European Journal of Marketing 28,11 50

Received February 1994

Organizational Buyers as Workers: The Key to Their Behaviour?

Alan Draper
University of Central Lancashire, Preston, UK
In 1985, in this journal, Smith and Taylor[1] argued that familiarity with existing literature in industrial buying was more likely to produce confusion than understanding.Their proposed solution was to draw on the extensive work on decision making conducted by organizational theorists. While accepting that much of what they were writing then is still very relevant today, the intention of this article is to draw attention to the even more extensive work on control practices and their consequences in organizations. Though control is increasingly being referred to in articles, the work has been largely ignored. Organizations have been defined in a recent Organizational Behaviour textbook as social arrangements for the controlled performance of collective goals[2]. Those who are involved in the process of buying in organizations are working within this framework. Their activities are being controlled with the intention of improving their performance. In this they are in the same situation as any other type of worker. It is the contention of this article that it is the way in which they are controlled that provides the key to understanding their behaviour. Not only is this a result of the behaviour which these control practices are designed to produce, but also because of the unintended consequences of these practices. Organizational Buying as Controlled Work The variety of methods of control that are employed is something about which a good deal is known, since it has been the focus of interest in the study of organizations for many years. This insight into control processes has come mainly from writings with a managerial perspective. These have been greatly augmented by contributions of a more sociological nature from within the various debates about labour process. Since control has been the focus of attention, indeed the central concept of organization studies, for many years, a review of the literature would seem an impossibly daunting task. However, a number of writers have attempted to simplify the diversity of practices by providing classifications, any of which would assist to some extent in providing insights into organizational buyer behaviour. Famously, McGregor[3] described two different sets of assumptions which managers might hold of their subordinates. The theory X or lazy set of

European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 28 No. 11, 1994, pp. 50-62. MCB University Press, 0309-0566

assumptions leading to one approach to control. The theory Y or hardworking set leading to a different approach. Similarly, Fox [4] described two alternative approaches to management. One was based on high trust relations characterized by the joining of equals in a common purpose. The other was based on low trust relations where men are conscious of submitting to superior power towards the pursuit of ends they do not fully share. The two sets of management practices depend on the degree of trust that is felt between management and workers. This in turn appears to hinge on the degree to which there is felt to be a commonality of interest between management and workers. Rather similar, is Friedmans[5] distinction between responsible autonomy and direct control. The former is intended to harness the adaptability of labour power by giving workers leeway. The latter tried to limit the scope for labour power by coercive threats, close supervision and minimizing individual responsibility. Some writers have argued that there is a historical trend in the approaches to control employed. One such writer was Edwards [6] who argued that there was a sequence starting with simple or personal control employed. In this case bosses generally behave as despots, benevolent or otherwise. Increased size of the business, together with increased resistance produces technical control, where the machinery itself directs the labour process. This then is replaced by bureaucratic control. Another writer arguing for a historical trend was Braverman [7]. He argued, following a Marxist analysis, that the conception of work had been separated from its execution through the application of scientific management. He argued that there was an historical trend towards jobs being degraded as scientific management was applied more widely. Those involved in organizational buying decisions certainly have felt the effects of scientific management, both through the application of quantitative methods to decision making and through the office equivalent of work study, i.e. organization and methods. Bravermans ideas, while producing a debate, were certainly not uncriticized. It is now more usual to argue that management attempts, as agents of capital, to control the workforce do not necessarily imply degradation of work since they have a wide range of differing practices open to them. Bravermans contribution, perhaps unfortunately, tended to re-concentrate attention purely on differences in role specificity. Hickson [8] had argued as early as 1967 that too much attention was already being paid to this one variable. Mintzberg [9], when writing about alternative co-ordinating mechanisms, gives us more of the flavour of the variety to be found. He suggests: q Mutual adjustment relying on informal communication between individuals for very simple tasks. q Direct supervision one person issuing instructions and monitoring. q Standardization of work processes either through procedures or through technology.

