SUCCESSION CASES

Succession Case#1 Coronel v. CA (Martinez, Joseph Eufemio)

Facts: On 19 January 1985, Romulo Coronel, et al. executed a document entitled Receipt of Down Payment in favor of Ramona Patricia Alcaraz for P50,000 downpayment of the total amount of P1.24M as purchase price for an inherited house and lot (TCT 119627, Registry of Deeds of Quezon City), promising to execute a deed of absolute sale of said property as soon as such has been transferred in their name. The balance of P1.19M is due upon the execution of said deed. On the same date, Concepcion D. Alcaraz, mother of Ramona, paid the down payment of P50,000.00. On 6 February 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the Coronels father was transferred in their names (TCT 327043). However, on 18 February 1985, the Coronels sold the property to Catalina B. Mabanag for P1,580,000.00 after the latter has paid P300,000.00. For this reason, Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract with Alcaraz by depositing the down payment in the bank in trust for Alcaraz. On 22 February 1985, Alcaraz filed a complaint for specific performance against the Coronels and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT 327403. On 2 April 1985, Mabanag caused the annotation of a notice of adverse claim covering the same property with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. On 25 April 1985, the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of Mabanag. On 5 June 1985, a new title over the subject property was issued in the name of Mabanag under TCT 351582. In the course of the proceedings, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision solely on the basis of documentary exhibits. Upon submission of their respective memoranda and the corresponding comment or reply thereto, and on 1 March 1989, judgment was handed down in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering the defendant to execute a deed of absolute sale of the land covered by TCT 327403 and canceling TCT 331582 and declaring the latter without force and effect. Claims for damages by plaintiffs and counterclaims by the defendants and intervenors were dismissed. A motion for reconsideration was thereafter filed, which was denied. Petitioners interposed an appeal, but on 16 December 1991, the CA rendered its decision fully agreeing with the trial court. Hence, the instant petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the appealed judgment. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner-sellers could validly sell their shares? Held: Yes. Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring ownership, providing succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. In the present case, petitioners-sellers being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at the instance of their fathers death, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Succession Case#2 Litonjua v. Montilla (Morales, Raymond Noel) Litonjua vs. Montilla Facts: Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for a sum of money. In the meantime, Agustin Montilla died. During the proceedings for the settlement of the deceaseds estate, Litonjua filed a motion praying for the satisfaction of Claudio Montillas judgment debt from his share in his Agustins estate. Issue: Can Montilla can collect the amount of Claudios judgment debt from Agustins estate pending settlement proceedings?

Held: No. Collection is premature because the debts of the estate have not yet been paid and Claudios inheritance has not yet been ascertained. Moreover, intervention was improper because Montilla is not a creditor nor an heir of Agustin. The creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate succession have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. Moreover, a person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. Succession Case#3 Ledesma v. McLachlin (Osdon, Charity Anne) FACTS Socorro Ledesma cohabited with Lorenzo Quitco. She bore him a daughter who is the other plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma. When their relationship ended Lorenzo executed a deed acknowledging Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter and on January 21, 1922, he issued in favor of the plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note for P2,000 of which P1,500 was to be paid two years from the date of the execution of the note. Subsequently, Lorenzo married Conchita McLachlin, with whom he had four children, who are the other defendants. Lorenzo died without leaving any property and then thereafter his father Eusebio Quitco also died, the latter having left real and personal properties upon his death. Socorro Ledesma filed before the committee on claims the promissory note for payment which was denied. An order of declaration of heirs in the intestate of the deceased Eusebio Quitco was issued by the court and as Ana Quitco Ledesma was not included among the declared heir. Socorro Ledesma, as mother of Ana Quitco Ledesma, asked for the reconsideration but was denied. ISSUE: WON Socorro can claim the P1,500 against the estate of Lorenzo's father for the payment of the promissory note HELD: NO. While it is true that under the provisions of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a children presents his father or mother who died before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of their said father from whom they did not inherit anything. Succession Case#4 Rabadilla v. CA (Palafox, Vincent Patrick) FACTS In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-ininterest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. It provided inter alia, that: 1) the Bacolod Cadastre be given Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his children and spouse should he die before testator; 2) should Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs receive ownership of the Bacolod Cadastre, and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, 75 piculs of Export sugar and 25 piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies; 3) In the event that Dr. Rabadilla shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the same obligation to Maria Marlina until she shall die; 4) Should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected the Codicil, Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize the land and turn it over to testators near descendants and the latter shall then have the same obligation to Maria Marlina until she shall die; and 5) Should Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than the near descendants and sister of the testator.

Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla. On 21 August 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, against the abovementioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil for alleged violations of the conditions of the Codicil: 1) Mortgage to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix. 2) Defendant-heirs failure to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar, despite repeated demands for compliance. 3) The banks failed likewise to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent. The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza. On the basis of a MOA between petitioner and private respondent, that the obligation be paid by partial delivery of sugar and partly its cash equivalent in instalments, from 1988- 1992, the trial court dismissed the action for being premature. However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988-1989. On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. The CA held that the evidence on record established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted noncompliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such noncompliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies. Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner appealed to Supreme Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reversion. ISSUE WON CA erred in ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code. HELD NO to both. Petition dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law. Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint below.

This is not a substitution as theorized by the petitioner since substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. It is not a simple substitution because the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution since the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent. Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed, by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. It is clear from the Codicil that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.

Succession Case#5 Suarez v. CA (Palattao, Rodolfo John Robert) Facts: Petitioners are siblings. Their father died but his estate consisting of several parcels of land has not been liquidated. Then the mother petitioners lost in the consolidated cases for rescission of contract and damages. The judgment having become final and executory, five parcels of land were levied to satisfy the judgment. Private respondents were the highest bidder and was issued a certificate of sale then registered. Before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory to recover ownership of the said properties. They allege that being strangers to the case, their properties cannot be levied nor sold. The court then issued an order directing them to vacate the premises of the said lands and to give the duplicate titles to private respondents. Petitioners filed for a motion for reconsideration an the order to vacate was lifted. The respondents then appealed to the CA which annulled the orders of the RTC. Issue: Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five parcels of land co-owned by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioners deceased father whose estate has not been liquidated, after the said properties were levied and publicly sold to private respondents to satisfy the personal debt of the surviving spouse and mother of herein petitioners? Ruling: Only of the 5 parcels of land should have been the subject of the auction sale. The law in point is Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case: The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

Article 888 further provides: The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided. Article 892 par. 2 provides: If there are two or more legitimate children or descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants. The propriety interest of petitioners is different and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right, therefore they are not barred in any way from annulling the auction sale. Succession Case#6 Opulencia v. CA (Palis, Lynn Margarita) FACTS: Private respondents Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that petitioner Natalia Opulencia executed a Contract to Sell over a piece of land and that they paid the petitioner the downpayment but the latter refused to comply with her obligations. Petitioner admitted to executing the contract but asserts that she cannot comply because the probate court did not allow the contract; its approval was necessary since the property belong to the estate of her deceased father. She also claims that the contract was subject to a suspensive condition (approval of the probate court) which the petitioners knew. Likewise, she avers that she wanted to give back the downpayment but the petitioners refused her. RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the probate court did not allow the contract to sell. CA reversed the RTC and claimed that the contract did not need the approval of the probate court since the contract was made by the petitioner in her capacity as an heir of a property that was devised to her under the will sought to be probated. ISSUE: W/N the contract to sell without the requisite approval of the probate court is valid HELD: Contract is valid. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of the subject parcel of land. 12 She also explained the reason for the sale to be "difficulties in her living" conditions and consequent "need of cash." 13 These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioners has no application to the instant case. We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father. The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father." Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration." Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to Sell with private respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as initial payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents who have relied on them. Succession Case#7 Ferrer v. Sps. Diaz (Quinsay, Stacy) FACTS: Ferrers Version: Atty. Ferrer claimed in his original Complaint that the Diazes, as represented by their daughter Comandante, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), obtained from him a loan of P1,118,228.00. The loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Prior to this, Comandante, for a valuable consideration of P600,000.00,

executed in his favor a Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided). On the basis of said waiver, Ferrer executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which he caused to be annotated at the back of TCT. The Diazes, however, reneged on their obligation so he filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money Secured by Real Estate Mortgage Contract. Diazes Version: Comandante alleged she sought financial accommodations from Ferrer couple which totaled P500,000.00. These loans were secured by chattel mortgages over her taxi units in addition to several postdated checks. As she could not practically comply with her obligation, Ferrer spouses presented to Comandante a Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) to secure Comandantes loan with the couple which at that time had already ballooned to P600,000.00 due to interests. Comandante likewise alleged that she later executed an Affidavit of Repudiation/Revocation of Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interests Over A (Still Undivided) Real Property, which she caused to be annotated on the title of the subject property. Apart from executing the affidavit of repudiation, Comandante also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Adverse Claim. ISSUE: Is a waiver of hereditary rights in favor of another executed by a future heir while the parents are still living valid? Is an adverse claim annotated on the title of a property on the basis of such waiver likewise valid and effective as to bind the subsequent owners and hold them liable to the claimant? RULING: All the respondents contend that the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante is null and void for being violative of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, hence, petitioners adverse claim which was based upon such waiver is likewise void and cannot confer upon the latter any right or interest over the property. We agree with the respondents. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code, no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. For the inheritance to be considered "future", the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur: (1) That the succession has not yet been opened. (2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and, (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.38 In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandantes Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parents properties has not yet been opened since both of them are still living. With respect to the other two requisites, both are likewise present considering that the property subject matter of Comandantes waiver concededly forms part of the properties that she expect to inherit from her parents upon their death and, such expectancy of a right, as shown by the facts, is undoubtedly purely hereditary in nature. From the foregoing, it is clear that Comandante and petitioner entered into a contract involving the formers future inheritance as embodied in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by her in petitioners favor. Waiver of Hereditary Rights and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided) executed by Comandante in favor of petitioner as not valid and that same cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation between them for being violative of the second paragraph of Article 1347 of the Civil Code. Anent the validity and effectivity of petitioners adverse claim, it is provided in Section 70 of PD 1529, that it is necessary that the claimant has a right or interest in the registered land adverse to the registered owner and that it must arise subsequent to registration. Here, as no right or interest on the subject property flows from Comandantes invalid waiver of hereditary rights upon petitioner, the latter is thus not entitled to the registration of his adverse claim. Therefore, petitioners adverse claim is without any basis and must consequently be adjudged invalid and ineffective and perforce be cancelled. Succession Case#8 Reyes v. CA (Realo, Glenn) REYES, et. al. V. CA, GR 124099, October 30, 1997 FACTS: Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament wherein he bequeathed to his wife Asuncion Oning Reyes all his shares in their personal properties, as well as of all the real estates that he co-owns with his brother. (par. II (a) and (b)). His will consisted of 2 pages. Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was filed before the RTC. This was opposed by the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo. According to them, Reyes was never married and could never marry Asucnion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was already

married Lupo Ebarle, who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus, Asuncion cannot be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public morals. RTC: Allowed the probate of the will except for par. II (a) and (b) of the will which was declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals. It ruled that Asuncion Reyes was never marred to the deceased Reyes and, therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one. CA: Affirmed but with the modification that par. II including subpars. (a) and (b) were declared valid because the oppositors never showed any competent, documentary or otherwise during the trial to show that Asuncion Oning Reyes marriage to the testator was inexistent or void, either because of a re-existing marriage or adulterous relationship. ISSUE: W/N it was correct for the RTC to have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the will of Torcuato. HELD: HELL NO! CA was damn right! CA affirmed. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the wills provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because practical considerations demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality. Where the parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may also do so. Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding were: (1) W/N the testator had animus testandi; (2) W/N vices of consent attended the execution of the will; and (3) W/N the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion Oning Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the wills intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate court. We agree with the CA that the RTC relied upon uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed husband of Oning. Succession Case#9 Nepomuceno v. CA (Rilloraza, Cynthia) NEPOMUCENO vs CA (Topic: Wills in General) Facts: Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses. In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part: Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar, and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare and admit to be legally and properly entitled to inherit from me; that while I have been estranged from my above-named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I

was legally married to her or that we have been separated up to the present for reasons and justifications known fully well by them: Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the things which she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did comport and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous marriage; On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIV, Caloocan City and asked for the issuance to her of letters testamentary. On May 13, 1975, the legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters testamentary should not be issued to her. On January 6, 1976, the lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The petitioner appealed to the respondent-appellate court. On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. On June 15, 1982, oppositors Rufina Gomez and her children filed a "Motion for Correction of Clerical Error" praying that the word "appellant" in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision be changed to "appellees" so as to read: "The properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without pronouncement as to costs." The motion was granted by the respondent court. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied by the respondent court. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner. Ruling: The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule is expressed thus: xxx xxx xxx ... It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last Will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428) The petition below being for the probate of a Will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature. xxx xxx xxx True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate. Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the second relates to descent and distribution (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369) xxx xxx xxx To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625). The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one valid. ... (Castaneda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426) The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

In Nuguid v. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449) cited by the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions would be superfluous. Even before establishing the formal validity of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez (64 SCRA 452) passed upon the validity of its intrinsic provisions. Invoking "practical considerations", we stated: The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void. We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho v. Udan L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693). There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in resolving the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and Testament, it ruled: This being so, the will is declared validly drawn. (Page 4, Decision, Annex A of .) On the other hand the respondents pray for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals' decision in toto. The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void. We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, (supra): We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. v. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522). After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions. Article 739 of the Civil Code provides: The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; (2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof; (3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office. In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides: The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now Intermediate Appellate Court, is AFFIRMED. No costs. Succession Case#10 Castaneda v. Alemany (Robles, Jo) Facts

The will of Dona Juana Moreno was typewritten in the office of her lawyer. After being typed, it was presented to the testatrix and to the three witnesses who signed it as witnesses in the presence of the testatrix and each other. Appellants are now contending that the will should not be allowed probate because it was not written by the testatrix herself nor was it done by someone else in her presence and under her direction Issue : W/N the will should be allowed probate? Held: Yes. There is nothing in the language of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure which supports the claim of the appellants that the will must be written by the testator himself or by someone else in his presence and under his express direction. That section requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it himself or, if he does sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence. What is the purpose of the probate of a will? To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will All such questions must be decided in some other proceeding. The grounds on which a will may be disallowed are stated the section 634. Unless one of those grounds appears the will must be allowed. They all have to do with the personal condition of the testator at the time of its execution and the formalities connected therewith. It follows that neither this court nor the court below has any jurisdiction in this proceedings to pass upon the questions raised by the appellants by the assignment of error relating to the appointment of a guardian for the children of the deceased Succession Case#11 In Re Will of Riosa v. Riosa (Saunar, Kris Norwin) In Re Will of Riosa GR L-14074 November 7, 1918 Facts: Jose Riosa died on April 17, 1917. He left a will made in the month of January, 1908 The will was duly executed in accordance with the law then in force, namely, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the will was not executed in accordance with a subsequent law that was enacted, Act No. 2645 which prescribes certain additional formalities for the signing and attestation of the wills, in force on and after July 1, 1916. The will was in writing, signed by the testator, and attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other; but was not signed by the testator and the witnesses on the left margin of each and every page, nor did the attestation state these facts. The new law, therefore, went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of the testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to the new requirements.

Issue: W/N Act No 2645 prescribing additional requirements in the execution of a will should be applied in Jose Riosas will? Held: No. there should be no retroactive effect. There are three views to consider. 1) The rule laid down by the courts in many jurisdictions is that the statutes in force at the testator's death are controlling, and that a will not executed in conformity with such statutes is invalid, although its execution was sufficient at the time it was made. 2) The rule prevailing in many other jurisdictions is that the validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the statutes in force at the time of its execution and that statutes subsequently enacted have no retrospective effect. 3) Retrospective laws generally if not universally work injustice, and ought to be so construed only when the mandate of the legislature is imperative. When a testator makes a will, formally executed according

to the requirements of the law existing at the time of its execution, it would unjustly disappoint his lawful right of disposition to apply to it a rule subsequently enacted, though before his death. This court is given the opportunity to choose between the three rules above described. Our selection, under such circumstances, should naturally depend more on reason than on technicality. Above all, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the testator has provided in detail for the disposition of his property and that his desires should be respected by the courts. Justice is a powerful pleader for the second and third rules on the subject. The plausible reasoning of the authorities which back the first proposition is, we think, fallacious. The act of bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act when the will is executed and attested according to the law, although it does not take effect on the property until a future time Nevertheless, it is proper to observe that the general principle in the law of wills inserts itself even within the provisions of said section 634. Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of property which must be complied with as completed act at the time of the execution, so far as the act of the testator is concerned, as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No. 2645, but is not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that date. To answer the question with which we began this decision, we adopt as our own the second rule, particularly as established by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The will of Jose Riosa is valid. The order of the Court of First Instance for the Province of Albay of December 29, 1917, disallowing the will of Jose Riosa, is reversed, and the record shall be returned to the lower court with direction to admit the said will to probate Succession Case#12 Enriquez v. Abadia (Trinidad, Jay-Ryan)

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA. SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ vs EL ABADIA, ET AL. August 9, 1954 DOCTRINE: THE VALIDITY OF THE WILL AS TO FORM IS TO BE JUDGED NOT BY THE LAW IN FORECE AT THE TIME OF THE TESTATORS DEATH OR AT THE TIME THE SUPPOSED WILL IS PRESENTED IN COURT FOR PROBATE OR WHEN THE PETITION IS DECIDED BY THE COURT BUT AT THE TIME THE INSTRUMENT WAS EXECUTED. FACTS: Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu. In 1923, he executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament. He died on January 14, 1943. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the CFI of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition. During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand;

TRIAL COURT: ADMITTED TO PROBATE THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL. Reasoning of the TC: It found and declared that the will to be a holographic will; and that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that ALTHOUGH at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted by law still, But because at the time of the hearing and when the case was to be decided

the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills, said trial court admitted to probate. LEGAL ISSUE: What is the law to apply to the probate of the holographic will? SUPREME COURT: It is a fact, that at the time that the will was executed in 1923 and at the time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted. What is the law to apply to the probate of the will? May we apply the provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. In view of the foregoing, the holographic will is denied probate.

Succession Case#13 Bellis v. Bellis (Balauag, Ed Warren) Bellis vs. Bellis 20 SCRA 358 June 6, 1967 Facts: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages. Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Issue: Whether or not the national law of the decedent applies to succession and capacity to succeed? YES. Whether or not the renvoi doctrine is applicable? NO. Held: The decedents national law governs the order of succession, the amount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to succeed. A provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. The Renvoi doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. It does not apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. Succession Case#14 Aznar v. Garcia (Baybay, Benedict Dominic) Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California. In his will, executed on March 5,1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the New Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute dominion. Issue: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply. Held: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the matter. 1. The conflict rule which should apply to Californians outside of California, and; 2. The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in California. The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code States that if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile. Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed. Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition be made as that of the Philippine law provides. Succession Case#15 Miciano v. Brimo (Black, Dominique)

Topic: Testamentary Succession Wills in General (Article 792) (15) Miciano v. Brimo G.R. No. 22595, November 1, 1924 Facts: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died testate. He placed as a condition in his will that it be disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Islands, it states: it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request. Article 10 of the Civil Code of the Philippines it provides that: o legal and testamentary succession as well as the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated. Partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph Brimo is in question in this case. The judicial administrator of the estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. o His opposition was based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. Issue: W/N the dispositions in the will remains valid despite the condition in the will which is in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. Held: YES! Although the condition is void being contrary to law, according to Article 792 of the Civil Code the said condition will just be considered not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner even if the testator otherwise provide. The said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testators national law when, according to Article 10 of the CC above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Said Condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor. All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testators national laws. Succession Case#16 Llorente v. CA (Bustamante, Cindy) Facts: The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was a US Navy serviceman. In 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in Nabua, Camarines Sur. He departed for the US. 1943, Lorenzo became a US citizen. In 1945, he came home to visit his wife. He discovered that Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Paula gave birth to a boy, registered as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In 1946, they drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the US Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with

judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. It was by both of them and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for divorce. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. The divorce decree was issued. Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, he married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.[i]Their 25-year union produced 3 children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Hugo, Neibres and Trajano. He left all his property to Alicia and their three children. In 1983, Lorenzo filed with the RTC a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. DENIED since he was still alive. Later, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court ADMITTED the will to probate. Before it could be terminated, he died. Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. TC: Divorce decree granted to Lorenzo is void and inapplicable in the Philippines. Marriage to Alicia is void. Alicias petition is denied. Alicia is not entitled to receive any share from the estate due to his relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of a paramour. Paula is entitled to 1/3 of the estate and the other 1/3 would go to the 3 illegitimate children. MR Denied. CA affirmed the decision. Issue: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente? Ruling: For failing to apply the doctrines in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Quita v. CA, and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the decision of the CA must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. Validity of the Will The Civil Code provides: Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours) The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity. Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law. CA decision is set aside. SC REVERSES the decision of the RTC and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952. SC REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

________________________________________ Succession Case#17 Dy Yieng Sangio v. Judge Amor Reyes (Coherco, Calvin Ryan) Facts: On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng opposed the petition. He contended that: 1) He is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. RTC dismissed the petition for probate proceedings: Issue: Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. Held: Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect. Issue: Whether or not there was preterition Held: With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. Succession Case#18 Bugnao v. Ubag (Concepcion, Giovani) 18 Succession Catalina Bugnao v. Francisco Ubag G.R. No. 4445, September 18, 1909 Facts: Catalina Bugnao asks the Court to admit to probate purporting to be the last will and testament of her deceased husband Domingo Ubag. Under said document Catalina is the sole beneficiary. The probate was contested by Francisco Ubag et al who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or descending line.

They contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the execution of the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of making a will. Allegedly, Catalina argues that said document was executed in accordance with the requirements of the law Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Marino, testified in support of the will, the latter being the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein it was executed; and their testimony was corroborated in all important details by the testimony of the proponent herself, who was present when the will was made. Held: The evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive manner the execution of the instrument propounded as the last will and testament of the deceased While a number of contradictions in the testimony of alleged subscribing witnesses to a will as to the circumstances under which it was executed, or a single contradiction as to a particular incident to which the attention of such witnesses must have been directed, may in certain cases justify the conclusion that the alleged witnesses were not present, together, at the time when the alleged will was executed, a mere lapse of memory on the part of one of these witnesses as to the precise details of an unimportant incident, to which his attention was not directed, does not necessarily put in doubt the truth and veracity of the testimony in support of the execution of the will. Proof of the existence of all the elements in the following definition of testamentary capacity, which has frequently been adopted in the United States, held sufficient to establish the existence of such capacity in the absence of proof of very exceptional circumstance: "Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty." Succession Case#19 Bagtas v. Paguio (Dequina, Doanni Lou) o The testator died on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and five months following the date of the execution of the will. o The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some fourteen of fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of speech. o Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. o He retained the use of his right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. o Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his family. o How was the will executed according to the witnesses? Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes and items relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Seor Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator; that the attorney read them to the testator asking if they were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Seor Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and each other. Issue: Whether or not the will was executed in accordance with law, thus valid. Held: Will valid as it was made in accordance with law. One of the attesting witnesses testified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he indicated by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to state whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his own signature as a subscribing witness.

