Brandia Taamu V The City of Everett City of Everett Animal Control

( Motion for Dismissal of all charges ( and expungement of record ( and return of all property ( and animals ( Cease & desist order with ( permanent No contact Order
I STATEMENT OF FACTS:

1) On or about 2002, 2009 & 2011 a representative of the City of Everett Officer Lori Trask harassed Ms Taamu, her son, her brother & her mother without ceasing, until sometime after 1/6/2011 the reasons became apparent, when your American Woman It can be shown all of the other people responding felt no need to use such identifiers to describe Ms Taamu in direct violation of malicious prosecution, & malfeasance numerous State & Federal laws, including unlawful discrimination, color of law,

representative made 3 very telling statements describing client as a Thin Native

9.91.010 Denial of civil rights Terms defined. (b) "Deny" is hereby defined to include any act which directly or indirectly, or by subterfuge, by a person or his agent or employee, results or is intended or calculated to result in whole or in part in any discrimination, distinction, restriction, or unequal treatment, RCW 49.60.030 Freedom from discrimination Declaration of civil rights. 1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability is recognized as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to: (b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement; (f) The right to engage in commerce free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists. Discriminatory boycotts or blacklists for purposes of this section shall be defined as the formation or execution of any express or implied agreement, understanding, policy or contractual arrangement for economic benefit between any persons which is not specifically authorized by

the laws of the United States and which is required or imposed, either directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, by a foreign government or foreign person in order to restrict, condition, prohibit, or interfere with or in order to exclude any person or persons from any business relationship on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability, or the use of a trained dog guide or service animal by a person with a disability, or national origin or lawful business relationship: PROVIDED HOWEVER, That nothing herein contained shall prohibit the use of boycotts as authorized by law pertaining to labor disputes and unfair labor practices; and

(2) Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a
civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit including reasonable attorneys' fees or any other appropriate emedy authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of 196r4 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq.).

This whole situation seems to be falling into the "Color of Law" In the words of Supreme Court Judge, Mr. Justice Rutledge He who acts under "color" of law may be a federal officer or a state officer. He may act under "color" of federal law or of state law. The statute does not come into play merely because the federal law or the state law under which the officer purports to act is violated. It is applicable when and only when someone is deprived of a federal right by that action. The fact that it is also a violation of state law does not make it any the less a federal offense punishable as such. Nor does its punishment by federal authority encroach on state authority or relieve the state from its responsibility for punishing state offenses. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 108 (1945).
This section was before us in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, where we said:

"Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under color of' state law." Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 109 (1945). For it was abuse of basic civil and
political rights, by states and their officials, that the Amendment and the enforcing legislation were adopted to uproot. The danger was not merely legislative or judicial. Nor was it threatened only from the state's highest officials. It was abuse by whatever agency the state might invest with its power capable of inflicting the deprivation. In all its flux, time makes some things axiomatic. One has been that state officials who violate their oaths of office and flout 117*117 the fundamental law are answerable to it when their misconduct brings upon them the penalty it authorizes and Congress has provided. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 116-7 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. "It is not open to question that this statute is constitutional. . . [It] dealt with Federal rights and with all Federal rights, and protected them in the lump . . ." United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386, 387. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 119 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. Separately, and often together in application, 19 and 20 have been woven into our fundamental and statutory law. They have place among our more permanent legal achievements. They have safeguarded many rights and privileges apart from political ones. Among those buttressed, either by direct application or through the general conspiracy statute, 37 (18 U.S.C. 88),[24] are the rights to a fair trial, including freedom from sham trials [including sham Collection Due Process Hearings] ; to be free from arrest and detention by methods constitutionally forbidden and from extortion of property [by threat of levy, lien, or lockdown letters] by such methods; from extortion of confessions; from mob action incited or shared by state officers; from failure to furnish police protection on proper occasion and demand; from interference with the free

exercise of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of speech and assembly;[25] and 127*127 the necessary import of the decisions is that the right to be free from deprivation of life itself, without due process of law, that is, through abuse of state power
by state officials, is as fully protected as other rights so secured. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 126-7 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. They simply misconceived

that the victim had no federal rights and that what they had done was not a crime within the federal power to penalize.[30] That kind of error relieves no one from penalty. Screws

v. United States, 325 US 91, 128 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result.

2) In 2002 Ms Taamu moved into the city of Everett with 1 pit bull terrier, her family children, & she were harassed mercilessly, to the point that Ms Taamu had to call the Everett Police after Ms Trask walked into my Taamu's house without knocking or without a warrant & attempted to grab one of the pitbull terriers.

Shortly there after Ms Taamu took another terrier from a teen who was hanging the dog by it's leash which only exhaserbated the harassment even further. After much careful thought & consideration, Ms Taamu made the heart-wrenching decision to give the dogs away for their own safety as she was sure that one day Taamu moved from the City 3) In 2009 Ms Taamu was realizing her dream of starting an animal rescue, & first in line was her dream of rescuing the pit bull Terriers from Everett Animal Services. After receiving many dogs a disturbing trend emerged, all of the dogs were injured, maced or both. After complaining about it, her pulling priveledges were suspended without reason, except that one of the animal control officers had complained about the accusations. (Triggering whistleblower) 4) In January of 2011 Ms Taamu was homeless & staying at a woman house in her driveway with her animals. On January 4th Ms Trask showed up & further harassed Ms Taamu. Ms Taamu had a water bottle in her hand, Ms Trask asked if she had water in the car for the dogs, Ms Taamu said no it was in her hands, Off. Trask it had to be in the car, Ms Taamu said it was in her hand because she had car. At this point Ms Taamu realized she was only there to harass her & left the area because of her fears about retaliation from 2009 & 2002. 5) On January, 6th, 2011 Ms Trask showed up with a warrant to take Ms Taamu's animals. All of the animals were warm & dry because everyone was asleep inside the vehicle when she showed up. At which point: A) Ms Trask took numerous pictures B) Ms Trask refused to give Ms Taamu the warrant C) Ms Trask camera was not date stamped just filled it back up, at which point Ms Trask once again said it had to be in the

she would come home from work & they would be gone. Shortly thereafter Ms

D) Ms Trask did not leave Ms Taamu any notice of her legal remedies as required by law
RCW 16.52.085. Notice requirements after removal of personal property by authorities is provided in paragraph (3). After removal of animals, notice must be provided by posting, personal service or certified mail and the owner must be provided written notice of the reasons for removal in this notice and legal remedies available to the owner.

6) The animal were seized illegally because they were not in any life threatening situation or condition & they had not been abandoned pursuant to RCW 16.52.085 7) The animals were not considered contraband & Ms Taamu is the rightful owners of these dogs and cats, Ms Taamu's property in dogs and cats is not contraband, statutory procedures for seizure of property have not been

followed, and the seized property in pets must be returned to the the rightful owner. If the state argues that the pets are derivative contraband and that Ms Taamu is somehow guilty of a crime, the government must follow property dogs and cats. forfeiture procedures to divest petitioners of their interest in their property in
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. At 699; Cooper, 904 F.2d at 305; Farrell, 606 F. 2d at 1344; David v. Fowler, 504 F. Supp. At 505, cf from State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3 (4/2/92).

