Demography: Clash or Encounter of Civilizations?

Youssef Courbage, INED, Paris

IIASA, Laxenburg, November 13th, 2009

1. INTRODUCTION
A scientific essay. Based on statistical data: family, demography, economy. Charts and graphs abound. Refutation of thesis of late Samuel Huntington on clash of civilizations. His arguments give considerable importance to the "population explosion" of Muslims in confrontation between Islam and Western civilization.
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 178 pages scanning 50 Moslem countries: Arab world, Greater non-Arab Middle East, Europe, the Caucasus and post-communist Central Asia, the Far East, sub-Saharan Africa. Groups not studied due to format: Muslims in India and China, America and some 10 million North African and Turk migrants in Europe.
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 Refutation of ideological premises of Huntington: a realistic vision of Muslim populations. The clash of civilizations attaches great importance to population explosion of Muslim world in this frontal clash. "The resurgence of Islam has been fuelled by spectacular rates of growth", p.116. Population growth in Muslim countries, expansion of the 15-24 years, provides recruitment for fundamentalism, insurgency and migration. Economic growth strengthens Asian government, demographic growth threatens Muslim governments and non-Muslim societies (Huntington, p. 103).

 Huntingtons message well understood that recent NATO report "Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World,", listing the 6 key threats to global security puts: -Number 1: Demographics -Number 4: The rise of the irrationality, of religious fundamentalism (only Moslem not Jewish or Christian mentionned).
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 Stream of thought animates bright intellectuals: Bernard Lewis, and less bright ones: Christopher Caldwell, journalist of the FT, nostalgic of Enoch Powell (a sort of English Le Pen) has just produced Reflections on the Revolution in Europe Can Europe be the same with different people Immigration Islam and the West. Hence, Huntington's thesis has made tremendous damages, like all self-fulfilling prophecy. It feeds islamophobia: establishing a kind of man, a homo islamicus, different from other human species.
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 Program of the presentation: -Demography as a measure of modernity: the general pattern, -the exceptions, - girls excess child mortality in Muslim countries, - Iran/Turkey - transitional crises, - discussion and conclusion.
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2. DEMOGRAPHY AS A MEASURE OF
MODERNITY THE GENERAL PATTERN
Demography help dismantling myths and stereotypes. Allows to analyze the concrete Muslim populations and not the imagined one. Relies on objective quantitative indicators, demography and anthropology :fertility, infant mortality, literacy, endogamous marriages, patrilinearity.

 Demographic variable sometimes considered as an indicator -superficial- of the state of a country. Instead demography, powerful indicator mentalities, goes deeper in the order of intimacy: union between men and women, sexuality, reproduction, death. Demography is a psycho-analysis, a Rorschach test of the societies.
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 Preferred indicator of demographers, the Total Fertility Rate. Varies worldwide from 8 for the most fertile populations to 1 child for less fertile. Exactly same for the 50 Moslem countries, first refutation of explanations based on culturalist arguments. Muslim countries come all across the spectrum. From 7-8 in sub-Saharan Africa (Mali, Niger) to the low of 1.7 children in Azerbaijan and Lebanon. Bosnian Muslims at 1.1, less than Serbs and Croats or Greeks.
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 Frances present fertility rate stands at 2.01 is, so to say, behind Tunisia, Lebanon and Iran. Not trivial phenomenon, but most meaningful. On demographic criteria, the "Muslim world" does not exist. Its population explosion is a myth, to feed fantasies of advocates of the "clash of civilizations".

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 Demographic transition: Where mortality decline in the eighteenth century led to a potentially unbearable population growth in relation to resources. Ultimately it had to be checked by reducing fertility: hence rise of age at marriage and use of contraception. This adjustment occurred thanks to the rise of literacy, first among young men then young women. But, secularism was a prerequisite: considerer reproduction, not as a supernatural phenomenon Gods will- but an attribute of mans free decision. Fertility limitation has to be within the calculus of conscious choice (Ansley Coale).
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 When people decide to control their fertility, this corresponds in changes in perception of the world, no more the outcome of a divine intervention. Disenchantment of the world", as Max Weber described it, the Muslim world is living it today. Demographic transition spread over two centuries in Europe. Began late among Muslims compared to Europe, but speedier. Two centuries for Europe to pass from 5 children to 2, two or three decades in the Arab Maghreb. In the Muslim world as a whole, fertility has been more than halved in 30 years.
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 Revisit sayings on Muslim demography 3 decades ago. Then culturalist stereotypes were widespread. Dudley Kirk, renowned American demographer in "Factors Affecting Moslem Natality" highlighted its laws : (1) Islamic fertility is universally high (2) it shows no significant decline (3) is greater than that of neighbouring peoples followers of other religions. Perception which marked next generation of demographers: a dogmatic unchanging Islam, reluctant to modernize and unable of demographic transition.
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TFR in some Arab countries before transition (1960-70) and in 2005