Florentino Ramos stated that he had frequently transacted matters of business for the decedent and had written letters and made inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately before and after the execution of the will he had performed offices of his character. He stated that the decedent was able to communicate his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly indicates the presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator. The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed under such circumstances, but the weight of the authority is in support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary document of this character. The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well established, and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. This we think they have failed to do. There are many cases and authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated as insanity and idiocy. The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as sacred as any other right which a person may exercise and this right should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is established in a positive and conclusive manner. The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on Insanity, section 365, and quoted with approval in Campbell vs. Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows: To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties. The striking change in the physical and mental vigor of the testator during the last years of his life may have led some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person. Succession Case#20 Neyra v. Neyra (Dimagiba, Hershel) Facts: Petitioner Trinidad Neyra and Defendant Encarnacion Neyra were sisters engaged in a legal battle over a piece of land their father left them. Petitioner filed a complaint against Encarnacion for recovery of of the property left by their father and which had been previously divided equally between them and demanding at the same time of the rents collected on the said property by defendant. On the other hand defendant filed an answer claiming that the property was community and filed a counterclaim amounting to over P1,000 for money spent during the illness of their father and money owed to her by petitioner. Trial court ruled that petitioner was entitled to of said property and adjudicated the same to her but at the same time ordered her to pay by virtue of said counterclaims. Trinidad appealed to the CA, but subsequently the appeal was dismissed pursuant to an agreement or compromise entered into by the parties as shown by the corresponding document dated November 3, 1942. On November 4, 1942 Encarnacion, who had been suffering from Addisons disease for about 2 years died. One Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacio and other relatives of hers, filed a petition asking for the reconsideration of the CA decision dismissing the appeal. He claimed that the alleged compromise could not have been understood by Encarnacion as she was already then at the threashold of death and that as a matter of fact she died the following day. And that if it had been signed at all by Encarnacion, her thumbmark must have been affixed thereto by Trinidads attorney against Encarnacions will. The court found that the following facts had been established by documentary and testamentary evidence:

o That Encarnacion executed a will on September 14, 1939 in favor of the Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria and her other relatives making no provisions for her only sister Trinidad. o That the religious congregation declined the bountry offered by Encarnacion. o That on November 1, 1942, Encarnacion who had become seriously ill, was convinced by Fr. Garcia to reconcile with her sister Trinidad. o Encarnacion accepted and at about noon of the same day sent for Trinidad who then came to Encarnacions house and the two reconciled. o The two spoke about the properties left by their father and they agreed to have the case dismissed and on the condition that the property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad, that the latter would wave her shared in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion and that Trinidad had no more indebtedness to Encarnacion. o That Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise as well as the new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's express instructions, and the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and were ready for signature, since the morning of November 3, 1942. o That in the afternoon of that day, of compromise and last will and testament to Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if their terms were in accordance with her wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and the two documents, and, with the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two documents, in duplicate, on her bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which said witnesses signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of each other. o The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a protege, as witnesses. Issue: W/N said compromise or agreement had been legally executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra, on November 3, 1942? Ruling: YES As to Mental Capacity In connection with mental capacity, in several cases, this court has considered the testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of the alleged medical experts. o Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors, who testified for the opponents to the probate of a will, to the effect that it tended to destroy mental capacity, was held not to effect the full possession of mental faculties deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil., 400.) o The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of the physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in the third or last stage of tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) o The testimony of the attending physician that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose condition for several days, prior to his death, was held not sufficient to establish testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive statement of several credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to understand what was said to him and to communicate his desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573.) o Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.) o Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons, although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still effect the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of the execution of the will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.) Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of signing and execution of the agreement and will in question. It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death.

 Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942. As to attesting witnesses The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable. It has been fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw each other at the time of the signing of the documents, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it all in this case. (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in question is equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) Teodora Neyra and her principal witnesses are all interested parties, as they are children of legatees named in the will, dated September 14, 1939, but eliminated from the will, dated November 3, 1942. As to the thumbmark Furthermore, the testimony of Teodora Neyra and her witnesses, to the effect that there could have been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the documents embodying the agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in their presence; and that her thumbmark was affixed to the will in question, when she was already dead, in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their view, is absolutely devoid of any semblance of truth. Said testimony is contrary to common sense. It violates all sense of proportion. Teodora Neyra and her witnesses could not have told the truth; they have testified to deliberate falsefoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely unworthy of belief. And to the evidence of the petitioners is completely applicable the legal aphorism falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. (Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728, 735.) Succession Case#21 Yap Tua v. Yap Ca Kuan (Doma, Angelo) FACTS: On August 11, 1909, Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong died leaving a will. The Honorable Judge Crossfield allowed and admitted said will to probate on September 29, 1909, and appointed appellee Yap Tua as executor. Appellants Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, who were minors, appeared and presented a petition. They alleged that they were interested in the matters of the said will, and desired to intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent them. Gabriel La O was appointed as such, and presented a motion one of the allegations of which was that at the time of the execution of the said will, the said Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was not then mentally capacitated to execute the same, due to her sickness. ISSUE: Whether or not the testator had clear knowledge and knew what she was doing at the time of signing the will. HELD: YES. While the testimony of one of the witnesses (Dr. Papa) is very strong relating to the mental condition of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, yet, nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps twenty-four hours before the execution of the will in question. Several witnesses testified that at the time the will was presented to her for her signature, she was of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink and kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen minutes and finally signed it. The lower court found that there was a preponderance of evidence sustaining the conclusion that Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was of sound mind and memory, and in the possession of her faculties at the time she signed this will. In view of the conflict in the testimony of the witnesses and the finding of the lower court, the Supreme Court does not feel justified in reversing the lower courts conclusions upon that question. Succession Case#22 Acop v. Piraso (Garcia, John) FACTS: The CFI of Benguet denied the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso because the will sought to be probated was written in English, a language he was not acquainted. The court ruled that since evidence showed that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect, his will should have been written in the said dialect and not in English. ISSUE: Should the will be probated?

HELD: No. It was, proven, that the instrument in question could not be probated as the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso, having been written in the English language with which the latter was unacquainted. The testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary. In the instant case, not only is it not proven the English is the language of the City of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but the record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorotte dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the English language in which the will is written. Succession Case#23 Avera v. Garcia (Javier, Franco) Avera v. Garcia FACTS: Eutiquia Avera instituted the probate of the will of Esteban Garcia. On the date of the hearing, Eutiquia introduced only one of the three witnesses of the will attesting that the will was executed with all the necessary formalities and the the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. It was contested in the latter part of the proceeding by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez as guardians for the minors Jose and Cesar Garcia protesting that Esteban didnt have full possession of disposing faculties at that time. The trial court admitted the will to probate. ISSUE: Whether or not a will can be admitted to probate where opposition is made, upon proof of a single attesting witness, without producing or accounting for the absence of the other two? HELD: No, an uncontested will may be proved by the testimony of only one of the three attesting witnesses. However, when a will is contested, all three attesting witnesses must be must be examined, if alive and within reach of the process of the court. Nevertheless, The Garcias failed to raise this argument in the trial court and only raises it now. Thus, they are too late to invoke this fatal defect and the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. Succession Case#24 Icasiano v. Icasiano (Javier, Ma. Feliza Amparo Cristina) FACTS: This case involved the probate of the original and the duplicate original of Josefa Villacortes LWT. The probated will named Celso Icasiano as the executor. However, Natividad Icasiano who wanted to become special administrator of the estate opposed the same. Pending the resolution, the court appointed Philippine Trust Company as special administrator. Thereafter, Celso introduced evidence which consisted of the original copy of the LWT which complied with all the requirements of the law save for the non-signature of one of the attesting witnesses in a page of the five paged LWT. It was only in the duplicate copy of the will that bore the complete signatures. During trial it was established that the failure to sign that page in the original will was due to the sticking of the pages. ISSUE: Whether LWT is valid despite the non-signature in one page of the will? HELD: Yes, on the question of law, we hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause".

That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time. This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated and that despite the requirement for the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect. These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege. On the probate of the duplicate original of the will: The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate (Exh. A-1) is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of original because it lacked one signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma; if the original is defective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional. Succession Case#25 Lopez v. Liboro (Laceda, Elaine Marie) Facts: Appellant Liboro opposed the probate of what purports to be the last will and testament of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947, almost 6 months after the document in question was executed. He specified five grounds for his opposition, to wit: (1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick. CFI found the last will and testament to have been executed in all particulars as required by law. Held: SC affirmed. The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476.) In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, all of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other than page one. The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this was that the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in testator's place might have directed someone else to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was

a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. (De Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 108; 28 R. C. L., 117.) The will is silent on the testator's understanding of the language used in the testament (Spanish). There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde. Succession Case#26 Azuela v. CA (Layug, Kristina) A notarial will was executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo, who died at the age of 80. The case stems from a petition for probate filed with the (RTC) by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent. The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed The petition was opposed by (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is o a forgery, o was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. o That the decedents signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. the RTC admitted the will to probate, taking into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will the Court of Appeals . reversed. Issue : won the will complied w/ the requirement of art. 805 and 809? No Held: denied. Issue of number of pages: no substantial compliance in this case because no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere else in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will. Issue of witnesses not signing under the attestation clause: the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. They should sign below it. Issue of not properly acknowledged: contrary to Art 806. Acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. Moreover, will must be acknowledged and not merely subscribed and sworn to. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public. Succession Case#27 Ortega v. Valmonte (Lee, Haidee) Ortega vs Valmonte Facts: ISSUE: WoN the will should be admitted to probate. HELD: YES! On the allegation of fraud: NONE exists. The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of the execution f the will. Leticia failed to discharge such burden. No evidence of fraud was ever presented other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would not have made. The omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.

The conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. More important, the will must be subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA that the variance in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are credible evidence of its due execution. Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing of ill motives. On the testamentary capacity of Placido: HAS capacity. According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the testators bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant. Mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound mind. Succession Case#28 Tabonada v. Rosal (Li, Elizabeth) Taboada v Rosal G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982 Facts: The last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez was written in the Cebuano-Visayan dialect. The will consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. The TC denied the probate of the will of Dorotea Perez for want of a formality in its execution. SC reversed. Issue: W/N it is enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" or that the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another. W/N it is sufficient compliance to sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that page. Held: The Art 805 uses the terms attested and subscribe. Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will to see that those things done exist as a fact. Subscription is the signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. With regards subscription, the will in this case was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification. The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the testatrix.

The attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page". Such circumstance takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within cases where broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured by the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control where the purpose of the law to guarantee the Identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Succession Case#29 Jaboneta v. Gustilo (Li, Tiffany) Facts: On December 26, 1901, Macario Jaboneta executed a will which is now presented for probate. He asked Julio Javellana, Aniceto Jalbuena and Isabelo Jena as witnesses. They were all together in the room when the will was executed, Jaboneta signed the will in their presence, Jena signed next then Jalbuena, but when Javellana was about to sign, Jena was about to leave the house, he only saw Javellana with the pen in his hand and in the position to sign the will but never saw him actually signing the document. TC denied probate held one of the witnesses did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of another of the witnesses. SC reversed. Issue: W/N witness is considered to have signed the Will in presence of another witness Held: Yes. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact signed before he finally left the room. Succession Case#30 In Re Estate of Neumark v. Neumark (Lim, Mary Rocelyn) Facts: The last will and testament of W. Neumark was typewritten at Manila in the German language upon a single sheet of legal-cap paper and bears the date of June 28, 1922. It is signed by the purporting testator and below his signature to the left are words in English mean "signed in the presence of," followed by the names of three attesting witnesses M. Cruz, P. Medel, R. Petrich. But it lacked an attestation. The trial court denied probate. Issue: Is an attestation mandatory? YES Art. 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it originally stood contains the following sentence at the end: "But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided. But this sentence was omitted when Act No. 2645 was passed. Since the Legislature had suppressed the last sentence of the section as it originally stood, from which the intention was deduced that the Legislature intended that the requirement as to the presence of an attestation clause and as to its contents should be mandatory. Thus, the will should provide he attestation clause which shall state the number sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three

witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other." Dissenting Opinion: The purpose of the law is to prevent fraud in the making of wills. After the will was signed, it was deposited by testator with the German Consul for safe-keeping. Under the facts shown in the record, in the instant case fraud would be a physical impossibility. Since fraud is impossible, the will should have been probated. Succession Case#31 Caneda v. CA (Lumagui, Rommell) Caeda v CA G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993 Facts: Mateo Caballero himself sought the probate of his last will and testament but he passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court. The attestation clause of the will provided: "We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on the Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO, has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in letters on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us." Issue: Whether the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero substantially complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code Ruling: No. What is fairly apparent upon a careful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The phrase "and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin," obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words "as his Last Will and Testament." On the other hand, although the words "in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of us" may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must however, be interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said phrase immediately follows the words "he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin." What is then clearly lacking, in the final logical analysis, is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. It is our considered view that the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate. The aforestated defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule under Art 809. The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings. Succession Case#32 Gil v. Murciano (Martinez, Joseph Eufemio) The will in question was presented for probate in the CFI of Manila in 1943 with Roberto Toledo y Gil, decedent's nephew, and Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano, decedent's sister opposing the application. Early in 1945, before the application was heard on the merits, the record, along with the will, was destroyed by fire, necessitating its reconstitution after liberation. In the reconstitution, a stipulation of facts was submitted in which, according to the

appealed order, "both parties . . . agreed that the will as transcribed in the record on appeal in Case G. R. No. L-254 is true and a correct copy. The will consisted of only two pages, and the last of the compound sentence of the attestation clause is truncated and meaningless. The last of the compound sentence is incomplete, lacking an adjective phrase. CFI admitted to probate the alleged will and testament of the deceased Carlos Gil. The oppositor Pilar Gil Vda. de Murciano appealed. HELD: Reversed. Probate denied. The attestation clause does not state that the alleged testator signed the will. It declares only that it was signed by the witnesses. This is a fatal defect, for the precise purpose of the attestation clause is to certify that the testator signed the will, this being the most essential element of the clause. Without it there is no attestation at all. It is contended that the deficiency in the attestation clause is cured by the last paragraph of the body of the alleged will. It is evident that one cannot certify his own signature, for it does not increase the evidence of its authenticity. Consequently, the last paragraph of the will cannot cure in any way the fatal defect of the attestation clause of the witnesses. In the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho, the court held that An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect annuls the will. In the subsequent case of Quinto vs. Morata it was held that The attestation clause must be made in strict conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. Where said clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those requirements, the defect constitutes sufficient ground for the disallowance of the will. Evidence aliunde should not be admitted to establish facts not appearing on the attestation clause, and where said evidence has been admitted it should not be given the effect intended. HELD ON MR: order of probate court affirmed. will admitted It seems obvious that the missing phrase was left out from the copy. The probabilities of error in the copy are enhanced by the fact that the form of the Will was not controversy in Toledo's appeal. The form of the will being immaterial, it is easily conceivable that little or no care was employed in transcribing the document in the agreement or record on appeal. The binding effect of a stipulation on the parties does not go to the extent of barring either of them from impeaching it on the score of clerical error or clear mistake. The mistake just pointed out clearly brings the case within the exceptions of the rule. The able counsel for the proponent of the will could not possibly have subscribed to the agreement if they had noticed the incomplete sentence in the copy without making an objection or reservation. From 69 C. J. 82, 83, we quote: "Words omitted from a will may be supplied by the court whenever necessary to effectuate the testator's intention as expressed in the will: but not where the effect of inserting the words in the will would alter or defeat such intention, or change the meaning of words that are clear and unequivocal." "Where it appears from the context that certain words have been inadvertently from a statute, the court may supply such words as are necessary to complete the sense, and to express the legislative intent." If the witnesses here purposely omitted or forgot that the testator signed the will in their presence, the testator said that he did and the witnesses by their signatures in the will itself said it was so. No extraneous proof was necessary and none was introduced or taken into consideration. If the sole purpose of the statute is to make it certain that the testator has definite and complete intention to pass his property, and to prevent, as far as possible, any chance of substituting one instrument for another, What better guaranty of the genuineness of the will can there be than a certification by the testator himself in the body of the will so long as the testator's signature is duly authenticated. A second ground of attack on the questioned will is that the first page or sheet thereof does not bear the testator's signature. The discussion on the correctness of the copy of the attestation clause amply answers this objection in fact, the appellee's case is much stronger on this point for the reason that there is not only speculative but also positive basis for the conclusion that the testator's signature was affixed to the first page of the original.

Both the testator and the attesting witnesses stated in the will and in the attestation clause, respectively, that the former signed both pages or sheets of the testament. Succession Case#33 Cuevas v. Achacoso (Morales, Raymond Noel) Cuevas v. Achacoso Facts: The will provides: IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I sign this testament or last will in the municipality of Iba, Zambales, Philippines, this 10th day of October, 1945, in the presence of the three witnesses, namely Dr. Nestorio Trinidad, Don Baldomero Achacoso, and Mr. Proceso Cabal as instrumental witnesses to my signing; this testament is written in three (3) sheets marked by letter "A", "B" and "C" consecutively on top of each sheet and upon my request and in my presence and also in the presence of each of the aforesaid instrumental witnesses, they also signed this testament already referred to. I hereby manifest that every sheet of the aforesaid testament, on the left-hand margin as well as the testament itself have been signed by me as also each of the witnesses has also signed in my presence and in the presence of each other. (Sgd.) JOSE VENZON Witnesses: (Sgd.) NESTORIO TRINIDAD (Sgd.) BALDOMERO L. ACHACOSO (Sgd.) PROCESO CABAL. As can be seen from the foregoing, the attestation clause appears to have been made by the testator himself, rather than by the instrumental witnesses. Issue: Is this a substantial defect that affects the validity of the will? Held: No. The court stated that the will substantially complied with the requirements of the law as the witnesses signed the attestation clause together with the testator. In reality it appears that it is the [testator] who makes the declaration about the points in the last paragraph of the will; however as the witnesses together with the [testator], have signed the said declaration, we are of the opinion and so hold that the words above quoted of the testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the requirements of Act No. 2645. Succession Case#34 Cruz v. Villasor (Osdon, Charity Anne) Facts: Petitioner Agapita Cruz, the surviving spouse of Valente Cruz, deceased, opposed the allowance of the will, alleging the it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, as to what properties he was disposing and that the will was not executed in accordance with law. Three instrumental witnesses, namely Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Paares and Atty. Teves, Jr.,. Atty. Teves was at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. As the third witness is the notary public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will. On the other hand, PR Manuel Lugay, the executor, maintains that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirement of at least three attesting witnesses relying on American Jurisprudence. CFI: allowing will of Valente Cruz for probate. Issue: whether the will was executed in accordance with law, particularly Articles 805 and 806? The first requiring at least three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public. Held: NO. Reversed. The last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged CANNOT be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will.

To acknowledge before means to avow; to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before" means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement, that function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For then, he would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him. To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses. Succession Case#35 Alvarado v. Gaviola (Palafox, Vincent Patrick) FACTS On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The notarial will was not read by the testator, who was suffering from glaucoma whose vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at three (3) feet", but was read aloud by the lawyer (private respondent) in the presence of the testator, the three witnesses and the notary public while they silently read their own copies. On 29 December 1977, a codicil was execute changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation but the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. The codicil was read by the lawyer in the same way as the notarial will. The holographic will admitted to probate on 9 December 1977. A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor. Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on several grounds, none of which he could substantiate in the probate court. On appeal to Intermediate Appellate Court, petitioner argued that deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto was executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied. On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals held that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming this, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their respective copies of the instruments. But despite it not being followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served. This decision was raised by the petitioner to the Supreme Court. ISSUE WON Brigido Alvarado blind for purpose of Art, 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed and if so, WON the double-reading requirement of said article was complied with. HELD YES and YES. Petition denied. Art. 808 states: If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and codicil were executed, he can be so considered within the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. The Court agreed as to the extent of the testators blindness, making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual reading for him, they held that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, he comes within the scope of the term "blind" as used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who

drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with. On this matter they agreed with the Court of Appeals finding that there was substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents, the notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. It can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. Succession Case#36 Garcia v. Vasquez (Palattao, Rodolfo John Robert) Facts: Gilceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried, leaving no descendants, ascendants, brother or sister. At the time of her death she was said to be 90 years old and owned mostly real property. Consuelo Gonzales, a niece of the deceased, petitioned the court for probate of the alleged last will and testament of the Gilceria and to be appointed as administratrix of the estate. This was opposed by the legatees of an earlier will made by the deceased. They allege that the latter will was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence and that the will did not follow the formalities required by law. The probate court, after hearing, granted Consuelos prayer and appointed her administratrix, on the ground that she was already the administrator during the lifetime of the deceased. In 1966, the court admitted to probate the 1960 (latter) will on the ground that there was no evidence presented to establish that the testatrix was of unsound mind, or that the fact that she made an earlier will did not prevent her from executing another one. Issue: Whether or not the 1960 will should be allowed probate? Ruling: No. There were two wills. The 1956 consisting of 12 pages and written in Spanish, a language she knew and spoke, witnessed by Messrs. Antonio Cabrera, Jesus Ayala and Valentin Marquez and acknowledge before notary public Jose Ayala; and another dated 29 December 1960, consisting of 1 page and written in Tagalog, witnessed by Messrs. Vicente Rosales, Francisco Decena and Francisco Lopez and acknowledged before notary public Remigio M. Tividad. The oppositors in the present case, however, are challenging the probate of the 1960 will on the ground that the eyesight of Gliceria was so poor and defective that she could not have read the provisions of the will. This was supported by Dr. Jesus Tamesis who said that she had cataract on her left eye above normal in pressure, denoting a possible glaucoma, a disease that leads to blindness.

Despite treatment her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not reading print. Therefore, she could not have read the provisions of the said 1960 will. In addition, the will were crammed together in a single sheet of paper with a lot of typographical errors indicating haste in execution. Therefore, the testatrix was for all purposes almost blind and due execution of her will must have observed the provisions of Article 808 which in this case they failed to do making the will invalid. Where the testator is blind, the will must be read to him twice as required by Article 808 of the Civil Code. The reason for this is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Failure to comply with this requirement makes the will invalid. Succession Case#37 Labrador v. CA (Palis, Lynn Margarita) FACTS: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a parcel of land and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will. On July 28, 1975, Sagrado, Enrica and Cristobal filed in the court a quo a petition for the probate of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador. Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus and Gaudencio filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for the consideration of P6,000, testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio the said lot and that as a matter of fact, a new title had been granted. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand P5,000. Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being premised on the fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious. After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial court rendered a joint decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of the holographic will and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. CA denied the probate of the will for being undated. ISSUE: Petitioner alleges that the holographic will was dated but the date was not in its usual place HELD: Petition granted. The will has been dated in the hands of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Art. 810. The first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will states: And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate. When private respondents sold the property (fishpond) with right to repurchase to Navat for P5,000, they were actually selling property belonging to another and which they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null and void. Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property from Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain possession of the property for its disposition in accordance with the will. Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the P5,000. Succession Case#38 Ajero v. CA (Quinsay, Stacy) FACTS:

Petitioners filed for allowance of Annie Sands holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a certain house and lot alleging it could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. RTC: admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate saying the probate proceedings must decide only the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix. No evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised are that the will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the question of identity of will. The holographic will in question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind at or around which time the holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object of her bounty, and the character of the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a nursing book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than sufficient showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act. CA: reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed saying the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." The decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 NCC. Certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent. RULING: Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases: (a) If not executed and attested as required by law; (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution; (c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit; (e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

Art. 839 NCC: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases; (1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with; (2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution; (3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats; (4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; (6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. In the case at bench, the court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 NCC, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous. For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code. In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 NCC. Article 813 NCC affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. As with the opposition of Dr. Ajero, Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot in its entirety. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. Here, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic will that the sibject property is in the name of her late father. Thus, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.

