but not to be swapped to Lot 2194; 4. That also during the October 30, 1992 hearing, it was provisionally agreed that the area to be assigned to Beethoven Buenaventura in Lot 2194 should only be from one (1) to two (2) hectares in area. However, it has come to the attention of Beethoven Buenaventura that the whole of this Lot 2194 is being tenanted by no less than nine (9) tenants, so that in order that a definite area could be effected insofar as the tenants are concerned, he hereby manifests that the portions of Lot 2194 as tenanted by tenants Fausto Vingno and Pedro Epondo be the ones to be assigned to him by the Intervenor, of course, the whole area won t exceed two (2) hectares.[17] Nicasia insisted that she should retain Lot No. 1871-B which was originally allotted to her, and prayed that the swapping of said lot for Lot No. 2194 be set aside. On February 2, 1993, the intervenor IAC, through counsel, filed a Motion[18] for the Approval of the Project of Partition dated October 30, 1992 as revised on December 10, 1992. The intestate court set another conference of the parties at 8:30 a.m., August 13, 1993.[19] During the conference, it noted that the parties had agreed on the partition of the estate on October 30, 1992, as revised on December 10, 1992 except Nicasia s share.[20] In the Manifestation[21] filed by Nicasia through counsel Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura on August 19, 1993, she alleged that she had not authorized Michael Francisco to swap Lot No. 1871-B for that of Lot No. 2194 considering that Lot No. 2194 had been already assigned to Anacoreta Francisco and Beethoven Buenaventura. She also filed a Motion[22] on September 13, 1993, praying that Lot No. 1871-B be restored to her as her share in the estate. On November 9, 1993, the RTC issued an Order[23] indicating therein the shares of the heirs in the estate. However, it declared that the distribution of Lot No. 1871-B and the portion of Lot No. 2194 be held in abeyance. During the hearing on November 25, 1993, IAC, through counsel, and Nicasia Buenaventura agreed that should a portion of the latter s share in Lot No. 1871-B comprising an area of 77,335 square meters be leased by intervenor IAC, she would no longer interpose further objection to the swapping as previously agreed on October 30, 1992. IAC, represented by Atty. Sorbito, manifested the corporation s willingness to lease Nicasia s share in Lot No. 1871-B with an area of 77,335 square meters in such an amount as may be agreed upon later. Nicasia agreed to a lease rate of P3,000.00 per hectare payable in advance for three years. Atty. Sorbito prayed to be allowed to confer with IAC as to the exact amount and manner of payment of the lease rental, and promised to inform the intestate court within three days, on or before November 27, 1993.[24]

On December 10, 1993, a hearing on the issue as to whether Nicasia Buenaventura agreed to swap Lot No. 1871-B for that of Lot No. 2194 was held, during which Nicasia Buenaventura, Michael Francisco and Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura testified. On December 13, 1993, the intestate court issued an Order[25] disposing of the disputed share in the estate of Felipe Buenaventura, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court rules that Lot No. 1871-B belongs to Ilog Agricultural Corporation, the entire share of Nicasia Buenaventura in Lot No. 1871, colored green, belongs to Anacoreta B. Francisco, and Lot No. 2194, colored red, belongs to Nicasia Buenaventura, in accordance with the swapping agreement of October 30, 1992 and the supplemental agreement of December 10, 1992. SO ORDERED. The intestate court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony of Michael Francisco, and to the fact that he was a member of the Joint Commissioners designated to prepare a physical partition of the estate.[26] Nicasia appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA), and raised the following issues: 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ENTIRE SHARE OF NICASIA BUENAVENTURA IN LOT NO. 1871-B BELONGS TO ANACORETA B. FRANCISCO AND LOT 2194 BELONGS TO NICASIA BUENAVENTURA; and 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HEIR-MOVANT-APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO HER MONETARY CLAIMS.[27] Nicasia averred that she never knew of the swapping of the two lots before October 30, 1992, and maintained that she never spoke with Michael Francisco about it. She also claimed that the trial court erred in its finding that she objected to the arrangement only when she learned that the rental for Lot No. 2194 was low. She maintained that she and her brother, Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura, declared before the trial court that it was only in October 1992 that she learned of the proposed swapping of the two lots. On July 31, 1997, the CA rendered judgment in favor of Nicasia. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, the lower court s order dated December 13, 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE and another order is entered declaring the swapping of the lots involved null and void. The Court orders the restoration of the share of appellant Nicasia Buenaventura to Lot 1871-B. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.[28] The CA declared that under the December 20, 1991 project of partition of the estate, Lot No. 1871B had already been allotted to Nicasia; she could thus not be deprived of her right over the lot. It pointed out that, based on the records, Michael Francisco was not authorized with a special power of attorney as to bind Nicasia to the amended agreement. The appellate court stressed that, under Article 1878 of the New Civil Code, a written authorization from Nicasia was needed.[29] Anacoreta, as the Judicial Administratrix, thereafter filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court on the following issues: (a) whether the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, may be raised in this Court; (b) whether a special power of attorney is required for respondents