8) Washington courts often look to federal law to determine lawful forfeiture

procedures. Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutory procedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture and must release the petitioners' property. A court does not have inherent authority to forfeit property. See, State v. Alaway, 64 Wn. App. 796, 828 P.2d 591, p. 3

(4/2/92). The government gave no notice, so petitioners are not bound by any time frame to reclaim their property which is still in impound in Everett Wa. In the case of the seizure of an owner's property in pets for feeding and care, as in this matter, the seizure and forfeiture provisions in RCW 16.52.085 appear to track Washington State's civil forfeiture statute RCW 69.50 et seq. and federal law notice procedures. The proper procedures by statute are enumerated above. Petitioners received no lawful notice and Ms Taamu's due process rights were violated.

RCW 69.50.505Seizure and forfeiture. If any person notifies the seizing law enforcement agency in writing of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession of items specified in subsection (1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), or (h) of this section within forty-five days of the service of notice from the seizing agency in the case of personal property and ninety days in the case of real property, the person or persons shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the claim or right. The notice of claim may be served by any method authorized by law or court rule including, but not limited to, service by first-class mail. Service by mail shall be deemed complete upon mailing within the forty-five day period following service of the notice of seizure in the case of personal property and within the ninety-day period following service of the notice of seizure in the case of real property. The hearing shall be before the chief law enforcement officer of the seizing agency or the chief law enforcement officer's designee, except where the seizing agency is a state agency as defined in RCW 34.12.020(4), the hearing shall be before the chief law enforcement officer of the seizing agency or an administrative law judge appointed under chapter 34.12 RCW, except that any person asserting a claim or right may remove the matter to a court of competent jurisdiction. Removal of any matter involving personal property may only be accomplished according to the rules of civil procedure. The person seeking removal of the matter must serve process against the state, county, political subdivision, or municipality that operates the seizing agency, and any other party of interest, in accordance with RCW 4.28.080 or 4.92.020, within forty-five days after the person seeking removal has notified the seizing law enforcement agency of the person's claim of ownership or right to possession. The court to which the matter is to be removed shall be the district court when the aggregate value of personal property is within the jurisdictional limit set forth in RCW 3.66.020. A hearing before the seizing agency and any appeal therefrom shall be under Title 34 RCW. In all cases, the burden of proof is upon the law enforcement agency to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture. 69.50.505(a)(2). Notice must be given within 15 days of seizure. RCW 69.50.505(c). If the property is personal property, one claiming an interest in it then has 45 days to respond, and if a response is made, a hearing must be held. RCW 69.50.505(d), (e ). Washington State's forfeiture statutes are exclusive. Unless statutory procedure are followed, a Washington court cannot order forfeiture and must release the petitioners' property. The seizing law enforcement agency shall promptly return the article or articles to the claimant upon a determination by the administrative law judge or court that the claimant is the present lawful owner or is lawfully entitled to possession thereof of items specified in subsection (1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), or (h) of this section.

9) In regards to the euthanasia of George amounting to permanent deprivation of

property & the continued impound of Ms Taamu's animals/property Ms

Taamu's due process rights have been blatantly trampled on. There is no question that client has a protected property interest in the ownership of these
Pasco v. Reihl, 635 So.2d 17 (S.Ct. 1994). In the instant case, the petitioner's private

animals, and the seizure and impoundment of these dogs triggers due process,
property was subject to, among other things, physical confinement, and muzzling. In the aggregate, these restrictions are a deprivation of property and before such restrictions are imposed, a property owner must be afforded an opportunity to be heard. Ms Taamu has suffered a deprivation of property without benefit of a hearing, and such violation was a violation of client's procedural due process rights. Id. at 19. See also, Mansour v. King, 131
Wash. App. 255 (Wash. App.2006) and Philips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept. of Animal Regulation, 183 Ca. App. 3d 372 (Cal. App. 1986). The deprivation here is unquestionably

more severe than Pasco, as this case involves destruction; a total, complete and final

deprivation of Ms Taamu's property rights. Where the property was forfeited without constitutionally adequate notice to the claimant, the courts must provide relief, either by vacating the default judgment, or by allowing a collateral suit. See Seguin v Eide, 720 F2d
1046 (9th Cir. 1983), on remand after judgment vacated, 462 U.S.1101,103 S. Ct. 2446 (1983); Wiren v Eide, 542 F2d 757 (9th Cir. 1976). Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics, 463 F2d 88 (3rd Cir. 1972); Jaekel v United States, 304 F Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y 1969); Glup v United States, 523 F2d 557, 560 (8th Cir. 1975). (See FED. R. CIV. P. Supplemental Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions Rule A(1)(B) (making rules applicable to forfeiture actions in rem arising from a federal statute) Where a person has been deprived of property in a manner contrary to the most basic tenets of due process, "it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits." Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 35 S. Ct. 625, 629, 59 L. Ed. 1027 (1915). As we observed in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965), only

"wiping the slate clean ... would have restored the petitioner to the position he would have occupied had due process of law been accorded to him in the first place." The Due Process Clause demands no less in this case. Peralta, supra, 108 U.S. at 898-99, 900.

The defendant would also like to add something to the statement of facts, possibly the most important thing. You have desecrated Georges body & refused to return him to defendant, so that he can be washed, wrapped, blessed & set free from his earthly bounds. He holds no further evidence, & defendant would request that you take the numerous vital organs & if you still have posession of those or his body & return them immediately, this would & does constitute CRUEL & UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT for a crime he was never guilty of nor that defendant as yet to be convicted of & withholding information about defendants animals, & further secreting them away constitutes theft according to RCW 9.56.020. Defendant requests he be returned for ceremony & so far thin Native American woman, as such, Defendant follow Native beliefs, ways & demand his body be returned immediately. 10) The policies enforced by Animal Care & Control are not law & thereby not

you have refused. As so MANY times stated in your officers reports, yes defendant is a practices & what you have done to him amounts to a FEDERAL CRIME & Defendant

enforceable & in fact are unconstitutional in regards to refusing Ms Taamu access to her animals or to send a vet into the shelter to check the animals thereby destroying any chance she had to defend herself, & further amounting to cruel & unusual punishment for a crime she was not yet convicted of. It is not the intent of the

Constitution or laws of the United States that a person be punished before they have been convicted & sentenced by a court of law & or a jury of their peers, in direct violation of numerous Amendments, Federal Laws & state laws 8th Amendment
In United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), the Supreme Court ruled that it was

unconstitutional to take $357,144 from a person who failed to report his taking of more than $10,000 in U.S. currency out of the United States.[29] In what was the first case in which the Supreme Court ruled a fine to violate the Excessive Fines Clause,[30] the Court ruled that it was "grossly disproportional" to take all of the money which Mr. Bajakajian attempted to take out of the United States without reporting trying to do so. In describing what constituted "gross disproportionality," the Court could not find any guidance from the history of the Excessive Fines Clause and so relied on Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause case law: We must therefore rely on other considerations in deriving a constitutional excesiveness standard, and there are two that we find particularly relevant. The first, which we have emphasized in our cases interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, is that judgments about the appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) (Reviewing courts should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes); see also Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment, these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy). The second is that any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular criminal offense will be inherently imprecise. Both of these principles counsel against requiring strict proportionality between the amount of a punitive forfeiture and the gravity of a criminal offense, and we therefore adopt the standard of gross disproportionality articulated in our Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, supra, at 288; Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980).