Succession Case#39 Kalaw v. Relova (Realo, Glenn) KALAW V. RELOVA, 132 SCRA 237; GR L-40207, September 28, 1984 FACTS: This is a sibling death match between brother and sister. Natividad left a holographic will. Rosa was first written as the sole heir but was subsequently erased and changed to Gregorio. Gregorio submitted the will for probate. Rosa opposed probate alleging that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Art. 814 of the NCC. CFI denied probate. Rosa filed this Petition for Review on certiorari on the sole legal question of w/n the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as the sole heir. ISSUE: W/N the holographic Will of Natividad may be admitted probate? HELD: NO! Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. However, when as in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which

alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the will after that which could remain valid. To state that the will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature. IN ESSENCE: General Rule: Erasures or alterations made in a holographic will which were not dated and authenticated by the testator do not invalidate the will itself by will only result in the disallowance of such changes. Exception: When there is only one substantial provision in the will and it was the one that was erased or altered without authentication and date. [this case is an exception to the Rule] Succession Case#40 Gan v. Yap (Rilloraza, Cynthia) Succession Case#41 Rodelas v. Aranza (Robles, Jo) Facts: A holographic will was executed by Ricardo Bonilla on January 1962 but he died in 1976 (14 years after). The original of the holographic will could not be found so a photostatic copy was presented. It was alleged that the holographic will did not contain a disposition of property but merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by the deceased. Ruling of the Lower Court In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will Issue: A lost or a will that cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Held: Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court Succession Case#42 Codoy v. Calugay (Saunar, Kris Norwin) Codoy vs Calugay GR 123487. August 12, 1999 Facts: On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990. Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal opposed the petition alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. (It was written by some other person) After presenting their witnesses and various documentary evidence, Petitioners instead of presenting their evidence, filed a demurer to evidence claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual legal basis for the probate of said holographic will. LC granted the demurer and denied the petition for probate. CA reversed the LC and allowed the will to probate. Issue: W/N the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory?

Held: It is mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator. The word shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is mandatory. The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to establish the true intent of the testator. It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they were familiar with the handwriting of the testator. In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals, we said that the object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased. The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who kept it even before the death of the deceased.There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased. The decision appealed from is SET ASIDE Succession Case#43 Perez v. Tolete (Trinidad, Jay-Ryan)

Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. They have 3 kids. Dr. Jose Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated". In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states: If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is no sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in accordance with such presumption. Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of her will states: If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in accordance with such presumption.

The entire Cunanan family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. The 2 wills were admitted to probate and letters

testamentary were issued in his favor. Salud Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, filed with the RTC in Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple. Perez asserted that she was the "sole and only heir" of her daughter.

The Cunanan heirs (the group of Dr. Rafael) filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify, Perez as special administratrix of the estates of the spouses Cunanan. The heirs said that being the "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses.

RTC issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of Perez as special administratrix. RTC said that Perez failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in accordance with the laws of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines. RTC said that probate of two wills in a single proceeding is not allowed in the Phils. Perez pointed out that separate proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings". However, the RTC issued an order denying the probate of both wills on a single proceeding. ISSUE: Whether or not the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses can be probated in a single proceeding

RULING: YES the wills of spouses Cunanan can be probated in a single proceeding

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills

Except for the first and last requirements, Perez submitted all the needed evidence. RTC was wrong in literally interpreting the rules on wills. Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, states that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818).

In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. SC ordered the RTC to allow Perez reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. Succession Case#44 Bilbao v. Bilbao (Balauag, Ed Warren) Bilbao vs. Bilbao 87 Phil 144 August 2, 1950 Facts: The will in question was executed on a single page or sheet by the deceased Victor Bilbao jointly with his wife Ramona M. Navarro. The two testators in their testament directed that "all of our respective private properties both real and personal, and all of our conjugal properties, and any other property belonging to either or both of us, be given and transmitted to anyone or either of us, who may survive the other, or who may remain the surviving spouse of the other." The petition for probate was opposed by one Filemon Abringe, a near relative of the deceased, among other grounds, that the alleged will was executed by the husband and wife for their reciprocal benefit and therefore not valid, and that it was not executed and attested to as required by law. After hearing, the trial court found the will to have been executed conjointly by the deceased husband and wife for their reciprocal benefit, and that a will of that kind is neither contemplated by Act No. 190, known as the Code of Civil Procedure nor permitted by article 669 of the Civil Code which provides: Two or more persons cannot make a will conjointly or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. The only assignment of error made in the appeal is that the lower court erred in not finding that a joint and reciprocal will particularly between husband and wife is valid under the present law. Issue: Whether or not a will executed by the husband and wife for their reciprocal benefit is valid? NO. Held: The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code prohibiting the execution of a will by two or more persons conjointly or in the same instrument either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person, is not unwise and is not against public policy. The reason for this provision, especially as regards husbands and wife is that when a will is made jointly or in the same instrument, the spouse who is more aggressive, stronger in will or character and dominant is liable to dictate the terms of the will for his or her own benefit or for that of third persons whom he or she desires to favor. And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless, or desperate, knowing as he or she does the terms of the will whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to the survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other. Considering the wisdom of the provisions of this article 669 and the fact that it has not been repealed, at least not expressly, as well as the consideration that its provisions are not incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure on the subject of wills, we believe and rule that said article 669 of the Civil Code is still in force. Succession Case#45 Unson v. Abella (Baybay, Benedict Dominic)

This refers to the probate of the LWT of Don Josefa Zalamca. LWT consisted of 10 pages. The inventory of the testatrix properties were embodied in an attachment appended to the end of the will after the attestation caluse. The will makes reference to the appended inventory on the third paragraph thereof. The testatrix signed at the bottom part of the inventory in this manner: In witness whereof, I sign this will composed of ten folios including the page containing the signatures and the attestation of the witnesses; I have likewise signed the inventory attached to this will composed of ten folios in the presence of Messrs. Gonzalo, Abaya, Eugenio Zalamea, Pedro de Jesus, in this municipality of Pagsanjan Laguna, Philippine Islands, this 19th of July, 1918. On the other hand, the attestation clause of the will is as follows: The foregoing will composed of ten folios including this one whereunto we have affixed our signatures, as well as the inventory of the properties of Doa Josefa Zalamea y Abella, was read to Doa Josefa Zalamea y Abella, and the latter affixed her name to the last, and each and every page of this will and inventory composed of ten folios in our presence; and she declared this to be her last will and testament and at her request we have affixed hereunto our respective signatures in her presence and in the presence of each other as witnesses to the will and the inventory this 19th of July, 1918, at Pagsanjan, Laguna, P.I. (Sgd.) GONZALO ABAYA, EUGENIO ZALAMEA, PEDRO DE JESUS. The trial court allowed probate of the will. One of the issues raised against the probate is the admittance of the appended inventory notwithstanding the absence of an attestation. Issue: Whether the LWT can be admitted in probate? Held: Yes, in view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part of it, the SC finds the foregoing attestation clauses is in compliance with section 1 of Act No. 2645 which requires that this solemnity for the validity of al will and makes unnecessary any other attestation clause at the end of the inventory. Succession Case#46 Testate of Maloto v. (Black, Dominique) (46) Topic: Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO G.R. No. L-32328 September 30, 1977 Facts: Adriana Maloto died. Believing that she died intestate, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews, respectively, of Adriana Maloto, commenced on November 4, 1963 in the Court of First Instance of iloilo an intestate proceeding. In the course of said intestate proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto executed an extrajudicial Partition of the estate of Adriana Maloto on February 1, 1964 whereby they adjudicated said estate unto themselves in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share for each. 2 The Court of First Instance of iloilo, then prescribed by Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, approved the extrajudicial on March 21, 1964. On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last with and testament of Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk of Art of the Art of First Instant of Iloilo. 4 It appears that Aldina Maloto Casiano Consent Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are named as heirs but Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares in said will which are bigger, different and more valuable than what they obtained in the extrajudicial partition. The said will also allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion (1) for reconsideration; (2) annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor also filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of Adriana Maloto. Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the motion of Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto. CFI issued an order denying the motion to reopen the proceedings on the ground that the said motion had been filed out of time. MR Denied. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court - This Court dismissed the petition - more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question. MR Denied. Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No. 2176 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the probate of the alleged last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss on the following ground (among others): o That the alleged will sought to be probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix The probate court dismissed the petition for the probate of the will on the basis of the finding of said court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged will sought to be Probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix.

Issue: W/N the LC erred in holding that the admittedly genuine last will and testament of Adriana Maloto had previously been revoked by her. Held: The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged with of Adriana Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the proceeding was denied because the same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that "Movants should have filed a separate action for the probate of the Will." 13 And this court stated in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that "The more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged with in question." In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto. WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against the respondents.

Succession Case#47 Testate of Maloto v. CA (Bustamante, Cindy) Facts: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that there was no last will and testament, these 4 heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. While the case was still in progress, they executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate. It provided for the division of the estate into 4 equal parts. The agreement was approved by the court.

 3 years later, Atty. Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Hervas, discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3, 1940, and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted to the office of the clerk of the CFI Iloilo on April 1, 1967. Panfilo and Felino are named as heirs, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares than what they received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor. Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees, filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a MR and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will. Denied. Petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the orders of the trial court to the SC. Petition dismissed and advised that a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the petitioners. CA: finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the document or papers allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, upon instructions of the testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. CA stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the facts that the document was not in the two safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of the will left in the latter's possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new will drawn up. For reasons shortly to be explained, we do not view such facts, even considered collectively, as sufficient bases for the conclusion that Adriana Maloto's will had been effectively revoked. Issue: Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana. Art. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following cases: (1) By implication of law; or (2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills: or (3) By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself. In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned. The CA in assessing the evidence presented by the respondents as oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the testimony of the 2 witnesses who testified in favor of the will's revocation appear "inconclusive." We share the same view. Nowhere in the records does it appear that the 2 witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay. The respondents in their bid for the dismissal of the present action for probate instituted by the petitioners argue that the same is already barred by res adjudicata. They claim that this bar was brought about by the petitioners' failure to appeal timely from the order dated November 16, 1968 of the trial court in the intestate proceeding (Special

Proceeding No. 1736) denying their (petitioners') motion to reopen the case, and their prayer to annul the previous proceedings therein and to allow the last will and testament of the late Adriana Maloto. This is untenable. The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no application in the present controversy. For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is, between the first and the second action, Identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action. We do not find here the presence of all the enumerated requisites. For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only the intestate settlement of the estate of Adriana. As such, that judgment could not in any manner be construed to be final with respect to the probate of the subsequently discovered will of the decedent. Neither is it a judgment on the merits of the action for probate. This is understandably so because the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the contested will. After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded on the presence of a will and with the objective of proving its due execution and validity, something which can not be properly done in an intestate settlement of estate proceeding which is predicated on the assumption that the decedent left no will. Thus, there is likewise no Identity between the cause of action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for probate. Be that as it may, it would be remembered that it was precisely because of our ruling in GR L30479 that the petitioners instituted this separate action for the probate of the late Adriana Maloto's will. Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of the private respondents on this score can not be sustained. One last note. The respondents point out that revocation could be inferred from the fact that "(a) major and substantial bulk of the properties mentioned in the will had been disposed of: while an insignificant portion of the properties remained at the time of death (of the testatrix); and, furthermore, more valuable properties have been acquired after the execution of the will on January 3,1940." Suffice it to state here that as these additional matters raised by the respondents are extraneous to this special proceeding, they could only be appropriately taken up after the will has been duly probated and a certificate of its allowance issued. Succession Case#48 De Molo v. Molo (Coherco, Calvin Ryan) Facts: Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941 without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. His wife Juana Molo (petitioner) survived him, and by his nieces and nephew Luz, Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo (oppositors-appellants). Oppositorsappellants were the legitimate children of a deceased brother of the testator. Mariano left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June 20, 1939. In both the 1918 and 1939 wills Juana was instituted as his universal heir. The latter will contains a clause, which expressly revokes the will executed in 1918. Juana Molo filed in the CFI a petition seeking the probate of the will executed in 1939. The court rendered a decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law. In view of the disallowance of the will, the widow filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 18, 1918. The oppositors filed an opposition to the petition contending that, notwithstanding the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocatory clause is valid and still has the effect of nullifying the prior will of 1918. Likewise, regardless of the revocatory clause, said will of 1918 cannot still be given effect because of the presumption that the testator himself deliberately revoked it. The will of 1918 was admitted to probate. Hence this appeal. Issue: 1. Was the admittance into probate proper? 2. What is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation? Held: A subsequent will containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executed an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails to effect for same reason.

The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will. Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect. The theory on which the principle of dependent relative revocation is predicated in that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on different occasions and instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate. Succession Case#49 Tolentino v. Francisco (Concepcion, Giovani) 49 Succession Tolentino v Francisco Facts: Gregrorio Tolentino (+) Benita Francisco (predeceased Gregorio) accumulated a large estate spouses have no children

At one time Tolentino contemplated leaving his property mainly to these kin of his wife, of the surname Francisco; and for several years prior to his death, he had kept a will indicating this desire. In October, 1930, strained relations, resulting from grave disagreements, developed between Tolentino and the Franciscos and he determined to make a new will in which, apart from certain legacies in favor of a few individuals, the bulk of his estate, should be given to Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion, as his universal heir. Tolentino went to the Atty. Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and informed him that he wanted to make a new will and wanted Repide to draft it for him. He also requested to make Syyap, Legarda, and Vergel de Dios as the witnesses. Pursuant to these instructions, Repide drafted the will; Tolentino returned to Repide's office and received from him the original document, with a carbon copy should be executed with the same formality as the original in order that the intention of the testator should not be frustrated by the possible loss or destruction of the original. At about 4.30 p.m. on October 22, Tolentino started in his car to pick up Syyap and Vergel de Dios at their respective homes on Antipolo and Benavides streets. He then caused his chauffeur to drive with the three to La Previsora Filipina, on Rizal Avenue, where Vicente Legarda, the third intending witness was to be found. Arriving at this place, the three entered the office of Legarda, who was manager of the establishment, and they were invited to take seats, which they did. Tolentino then suggested that the three should go as his guests to a panciteria, where they could take refreshments and the will could be executed. Legarda replied that he must decline the invitation for he had an engagement to go to the Cosmos Club the same afternoon. Upon this Tolentino asked Legarda to permit the will to be signed in his office, and to this request Legarda acceded. Tolentino thereupon drew two documents from his pocket saying that it was his last will and testament, done in duplicate, and he proceeded to read the original to the witnesses. After this had been completed, Legarda himself took the will in hand and read it himself. He then returned it to Tolentino, who thereupon proceeded, with pen and ink, to number the pages of the will thus, "Pagina Primera", "Pagina Segunda", etc.

He then paged the duplicate copy of the will in the same way. He next proceeded to sign the original will and each of its pages by writing his name "G. Tolentino" in the proper places. Following this, each of the three witnesses signed their own respective names at the end of the will, at the end of the attesting clause, and in the left margin of each page of the instrument. During this ceremony all of the persons concerned in the act of attestation were present together, and all fully advertent to the solemnity that engaged their attention. After the original of the will had been executed in the manner just stated, the testator expressed his desire that the duplicate should be executed in the same manner. To this Syyap objected, on the ground that it was unnecessary; and in this view he was supported by Vergel de Dios, with the result that the wishes of the testator on this point could not be carried out. Tolentino went to the Oriental Safe Deposit and there left the instrument in his private compartment, No. 333, in which place it remained until withdrawn some two weeks later by order of the court. On the morning of November 9, 1930, Gregorio Tolentino was found dead in his bed, having perished by the hands of an assassin. Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion filed a petition before the CFI of Manila for the purpose of procuring probate of the will of Gregorio Tolentino, deceased. Opposition was made to the probate of the will by Ciriaco Francisco, Natalia Francisco, and Gervasia Francisco, all cousins of the deceased. Jose Syyap and Verge de Dios, repudiated their participation in the execution of the will at the time and place stated; and while admitting the genuineness of their signatures to the will, pretended that they had severally signed the instrument, at the request of the testator, at different places. Syyap, testifying as a witness, claimed that the testator brought the will to Syyap's house on the afternoon of October 21 and upon learning that Syyap could not be present at the time and place then being arranged for the execution of the will, he requested Syyap, as a mere matter of complaisance, to sign the will then, which Syyap did. Vergel de Dios has another story to tell of isolated action, claiming that he signed the will in the evening of October 22 at the Hospital of San Juan de Dios in Intramuros. Issue: Whether probate of the will should mbe allowed in light of the testimonies of the witnesses to the will Held: YES We are unable to give any credence to the testimony of these two witnesses on this point, the same being an evident fabrication designed for the purpose of defeating the will. In the first place, the affirmative proof showing that the will was properly executed is adequate, consistent, and convincing, consisting of the testimony of the third attesting witness, Vicente Legarda, corroborated by Miguel Legarda and Urbana Rivera, two disinterested individuals, employees of La Previsora Filipina, who were presented in Legarda's office when the will was executed and who lent a discerning attention to what was being done. In the second place, each of the seven signatures affixed to this will by Syyap appear to the natural eye to have been made by using the same pen and ink that was used by Legarda in signing the will. The same is also probably true of the seven signatures made by Vergel de Dios. This could hardly have happened if the signatures of Syyap and Vergel de Dios had been affixed, as they now pretend, at different times and places. In the third place, both Syyap and Vergel de Dios are impeached by proof of contradictory statements made by them on different occasions prior to their appearance as witnesses in this case. In this connection we note that, after the murder of Gregorio Tolentino, and while the police authorities were investigating his death, Nemesio Alferez, a detective, sent for Syyap and questioned him concerning his relations with the deceased. Upon this occasion Syyap stated that Gregorio Tolentino had lately made a will, that it had been executed at the office of La Previsora Filipina under the circumstances already related, and that he himself had served as one of the attesting witnesses.

The circumstances and other incidents revealed in the proof leave no room for doubt in our mind that Syyap and Vergel de Dios have entered into a conspiracy between themselves, and in concert with the opponents, to defeat the will of Gregorio Tolentino although they are well aware that said will was in all respects properly executed; and the trial court, in our opinion, committed no error in admitting the will to probate. When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call all of the attesting witnesses, if available, but the validity of the will in no wise depends upon the united support of the will by all of those witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the validity of the will rests. It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.

Succession Case#50 Mercado v. Santos (Dequina, Doanni Lou) Facts: o On May 28, 1931, the petitioner herein filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. o The probate court admitted the will to probate. o Almost three years later the five intervenors herein moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court to probate the will and to close the proceedings, which was denied. o 16 months after the probate of the will of Ines Basa, intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint against the petitioner herein, for falsification or forgery of the will probated as above indicated, which was dismissed. o 3 months later, or on March 2, 1933, the same intervenor charged the petitioner for the second time with the same offense in the justice of the peace court of Mexico, Pampanga. o Some 9 months later to be exact, the same intervenor accused the same petitioner for the third time of the same offense and filed the case in Mexico. o DECISION: will was already probated and the case dismissed on the ground that the will alleged to have been falsified had already been probated and there was no evidence that the petitioner had forged the signature of the testatrix appearing thereon, but that, on the contrary, the evidence satisfactorily established the authenticity of the signature aforesaid. o However motion for reinvestigation and for the 4th time, the petitioner was arrested. o Petitioner contends (1) that the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to his criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will; and, (2) that he has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Issues: Whether the probate of the will is a bar to petitioners criminal prosecution? Accordingly, whether the probate of the will is decisive of its due execution and authenticity? Held: YES. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding. The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery. The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by Publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The majority decision of the Court of Appeals cites English decisions to bolster up its conclusion that the judgment admitting the will to probate is binding upon the whole world as to the due execution and genuineness of the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are concerned, but not for the purpose of punishment of a crime. A judgment admitting a will to probate cannot be attacked collaterally although the will was forged; and a payment to the executor named therein of a debt due the decedent will discharge the same, notwithstanding the spurious character of the instrument probated. It has also been held that, upon an indictment for forging a will, the probate of the paper in question is conclusive evidence in the defendants favor of its genuine character. But this particular point has lately been ruled otherwise.

We hold, therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of our Code of Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction. Succession Case#51 Nuguid v. Nuguid (Dimagiba, Hershel) Facts: Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, and 6 brothers and sisters. Petitioner Remedios Nuguid (one of her sisters) filed in CFI of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground, is that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors, who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line, were illegally preterited and that consequently, the institution is void. Before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition. Subsequently, the court ruled that the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition. Issue: WON the petition for probate of the will of Rosario Nuguid is a complete nullity. Ruling and Doctrine: (no connection with the heading) The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should he allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will been duly authenticated. But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity? If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the nullity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. The deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending time her parents. Her will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than he labelled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition. Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because the are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." Disinheritance; in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of heir share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law." Disinheritance is always "voluntary"; preterition upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntary." Succession Case#52 Dy v. Enage (Doma, Angelo) Facts: Respondent Emmanuel bought from petitioner spouses Sy and Dy copra on credit basis. Emmanuel made partial payments in checks and in cash amounting to P16,000, leaving an unpaid balance of P15,104.30. But despite earnest efforts exerted by petitioner spouses towards a compromise and extra-judicial amicable settlement of Emmanuels indebtedness, the same have failed and despite repeated demands made by petitioner spouses upon Emmanuel to pay said unpaid balance, the latter failed and refused and still continued to do so without valid and justifiable cause therefore, thereby committing breach of contract in evident bad faith. While the case was pending, Emmanuel died. Thus, his heirs filed a Jurisdictional Motion for Dismissal of Plaintiffs Complaint based on the ground that inasmuch as the plaintiff's case was a claim for money, under Section 21 of Rule 3, it should be dismissed as an action and filed as a claim in the special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant. Respondent Judge, however, denied the motion to dismiss. Issue: Is respondent judge correct? Held: NO.