10 | S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

B alb astro _b y

Ch a Men doza

counsel, Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura, to bind her to the new agreement, that is, the swapping of Lot No. 1871-B with that of Lot No. 2194; (c) whether such authority is required for the Joint Commissioners to bind respondent to the new agreement; and (d) whether respondent had agreed, through Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura and Michael Francisco, to the agreement. Petitioner submits that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of Michael Francisco and its disquisitions on the agreement of respondent to the swapping of the lots should be accorded due respect by the CA. She avers that no less than Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura, respondent s brother and counsel, had agreed to the swapping of the lots before the hearing on October 30, 1992. She knew that Michael Francisco and Beethoven Buenaventura represented the heirs, including herself, in the negotiation for the allotment of the estate. After Michael Francisco and Beethoven Buenaventura informed her of the terms and conditions of the settlement of the estate, she never objected nor disavowed their authority to bind her to a swapping of the lots or the settlement of the estate. Atty. Buenaventura even signed the stenographic notes taken on October 30, 1992 for and in behalf of respondent. Petitioner insists that respondent objected to the swapping, for the first time, only when she learned of the low rate of rental of Lot No. 2194. As against the recommendation of the Joint Commissioners and a judicial consideration by the trial court of all the circumstances, such belated objection to the amended agreement should not prevail. She pointed out that the findings of facts of the Joint Commissioners, duly approved by the court, are those of the court and are presumptively correct. Petitioner avers that it was not necessary for Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura, as respondent s counsel to be authorized in writing to agree to a swapping of the two lots for and in behalf of respondent, especially as the respective shares of the other heirs under the partition had already been delivered. Petitioner points out that a partition is not a conveyance but simply a separation and designation of that part of the estate which belongs to each heir, and cites the ruling in Vda. de Reyes v. Court of Appeals[30] to support her claim. Respondent, for her part, avers that her counsel, Atty. Buenaventura, had never agreed to the swapping of the two lots for and in her behalf. She found out about the proposed swapping for the first time only when the IAC s counsel, Atty. Nilo Sorbito, proposed the swapping; and when she learned of it, she vigorously objected to the proposal. She insists that although her counsel signed the stenographic notes, he did so in his behalf as heir and not as her counsel. The petition has no merit. The general rule is that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive on the Court. However, the rule does not apply if the trial court s factual findings and those of the CA are contradictory or conflicting.[31] While Rule 45 of the Rules of Court mandates that only questions of law should be raised, where the factual findings of the trial court and those of the appellate court are contradictory, the Court must perforce to review the records and make its own findings. A careful perusal of the records show that petitioner failed to prove that, before October 30, 1992, respondent already knew, through Michael Francisco and Beethoven Buenaventura, that Lot No. 1871-B which was assigned to her would be swapped for a portion of Lot No. 2194. Nor did petitioner adduce in evidence that respondent had authorized Michael Francisco or Beethoven Buenaventura to agree, in her behalf, to the swapping of the two lots. While it is true that respondent engaged the services of Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura as her counsel, she did so only after December 10, 1992, upon learning that the Joint Commissioners had agreed to revise the October 30, 1992 partition of the estate during the December 10, 1992 conference. This prompted respondent to secure the services of counsel and file a Manifestation on January 15, 1993 informing the trial court of her objection to the swapping.