11) Mr James Iles & Mr Mike Fisher did seek to deprive Ms Taamu of her legal

rights as guaranteed by the 5th Amendment to not incriminate herself during a hearing in Superior court in which Ms Taamu was requesting the return of her animals, thereby giving away her case in it's entirity with which the City of Everett used to amend their complaint & further argue that they were not bound federal laws as evidenced by the states exhibits of RCW 35.01.010 & RCW

by the United States Constitution, the Washington Constitution & various state & 35.22.010 & in direct disregards of Rules for a Prosecutor 3.8 did seek to defame Ms Taamu with facts not in evidence, by stating she Fancied herself a dog rescuer it seems at one time the City of Everett Shelter also fancied Ms Taamu as a dog rescuer as well, as evidenced by the dogs they released to her custody some of which they actually solicited her to take & accusing her of a crime of moral cynical person might wonder if Ms Taamu kept her terminally ill dog alive to In direct violation of turpitude with which there was no proof & which she was not charged with A garner funds & donations a statement made by Mr Iles & presented by Mr Fisher.

RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel; (c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right

to a preliminary hearing; (f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule 526 State v. Boehning May 2005 127 Wn. App. 511 ANALYSIS Prosecutorial Misconduct [1]19 We begin our discussion with an obvious truism: Every prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer of the court, charged with the duty of insuring that an accused receives a fair trial. State v. Coles , 28 Wn. App. 563 , 573, 625 P.2d 713, review denied , 95 Wn.2d 1024 (1981); State v. Huson , 73 Wn.2d 660 , 663, 440 P.2d 192 (1968), cert. denied , 393 U.S. 1096 (1969). We hold that the prosecutors misconduct in this case violated that duty, both in the closing argument and in the presentation of evidence. [2]20 In order to establish prosecutorial misconduct, Boehning must show that the prosecutors conduct was improper and prejudiced his right to a fair trial. State v. Dhaliwal , 150 Wn.2d 559 , 578, 79 P.3d 432 (2003). Prejudice is established where there is a substantial likelihood the instances of misconduct affected the jurys verdict. Dhaliwal , 150 Wn.2d at 578 (quoting State v. Pirtle , 127 Wn.2d 628 , 672, 904 P.2d 245 (1995), cert. denied , 518 U.S. 1026 (1996)). [3, 4]21 Boehning did not object to the prosecutors questioning and arguments below. A defendant who fails to object to an improper remark waives the right to assert prosecutorial misconduct unless the remark was so flagrant and ill intentioned that it causes enduring and resulting prejudice that a curative instruction could not have remedied. State v. Russell , 125 Wn.2d 24 , 86, 882 P.2d 747 (1994), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1129 (1995). In determining whether the misconduct warrants reversal, we consider its prejudicial nature and its cumulative effect. State v. Suarez-Bravo , 72 Wn. App. 359 , 367, 864 P.2d 426 (1994). [5, 6]23 We review a prosecutors comments during closing argument in the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the jury instructions. Dhaliwal , 150 Wn.2d at 578 ; State v. Brown , 132 Wn.2d 529 , 561, 940 P.2d 546 (1997), cert. denied , 523 U.S. 1007 (1998). A prosecutor has wide latitude in closing argument to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and to express such inferences to the jury. State v. Hoffman , 116 Wn.2d 51 , 94-95, 804 P.2d 577 (1991). However, a prosecutor may not make statements that are unsupported by the evidence and prejudice the defendant. State v. Jones , 71 Wn. App. 798 , 808, 863 P.2d 85 (1993), review denied , 124 Wn.2d 1018 (1994). 134 Wn. App. 907, Sept. 2006 State v. Perez-Mejia DISCUSSION Prosecutorial Misconduct 30 In closing argument, the prosecutor appealed to the jurys passions and prejudices, urging jurors to base a guilty verdict on a goal of sending a message to gangs or taking part in a mission to end violence, rather than returning a verdict based upon a consideration of the evidence properly admitted in the case. The majority of this improper argument followed a timely objection interposed by Soto-Rodriguezs counsel. The trial court overruled this objection and, thus, no curative instruction was given. We conclude that the prosecutors improper argument irreparably damaged the fairness of the trial and diminishes our confidence in the verdict reached. As a result, Soto-Rodriguezs conviction must be reversed and a new trial held. [1-3]31 Prosecutors have a duty to seek verdicts free from appeals to passion or prejudice. State v. Belgarde , 110 Wn.2d 504 , 507, 755 P.2d 174 (1988); State v. Echevarria , 71 Wn. App. 595, 598, 860 P.2d 420 (1993).7Accordingly, a prosecutor engages in misconduct when making an argument that appeals to jurors fear and repudiation of criminal groups or invokes racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice as a reason to convict. Belgarde , 110 Wn.2d 504 . Likewise, inflammatory remarks, incitements to vengeance, exhortations to join a war against crime or drugs, or appeals to prejudice or patriotism are forbidden. State v. Neidigh , 78 Wn. App. 71 , 79, 895 P.2d 423 (1995).8In closing argument, a prosecuting attorney has wide latitude to draw and express reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Hoffman , 116 Wn.2d 51 , 94-95, 804 P.2d 577 (1991). However, a prosecutor may never suggest that evidence not presented at trial provides additional grounds for finding a defendant guilty. State v. Russell , 125 Wn.2d 24 , 87, 882 P.2d 747 (1994) (citing United States v. Garza , 608 F.2d 659, 663 (5th Cir.