The principal ground of the petition was the alleged violation by respondent judge of Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court in refusing to dismiss the petitioners complaint, which they contended constituted a money claim, notwithstanding the death of Emmanuel before final judgment could be rendered. Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules. The respondent judge deviated from the course laid down by the provision when it refused to dismiss the petitioners complaint. The fact that the trial was practically finished was no legal excuse for such departure from the established procedure, considering no final judgment had yet been rendered. The language of Section 21 of Rule 3 was too clear in this respect as to require any interpretation or construction. There can be no question that a violation of this provision constituted grave abuse of discretion, as it wrecked the orderly procedure prescribed for the settlement of claims against deceased persons designed to protect the interests of the creditors of the decedent. Succession Case#53 Fernandez v. Dimagiba (Garcia, John) Facts: On January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba submitted the purported will of Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22, 1930, to court for probate. The will instituted Ismaela as the sole heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was opposed by those claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent on the grounds of forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppels by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by the SC in 1954. By decision of June 20, 1958, the CFI found the will was genuine and properly executed. No appeal was made on this decision. On July 27, 1959, the court overruled the claim of estoppel. On February 27, 1962, the CFI resolved that the will was unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale. CA affirmed. Issues: (a) whether or not the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal; (b) whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositorsappellants had likewise become final; and (c) whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944. Held: (a) It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise. (b) The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits. Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court, and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. (c) The last issue, that of revocation, is predicated on paragraph 2 of Article 957 of the Civil Code of 1950 which recites: Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect: (2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase; As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself, appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision annulling these conveyances which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, "no consideration whatever was paid by respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom. Revocation being an exception, we

believe, with the Courts below, that in the circumstances of the particular case, Article 957 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, does not apply to the case at bar. Succession Case#54 Avera v. Garcia (Javier, Franco) Avera v. Garcia FACTS: Eutiquia Avera instituted the probate of the will of Esteban Garcia. On the date of the hearing, Eutiquia introduced only one of the three witnesses of the will attesting that the will was executed with all the necessary formalities and the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. The signatures of the testator and the witnesses were on the right margin of the pages of the will. It was contested in the latter part of the proceeding by Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez as guardians for the minors Jose and Cesar Garcia protesting that Esteban didnt have full possession of disposing faculties at that time. The trial court admitted the will to probate. ISSUE: Whether or not the signatures of the testator and the witnesses appearing on the right margin is a fatal defect? HELD: NO, the will is valid even if the signatures are on the right margin as long as the instrument contains the necessary signatures on every page. Succession Case#55 Sanchez v. CA (Javier, Ma. Feliza Amparo Cristina) Facts: Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of Rosalia. On the other hand, Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez. Following the death of Rosalias mother, Rosalia filed a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and the estate of her father, Juan C. Sanchez, who was at the time in state of senility. Before the administration proceedings could formally be terminated and closed, Rosalia's father, died. The illegitimate children of Juan C. Sanchez, filed a petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez, which petition was opposed by Rosalia. Rosalia and the illegitimate children of her father assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise agreement wherein they agreed to divide the properties enumerated of the late Juan C. Sanchez. Rosalia was appointed by the trial court, and took her oath as the administratrix of her father's intestate estate. The illegitimate children of Rosalias father filed a Motion to require Rosalia, to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and or to set aside compromise agreement. Rosalia and the illegitimate children entered into and executed a mernorandurn of agreement which modified the compromise agreement. Nine years later, the illegitimate children filed a motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement in which they prayed for the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud. The illegitimate children contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the pendency of the probate proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with validity. They stress that the probate court had jurisdiction over the properties covered by said agreement, Trial court: A compromise agreement or partition, executed by the parties was void and unenforceable, the same not having been approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably repudiated by the illegitimate children on the ground of fraud. Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition, setting aside the trial court's decision and declaring the modified compromise agreement valid and binding.

Issue: Whether a compromise agreement partitioning on the inherited properties is valid even without the approval of the trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner? Held: The compromise agreement is valid. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. And from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties, it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata. Although it is denominated as a compromise agreement, the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition, pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that "every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction." For a partition to be valid, Section 1. Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (I) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. All the foregoing requisites are present in this case. The court therefore affirm the validity of the parties' compromise agreement/partition in this case. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision in disregard of the parties' compromise agreement. Such disregard, on the ground that the compromise agreement "was not approved by the court," is tantamount to "an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation and within the bounds of law." Succession Case#56 Pecson v. Coronel (Laceda, Elaine Marie) Facts: Lorenzo Pecson, husband of Angela Coronel, who is a niece of the deceased Dolores Coronel, submitted the will of said deceased for probate. The blood relatives of the deceased opposed the probate on arguing that it was improbable and exceptional that Dolores Coronel should dispose of her estate, as set forth in the will, her true intention being that the same be distributed among her blood relatives; and if such intention was not expressed in fact, it was due to extraneous illegal influence. The opponents contend that it was not, nor could it be, the will of the testatrix, because it is not natural nor usual that she should completely exclude her blood relatives from her vast estate, in order to will the same to one who is only a relative by affinity, there appearing no sufficient motive for such exclusion, inasmuch as until the death of Dolores Coronel, she maintained very cordial relations with the aforesaid relatives who had helped her in the management and direction of her lands. From the testimony of Atty. Francisco, the deceaseds legal adviser, it was however found that Dolores Coronel revealed to him her suspicion against some of her nephews as having been accomplices in a robbery against her. CFI allowed probate of the will. Held: SC Affirmed. The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very strongly knit and that the exclusion of relative from one's estate is an exceptional case. It is true that ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889 Any person who has no forced heirs may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire it. As to preference given to Lorenzo Pecson, it is not purely arbitrary, nor a caprice or a whim of the moment. The proof adduced by this appellee, although contradicted, shows by a preponderance of evidence that besides the services which the opponents admit had been rendered by him to Dolores Coronel since the year 1914, he had also rendered services prior to that time and was the administrator and manager of the affairs of said Dolores in the last years of her life. It was also shown that 6yrs before the execution of the will in question, said Lorenzo Pecson was named and appointed by Dolores Coronel as her sole heir in a prior will which was remade to comply with the formalities required by Act No. 2645 enacted after its execution, upon advise of Atty. Francisco. Although such administration and confidence were enjoyed by Pecson always jointly with others and never exclusively, this fact

does not show that the will of the testatrix was to appoint Pecson only as executor and distributor of her estate among the heirs as contended by the oppositors, nor does it prevent her from instituting him in 1912 or 1918 as sole beneficiary; nor does it constitute, lastly, a test for determining whether or not such institution in favor of Pecson was the true will of the testatrix. In the absence of any statutory restriction every person possesses absolute dominion over his property, and may bestow it upon whomsoever he pleases without regard to natural or legal claim upon his bounty. Succession Case#57 Parish Priest of Victoria v. Rigor (Layug, Kristina) This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares. That devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative. The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will was executed and probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia RigorEscobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda. To implement the foregoing bequest, the administratix submitted a project containing the following item: o 5. LEGACY OF THE CHURCH o That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to be administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the real properties xxx Judge Roman A. Cruz approved the project partition It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to analyze the meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the same were not delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained pending. ISSUE : WON the ca erred when it ruled that the will violate the rule against perpetuities ? No HELD: appealed dismissed. Affirmed. We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code). The said testamentary provisions should be sensibly or reasonably construed. To construe them as referring to the testator's nearest male relative at anytime after his death would render the provisions difficult to apply and create uncertainty as to the disposition of his estate. That could not have been his intention. Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" . This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands. The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional

legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267). Succession Case#58 Acain v. IAC (Lee, Haidee) Acain vs IAC Facts: ISSUE: whether or not private respondents have been pretirited. HELD: In the widows case: NO. In adopted daughters case: YES. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner. U nder Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance. T he only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. No legacies or devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy except that proper legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. Where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief. Succession Case#59 Neri v. Akutin (1941 and 1943 MR case) (Li, Elizabeth) Neri v Akuti (1941) Facts: Agripino Neri y Chavez, who died on December 12, 1931, had by his first marriage 6 children; and by his second marriage with Ignacia Akutin, five children. Getulia, daughter in the first marriage, died on October 2, 1923, eight years before the death of Agripino Neri y Chavez, and was survived by seven children. In Agripino Neri's testament, he willed that his children by the first marriage will no longer have any participation in his estate, as they have already received their shares during his lifetime. However, the trial court found the contrary. The TC declared that all his children by the first and second marriage should inherit by intestacy. It declared all the children of both marriages intestate heirs of the deceased. The CA affirmed with modification that the will was valid with respect to the 2/3s part which the testator could freely dispose of. SC reversed and affirmed the TCs decision.

Issue: W/N the omission of the children of the first marriage annuls the institution of the children of the second marriage as sole heirs. W/N the will may be held valid with respect to one-third which the testator may dispose of as legacy and to the other one-third which he may bequeath, to the children of the second marriage Held: The testator had not intended to disinherit the children of the first marriage. The testator expressly denied them any share; but the denial was not predicated upon the desire to disinherit, but upon the mistaken belief that the children by the first marriage had already received their corresponding shares in his lifetime in the form of advancement. Article 814 of the Civil Code, provides that: The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. In the case, the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, but they were not accorded any share in the hereditary property, without expressly being disinherited. It is a clear case of preterition. The omission of the forced heirs or anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not expressly made or is not at least manifest. Except as to "legacies and betterments" which "shall be valid in so far as they are not inofficious" preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. In the instant case, no such legacies or betterments have been made by the testator. There is no express betterment made in favor of the children by the second marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have already received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention would have been to divide his property equally among all his children. Neri v Akuti - MR (1943) Facts: The testator Neri, in his will, left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage, the respondents, with preterition of the children by his first marriage, the petitioners. This Court in 1941 annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy. The Respondents filed and MR. SC denied the MR. Issue: W/N assuming there has been a preterition, the effect would not be the annulment of the institution of heirs but simple reduction of the bequest made to them. Held: TC found that the children from the first marriage Agapita Rosario and the children of Getulia did not receive any property, personal, real or in cash. This is preterition where the institution of heirs shall be annulled and intestate succession should open. As to the effect of preterition, article 814 should not be confused with articles 817 and 851. In preterition (article 814). the nullity of the institution of heirs is total, whereas in disinheritance (article 851), the nullity is partial in so far as the institution affects the legitime of the disinherited heirs. In preterition, the institution of heirs is null in toto whereas in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the legitime of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. In preterition, the property bequeathed by universal title to the instituted heirs should not be merely reduced according to article 817, but instead, intestate succession should be opened in connection therewith under article 814. The annulment of the institution of heirs in preterition does not always make the whole will ineffective. Legacies and mejoras shall be respected when they are not inofficious or excessive. However, in the case, no legacies or mejoras are provided in the will, where the whole property is left by universal title to the children of the second marriage. Such cant be treated as legado and mejora. Else, every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest making the provisions of articles 814 and 851 absolutely meaningless. The provisions concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by article 817. The institution of heirs is separate and distinct from legacies or betterment. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. The first is also different from a betterment which should be made expressly (article 828). The only instance of implied betterment recognized by law is where legacies are made which cannot be included in the free portion (article 828).tual law library

There is a difference between a case of preterition in which the whole property is left to a mere friend and a where property is left to one or some forced heirs. If the testamentary disposition be totally annulled in the first case, there would be a total deprivation of the friend of his share. This is contrary to the intention of the testator who will be presumed to give his friend at least the free portion. In the second case, the total nullity of the testamentary disposition has the effect, not of depriving totally the instituted heir of his share, but merely place him and the other forced heirs on equal footing. This is also in consonance with the presumptive intention of the testator. Preterition is due to mistake or inadvertence without which the testator may be presumed to treat alike all his children. This is true in the case where the testator omitted the children by his first marriage upon the erroneous belief that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his second marriage. Succession Case#60 Heirs of Montinola Sanson v. CA (Li, Tiffany) Facts: A petition was filed by Atty. Hernandez with CFI of Manila seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola. The testatrix died single, parentless and childless, devised in this will several of her real properties to specified persons. Matilde, the only surviving sister who was not named in the said will, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, alleging that the will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the will; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder of the estate. Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged holographic will was without rhyme or reason, being the only surviving sister of the testatrix with whom she shares an intimate relationship, thus demonstrating the lack of testamentary capacity of testatrix. That the fact that in her holographic will the testatrix failed to dispose of all of her estate is an indication of the unsoundness of her mind. Probate court allowed probate of the will, CA affirmed. Held: Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. It is therefore within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister who is not a compulsory heir in her will. Also, Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed. In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs. The fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of her real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of unsound mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in intestate succession. Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than compulsory heirs have been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the testator's right to disregard non-compulsory heirs. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither fraud or undue influence. While it is true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we understand that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. Succession Case#61 Viado Non v. CA (Lim, Mary Rocelyn) Facts: The Isarog property was owned by Julian and Virginia Viado. Virginia died intestate in 1982, and Julian in 1985. Surviving them were their children Nilo, Leah, and petitioners Rebecca and Delia, a retardate. Nilo and Leah both died in 1987. Nilo Viado left behind as his own sole heirs herein respondents his wife Alicia Viado and their two children Cherri Viado and Fe Fides Viado. Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at the Isarog property. Soon, however, tension would appear to have escalated between petitioner Rebecca and Alicia after Rebecca had asked that the property be equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing children. Alicia claimed ownership by virtue of: (1) a deed of donation by Julian covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of Nilo Viado and (2) a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian, Leah, (through a power of attorney in favor of Nilo Viado) and petitioner Rebecca waived in favor of Nilo Viado their rights and interests over their share of the

property inherited from Virginia Viado. Both instruments were executed on 1983 and registered five years thereafter. Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the instruments, contending that Nilo employed forgery and undue influence to coerce Julian to execute the deed of donation. Rebecca, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial settlement, thinking it was a document for the administration of the property. In addition, the instruments were registered only five years after its execution, at the time also, Julian, Nilo and Leah were dead. In addition, she claimed that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment. RTC ruled in favor of Alicia. CA partly modified the decision remanding the case to RTC for further proceedings to determine the value of the property and the amount respondents should pay to petitioner Delia Viado for having been preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement. Issues: Who are the lawful owners of the Isarog property? Was Delia preterited? If so, what is the remedy available to her? Alicia and children; Yes; the value of her share in the Isarog property only. Ruling: When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirs her husband Julian and their children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.4 The questioned instruments were already held valid by the lower courts. Additionally, the petitioners are vague, however, on how and in what manner was fraud employed. Neither have petitioners shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo Viado. The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed of extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous because she was a teacher by profession, and could have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document. The registration of the documents was a ministerial act and merely created a constructive notice of its contents against all third persons. Among the parties, the instruments remained completely valid and binding. Hence, the belated registration of the properties after five years is of no moment. The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the isarog property and ascertainment of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado. Succession Case#62 Nuguid v. Nuguid (Lumagui, Rommell) Nuguid v Nuguid G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966 Facts: Rosario Nuguid died single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, and 6 brothers and sisters. Petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in Court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid. The parents of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will on the ground that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void. The court's order held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs. Issue: Whether the institution of universal heir is void due to preterition Ruling: Yes. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. The one- sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No

specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law." The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "shall annul the institution of heir." This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs," but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited," which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null. Succession Case#63 Perez v. Garchitorena (Martinez, Joseph Eufemio) Perez vs. Garchitorena Facts: Plaintiff Carmen Perez is the sole heiress of Ana Maria Alcantara. The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in her name with La Urbana as the final payment of the liquidated credit of deceased. As Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of Carmen, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana. Carmen filed a petition for the issuance of a preliminary injunction alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara. Defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress. CFI held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction. The will provides the following clauses: o Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, x x x I institute her as my sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the payment of my debts and legacies, x x x, that she may enjoy them. o Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving children; x x x in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible. HELD: Affirmed. Deposit held in trust for the fideicommissary. The will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might give rise to a simple substitution, only the death of the instituted heiress before the testatrix would in the instant case give place to such substitution, inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver of inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. It is evident that, considering the nature of simple substitution by the heir's death before the testator, and the fact that the substitution is ordered where the heiress instituted dies after the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple substitution. The fact that the plaintiff was instituted the sole and universal heiress does not prevent her children from receiving, upon her death and in conformity with the express desire of the testatrix, the latter's hereditary estate. The word sole does not necessarily exclude the idea of substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses together, such word means that the plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first instance. The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the estate, is not incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution. In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the

idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the second heir. From the whole context it appears that in making the provisions, the testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate to the children of the heiress by this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible." Such intention is also evident from the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs. Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and after receiving and enjoying the inheritance. All the requisites of a fideicommissary substitution are present in the case: 1. A first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate -- the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate. 2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate -- Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children" 3. A second heir -- the children of the heiress instituted Finally, the requisite added -- that the fideicommissary or second heir should be entitled to the estate from the time of the testator's death, which in the instant case, is, a necessary consequence derived from the nature of the fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit from the heir first instituted, but from the testator. Succession Case#64 Testate Estate of Ramirez v. Vda de Ramirez (Morales, Raymond Noel) Facts: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will which provided for substitutions was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate and she submitted an inventory of the estate. Ramirezs principal beneficiaries were as follows: (1) his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez, a French who lived in Paris; (2) his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and (3) his companion Wanda de Wrobleski, an Austrian who lived in Spain. Issue: Whether or not the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries was correct. Held: As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons: (a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted." What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows: Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir. From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first heir who are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary. (b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a

fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as follows: One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime; One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez because dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid. Succession Case#65 Kilayko et al v. Tengco (Osdon, Charity Anne) Vda. de Kilayko vs. Tengco March 27, 1992 Facts: In 1968, Maria Lizares died. She left a will to her niece Eustaquia Lizares. The court declared the will probated and appointed Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria. (The will was written in Spanish so I cannot make a summary.) Eustaquia filed a project partition. Such partition was also granted by the probate court. The court then ordered the transfer of the properties to the heirs and the closure of the testate proceedings. (The heirs are the sisters and niece of Maria.) After, Eustaquia filed a motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some properties of Maria which were not included in the partition be adjudicated to her. The court reopened the proceedings and adjudicated to Eustaquia all the properties which were not given by Maria to any person in her will. Then, Eustaquia and the other heirs of Maria terminated their co-ownership over some parcels of land by executing an agreement of partition and subdivision of the lots. And then, Eustaquia died. She died single without any descendant. Petitioners (sisters of Maria) filed a motion to reopen the testate proceedings of Maria. They were claiming that paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will of Maria, are in the nature of a simple substitution. Court denied the motion to reopen and held that the settlement of an estate is a proceeding in rem and the judgment is binding against the whole world. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioners then filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the administrators of the estate of Eustaquia. Issue No. 1: Are petitioners conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria? Held No. 1: NO. While the allegation of the joint administrators that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is also baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor of the petitioners, neither may said paragraphs be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution. It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such heir should die a second heir also designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy. (Other issue) Issue No. 2: Can the petitioners still attack the project partition? Held No. 2: NO. In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted a project of partition in which the parcels of land, subject matters of the complaint for reconveyance, were included as property of the estate and assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In accordance with said project of partition which was approved by the probate court, Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios Lizares Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, . . . xxx . .. These facts taken altogether show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof.

Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was affected through improper means or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant. The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Succession Case#66 Morente v. dela Santa (Palafox, Vincent Patrick) FACTS Consuelo Morento made a will that had several clauses. First, it bequeathed all her real estate to her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa. Second, it provided that he should not leave her siblings or marry another. Third, it also directed her husband to dwell in the camarin in the bakery also belonging to her. In addition, if Gumersindo should have other children by anyone, he may only convey one-third part of that property and the two remaining thirds would be for her brother Vicente or his children should he have any. Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition asking that the legacy to him be annulled. The court denied the petition; in the decision the court said, that the husband having married, had the right to the use of all the property during his life and that at his death two-thirds thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and one-third thereof could be disposed of by the husband. Elena brought this issue to court, claiming that by the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost all rights acquired by the will. ISSUE WON Gumersindo lost all rights to his wifes real estate upon his subsequent marriage HELD NO. Judgment of that court denying the petition is affirmed. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower. It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. Therefore the intention of the testatrix cannot be construed as wanting to forfeit the legacy if her husband married again. There being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, no condition can be implied from the context of the will. In order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will. But it is expressly provided that if one event does happen the disposition of the property contained in the first clause of the will shall be changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall pass to Vicente, the brother of the testatrix. However, this has not been alleged in the present case. Succession Case#67 Natividad v. Gabino (Palattao, Rodolfo John Robert)

Facts: This is a case involving the proceedings in the partition of an estate. Testator Tiburcio Salvador Reyes contracted a valid marriage with Anselma Nicasio, who died in 1868, leaving a daughter named Higinia who married Clemente Natividad. Higinia died in 1913 and was survived by Emilio and Purificacion. Tiburcio disposed of all his properties in the manner recorded in the will executed in legal form on November 9, 1914 instituting as sole heirs Emilio and Purificacion. The sixth clause stated she will bequeath to Dona Basilia Gabino ownership of an urban property with the condition that should the legatee die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver this house and lot to Emilio upon payment of the latter of 4,000 pesos. In other words the sixth clause was itself a right of usufruct. Gabino then opposed the approval of the proposed partition with the adjudication of usufruct only and instead wants ownership over the property. The judge issued the amendment to the partition. An appeal was taken by counsel for the executor. Issue: What construction must be be given to the above-quoted sixth clause of the will executed by Tiburcio Salvador? Ruling: Affirmed. A person is entirely free to make his will in manner he pleases. He may impose conditions, either with respect to the institution of heirs or the designation of legatees, and when the conditions imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall under the Civil Code, they shall be governed by the rules on conditional obligations. All conditions imposed in a will must be observed in accordance with the express wishes of the testator, if they are neither impossible to fulfill and not contrary to law and morality. The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon the happening of the event constituting a condition, to wit, the death of the legatee Gabino, a perfectly legal condition according to Article 1114 of the Civil Code, as it is not impossible of performance and is not contrary to law or public morals. Therefore the moment legatee dies, Lorenzo Salvador is obliged to deliver the property to the heir Emilio Natividad, who in turn must pay the legatee the sum of 4,000 pesos to fulfill the condition imposed on the will. Succession Case#68 Mangulabnan v. IAC (Palis, Lynn Margarita) FACTS: Edna Mangulabnan filed an action for damages and support for her child Alfie Angelo against Ambrosio Tan Chew Acero, the alleged father. Pending litigation, she filed an application for support pendent lite to which Acero opposed. The RTC granted the provisional support. Acero filed a MR which was denied. He appealed to the CA which annulled the support pendent lite. CA reasoned that there should first be declaration of the childs civil status, being the source of the right to support, before support pendent lite could be granted. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N support pendent lite can be granted for a natural child? HELD: Yes. It should be granted. Cause of action happened in 1984; hence, the Civil Code, not the Family Code, applies. Art. 291, no. 5, provides that parents and illegitimate children who are not natural are obliged to support each other. This support should be distinguished from the obligation to support between the other persons enumerated in the same Article. Art. 287 of the Civil Code also provides that illegitimate children other than natural in accordance with Art. 269 and other than natural children by legal fiction are entitled to support and such successional rights as are granted in this Code. In this case, petitioner established the paternity of her childe not only be her own affidavits but also by affidavits of two witnesses. In addition, she also submitted a birth certificate of her child, a certificate to which the private respondent claims as spurious. CA claims that, since the birth certificate was opposed by the private respondent, there is need for further evidence that the illegitimate child who is not natural to be recognized either voluntarily or by judicial decree, otherwise they cannot demand support. SC agrees with the petitioner. The requirement for recognition by the father or the mother jointly or by only one of them as provided by the law refers in particular to a natural child under Art. 276 of the Civil Code. Such child is presumed to be the natural child of the parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception. Thus an illegitimate child, like the minor Alfie in this case, whose father, Acero, is married and had no legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of his conception is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious child in which case recognition is not required before support may be granted. However, under Art. 887, in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be proved. Such filiation may be proved by voluntary or compulsory recognition. Recognition is voluntary when made in the record of birth,

a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. As above related, the affidavits of the petitioner and the two witnesses were presented to prove the paternity of the child, and a birth certificate was also presented to prove the paternity of the child, and a birth certificate was also presented to corroborate the same. SC agrees with the RTC that the status of the child has been provisionally established. Succession Case#69 Noble v. Noble (Quinsay, Stacy) FACTS: The proceedings for the probate of the last will of the deceased was instituted by Juan Noble (named executor therein). This was opposed by Maria Noble, who claimed to be an illegitimate (spurious) child of the deceased. It was alleged that the will sought to be probated was not the last will and testament of the late Don Vicente Noble; it was not executed in accordance with the law, and it was executed through undue influence, mistake and improper pressure on the part of one or some of the beneficiaries, and that Juan Noble, as then incumbent Assistant General Manager of the NAMARCO, could not properly execute the trust of his office in the estate of the deceased. Maria prayed that the purported last Will and Testament presented to the court be disallowed; that she be declared the only surviving illegitimate daughter of the deceased. Simultaneously, she filed a motion asking for permission to present evidence of her alleged filiation with the deceased. This motion was opposed by Juan Noble, on the ground that the claim was in effect an action for compulsory recognition, and since it was brought after the death of the putative father and when claimant was already of majority age, the right to bring the same has already prescribed pursuant to Article 285 of the new Civil Code. This motion was not immediately resolved. Instead, the court proceeded with the reception of the evidence, during which proceeding, the oppositor was allowed to cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses. Finding, on the basis of the evidence, the will was admitted to probate, and Juan Noble was appointed administrator of the estate. It was also ruled that the petition of Maria Noble to present proof for the purpose of establishing her filiation, filed after the death of the presumed father, had been barred by prescription. ISSUE: What is necessary to be established by an illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be entitled to successional rights under Article 887 NCC, the fact of his bare filiation, or a filiation acknowledged by the putative parent? RULING: While the Civil Code merely provides that "in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved" (Art. 887), there are cogent reasons, both legal and moral, which require that such filiation must be acknowledged by the presumed parent. For, if the mere fact of the paternity of the supposed father is all that need be proved, that construction of the law would pave the way to unscrupulous individuals taking advantage of the death of the presumed parent who would no longer be in a position to deny the allegations, to present even fictitious claims and expose the life of the deceased to inquiries affecting his character. The law could not have demanded anything less than proof of an acknowledged filiation. Precisely, under Article 289 NCC, the investigation of the paternity or maternity of children mentioned in the two preceding articles (referring to illegitimate not natural children) is specifically permitted only in the circumstances enumerated in Articles 283 and 284. These two articles refer to compulsory recognition or acknowledgment. Hence, since the proof of filiation required in Article 887, necessarily involves the investigation mentioned in Article 289, and this investigation in turn refers to recognition by the putative parent, it follows that the filiation to be proven must be one that is recognized. In the present case, what is intended to be proved by Maria is simply the supposed naked paternity of the deceased. This is evident from the pertinent allegations of her opposition to the probate of the will, which state:

2. That the oppositor is in continuous possession of status of a child of the late Don Vicente Noble by the direct acts of the latter and/or his family; and, that the oppositor has in her favor evidence and/or proof that the late Don Vicente Noble is her father. It does not state that the supposed father had recognized or acknowledged the oppositor as his child. It is merely claimed that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child, an allegation which is a ground for compelling recognition under Article 283 NCC and, therefore, presupposes no previous recognition. The last sentence alleges that oppositor has in her favor evidence and/or proof that the late Don Vicente Noble is her father. Again, there is no assertion that she has evidence that the deceased had recognized or acknowledged her as such a child. It is necessary to allege that her putative father had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment is essential and is the basis of her right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment the action becomes one to compel recognition which can not be brought after the death of the putative father. This is authority to the declaration that acknowledgment is the basis of the right of a spurious child to enjoy the successional rights mentioned in Articles 287 and 887 of NCC. There being no allegation of her recognition or acknowledgment by the alleged father in the petition to establish her filiation, the same, therefore, states no cause of action and the dismissal thereof by the lower court was proper.

