Introduction

Scott Abel

After over four hundred years of Portuguese colonial rule, the people of East Timor moved toward independence only to have their dreams of sovereignty destroyed by Indonesia and a Cold War reality. The people of East Timor, or Timor-Leste as they call their nation, endured much suffering during the occupation by Indonesia, but international powers decided that East Timor must remain a mere province that Jakarta could claim for its own. The lack of foreign intervention in East Timor by nations such as Australia and the United States allowed Indonesia to maintain a brutal occupation of East Timor for the sake of commercial interests and to avoid antagonizing Indonesia politically and diplomatically. Public outcry against atrocities committed in East Timor and misjudgment of the political climate in East Timor resulted in the United Nations intervention. This study will examine the role of the international community or the lack thereof in East Timor throughout the years 1975 to 2002. The first chapter will give background information on the existence of Portuguese Timor and the occupation by Indonesia to establish a context so the reader will better understand the situation in the last quarter of the twentieth century in East Timor. The second chapter will give the reader information about the United States relationship with Indonesia and attempt to emphasize its importance. The subsequent chapters will back the thesis in a stronger manner and will seek to explain the policies and attitudes of the United States and Australia toward East Timor. The objective of the study is to inform the reader of one example of pragmatism in the foreign policies of nations and the motivations behind supporting a nation that has committed unjust actions.

The study will use documents that express the opinions of policymakers from the United States and Australia. Two examples of primary source documents the study will be using are UN resolutions and reports from the US President to Congress about the presence of US military forces in East Timor. The study will investigate US government documents about foreign policy in East Timor and the motivations behind the State Department in its decisions and actions. The difficulty with these sources is determining whether governments are lying or being sincere. Other sources include newsmagazine articles from Time, which are richly detailed with plenty of information. Unfortunately, the accuracy of these details is not as easy to confirm with other sources. Other sources the study will use include newspapers such as the New York Times, but these sources are not necessarily reliable for this topic. The governments sources will help establish the motives behind the actions of those in power and will give the reader an idea of how the policy toward East Timor changed over time. East Timor gained its independence recently and its attempts at nation-building are ongoing. There has been relatively little written about the subject by historians. Most writings on the subject of East Timor involve an analysis of the role of the United Nations and foreign powers associated with International Force East Timor (Interfet). These analyses examine what has gone well and not so well in Timorese society and with foreign intervention. Australian Major General Michael Smith went into detail about the military aspect of the foreign intervention and why it was relatively successful in maintaining peace. Smith provided a record of what happened during the years of Australian intervention and how present and future military commanders could learn from his successes. Smith also wrote about some of the political troubles in the nation

building process. There have not been very many works in English about the Indonesian interpretation on international intervention or the lack thereof in East Timor. As for the East Timorese themselves, Jos Ramos-Horta has tirelessly advocated for independence abroad and has written about his experiences in his book, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor. Ramos-Horta wrote in great detail about the motives behind the governments of the world for ignoring the tragedies that were occurring in his homeland, yet, he makes no effort to conceal his bias on the situation. Ramos-Hortas work is unique, because he wrote a relatively complete history of the nation since its colonial beginnings and he offers the perspective as an East Timorese. Brad Simpsons article in Cold War History, Illegally and Beautifully: The United States, the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 1974-1976 is not a firsthand account, but sums up the decision-making process by major powers such as the United States, Great Britain, and Australia. Most of these authors were involved in the nationbuilding process and are important to the creation of the East Timorese state. Other sources include works by multiple authors that were edited and compiled into a single book. Robert Lawless wrote his article in a detailed manner about the invasion shortly after it happened, but has sympathy toward the East Timorese. Other sources have various amounts of material that pertain to subjects relating to East Timorese independence and the role the international community has played in the transition from occupation to the establishment of total sovereignty. United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004 is an edited book with many different authors who sought to write about the successes and failures of the UN organized relief and nation building effort. The emphasis was more on the failures of the UN interim government and the

transitional authorities. These sources were written not long after the events occurred, so it is difficult to determine the long term effects of international involvement. Another similar book edited by Damien Kingsbury, East Timor: Beyond Independence, investigates the problems of East Timor and how many of these problems relate to the international community. More research should be done about the reasons behind the change of opinions with both the international community and the Indonesian government. Perhaps peace lobbyists records and newspapers could help the study determine why public opinion became strongly interventionist. This will help the study determine why the foreign policies in Australia and the United States changed so swiftly and became supportive of East Timor. Some, such as Timorese exiles and those with certain political affiliations, may disagree with the findings of this study. Timorese pro-Indonesian groups, such as Apodeti and eventually the UDT, believed that the international community had no right to intervene in East Timor because it was a part of Indonesia. These people considered themselves Indonesian as well as Timorese and thought that the occupation was justified. Although these people were clearly in the minority of the East Timorese people, they did hold important positions throughout society as the study will eventually mention. Many Indonesians thought that the occupation was doing the East Timorese a favor because the Timorese were so poor and East Timor lay within a geographic sphere of Indonesian dominance. East Timors location has played an important role in which nations it had to deal with diplomatically. East Timor is located on the island of Timor in the East Indies, which is less than 400 miles from Australias northwest coast. Indonesia is the only

nation that borders East Timor on land, and Indonesia generally controls the western half of the island. The latitude of the country is between 08 22 South and 10 22 South with longitude between 123 25 and 127 19 East. The nation has 18,889 square kilometers of territory surrounded by the Timor Sea to the south, the Wetar Strait in the north and Ombai Straight to the northwest. The island has a mountainous interior with multiple mountains over 5,000 feet tall, the tallest of which being Mai Lau at 10,000 feet above sea level.1 The Portuguese arrived in Timor in 1513 to an island divided into two main kingdoms with the eastern kingdom of the Belu and the western kingdom of the Serviao. Portugal did not have much control over the island for another 399 years. The island of Timor was visited by the survivors of Magellans fleet in 1522. The Portuguese began to spread Roman Catholicism in the region under the direction of Antonio Taveira, a Dominican Friar on Solor Island. A Portuguese settlement developed around the fort on Solor Island to that was constructed to protect his followers. This settlement was composed of native women married to Portuguese soldiers, traders, and sailors known as Topasses. Eventually other Portuguese settlements were established on Timor and Flores, which allowed the Topasses to become an influential component that was divided between the da Costa family and the Hornay family.2 The authority of these families became so strong that the Portuguese crown had to accept their autonomy in return for their loyalty during the 16th and 17th centuries. The Topasses were so powerful that they controlled Timor rather than the representatives of
1

Jos Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1987), 17; Clive Schofield, The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries: a Matter of Life and Death for East Timor, Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach, eds., East Timor: Beyond Independence (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2007), 68.
2

Jos Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1987), 19

the Viceroy of Goa, who were supposed to be in power. It was not until 1701 that Portugal appointed Antonio Coelho Guerreiro as the first royally sanctioned governor, who ruled by keeping the native rulers divided. Portuguese control over Timor was weak for much of its colonial history, and the Dutch managed to occupy much of the western half of the island. Although the Dutch and Portuguese came to a boundary agreement in 1858, the current border was not officially established until April 3, 1913 when the Sentence Arbitral was signed at The Hague. Timor had its first nationalist uprising when Dom Boaventura united local tribes to resist Portuguese rule. Boaventura initiated a seventeen-year struggle against the Portuguese and managed to seize the capital and loot the Governors residence. The rebellion was quelled in 1912 when troops with modern weaponry from Mozambique were deployed in Timor.3 World War II had a great impact on the island of Timor, despite Portugals neutrality. In anticipation of a Japanese invasion, a small force of Dutch and Australian soldiers arrived in late December 1941, despite the protests of local Portuguese officials. The Japanese invaded in February 1942 to help with the offensive on Java and were brutal to the local populace by committing atrocities that included the slaughtering of families, raping women, and seizing assets such as livestock and crops. As a result, four hundred Australian commandos found allies in the native Timorese, who did much of the fighting and dying. The commandos received assistance from the locals, who helped keep all but forty commandos alive over a three-year period. The war caused the death of thousands of Timorese and left deep scars on the psyche of these people.4
3