1979)). 7This principle is one of long standing. Almost three decades ago, our Supreme Court explained:

In presenting a criminal case to the jury, it is incumbent upon a public prosecutor, as a quasijudicial officer, to seek a verdict free of prejudice and based upon reason. As we have stated on numerous occasions, the prosecutor, in the interest of justice, must act impartially, and his trial behavior must be worthy of the position he holds. Prosecutorial misconduct may deprive the defendant of a fair trial. And only a fair trial is a constitutional trial. State v. Charlton , 90 Wn.2d
657 , 664-65, 585 P.2d 142 (1978). 8Federal courts addressing these issues have likewise held that it is improper for a prosecutor to urge the jury to view this case as a battle in the war against drugs, and the defendants as enemy soldiers, Arrieta-Agressot v. United States , 3 F.3d 525, 527 (1st Cir. 1993), that the constitution prohibits appeals to racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice, United States v. Cabrera , 222 F.3d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 2000), and that it is improper for a prosecutor to direct the jurors desires to end a social problem toward convicting a particular defendant. United States v. Solivan , 937 F.2d 1146, 1153 (6th Cir. 1991) (reversing based on prosecutors call to send a message to drug dealers, notwithstanding curative instruction given by trial court). 125 Wn. App. 895, State v. Jungers Court of Appeals: Holding that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct at trial by attempting to elicit opinion testimony as to the defendants guilt and by arguing stricken credibility testimony to the jury, and that the trial court erred by denying the defendants motion for a mistrial based on the prosecutorial misconduct, the court reverses the judgment and remands the case for further proceedings. Pattie Mhoon , for appellant . Gerald A. Horne , Prosecuting Attorney, and John M. Sheeran , Deputy, for respondent . 1 HUNT , J . Lisa D. Jungers appeals her conviction for unlawful possession of methamphetamine. She argues (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence seized during an illegal search of probationer Michael Hodgkins residence, (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct in eliciting and arguing inadmissible opinion evidence, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Jungers motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. Holding that the search and seizure were legal, we affirm the trial courts ruling that the methamphetamine was admissible. Holding further that prosecutorial misconduct required a mistrial, we reverse. ANALYSIS PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 17 Jungers argues (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting inadmissible credibility testimony and arguing stricken credibility testimony to the jury, and (2) the trial court erred by denying her motion for a mistrial based on this prosecutorial misconduct. A. Standard of Review [1]18 A criminal defendants right to a fair trial is denied when the prosecutor makes improper comments and there is a substantial likelihood that the comments affected the jurys verdict. State v. Reed , 102 Wn.2d 140 , 145, 684 P.2d 699 (1984). Such is the case here. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 108 (1945). This section was before us in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, where we said: Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under color of state law. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 109 (1945). For it was abuse of basic civil and political rights, by states and their officials, that the Amendment and the enforcing legislation were adopted to uproot. The danger was not merely legislative or judicial. Nor was it threatened only from the states highest officials. It was abuse by whatever agency the state might invest with its power capable of inflicting the deprivation. In all its flux, time makes some things axiomatic. One has been that state officials who violate their oaths of office and flout 117*117 the fundamental law are answerable to it when their misconduct brings upon them the penalty it authorizes and Congress has provided. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 116-7 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. It is not open to question that this statute is constitutional. . . [It] dealt with Federal rights and with all Federal rights, and protected them in the lump . . . United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 386, 387. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 119 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. Separately, and often together in application, 19 and 20 have been woven into our fundamental and statutory law. They have place among our more permanent legal achievements. They have safeguarded many rights and privileges apart from political ones. Among those buttressed, either by

direct application or through the general conspiracy statute, 37 (18 U.S.C. 88),[24] are the rights to a fair trial, including freedom from sham trials [including sham Collection Due Process Hearings] ; to be free from arrest and detention by methods constitutionally forbidden and from extortion of property [by threat of levy, lien, or lockdown letters] by such methods; from extortion of confessions; from mob action incited or shared by state officers; from failure to furnish police protection on proper occasion and demand; from interference with the free exercise of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of speech and assembly;[25] and 127*127 the necessary import of the decisions is that the right to be free from deprivation of life itself, without due process of law, that is, through abuse of state power by state officials, is as fully protected as other rights so secured. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 126-7 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result. They simply misconceived that the victim had no federal rights and that what they had done was not a crime within the federal power to penalize.[30] That kind of error relieves no one from penalty. Screws v. United States, 325 US 91, 128 (1945) Mr. Justice Rutledge, concurring in the result.

12) It would seem that Ms Taamu has an affirmative defense, but the prosecutor & the city are still pursuing charges, so much so that in order to garner a case against Ms Taamu they dropped 3 gross misdemeanor charges against the states witness in exchange for testimony against Ms Taamu for 1 misdemeanor. Again in direct conflict with Rules 3.8 Also clearly showing the malicious intent with Ms Taamu is being charged. It should also be noted that Ms adams began her campaign request a hearing for those very same infractions. Rose Adams Cause# IN0128726 against Ms Taamu on the same day she came to the Everett Municipal Court to

6 Charges, 3 of dangerous dog running at large, 3 of failure to display license, amended to 3 counts of failure to display license on Mar/4/2011
RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) RCW 16.52.207

refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;
(4) In any prosecution of animal cruelty in the second degree under subsection (1) or (2)(a) of this section, it shall be an affirmative defense, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's failure was due to economic distress beyond the defendant's control.

13) On numerous occasions Ms Adams sent numerous emails out about Ms Taamu & made hundreds of postings on craigslist about the case where she stated

that Animal Control officers were sharing private information with Ms Adams, which were false, & as recently as the beginning of August Ms Adams went on another posting campaign against Ms Taamu releasing her private info, & court date, a behavior that seems to be instigated by the City of Everett & it's agents by further giving her information about Ms Taamu (Please note these are only 2 of animal rescue networks & media) the numerous emails that Ms Adams sent out to literally hundreds of people in the

RCW 9A.36.078 Malicious harassment Finding. The legislature finds that crimes and threats against persons because of their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicaps are serious and increasing. The legislature also finds that crimes and threats are often directed against interracial couples and their children or couples of mixed religions, colors, ancestries, or national origins because of bias and bigotry against the race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin of one person in the couple or family. The legislature finds that the state interest in preventing crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias goes beyond the state interest in preventing other felonies or misdemeanors such as criminal trespass, malicious mischief, assault, or other crimes that are not motivated by hatred, bigotry, and bias, and that prosecution of those other crimes inadequately protects citizens from crimes and threats motivated by bigotry and bias. Therefore, the legislature finds that protection of those citizens from threats of harm due to bias and bigotry is a compelling state interest. The legislature also finds that in many cases, certain discrete words or symbols are used to threaten the victims. Those discrete words or symbols have historically or traditionally been used to connote hatred or threats towards members of the class of which the victim or a member of the victim's family or household is a member. In particular, the legislature finds that cross burnings historically and traditionally have been used to threaten, terrorize, intimidate, and harass African Americans and their families. Cross burnings often preceded lynchings, murders, burning of homes, and other acts of terror. Further, Nazi swastikas historically and traditionally have been used to threaten, terrorize, intimidate, and harass Jewish people and their families. Swastikas symbolize the massive destruction of the Jewish population, commonly known as the holocaust. Therefore, the legislature finds that any person who burns or attempts to burn a cross or displays a swastika on the property of the victim or burns a cross or displays a swastika as part of a series of acts directed towards a particular person, the person's family or household members, or a particular group, knows or reasonably should know that the cross burning or swastika may create a reasonable fear of harm in the mind of the person, the person's family and household members, or the group. The legislature also finds that a hate crime committed against a victim because of the victim's gender may be identified in the same manner that a hate crime committed against a victim of another protected group is identified. Affirmative indications of hatred towards gender as a class is the predominant factor to consider. Other factors to consider include the perpetrator's use of language, slurs, or symbols expressing hatred towards the victim's gender as a class; the severity of the attack including mutilation of the victim's sexual organs; a history of similar attacks against victims of the same gender by the perpetrator or a history of similar incidents in the same area; a lack of provocation; an absence of any other apparent motivation; and common sense.

Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2011 11:13:13 -0800 From: stopanimalabuseandfraud@yahoo.com Subject: Brandia Taamu/Fake Pet Rescuer/Does Not Have A 501(c)3/Frauding & Scamming For Money & Donations/All Her Animals Were Removed, by Everett Animal Control This Month!!! To: animalcarenetwork@yahoogroups.com; information@popptricities.org; cascadeanimal@yahoo.com;

melissa_companionanimal@hotmail.com; info@kindredsoulsfoundation.org; perrin@savinggreatanimals.org; spot@savingpetsoneatatime.org; violet@ucarerescue.com; sccpets@yahoo.com; drawashington@hotmail.com; info@vipp.org; dogs@vipp.org; sandjswanson@juno.com; info@paws.org; amy@seattlehumane.org; xol@drizzle.com; southsoundadoptions@gmail.com; vickijimniles@msn.com; dogfarm@gmail.com; andreanelson2005@yahoo.com; WECARE161@hotmail.com; angelahoschek@msn.com Brandia Taamu came to stay at a friends home 32 days ago. She NEVER once let her animals out of her car the whole time she stayed there, even though she was asked over and over again to let the animals get out and exercise, and to come into the house. Brandias car stinks badly of cat urine, dog urine, and feces!! There are worms in her car all over, because her animals need to be treated, and they had Giardia too! When animal control came with several police cars there was NO WATER OR FOOD AVAILABLE FOR THE ANIMALS!!! Brandia claims you can not give them an endless supply of water, because they will pee all over her car. Animal Control of Everett recieved NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS. AC came with a search warrant, and took all her animals. Also, animal control displayed on their computer that Brandia has actually dumped off dogs at the Everett Animal Control. The last time which was two dogs, a Husky mix, and the other one said Golden Lab/Retriever. ===================================================================== From: roseandgeorge@hotmail.com To: animalcarenetwork@yahoogroups.com; information@popptricities.org; cascadeanimal@yahoo.com; melissa_companionanimal@hotmail.com; info@kindredsoulsfoundation.org; perrin@savinggreatanimals.org; spot@savingpetsoneatatime.org; violet@ucarerescue.com; sccpets@yahoo.com; drawashington@hotmail.com; info@vipp.org; dogs@vipp.org; sandjswanson@juno.com; info@paws.org; amy@seattlehumane.org; xol@drizzle.com; southsoundadoptions@gmail.com; vickijimniles@msn.com; dogfarm@gmail.com; andreanelson2005@yahoo.com; wecare161@hotmail.com; angelahoschek@msn.com; betshar@fairpoint.net; rr_flores@comcast.net; outwestpetrescue@yahoo.com; thebigdogproject@yahoo.com; dogs@homewardpet.org; dmelsha@charter.net; rescue@cprgroup.org; toni@happytailsrescue.com; washingtonshepherds@yahoo.com; pattyk@folcas.org; jme@motleyzoo.org; marthalight@aol.com; sandy@animalnature.com; wigglesandwags@comcast.net; musicaldreams@gmail.com; dyarchak@q.com; camelot@gemsi.com; catherine.m.wilson@gmail.com; info@peopleunitedforpets.com; elleny@comcast.net; puglady@hotmail.com; nwinternationalpetrescue@gmail.com; shannon@loveamutt.org; lynn@loveamutt.org; cmanning23@comcast.net; crimis@msn.com; linda.logan@myquiznos.com Subject: Why Brandia Taamus dogs & cats were taken! Date: Sun, 16 Jan 2011 07:22:11 -0800 Anyone who has any questions about WHY Brandia Taamus dogs were taken by Everett Animal Control can call them, or they can call me at Ph# 425-750-7126, since they came to my house with a search warrant for Brandia Taamus car, and took her animals that were extremely dehydrated! By the way, they WERE NOT here for my animals, and I offered to let them look at my animals, but they were not interested they said there sole interest was in Brandias car, because of the NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS REGARDING BRANDIA TAAMU. Two days earlier, Animal Control was here to see Brandia, and Brandia REFUSED to let them see the animals in her car, which DID NOT have water then either, and as the woman was writing down Brandias plated number, Brandia floored it backwards down my long driveway almost running the AC officer down, and almost hitting my neighbors fence! My driveway curves, and is very long. Brandia is lying to everyone saying she came to stay at my house on Christmas Day, and that is a lie. There are NUMEROUS witnesses that she has been here since December 12th, 2010 after she was evicted from her house. She refused to take her animals out of the car even when Sadie was not here for days on end, and was with my son at his dads. Those animals that Brandia had were suffering. Everett Animal Control had to call me the other day to tell me I have to take all my animals in to be checked, because Brandias animals all had Giardia & Worms. The dogs Brandia took to Christines (the Eskies) all had Giardia too! She took those dogs to Christine BEFORE she ever came to my house. Animal Control aslo said that the animal garbage which Brandia shoved under our car trailer, and has NEVER cleaned up, along with the blankets that were in her car, AND NOW ON OUR GROUND, that are covered in her dogs & cats urine & feces is CONTAMINATED WITH GIARDIA!!! I can not let my dogs in the front yard at all, because thanks to Brandia our ground is contaminated! Brandia has sent out numerous

postings lying to everyone about WHY her animals were taken. They were not taken because she was homeless, which really is not true, because she has been with us since December 12th, when one of your fosters asked me to take her in. Her dogs and cats were taken because she NEVER IN 3 PLUS WEEKS LET THEM OUT OF HER CAR, AND THEY HAD NO WATER WHEN ANIMAL CONTROL SHOWED UP!!! Also, remember that Animal Control DOES NOT take someones animals without evidence that they are abused or neglected! Brandia is facing criminal charges, for many reasons. BRANDIA TAAMU NEEDS TO TELL THE TRUTH!!! Rose

14) Sharing of personal Information is in direct conflict with numerous state & federal statutes as well

42.23.070 Prohibited acts. (4) No municipal officer may disclose confidential information gained by reason of the officers position, nor may the officer otherwise use such information for his or her personal gain or benefit. 42.52.020 Activities incompatible with public duties. No state officer or state employee may have an interest, financial or otherwise, direct or indirect, or engage in a business or transaction or professional activity, or incur an obligation of any nature, that is in conflict with the proper discharge of the state officers or state employees official duties. 42.52.050 Confidential information Improperly concealed records. (1) No state officer or state employee may accept employment or engage in any business or professional activity that the officer or employee might reasonably expect would require or induce him or her to make an unauthorized disclosure of confidential information acquired by the official or employee by reason of the officials or employees official position. (2) No state officer or state employee may make a disclosure of confidential information gained by reason of the officers or employees official position or otherwise use the information for his or her personal gain or benefit or the gain or benefit of another(3) No state officer or state employee may disclose confidential information to any person not entitled or authorized to receive the information.