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Standardization of output either through dimensions or profit measurements. q Standardization through skill or knowledge through specifying the kind of training needed to do a job. q At very high degrees of complexity there is a reversion to co-ordination through mutual adjustment but this time the adjustment is between teams rather than individuals. Any of the above classifications of control practices could serve the purpose of providing insight into organizational buying behaviour. The classification employed here, however, is the same as that of Child[10]: q personal control; q bureaucratic control; q output control; q cultural control. This is a simple classification but succeeds in including most of the varieties of control practices to be found, though the classification rather tends to obscure some complications which are referred to later. However, it does make possible both the identification of clues as to the nature of the form of control being employed and the description of unintended outcomes. In the account here of clues and outcomes we are relying on three sources. First, some consequences follow logically from the chosen control practices when those controlled are behaving in a rational manner. Second, they have shown themselves in a series of case studies undertaken by the author and his students over a period of nearly ten years. Finally, the chosen classification aligns neatly with existing literature on the consequences of the applications of particular control processes. Interests of brevity and clarity of necessity have reduced the impact on this article of the third source. Child [10], since he uses the same classification, provides a good source for initial further reading. It is possible to examine each control practice in turn to determine the consequences of its use. It might also be useful to possess clues which give a rapid indication of the likely dominant control practice.
q

Personal Control This form of control mostly exists in small organizations. Most decisions are taken by the chief executive, who is probably the owner in the case of a private sector organization. In this case the framework of control practices employed here cannot be usefully applied. In so far as subordinates are engaged in buying behaviour they are likely to be controlled through direct surveillance. They are attempting to second-guess what their boss would have decided. So their behaviour, presumably, can be predicted best through an understanding of the preferences, criteria, etc. of their employer. If a potential supplier was attempting to modify existing buying behaviour it would be necessary to

bypass the employee. The employee would be unwilling to risk the wrath of his or her boss by trying any new risky products or services. Fortunately, other control practices offer rather more scope for using clues to predict outcomes. Bureaucratic Control Controlling workers through specifying how a job is to be done is a very old technique but is usually, nowadays, traced back to two developments. The first of these is the practice of scientific management originated by Taylor [11] and subsequently modified in various ways. The original idea was to discover scientifically and objectively the one best way to do a job and then to select and train workers to perform the job precisely in that way. This approach is now not only employed on the manual tasks for which it was originally devised but also as organization and methods in office work. A second strand of scientific management led to the wide use of quantitative methods for decision making. When used in this context they provide a procedure to be followed by subordinate organization members. For example, following set procedures might indicate when reordering is appropriate and in what quantity. The emphasis on the following of carefully prescribed procedures also can be traced back to the spread of bureaucratization. The workforce is thought to accept instructions as authoritative because they are rational. The instructions are based on knowledge possessed by superiors and this is translated to subordinates as rules to be followed. The aim is one of formal rationality. If clear procedures have been set out and followed there is an appearance of rationality which in a sense is what really counts. Outcomes Commentators of this form of control usually point to its detrimental effects. Treating workers as if they are children reduces their efficiency [12]. There is a lack of interest in the work. They will not seek imaginative solutions or those requiring any but the minimum effect. It would appear that it is the supplier that is going to have to do the work. Others have emphasized that even with goodwill on the part of those following the set procedures, considered slippage from the intentions of the procedures authors is likely [13]. In order to specify totally how decisions are to be taken it would be necessary to have a set of rules about how the first set were to be used and so on in an infinite regress of rules [14]. In practice, rules are applied with common sense. The problem is that the very different experience of the rule framers and followers is likely to result in there being no real sense in common. Thus a rule follower, in using their own common sense, might follow a rule when the authors intention would suggest ignoring it, or ignore it when the authors intention would suggest following it. Thus, a buyer might insist on an original technical specification being met even in circumstances where it is not really relevant.