Jos Ramos-Horta, Funu, 19-20; Michael Smith, Peacekeeping in East Timor (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 34; Arbitration Convention between Portugal and the Netherlands, Signed at The Hague, edited by Heike Krieger April 3, 1913, East Timor and International Community: Basic Documents, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5. 4 Jos Ramos-Horta, Funu, 20-21;

The Portuguese increased their control over the island, but did not develop the colony as their other colonies had been developed. The infrastructure of the island was hardly improved. The main focus of development involved the construction of ports and the facilitation of trade. The most important part of the colonys economy was coffee, which measured 80 percent of the colonys exports. Only in the post-World War II era did Portugal make any attempt at improving the lives of the Timorese by the construction of secondary schools, which included a senior high school and a technical school. Most of the country endured a low standard of living in comparison with the rest of the world, despite Portugals efforts. For instance, the colonial capital finally received electricity in the 1960s, while the rest of the country did not. Although there was an attempt to improve the lives of the Timorese by Governor Colonel Fernando Alves Aldeia in the early 1970s, the colonial system was so corrupt and inept that it could not achieve its objectives. There were attempts in constructing infrastructure such as water pipes, schools, medical facilities and other forms of infrastructure, as well as the donation of tools, water pumps, and other pieces of equipment to villages. Despite these efforts, attempts to develop the colony were often disastrous. For example, the first bridge in East Timor was constructed in the 1960s but collapsed shortly afterward. This resulted in the dismissal of the chief architect, who found work with the firm that was contracted to reconstruct the bridge over the Laklo River. Unfortunately, the bridge was still poorly constructed and collapsed a few years later.5

End of a Dream, Time, March 2, 1942; More Islands for Japs, Time, October 19, 1942.
5

Aurlio Guterres, Migration and Development, Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach, eds., East Timor: Beyond Independence (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2007), 156-174; Jos Ramos-Horta, Funu, 20-22.

East Timors chaotic history gave hints as to the colonys future. Having been a Portuguese colony was critical to forming a national identity separate from that of Indonesia, and the religious dominance of the Roman Catholic Church was critical for the formation of the State of East Timor. The lack of economic and infrastructural development resulted in the immense poverty suffered by the residents of East Timor. It is possible that the many years of the lack of central authority during the colonial period contributed to continual resistance to authority under the Indonesian occupation. There was little or no structure to control much of the territory during the era of Portuguese rule, which may have made the occupation by Indonesia much more difficult. Furthermore, World War II foreshadowed what conflict would be like on the island decades later with bloody massacres, guerrilla warfare, and Australian soldiers. By the 1970s, Portugal was the oldest surviving colonial empire in the modern world and was holding on to its colonial possessions longer than all the other imperial European nations. The cost of maintaining an empire began to weigh heavily on the undemocratic Portuguese government. In 1973, it cost the Portuguese forty percent of its $1.3 billion budget to support a military to put down the colonial insurrections in the African colonies of Angola, Guineau-Bissau, and Mozambique. Ironically, it was the military that was most willing to challenge government colonial policy. The most famous advocate of an anti-imperialist agenda was a hero of the African Wars, General Antonio de Spinola, who argued, as the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces, that there was only a political solution to the colonial problem. Although he had the support of many of his officers, President Amrico Thomaz and his supporters, who happened to be Portugals elite, believed that the colonies were a part of Metropolitan Portugal and

should not be relinquished. The President successfully pressured Premier Marcello Caetano to sack Spinola and his superior, General Francisco Cota Gomes, but Spinola would not give up his goals and still had strong support from among the 45,000 soldiers in Portugal.6 Eventually, the militarys animosity toward the government led to a coup dtat that was signaled at 10:55 pm on April 24, 1974 by a radio station playing We Say Goodbye and another song that mentioned dark land in the lyrics. The officers leading the coup intended to replace Premier Marcello Caetano with a liberal democracy. By the morning of April 25, the military was in control of many strategically important locations such as seaports, radio stations, television stations, and airports. For the government militarily to counter such operations with the National Republican Guard or secret police units was impossible. After the fall of the Caetano regime, Portugal established the Junta de Salvao Nacional (Junta of National Salvation) to assist in the abandoning of colonies. One such colony was Portuguese Timor, which would eventually call itself Republica Democratica de Timor Leste.7 At the time in East Timor, three main political parties dominated politics, while two minor parties that did not have much effect on the nation. There was the Associao Social Demcratica Timorese that became the Frente Revolucionriade Timor Leste Independente, or Fretilin, which had support from the lower civil servants, students, and urban workers who wanted immediate independence. The leader of Fretilin was Francisco Xavier do Amaral, who had been trained as a priest in Macao, but was a customs officer for the Portuguese. Tribal chiefs and higher civil servants such as the
6

Lisbon Armed Doves, Time, April 1, 1974; A Whiff of Freedom for the Oldest Empire, Time, May 6, 1974. 7 A Whiff of Freedom for the Oldest Empire, Time, May 6, 1974; Robert Lawless, The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor, Asian Survey 16, 10 (1976):948-964.

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mayor of Dili, Costa Mouzinho supported the party Unio Democrtica de Timor, otherwise known as the UDT. The UDT was initially led by a wealthy planter named Joo Carrascalo, who later resigned in favor of the war veteran Lopez da Cruz. The UDT did well initially, because it seemed legitimate to the Timorese populace and the chief members were already high-ranking government officials. Its goal was to gain autonomy progressively and still maintain a connection with Portugal. The Associao Popular Democrtica de Timor or Apodeti supported the integration with the Republic of Indonesia, because its leaders believed that East Timor had ethnic and historical links with that country. The two other minor parties were Klibaur Oan Timor Aswain, which favored independence with traditional leaders and Partido Trabalhista, which wanted independence under a commonwealth system.8 There was much difficulty in getting the parties to meet together with the Portuguese Governor Colonel Mario Lemos Pires in late 1974, because Apodeti refused to deal with Portugal and believed that Indonesia was the only legitimate power with whom it could negotiate. Fretilins members thought that theirs was the only legitimate party representing the interests of the Timorese people, so they refused to negotiate until they became more pragmatic in its approach to gaining legitimacy in the eyes of foreign powers. Fretilin decided that it was willing to allow Portuguese dominance and sponsorship for a projected five to ten years. The party sent Jos Ramos-Horta to try to gain support in Australia from religious groups, trade unions, and members of parliament, while offering to teach Bahasa Indonesian in schools to appease Indonesia. Fretilin became more popular than the UDT, which was seen as being too connected to

Robert Lawless, The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor, 948-9.

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foreigners, and some within the UDT deserted, such as Dominiques Oliviera, who helped form a coalition on January 22, 1975 that rejected Apodeti.9 Fretilin began to worry that Indonesia was planning an intervention in East Timor, and rightly so, since much of the Indonesian public viewed a possibility of their annexation of East Timor as being almost humanitarian. In February 1975, Deputy Chief Mission Martono Kadir of the Indonesian Embassy in Australia announced that he feared a communist coup in East Timor to Australian Union Students and Deputy Commanderin-Chief General R. Surono proclaimed Indonesia would annex East Timor, if the people of East Timor wanted to be annexed. Claims of a possible communist coup by an Indonesian official worried pro-independence Timorese, because during the Cold War defeating communism was often used as a pretext for hostilities. Also, the people of East Timor did not require a majority to ask for an intervention from Indonesia, rather Indonesia might inaccurate polls to justify an occupation. Timorese associated with Fretilin in Portugal tried to warn the United Nations Secretary-General of an Indonesian invasion as early as March 9, 1975.10 The Fretilin-UDT coalition decided that it was willing to discuss a plan for independence with Portugal on March 2, 1975. It was joined by Apodeti to meet with the Portuguese decolonization committee on May 7, 1975. They came to an agreement with the Portuguese government and passed a bill into law in October 1976 that Portugal would cease colonial rule in 1978. Unfortunately, on May 29, 1975, the UDT withdrew from the coalition under the pretense that Fretilin was destabilizing East Timor, but it may have been that they resented the popularity of Fretilin. Fretilin began to prepare for

10

Robert Lawless, The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor, 948-950. Robert Lawless, The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor, 950.

