FROM THE CELL TO .....

Lieutenant Colonel William M. Hartne.s,

United Staten Armg Re8erve, Retired

in Vietnam, it may appear on the surface m though we are fighting an enemy who is loosely organized and scattered. Yet it must be acknowledged that, in view of the large scale of his efforts, he has an over-all organization with the necessary leadership to implement and coordinate the multiple and diversified activities in which the insurgents are engaged. It i~ 51s0 readily apparent that this or-

ROM some accounts of the war

ganization is quite ditferent from any encountered previously in conventionul-type war where organi~d milItnry forces hnve opposed ench other openly in accordance with the Iawa und customs of war. #

In subversive insurgency, Communist+ consider organization s key weapon. Communists hove long under. stood the vital significance of disci. plined, centralized organization, and have continuously used it ae a dcvict not only to seize power, but also to maintnin control. Based on trial and error over a w riod of years, they hnva developed I formal, dhtcipIined organization, com plex in structure yet flexible in opem. tion, which they strive to cntnbli~ in any given insurgency. Althou@ only in Vietnam has this organin

t[on reached fuil-scnle proportlotw, lb evolutionary growth in varying dn~

may be noted in thono innurganci= Mlllt#y -d IS

CELLTO BATTLEFIELD

Greece, Malaya, and the Philippine. An understanding of this organization is of critical importance, for only in attacking this weepon of the ineurgent areenal can Iaeting victory be whieved over Communist subversive izeurgency. The Communist insurgent organizationis composed of three major elements-party core, mass civil organimtion, and military forces. While the erect organizational relationship of its elemente may vary from one insur-

gency to another, all will employ the interlocking directorate arrangement that insures absolute control by the party over the entire organisation. An optimum-type Communiet ineurgent etructure is shown in the chart. At the heart of every Communistdominated insurgency may be found a tightly tilt, disciplined party organization vertically structured to parallel the exieting governmental organization in the country. This structure may exist at national, interprO-

THE BATTLEFIELD :. . . .

I@ 1967

CELLTO BAITIEFIE1.O v~ncial, province, dktrict, and village

levele. However, intermediate echelons may be deleted from the party structure if the leadership believes that it can adequately superviee and coordinate the activities of subordinate committee from the national level. Iho cdl At the base of the party command structure is the cell. The cellular structure of any Communist organization, legal or illegal, is it9 most critical qharactwistic. Communism as a way of life and form of organization is not realizable in the absence of the cell. A Communist PartY member normally belongs to two or more cells: hie party cell in which the fundamental dynamics of communism are to be found; and one or more functional cells which exiet in hie place of daily employment, euch as the party committee, school, or factory. It is the party cell which mo~de the recruit into a disciplined party eubjcct, while the functional cell servee as the beeic organizational unit for the accomplishment of some task or mission. In an insurgency, party cells normally contehr from three to seven members. Where two or more party cells exist within a single functional committee of an insurgent organiLieutenant Colonel Witiiam M. Hartnese, US ArmII Rewrve, Retired, ie a Countevkrurge?wy Consultant wit h the US Arrnv (%rnbat Devefopment8 Command Sperial Warfarw Ageney at Fort lhwgg, North Carolina. He woe Committee, Chief, Cmmterlnargenq tLS Arrnv Intelligence School, Fort Hotab{rd, Afqiand, prior to hie retirement. Colonel Hartne88 received the Central Intelligence Agerrqta 1$6S annrd award for ontatmkfing contributioru to intetfigence thnrugh literature for h& re.wrmch in twunterrnuurgencp intelligence. 82
h.