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An important aspect of this form of control when applied to decision making is that in practice it relies heavily on the use of categories. All problems have to be labelled and this then subsequently indicates how they are to be dealt with. A particular purchase will be treated through the use of a small predetermined range of procedures even if it does not fit any of those procedures very well. A new category is highly unlikely to be produced until a number of such purchases have already been dealt with in a similarly inappropriate fashion. Allocation to categories may be entirely arbitrary. Thus, a purchase of 1,000 may be dealt with in a manner quite different from one of 999. Though, of course, junior bureaucrat and supplier may co-operate to ensure that a purchase is divided into suitably sized parts in order to avoid the more onerous procedure. Initially, an inexperienced bureaucrat is likely to attempt to use the procedures in a literal fashion. However, the experienced competent bureaucrat will have internalized the rules and will know when competence rule use involves ignoring a particular rule; in the same way as a competent composer of music or a chess player knows when to ignore a rule that they were originally taught to follow. However, when the outcome is in some sense a failure and the rules have not been followed literally, the bureaucrat may be disciplined even if other competent rule users would have behaved in the same way in those circumstances. In these circumstances, the supplier might also receive a black mark since it was involved when procedures were not followed properly. When events have turned out badly, for these or any other reasons, management will rarely react by allowing junior bureaucrats greater discretion. It will almost invariably react with more specific rules. The junior bureaucrats are likely to welcome this because these rules will provide a degree of protection. It has been argued [15-17] that decision makers begin to suffer a form of functional fixation when faced with repetitive similar decisions. So that where information, e.g. pricing or performance characteristics, is presented on a new basis, the decision maker will, through habit, continue to treat it as if it was constructed on the old basis. Though there must be some doubt about the extent to which this happens in the real world, as opposed to in laboratory tests. A point to remember is that the junior bureaucrats are unlikely to have a strong allegiance to their employer. They can, if approached in an appropriate fashion, be surprisingly helpful in explaining how a supplier can best use the procedures to their advantage. Clues Suppliers are likely to be made very aware of the need to follow correct procedures. Probably there will be forms to be filled in without errors. The product or service will have to be presented in the right way. The suppliers will find themselves and their products or services being labelled very early on: This is an X sort of case; or they will be referred to as an X sort of company.

In some cases bureaucracy is clearly endemic throughout an organization and few purchases will escape bureaucratic treatment. In other cases, which may not be so easy to spot, only certain purchases will be dealt with in this way. These may be at both ends of the spectrum: the highly routine, inexpensive purchase and also the very large purchase where alternative offerings need to be compared with great care. Output Control Management, through the setting of objectives, has been a widely advised and practised technique. The emphasis on this approach again can be traced to two main sources. Target setting is seen as a useful form of motivation. Secondly, it is seen as allowing the use of a form of cybernetic control. An important popularizer of the use of objective setting has been Lock [18]. The protagonists of goal setting theory argue that it is the goal that is the motivator and that any rewards received, or social comparisons made, are only secondary. An acceptance of, and commitment to a goal, provides the necessary motivation to achieve a high quantity and/or quality of work. This assumes, of course, that the task is sufficiently clear and is not impossibly difficult. Some variations to the approach emphasize the role of participation in goal setting as an assistance in gaining the necessary commitment to the goal. This has appeared as conventional wisdom for some years now in relation to budget setting in accountancy textbooks [19,20]. Others emphasize that the use of targets allows a delegation of authority with respect to the means by which a job is to be done [10]. The argument being that the greater discretion allowed is itself an important motivator. However, it can be argued that any apparent motivational benefit from such intrinsic rewards is only secondary to the goal setting effect. The second major reason for the widespread use of the approach flows from the popularity of cybernetic management, variations on which have been used in widely read management textbooks for some years now [10,21,22]. This assumes that the organization of any subsystem within it can be usefully conceived of as a system of input, operations output, together with a feedback loop. Management is conducted through the creation of standards or goals and then by checking performance against those targets. As indicated by the double-headed arrow in Figure 1, the controller, after checking performance against the targets, can take action at the input and change the standard, if it now appears too easy or hard or, indeed, do nothing if that seems appropriate. Modification of the target also might take place as a result of environmental monitoring, as some degree of feedforward is inevitably involved, in the same way as it is advised for marketers [23]. Figure 1 could represent the whole organization, subsidiary company or division; or just one person: the principle is the same. If it represents less than the whole organization then the goals given will be designed so as to meet the needs of the larger system of which it is a part. The goals of the many subsystems of which the organization is made up will total to the overall goal.

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INPUT

Operations

Output

Feedback

Controller

Standard

Figure 1.