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a political struggle by trying to gain support through agricultural cooperatives and literacy campaigns so they could win the planned October 1976 election. Also, Revolutionary Brigades, mainly of students from Dili, were formed in anticipation of a conflict.11 All sides began to prepare for a conflict, including Indonesia, which in June claimed via its official newspaper that Fretilin was committing atrocities that forced thousands from their homes to flee to the west. That same month, the Indonesians commenced construction of a 120 kilometer road to the border of East Timor for future operations. On July 4, 1975, the UDT leader, da Cruz claimed that if his people wanted to join Indonesia, he would not object. Fighting soon broke out afterwards between Fretilin and UDT supporters in Dili, which resulted in six dead and twenty-one wounded. Violence escalated sharply on August 11, 1975 when UDT supporters seized important structures such as the airport, radio station, and important administrative offices. They demanded immediate independence and the arrest of Fretilin supporters. Reporters claimed that UDT had seized Dili and described the incident as Bloody Carnage. Two days later, the Portuguese government finally admitted that there was fighting going on in East Timor. There were estimates of 100 people killed in that short period of time.12 Timorese began to flee their country by chartered Portuguese freighters to Australia and by land to Indonesia, but Fretilin did not give up and launched a counter offensive on August 22. Fretilin, despite being described by an Australian reporter as looking like a Dads army of hippies, managed to take a supply depot and the Army Headquarters. Portuguese forces in East Timor practically collapsed, and many soldiers
11 12

Robert Lawless, The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor, 950-952. Robert Lawless, The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor, 952. Invasion in Timor, Time, Dec. 22, 1975.

13

joined the factions, especially Fretilin. Over the course of the five-day battle an estimated 200 people were killed, but Fretilin managed to occupy the capital, Dili. Indonesia was reluctant to intervene on the side of its Timorese supporters, as it did not want to be seen intervening in a foreign countrys affairs. The remnants of the Portuguese authority were tenuous and managed the port area in the unrealistic hopes that they could get the International Red Cross to help the hundreds of refugees. On August 27, Portuguese Governor Pires withdrew to the island of Ataro twenty miles from the mainland.13 When Fretilin gained control over most of the country, other Timorese political parties began to operate from Indonesia and formed the Moveimento Anti-Communista, or MAC, to fight Fretilin. Indonesia became increasingly involved in the conflict by bombarding towns such as Balib and Baucau. MAC forces were supported by the Indonesian military. Fretilin declared independence from Portugal on Nov. 28, 1975 as a new state, Republica Democratica de Timor Leste, despite protest in Lisbon. The next day MAC declared East Timor a part of Indonesia.14 Indonesia took MACs declaration and decided to enforce it on December 7, 1975 in an assault on the capital. In a coordinated nighttime offensive, seven Indonesian warships entered the seas around Dili and brightened the dark sky with the flash of their armaments firing on the coast. Indonesian marines, heavily equipped for war, stormed the local beaches while paratroopers dropped from aircraft. Indonesian forces seized Dili, but there was still mopping up to be done. Ham radio operators 400 miles away in Australia reported to have heard a weak single reporting, Women and Children are
13

Robert Lawless, The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor, 952-953; Invasion in Timor, Time, Dec. 22, 1975 www.time.com/time/magazine/article.
14

Robert Lawless, The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor, 953.

14

being shot in the streets. We are going to be killed. Please help us. Please A twentyfour year conflict commenced that eliminated at least 180,000 people of the estimated 650,000 people living in East Timor in 1975.15

15

Invasion in Timor, Time, Dec. 22, 1975 www.time.com/time/magazine/article; Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach, East Timor: Beyond Independence, (Victoria, Monash University Press, 2007), 1.

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Chapter One: Indonesia

Scott Abel

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During the Nixon Administration, the United States improved relations with Indonesia in the hope of creating a stable state that could help fight communism during the Cold War. In the first twenty years of Indonesian independence, Indonesia moved away from western influences. Once Suharto became President of Indonesia, the nation changed its policy toward friendlier relations with the United States. Indonesia became more reliant on the United States and allowed US investment to enter the country. The United States transferred arms to Indonesia, demonstrating the cordial relationship between the two nations. The trade continued, even when evidence of the weapons use in offensive actions became apparent. The nations developed a stronger trade relationship in civilian areas too. With so much time, money, and effort put into the relationship with Indonesia, the United States was more reluctant to damage that relationship by the mid-1970s. Indonesia became a strategically important friend to have in Southeast Asia. The concept of an Indonesian State came from the union of various islands of the East Indies under Dutch authority, which established a presence there in the seventeenth century. During World War II, the Japanese seized the Dutch East Indies and consciously began to help create a territory that saw itself as independent from European domination. During the Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945, the Japanese created an army of locals to help defend the islands from a potential Allied assault. By 1943, the ranks of the Javanese Auxiliary Army reached 35,000 soldiers, from which the revolutionary army and the Indonesian Armed Forces eventually formed. The Japanese occupation planted the seeds for Indonesian independence in 1945. When the Allies

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soundly defeated the Japanese, Indonesia declared independence and adopted a constitution.16 On December 27, 1949, Sukarno became the President of Indonesia with his government based in Jakarta on the island of Java. The next year, Dutch forces left the United States of Indonesia, but these states soon fell under the control of a unitary republic. Sukarno antagonized the former colonial overlords by nationalizing Dutch interests and property from 1957 to 1958. Although Indonesia controlled the formerlyDutch holdings, it could no longer attract foreign investment. As a result, the Dutch shipping company, KPM (Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij), reduced its services from transporting three quarters of Indonesian interisland shipping. On February 21, 1957 Sukarno invited the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, to participate in his government. In March 1957, Sukarnos cabinet resigned and he abandoned the system of parliamentary democracy for a system called Guided Democracy. As an attempt to maintain stability, Sukarno declared martial law and gave much power to the Army. The United States and Great Britain decided that Sukarno no longer suited their interests and supported rebels with covert operations against Sukarno. In one instance, government forces shot down a US B-26 bomber over their territory. Sukarno drifted closer to the PKI, which generally supported him, and he began to move closer to socialist then communist ideologies. Sukarno demonstrated that he was willing to move toward policies that other nations found objectionable, asserting the independence his country gained.17

16 17

Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 25 30; Kingsbury, Politics of Indonesia, 30-45.

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Sukarnos policies began to isolate him and gave the military more power. In 1958, Sukarno allowed Major-General Abdul Haris Nasution, Army Chief of Staff, to establish the military as an important part of politics in what became known as the Middle Way. As the economy declined, Sukarno became more vulnerable politically. He eventually lost all control of the economy. The budget deficit began to triple and the price of rice went up approximately nine-hundred percent. Then, to make matters worse for Sukarno, he became ill.18 During the period of disorder, events occurred which in time gave rise to a new leader of Indonesia. An incident occurred between September 30 and October 1, 1965 that resulted in the murder of six generals. The surviving top officials in the Army blamed the PKI for an attempted coup, but in reality the attacks occurred from within the military itself. Lt. Colonel Untung with soldiers and air-force personnel attempted to kidnap the military leadership, perhaps to prevent a planned coup. During the process, three general resisted and would-be kidnappers shot them. Untung took the surviving generals to Halim Air Force Base, executed his prisoners, and dumped their bodies in a well. General Nasution barely escaped with his life, but his daughter became a casualty in the coup attempt. The news of the coup became a justification for the military to hunt down communists and their sympathizers. With the help of civilians, the military executed 300,000 to 400,000 PKI members, potential sympathizers, and people involved in local feuds. Over the next five years an estimated one and a half million people, both communists and non-communists lost their lives. Sukarno was weak and a new leadership emerged to control the nation.19

18 19

Kingsbury, Politics of Indonesia, 43, 45-46. Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 47-48.