Succession Case#70 Bulos v. Tecson (Realo, Glenn) BULOS V. TECSON, 6 SCRA 567; GR L-18285 October 31, 1962. FACTS: Pablo Tecson died in Manila on April 2 1940. Soon thereafter, Tomasa V. Bulos, his widow by second marriage, initiated this proceeding with a petition for the probate of a document said to be the last Will of the deceased. The court allowed the will for probate. Subsequently, Jose Tecson filed a motion praying that, he be declared an illegitimate child of the deceased, with the right to succeed him and have in his estate a share equivalent to 4/5 of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. Vicente Tecson, a legitimate child of the deceased, objected to said motion. Probate Court: Jose Tecsons rights, as an adulterous son of the deceased, should be determined pursuant to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code. An illegitimate child, other than a natural child, is entitled, under said Code, not to a legitime, but, only to support, which may not be availed of Jose Tecson since he is already of age. ISSUE: W/N the provision of the Spanish Code Applies. HELD: YEZZIR! Although the status and rights of illegitimate children under Art. 278 of the NCC are also extended by Art. 2264 thereof to children born before the effectivity of said Code, Art. 2264, in so far as relevant to cases of succession, applies only when the illegitimate father dies after said Code has become effective, for Art. 2263 thereof explicitly provides that rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without will, before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other previous laws and by the Rules of Court. The NCC applies only when the illegitimate father dies after the said Code has become effective. However, if the father dies before the effectivity of the NCC, the Spanish Civil Code would govern. Hence, as an illegitimate child, he is not entitled to legitime. Succession Case#71 Rosales v. Rosales (Rilloraza, Cynthia) INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES ROSALES vs ROSALES (Topic: Legitime) Facts: Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving

behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order, declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4. This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975. These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales. Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence this petition. Issue: whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law. Ruling: Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same law. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code. Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code, which refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit: We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied). By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code. The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.) Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law. Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales. On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner. Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law. Succession Case#72 Nieva v. Alcala (Robles, Jo) Succession Case#73 Florentino v. Florentino (Saunar, Kris Norwin) Florentino vs Florentino GR L-14656 November 15, 1919 Facts:

A complaint was filed alleging that Apolinario Florentino (the deceased) during his lifetime first married Antonia De Leon and begotten nine children; That after the death of Antonia, he married for the second time Severina De Leon with whom he had two children; Apolinario died and was survived by his second wife Severina and the ten children from the first and second marriage. Apolinario left a will instituting as his universal heir the ten children, the Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages. Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumous son of the second marriage, died. His mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property described in the complaint. Severina died and left a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter. That daughter took possession of all the property left at the death of her mother Severina.

Issue: Whether the property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the character of reservable property when it was received by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Held: It is a reservable property. The property came, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became reservable property. If this property was in fact clothed with the character and condition of reservable property when Severina Faz de Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver or

return it as such reservable property to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree, among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios is unlawful, null and void, It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by operation of law all of the reservable property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. The legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is expressly respected in this decision.

Succession Case#74 Sumaya v. IAC (Trinidad, Jay-Ryan)

MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE, INC vs. THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, all surnamed BALANTAKBO September 2, 1991 DOCTRINES: FACTS: Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: o a parcel of land situated in Liliw Laguna from his father Jose, Sr. and o ten parcels of registered lands from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista. Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real properties. Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo" Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the property to Mariquita H. Sumaya and was subsequently sold to Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative. Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the second property to Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna AgroIndustrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession. The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable character. Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.

TRIAL COURT:

It ordered the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to convey to the plaintiffs the said lands. COURT OF APPEALS: This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision of the court a quo in toto. LEGAL ISSUE/S: WON PETITIONERS ARE INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE AND IN GOOD FAITH? (Are they aware of the reservable character of the property?) SUPREME COURT: Upon the death of the propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr., and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista. The said affidavit was, in its form, a declaration of the reservable character of the properties. Furthermore, the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with the Property Registration Decree. The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal provides: Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis supplied)

Succession Case#75 Riosa v. Rocha (Balauag, Ed Warren) Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil 737 February 18, 1926 Facts: Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it being her first and only marriage and during which time she bore him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died during infancy and the other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named Magin and Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only heir. The will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the preterition of Maria Corral who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date of the filing of the will for probate, entered into a contract by which they divided between themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint being assigned to Maria Corral. Maria Corral sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas for the sum of P20,000 in a public instrument which was recorded in the registry of deeds. Marcelina Casas sold these eight parcels of land to Pablo Rocha for the sum of P60,000 in a public document which was recorded in the registry of deeds. Pablo Rocha

returned parcels No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 to Maria Corral stating in the deed executed for the purpose that these parcels of land had been erroneously included in the sale made by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas. The Court of first Instance denied the probate of the will of Jose Riosa, but on appeal this court reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed the will to probate.. The legal proceedings for the probate of the will and the settlement of the testate estate of Jose Riosa were followed; and, at the time of the partition, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas submitted to the court the contract of extrajudicial partition which they had entered into on May 16, 1917, and which was approved by the court, by order of November 12, 1920, as though it had been made within the said testamentary proceedings. From the foregoing is appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint were acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father Mariano Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, by operation of law, they passed to his mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land are reservable property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 still belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were successively sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha. Lastly, it appears that Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree of the line from which this property came. This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have been reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and 11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make the reservation was included as a defendant as she refused to join as plaintiff. The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared reservable property and that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be declared reservees; that this reservation be noted in the registry of deeds; that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be declared valid only in so far as it saves the right of reservation in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that this right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha. Issue: Whether or not the property must be deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the extrajudicial partition was made? NO. Held: For the purposes of the reservation and rights and obligations created thereby, in connection with the relatives benefited, the property must be deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the partition was approved by the court. When the deceased has left a will the partition of his property must be made in accordance therewith. According to section 625 of the same Code no will can pass property until it is probated. And even after being probated it cannot pass any property if its provisions impair the legitime fixed by law in favor of certain heirs. Therefore, the probate of the will and the validity of the testamentary provisions must be passed upon by the court. For the reasons stated, and without making any express finding as to the efficacy of the extrajudicial partition made by Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas, we hold that for the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations arising thereunder in connection with the favored relatives, the property cannot be considered as having passed to Maria Corral but from the date when the said partition was approved by the court. In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the reservation as a resolutory condition for the benefit of the reservees (article 975, Civil Code). The fact that the resolvable character of the property was not recorded in the registry of deed at the time that it was acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha cannot affect the right of the reservees, for the reason that the transfers were made at the time when it was the obligation of the reservor to note only such reservation and the reservees did not them have any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation. Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character of the property when they bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of the last will and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels were transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the legatees in the will. Marcelina Casas was the one who entered into the contract of partition with Maria Corral, whereby these parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the very person who drafted the contracts of sale of these parcels of land by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to himself. These facts, together with the relationship existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the former a daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria Corral, amply support the conclusion that both of them knew that these parcels of land had been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa who had inherited them, by will, from his father Mariano Riosa, and were reservable property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable character of lots 10 and 11 has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an action against him to compel him to comply with this obligation.

Succession Case#76 De Papa v. Camacho (Baybay, Benedict Dominic) Plaintiffs (francisca de papa, manuel tioco, Nicolas tioco, and januario papa) are grandaunt and granduncles of Dalisay Camacho They have a common ascendant Balbino Tioco father of the plaintiffs, who has a sister named Romana. Romana donated to Toribia, sister of the plaintiff, four parcels of land. IN 1915 Toribia died intestate leaving her husband Eustacio and two legitimate children Faustino and Trinidad (mother of Dalisay) leaving the four parcels of land mentioned. IN 1928 Balbiono died intestate survived by his children, the plaintiffs, and Faustino and Trinidad, his grand children. 3 parcels of land were the inheritance of Toribia since she pre deceased her father now goes to Faustino and Trinidad, her children. In 1937 Faustino (prepositus) died intestate and without issue leaving his share in the 7 parcels of land to his father, Eustacio (reservista), subject to reserve troncal. In 1939 Trinidad died leaving all her rights and interest from the aprcels of land mentioned to her sole heir Dalisay, subject to the usufructuary of her husband. Dalisay owns the of the 7 parcels of land in question in this case. Dalisay now claims the other half by virtue of reserve troncal. On the other hand, the plaintiffs are claiming the of the by virtue of being 3rd degree relatives of Faustino Dizon. Lower court rules that that plaintiffs and defendant are reservatarios and entitled to in equal portions. Issue: Whether all relatives of the prepositus within the 3rd degree in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista? Held: NO. Principles of intestacy are controlling. Reversion of reservable property being governed by rules in intestate succession, the plaintiffs do not have any right since they are aunt and uncles of the prepositus, Francisco. They are excluded from succession by his niece, the defendant appellant although they are related to him in the same degrees. Succession Case#77 Pecson v. Mediavillo (Black, Dominique) (77) Topic: Disinheritance (Article 915) Pecson v. Mediavillo G.R. No. 7890, September 29, 1914 Facts: Rosario the granddaughter of the testator Florencio Pecson from his child Teresa was disinherited by said testator because she was grossly disrepestful to me and because on one occasion she raised her hand against me. Rosario claims that she was disinherited without cause. Issue: W/N the courts, when a parent (in his case grandparent) disinherits his children (grandchildren), may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such disinheritance. Held: YES! The Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the cases or causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes provided for by law. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code.

Article 850 provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if the person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the provisions of article 851, which in part provides that: Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited. It seems clear from the above-quoted provisions, that the courts may inquire into the justice of a disinheritance such as was attempted in the present case, and if they find that the disinheritance was without cause, that part of the testament or will may be pronounced null and void. It remains, however, to be seen whether the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause was sufficient to show that the disinheritance made in paragraph 3 of the will was made for just cause. It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had received some attentions from a young man that she had received a letter from him and that her grandfather, Florencio Pecson, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said young man; that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that very soon after said event she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the present time. The lower court, taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact that she very soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, reached the conclusion that she was probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895. After a careful consideration of the record, we are inclined to believe that the same supports the conclusions of the lower court and that the same supports the conclusions of the lower court that he did not commit the error complained of in the first assignment of error.

Succession Case#78 Dy Yieng Seangio v. Judge Amor Reyes (Bustamante, Cindy) Facts: Respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, and prayed for the appointment of respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will. Upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. 9993396 were consolidated. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings, on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.

RTC: Dismissed the petition for probate proceedings. The "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. The other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line. Ruling: The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo. For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code: Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate: (1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants; (2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless; (3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator; (4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made; (5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant; (6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant; (7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life; (8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will. A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo. Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect. Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect. With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.

The trial court should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Succession Case#79 Singson v. Lim (Coherco, Calvin Ryan) Vicente Singson Pablo died without any descendant or ascendant, his nearest surviving relatives being his widow Doa Rosalia Rosario, four brothers, and four nieces, the children of a deceased sister. He left a will which was duly probated, clause 8 of which states that all his property not otherwise disposed of in this will, be distributed equally to all those entitled to it. The widow, as administratrix, presented a project of partition in which the properties not disposed of in the will were adjudicated to the four brothers and the four nieces of the deceased. The brothers, appellants herein, objected to the project of partition insofar as it includes the nieces of the deceased, on the ground that in relation to article 751 of the Civil Code, they were not entitled to any share. The trial court ruled for the nieces and held that other properties should be included as well. Issue: WON the clause in his contract saying that "all of my properties not disposed of otherwise in this testament shall be distributed in equal parts to all who are entitled thereto" should be read in connection with article 751, which provides that "a disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree." Held: The authorities differ on the interpretation of article 751. Some hold that under said article the nephews and nieces inherit by representation together with the brothers and sisters of the testator, as in legal succession; while others. Manresa among them, hold that said article excludes nephews and nieces when brothers and sisters survive. We think the testator, by referring to "all who are entitled thereto," instead of referring to his "relatives," precisely meant to avoid the uncertainty of the interpretation of article 751 and to indicate his wish that the residue of his estate be distributed in equal parts to all who would have been entitled to inherit from him had he dies intestate. Succession Case#80 Llorente v. Rodriguez (Concepcion, Giovani) 80 Succession Llorente v. Rodriguez G.R. No. L-3339, March 26, 1908 Facts: Martina Avalle (+ 1902) Jacinta (+ 1902) Julio Llorente Martin Francisco Soledad and Adela In the will executed by her on the 31st of December, 1900, she instituted as her sole and general heirs her three firstnamed children, Jacinta, Julio, and Martin, and the children of the late Francisco, named Soledad and Adela Llorente. Jacinta died prior to the testatrix, on the 11th of August, 1901, leaving several legitimate children with the surname of Rodriguez y Llorente, and besides them, a natural daughter named Rosa Llorente. The said Rosa Llorente, the natural daughter of Jacinta Llorente, wanted to become a party in the proceedings for the probate of the will of Martina Avalle, but the legitimate children of the said Jacinta Llorente objected thereto on the ground that they were the sole and exclusive heirs of their mother, the late Jacinta Llorente, and that the plaintiff, Rosa Llorente, absolutely cannot be a party thereto. Issue: whether the hereditary portion which Martina Avalle left in her will to her legitimate daughter Jacinta Llorente, and which the latter had not been able to possess because of her death before that of the testatrix, should also pass to her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente, the same as to her legitimate children

Held: NO A natural son has the right to inherit from the father or mother who acknowledged him, conjointly with the other legitimate children of either of them, it does not follow that he has the right to represent either of them in the succession to their legitimate ascendants; his right is direct and immediate in relation to the father or mother who acknowledged him, but it ca not be indirect by representing them in the succession to their ascendants to whom he is not related in any manner, because he does not appear among the legitimate family of which said ascendants are the head. If Jacinta Llorente had survived her mother, Martina Avalle, she would have inherited from her, and in what she inherited from her mother, her natural daughter, Rosa Llorente would have participated, in conjunction with her legitimate children, from the day in which the succession became operative, because she would then appear by virtue of her own right to inherit from her mother the legal quota that pertained to her; but, not because she has said right, would she also be entitled to that of representation, inasmuch as there is no legal provision establishing such a doctrine; that Rosa Llorente might and should inherit from her natural mother is one thing, and that she should have the right to inherit from her who would be called her natural grandmother, representing her natural m Succession Case#81 Diaz v. IAC (Dequina, Doanni Lou) Facts: o Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion. o Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; o Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; o Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; o Pascual Santero died in 1970; o Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; o Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa. o Judge Jose Raval: declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. o Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit: Sp. Proc. No. B-4 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the intestate Estate of Pablo Santero; Sp. Proc. No. B-5 is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of Pascual Santero; Sp. Proc. No. B-7 is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; Sp. Proc. No. B-21 is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. o Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August 24, 1977. o Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero. o Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation of March 14, 1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz. o On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." o IAC: petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Issue: who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?

Since the heridatary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a) Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors (petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992, Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. 6 Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code. It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the Orders of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held that the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final and executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to order its execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and executory, hence null and void. " Succession Case#82 Cacho v. Udan (Dimagiba, Hershel) Facts: One Silvina Udan, single, died leaving a purported will naming her illegitimate son Francisco Udan and one Wenceslao Cacho as sole heirs, share and share alike Cacho filed a petition to probate the will Rustico Udan, legitimate brother of the testatrix filed an opposition to the probate but subsequently withdrew said opposition due to the appearance of Francisco. Francisco filed an opposition to the probate of the will but died while the probate was on going. After the death of Francisco, John and Rustico, both legitimate brothers of Silvina filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as required by law, that testatrix was incapacitated to execute it, and that it was procured by fraud or undue influence. Issue: W/N brothers of testatrix may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister? Ruling: NO At the time of her death, Silvinas illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This is clear from Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force at the time of the death of the testatrix

 These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of the one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Art. 1101, they do not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate. That Francisco Udan was the illegitimate son of the late Silvina is not denied by the oppositor; and he is so acknowledged to be in the testament, where said Francisco is termed son by the testatrix. The death of Francisco two years after his mothers demise does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law, not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, as correctly laid down by the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. Succession Case#83 In Re: Intestate Estates of Josefa Selgado and Guillermo (Doma, Angelo) Facts: Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia both died without a will. The claimants to their estates are (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa consisting of her half and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo consisting of his sisters, nephews and nieces, illegitimate child, and de facto adopted child. Josefas mother, Felisa, was never married to her father (Lucio) nor to her half-brother Luiss father (Ramon). Hence, all the children born to Felisa out of her relations with Ramon and Lucio were her natural children. Issue: May Luis inherit from Josefa? Held: YES. All the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio (Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa) and Lucio Campo (Luis), all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children. Art. 992, new Civil Code provides: Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. However, succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. Therefore, the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally. Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her halfbrother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado. Succession Case#84 dela Merced v. dela Merced (Garcia, John) Facts: On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue. She left five (5) parcels of land situated in Orambo, Pasig City. At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs: (1) Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate brother; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her niece who is the only daughter of Rosa dela Merced-Platon (a sister who died in 1943); and (3) the legitimate children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano (another sister of Evarista who died in 1965), namely: Herminio, Ruben, Joselito, Rogelio, Wilfredo, Victor and Constantino, all surnamed Adriano, Corazon Adriano-Ongoco and Jasmin Adriano-Mendoza.

On March 19, 1988, Francisco (Evarista's brother) died. He was survived by his wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced and their three legitimate children, namely, Luisito E. dela Merced, Blanquita M. Macatangay and Ma. Olivia M. Paredes. On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, Evarista M. dela Merced, referring to (1) the abovenamed heirs of Francisco; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan and (3) the nine [9] legitimate children of Eugenia, executed an extrajudicial settlement, entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Evarista M. dela Merced" adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso. On July 26, 1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced, illegitimate son of the late Francisco de la Merced, filed a petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial Settlement alleging that he was fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully aware of his relation to the late Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private respondent Joselito prayed that he be included as one of the beneficiaries, to share in the one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of the deceased Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of Francisco. The Trial court dismissed the petition of Joselito. It reasoned that Francisco Dela Merced, alleged father of the herein plaintiff, is a legitimate child, not an illegitimate. Joselito, on the other hand, is admittedly an illegitimate child of the late Francisco Dela Merced. Hence, as such, he cannot represent his alleged father in the succession of the latter in the intestate estate of the late Evarista Dela Merced, because of the barrier in Art. 992 of the New Civil Code which states that: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother, nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. CA reversed the Trial courts decision. It reasoned that it is a basic principle embodied in Article 777, New Civil Code that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent, so that Francisco dela Merced inherited 1/3 of his sister's estate at the moment of the latter's death. Said 1/3 of Evarista's estate formed part of Francisco's estate which was subsequently transmitted upon his death on March 23, 1987 to his legal heirs, among whom is appellant as his illegitimate child. Appellant became entitled to his share in Francisco's estate from the time of the latter's death in 1987. The extrajudicial settlement therefore is void insofar as it deprives plaintiff-appellant of his share in the estate of Francisco M. dela Merced. Issue: Is Joselito barred by Art. 992 from inheriting from the estate of Evarista? Held: No. Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because involved here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista. As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article 777 of the New Civil Code which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs, namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and the private respondent, Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his (Francisco's) share in the estate of Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito does not claim to be an heir of Evarista by right of representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of the late Francisco, in the latter's share (or portion thereof) in the estate of Evarista. Succession Case#85 Albolario v. Colinco (Javier, Franco) FACTS: The original owners of the lot were the spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan who had five (5) children, namely: (1) Agueda Colinco, (2) Catalina Baloyo, (3) Eduardo Baloyo, Gaudencia Baloyo, and (5) Julian Baloyo. All of the persons mentioned are now dead. Agueda had 2 children. Eduardo sold his share to Agueda. Catalina Baloyo, was married to Juan Arbolario. They only had one child, Purificacion, who, died a spinster and without issue. Juan also consorted with one Francisca during his marriage with Catalina in which they had 5 children (petitioners Arbolario). A declaration of heirship and partition was executed by and between Agueda, Catalina, Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the late spouses Anselmo and Macaria. When they all died, the Colincos (the surviving heirs of the spouses Anselmo and Macaria) executed declaration of heirship and partition. The Arbolarios filed for cancellation of title against the Conlincos because they were excluded. ISSUE:

Whether or not illegitimate half-brothers or sisters can inherit from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother? HELD: No, Art. 992 of the Civil Code provides that, An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother. As the illegitimate siblings of the late Purificacion, petitioners cannot conveniently undermine the legal limitations by insisting that they were treated as half-brothers and half-sisters by the deceased. Succession Case#86 Rosales v. Rosales (Javier, Ma. Feliza Amparo Cristina) FACTS: Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato T. Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased in the CFI. In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order declaring the following individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the estate Fortunate T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales (son), 1/4. Issue: Whether a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Held: No. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The aforesaid provision of law refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law. "Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants; (2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendents, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287; Succession Case#87 Verdad v. CA (Laceda, Elaine Marie) Facts: During her lifetime, Macaria Atega contracted two marriages: the first with Angel Burdeos and the second with Canuto Rosales. At the time of her own death, Macaria was survived by her son Ramon A. Burdeos and her grandchild (by her daughter Felicidad A. Burdeos) Estela Lozada of the first marriage and her children of the second marriage, namely, David Rosales, Justo Rosales, Romulo Rosales, and Aurora Rosales. PR Socorro Rosales is the widow of David Rosales who himself, sometime after Macaria's death, died intestate without an issue. In an instrument, dated 14 June 1982, the heirs of Ramon Burdeos sold to petitioner Zosima Verdad (their interest on) the disputed lot. Socorro discovered the sale on 30 March 1987 and later initiated against petitioner an action for "Legal Redemption with Preliminary Injunction" before the RTC, and tracing her title to the late Macaria Atega, her mother-in-law, who died intestate on 08 March 1956. RTC held that PRs right to redeem the property had already lapsed. CA reversed declaring PR entitled to redeem the property.