cation, party groups are normally created to control and coardinata their actbitias. Party groups, in turn, are responsible to yet another higher body that exists at each echelon of the pa~ hierarchy. This body, the intarparty committee, is the supreme Communist organ at its prdcular level of organi. zction, and ia responsible only to ite counterpart omce at the next higher echelon.
Committee System

all authority within a insurgency movement the hard-core intmpartj committee system, a counterpart f urw tional body ie required to carry out the partys day-to-day activities at each level of organicetion. The pri. mary organicetion used for this purpose ie the party executive cqmmit~ commonly referred to in times of in. surgency as the party revolutions~ committee. The revolutionary commi~ tee may develop into a highly sopblu ticated structure under the dircctioo of a secretary, an assiMrmt, and m executive otfker. Under tbeee officials will function a permanent shnding or current zffaire committ?e composed of, perha~

Although Communiet stems from

four to 10 persona. Subordinate to this body, a number of subcommittw or eectione will function. The revolu. tiomwy committee, wblch receives lb orders from the hrterperty committea may be termed the directing orgnn of the insurgency. The party youth organirmtion Is@ third body within the party core strvrture, and is an indispeneeble atlllixtr of any Commurdnt Party, The youth
qranhtion h m halfwpy hinto whictr Mkely future partY m=

here may be dram in their ewly YV@ before they rwuh the raQulred ete for carrdidata membership in tfm pm@
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CELLTO BATTLEFIEU

COMMUNIST INSURGENT ORGANIZATION

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CELLTO BATfLEFIELD

proper. This age varies between 1S and 26 years. A party yonth organization exists at each operational level of party organization, and the junior body is structured in a manner eimilar to its parent cellular organization at each echelon. Party youth members engage in meet of the activities conducted by actual party members since tide youth organization is considered a school of training and preparation for the assumption of inner-party responsibilities at a later date. Mass Organisation Communists have never aimed at the conversion of great masses of people to communism. Their concept ie ! that of a compact, mobile, disciplined, and dedicated party consisting largely of an intellectual elite. It is the task of this smaI1 group to use scientifically the social forces that move and direst the masses so that the Communist Part y may come to power over them and forcibly impose the Communiet program. Their aim is to recruit into the service of the party great numbers of individuals, most of whom are unaware that they are serving the Communist cause. Mass organizations serve the party in at least five distinct waye in that they: . Provide the party with a seemingly legitimate front which by outward appearances represents the intereet of the population. q Establish a cover which diverts attention from tbe party and its operations. q Help divert the allegiance of the population from the legal government and mobilize its support in behalf of the insurgency movement. q Constitute a means of secial control. 84

q Provide the apparatus for estzb. lisbkg a shadow or actual govern. ment competing with or replacing thai of the legal government.

Methods of Control

Communist employ two prineipd methods to gain control over and tc manipulate the masses. These are the penetration of existing nOn-Commu. nist organisations and the creation of fronts. Principal objectives in pens. trating existing mase organizations are to neutralize agencies which enp. port the government, jnstif y and le gitimatize causes which can be ex. ploited by the insurgents, and mo. bilize and manipulate mass support. Front organizations are normally created when the party is unable to penetrate existing organizations, or desires to conceal its role in the activity. In general, fronts are used te establish access to and control over unorganized sectors of the population. In creating such organizational weapons, the Communist seek to cre. ate a useful mass by transforming m unstructured segment of the population-such as youth, the unemployed and the intelligentsiainto one which haz an established leadership and effective channels of communication and manipulation. In most instances, fronte employ organizational titles and promote causes which appeal to the population and are not commonly associated with communism. In many instancee, these fronts may be headed or endorsed by respected citizens who are unwittingly aiding the Communist movement. Individual organizations and group falling under Communist domination or intluence are brought together IUI. der a United Front. The term refers essentially to the alignment of d popular mass organizations against MimsIy H ..4ss

CELLTO FJATTLEFIEL ~

m enemy, although a more accurate

definition would be an organizational

rwrangement whereby Communists andnon-Communiztz work together to control an organization, agency, or government.
FederatedFront In an insurgency, an organizational

metamorphoziz occurs witidn the mass civil organization when the United Frbnt is tranzforrned into the Federated Front, commonly referred to by such titles as National Liberation Front, Peoples Front, or Popular Front. In effect, this organization replaces the United Front and becomes a formally structured body with liberation committees or similarly named bodies at each operational echelon. These liberation committees, composedmainly of non-Communist members, preempt local government administration at village, district, and province level, replacing legal administration with actual insurgent control.