When something larger than an individual is represented the target will represent the individual goal of the manager of that subsystem. Thus the approach becomes consistent with the use of goal setting as a motivational technique. Consequences Those being controlled through the use of targets will attempt to improve their performance against those targets. They will do so at the expense of other activities in which they might reasonably engage. If they can best improve their performance on the measure by concentrating on buying at the lowest possible price, that is what they will do. It is not of importance in determining their behaviour that the employers interests might be better served by them taking more account of other factors. Where individuals have an operationalized target (e.g. 4 per cent reduction in six months) this will become the operative target while a general aim is ignored [24]. This is one of the few statements with a real claim to being an iron law of organizations. Those involved in buying will do what they believe will improve their measured performances. Usually it is fairly obvious what they can do in terms of improving their performance and/or easing their target to make its achievement more likely. Occasionally, more sophisticated measures are used in order to take into account a range of factors. In one case known to the writer, a buyer who actually performed exceptionally well against a complex measure apparently had no understanding of how it worked. This is, however, very unusual and it occurred because his very single-minded concern for price still achieved a good score because of the high weighting the price received. The unintended consequences of this form of control include the ignoring of unmeasured aspects and the use of artificial means of fixing performance scores. For example, targets are often set in terms of performance within a set time period. This can produce an artificial desire to advance or delay purchases. There may be an advantage in smaller or larger quantities being delivered. It may change the balance of advantage of buying as against hiring. Clearly it would benefit a potential supplier to be sensitive to these distortions.

Artificial attempts are always likely to be made to fix the target more favourably. Thus there will be an interest in, for example, expensive or long delivery quotations in order to make the eventual performance appear relatively better. Finally, targets are often set as a minimum standard or as a form of criteria to be met. This could be, for example, a technical performance criteria or a return on investment criteria. The result is that the first minimally satisfactory alternative to be considered will be the one that will be accepted. The well known distortion produced by this satisfactory decision is that search behaviour is likely to be biased by past experience [25]. A decision maker looks first where past experience suggests and this will largely determine which minimally acceptable solution is found first. A supplier that has been able to produce a satisfactory product or service in the past is likely to be approached again. Newcomers will have to be very persistent if they are to be considered, however superior their product. One strategy open to newcomers is to make themselves known to the target setter so as to get the targets raised or in some other way made more favourable to themselves. By making the target setter aware of the high performance a product has in one area, the target setters aspiration level will be raised in this area. This would have the effect of a high target being set in the area in which that product is relatively strong. Clues to the Use of Target Setting To outsiders, whether for example salespersons or researchers, this is not the easiest method of control to spot when talking to those involved in buying. Sometimes they are so obsessed with their target(s) that they will mention them frequently in conversation. They might then use the targets as a justification for putting pressure on a supplier. They might also quite helpfully point out that feature X while no doubt very fine, does not achieve many marks on the measure. Similarly, what is important on the measure will be emphasized. It is the latter concern for one aspect of the purchase, or a very small range that is usually the key. There might be, for example, a sole concern for price to the extent of ignoring other aspects. There might be the already noted concern for delivery or order data. The potential supplier needs to be sensitive to changes in targets which can occur very abruptly. The measures can change or be augmented by other measures immediately affecting buying behaviour. Safety or reliability of supply might suddenly become a major concern because of a change in policy and thus in targets. The use of quantitative methods is not in itself a reliable clue since these methods are consistent with bureaucratic control and heavy reliance on the following of set procedures. However, the use of numerical targets will encourage the use of quantitative techniques in buying and vice versa. If quantitative techniques in buying are used it makes target setting easier and, therefore, more likely. The use of