15) Officer Ingrid Weaver either lied, or Ms Trask lied on a statement to the court saying that Ms Taamu's vet had been worried about her dogs for years, when in fact they had only been Ms Taamu's vet for several months. It is uncertain into evidence by Off Trask whether Officer Weaver made these statements as they were entered as hearsay

42.20.040 False report. Every public officer who shall knowingly make any false or misleading statement in any official report or statement, under circumstances not otherwise prohibited by law, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor. 42.20.050 Public officer making false certificate. Every public officer who, being authorized by law to make or give a certificate or other writing, shall

knowingly make and deliver as true such a certificate or writing containing any statement which he knows to be false, in a case where the punishment thereof is not expressly prescribed by law, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor. RCW 40.16.030 Offering false instrument for filing or record. Every person who shall knowingly procure or offer any false or forged instrument to be filed, registered, or recorded in any public office, which instrument, if genuine, might be filed, registered or recorded in such office under any law of this state or of the United States, is guilty of a class C felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not more than five years, or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or by both.

16) Malicious intent is more than clear & supported by facts in evidence throughout statements 1 through 15. Malicious Prosecution is a waste of tax payer monies & a clear violation of Ms Taamu's rights as a Natural born citizen of these United States of America & the 14th amendment of these United States
RCW 9.62.010 Malicious prosecution. Every person who shall, maliciously and without probable cause therefor, cause or attempt to cause another to be arrested or proceeded against for any crime of which he or she is innocent: (1) If such crime be a felony, is guilty of a class C felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not more than five years; and (2) If such crime be a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. [2003 c 53 40; 1992 c 7 15; 1909 c 249 117; Code 1881 899; 1873 p 203 98; 1854 p 92 89; RRS 2369.] RCW 9A.36.080 Malicious harassment Definition and criminal penalty. (1) A person is guilty of malicious harassment if he or she maliciously and intentionally commits one of the following acts because of his or her perception of the victim's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap: (b) Causes physical damage to or destruction of the property of the victim or another person; or (2) In any prosecution for malicious harassment, unless evidence exists which explains to the trier of fact's satisfaction that the person did not intend to threaten the victim or victims, the trier of fact may infer that the person intended to threaten a specific victim or group of victims because of the person's perception of the victim's or victims' race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap if the person commits one of the following acts: This subsection only applies to the creation of a reasonable inference for evidentiary purposes. This subsection does not restrict the state's ability to prosecute a person under subsection (1) of this section when the facts of a particular case do not fall within (a) or (b) of this subsection. (3) It is not a defense that the accused was mistaken that the victim was a member of a certain race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, or sexual orientation, or had a mental, physical, or sensory handicap. (4) Evidence of expressions or associations of the accused may not be introduced as substantive evidence

at trial unless the evidence specifically relates to the crime charged. Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rules of evidence governing impeachment of a witness. (b) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly, the intent to: (i) Cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or (ii) Cause physical damage immediately or in the future to the property of a person threatened or that of any other person. (7) Malicious harassment is a class C felony. (8) The penalties provided in this section for malicious harassment do not preclude the victims from seeking any other remedies otherwise available under law. (9) Nothing in this section confers or expands any civil rights or protections to any group or class identified under this section, beyond those rights or protections that exist under the federal or state Constitution or the civil laws of the state of Washington. [2010 c 119 1; 2009 c 180 1; 1993 c 127 2; 1989 c 95 1; 1984 c 268 1; 1981 c 267 1.] Notes: Severability -- 1993 c 127: See note following RCW 9A.36.078. Construction -- 1989 c 95: "The provisions of this act shall be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purpose." [1989 c 95 3.] Severability -- 1989 c 95: "If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the act or the application of the provision to other persons or circumstances is not affected." [1989 c 95 4.] Harassment: Chapters 9A.46 and 10.14 RCW.

17) After 8 months the state is still with-holding critical evidence in regards to Ms Taamu's case, including pictures taken at the scene, which show her dogs, & the stated before & up til now Ms Taamu's defense has only received grainy poor left rear side of her car, keeping in mind none of the pictures were date stamped as quality black & white photo-copies, the vet records were only received 2 days before trial & they were also of poor quality & cut & pasted out of chronologial given without which Ms Taamu has no defense nor would she have time to acquire an expert witness to even look at such faulty records. order, the original color photo's & original vet as well as lab records were never

Prosecutors have ethical and professional obligations to turn over exculpatory information to defendants pursuant to the rules of professional conduct. . Generally speaking, those ethical and professional obligations do not hinge on whether the information to be provided to defendants may be said to be material in any sense. Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the Model Rules) states that a prosecutor shall make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal. Although the Model Rules serve as guidance only, almost every state has adopted enforceable rules of professional conduct that are identical to or based upon the Model Rules. Failure of a prosecutor to abide by applicable ethical rules can result in a range of sanctions, including, in particularly egregious circumstances, disbarment. The government has what is sometimes referred to as a Super-Brady obligation to disclose information beyond that which is material to guilt as articulated in Kyles v. Whitley (citations omitted) and Strickler v. Greene (citations omitted). The government must disclose information that is inconsistent

with any element of any crime charged against the defendant or that establishes a recognized affirmative defense, regardless of whether the prosecutor believes such information will make the difference between conviction and acquittal of the defendant for a charged crime. This also requires disclosure of information that either casts a substantial doubt upon the accuracy of any evidence including but not limited to witness testimony the prosecutor intends to rely on to prove an element of any crime charged, or might have a significant bearing on the admissibility of prosecution evidence.

18) This case is not about prosecution by any means necessary, and the prosecutor is failing to meet its most basic discovery obligations. The Supreme Courts directed that a criminal trial is a search for the truth. This case is troubling in its failure to produce exculpatory evidence in violation of the law. In particular,

1) The 20 plus emails back & forth between Rose Adams & several of the EAS staff, law enforcement, as well as the prosecutors office & , along with all electronic communication as well as any communication made in writing days this time please 2) Lab results showing all of the results of any tests done on the dogs with the correct 3) A more descriptive explanation of what video taped audio taped & photographic evidence you are going to present as well as the originals for authentication. It is requested that Grant Fredricks do the authentication..