It bears stressing that Michael Francisco was merely the encargado of the administratrix, a member of the Joint Commissioners tasked to effect a physical partition of the estate. Any recommendation made in such capacity is still subject to the action of the court after due notice to the heirs; unless and until all the parties are notified of any report/recommendation, thereafter duly heard by the court, the heirs cannot thereby be bound. Moreover, respondent is not bound by the agreement of Atty. Beethoven Buenaventura on the partition of the estate agreed upon on October 30 and December 10, 1992 because the latter did so in his personal capacity as heir of the deceased and not for and in behalf of respondent. This is gleaned from his testimony: ATTY. GARAYGAY: That as one of the co-administrators during the hearing on September 30, 1992, whether he has placed his signature for approval and that a conference was held on October 12, 1982 and their respective shares were being distinguished with identifying colors, and I would like to ask him whether he affirms the partition plan on October 12, 1982 and affixes his signature. I mean, did he affix his signature on the transcript of the stenographic notes report of October 10, 1992 hearing. I think, Your Honor, the signature was not on the parcellary plan but to the transcript of record. COURT: Are you willing to answer the manifestation before this Court? ATTY. BUENAVENTURA: I have already admitted that, Your Honor, if, at all, I have agreed to the partition relative to the hearing on October 10, 1992, it was because during that time, I was only acting in my behalf and in my capacity as co-special administrator but not for Nicasia Buenaventura. COURT: I am asking you about your signature? ATTY. BUENAVENTURA: I admit that, Your Honor. DIRECT EXAMINATION CONDUCTED BY ATTY. VICENTE T. GARAYGAY, JR. ON WITNESS ATTY. BEETHOVEN BUENAVENTURA ATTY. GARAYGAY: Did you attach your signature in the December 10, 1992 proposal wherein there was a swapping, Atty. Buenaventura? WITNESS: Not approved yet. Q: And wherein the 3 of you have to agree on that proposal made on October 10, 1992?

11 | S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

B alb astro _b y

Ch a Men doza

A: Myself, Michael Francisco, and Atty. Nilo Sorbito were the ones who affixed our signatures regarding the hearing. Q: On December 10, 1992, there was a swapping, will you agree with me? A: I will clarify my answer, Your Honor, I have affixed my signature therein, however, if I have attached my signature thereon, I was only representing as co-special administrator and was not representing this share of Nicasia Buenaventura. I also fully believed (sic) that this Michael Francisco was duly authorized by his aunt to do the swapping but a week later, I was surprised when my sister went to Bacolod and I asked her what transpired in the conference in October 1992 but immediately upon hearing this, she vehemently opposed having authorized Michael Francisco to the swapping for her and later on she said that I will prepare to represent her in this case. She vehemently denied Michael Francisco to do the swapping of her share over Lot No. 1871-B with that of Lot No. 2194. Q: Now, according to you since 1991, you already knew that Nicasia Buenaventura has already vehemently opposed, is that correct? A: No. In 1991, there was no swapping yet. The swapping was made in 1992. Q: When you were examining the heir Nicasia Buenaventura and she told you in answer to your question that, in 1991, she already knew about the swapping and she objected to the proposed swapping now, the question is, since 1991, she was already opposing to the swapping, did she A: That is misleading, Your Honor, because actually during the hearing in 1992 that the swapping was made. (TSN, Dec. 10, 1993, pp. 12-16, R.C. Hollero)[32] The evidence on record negates petitioner s claim that respondent had knowledge of the planned swapping of lots even before October 30, 1992, and agreed to the same. As gleaned from the testimony of Francisco, sometime in 1990, respondent merely asked for a certain amount as an advance of her inheritance which she needed for the expenses for the death anniversary of her father, and that he (Michael) agreed to give only a portion of the amount she was asking: ATTY. GARAYGAY:

COURT: But the question is, when did she authorize you to swap, before you signed the agreement or after? WITNESS: Way back in 1990. COURT: So, before the signing? WITNESS: Yes, Sir. COURT: Proceed. ATTY. BUENAVENTURA: Now, where did you meet her and talked of the swapping of her share with that Lot 1871-B and Lot 2194? WITNESS: It was herself (sic) who went to our house and asked me for a favor, and it was that time when she asked for a certain amount to be spent for the anniversary of my grandfather and I said, I will only give you a part but for the amount that she was asking I said, I will give you the amount as soon as I have it. Q: More or less, what month was that in 1990?