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Sukarno became weaker and on March 11, 1966, he gave General Suharto of the Army Strategic Reserve Command what almost amounted to a carte blanche to bring stability to the country. The next day, Suharto formally outlawed the PKI. Neither Sukarno nor Suharto wanted a violent confrontation, and Sukarno officially lost power a year later. Suharto became the acting President until he could be confirmed as the official President. Suharto established his New Order Government in 1968 and became the formal President of Indonesia. Sukarno died essentially under house arrest in 1970. A new era in Indonesian history began.20 With the assistance of advisors from the United States, Suharto made important reforms and this led to improved relations with the West. As a result of these reforms, inflation declined from 635% in 1966 to 26% by 1969. The tightening of spending and improved tax collection helped result in a balanced budget in 1968. During his administration, Suharto made economic reforms that loosened restrictions on trade, encouraged the attraction of foreign capital, and modernized the country. These reforms allowed the market to dictate what imports should have priority and permit easier transport of goods. The elimination of restrictions helped result in highest level of exports in seven years for 1968, which was ten percent higher than the previous year. Indonesia also saw its highest productivity level since 1941, when it was a Dutch colony before the Japanese invasion. But the lessening of restrictions was not enough, so Indonesia sought $500 million in aid from the global community.21

20 21

Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 47-53. Rogers, Memorandum from the Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, April 1, 1969, Volume XX: Foreign Relations: 1969-1976, Southeast Asia, 1969-1972, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006) 567-568; Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, 64.

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In 1966, the United States sought multilaterally to develop a plan to help the Indonesian economy and even invited communist nations to join wealthy nations in an attempt to help the nation. Although the communist states declined the offer to attend, the conference continued with Indonesias western creditors. Lenders considered rescheduling payments during the conference. Indonesia had a $ 2.2 billion debt left from the Sukarno era. In 1967, nations of the world decided to give assistance in order to stabilize the country. The total value of the package was around $210 million, with the United States providing $65.2 million in loans and commodities. Japan was also a large contributor offering around one third of the package. In 1969, the US pledge was a significant increase in comparison with the previous years that the US donated aid. On October 21, 1968, the United States pledged $365 million in non-food assistance, along with $135 million to help with food needs. The United States was not the only contributor for aid to Indonesia, but it pledged the most aid at the time.22 In 1969, the Nixon Administration wanted to exploit Suhartos rise to power, to become good friends with Indonesia, and fight communism. Henry Kissinger as Assistant for National Security Affairs noticed Suhartos dislike of communism. He welcomed Suhartos offer for Indonesia to send armed forces to Malaysia, should a foreign power infringe on its sovereignty. This differed from Sukarnos Indonesia, which confronted Malaysia from 1963 to 1966. Suharto remained concerned about Chinese communists. He feared they threatened his government, so he sought assistance from the international community to improve his country and his hold on power. Perhaps this played a role in Suhartos desire to visit the United States as early as March 26, 1969.
22

Henry Kissinger, Memorandum From the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon: Washington, March 26, 1969, Indonesia, Foreign Relations,1969-1976, Volume XX, 566- 569.

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Suharto and the Army strongly opposed communist ideology and policy because of a series of disagreements with the PKI, such as differences in opinion with mobilization strategies and foreign policy. Kissinger noticed that Suharto was willing to fight communism because his forces attacked communists.23 An important issue between the United States and Indonesia at the time was the US involvement in Vietnam. The US involvement in Southeast Asia during the years before the invasion of East Timor focused on the conflict in Indochina. The United States wanted as much support as it could get for a favorable outcome in the conflict in Vietnam and continually communicated with Indonesia on the subject. Indonesia believed that keeping US troops in Southeast Asia was important to prevent the further spread of communism throughout the region until the nations in the region were powerful enough to resist communist forces. In a meeting with Henry Kissinger with Indonesian generals, Sumitro, Tjakradipura, and Juwono on June 23, 1969, the three men expressed relief upon hearing that the United States military was not going to leave Vietnam immediately.24 Although the government of Indonesia wanted to prevent the spread of communism in the region, the nation would be pleased if US forces departed South Vietnam. Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik believed that the Vietnamese should fix their own problems, while ultimately the United States should leave on the grounds of that principle. But the Indonesians were willing to deal with US forces in the region so long as communism was kept at bay until the other nations were strong enough. Malik predicted that the Paris peace talks about Vietnam would fail, but he also told the United
23

Henry Kissinger, Memorandum From the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Nixon: Washington, March 26, 1969, Indonesia, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume XX, 566-568. 24 National Security Study Memorandum 61, Washington, DC June 23, 1969, 268.

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States that Indonesia would try to apply pressure on Hanoi for peace. The image of the South Vietnamese forces and the US concerned Malik because he wanted the US military to be seen as comrades and protectors of the South Vietnamese.25 The Indonesians desired a cordial relationship with the United States so that they could receive economic and military assistance. If Suharto was to remain in power, he needed to keep his military strong and allow economic growth. Also, Suharto used anticommunism as a common link for both the military and civil service. To improve Indonesias economy by asking the United States for an increased market quota for Indonesian primary goods. Suharto hoped to improve his relations with the United States by visiting it and even hoped to encourage business executives in New York City to do more business with the Indonesia.26 Suharto realized that he could not rely on the Soviet Union for reliable military assistance and decided that going to the United States for help would be more useful. He allowed General Sumitro to request arms from the United States over a five-year period with the understanding that the request required US congressional approval which could take two or three years. The Indonesian military also required training from the United States to become more professional. With a strain on Indonesian-Soviet relations, the Indonesians required replacement parts and equipment that the Soviets were unwilling to provide in a timely manner. For example, Indonesia realized that, without proper equipment, it had to scrap the cruiser, West Irian and destroyers, along with sixteen other vessels. The United States provided the best alternative as a provider of weaponry.27
25

Galbraith, Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, July 29, 1969, 571-583. 26 Galbraith, Telegram From the Embassy in Indodesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, July 29, 1969, 571-586. 27 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, May 21, 1970, 630;

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The United States realized that Indonesia was an essential player in regional politics and having cordial relations with the Indonesian government would favor US interests. Indonesia was important to US policy because it possessed much of the land and population in the region, and a successful Indonesian State could set an example for other nations to follow. An Indonesia that was weak and chaotic might cause problems for the rest of Asia and Australia, which would wreak havoc with US policy goals in the Pacific. Although Indonesia had a shortage of people with technical or managerial skills and a decaying infrastructure, the US State Department saw potential with Indonesias raw materials, primary goods-manufacturing, and rice production capability. The United States noticed that Indonesia had no issues that had to be altered immediately, so US policy could support a long-term economic expansion of Indonesia. If Indonesia showed economic progress, forces within Indonesia that threatened US interests in the country would be significantly diminished. The United States respected Indonesias non-aligned status and wanted to continue a balanced bilateral relationship. Analysts within the US State Department did have some concerns regarding the posture of the United States in Indonesia. The US presence in Indonesia might be too prominent, which could result in the traditionalists reacting negatively against what they might call Americanization. To prevent this, the United States wanted to maintain a low profile and encourage Indonesians to solve their own problems while remaining the most prominent international assistant.28 To demonstrate his commitment to the United States as a friend, Suharto visited the United States. On May 26, 1970, Malik discussed the possibility of Indonesia
Memorandum from John H. Holdridge of National Security Council Staff to the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs, Washington, October 30, 1969, 593. 28 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, 599-601.