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quantitative techniques also can be a response as they may provide a way of performing well on the numerical target. Cultural Control Cultural control essentially consists of two elements. The desired degree of control is achieved through a combination of appropriate recruitment and subsequent socialization of those recruited. Cultural control is an extraordinarily difficult concept with which to get to grips. An organization with a strong culture would seem to be one in which there is a highly consistent and conscious view of the way in which things are done here. Members of such organizations are made very aware of these ways by being exposed to organizational myths and rituals. Socialization processes are deliberately employed to produce pressure on individuals to conform to the managements concepts of ideal behaviour. The individual is intended to modify his or her behaviour so as to avoid social disapproval. Social comparison processes, regarded as secondary by the protagonists of target setting, are regarded here as being of prime importance. Employers often will attempt to recruit appropriately presocialized individuals, e.g. those with appropriate education and training. This is not always regarded as necessary. The organization may use its own training processes to inculcate appropriate values and ways of thinking and may actually prefer those who are previously untrained. Military organizations would be good examples of those relying heavily on the socialization efforts of their training but business organizations also do the same. The commercial success of firms that have been relying on their deliberate culture manipulation has attracted a great deal of attention [26-29] and this will have encouraged others to emulate them. Much of the socialization is achieved in the first year of employment. It is also reinforced through repeated short courses or conferences. Continual verbal pressure will also be put on those perceived as not quite meeting the required norms. It is important to bear in mind that cultural control is often seen by management as a useful additional tool. It is very often combined with output control. Consequences Emphasis on this form of control can produce a high degree of predictability. If a person occupying a particular position is promoted then their replacement is unlikely to do things in a very different way. In order to become very sensitive to the actions likely to flow from this predictability, it becomes particularly important to understand the thinking within this type of organization. This will be easier if you are already rather like this organizations right type of person. It is specially important to be able to use the particular language of the culture correctly. Clearly, one way of achieving this is for a supplier to an organization with a strong culture to recruit people from that organization for the key interface

roles. They will understand the thinking of their previous organization and will themselves be acceptable. In these circumstances, closeness of relationships can be improved through joint social events of various sorts between members of the two organizations. A supplier might well be keen to establish the idea that a close relationship with them is normal in those undergoing the crucial first months of socialization. Clearly, there are likely to be possible problems here if the supplier has a strong but different culture. Attempts to socialize employees into a particular culture will not always be totally successful. However, those that remain within it will either have been socialized or will be acting as if that is so. They will see the sense in going along with practices even if they may not have come to share underlying assumptions, values and ethics. The essential predictability will not be affected much by this. For example, the culture of the organization might favour a nationalistic buying policy. Somebody involved in buying might doubt the wisdom of this but will go along with it. Clues Clues to the use of this control method are noticeable especially in the language being used. There is a consistency of language with particular words and phrases being repeated. Culture is transmitted partly through myths and stories that are retold. When beginning to be accepted the outsider will hear stories which explain the way in which things are done within the organization. Complications Clearly, when working with ideal types one would never expect to meet a real organization which perfectly matched the type. There are far too many variables to allow this. There are, however, three complicating variables so frequently seen as to be worth specific comment. When viewing organizational buyers engaged in controlled activity it is natural to consider the impact of the buyers professional training. Rather than identifying professional training as a distinct form of control it seems more helpful to regard professionals as being exposed to a mix of the other control practices. Professionals usually will stress the element of professional judgement in their work and will argue that indeterminacy is a key element of what they do. They should, they argue, be managed through high trust relations [4] and responsible autonomy [5]. However, as Mintzberg [9] has observed, much professional work involves the following of professional practice which is for most purposes indistinguishable from the following of procedures. So, most of the earlier discussions in method setting still applies. In addition, they may well be controlled by objective setting but the use of more than one control technique simultaneously is not unique to professionals.

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One source of uncertainty in predicting the behaviour of professionals follows from their being exposed to socialization both through their training and also from their employing organization. These two socialization attempts may conflict, thus reducing the predictability normally associated with culture manipulation. The professional training received may not necessarily be directly relevant to purchasing but will affect the ways in which offered products and services are compared. In the authors own series of case studies it was evident both in a private nursery school and in a county education authority that views on child development were affecting decision making over a wide variety of purchases. Clearly, a supplier would need to be aware of other currently dominant professional concerns and ideas among relevant buyers. A second complicating variable is that of the impact of technology. Unlike Edwards [6] we have not used technology as a separate control practice. Computerization can be used to aid buyer decision in a wide variety of ways. It might be used to bring more relevant information to the desk of one person to assist that persons judgement. It might result in greater emphasis on quantifiable elements in the buying process. The introduction of computer systems can be seen as part of a deskilling exercise so that the remarks on bureaucratic control only need modifying in so far as the rules are set out in the computers program rather than in a manual. Women workers seem to particularly suffer from computers being used to deskill, rather than being used to produce high discretion jobs. This point is made by Crompton and Reid [30] on the basis of their work in a local authority treasurers department. It was also confirmed in the authors own study of a bus companys buying office. Clearly, the clue of the presence of computing has to be interpreted with some caution. The third complicating factor probably deserves an article itself. That is, the ways in which behaviour is modified through processes of resistance and negotiation. Workers of all sorts on the receiving end of control practices can cope with them in a wide variety of ways. There might be an open form of resistance, for example, through adjustments intended to maintain identity such as in Goffmans [31] famous study of total institutions or in the playing of games [30] or through the use of scripts to introduce some element of meaning into work [32]. Awareness of that is important, especially in the most heavily prescribed work but really goes beyond the scope of an article of this nature. There is no denying that some purchases can be well understood through a political model of decision making [32] but the techniques employed above of looking for clues can still be useful. Conclusions Clearly, what are outlined here are no more than ideal types or archetypes and real world organizations will only match each to a greater or lesser extent. Nevertheless, it does seem likely that they do provide a means of choosing between marketing strategies and tactics, especially since the clues do indicate