Before the swapping, Your Honor, there was already a communication. A: I cannot remember anymore. COURT: (TSN, Dec. 10, 1993, pp. 37-38, R.C. Hollero)[33] What was that communication about that she authorized you or did she not authorize you? WITNESS: Before the swapping, Your Honor, as I have said, she approached me because it was her desire to have the fishpond. COURT: Alright, next question? ATTY. GARAYGAY: I think that is all for the witness, Your Honor. xxxx As admitted by the IAC in its Manifestation[34] filed on September 3, 1992, the technical plan prepared by Technical Assistant Pamposo Juanola was merely to satisfy the desire of Michael Francisco and to comply with his orders without any objection of the two other administrators and the IAC. This is gleaned from the affidavit of Juanola: That sometime on May 7, 1991, our firm headed by Engr. Antonio Y. Bincal, as Geodetic Engineer, was hired to conduct a survey over the property of the late Felipe Buenaventura, subject matter of Spec. B alb astro _b y Ch a Men doza A careful reading of Michael Francisco s Compliance filed with the trial court on January 24, 1992 will show that he objected to the partition of the estate as approved by the trial court on December 20, 1991 only because the sketch plan submitted by Attys. Sorbito and Buenaventura was incomplete, in that the area was assigned only to Pedro Buenaventura and Luz Buenaventura, and Emilia Vail was not indicated therein, and that Lot Nos. 2380 and 2194 assigned to the IAC (which the latter had assigned to Anacoreta Buenaventura and Beethoven Buenaventura) were not colored with the color code agreed upon by the Joint Commissioners. Michael Francisco did not interpose any objection to the December 20, 1991 partition relative to the allocation of Lot No. 2187-B to respondent.

12 | S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

Proc. No. 053 (130-3139), to determine the respective shares and the actual area of the heirs of the late Felipe Buenaventura and that of Ilog Agricultural Corporation; That pursuant to the instructions and agreement of the three (3) co-administrators, Michael B. Francisco, Beethoven Buenaventura, and Nilo Sorbito, and in accordance with the instructions of Michael B. Francisco, I conducted the survey of the area and prepared a parcellary plan in accordance with the instructions of Michael B. Francisco with conformity of the two (2) co-administrators Beethoven Buenaventura and Nilo Sorbito; That the plan was submitted to the Court last November 25, 1991, however, correction was made pursuant to the instructions of Michael B. Francisco, particularly as to the actual site/location of the area pertaining to Beethoven Buenaventura; vis-a-vis that of his mother Anacoreta B. Francisco; That as instructed, I have prepared a new parcellary plan, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A of this affidavit; That when I prepared the parcellary plan, it is all in accordance with the instructions of Michael B. Francisco, with the conformity of [the] other co-administrators Beethoven Buenaventura and Nilo Sorbito.[35] Michael Francisco s Comment[36] dated November 26, 1993 even states that the swapping was approved by the co-administrators and the trial court on December 10, 1992. Respondent was not present therein and could not thus have agreed to any swapping of the lots. Even the IAC to which Lot No. 1871-B was assigned under the December 10, 1992 Order of the trial court, finally agreed to the lease by it of Lot No. 1871-B should the lot be assigned to respondent. What is so worrisome is that in its Order dated November 9, 1993, the trial court allotted Lot No. 1871-B to the IAC and, at the same time, declared that the distribution of Lot No. 1871-B and a portion of Lot No. 1294 would be held in abeyance. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