24

assisting the Cambodian government to stay in power. Although the United States assisted the Cambodians by giving small arms to them, assistance from other nations in the region would help both militarily and psychologically. Indonesia wanted to assist Cambodia but could not immediately assist Cambodian troops. One concern was that even if the Cambodians received weapons, many lacked the training to use them. Although Indonesia wanted to train the Cambodians, it did not want to attract too much attention. Despite this, Suharto believed that preventing Cambodia from becoming a sanctuary for communists was essential for US efforts in Vietnam.29 The next day, talks continued between Indonesian State Minister Alamsjah, Henry Kissinger, and John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff. Alamsjah stated that Indonesia wanted to become more involved in military affairs and become a major power in the region. Lon Nol of Cambodia informally asked for weapons from Indonesia and Suharto agreed. At the time, Suharto considered equipping ten infantry battalion with small arms, but, Suharto would do this only if the United States was willing to replace these weapons. During this meeting, the issue of training came up and Alamsjah floated the idea of sending Cambodian soldiers to Indonesia for training.30 Allowing in the region without turning too many heads in foreign capitals. Indonesian General Sumitro, two subordinate officers, Kissinger, and Holdridge outlined the basic tenets of their strategic vision for the region. By 1970, Indonesia decided to contradict an earlier policy of 1965, which stated that the government would focus on improving the standard of living for the nations inhabitants at the cost of national security. But if the United States had a reduced presence in Southeast Asia
29

Memorandum of Conversation, President Suhartos Washington visit- Concurrent White House Talks Washington, May 26, 1970, 632-635. 30 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 27, 1970, 642-645.

25

that meant Indonesia needed to build up its military by 1973. There did not seem to be much of an alternative otherwise. Sumitro wanted the Japanese Defense Forces to play a larger role but did not trust Japan to fulfill the role of the major military power in the region unless a threat emerged. General Sumitro indicated he did not want India to play a military role in the region. Sumitro desired surplus US and Western European materials but was aware that the US Congress was not likely to fund an Indonesian military expansion. So Sumitro believed that once US Armed Forces were reduced in number in Southeast Asia, more surplus weaponry would be available for use by his nation.31 On July 8th, the group previously mentioned in Los Angeles, add Dr. Laurence Lynn, met in Washington to discuss arming Indonesias Armed Forces. The group discussed plans for a reduced presence of US forces in the region along with Suhartos desire to become more of a presence in the region. President Nixon reviewed notes from the meeting in Los Angeles and agreed that Indonesia should help fill the power vacuum. Nixon agreed that the Indonesian military would have to be seriously upgraded if it was to fulfill that task. By this point, the number of AK-47s to be sent to Cambodia was revised to 25,000 and Kissinger was willing to replace them with 14,000 M-14 rifles. But Sumitro desired M-16 rifles, so Kissinger suggested replacing the M-14s with the M-16s once they were available. Ultimately, the United States gave Indonesia $262,000, 2,640 M-16s, and 1,000 rounds of ammunition per rifle. Suharto showed that he was willing to work in coordination with US policy goals.32 Nixon and his advisors spoke of how important Suharto and Indonesia were to his foreign policy objectives. In the meeting previously mentioned, Henry Kissinger told
31 32

Memorandum of Conversation, Los Angeles, California, July I, 1970, 663-668. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 8, 1970, 670-674; Memorandum from the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard), Washington, November 2, 1970, 679.

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Sumitro that Nixon considered his relationship with Suharto to be one of the warmest he possessed.33 In a conversation with Secretary of Defense Laird on Nov. 10, 1971, Nixon explained that the Indonesians needed military equipment to defend their islands from their enemies. He did not want another Sukarno to be president of Indonesia. Nixon also stated, Indonesia is the big prize. Its a big prize. We dont think of it very much. Nixon also spoke in the Executive Office Building to Secretary of the Treasury Connally, who had recently visited Indonesia. Connally expressed his view that Indonesia was important for US policy in the region and that a US presence could be sustained in Southeast Asia militarily and economically. Connally spoke positively of the Indonesian leadership as smart, fluent in English, well-educated in the United States, and aggressive. But almost as a foreshadowing, he mentioned that some from the United States did not like a few Indonesian generals who were buddies with Suharto, because they were bad men. The Nixon Administration considered Indonesia a valuable friend to have in Southeast Asia.34 By late 1972, the United States continued to support Suhartos government and despite limiting of funds by Congress, the White House remained determined to keep good relations with Indonesia. Overall, John Holdridge stated the US - Indonesian relations were very good and argued that Indonesia was grateful for the economic and military support the United States rendered. Suharto requested $750 million in economic assistance from the Inter Governmental Group for Indonesia (IGGI) and Nixon planned to contribute a third of that amount. Although in 1972, the United States prohibited the issuing of loans to the Indonesian oil company, Pertamina, because of allegations of
33 34

Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 8, 1970, 674. Editorial Note, Nov. 10, 1971 conversation between Nixon & Laird, November 14, 1971 conversation between Nixon & Connally, 696-699.

27

massive corruption.35 Nixon wanted the United States to remain in Southeast Asia so that peace and stability might be preserved, despite the conflict in Vietnam.36 The United States began to trade military hardware to the Suharto regime, much of which was used in the conflict in East Timor. Lynn proposed giving military deals to Indonesia for dealing with issues of internal security. He suggested arming the Indonesians with aircraft such as eighteen T-37s and twenty C-47s, along with naval vessels such as ten patrol craft and twelve landing craft. He also suggested arming nine infantry battalions, which all in total, would have cost $75 million over a five-year period. The purpose of these weapons was supposed to be purely defensive, because US law indicated that US arms sales must not be used in acts of aggression. Lynns proposals soon became a reality on a much larger scale.37 An important part of the United States-Indonesian relationship was the willingness for the United States to sell arms to Indonesia, despite their actions in East Timor. In 1975 alone, the United States made a total of $65 million in arms transfers to Indonesia up from only $12 million in 1974. Some of the weaponry that has been confirmed as having been put to use in East Timor included aircraft, such as three Lockheed C-130 transports and sixteen Rockwell Bronco OV-10s. The United States transferred ground vehicles such as thirty-six Cadillac-Gage Commando V-150s. Other vehicles that the United States transferred to Indonesia which it used in East Timor include S-61 Helicopters and patrol vessels. Some small arms from the United States were also used in East Timor by Indonesia including pistols, M-16 assault rifles, mortars,
35 36

Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002), 65. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, Nov. 21, 1972, 719-721. 37 Matthew Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, (Tucson: Odonian, 1995), 38. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 8, 1970, 671.

28

recoilless rifles, and machine guns. The Indonesians also used US-manufactured ammunition and communications equipment in East Timor. Overall, from 1975 to 1995, the US sold $1.1 billion in arms to Indonesia, much of which Indonesia used in East Timor. The United States allowed for weapons transfers to Indonesia to expand the Indonesian military greatly, even after the East Timor invasion.38 Indonesias geographic location provided it with strategic importance in regard to maritime traffic. Indonesia helped form the Strait of Malacca, a shipping lane that much of the worlds trade passes through every year. It would be in the US interests to have friendly nations to control the strait to protect trade. The United States wanted to have permission to enter Indonesian territorial waters, particularly in the deep narrows near Timor. A right of passage would allow US submarines to transit secretly between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The security of maritime traffic was important to US policy and Indonesia was located near a strategically important shipping lane.39 The United States possessed various economic interests in Indonesia since 1966 and although it is difficult to determine how much these interests determined US foreign policy, they should be noted regardless. The Suharto government went through a number of reforms that attracted foreign investment. Indonesias geography, abundant natural resources, and proximity to East Asia helped convince American investors and traders to deal with Indonesia. After oil prices quadrupled in 1974, the dominant commodity of Indonesian trade was petroleum. The United States bought a sizeable portion of
38

William Hartrung, US Arms Transfers to Indonesia 1975-1997, Whos Influencing Whom? World Policy Institute, http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/indoarms.html#important. 39 Brad Simpson, Illegally and Beautifully: The United States, the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 1974-76, Cold War History 5, No. 3 (August 2005): 289; US Congress, House Subcommittees on International Organizations and on Asia and Pacific Affairs of Committee on International Relations, Human Rights in East Timor and the Question of the Use of US equipment by the Indonesian Armed Forces, 95th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington: GPO, 1977), 17.