Held: SC affirmed CA and ruled that PR may redeem the property. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, PR's right to the property is not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but because she is a legal heir of her husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance. David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession. Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001. Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. By virtue of these provisions, PR, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria. Thus when their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption arose in favor of PR. Succession Case#88 Sayson v. CA (Layug, Kristina) SAYSON VS. CA Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia (adopted), Edmundo(adopted), and Doribel (legitimate), all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children. First case is a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson instituted by the four siblings of Teodoro and mother of Isabel named Juana Bautista. The action was resisted by the 3 children who alleged successional rights. Second case is for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson instituted by the 3 children claiming to inherit by reason of their right of representation of their father Teodoro. RTC decided in favor of 3 children: In the 1st case, they may inherit because they are legitimate children (heirs). In the 2nd case, they may inherit through right of representation. CA affirmed the 1st case but modified the 2nd case because only natural child not adopted child may inherit by right of representation. Contention of the Petitioners: Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting. Basically, if the children are disqualified to be adopted, then they cannot become legitimate children; hence they cannot inherit. Issue: Can the adopted children inherent from (1) Teodoro and Isabel and (2) Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation of their father Teodoro? Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple, conformably to the Article 979 of the Civil Code wherein An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child. Meanwhile, regarding the right of representation, there is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party. Succession Case#89 Armas v. Calisterio (Lee, Haidee)

FACTS: 1/13/1946- Marietta married first hubby- James. James disappeared for 11 years. 5/8/1958Marietta married Teodorico (deceased) without priorly securing a court declaration that James is presumptively dead. 4/24/1992- Teodorico died intestate Petitoner Antonia, Teodoricos sister, filed a petition with RTC to settle the intestate estate of Teodorico claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent. RTC: Ruled in favor of Antonia. Marietta and Teodoricos marriage is bigamous. Antonia is declared as sole heir. CA: Reversed! Marriage valid. ISSUE: WoN the marriage of Marietta and Teodorico is valid. HELD: VALID! The marriage took place in 1958; hence the applicable law is the Civil Code and NOT the FC. Under Art. 83, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court does not find these circumstances to be here extant. A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriages in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage. In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds. ISSUE: Who should inherit from Teodorico? HELD: Widow and surviving brothers and/ sisters- Antonia. The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother. Succession Case#90 Bagunu v. Piedad (Li, Elizabeth) Facts: Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent; while, respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent. In this case, Petitioner, a fifth degree relative of the deceased moved to intervene in Special Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad as she seeks to inherit from the deceased. She assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad, a third degree relative of the deceased. The trial court denied the motion. CA and SC affirmed. Issues: W/N petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, can inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree. W/N the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral relatives.

Held: The rule on proximity favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation apply. Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides that In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. "Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines." The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" who are sixth in the order of preference as follows: firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962, , is an absolute rule. Hence, Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent. Among the other collateral relatives, no preference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a thirddegree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative.

Succession Case#91 Fernandez v. Fernandez (Li, Tiffany) Fernandez vs. Fernandez Facts: Dr. Jose K. Fernandez died, leaving his wife, Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez claiming to be the son of the spouses. They executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to themselves the estate and on the same day, Generosa executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Rodolfos son, selling the property subject of the extra-judicial partition. Nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez filed an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio, on the ground that Rodolfo is not the son of the deceased, spouses being childless they are entitled to inherit from their uncle. TC and CA in favor of nieces and nephews. Issue: Whether or not the nieces and nephews of the deceased can inherit from their uncle through intestate succession Held: Yes they are entitled to inherit from Dr. Fernandez. Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez. Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned. Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides: "Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half." Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as provided in Article 1001, she is entitled to the of the inheritance and the respondents to the other . In effect, pro indiviso is the share of Generosa as the surviving spouse, i.e., as her share of the conjugal property estate and of the remaining as share as heir from her husband's estate.

Respondents are entitled to the of the entire conjugal property, however considering that widow Generosa, during her lifetime, sold the entire building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, respondents had been deprived of their share therein, thus the deed of sale was prejudicial to the interest of respondents as regards their share in the building. Respondents therefore, have a cause of action to seek the annulment of said deed of sale. We rule, that such a sale of the entire building without the consent of the respondents is not null and void as only the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer, petitioner Eddie, a co-owner of the share of the building together with the respondents who owned the share therein.

Succession Case#92 Spouse Zaragoza v. CA (Lim, Mary Rocelyn) Facts: Don Flavio Zaragosa owned several properties in Iloilo. He died intestate and was survived by three children: Gloria, Florentino and Alberta. Alberta filed a complaint against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871. During the lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties among his three children, excepting Alberta, through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had become an American citizen by marriage and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Florentino Zaragosa admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of Alberta. The RTC ruled that Lot 871 be conveyed to Alberta but dismissed the claim as to Lot 943 because it was validly sold to Florentino by Flavio, to which a TCT was already issued. The CA affirmed the decision but reversed the finding that the Florentino spouses are the owners of Lot 943. Issues: (1) whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio of his properties, which include Lots 871 and 943, is valid [VALID]; and (2) whether the validity of the Deed of Sale and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title over Lot 943 registered in the name of the Spouses Zaragosa, can be a valid subject matter of the entire proceeding for the delivery of inheritance share [NO]. The partition inter vivos was valid. It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as provided for in Article 1061: Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other compulsory heirs. Gloria was not impleaded. The petition must therefore be dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos. However, in a petition for the delivery of inheritance share, the question on the validity of the deed of sale covering Lot 943 in favor of Florentino and consequently, the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the latter's name is a collateral attack. This is not allowed by the Property Registration Decree. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Succession Case#93 Pedrosa v. CA (Lumagui, Rommell) Pedrosa v CA G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa was the adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina. Miguel Rodriguez died intestate. The Rodriguezes then entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to secure new Titles and were able to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein. A complaint was filed by petitioner to annul the said deed.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed Ruling: No. Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians. Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that: The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively. Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed. The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code. Succession Case#94 de Jesus v. Estate of Dizon (Martinez, Joseph Eufemio) De Jesus v. The Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, 2 October 2, 2001 Facts: Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that petitioners Jacqueline and Jinkie were born. In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992. On the strength of the notarized acknowledgement, petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. RTC denied the MTD. CA affirmed the denial. On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions, respondents filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able the establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding. RTC dismissed the complaint and decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right. Issue: WON the recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Held: No. The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and

special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicted on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgement. The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent however cannot be validly invoked in this case. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress. Succession Case#95 Abellana de Bacayo v. Borromeo (Morales, Raymond Noel) Doctrine: Under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. Facts: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs. Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court. The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris. A resolution excluded petitioner-appellant herein, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate of Melodia Ferraris. Issue: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter? Trial Court Held: Oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is three degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code. Held: The trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.

Succession Case#96 GSIS v. Custodio (Osdon, Charity Anne) Facts: Simeon Custodio died intestate. He was a member of the Retirement Insurance Fund of the GSIS. He was survived by his only sister, Susana Custodio and his nieces and nephews. Simeons 3 brothers (the fathers of his nieces and nephews) predeceased him. After the death of Simeon, his application form for retirement was found in his personal belongings, wherein his sister, Susana was named the beneficiary. However, the application was never submitted to the GSIS. At the residence of the son-in law of Susana, Susana and the nieces and nephews signed a document entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among the Heirs which provides that Susana is recognized by the other heirs as the sole and only beneficiary of the deceased and she was the only one who has the right to file, sign and receive the deceaseds retirement pay. Luisa, David and Macario C. (niece and nephews also) did not sign the document. The nieces and nephews wrote a letter to the Manager of the GSIS stating that they inadvertently signed the document waiving their claim on the GSIS benefits of the deceased without properly having understood it. RTC in favor Susana. Her designation as beneficiary in the unsigned application form for retirement benefits, which was not filed with the GSIS prior to the death of the deceased was invalid. Nonetheless, she is entitled to the retirement benefits to the exclusion of the nieces and nephews because they have recognized her as sole beneficiary in the deed of extrajudicial settlement which is presumed regular in the absence of evidence of fraud or mistake. CA issues involved pure questions of law. Referred the case to the SC. Contention of nieces and nephews Fraud or mistake rendered the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased null and void, such vice of consent was shown by the ff. badges of fraud: (a) David was not made a party to the extrajudicial settlement of the estate; (b) failure to secure the signatures of David, Luisa and Macario C.; (c)repudiation of the extrajudicial settlement was made 1 day after its execution; (d) the fact that the son-in-law of Susana had some intervention in the execution of the deed; and (e) adjudication to Susana of an alleged unconscionable bulk of the estate. Issue: WON Luisa, David and Macario C. can succeed from the deceased per stirpes. Ruling: Yes. Luisa, David and Macario C. should inherit per stirpes in accordance with Art. 1005, CC: Should brothers and sisters survive together with nieces and nephews, who are the children of the decedents brothers and sisters, of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita and the latter per stirpes. Even if the 5 circumstances stated by the nieces and nephews be held to be indicative of fraud or mistake, and infirming the deed of extrajudicial settlement, the stark fact is that the existence of fraud or mistake was not stipulated. Appellants' raising the issue of fraud or mistake without having specifically stipulated or pleaded the same, constitutes and unfair surprise upon their adversary, besides being in violation of the rule that fraud be specifically pleaded. Therefore, this plea of fraud or error is not allowable, being deemed waived by the lack of proper averment. At any rate, the circumstances now stressed by the heirs who have actually signed the deed of partition, and who have been allocated properties therein, fall short of evidencing fraud or mistake. The failure to secure the signatures of Luisa, David, and Macario C. could not have escaped their co-heirs, now appellants, and it is unfair to lay blame therefor on Susana Custodio. The intervention of Leon Tongohan, her son-in-law, is without particular significance, since none of the signers was illiterate, nor was the deed notarized by him. As to the appellants' having repudiated their signatures, the same was a self-serving act, more indicative of a belated intention to squirm out of a disadvantageous transaction, after they entered it with open eyes, which is no ground for setting the same aside. Certainly, it should take much weightier proof to invalidate a written instrument. Macario C. inherits by representation to the share pertaining to his father, while Luisa and David, being 2 of the 6 children of Jacinto, are each entitled to 1/24 of the hereditary mass (1/6 x 1/4). Succession Case#97 City of Manila v. Archbishop (Palafox, Vincent Patrick) FACTS Property located in Malate and Paco, Manila consisting of five parcels of land were made the subject of escheat proceedings in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. The theory of the plaintiff is that one Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said property and died in the year 1668 without leaving "her or person entitled to the same." During the trial, it was proven that Ana Sarmiento made a will on 17 November 1668, to which she added a codicil on 23 November 1668. This codicil was still made a part of a new will she made on 19 May 1669. The will

contained provisions for the establishment of a "Capellania de Misas," provided that the first chaplain should be her nephew Pedro del Castillo and succeeding administration should continue perpetually. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, through his various agencies, has administered said property for more than two hundred years since it has rightfully and legally succeeded in accordance with the terms and provisions of the will of Ana Sarmiento. After hearing the evidence, the prayer of the plaintiff was denied and thereafter sought recourse in the Supreme Court. ISSUE WON the said property may be declared escheated. HELD NO. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides when property may be declared escheated. It provides, "when a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property . . . leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same," that then and in that case such property under the procedure provided for by sections 751 and 752, may de declared escheated. The proof shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will. She did not die without an heir nor without persons entitled to administer her estate, who by law are entitled to inherit her property. The property in question cannot be declared escheated. If by any chance the property may be declared escheated, it must be based upon the fact that persons subsequent to Ana Sarmiento died intestate without leaving heir or person by law entitled to the same. The will clearly, definitely and unequivocally defines and designates what disposition shall be made of the property in question. The heir mentioned in said will evidently accepted its terms and permitted the property to be administered in accordance therewith. And, so far as the record shows, it is still being administered in accordance with the terms of said will for the benefit of the real beneficiary as was intended by the original owner. Succession Case#98 Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino Briones (Palattao, Rodolfo John Robert) Facts: Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husbands estate with the Cebu City Court of First Instance, where the CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximinos estate. She submitted an Inventory of Maximinos properties, which included parcels of land acquired by the latter prior to his marriage. The CFI would subsequently issue an Order awarding ownership of the aforementioned real properties to Donata, who had the said CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs, covering the said properties in her name. Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donatas nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donatas intestate estate. Then Silverio Briones, a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order allowing Silverio to collect rentals from Maximinos properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order claiming that the said properties were already under his and his wifes administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverios Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC. The heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property. They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino. After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in favor of the heirs of Maximino.

Hence, the RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to of the real properties. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of the fruits thereof. The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision affirmed the RTC Decision. Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of Donata filed the present Petition. Issue: Whether or not the right to inherit can be barred by prescription or latches? Maximino left no will at the time of his death so his estate was to be settled through intestate succession. The heirs of Maximino, respondents in the Petition at bar, claimed the right to inherit, together with Donata, from the estate of Maximino, based on the Articles 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code, which read ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001. ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. The heirs of Maximino asserted that Donata had fraudulently excluded them from the intestate proceedings of the estate of Maximino before the CFI . They were not given notice of the institution of Special Proceedings No. 928-R and the scheduled hearings therein. When Donata was declared the "sole, absolute, and exclusive heir" of Maximino in the CFI Order and when she managed to have the real properties of Maximino registered in her own name on the basis of the foregoing CFI Order, she should be deemed to have held the said properties in trust for her other coheirs. It is granted that the heirs of Maximino had rights to his intestate estate upon his death on by virtue of Articles 995 and 1005 of the New Civil Code. Nonetheless, the CFI, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, had declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino. This Court, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, can only presume that Special Proceedings No. 928-R was fair and regular, which would consequently mean that the CFI complied with the procedural requirements for intestate proceedings such as publication and notice to interested parties, and that the CFI had carefully reviewed and studied the claims of creditors, as well as the rights of heirs to the estate, before issuing the Order. There is no showing that the Order, had been appealed and had, therefore, long attained finality, which even this Court would be bound to respect. Without doubt, if the action for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession instituted by the heirs of Maximino, it would be a circumvention of the finality of the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952 because, necessarily, a recognition of the rights of the other heirs to the estate of Maximino would violate the sole, absolute, and exclusive right of Donata to the same estate previously determined by the CFI. As this Court had discussed in Ramos v. Ortuzar If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene, still they would be concluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the estate as well. As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The proceeding for probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by sec. 630 C. P. C.; and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156) "A final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees." (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895) There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutory doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings. The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, dated 28 September 1986, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby DISMISSED. Succession Case#99 Adlawan v. Adlawan (Palis, Lynn Margarita) FACTS: In 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia Adlawan needed money to finance the renovation of their house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of their property to their son, Dominador, the only child who had a college degree. By virtue of a simulated deed of sale, a title was issued to Dominador which enabled him to obtain a loan. Notwithstanding the simulated deed, Dominador never disputed his parents ownership of the property. He and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb the possession of the ancestral house by the respondents Narcisa and Emetrio Adlawan, Dominadors siblings, until their deaths. On the other hand, petitioner Arnelito Adlawan claims that he is the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador. He claims that he allowed the respondents to stay in the property because they were the siblings of his father. However, when he verbally asked them to leave, they refused to do so. Respondents, on the other hand, assert that petitioner is a stranger and that he is not an illegitimate son of Dominador. They also claim that, even if he is the illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because Graciana succeeded Domindar as the latter died before the former. The MTC dismissed Arnelitos complaint. On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTC. It likewise granted his petition for execution pending appeal which was opposed by Gracianas alleged nephews and nieces. Gracianas alleged heirs filed a petition to intervene which was subsequently denied by the RTC. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and reinstated the MTC decision. ISSUE: W/N petitioner can validly maintain the petition for ejectment HELD: Petition dismissed. The court notes that the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by the petitioner would end up that he is not the sole owner of the property. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987.By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of the lot.The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of the lot because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of the lot. Succession Case#100 Santos v. Alana (Quinsay, Stacy) FACTS: Rolando Santos (petitioner) and Constancia Santos Alana (respondent), are half-blood siblings both asserting their claim over a parcel of land. It was registered in the name of their father, Gregorio Santos. He died intestate on March 10, 1986. During his lifetime, Gregorio donated the lot to Rolando which the latter accepted. The deed of donation (Pagsasalin ng Karapatan at Pag-aari) was annotated on Gregorios title. Later, Gregorio sold the lot to Rolando as per a Deed of Absolute Sale. A new title was issued to Rolando. Constancia Santos filed a complaint for partition and reconveyance alleging that the donation is inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime. Rolando contends the suit is barred by prescription considering that Constancia is aware that he has been in possession of the lot as owner for more than 10 years; and that the lot was sold to him by his father, hence, Constancia can no longer claim her legitime. RTC: The Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by the parties nor was it registered in the Registry of Deeds. Thus, it is not a valid contract. What is valid is the deed of donation as it was duly executed by the parties and registered. Since Gregorio did not own any other property, the donation to Rolando is inofficious because it impaired Constancias legitime. CA: affirmed. ISSUE: (1) Whether the donation is inofficious; and (2) Whether Constancias ction has prescribed. RULING:

Under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is inofficoius if it exceeds this limitation no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will. Inofficiousness may arise only upon the death of the donor as the value of donation may then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor deceased. RTC found that Gregorio did not sell the lot to Constancia. He donated it. The donation is inofficious as it impairs Constancias legitime; that at the time of Gregorios death, he left no property other than the lot now in controversy; and that the deceased made no reservation for the legitime of Constancia, his daughter and compulsory heir. Gregorio could not donate more than he may give by will. Clearly, by donating the entire lot to Rolando, Gregorios donation is inofficious as it deprives Constancia of her legitime, which, under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists of 1/2 of the hereditary estate of the father and the mother. Since the parents of both parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to 1/2 thereof. Donations, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason, we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs. The cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined. Here, Gregorio died in 1986. Consequently, Constancia had until 1996 within which to file the action. Records show that she filed her suit in 1992, well within the prescriptive period. The subject deed of donation being inofficious, 1/2 of the lot is awarded to Constancia Santos Alana, the same being her legitime. The remaining one-half (1/2) shall be retained by Rolando Santos, as his legitime and by virtue of the donation. Succession Case#101 Montero v. Septimo (Realo, Glenn) MONTERO V. SEPTIMO, GR 149751, March 11, 2005 FACTS: Jose Balilo was the owner of a parcel of land, with an area of 7.7837 ha, located in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. In 1943, Jose died intestate. Sometime in 1948, Niniana Balilo, the sister of Jose Balilo, filed a petition in the CFI of Pampanga, for the guardianship of the property and the person of Jovencio Balilo whom she alleged to be the son of her brother, Jose Balilo; hence, her nephew. Niniana filed a motion in the said case, for authority to execute, for and in behalf of her ward, a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of Jose Septimo. Jose Septimo failed to register the deed in the Office of the RD and, consequently, to secure a torrens title over the property in his name. Thereafter, on October 12, 1963, Jovencio Balilo filed a complaint against Jose Septimo in the CFI of Occidental Mindoro, to compel the latter to resell the property to him. Jovencio alleged therein the he was the only legitimate child of the spouses Jose Balilo and Juana Villarama, and that the latter died on August 30, 1946. Later, on 1987, Purificacion Balilo-Montero filed a complaint with the RTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, against the respondents, Eugenia Septimo, the surviving spouse of Jose Septimo, and the spouses Placido Robles and Consuelo Robles, for recovery of possession of the said property. She alleged therein that they were the children and only legal heirs of the late Jose Balilo. Eugenia Septimo alleged that her late husband Jose Septimo had purchased the property from Jovencio Balilo, through his guardian, and that the sale was approved by the CFI of Pampanga. She specifically denied the allegation of Purificacion Montero that she was one of Jose Balilos children and one of his heirs. Consuelo Robles was declared in default for her failure to file her answer to the complaint. CA: (2/3 to Jovencio; 1/3 to Purificacion) Ruled that the property was registered in the name of Jose Balilo whose civil status was stated as single. Considering that he was survived by Purificacion Montero, his wife Juana Villarama and their son Jovencio Balilo when he died in 1943; and when Juana Villarama died intestate, was in turn, survived by her son Jovencio Balilo and Purificacion Montero, Jovencio was entitled to two-thirds undivided portion of the property, while Purificacion Montero was entitled to one-third undivided portion of the property.