strongly the types of organization buying behaviour likely to be encountered. No doubt many marketing practitioners are already skilful in picking up clues of this type. The research of Jaworski and Young [33] suggests that their own experiences of being controlled might well help in this. Researchers might well find that considering the control practices employed a fruitful way of proceeding, either on their own or in conjunction with other factors considered relevant. The central argument here is not that these four control practices are those that dominate and ought to determine our understanding of the behaviour of organizational buyers. Rather, that we ought to be sensitive to the range of control strategies that do exist. We ought to be sensitive, in particular to the unintended consequences of each of these control practices, whether due to the buyers failure to grasp the intentions of their controllers or buyers acting with regard to their own self interests. As indicated at the beginning of the article, this amounts to a renewed call to attend to neglected writings on organizations. It is perhaps timely since writers on organizations are now, at last, starting to show an interest in marketing [34]. It may have been noticed that throughout the article the term practice has been preferred to strategy. This has meant it is unnecessary to assume an allknowing, all-seeing rationality on the part of management. It also leaves open the possibility of further extending the concepts of control so that in the words of Coombs et al. [35] it is neither taken for granted nor assumed to be a one-way process.

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References 1. Smith, D. and Taylor, R., Organizational Decision Making and Industrial Marketing, European Journal of Marketing Vol. 19 No. 7, 1985, pp. 56-69. 2. Huczynski A. and Buchanan, D.A., Organizational Behaviour, 2nd edition, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1991. 3. McGregor, D.M., The Human Side of the Enterprise, McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead, 1960. 4. Fox, A., Man Mismanagement, Hutchinson, London, 1974. 5. Friedman, A.L. Industry and Labour Class Struggle and Monopoly Capitalism, Macmillan, London, 1977. 6. Edwards, R., Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century, Basic Books, New York, NY, 1979. 7. Braverman, H., Labour and Monopoly Capital: The Organization of Work in the Twentieth Century, Monthly Press, New York, NY, 1974. 8. Hickson, D.J., A Convergence in Organization Theory, Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 11, 1967, pp. 224-37. 9. Mintzberg, H., Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1983. 10. Child, J., Organisations: A Guide to Problems and Practice, 2nd edition, Paul Chapman, London, 1984. 11. Taylor, F.W., Principles of Scientific Management, Harper, New York, NY, 1911. 12. Argyris, C., Personality and Organisation, Harper and Row, London, 1957.