29

Indonesias metal and energy exports during the mid-1970s. The largest share that the United States had in the Indonesian market was labor-intensive manufacturing, particularly the garment industry. The United States bought around sixty percent of these goods until the late 1980s. Companies such as Nike and Levi Strauss operated extensively in Indonesia. Most foreign firms in Indonesia intended to export their goods to other nations. The United States was not Indonesias greatest trading partner by the 1970s, but still remained an important trading partner throughout the 1980s.40 Indonesia entered statehood after occupation by both Dutch and Japanese imperialists and from that attempted to form a nation that united thousands of islands and various peoples of differing faiths. Sukarno became the leader of this new nation and made policy that upset many nations of the West. By the mid-1960s, the Indonesian economy was in poor shape and its government was heavily in debt. As Sukarno began to rely increasingly on communists for help, military officers sought to expand their power until General Suharto replaced Sukarno as the President. Suharto heavily relied on nations such as the United States for assistance, and the United States was willing to oblige. As American influence grew, Indonesia became a more important to the United States strategic and economic interests. With so much invested in Indonesia, the United States became less willing to enact a policy that would damage this important relationship.

40

Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy Since 1966, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p66-87 Matthew Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, (Tucson: Odonian, 1995), 41.

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Chapter Two: Invasion

Scott Abel

31

US officials kept a close eye on the situation in Portuguese Timor and often wrote to the US State Department in Washington to inform it of developing situations. There was a certain mindset that led to US and Australian diplomats inaction when Indonesia invaded East Timor. This mindset was to keep a good relationship with Indonesia, despite its illegal invasion. There is little evidence for malice on the part of policymakers or diplomats, but their indifference proved to be just as lethal. The governments of Portugal, Australia, Indonesia, and the United States all knew that colonial rule on East Timor could be sustained, because of the financial toll colonialism had on Portugal. The question remained, how far should the nations go to preserve their interests and keep the region stable? The results were not satisfactory to any of the nations involved. In 1974, US Foreign Service Officers in various embassies observed that a political change in Portuguese Timor was likely because of the policies of Lisbon. The Portuguese Minister of Interterritorial Coordination, Almedia Santos, desired a peaceful transition for the Timorese from Portuguese authority. While visiting Jakarta from October 16 to19, Santos told Jakarta that the Portuguese government realized that an independent Timor was not viable, and then proceeded to Timor to inspect the colony. Santos proclaimed that an independent Portuguese Timor was Out of the question. Portugals government considered the possibility of allowing Indonesia to administer the colony, because it seemed logical that a larger neighbor could absorb a smaller territory in a peaceful and orderly manner. Indonesia would certainly be able to pour four times more resources in the Portuguese Timor than Portugals spending of only $24 million per annum. There was a clause in the Portuguese governments opinion, for it would only accept a transition to Indonesian authority if the people of Portuguese Timor willingly

32

accepted it. Unlike some Indonesian officials, Portuguese authorities such as Santos did not believe that Fretilin had connections with communist China. Rather, they believed Fretilin was a pro-independence social democratic political party. The US Embassy in Jakarta believed that articles from Indonesian newspapers attempted falsely to accuse Fretilin, particularly with the September 17th protests, of being heavily influenced by communist China. The United States saw a bleak picture emerging and realized that there were few options on the table for Portuguese Timor. Other governments of the world realized the nature of the situation for the colony.41 To the United States Embassies in Jakarta, Canberra, and Lisbon in September 1974, Indonesias views on Portuguese Timor seemed inconsistent. Some Indonesians, such as Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo, claimed that Portuguese Timor was culturally similar to Indonesia and that a majority in Portuguese Timor supported integration of the territory into Indonesia. Murtopo stated on Oct. 23, 1974 that his government was pleased by Minister Santos position on Timor and that independence could only be granted in name. US officials knew that this simply was not true. Despite Apodetis claims that it was the strongest party, it was really the weakest major party in East Timor. On the other hand, Foreign Minister Malik told an ambassador that Indonesia did not wish to integrate with Portuguese Timor even if Portugal relinquished its domination, because the economic burden would be too heavy for Indonesia. Although US officials hoped for a peaceful integration that would likely require avoiding the scheduled plebiscite in March 1975. The US Embassy in Jakarta paid close attention to Indonesias policy and statements toward Portuguese Timor. Although Lt. Gen. Yoga Sugomo of

41

US Department of State, Statement of Portuguese Timor Independence Group, 30 May 1974; US Department of State, Visit By Portuguese Minister Santos Begin, 21 October 1974.

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Indonesia said that his nation had no desire to annex the rest of Timor, he argued that an independent Portuguese Timor would threaten the security of his nation and that the projected economic impact of controlling the rest of Timor was worth the security of integration. The US Ambassador wanted a cordial agreement but believed that the United States should not be involved in the matter. Indonesias position on Portuguese Timor became unclear thanks to statements such as these and although the United States did not intend to become involved, it would have liked to have known that all parties desired a peaceful solution.42 As a close neighbor of Timor, Australia was understandably concerned about the future of the island. Indonesian foreign policy began to appear as if an independent Portuguese Timor was not an option. Australian Foreign Minister Don Willessee objected to the idea that there were only two options for Portuguese Timor, integration or colonialism. Rather he believed that independence was an option but did not believe that Australia should get involved in the future of Timor and should adopt in a hands off approach. To calm such tensions, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik declared that the third option of independence was theoretical. He considered that joining Indonesia was logical for Portuguese Timor, because it was so poor, and suggested that chaos might ensue without any outside authority. The governments of Australia, New Zealand, and Indonesia agreed at the time that the United Nations should not get involved in the situation in East Timor. To calm the worries of the Australian government, Malik stated that at the time there was no reason to be particularly concerned about the manner. Yet

42

US State Department, Visit to Australia by Portuguese Minister Dr. Almeida Santos, 21 October 1974; US State Department, Ali Murtopo on Portuguese Timor, 18 September 1974; US State Department, Malik On Future of Portuguese Timor, 14 August 1974.

34

despite Australias concern over Timor, the government was not as willing to get heavily involved in the potential problem at the time.43 Not everyone in the Indonesian government shared position stated by Malik. Malik eventually altered his opinion. Indonesia became increasingly concerned over the situation in Portugal because President Spinola left office and worries of a leftist government emerged. Malik began to boast that 60-70 percent of the inhabitants of Portuguese Timor desired integration and that Indonesia could oblige without too much difficulty. This position was a complete reversal from two months earlier for Malik. Presidential advisor General Murtopo stated in public that the Indonesian government should avoid the appearance of expansionism and the use of military force would damage Indonesias image. But he suggested that there were only two legitimate options for Portuguese Timor: either remaining a colony or integration with Indonesia, but remaining a colony was not feasible in Murtopos eyes. He therefore believed that integration was the only real option. Ambassador Newsom believed that Murtopo acted on orders from Suharto to make those statements, because it was just too important an issue for Murtopo to attribute falsely to Suharto. Statements by high-ranking Indonesian officials demonstrated the changed attitude and policy of Suhartos Indonesia. US officials were happy to hear Indonesia renounced the use of military action at this point but had reason to be suspicious about the willingness of the Indonesian government to accept any alternatives other than integration.44 Santos held a press conference in Portugal upon his return on October 22 and spoke of his plans for the future of Portuguese Timor. He expressed much concern over
43

US State Department, Australian Foreign Minister Disagrees with Indonesia on Portuguese Timor; Malik Clarifies GOI Policy, 9 December 1974; 44 US State Department, Malik on Portuguese Timor, 10 October 1974; US State Department, Indonesian Policy towards Portuguese Timor, 6 November 1974.