Purificacion maintains that the CA should have applied the provisions of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession because Jose Balilo died intestate in 1943 before the NCC took effect. She posits that she and Jovencio Balilo were entitled to inherit the property from Jose Balilo in equal shares, because there is no competent evidence on record to prove that Jose Balilo and Juana Villarama, the mother of Jovencio, were married. ISSUE: Is Purificacion entitled to , or 1/3 only? HELD: We agree with the contention of the petitioner that ther is no evidence onrecord that Jose Balilo and Juana Villarama were married, or that they cohabited with each other as husband and wife. Even Jovencio Balilo opted not to testify. Neither was Jose Balilo survived by any ascendants. However, we agree with the ruling of the CA that Jose Balilo and Gertrudes Nicdao were not, likewise, married. The contention of the petitioner that the CA erred in applying the law on testate succession under the Old Civil Code is, likewise correct. The appellate court should have applied the provisions of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession considering that Jose Balilo died intestate in 1943, before the effectivity of the NCC. Article 931 of the Old Civil Code provides that when a person dies intestate, his legitimate children and their descendants succeed him, without distinction of sex, or age, even though they spring from different marriages. Article 932 of the same Code provides that the children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares. Moreover, under Article 939 of the Old Civil Code, in the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the natural children legally acknowledged and those legitimated by royal succession shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. When Jose Balilo died intestate, he was survived by his daughter Purificacion, his son Jovencio Balilo, and Gertrudes Nicdao and Juana Villarama. Conformably to Article 939 of the Old Civil Code, only the petitioner and Jovencio Balilo inherited the property in equal shares, to the exclusion of Juana Villarama, and Gertrudes Nicdao. Neither of them was the lawful wife of Jose Balilo. Besides, under Article 946 of the Old Civil Code, the surviving spouse shall inherit only in default of the persons enumerated in the three sections next preceding. Consequently, when Jovencio Balilo, through his guardian Ninana Balilo, executed the deed of absolute sale over the entire property on May 26, 1948 in favor of Jose Septimo, the latter did not acquire the title over the entire property, but only to an undivided one-half portion thereof which Jovencio Balilo had inherited from Jose Balilo. Jose Septimo could not have purchased and acquired the other half of the property from Jovencio Balilo because the latter was not the owner thereof. Hence, CA erred in holding that Jovencio Balilo inherited an undivided two-thirds portion of the property, and that Jose Septimo acquired title over the said two-thirds undivided portion. Succession Case#102 Republic v. Guzman (Rilloraza, Cynthia) REPUBLIC VS GUZMAN (Topics: Intestate Succession) Facts: The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES seeks the nullification of the 5 March 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court of the petition for escheat filed by the Government. David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman, a naturalized American citizen, and Helen Meyers Guzman, an American citizen. In 1968 Simeon died leaving to his sole heirs Helen and David an estate consisting of several parcels of land located in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. On 29 December 1970 Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman dividing and adjudicating to themselves all the property belonging to the estate of Simeon. The document of extrajudicial settlement was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds on 8 December 1971. The taxes due thereon were paid through their attorneys-in-fact, Attys. Juan L. Austria and Lolita G. Abela, and the parcels of land were accordingly registered in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman and David Rey Guzman in undivided equal shares. On 10 December 1981 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her undivided one-half (1/2) interest on all the parcels of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of

the Estate of Simeon Guzman. Since the document appeared not to have been registered, upon advice of Atty. Lolita G. Abela, Helen executed another document, a Deed of Quitclaim, on 9 August 1989 confirming the earlier deed of quitclaim as well as modifying the document to encompass all her other property in the Philippines. On 18 October 1989 David executed a Special Power of Attorney where he acknowledged that he became the owner of the parcels of land subject of the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Helen on 9 August 1989 and empowering Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or otherwise dispose of the lots. On 1 February 1990 Atty. Lolita G. Abela, upon instruction of Helen, paid donors taxes to facilitate the registry of the parcels of land in the name of David. On 16 March 1994 a certain Atty. Mario A. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the Solicitor General and furnished it with documents showing that Davids ownership of the one-half (1/2) of the estate of Simeon Guzman was defective. On the basis thereof, the Government filed before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan a Petition for Escheat praying that one-half (1/2) of David's interest in each of the subject parcels of land be forfeited in its favor. On 9 August 1994 David Rey Guzman responded with a prayer that the petition be dismissed. On 11 July 1995 the trial court dismissed the petition holding that the two (2) deeds of quitclaim executed by Helen Meyers Guzman had no legal force and effect so that the ownership of the property subject thereof remained with her. The Government appealed the dismissal of the petition but the appellate court affirmed the court a quo. Issue: W/N the nullity of the repudiation of inheritance operate to convert the parcels of land into res nullius to be escheated in favor of the Government. Ruling: The inexistence of a donation does not render the repudiation made by Helen in favor of David valid. There is no valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29 December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2) of them all the property in Simeons estate. By virtue of such extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in her and her sons name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years they possessed the lands in the concept of owner. Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except when it was made through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when an unknown will appears. Nothing on record shows that Helens acceptance of her inheritance from Simeon was made through any of the causes which vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of the existence of an unknown will executed by Simeon. Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot belatedly execute an instrument which has the effect of revoking or impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property from Simeons estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds which she executed eleven (11) years after she had accepted the inheritance have no legal force and effect. Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of land into res nullius to be escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the litigation. Succession Case#103 JLT Agro Inc v. Balansag (Robles, Jo) JLT Agro vs. Balansag GR 141882 March 11, 2005 Facts : The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering 954 sqm originally registered in the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia known as Lot 63 When Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for partition and damages. Milagros participated as intervenor.

 Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian. On the basis of this compromise agreement, Milagros and her children took possession of Lot 63, built their home therein and a lumberyard. The CFI decision in the Compromise Agreement declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and his 2 children of the first marriage. The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais, including the electric plant, the movie property, the commercial areas, and the house where Don Julian was living. As per the compromise agreement, the properties adjudicated to Josefa and Emilio shall be understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of the other half belonging to their father. In other words, the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to Milagros and her 4 children. The rest including Lot 63 was retained by Don Julian. (In effect, a partition inter vivos happened) July 31, 1973, A Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of JLT Agro was executed and in that instrument, Lot 63 was transferred to JLT. Don Julian died intestate April 14, 1974 JLT registered the lot in its name on the strength of the Deed of Assignment in its favor. Milagros, unaware that Lot 63 was already registered in the name of JLT executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition allotting Lot 63 to herself and her two children. Milagros later on sold this lot to Balansag After the sale to Balansag (respondent) and when they sough to register the land with the Registry of Deeds, they could not do so because they found out that it was registered under the name of JLT, prompting them to file a complaint seeking the declaration of nullity of the registration of the lot in favor of JLT. Ruling of the RTC Dismissed the complaint of Balansag seeking the declaration of nullity of the registration of the lot in favor of JLT (hence they ruled that JLT was the owner of the lot). According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa and Emilio comprised their shares in the estate of their deceased mother Antonia, as well as their potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the latters death. Thus, upon Don Julians death, Josefa and Emilio could not claim any share in his estate, except their proper share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa which was adjudicated in favor of Don Julian in the Compromise Agreement. As such, the properties adjudicated in favor of Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa, were free from the forced legitimary rights of Josefa and Emilio, and Don Julian was under no impediment to allocate the subject lot, among his other properties, to Milagros Donio and her 4 children With Lot No. 63 being the conjugal property of Don Julian and Antonia, the trial court declared that Milagros Donio and her children had no hereditary rights thereto except as to the conjugal share of Don Julian, which they could claim only upon the death of the latter. The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julians death on 14 April 1974, Lot No. 63 was no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31 July 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of extrajudicial partition by Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the owners they could not have sold it Ruling of the CA Reversed the RTC and declared the TCT registered in the name of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. as null and void. Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement determined, adjudicated and reserved to Don Julians two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate except as regards his (Don Julians) share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them in the Compromise Agreement and Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same, including Lot No. 63. Don Julian could have disposed of only his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa. The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right judgment would preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document like the Supplemental Deed which practically covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved in favor of his heirs from the second marriage. It dubbed the TYCT spurious and of dubious origin. Issues / Ruling : SC affirmed CA decision in toto. A closer look at paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement shows the properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children. Can future legitime be determined, adjudicated and reserved?

Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080 For the inheritance to be considered future, the succession must not have been opened at the time of the contract. A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the following requisites concur: (1) That the succession has not yet been opened; (2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article. The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily require the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring ownership. Neither will the formalities of a donation be required since donation will not be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no will has been made it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition here is merely the physical determination of the part to be given to each heir. Were the compulsory heirs from the 2nd marriage preterited? No, premature to bring up partition. Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. It is the total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. It consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir. In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are indicative of Don Julians desire along this line. Hence, the total omission from inheritance of Don Julians heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded. Was there a valid transfer of Lot 63 to JLT? No. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of petitioner, and his daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course no legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is in order, especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the estate from which Milagros and her children could inherit The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name of Julian by T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also an illegality, as it contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal process established by law. And, worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both titles PRESCRIPTION CASES Prescription Case#1 Cutanda v. Heirs of Roberto Cutanda (Saunar, Kris Norwin) Cutanda vs Heirs of Cutanda GR 109215 July 11, 2000 Facts: Private respondents brought an action for recovery of possession, accounting and damages against petitioner. They alleged that in the 1900's, their grandfather, Roberto Cutanda, owned two parcels of land in

Bohol. Upon Roberto Cutanda's death, these lands were inherited by his children, namely: Doque, Diego, Pedro, Andres, and Anastacia, all surnamed Cutanda. Except for Doque who stayed in Bohol and administered the lands, all of Roberto Cutanda's children established residence in Leyte. In 1987, they returned to Bohol to personally work the inherited lands. Their plan, however, was frustrated as petitioners, who were occupying the lands, refused to leave. Private respondent thus prayed that each be declared owner of 1/5 of the subject real properties and that petitioners be ordered to return to them said properties. Petitioners denied that private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Roberto Cutanda, was the original owner of the lands in question. Instead, they claimed that the owner was their uncle and predecessor-ininterest, Anastacio Cutanda. They alleged that Anastacio Cutanda dided without children and that the real properties in question were inherited by his brothers and sisters whose children are the present petitioners. TC declared petitioners to have acquired the ownership of the subject properties through prescription and dismissed private respondents complaint. CA affirming the dismissal of the case but declared that there was no sufficient evidence that they were the owners of the properties.

Issue: W/N petitioners presented sufficient evidence to prove their ownership of the lands in question? Held: Yes. Petitioners are the owners of the land. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not. Based on this distinction, we hold that prescription, not laches, is the proper ground for holding private respondent's action to be barred. Art. 1106 of the Civil Code provides that by prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time, in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. In the same way, rights and actions are lost by prescription. There are thus two kinds of prescription: (1) the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time, or acquisitive prescription; and (2) the loss of a right of action by the lapse of time, or extinctive prescription. Private respondents' action was an accion publiciana to recover the right of possession and to be declared owners of the subject lands. Their complaint squarely put in issue the ownership of the lands in dispute. It may thus be properly treated as an accion reivindicatoria. It is settled that the remedies of accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria must be availed of within 10 years from dispossession. Under Article 555(4) of the Civil Code, the real right of possession is lost after the lapse of 10 years. Hence, insofar as petitioners are concerned, private respondents' cause of action was barred, not by laches, but by extinctive prescription, regardless of whether their complaint is considered as an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria. Anastacio Cutanda was in possession of the land from 1933 up to 1968, or a period of 35 years. Such possession appears to be adverse, continuous and in the concept of an owner because Anastacio Cutanda cultivated the land, thereby, performing an act of ownership over it. It is to be noted that Anastacio's possession began under the former Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, ten years of actual adverse possession was required, regardless of how such occupancy may have commenced or continued, before possession ripened into full and complete title over the land. Applying this to the present case, by 1943, ten years.after his possession of the subject parcel of land had begun, Anastacio Cutanda became owner of the land in question through acquisitive prescription.

The Court of Appeals limited its review of the evidence to the issue of acquisitive prescription. As Anastacio Cutanda had acquired ownership of said parcel of land through the lapse of the period required by law, he could validly adjudicate and partition it among his brothers and sisters who were his only heirs. Petitioners, in turn, as children of Anastacio's brothers and sisters, acquired ownership of the subject land not through prescription but through hereditary succession. The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and another one is rendered declaring petitioners to be true and lawful owners of that parcel of land.The complaint filed by respondents is dismissed.

Prescription Case#2 Rigonan v. Derecho (Trinidad, Jay-Ryan)

DELFINA Vda. de RIGONAN and Spouses VALERIO LAUDE and VISMINDA LAUDE, Petitioners, vs. ZOROASTER DERECHO FACTS: The instant controversy revolves around a parcel of land located originally owned by Hilarion Derecho. When Hilarion died, his eight children Leonardo et al became pro indiviso co-owners of the subject property by intestate succession. Five of the co-owners -- Leonardo, Apolinar, Andres, Honorata, and Dolores -- sold the inherited property to Francisco Lacambra, subject to a five-year redemption clause. Two years after the period for redemption expired, Dolores -- together with her husband, Leandro Rigonan -- purchased the land from Lacambra and immediately occupied it. Leandro Rigonan executed an Affidavit of Adjudication in favor of his son, Teodoro Rigonan. Under this instrument, Leandro declared himself to be the sole heir of Hilarion. During the same year, Teodoro mortgaged the subject property to the Rural Bank. Teodoro executed the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land in favor of Valerio Laude, On November 10, 1993, respondents brought an action before the Regional Trial Court first, to recover the property; and, second, to annul the Deed of Sale in favor of Laude and the Affidavit of Adjudication. Petitioners argued that they and their predecessors-in-interest had continuously owned and possessed the subject property for 72 years. Accordingly, acquisitive prescription had allegedly set in, in their favor, when the case was filed in 1993. Lastly, petitioners maintained that they were entitled to the equitable defense of laches.

COURT OF APPEALS: As the Contracts were void, the defense of prescription was inapplicable. Article 1410 of the Civil Code states that actions for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract do not prescribe. Nrob The CA added that prescription was inapplicable, because it did not run in favor of a co-owner as long as the latter recognized the co-ownership. anroblesvirtuallawlibrary The appellate court further ruled that Valerio Laude was not a buyer in good faith

Finally, the appellate court held that the action for recovery prescribed within ten years from the issuance of the Certificate of Title, which operated as a constructive notice. It concluded that the action was filed well within the period allowed by law for its recovery. LEGAL ISSUES: Whether the action in the RTC was barred by prescription and laches? SUPREME COURT: Since the Spanish Civil Code was still in effect when Hilarion died and when the sale was executed it is the said law that governed both the co-ownership and the pacto de retro sale. Pacto de Retro and Failure to Redeem Under a pacto de retro sale, title to and ownership of property are immediately vested in the vendee a retro, subject only to the resolutory condition that the vendor repurchases it within the stipulated period. Pending the redemption, the vendor loses all ownership rights over the property, save for the right to repurchase it upon compliance with the requirements provided in Article 1518 of the Spanish Civil Code. rary In a number of cases, this Court has held that once the vendor fails to redeem the property within the stipulated period, irrevocable title shall be vested in the vendee by operation of law. roblesvirtuallawlibrary In the instant case, the parties to the contract stipulated a five-year redemption period, which expired on July 16, 1926. The failure of the sellers to redeem the property within the stipulated period indubitably vested absolute title and ownership in the vendee, Lacambra. Consequently, barring any irregularities in the sale, the vendors definitively lost all title, rights and claims over the thing sold. To all intents and purposes, therefore, the vendors a retro ceased to be co-owners on July 16, 1926. Clearly then, the parties to the sale -- Leonardo, Apolinar, Andres, and Honorata (but not Dolores, as will be explained later), as well as all their successors-in-interest -- no longer had any legal interest in the disputed property, none that they could have asserted in this action. Purchase Beyond the Redemption Period In the case of Adiarte v. Tumaneng illustrates the legal effect of the expiration of the stipulated period for redemption. In that case, the Court ruled that the Contract did not constitute a promise to resell, because the right to repurchase had been lost after the expiration of the stipulated period. After the expiration of the period for redemption, the parties could either (1) enter into an entirely new contract involving the same property; or (2) if they did not expressly stipulate the period, extend the time for redemption, provided the extension did not exceed the maximum period of ten years allowed by Article 1508. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In the present case, Lacambra and the heirs stipulated a five-year redemption period. When it lapsed, the vendee acquired absolute title, while the five co-owners-sellers were stripped of their co-ownership of the property. Prescription or Laches Petitioners maintain that they obtained absolute ownership of the subject land through acquisitive prescription. They point out that the heirs did not impugn the validity of the documents of sale until after seventy-two years, in 1993 when the case was filed before the trial court. Petitioners are correct.

Prescription of Action Possession of the property by petitioners commenced way back in 1928 when the prescriptive periods applicable were those provided in Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure). Their argument finds basis in Article 1116 of the new Civil Code, which states that 'prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force. Under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an action for recovery of real property, or of an interest therein, can be brought only within ten years after the cause of action accrues.[ The cause of action of respondents accrued in 1928, when they lost possession of the property to the forebears of petitioners. These predecessors-in-interest took possession from 1928 until 1980 when Laude, their successor-ininterest, continued possession up to the present. During this entire time, respondents inexcusably failed to take action to recover the property. In 1993, they finally rose from their seeming slumber when they filed the present suit. Unfortunately, 65 years had already lapsed and, by that time, their right of action had clearly been barred by extinctive prescription.

Acquisitive Prescription Petitioners acquired title to the subject property by prescription. Section 41 of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) provides: Title to land by prescription. -- Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to the person under disabilities the rights secured by the next section. In order to constitute such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims must be actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all claimants x x x. In the instant case, the Rigonan spouses possessed the property in the concept of owners after their purchase in 1928. They peacefully occupied it, were never ousted from it, and never prevented from enjoying its fruits. As petitioners have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the disputed land since 1928, a length of time that has never been questioned, there can be no doubt that they obtained title to it by acquisitive prescription. Action to Annul Contracts Imprescriptible, but Recovery of Realty Barred by Acquisitive Prescription In the present case, we hold that respondents can no longer recover the property despite the nullity of the assailed contracts, because they have lost their ownership by reason of prescription. Laches Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society. Coming to the present case, the record does not reveal, and respondents do not even assert, that there was a concealment of the 1921 sale of the property to Lacambra. Although three of the co-heirs were not parties to that transaction, there is no showing whatsoever that they interjected any objection to the conveyance. There is no allegation, either, that respondents were unaware of the sale in favor of Dolores or of her family's possession of the property since 1928. On the contrary, Respondent Ruben Derecho warned Laude not to buy the land because it had not been partitioned.[74] This fact shows that respondents were aware that Teodoro intended to sell the land, a move

that was clearly an act of dominion over the entire property. Their cognizance of these facts eliminates the need for a repudiation on the part of petitioners. Four elements had to be shown in order to use laches as a defense: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom a claim is made, giving rise to a situation for which a complaint is filed and a remedy sought; (2) delay in asserting the rights of the complainant, who has knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and has been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant will assert the right on which the latter has based the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event that the complainant is granted a relief or the suit is not deemed barred. The four requisites are present in the instant case. First, the five co-owners' act of selling the entire property deprived respondents' predecessors of the enjoyment of their rightful shares in the inheritance. Second, respondents waited more than six decades to file a suit without offering any excuse for the long delay in the assertion of their rights. Third, after being allowed more than six decades of peaceful possession of the property, petitioners were certainly not expecting respondents to reclaim it. Fourth, there is no doubt that petitioners will suffer if respondents are allowed to recover the property. The former have already developed, invested in, and religiously paid the taxes for it for at least a half-century.

Prescription Case#3 DBP v. Adil (Balauag, Ed Warren) Prescription Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) vs. Adil G.R. No. L-48889 May 11, 1989 Facts: On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine Currency, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations. As the obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even after the lapse of the aforesaid ten-year period, Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961. The new promissory note reads as follows I hereby promise to pay the amount covered by my promissory note on or before June 15, 1961. Upon my failure to do so, I hereby agree to the foreclosure of my mortgage. It is understood that if I can secure a certificate of indebtedness from the government of my back pay I will be allowed to pay the amount out of it. Said spouses not having paid the obligation on the specified date, the DBP filed a in the City Court of Iloilo City against the spouses for the payment of the loan. After trial on the merits a decision was rendered by the inferior court against the spouses. Defendants-spouses appealed therefrom to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo wherein in due course a decision was rendered reversing the appealed decision and dismissing the complaint. Issue: Whether the promissory note, which was executed in consideration of a previous promissory note the enforcement of which had been barred by prescription, valid? YES. Whether the right to prescription may be renounced or waived? YES.

Held: The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Article 1112 of Civil Code provides: Art. 1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained, but not the right to prescribe in the future. Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced when the renunciation results from acts which imply the abandonment of the right acquired. There is no doubt that prescription has set in as to the first promissory note of February 10, 1940. However, when respondent Confesor executed the second promissory note on April 11, 1961 whereby he promised to pay the amount covered by the previous promissory note on or before June 15, 1961, and upon failure to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage, said respondent thereby effectively and expressly renounced and waived his right to the prescription of the action covering the first promissory note. This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new promissory note is the pre-existing obligation under the first promissory note. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt. Prescription Case#4 Spouses Salustiano and Flora Oca v. CA (Baybay, Benedict Dominic) On January 1963, Salustiano Oca executed a general loan and collateral agreement which constitutes a "continuing agreement, applying to any and all future as well as existing transactions" of plaintiffs-appellees with the defendantappellant bank pursuant to which "as security for any and all loans, advances, credits, etc." the plaintiffs gave a lien on property of any kind, which may come to the possession or custody of the Bank On February 12, 1963, plaintiffs-appellees spouses Oca executed a mortgage in favor of appellant Bank over two (2) parcels of lands covered by T.C.T. 66428 (Manila) and TCT 106211 (Rizal) as security for a loan in the amount of P200,000.00 as principal and "those that the mortgagee may extend to the mortgagors, including interest and expenses or other obligations owing to the mortgagee" as well as "the credit accommodations obtained from the mortgagee by S.R. Oca Logging Industry, Inc." On April 27, 1966, a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of Salustiano R. Oca Logging Industry, Inc. authorizing Salustiano R. Oca to consolidate all credit accommodations extended by the Bank to Salustiano Oca and/or Salustiano R. Oca Logging Industry, Inc., and/or Oca Electric Co., Inc. into one (1) promissory note in favor the Bank. A promissory note in the sum of P3,017,721.66 was signed by Salustiano Oca in his capacity as President of S.R. Oca Logging Industry, Inc. and in his own behalf, together with his wife Flora O. Oca in her own behalf. Said promissory note is payable on or before May 11, 1967 (Exh. 3, p. 116, Ibid.). The corporation's and the personal undertaking of the spouses Oca's obligation covered by the promissory note was transferred into a time loan designated as time loan No. 043. On August 12, 1971, the Bank sent a demand letter for the payment of time loan No. 043 in the sum of P4,830,478.95 as of July 31, 1971 to S.R. Oca Logging Industry, Inc. In May of 1978, the property located in Manila covered by TCT 103316 was foreclosed and sold at public auction for the sum of P195,000.00 with the Bank as the highest bidder. Spouses filed for damages with a writ for injection. Issue: Whether the right of the Bank to foreclose the mortgage had already prescribed. Held: No. Under the terms of the loan, Time Loan No. 43 matured on May 12, 1967. The tolling of the prescriptive period within which respondent Bank had to file the foreclosure action began to run on said date, when petitioners failed to fully pay the time loan. On August 12, 1971, respondent Bank made an extrajudicial demand upon S.R. Oca Logging Industry, Inc. to settle the time loan. A copy was furnished to the spouses. Two other demand letters were sent by respondent Bank: one dated March 13, 1973 addressed to S.R. Oca Logging Industry, Inc.,and another dated July 13, 1977 addressed to petitioner Salustiano R. Oca as President and General Manager of North Mindanao Bay Woods Exports. These letters sent by respondent Bank to petitioners and/or S.R. Oca Logging Industry, Inc. effectively stopped the tolling of the prescriptive period. According to Art. 1155: The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.