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13. Hood, C.C., The Limits of Administration, Wiley, Chichester, 1976. 14. Wittgenstein, L., Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, 3rd edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1978. 15. Lurchins, A.S., Mechanisation in Problem Solving Behaviour, Psychological Monographs, Vol. 56 No. 6, 1942. 16. Ijiri, Y. and Jaedicke, R.K., Reliability and Objectivity of Accounting Measures, The Accounting Review, Vol. 41, pp. 474-83, July 1966. 17. Barnes, P. and Webb J., Management Information Changes and Functional Fixation: Some Experimental Evidence from the Public Sector, Accounting Organisations and Society, Vol. 11 No. 1, 1986, pp. 1-18. 18. Lock, E.A., Goal Setting: A Motivational Technique That Works, Prentice-Hall, Hemel Hempstead, 1981. 19. Asch, D.C., Cost Accounting and Budgeting, Macdonald and Evans, London, 1983. 20. Owler, L.W.J. and Brown, J.C., Weldons Cost Accounting, 15th edition, Macdonald and Evans, London, 1984. 21. Hicks, H.G. and Gullett C.R., Management, 4th edition, McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead, 1979. 22. Kast, F.E. and Rosenweig, J.E., Organisation and Management, 3rd edition, McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead, 1979. 23. Tadepalli, R., Marketing Control: Reconceptualization and Implementation Using the Feedforward Method, European Journal of Marketing, Vol. 26 No. 1, 1992, pp. 24-40. 24. March, J.G., et al., Organisations, Wiley, 1958. 25. Dearborn, D.C. and Simon, H.A., Selective Perception: A Note on the Departmental Identifications of Executive Sociometry, in Handy, C.B., Understanding Organizations, Penguin, 1976, p. 68. 26. Goldsmith, W. and Clutterbuck, D., The Winning Streak, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1984. 27. Peters, R.W. and Waterman, T.J.P., In Search of Excellence, Harper and Row, London, 1982. 28. Marshal, C., Corporate Culture: The Role of Top Management, Multinational Business, Spring, 1988. 29. Pettigrew, A. (Ed.), The Management of Strategic Change, Blackwell, Oxford, 1988. 30 Crompton, R. and Reid, S., The Deskilling of Clerical Work, in Woods (Ed.), The Degradation of Work?, Hutchinson, London, 1982. 31. Goffman, E., Asylums, Anchor, London, 1961. 32. Pettigrew, A.M., The Politics of Organisational Decision Making, Tavistock, London, 1973. 33. Jaworski, B.J. and Young, S.M., Dysfunctional Behaviour and Management Control: An Empirical Study of Marketing Managers, Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 17 No. 1, 1992, pp. 17-36. 34. Knights, D. and Morgan, G., Organisation Theory and Consumption in a Post-modern Era, Organisation Studies, Vol. 14 No. 2, 1993, pp. 211-34. 35. Coombes et al., Culture, Control and Competition, Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Information Technology, Organisations, Vol. 13 No. 1, 1992, pp. 51-72.

Call for Papers

Call for Papers

International Marketing Review
Special Issue

Markets and Marketing in Central and Eastern Europe

With the fall of the Wall in 1989, there have been dramatic changes in markets and marketing in Central and Eastern Europe. Economic transformation has provided new opportunities for marketing. Marketing change takes place almost on a daily basis and will continue to do so for many years to come. Marketing practice is being affected by the transformation of old state enterprises, the entry of western firms, and the activities of local entrepreneurs. While many western marketing practices dominate, there are also important cases of blended practices and even unique practices. Many of these are documented in the daily press, but little attention has been given over to examining these with care in a systematic manner. This Special Issue is concerned with a wide range of institutional and strategic issues which evaluate the various practices of marketing in Central and Eastern Europe. It seeks papers which provide insights into marketing developments, which offer interesting theoretical insights into the issues of marketing transformation, and comparative analyses between change in the developing economies and the transforming economies. Papers should go beyond description and should focus on concepts. Some of the issues which might be addressed include: q Effects of transformation and privatization on the marketing practices of individual firms. q Comparison of specific marketing practices in different countries within the region. q Comparison of marketing development between economic development and transformation. q Case studies of specific firms with regard to how they are attempting to become market-oriented. q Cross-national studies related to branding, product adaptation, promotional and similar marketing practices. q Analysis of the developing public policy aimed at regulating marketing activities. q Studies of the challenges of ultimate consumers in emerging market economies. Though not a requirement, it would be interesting to have papers by Western and Central and Eastern European scholars looking at the same issue in individual economies. Articles of approximately 4,000 words are invited in any of these areas or areas that relate to markets and marketing in Central and Eastern Europe. All articles should conform to the normal style of International Marketing Review and should be submitted for review by 12 January 1995 to: Ronald Savitt John L. Beckley Professor of American Business The University of Vermont School of Business Administration, Kalkin Hall Burlington, Vermont 05405-0157, USA Tel: (802) 656 0502; Fax: (802) 656 8279

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