35

the situation in Portuguese Timor and wanted to have elections for a Constituent Assembly but worried that the high rate of illiteracy would impede that process. He did not want to grant a premature independence to the territory in fear that it would lead to Portuguese Timor falling under the orbit of another state. Despite this view, US Ambassador to Portugal Scott noted that there was much support for integration with Indonesia in Portugal. On October 29, 1974 the Portuguese Council of State approved the nomination of Lieutenant Colonel Mario Lemos Pires as the new governor of Portuguese Timor. At the time of the appointment, Pires was forty-four years old and had served in the Portuguese Army since 1948. There is a possibility that the nomination of Pires was an attempt to please the United States in the hope that the US influence would prevent any extreme action by the territorys neighbors. Pires graduated from Fort Leavenworth Staff College in the United States in the top five percent of the class of 72-73. Pires supported the United States, was politically moderate, and disapproved of the policies of the government of Portugal. Pires record demonstrated that he was a competent officer who could handle a transition of power demonstrate their concerns over their far away territory.45 The Indonesian government became even more brazen in suggesting a course of action in Portuguese Timor to the United States. Indonesian Ambassador Rusmin Nuryadin spoke with Assistant Secretary Habib of the United States. During this discussion he asked if Indonesia could have permission to take a Drastic Step if one party in Portuguese Timor took power and declared independence. Habib responded that he did not want to hypothesize and speculate about future events. Henry Kissinger
45

US State Department, GOP Statement of Future of Timor, 24 October 1974; US State Department, Portuguese Council of State, 5 November 1974; Former US Ambassadors to Portugal, US Embassy Lisbon, Portugal, http://portugal.usembassy.gov/ambassador2/former-ambassadors.html.

36

argued that the United States should not deviate too much from the policies of other nations in the region such as Australia and Malaysia and follow the general tide of international affairs. Also, one US official believed that the United States should not engage itself in these affairs and that Indonesia would prefer non-intervention by the United States.46 By the end of 1974, Indonesian intentions became apparent to the United States and Australia. Despite the rhetoric and the so-called respect of Portuguese Timors right to self-determination, this was merely a show. Australians Richardson and Hasting talked to Indonesian official Harry Tjan in a private lunch. Tjan blatantly proclaimed Indonesias intentions to use force to occupy the rest of Timor if Suharto deemed an invasion necessary. The US Consulate in Surabaya uncovered a reason for intended integration of Timor into Indonesia. The governor in Surabaya was concerned if the Timorese of the east received independence, it might provide inspiration for those in the west to revolt. Although the US Consulate could not confirm the truth of the statement, all Indonesian officials seemed to be both from Java or Roti and not from the other islands of Indonesia. This led the consulate to believe that Indonesia was not necessarily a nation where all islands were held in equal regard. The same consulate predicted that the Indonesians would have difficulty in an assault on East Timor because there were roughly 1,000 Portuguese soldiers present with an average of three years in the service. Portuguese soldiers received training in guerrilla warfare, many were veterans of colonial wars in Angola and Mozambique, and most were highly disciplined. The US Consulate officials had reason to believe that the natives would not bend to Indonesian authority, because the Timorese did not speak Indonesian and, in the last invasion, an estimated
46

US State Department, Indonesia and Portuguese Timor, 3 September 1974.

37

100,000 Timorese died at the hands of the Japanese, yet the local leaders did not relent. The poor roads and geography of the island made logistics a nightmare. The Indonesian military was also unprepared for a conflict of this magnitude according to the consul. The United States government became aware of the Indonesian intentions more than a year before the conflict got underway.47 The Australian Press began to focus attention on the possibility of the use of force by the Indonesian government against Portuguese Timor. Editorials in Australian newspapers suggested that an invasion of the territory would be viewed negatively by the Australian public. People criticized Suharto, who acted like he could repeat Sukarnos military success in West New Guinea. Fretilin and UDT requested assistance from the Australian government for assistance in achieving independence on February 24, 1975. Evidence suggested that these parties enjoyed support from as much as 95 percent of the Portuguese Timorese population for independence. The Australian government must have realized the potential damage in the public sphere that an invasion of a neighbor by another neighbor could have on long-term relations between Indonesia and Australia.48 Portugal tried to communicate to the United States that its soldiers were being unfairly portrayed by Indonesia and the Timorese political parties possessed an understanding about the possibility of recognition. Indonesia conducted a propaganda campaign that attempted to smear the Portuguese authorities based in Portuguese Timor as an attempt to minimize any potential fallout from any action that might seem unnecessary in western eyes or provide justification for an assault. These attempts probably had little effect on the US policy, because the accusations were ridiculous. The
47

US State Department, Annual Indonesian Discussions, 1 November 1974; US State Department, Current Developments in Portuguese Timor, 18 December 1974; 48 US State Department, Australian Press and Parliament Continue to Discuss Situation in Portuguese Timor, 26 February 1975.

38

insistence that Lemos Pires and his officers were members of the Communist Party and that Portuguese perpetuated chaos were illogical absurdities. Political organization such as Fretilin understood that de facto independence could not be achieved until the Timorese economy could support a viable State. Fretilin would have preferred de jure independence in early 1975. Portuguese officer Major Costa Jonatas, Chief of Cabinet of Information Department, tried to explain that Portuguese Timor lay within the sphere of American influence and Fretilin was not communist, but merely progressive. Aldmeida Santos remained open to the idea of integration, but believed the political instrument for that process, Apodeti, was worthless as a political party because it hardly had any support. He believed that maybe it could be useful for administering aide but not to represent the beliefs of the Portuguese Timorese people. The Portuguese objected vigorously to the slander that their people received for merely being in Portuguese Timor.49 The discovery and drilling of petroleum off Portuguese Timor promised to bring wealth to whomever could tap this precious resource. A company known as Timor Oil found encouraging results and hoped to begin serious drilling, but the major stockholder, Dodson, undoubtedly became furious when he found out that Burma Shell bought half of Timor Oils stock. As an attempt to fend off this corporate takeover, Dodson received assistance from an unnamed American oil company. The US Embassy paid close attention to these discoveries, but there is little evidence as to how this directly affected US foreign policy.50

49

US State Department, Portuguese Timor Developments, 4 March 1975; US State Department, Gov. of Portuguese Timor Protest, 6 March 1975. 50 US State Department, Petroleum Drilling in Portuguese Timor, 3 March 1975.

39

By 1975, an impending invasion of Portuguese Timor seemed imminent. Despite the government of Indonesias denials of any plans to assault Portuguese Timor, it was apparent to the United States by February that the Indonesians constructed and improved roads in western Timor. These improvements were taken as signs of an impending offensive. In March, Australian Ambassador Walcott noticed that some officers in the Indonesian military wanted to invade Portuguese Timor, but he believed Suharto refused to invade unless the situation deteriorated into chaos. The United States was also aware of this information. Suharto claimed that he had no intentions of intervening, but according to Rowland, Indonesia was at the least, trying to keep its options open. Although the United States could not be absolutely certain that Indonesia intended to invade Portuguese Timor, there were certainly enough signs to suggest the possibility.51 As the possibility of a war in Portuguese Timor became more likely, other nations hoped to minimize their involvement. The Australian government did not want to intervene militarily; rather it only wanted to help the humanitarian crisis that would emerge. Australia did not want to appear like a colonial overlord, and such extensive actions would take resources that Australians might not have wanted to spend at the time. The United States worried about the humanitarian aspect too, but also feared what impact an Indonesian intervention might have on relations with Indonesia. Officials in the State Department believed that nations such a Portugal and region powers should help determine the status of Portuguese Timor in the future. Sisco suggested that the United States should not pursue a policy that favored any particular option, but rather should let other nations deal with the problem. In stark opposition to a report from Surabaya, Sisco
51

US State Department, Indonesian Intentions in Portuguese Timor, 10 March 1975; US State Department, Indonesia and Portuguese Timor-Australian View, 12 March 1975; US State Department, Indonesia Denies Plans to Seize Portuguese Timor, 26 February 1975.