Thus, the institution of extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings by respondent Bank in 1977 was not yet barred by prescription. Prescription Case#5 Roque v. IAC (Black, Dominique) Topic: Prescription (Article 1106-1155) (5) Roque v. IAC GR-L-75886, August 30, 1988 Facts: The controversy here involves a 312 sqm parcel of land. The property was registered originally in the name of Junario Avendano, a bachelor who died intestate and without issue on October 22, 1945. September 21, 1959 the intestate heirs of Juanario executed a document entitled Paghahati at Pagtatagbuyan ng Mana sa Labas ng Hukuman. Through, extrajudicial partition of the property was effected among the intestate heirs as follows: a. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada Avendao. b. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio Avendafio and Miguel Avendao. c. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendao. d. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to respondent Emesto Roque and Victor Roque. 28 September 1959 o Co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido, Numeriano and Rufina, all, in consideration of the aggregate amount of P500.00, transferred their collective and undivided (3/4) share in the property to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque, thereby vesting in the latter full and complete ownership of the property. o The transactions were embodied in two (2) separate deeds of sale both entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan" 3 and both duly notarized. Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" 4 dated 27 November 1961, Emesto and Victor Roque purportedly sold a (3/4) undivided portion of the property to their half-sister, petitioner Concepcion Roque, for the same amount. The property, however, remained registered in the name of the decedent, Januario Avendao. 20 September 1975 - Upon the instance of petitioner Concepcion Roque and allegedly of respondent Ernesto Roque, the property was surveyed. Consequent thereto, a Subdivision Plan 5 was drawn up by the Geodetic Engineer Identifying and delineating o a (1/4) portion (78 square meters) of the property as belonging to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque (who had died on 14 April 1962), upon the one hand, and o a (3/4) portion (234 square meters) of the same property as belonging to petitioner Concepion Roque, upon the other hand. Petitioner claimed that preparation of the Subdivision Plan, which was approved on 3 November 1975 by the Land Registration Commission was a preliminary step leading eventually to partition of the property, partition allegedly having been previously agreed upon inter se by the co-owners. Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however, refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land. Attempts at amicable settlement having fallen through, petitioner Concepcion Roque, on 6 December 1977, filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific Performance" 6 with Branch 2 of the CFI of Malolos against respondents Emesto Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque. o In her complaint, petitioner (plaintiff below) claimed legal ownership of an undivided (3/4) portion of the property, by virtue of the 27 November 1961 "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" executed in her favor by Emesto Roque and Victor Roque. In support of this claim, petitioner also presented an undated and unnotarized

"Kasulatang Pagkilala sa Bilihan Patuluyan ng Bahagui at Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman at Paghahati-hati at Abuyan ng Bahagui" 7 said to have been signed by the respondents in acknowledgment of the existence and validity of the Bilihan in favor of petitioner. Finally, petitioner alleged that, as a coowner of the property, she had a right to seek partition, that she could not be compelled to remain in the coownership of the same. In an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim 8 filed on 28 December 1977, respondents (defendants below) impugned the genuineness and due execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" dated 27 November 1961 on the ground o "that the signatures appearing thereon are not the authentic signatures of the supposed signatories ...." It was also alleged that petitioner Concepcion Roque, far from being a co-owner of Lot No. 1549, "occupied a portion of the lot in question by mere tolerance of the [defendants]." o Respondents also refused to honor the unnotarized Kasulatan and, additionally, denied having had any participation in the preparation of the Subchvision Plan. 27 June 1983 - the CFI (TC) rendered decision infavor of plantiffs. 31 July 1986 CA reversed the judgment of the TC and dismissed both the petitioners complaint and the respondents appeal. MR Denied. 18 September 1986 - Filed a petition for review with the SC.

Issue: (1) W/N action for partition of the property had already prescribed? Held: NO! Petitioner Concepcion Roque-the co-owner seeking partition has been and is presently in open and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of the property owned in common. The Court notes in this respect the finding of the trial court that petitioner, following execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Pattlluyan" on 27 November 1961, had been in "continuous occupancy of the 3/4 portion of the lot ... up to the present, and whereon plaintifrs house and that of her son are erected. " 14 Respondents do not dispute this finding of fact, although they would claim that petitioner's possession is merely tolerated by them. Second, prior to filing in 1977 of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-M, neither of the parties involved had asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the whole of Lot No. 1549 adverse to that of any of the other co-owners: in other words, coownership of the property had continued to be recognized by all the owners. Consequently, the action for partition could not have and, as a matter of fact, had not yet prescribed at the time of institution by Concepcion of the action below. 2. Coming now to the matter regarding dismissal of the respondents'appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court held that inasmuch as the attack on the validity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" was predicated on fraud and no action for annulment of the document had been brought by respondents within the four (4) year prescriptive period provided under Article 1391 of the Civil Code, such action had already prescribed. We find it unnecessary to deal here with the issue of prescription discussed by the respondent court in its assailed decision. The facts on record clearly show that petitioner Concepcion Roque had been in actual, open and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549 ever since execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" in November of 1961. The Court notes that it was only in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court in December of 1977 more than sixteen (16) years later that respondents first questioned the genuineness and authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan." Not once during those sixteen (16) years did respondents contest petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549. Furthermore, if indeed it is true that respondents, as they claim, are the absolute owners of the whole of Lot No. 1549, it is most unusual that respondents would have allowed or tolerated such prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major portion (3/4) of the land while they, upon the other hand, contented themselves with occupation of only a fourth thereof.

This latter circumstance, coupled with the passage of a very substantial length of time during which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and uninterrupted in her occupation and possession, places respondents here in laches: respondents may no longer dispute the existence of the co-ownership between petitioner and themselves nor the validity of petitioner's claim of a threefourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549, as they are deemed, by their unreasonably long inaction, to have acquiesced in the coow,aership. 15 In this respect, we affirm the decision of the respondent appellate court presently under review. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated 31 July 1986 in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248 is SET ASIDE with respect to that portion which orders the dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-M, but is AFFIRMED with respect to that portion which orders the dismissal of the respondents'appeal in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248. The Decision of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos dated 27 June 1983 in Civil Case No. 5236-M is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Prescription Case#6 Rongavilla et al v. CA (Bustamante, Cindy)

SPOUSES RONGAVILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS and MERCEDES DE LA CRUZ AND FLORENCIA DE LA CRUZ Facts: The respondents are the aunts of petitioner Rongavilla. Both spinsters, they earn their livelihood as embroiderers/dressmakers. Although unschooled in English, they are able to read and write in Tagalog. They are of advanced age (Mercedes-60 and Florencia-71). The property subject of this controversy is the property owned by respondents, in the proportion of 1/2 proindiviso, with another niece named Juanita Jimenez as co-owner of the other 1/2. It has an area of 131 sq.m. and was covered by OCT 5415 of the Rizal Register of Deeds. This OCT and TCT S-28903 after the parcel was subdivided, was kept in the possession of Juanita, the elder sister of Dolores. Respondents borrowed P2,000 from the petitioners for the repair of their rooftop. A month later, Dolores and Juanita visited their aunts' home, bringing with them a document for the signature of their aunts. The document is admittedly typewritten in English. When asked in Tagalog by Mercedes, what the paper was all about, Dolores answered also in Tagalog, that it was just a document to show that the respondents had a debt amounting to P2,000. On account of that representation, respondents signed. After a lapse of over 4 years, Dolores went to respondents' place and asked them to vacate the parcel in question, claiming that she and her husband were already the new owners of the land. Surprised by petitioners' moves, respondents with the help of friends went to the Register of Deeds to verify the matter. They discovered that their Certificate of Title had been cancelled and TCT S-28903, had been issued. They discovered that the land had been mortgaged with the Cavite Development Bank by the petitioners. It was only then that the respondents realized that the document they had previously been asked by their nieces to sign was a deed of sale. Respondents filed with the CFI a sworn complaint to have the purported deed of sale declared void and inexistent, for being fictitious and simulated, and secured by means of fraud and misrepresentation. They alleged that they did not sell their property in question to the defendants; that they did not receive any consideration on the supposed sale; that their OCT was cancelled and TCT S-28903 was issued in favor of petitioners, who thereafter mortgaged said title for a total of P40,000 to their damage and prejudice.

CFI: Deed of Absolute Sale is void. CA affirmed the decision. When plaintiffs voluntarily signed the document which turned out to be a deed of sale, they were misled by defendant Dolores and Juanita into believing that what they signed was a document acknowledging the loan of P2,000.

The Deed of Absolute Sale mentions a consideration of P2,000. 3 years after the alleged sale, the same property was mortgaged by defendant spouses with the Cavite Development Bank for P40,000. Clearly enough, the gross inadequacy and unconscionableness of the consideration deters the Court from subscribing to defendants' theory that plaintiffs sold the property to them. It is more reasonable to assume that the P2,000 mentioned in the deed refers to the loan defendants extended to plaintiffs for the same amount. Plaintiffs are now of advanced age. Their only property is the lot in question and the house erected thereon. No indication that plaintiffs were in dire need of money, except for a few amount necessary for the repair of the roof of their house for which they obtained a loan of P2,000 from defendants, there was no reason for plaintiffs to dispose of their property.

CA: Laid stress on the point of lack of consideration by quoting agreeably the trial judge's holding:

By more than mere preponderance of evidence plaintiffs have established the merit of their cause of action. The Court is of the opinion and so holds that there was fraud exercised by defendant Dolores and Juanita in securing the signature of the Deed of Absolute Sale and there was no consideration whatsoever for the alleged sale. Undoubtedly, the said deed of sale is simulated, fictitious and void. The proper characterization of the deed of sale in question, not as an annullable contract, but as a void and inexistent contract as found by the trial court.

Whether the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it upheld the trial court's judgment that the disputed Deed of Sale is void and inexistent? (NO) By their own testimony, the petitioners are pictured as not exactly averse to bending the truth, particularly the purported consideration. Sadly, the irony of it is that while they claimed they were regularly paying taxes on the land in question they had no second thoughts stating at the trial and later on appeal that they had resorted to doctoring the price stated in the disputed Deed of Sale, allegedly "to save on taxes". That admission surely opens the door to questions on the integrity, genuineness and veracity of said public instrument. The trial court could not be said to err in asserting that "while it is true that public documents are presumed genuine and regular under the provisions of the Rules of Court, this presumption is a rebuttable presumption which may be overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence." Moreover, the deed itself, shows that contrary to the testimony of the notary public, who appeared as a witness for petitioners, what was originally typed therein was the amount of "P3,000", which later on was substituted by the handwritten amount now of "P2,000." There is no need to speculate on the motivation for this alteration. The notary public might have just wanted to further save on taxes, rather than short-change the coffers of the government. But, again, the whole fabric of petitioners' claim to the sanctity of the deed as public instrument had thereby been shredded. If as petitioners claimed on trial, the price paid was P7,800 while their deed showed only P2,000, after the amount of P3,000 in the deed was altered, one may well inquire: which figure could this Court believe? Could one say that the trial and the appellate courts both erred in holding that no consideration passed from the buyer to the seller? But petitioners herein would further take to task the appellate court for grave abuse of discretion, as well as for a reversible error, in having relied on the "purported Certification of the Bureau of Internal Revenue which was not offered in evidence". Since this is a petition under Rule 45, however, we will not dwell on the alleged grave abuse of discretion but limit our observation to the alleged error of law. The BIR certificate was the subject of the testimony of witnesses at the hearing where both parties took full advantage of the opportunity for direct and crossexamination as well as rebuttal and sur-rebuttal. On the witness stand, respondents as plaintiffs below denied that they had any tax account number nor even residence certificates. They were supported by their witnesses, testifying also under oath. They contradicted the claim of the petitioners' lawyer-notary public, that the disputed deed of sale was complete and in due form and was signed in his presence by the private respondents. They further denied even

having gone to the office of the lawyer-notary public in Bacoor, Cavite, on June 3, 1976, the date of execution shown in the deed, or on any other date. While indeed the BIR certificate was not formally offered in evidence, hence no longer available on review, the record would show that said BIR certificate was presented during the testimony on rebuttal of respondent Mercedes de la Cruz. Now even if the matter of the official certification by the BIR is set aside, the whole question of the TAN being fake or belonging to somebody else, would boil down to one of credibility between the two camps. Unfortunately for the petitioners herein, the trial court found them and their witnesses far from credible. As remarked by the trial Judge, "the declarations of defendants [herein petitioners] do not inspire rational belief." It would thus appear that the trial court and the CA committed no grave error of law, that would impel us on this point to override their judgment. On the issue of prescription, it follows that once the disputed deed is found to be inexistent and void, the statute of limitations cannot apply. As the courts below ruled, the cause of action for its declaration as such is imprescriptible. Petitioners-spouses contend, however, that this is contrary to settled jurisprudence because the applicable precedent should be Pangadil v. CFI Cotabato. But the fact situation of that case differs radically from the present controversy. There the Court upheld the dismissal of the action to declare a document known as "Ratificacion de Una Venta" as inexistent and void after finding that it was "not a contract wherein the parties do not intend to be bound at all," that no circumstance was alleged to sustain the contention "that the execution of the aforesaid document is contrary to public policy;" and that for 27 years the petitioners did not even care to verify the status of the land in question. "Their inaction for such a considerable period of time reflects on the credibility of their pretense that they merely intended to confirm an oral mortgage, instead of a sale of the land in question." Here in the present case, there is no doubt about the credibility of plaintiffs below (herein private respondents) in pursuing their cause promptly and forcefully. They never intended to sell, nor acceded to be bound by the sale of their land. Public policy is also well served in defending the rights of the aged to legal protection, including their right to property that is their home, as against fraud, misrepresentation, chicanery and abuse of trust and confidence by those who owed them candor and respect. And if the passage of time could not cure the fatal flaw in the inexistent and void contract, neither could an alleged ratification or confirmation thereof. Further, as in the case before us, reconveyance is proper. "The defect of inexistence of a contract is permanent and incurable, hence it cannot be cured either by ratification or by prescription. . . . There is no need of an action to set aside a void or inexistent contract; in fact such action cannot logically exist. However, an action to declare the non-existence of the contract can be maintained; and in the same action, the plaintiff may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract."

Prescription Case#7 Alviola v. CA (Coherco, Calvin Ryan) Facts: Victoria Sonjaconda Tinagan purchased from Mauro Tinagan 2 parcels of land in Negros Oriental. Thereafter, Victoria and her son Agustin Tinagan, took possession of said parcels of land. Sometime in 1960, petitioners occupied portions thereof whereat they built a copra dryer and put up a store wherein they engaged in the business of buying and selling copra. On June 23, 1975, Victoria died. On October 26, 1975, Agustin died, survived by herein private respondents, his wife and their children. On March 29, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Editha and her husband Porferio Alviola praying, among others, that they be declared absolute owners of the said parcels of land, and that petitioners be ordered to vacate the same, to remove their copra dryer and store, to pay damages. RTC ruled for respondents and against Alviola. Issue: Whether or not Alviolas have acquired the land through prescription. Held: No. Although the Alviolas have been on the disputed portions since 1961, their stay thereon was merely by tolerance on the part of the private respondents and their predecessor-in-interest. The evidence shows that the petitioners were permitted by Victoria Sanjoco Tinagan to build a copra dryer on the land when they got married. Subsequently, petitioner Editha Alviola, claiming to be the illegitimate daughter of Agustin Tinagan, filed a petition for partition demanding her share in the estate of the deceased Agustin Tinagan on December 6, 1976. However, the petition was dismissed since it was brought only after the death of Agustin Tinagan. This Court dismissed the

petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioner Editha Alviola on August 9, 1982. It was on March 29, 1988, when private respondents filed this complaint for recovery of possession against petitioners. Considering that the petitioners occupation of the properties in dispute was merely tolerated by private respondents, their posture that they have acquired the property by occupation for 20 years does not have any factual or legal foundation. Prescription Case#8 Nestor Lacsamana v. CA (Concepcion, Giovani) 8 Prescription Nestor Lacsamana v. CA G.R. No. 121658, March 27, 1998 Facts: Leon Robles and Amparo Robles were the registered co-owners in equal shares of Lot No. 13535 situated in Bo. Inosloban, Lipa City. On April 26, 1965, Amparo sold her one-half undivided share to El Dorado Corp. (El Dorado). Consequently, TCT No. 15261 was issued in the names of El Dorado and Leon Robles as co-owners. On September 24, 1969, Leon Robles, who was then residing in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., died survived by his wife Ester Gaitos Robles and children Leon, Jr. and Dulce Clara as his sole heirs. However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 22, 1971, Leon Robles purportedly with the marital consent of his wife sold his one-half undivided share in the said lot to one Nestor Lacsamana. Nine years later, or on January 22, 1980, the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds of Lipa City. On July 22, 1980, Nestor Lacsamana purportedly sold his one-half share to LBJ Development Corp. (LBJ). And on January 26, 1982 LBJ became the owner of the entire lot when El Dorado sold its one-half share to its sister company LBJ. On November 11, 1983, the surviving heirs of Leon Robles filed a complaint against the herein petitioners. Defendants LBJ and El Dorado invoked the defense of prescription and/or laches and alleged that LBJ was a buyer in good faith and for value. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusions of the trial court, with the only difference as regards the issue of prescription as the trial court ruled that the action for reconveyance of real property on ground of fraud may be filed within four (4) years whereas the Court of Appeals ruled that the present action had not yet prescribed since actions to declare the nullity of a void contract was imprescriptible. Issue: Whether the action for reconveyance already prescribed? Held: NO The Court affirmed the decision of respondent appellant court. On the issue of prescription, it ruled that the present action has not yet prescribed because the right to file an action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which action does not prescribe. Neither can the defense of laches be sustained. The Court cannot see how private respondents may be considered guilty of laches. It should be noted that private respondents, upon learning that the relevant portion of Lot No. 13535 was no longer registered in the name of Leon, immediately caused an investigation to be made for the purpose of finding out the author and the circumstances behind the execution of the fictitious 1971 Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, in less than two (2) months after it was discovered by the National Bureau of Investigation that Nestor Lacsamana was in fact a fictitious/non-existent person, private respondents through their attorney-in-fact Petronilo Gaitos instituted on November 11, 1983, the present action, i.e., barely three (3) years and nine (9) months after the fraudulent registration on January 22, 1980. Thus, it is said, the concept of laches is not concerned with the lapse of time but only with the effect of unreasonable lapse.

Petitioners urged the Court to rule that LBJ was a buyer in good faith. But the Court cannot. Besides being a factual finding shared by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that it was not, supported by the evidence on record, it is conclusive upon the Court. Prescription Case#9 Dela Cruz v. CA (Dequina, Doanni Lou) Facts: Petitioner Eugenio De La Cruz claims to be the owner and actual possessor of the lot, in the concept of an owner, for more than thirty years. Private respondent Cristina Villanueva is a purchaser of the same lot from the Ramos brothers who claim to be successors-in-interest of a previous possessor of the same. In October 1959, petitioner contracted a loan from the parents of private respondent, mortgaging the disputed land as security. Sometime in 1973, the land became the subject of an application for registration under the by the Ramos brothers. Petitioner seasonably opposed the application which, after trial, was denied on the ground that the land remained part of the forest reserve, hence, inalienable. Shortly thereafter, the brothers successfully pursued the reclassification of the land and were granted ownership of the same. It was after this occurrence that private respondent came to purchase the disputed land from the Ramoses. Petitioner was later surprised to learn that its ownership had been bestowed upon them, and that it was subsequently sold to private respondent. Petitioner filed a reconveyance against private respondent which was dismissed. On appeal, plaintiff-appellant elucidated that an uncle of his had given the land to his mother, after having purchased it from a Cecilio Espiritu in 1930. Issue: Who has a better right to the land? Held: Private Respondent. Here, petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it had been declared by the Government as part of the forest zone. In fact, the land remained part of the forest reserve until such time that it was reclassified into alienable or disposable land at the behest of the Ramoses. A positive act of the Government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest, and to convert in into alienable or disposable land for other purposes. Until such lands have been properly declared to be available for other purposes, there is no disposable land to speak of. Absent the fact of declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by prescription. PRESCRIPTION: Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by petitioner, as it is an ironclad dictum that prescription can never lie against the Government. The lengthy occupation of the disputed land by petitioner cannot be counted in his favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial property of the State, which property, as stated earlier, is inalienable and indisposable. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which iterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property. Possession of the residential lot by petitioner, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership. The fact that the disputed land was used for a dual private purpose, namely, as a residential lot and as part of the ricemill business of private respondent's parents, is immaterial. The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is descriptive of its legal nature or status, and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.

Prescription Case#10 Aznar Bros. Realty v. Heirs of Aniceto Augusto and Petrona Calipan (Dimagiba, Hershel) Facts: The subject matter of the controversy is Lot No. 4397 situated in Cebu City. It was owned by Aniceto Augusto and Petrona Calipan When Anicedo died in 1934 he left behind 5 children: Geronimo, Zacarias, Teodorica, Arsenia, and Irenea. Apparently the property remained undivided as evidenced by tax declaration No. 02679 issued to Petrona Calipan.

 Sometime in 1962, Tax Declaration No. 02679 was cancelled pursuant to an Extrajudicial Partition, in lieu thereof, tax declaration certificates covering said lot was issued to the following: Filomeno Augusto, Ciriaco Icoy, Felipe Aying, Zacarias Augusto, Abdon Augusto, Teodorica Augusto, Pedro Tampus, and Anacleto Augusto. As evidenced by a Deed of Sale of Unregistered land, the lot was sold in 1962 by these people to petitioner Aznar Realty and registered on the same date with the Register of Deeds. On July 1992, respondent heirs filed a case against petitioner for 1) recovery of Lot. 4397; and 2) declaration of the Deed of sale dated February 13, 1962 as null and void (among others) RTC: ruled that the claim of respondent heirs was already barred by prescription o Court believes that the action of the plaintiffs is indisputably barred by prescription. Principally, plaintiffs action is for recovery of a parcel of land. This type of action prescribes after 10 years from the date of registration or from discovery of the fraud. CA: overturned the decision and remanded the case to the court a quo. Citing the case of Castillo vs. Heirs of Madrigal, the CA found that the claim had not yet prescribed since the action of respondents was for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale on the ground of absence of consent. Such action was imprescriptible. o Action for declaration of the inexistence of a deed of sale is imprescriptible because of the absence of the vendors consent following Art. 1410 of the Civil Code o Article 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe Issue: W/N the respondents are barred by prescription? Ruling: NO The respondents claim is imprescriptible and not barred by laches. Respondents anchored their action for reconveyance in the trial court on the nullity of the Deed of Sale between petitioner Aznar and the supposed owners of the property. Respondents impugned the validity of the document because the sellers were not the true owners of the land and, even if one of the real owners (Teodorica) thumbmarked the document, she was unaware that she was selling the land. Respondents sought the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Sale because of the absence of their consent as the true and lawful owners of the land. They argued that the sale to petitioner Aznar was void since the purported owners who signed the Deed of Sale as vendors were not even heirs of Aniceto and Petrona. The owners who sold the land to petitioner Aznar Realty could not have been the true owners of the land since there was no showing how they acquired the land in the first place. Thus, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint without looking into the validity of the sale of land to petitioner Aznar. In actions for reconveyance of property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was null and void ab initio, a claim of prescription of action would be unavailing. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not precribe. Neither could laches be invoked in the case at bar. Laches is a doctrine in equity and out courts are basically courts of law and not courts of equity. Equity, which has been aptly described as justice outside legality, should be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law. The positive mandate of Art. 1410 of the NCC conferring imperceptibility to actions for declaration of the inexistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. Certainly, laches cannot set up to resist the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right, and petitioners can validly vindicate their inheritance despite the lapse of time. Prescription Case#11 China Banking Corp v. CA (Doma, Angelo) FACTS: Private respondent AFPSLAI filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner. On the other hand, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, invoking prescription. It claimed that the Home Notes annexed to the pleading bearing a uniformity maturity date of December 2, 1983 indicate the date of accrual of the cause of action. Hence, private respondents filing of the complaint for sum of money on September 24, 1996, is way beyond the prescriptive period of ten years under Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Petitioner argued the prescription period starts from the time when the creditor may file an action, not from the time he wishes to do so. But private respondent insisted that the action accrued only on July 20, 1995, when demand to pay was made on petitioner. ISSUE: When did private respondents cause of action accrue? HELD: July 20, 1995, when its demand for payment of the Home Notes was refused by petitioner.

Well-settled is the rule that since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legal right of the plaintiff and a correlative duty of the defendant but also "an act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right," the cause of action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty. Otherwise stated, a cause of action has three elements, to wit, (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. It bears stressing that it is only when the last element occurs that a cause of action arises. Accordingly, a cause of action on a written contract accrues only when an actual breach or violation thereof occurs. Applying the foregoing principle to the instant case, private respondents cause of action accrued only on July 20, 1995, when its demand for payment of the Home Notes was refused by petitioner. It was only at that time, and not before that, when the written contract was breached and private respondent could properly file an action in court. The cause of action cannot be said to accrue on the uniform maturity date of the Home Notes as petitioner posits because at that point, the third essential element of a cause of action, namely, an act or omission on the part of petitioner violative of the right of private respondent or constituting a breach of the obligation of petitioner to private respondent, had not yet occurred.