9 8,5 8 7,5 7 6,5 6 5,5 5 4,5 4 3,5 3 2,5 2 1,5 Lib Tun Mar Alg Liby Egy Ira Syr Jor Om AS Pal Mau Ym

2005 60-70

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3.THE EXCEPTIONS
Definitely universal story of accession to modernity whose trigger is the move to literacy. Today, varying levels of literacy explain why some Muslim countries are still lagging in demographic transition, while others are as advanced as in Europe. There are also failed or stalling transitions, that might be superficially attributed to Islam, whereas the real reasons might be elsewhere:
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3.1.POLITICAL REASONS
Deliberate form of resistance to demographic transition in Muslim countries do exist, but has nothing to do with the religion as such. They are essentially political under religious dress. The Middle East under the impact of the ArabIsraeli conflict is an example of "war of cradles. High fertility of Palestinians in the occupied territory (at least until the 2nd intifada) despite modernization: urbanization, literacy
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 -In Israel: The Palestinians, Israeli citizens had on average many children, also despite their high levels of education and urbanization, But Israeli Jews also very fertile: twice more than Europeans or Jews of the diaspora. Demographic rivalries between Orthodox and religious Jews and seculars fuels the game number. Between Sephardic Jews and Ashkenazi dominated the differences are also significant.
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War of cradles in the Near East, TFR by groups

in Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine
7,5 7 6,5 6 5,5 5 4,5 4 3,5 3 2,5 2 1,5 1 SYR SYR SYR SYR SUN ALA DRU CHR LIB CHI LIB LIB LIB ISR ISR SUN DRU CHR ORT REL ISR LAI ISR PAL PAL PAL SUN COL

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 Syria considered as a Jacobin Nation-State. Yet, differences are considerable between the high fertility Sunni majority, politically dominated and the minorities holding the power (Alawites) or close to it: (Druzes, Christians) whose demographic behavior is now of a European pattern. Fertility rates in Lebanon, show rapid convergence among Christians (maronites) and Muslims (Shias).Does it pave the way to political convergence, contrary to what is suggested by sensationalist medias?
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3.2. FAMILY SYSTEMS

Demographic differences might derive from family systems. Existed before Islam and have survived to it. Yet, this family system much older than Islam: Patrilineality prior to Islam, identifiable in Mesopotamia in the 2nd millennium BC. The central Arab, Iranian, Indian system are patrilineal, give advantage to boys, and patrilocal - young couples live with or near relatives of the husband - and endogamous.

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 Decrease in patrilinearity intensity as we moves away from the original Arabic kernel: Arabian Peninsula, Fertile Crescent. Some traces of matrilocality in North Africa, Iran, Turkey, in heterodox provinces in Syria. North Africa adopted it, but with notable exceptions: Sahraouis in Morocco matrilocality reached 21-38% in1982, against 5.5% in Morocco as a whole. Effect on fertility: few couples willing stop having babies until they have at least 1 boy. Explains stalling fertility in Syria, Egypt and Jordan. With TFR of 7-8 odds for remaining sonless 1%. With TFR of 2, it is close to 25%.
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Probability (%) to remain sonless by average number of children

Probability 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

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 In contrast the matrilocality of Indonesia -the largest Muslim country 240 millions, 200 millions Muslims-, guarantees women higher status, transmission through girls. In Indonesia and Malaysia, matrilocality is the norm for 2/3 couples (peaks at 77- 91% in Aceh and for the Menangkabaus). Men and women inherit equally. Sometimes men are disinherited and eldest daughter collects bulk of the inheritance. Fertility reduction undergoes no obstacles. Incidentally in Indonesia, Muslims less fertile than Christians; and lower fertility than Christian Philippines.