4) All documents you plan on presenting in great detail- Other tangible evidence is vague & dangerous in that it leaves the door open for the state to introduce anything without giving Ms Taamu's defense an opportunity to review & prepare for it. We too vague & non descriptive. request a COMPLETE listing of what is described as any other tangible objects it is 5) Rough notes by state agents memorializing converations with the complaining witness Rose Adams, Jennifer Speelmon, & Mike Zachman 6) Any & all communications between the prosecutor, Rose Adams, & any other

witness, or complainant as well as the any & all communication between EAC & the prosecutors office, whether it be audio recordings or emails complete with time & date stamp verification 9) I requested a subpeona of Rose Adams Craigslist account to present the more than 100 ads she posted about me in a matter of days slandering me & defaming me. 10) The credentials as well as the names of your expert witnesses , as previously requested by Defendant. 11) Disclosure of settlement with Rose Adams in regard to her pending animal control charges in relation to her testimony in my case. Disposition of the pending case in

regards to the animal control matter & the final outcome & agreement. 12) An exact accounting of the costs of lab work, housing my animals, vet care, trial costs impound costs, cost of Necropsy, court costs per day per appearance, & an estimate of 13) Rough notes by state agents memorializing converations with the complaining witness Rose Adams outcomes The prosecutions position seems to be that the virtue of its case sanctifies the means chosen to achieve conviction. This argument cannot prevail in a legal system that is designed to ensure fairness in the proceeding when each side follows the rules. Our Useful falsehoods are particularly dangerous in a criminal case, where the cost of wrongful conviction cannot be measured in the impact on the accused alone. Such tainted proof inevitably undermines the process, casting a dark shadow not only of the state over the individual. No man should go free nor lose his liberty on the strength of false, misleading or incomplete proof. To date, the prosecution has violated its constitutional obligations to the defendants, 14) Detailed copy of Rose Adams entire criminal history, charges, dispositions &

confidence in the fairness of our system is rooted in the belief that our process is sound.

on the concept of fairness, but also on the purpose of the exercise of the coercive power

the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and other U.S. and state authorities. Prosecutors have an affirmative duty to comply with the Constitution, the Rules of Criminal Procedure and orders from the court. That duty includes the affirmative responsibility to learn of any evidence favorable to the accused and to disclose such evidence in a timely manner so that it can be effectively used by the accused. The government has violated its pertinent to the credibility of its complaining witnesses and other information previously requested by defendant. This includes all information in any form, whether or not admissible, that tends to: (a) exculpate the defendant; (b) adversely impact the credibility of prosecutors witnesses or evidence; (c) mitigate the offense; or (d) mitigate punishment. solemn obligation and duty in this case by suppressing or withholding material proof

19) If the Court does not grant Defendants motion to dismiss, namely, defendant requests that the government disclose information that is inconsistent with any element of any crime charged against the defendant or that establishes a recognized affirmative defense, regardless of whether the prosecutor believes such information will make the difference between conviction and acquittal of the defendant for a charged crime. Defendant further moves for an order allowing a hearing on the credibility of Rose Adams
RULE CrRLJ 4.7 DISCOVERY (a) Prosecuting Authority's Obligations. (1) Except as otherwise provided by protective orders or as to matters not subject to disclosure, the prosecuting authority shall, upon written demand, disclose to the defendant the following material and information within his or her possession or control concerning: (i) the names and addresses of persons whom the prosecuting authority intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial, together with any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements of such witnesses; (ii) any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant, or made by a codefendant if the trial is to be a joint one; (iii) any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons; (iv) any books, papers, documents, photographs, or tangible objects which the prosecuting authority intends to use in the hearing or trial or which were obtained from or belonged to the defendant; (v) any record of prior criminal convictions known to the prosecuting authority of the defendant and of persons whom the prosecuting authority intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial; (vi) any electronic surveillance, including wiretapping, of the defendant's premises or conversations to which the defendant was a party and any record thereof; (vii) any expert witnesses whom the prosecuting authority will call at the hearing or trial, the subject of their testimony, and any reports relating to the subject of their testimony that they have submitted to the prosecuting authority; (viii) any information indicating entrapment of the defendant; (ix) specified searches and seizures; (x) the acquisition of specified statements from the defendant; and (xi) the relationship, if any, of specified persons to the

prosecuting authority. (2) Unless the court orders otherwise, discoverable materials shall be made available for inspection and copying within 21 days of arraignment or within 21 days of receipt of the demand by the prosecuting authority, whichever is later. (3) Except as otherwise provided by protective orders, the prosecuting authority shall disclose to defendant's lawyer any material or information within his or her knowledge which tends to negate defendant's guilt as to the offense charged. (4) The prosecuting authority's obligation under this section is limited to material and information within the actual knowledge, possession, or control of members of his or her staff.

20) It would seem that the court may have nothing better to do than to file frivolous line blog, since it seems to be such a focus of the Prosecution we submit that if the

Motions as evidenced by the prosecutions Motion in Limine by scanning defendants on charges are not dismissed that the whole blog be admitted into evidence, not just parts which have been taken out of context. Defendant stated she had offers from over 169 people to come to court, several days after she narrowed it down to 23 witnesses, several days later the prosecutor issued a Motion in Limine requesting she produce 169 people & parade each witness in front of the court. Again we are bordering on what looks like malicious prosecution. 21) Next the court needs to address the issue of the absolute denial & deprivation of Ms Taamu's right to worship in the manner to which she is accustomed to in regards to refusing to return his body & by disemboweling him & parading his vital organs the death & desecration of her dog an American Eskimo named George, by losing & or around & putting post-it notes all over his internal organs further demeaning his existence when a simple blood test would've confirmed the findings of Lymphoma, the City chose to do otherwise in direct violation of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Public Law No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (Aug. 11, 1978) (commonly abbreviated to AIRFA), codified at 42 U.S.C. 1996, is a United States federal law and a joint resolution of Congress that was passed in 1978. It was enacted to protect and preserve the traditional religious rights and cultural practices of American Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts, and Native Hawaiians.[1] These rights include, but are not limited to, access of sacred sites, freedom to worship through ceremonial and traditional rights and use and possession of objects considered sacred. The Act required policies of all governmental agencies to eliminate interference with the free exercise of Native religion, based on the First Amendment, and to accommodate access to and use of religious sites to the extent that the use is practicable and is not

inconsistent with an agency's essential functions. It also acknowledges the prior violation of that right Public Law 95-341 95th Congress Joint Resolution American Indian Religious Freedom. Whereas the freedom of religion for all people is an inherent right, fundamental to the democratic structure of the United States and is guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; Whereas the United States has traditionally rejected the concept of a government denying individuals the right to practice their religion, and as a result, has benefited from a rich variety of religious heritages in this country; Whereas the religious practices of the American Indian (as well as Native Alaskan and Hawaiian) are an integral part of their culture, tradition, and heritage, such practices forming the basis of Indian identity and value systems; Whereas the traditional American Indian religions as an integral part of Indian life, are indispensable and irreplaceable; Whereas the lack of a clear, comprehensive, and consistent Federal policy has often resulted in the abridgment of religious freedom for traditional American Indians; Whereas such religious infringements result from the lack of knowledge of the insensitive and inflexible enforcement of Federal policies and regulations premised on a variety of laws; Whereas such laws were designed for such worthwhile purposes as conservation and preservation of natural species and resources but were never intended to relate to Indian religious practices and, there, were passed without consideration of their effect on traditional American Indian religions; Whereas such laws and policies often deny American Indians access to sacred sites required in their religions, including cemeteries; Whereas such laws at times prohibit the use and possession of sacred objects necessary to the exercise of religious rites and ceremonies; Whereas traditional American Indian ceremonies have been intruded upon, interfered with, and in a few instances banned; Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of American in Congress Assembled, That henceforth it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites. SEC. 2. The President shall direct that various Federal departments, agencies, and other instrumentalities responsible for the administering relevant laws to evaluate their policies and procedures in consultation with Native traditional religious leaders in order to determine appropriate changes necessary to protect and preserve Native American religious cultural rights and practices. Twelve months after approval of this resolution, the President shall report back to Congress the results of his evaluation, including any changes which were made in administrative policies and procedures, and any recommendations he may have for legislative action. Approved August 11, 1978