The Federated Front normally aphas achieved somedegree of military predominance and controls a majority of the populationwithin a given area. Communist doctrineprescribes three prerequisites for activation of a liberation committee in any given area. Firzt, insurgent military forces muet be stronger than those of government forces. Second,mass work haa enjoyed success to a degree leading to popular disregard of enemy laws. Third, the party organization has reeolved the problems Ofits first major e~panziOn of membership and has been able to establish a viable cellular committee structure at the village level. The village militia should not be thought of as inferior military forces Whichwork only part time, but as
pears when the party

elite formations drawn from and exist- ~ ing within the mazs civil structure. Three distinct paramilitary elements aPpear tO exist in the village militia. These are self-defense forces, combat guerrilla units (liberation troopa), and seeret guerrilla unita. All three of these elements fall under the contrO], of their local party secretary. The zelfdefense forces are normaliy organized for and trained in ,the defense of villages and other insurgent facilities, whereas the guerrilla units constitute the local instrument for both inflicting damage on the enemy and gaining and maintaining population control. The combat guerrilla units of the village militia are used by the party in the support of regular insurgent military gorces in the area or are employed in small independent operations. The secret guerrilla units, on the other hand, are used primarily in enforcing the wili of the party in a given area and are composed, to a large extent, of party members. Military Forces According to Communist doctrine, the military forces are but one of several instruments through which the party seeks to establish its power. Actually, they are considered the least important of the three principal organizational elements. Communist planning provides for the possible neceesity for retrenchment, restructuring, or even temporarily disbanding its armed forces should enemy strength prove overwhelming. Party strategy is based upon the assumption that as long as the party core and the mase civil organization remain intact, the military arm of the insurgent movement can be reactivated or replenished. Howevqr, without the mass civil base, the movement cannot succeed. 85

1907

. ,.

tEIL TO BATXEFIELB Communist insurgent military forces feIl into the categories of main

and regional forces. Together, theee two forces constitute whet may he referred to as the regular forces es disfrom the viilage militia tinguished which, although paramilitary, does not falI, within the miIitary chain of command. The main force is normally a body of well.trained soldiers, many of whom may have been infiltrated into the country from the outside. A highly motiva~d, professions] fighti]ng group, many of its personnel are full or candidate membem of the Communist Party. Although deployable where needed, the main force is usually controlled at interprovincial level. The regional force, on the other hand, is made up mostly of local pereonne} recruited directly from the mass civil organisation or promoted from the ranks of the village militia. Units of this type operate in regions of no more than provincial size, Only in South Vletnarn has the military arm of the Communiet organization reecbed the stage of development where main forces could be effectively empIoyed. In Malaya and the Philippines, military unite rarely exceeded 200 men in size and most of the time operated in emaller groups. Within the headquarters, staff sec-

tirma, and operational unite of the main force, totdy distinct but paraIleI channels of control exist-ths traditional military chain of command and the party channels of control. bfii. itery command channels stern from the major commander and mmcecd drmo through h~e etrdf to suberdlnate sW% and operational units. The party insures complete domination over this military structure by use of its own paraIleI organization that includes, in addition te those party elements already dlscueeed, a special control body the interparty committee of tbe military. As an additional control, party cells operate witbin each @aff ssotion and operational unit. Regional forces operate under the cdntrol of the partys provincial or district apparatus. Normally consish ing of units no larger than a battidion, the regional forces conduct most of tbe activities thought of as guerrilla warfare. It ie evident that any progrrtm de. signed to defeat insurgency must include not only the defeat of inmrgent military forces, but also the destruction of the party core. Eliminating tbe guerrilla may be a necmsary temporary measure, but it will remain temporary unless action is taken to destroy the apparatus which spawns tbe guerrilla-the party cora

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