-Subdivision title issued to Luz Caro, with consent of Alfredo and Saturnino (as administrator) - both executed affidavits -almost 6 years after, Caro filed a pleading (not sure - as claimant/creditor? ) in the SPECPRO that she bought 1/3 of the property co-owned. Only then did Basilia found out about it. -Basilia offered to redeem the said share but was ignored -Basilia then intervened in case of Rosa Amador vda De Benito vs. Luz Caro for annulment of sale and mortgage and cancellation of the annotation of the sale and mortgage involving same parcels of land PRINCIPAL CASE dismissed for failure to prosecute and to pay docket fees -Basilia then filed this independent case for legal redemption: no notice of the sale as required under A1620 and 1623 of NCC (no notice to her as administrator of the estate of a co-owner) >La Luz presented secondary evidence of service of written notice to possible redemptioners (written notice sent to Alfredo and Saturnino - the best evidence - cannot be presented because they were already dead when the complaint for legal redemption brought): y Affidavit of Benjamin Benito, ante lite motam, attesting to the fact that the possible redemptioners were formally notified in writing of his intention to sell his undivided share y Deposition of Saturnino's widow (bale mother in law ni Basilia): testified that she received and gave Saturnino the written notice of intended sale and Saturnino expressed disinterest in buyingproperty >>Complaint for legal redemption DISMISSED a. Administratrix of co-owner does not have the power to exercise right of legal redemption b. Seller co-owner substantially complied w/ written notice requirement to possible redemptioners MR denied, appealed to CA (with additional contention that Judge should have inhibited himself, his son being an associate/member of law office of Caro's lawyer CA: for Basilia 1. It is w/n the judge's discretion to disqualify himself, besides, no showing that Basilia asked for the Judge's disqualification 2. Right to redeem arose after death of Mario, so it's not part of the hereditary estate but a personal right of the heirs (which would include Basilia) 3. The deed of sale statement of the seller saying that the other co-owners declined to buy was a unilateral statement, not a proof of notice required by law 4. Registration of deed of sale did not erase right to redeem of other heirs who did not receive notice 5. Affidavits attesting to notice would not show that there was clear notice given. Saturnino's unilateral act as co-administrator can't bind his co-administrator who has right to redeem personally as heir 6. Basilia can still redeem >Caro appealed WON RIGHT OF REDEMPTION COULD STILL BE EXERCISED WHEN THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REDEEMED IS NOT CO-OWNED ANYMORE (on the theory that through the other co-owner and one of the administrators of the estate of the other co-owner already agreed to subdivide the property) 1. On the theory that there is no longer co-ownership, with partition of the property: -CARAM vs. CA - though this case refers to conveyance made after partition:Once a property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated and there is no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption (purpose is to reduce the number of participants until the community is done away with -no difference w/ respect to conveyance before partition agreement. Basta may partition na, can't exercise right to redeem -on allegation of fraud: fraud in securing the registration of titles to the land should be supported by clear and convincing evidence

CARO VS. CA (1982) Short Summary: Property was co-owned by 3 brothers, one of which predeceased the others. His estate was administered by the surviving wife and his father. One of the co-owners sold his 1/3 undivided portion to a RP. Although the other co-owners did not want to redeem the property, the widow of the deceased co-owner (who was also 1 of the administrators of his estate) wanted to exercise such right. Court held that an administrator cannot exercise the right of legal redemption. Facts: -Sorsogon property (2 parcels of land) co-owned by: y Alfredo Benito y Mario Benito (+) y Benjamin Benito -Mario died. Surviving wife Basilia Lahorra and father Saturnino Benito appointed as joint administrators of Mario's estate -Benjamin sold through DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE of 1/3 undivided portion to LUZ CARO, for P10k. Registered sale.

13 | S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

B alb astro _b y

Ch a Men doza

-since subdivision title issued, and 1 year from date of entry of subdivision of title no claim for redemption, the Certificate of Title becomes indivisible, cannot be indirectly attacked 2. On the assumption that there is still co-ownership and right of legal redemption still exists -as administratrix, no personality to exercise right BUTTE vs. UY AND SONS: "While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the right to the possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the expenses of administration, and the administrator may bring and defend action for the recovery or protection of the property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession and administration do not include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners after the death of another, because in such case, the right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to the stranger was perfected and formed no part of the estate of the deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted to the heir of the deceased co-owner." -not discuss WON she could bring action as heir of a co-owner because her pleading specifically stated that she brought the action in her capacity as administratrix

of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shall share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased. 4. Manila Probate court already has exclusive jurisdiction over the proceeding and the properties claimed: R73.1 5. The law is clear that where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court. MANANQUIL V. VILLEGAS Short Summary: Disbarment case against the lawyer of the administrator for entering into a lease agreement with the estate he's working for, allegedly for a minimal fee and w/o court approval. Court held that no court approval is necessary for the administrator to enter into a lease agreement. But there is still sufficient grounds for disciplinary sanction, as he is prohibited under the civil code to enter into any transaction regarding the property which he is supposed to litigate. Facts: -Felomina Zerna died. Administration proceedings initiated, w/ Felix Leong appointed as administrator . Atty. Mananquil served as Leong's lawyer -Lease contract was executed between Leong (administrator) and the Heirs of Jose Villegas (to which Atty. Mananquil belonged), represented by brother in law of Atty. Mananquil involving sugar lands -2 years after, Hijos De Jose Villegas was formed among the heirs of Jose Villegas. Another lease contract entered between Leong and Hijos De Jose Villegas -as representative brother in law already dead, Atty. Mananquil was appointed manager -lease contract again renewed, but now Atty. Mananquil was the representative of the Hijos De Jose Villegas. He signed for the partnership for at least 3 times. 1. WON ATTY. MANANQUIL SHOULD HAVE 1ST SECURED THE APPROVAL OF THE COURT IN SPECPRO TO THE VARIOUS LEASE CONTRACTS? NO -a judicial executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority and approval 2. WON ATTY. MANANQUIL SHOULD STILL BE SUBJECTED TO DISCIPLINARY SANCTION? YES -violated Art 1646, NCC and Art 1491: prohibited from leasing, either in person or through mediation of another, (4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the sale; (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property or rights in litigation or levied upon on execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. -prohibited because of the fiduciary relationship involved, or the peculiar control exercised by these individuals over the properties -Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed lease contracts were the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" and the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, and respondent signed merely as an agent of the