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TFR in Indonesia by provinces (in red high % of Christians)

4,2 4 3,8 3,6 3,4 3,2 3 2,8 2,6 2,4 2,2 2 1,8 Yogyagarta

Bali

Bangka Betilung

Sulaw esi Nord

Lampung

Gorontalo

Bengkulu

Riau

Maluku

Nusa Tengarra Est

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 But why not in Malaysia, which has the same family system as Indonesia? Return to politics. The Malay Muslims excess fertility is explained by the "war of numbers," the competition with the Chinese and Indians. Same phenomenon elsewhere:, Palestinians in Israel or in occupied territories, Kosovo, Uigurs in China etc.. akin to reflex of defence of minority.
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Ethnic/religious TFR in Malaysia

7,75 7,25 6,75 6,25 5,75 5,25 4,75 4,25 3,75 3,25 2,75 2,25 1,75 1957 1965 1973 1981 1989 1997 2005

Malais Chinois Indiens

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3.3. OPENESS AND GLOBALIZATION

Differences in pace of fertility transitions might be due to the contrasting effects of globalization of the opening to the outside world. International migration, depending on the country of destination, facilitates a more or less rapid demographic modernity. Hence large differences between Maghreb and Near East. History, geography, languages in use, especially destination of migrants : Europe in the first case, Arabian peninsula in the second, plays a significant role.
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The demographic advance of Morocco on Egypt and Syria

7,75 7,25 6,75 6,25 5,75 5,25 4,75 4,25 3,75 3,25 2,75 2,25 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

MAROC Egypte Syrie

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4. ISLAM AND GIRLS EXCESS MORTALITY

Islam often associated to discriminatory treatment of women. The idea deserves to be dug, using an index of excess U5 mortality (Hill and Upchurch). Girls mortality is naturally lower than boys one. In non-sexist countries (Scandinavia in the nineteenth century), index equal to 1, higher than 1 girls discrimination. Muslims are not the most sexist in the world: China, North India, are much worst. Sexism more widespread among non-Arab Muslims: Kosovo, Albania, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, than among Arabs: Morocco, Lebanon, even Saudi Arabia, 30 Yemen, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan.

Index of Girls discrimination, girls U5 excess death-rate

Pundjab Chine Haryana Uttar Pradesh Rajasthan Bihar Kosovo Turquie Jordanie Azerbaidjan Iran Pakistan Oman* Bahrain* Libye Niger Burkina Faso Qatar* Albanie Ouzbkistan Egypte Afghanistan Tunisie Syrie Armnie Indonsie Tchad Soudan 1,98 1,84 1,77 1,43 1,40 1,35 1,31 1,21 1,21 1,20 1,19 1,19 1,18 1,17 1,16 1,15 1,15 1,15 1,14 1,13 1,13 1,13 1,13 1,12 1,11 1,11 1,10 1,10 Nigeria Bangladesh Koweit* Mauritanie Algrie Kirghistan Sngal Palestine Ymen Arabie saoudite* Liban Djibouti Gambie Somalie Malaysia Bosnie Maroc Guine Bissau Comores Guine Irak Mali Emirats Arabes Unis* Tadjikistan Kazakhstan Turkmnistan Sierra Leone 1,10 1,08 1,08 1,08 1,08 1,07 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,06 1,05 1,05 1,05 1,04 1,03 1,02 1,02 1,01 1,00 1,00 0,99 0,97 0,95 0,95 0,93 0,91

31 0,90

 The explanation has to do with endogamy. Plays a protective role of girls and women. Unlike exogamous patrilineal systems, which rely on infanticide of baby girls. In the Arab family, girls do not leave the family but stay there, by marrying their cousin, under the authority of the uncle. Sometimes there are distortions, as in the case of high fertility decline (Tunisia). Hence the effect of modernity in demography can sometimes be devastating: foeticide of girls (ultrasound and amniocentesis) or after birth: deliberate neglect of girls deprived of food, care, affection.
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5.IRAN/TURKEY
Paradoxically, according to demographic parameters, Iran appears more modern than Turkey a country willing to join the EU. Iran is closer to a real Nation-State than Turkey. The Kurds in Iran have the same fertility behavior than other Iranians, which is not the case of those of Turkey, who still have a fertility thrice higher than in Istanbul.
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More advanced demographic transition in Iran than in Turkey

8 7,75 7,5 7,25 7 6,75 6,5 6,25 6 5,75 5,5 5,25 5 4,75 4,5 4,25 4 3,75 3,5 3,25 3 2,75 2,5 2,25 2 1,75 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Turquie Iran

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6. CRISIS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITIONS

Demographic transition might be destabilizing for social order. Modernization has not only its positive side. If it takes place quickly -as is the case in Muslim countries- the risks of destabilization are high. Concretely, in a society which becomes more and more literate, the son tolerates increasingly less the power of an illiterate father.
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 The questioning of authority throughout the family will reflect on the global society. Women who become literate and start practicing contraception, undermine the predominance of male, brother or father. and arouse suspicion because of the likelihood of illicit sexual relations. (Shalimar the Clown, Salman Rushdie).
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 This mental disorientation helps explaining the unrest in Muslim countries. It is not peculiar to Moslem countries, but is relevant to this phase of transition. In sub-Saharan Africa, Cte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, in Asia : Sri Lanka the crisis of transition are present. In 2nd phase, reached by advanced Muslim countries: Morocco, TFR 2.2, major risks now well behind.
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 Thus, the collapse of the Islamist PJD party in the elections of September 2007 (which was credited with 47% of the vote in some polling institutes, and had received less than half) is to correlate with the progress of demographic transition, which bears the seeds of democratic transition. Strong contrast with Pakistan, which hit the headlines. Here accumulated political risks: the borders of Afghanistan Taliban movement. Atomic bomb And another destabilizing factor: the "demographic bomb". Pakistans TFR twice higher than Morocco: 4.6.
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Muslims and Hindus in the Indian sub-continent : India, pakistan, Bangladesh, 2000 and 2050
1 400

1 200

1 000

800 M usulmans Hindous et aut res 600

400

200

0 2000 2 050

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7. DISCUSSION
1) To use demography to explain the modernization of the Muslim world: The approach of social reality is complex and has multiple levels of explanation. Demographic indicators are able to encapsulate an infinite number of individual and collective behaviours, phenomena of mentality. Are more objective than other indicators. 2) Eurocentrism : Modernity does not imply mere acceptance of the European patterns. In the Middle Ages, the Abbasid Empire and Andalusia led the way to modernity. Since the siege of Baghdad by Mongols in the XIIIth century, Muslim world irremediably declined. Science, knowledge moved elsewhere to China then Europe.
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 Thus, from the nineteenth century on, all reform movements in the South, have looked to Europe, with failures for the Arabs, success story for Japan. Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pasha in Egypt and Syria called the Saint-Simoniens to help modernize Egypt. Beys in Tunis, did not request Europeans but adressed a Lebanese Francophile Ahmed F. Chidiac (a Christian convert to Islam) to help them reform the school system, the key to modernization.
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 Same for Hassan I king of Morocco, who sent a mission to Japan under the Meiji era to benefit indirectly from European experience. The Young Turks, most of whom were westernized free-masons, appealed to France then Germany to modernize the Ottoman Empire. For a demographer, in any case, the path to modernity has gone from Europe. The demographic revolution started in the Paris basin middle of the eighteenth century, then spread to Europe and the whole world in successive waves.
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 For important matters in life, men are very similar. If an innovation is successful like fertility control- , at any point on the planet, it is unlikely that it does not spread elsewhere. 3) The contradiction between secularization and religious practice: Muslims are going through simultaneous movement of secularization, a secular space that becomes pervasive in their lives and a significant resurgence of religious practices: ramadan, mosque attendance, daily prayer, pilgrimage to Mecca, Umrah, Zakka ...
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 This contrasts with the generation of the 1960s, marked by Nasser in the Arab countries and comparable forms of secular nationalism elsewhere (Iran, Turkey, Indonesia ...). The individuals practice ambivalence: a kind of secular doubt and bursts of religiosity. This has been confirmed in a field survey in Morocco, that showed that Moroccan society is secularizing more than expected. In two key areas, politics: 71% believe that religion should not guide it and economics: 66% are favorable to bank credit. 40% do not give particular importance to fast of 44 Ramadan.

8. CONCLUSION
1) Nothing such as Islamic demography, contrary to claims of some demographers. Range of indices of fertility rates from about 8 children to 1. 2) Unavoidably, transitions produce crisis, triggered by rise of male then female literacy, contraception, change of gender relations. Violence can accompany transitions. This was the case in Europe (Cromwell, French Revolution, Russian Revolution). 3) Universality of fertility decrease, invalidates the concept of an unbridgeable gap between West and Islam. Invalidates idea of intangible religious roots of demographic behaviour and radically opposed mentalities. The world is in a logic of convergence.

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