22) With respect to the taking of Ms Taamu's Therapy & Service dog, the officers were told that day that that is what they were as was the interim shelter manager Shannon Delgado. The only purpose that seemed to serve was to inhibit Ms Taamu's ability to

negotiate in the world around her. The taking of these 2 animals is in direct violation of

the Americans With Disabilities Act & has been more than an minor detriment to Ms Taamu's well being, health, safety & comfort, again amounting to Cruel & Unusual Taamu is autistic, has extreme Agoraphobia, because of almost being murdered in 2001 & in the past had a stroke & still needs help with balance & movement & has seizures, as well as being Bi-Polar. Soffia her Schanuzer is Ms Taamu's lifeline to a Punishment & in direct with Washington state & Federal laws. It is well known that Ms

world outside as a Therapy dog, & Hoki her Kelpie was a service dog & a seizure alert dog, possibly because of the seizures he has himself. Just the fact that Ms Taamu has overcome her fears to venture out more than 30 times to secure the safety & well being & to fight for her dogs speaks volumes about her level of dedication & love for them.
RCW 9.91.170 Interfering with dog guide or service animal.

23) Last but most certainly not least is the abuse that Ms Taamu's animals have suffered as a result of their impoundment & seizure. George, Ms Taamu's terminally ill dog was not allowed any dignity in death & instead sat in a shelter in his final hours alone & afraid. Most troublesome is the fact that Ms Taamu's animals were seized at

approximately 10 a.m. But never made it to the shelter until 4:40p.m. At which time Soffia was reported as bloody, missing teeth & hypothermic, when she left Ms Taamu's care she was warm dry, not bleeding & had all of her teeth. Hoki Ms Taamu's Kelpie was reported as in full throes of seizures yet was denied vet care til the following day.

Geroge, Ms Taamu's terminally ill Eskimo was reported as bleeding from his rectum & unable to walk. Furthermore because of the shoddy vet records & scant lab results that were received, all we can surmise is that on 5/21/2011 Hoki was reported as having tapeworms & on 3/29/2011 Libby, Ms Taamu rescued Pomeranian also was reported as having Tapeworms, a condition caused by fleas when the dogs did not have fleas when they were taken, as a result Libby is allergic to fleas& had another skin outbreak & was given medications that are known to be deadly & is reported as lethargic & agitated & throwing up. Any vet that has any knowledge of dogs knows full well that Australian Shepherds, Border Collies & few other working breeds have an MDR1 gene, yet Ms Taamu's Toy Aussie Misty was given Selemectrin in the form of Revolution which is a derivative of Ivermectin known to be deadly to these breeds of dogs. Ms Taamu's cat for any of Ms Taamu's animals have been produced from Phoenix labs or any other was listed as having Giardia on the 20th of January but no lab results for any such thing

lab, it should be noted that Jan,20th was the last time Ms Taamu has any reference on her cat. It has also come to our attention that Officers Ingrid Weaver & Lori Trask are RCW 18.92 We would request that a full scale investigation into the practices of the dispensing & administering medications to Ms Taamu's animals directly in violation of Everett Animal Control by the appropriate agencies be instigated as well. Or we will instigate the investigation ourselves. At this point from what we can gather from the scant vet records that aren't even in chronological order, it would seem as though the Everett Animal Control is now in violation of 16.52 as well. To take warm safe healthy dry animals & bring them to the shelter 7 hours later bleeding from the rectum, hypothermic, unable to walk in medical distress, missing teeth & obviously bloody is considered abuse at it's worst. The claims that Ms Taamu's dog Soffie was matted & & unlike the Everett Animal Control Ms Taamu has pictures of Soffie that are date her mats were filled with feces & that her fur was urine stained is absolutely ridiculous stamped of her right before the raid showing otherwise. She most certainly was not

bloodied or missing teeth. It will also be shown by the vet records that no one seemed to have any idea what was going on with any of the animals as many are listed as the wrong sex, & all are listed at the wrong ages, some by 4 yrs or more. Judicial Misconduct II Relief Requested In the interest of justice we would ask that the courts dismiss all charges, expunge the defendants records & order immediate return of all of defendants property & animals. We would also ask for a life time no contact/anti-harassment order so that Everett Animal Control will refrain from further harassing & intimidating Ms Taamu at a later date, & issue a cease & desist order to prevent the city of Everett & it's officials from further harassing, intimidating threatening &/or releasing of any other personal can restore her personal & work reputation.

information to defame her any further & to issue a statement of such so that Ms Taamu

III Laws, Rules, & Amendments

1. RCW16.52 2. RCW 16.52.207 3. RCW 16.52.085 4. RCW 18.92 5. RCW 9.91.070 6. RCW 49.60.030 7. RCW 69.50 8. RCW 69.50.505 9. RCW 69.50.505(a)(2) 10. RCW 69.50.505(c) 11. RCW 69.50.505(d) 12. RCW 69.50.505(e) 13. RCW 9.56.020 14. RCW 35.01.010 15. RCW 35.22.010 16. RCW 9.62.010 17. RCW 9A.36.078 18. RCW 9A.36.080 19. RCW 9A.46 20. RCW 9.91.170 21. RCW 10.14 22. RCW 40.16.030 23. RCW 42.23.070 24. RCW 42.41.040

25. RCW 42.52.020 26. RCW 42.52.050 27. RCW 42.20.040 28. RCW42.20.050 29. AIFRA Public Law No. 95-341,92 Stat 469 30. Title 42 USC 1966 31. Title 42 USC 3601 32. Title 18 USC 88 (24) 33. Fed. R. Civ. P Supplemental Admiralty or Maritime Clams & Asset Forfieture

Action Rules A(1)B

34. 4th Amendment (BOR) 35. 5th Amendment (BOR) 36. 6th Amendment (BOR) 37. 7th Amendment (BOR) 38. 8th Amendment (BOR) 39. 14th Amendment 40. WAC 246-15-020 41. S.372 THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION ENHANCEMENT ACT 42. Title 42 USC 1983 43. RULE CrRLJ 4.7