WON action for enforcement of right of redemption already expired? Moot and academic -Caro argues that the tender of payment w/n 30 d from written notice of sale by co-owner already prescribed, and such being a condition precedent to file action for enforcement of right, it already prescribed -court did not rule on it, saying issue was already moot and academic ESTATE OF OLAVE VS. REYES (1983) Short Summary: Administrators of estate of decedent entered into an amicable settlement with a creditor company who wanted to collect from the estate of the decedent in a separate proceeding. This was done w/o prior approval of the probate court. SC held that prior approval of the probate court needed because (1) the claim of the creditors is a claim against the estate; and (2) probate court already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case, to the exclusion of the other court) Facts -there's already a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave in the Manila court. There's an order from this court providing that the co-administrators should first secure the probate court's approval before entering into any transaction involving the 17 titles of the estate -Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO) filed Civil case for collection of debt and attorney's fees in Davao court against the co-administrators of the estate of Amadeo Olave -even after order from the probate court to secure first its approval, SAMCO and the co-administrators entered into an AMICABLE SETTLEMENT wherein one of the 17 titles of the estate was ceded to SAMCO as payment for its claim. This was done w/o notice and approval of the probate court -DAVAO COURT: approved amicable settlement WON SAMCO PROPERLY FILED CLAIM IN A SEPARATE PROCEEDING? NO 1. R87.1: "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; . . ." 2. Claim of Samco could only be pursued by filing it in the administration proceedings and w/n the prescribed period, or else barred forever 3. Why present claims in the probate court: to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment

14 | S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

B alb astro _b y

Ch a Men doza

latter, the Court rules that the lease contracts are covered by the prohibition against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes part. To rule otherwise would be to lend a stamp of judicial approval on an arrangement which, in effect, circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law. For, piercing through the legal fiction of separate juridical personality, the Court cannot ignore the obvious implication that respondent as one of the heirs of Jose Villegas and partner, later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit from the contractual relationship created between his client Felix Leong and his family partnership over properties involved in the ongoing testate proceedings. -on alleged lack of knowledge: impossible that he would not have knowledge of transactions of his family partnership, he even participated in some of the lease contracts -on alleged acquiescence and consent of the heirs: even with that, still prohibited from having any interest in the properties under litigation under Art 1491 and 1646, NCC, and as a lawyer, should uphold the laws of the land -on Tuason vs. Tuason (allegedly ruled that renewal of contracts do not fall w/n NCC prohibition): can't infer from that case that contracts of sale or lease where vendee/lessee is a partnership, of which a lawyer is a member, over a property involved in a litigation in which he takes part by virtue of his profession, are not covered by the prohibition under Articles 1491 and 1646. >>>SUSPENDED FOR 4 months ESTATE OF RUIZ VS. CA, SUPRA WON THE ORDER OF THE COURT DEPRIVED HIM OF HIS RIGHT TO TAKE POSSESSION AND MANAGEMENT OF ALL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE WILL? NO -The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration (R84.3) -he should first submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before he be released any more money: y he was already granted release of funds for the repair and maintenance expenses and payment of real estate taxes, w/o rendering accounting for the same. y He only deposited a portion of 1-year rental income from the Valle Verde property, but not the succeeding rents. Also no accounting of such funds -Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. *As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. *He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.

15 | S p e c i a l P r o c e e d i n g _ D e a n

B alb astro _b y

Ch a Men doza