40

believed that the Indonesians could easily defeat Portuguese soldiers and Timorese partisans. Sisco attempted to assess the repercussions of a conflict and predicted that the US and Australia public would be angry, but a lack of knowledge and interest in the territory would not result in too much bad publicity. However, Sisco recommended that the United States should terminate military and economic assistance to Indonesia. Overall the United States government believed that the people of Portuguese Timor should determine their future, despite these bleak circumstances.52 Before President Ford and Henry Kissinger visited Indonesia from December 5 to 6, 1975, the State Department issued reports that included information about Indonesia and Portuguese Timor. Kissinger sent a memorandum to the President describing the strategic importance of Indonesia to US foreign policy, and at the end of the document was the section about Portuguese Timor. In the memo, Kissinger states that although Indonesia would normally be willing to allow a colony as a neighbor, Suharto feared that an independent Portuguese Timor would create vacuum for Chinese communist influence. Kissinger told Suharto he did not want an armed occupation, because this would inevitably mean that US arms were being used in an illegal context, and US arms were not supposed to, by law, be used in any offensive action. For the moment, Suharto was hesitant to launch an invasion, possibly because the United States quietly indicated that restriction. According to the memo, Ford was only to talk about the subject if Suharto brought it up and the Presidents policy was not substantially different from previous statements. The United States expressed appreciation for the hitherto restraint and acceptance of a merger if the people of Portuguese Timor agreed. The memo

52

US State Department, Prime Minister on Portuguese Timor, 3 September 1975; US State Department, Indonesia and Portuguese Timor, 16 August 1975.

41

demonstrates that Kissinger was the man who focused more on the issue, and Ford had limited of knowledge of the subject.53 Suharto met with Ford and Kissinger to discuss a variety of issues and if the memo is any clue, Portuguese Timor was on the bottom of the agenda for the United States. In a discussion with reporters in Indonesia, Kissinger reportedly stated when confronted about East Timor, the US understands Indonesias position on the question of [East Timor] Also he stated that, if the United States was forced to pick a side, it had to be on the side of Indonesia. Others such as Matthew Jardine interpret these comments as being evidence of the so-called green light to invade Indonesia given by Kissinger. This suggestion seems logical considering the invasion that followed shortly afterwards; but further evidence should be provided for this claim. The meeting between Ford, Kissinger, and Suharto has become infamous in the eyes of those who believe that the United States gave permission for an invasion of East Timor.54 The United States governments concern over the invasion seems to be based on the fact that Indonesia blatantly used US equipment to invade East Timor. The most prominent former US Navy warship used during the campaign was the KRI Martadinata, which was the former USS Charles Berry, DE-1035, which bombarded Dili, East Timor for an hour on December 7, 1975 as part of the invasion.55 The United States was aware that Indonesia used at least five former American transports known as 511 Class LST. As part of airborne operations Indonesia used five C-47s and eight Hercules C-130s.
53

US State Department, Your Visit to Indonesia, 1975 US State Department, Indonesia, Presidential Visits, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/trvl/pres/dest/di/12593.htm. 54 Jos Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1987), p1 Matthew Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, (Tucson: Odonian, 1995), p38. 55 It should be noted that the author, Scott Abel, may have some bias regarding Charles Berry, because the author wrote of her extensively in the summer of 2008 as an intern historian for the US Navy. Also, other sources than the one below claim more than one ship fired that day.

42

Although no US-made combat aircraft were discovered in the initial assault, helicopters did use American .50 caliber machine guns. During the initial assault, the United States was aware that Indonesian paratroopers used American-manufactured assault rifles, light machine guns, grenade launchers, mortars, and a variety of other small arms. Despite this knowledge, the United States was extremely slow to stop the sale of weapons to Indonesia.56 The United Nations Security Council reacted slowly to the crisis in East Timor to agree on a resolution that addressed the situation. The language in the resolution was relatively soft because the council deplored the invasion, rather than outright condemning it. The resolution called for nations to respect the territorial integrity and self-determination of East Timor. The council expressed its grief over the loss of life and for Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor. Kissinger relayed the message to the US Embassy in Jakarta. Despite this plea from the international community, Indonesian troops occupied East Timor and gave no appearance that they intended to leave.57 By the end of 1975, Suharto decided that an independent East Timor was too much of a liability to the Indonesian State and required action. The United States was initially opposed to an invasion, but ultimately proved to be remarkably understanding of the Indonesian position at the bloody expense of the East Timorese people. Australia also neglected to make any substantive action in favor of the East Timorese, despite their proximity to East Timor. The consequences of this indifference would eventually cost both the United States and Australia in terms of millions of taxpayer dollars.

56 57

National Security Council, Indonesian Use of MAP Equipment in East Timor, 12 December 1975. US State Department, Portuguese Timor-UN Security Council Adopts Resolution Unanimously, 23 December 1975 Ramos-Horta, Funu, 106.

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Chapter Three: Occupation

Scott Abel

44

Both the United States and Australia regretted the invasion of East Timor, but this regret hardly affected policy. The US Congress only changed its policy once US citizens testified on Indonesian atrocities and the Australian Parliament took even longer to confront Indonesian brutality. US policy after the invasion of East Timor was not necessarily consistent, but confusion and lack of definitive evidence that could be presented to the US public prevented an acknowledgement of unspeakable brutality until tens of thousands died. As Suhartos blanket of secrecy over East Timor began to disappear, details about the occupation became evident. As the US Congress learned of atrocities committed by Indonesian soldiers from sources they deemed reliable, US law denied funds to Indonesia. The undeniable evidence of Indonesian brutality changed US arm-supply policy. Australia pursued a policy of favoring Indonesia over East Timor to a much larger extent than the United States and took longer to change its policies. The US State Department either concealed or neglected East Timor to protect Indonesia from Congress. Initially, the US State Department seemed to act in favor of the East Timorese population. Indonesia had no rightful historical claim to lands of East Timor and no legitimate mandate from the people of East Timor to govern them. Although the United States did not recognize East Timors independence from Portugal, it still regarded the territory as Portuguese in a de jure sense. Only Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea recognized the East Timorese Fretilin government. Regardless, Indonesian military forces attacked and invaded territory not belonging to their State. As a result, the State Department allegedly decided to halt all weapons shipments to Indonesia. The State Department did not make this alleged halt public and only told select members of

45

Congress. It then reinstated military assistance towards Indonesia in late June 1976. According to Robert Oakley, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the end of the suspension took place because the State Department was simply acknowledging the factual situation [in East Timor], although the department did not formally recognize the occupation. This initial punishment for using US-made weapons in an offensive action by Indonesia was over, if it ever even existed.58 Kissinger deceived Congress to protect his policy and the reputation of Indonesia. Contrary to Oakleys testimony, there is evidence to suggest that there was no suspension of arms transfers. Alternatively, on Kissingers orders, his staff falsely claimed that weapons orders had stopped for around six months. Evidence for the idea that there was no suspension is supported by a telegram from Ambassador David Newsom stating that there was no suspension and that Kissinger would try to avoid one. Although, Ambassador Paul Gardner claims that there was a suspension. But, there is no doubt that the United States resumed supplying Indonesia not too long after the invasion. Regardless of if there actually was a temporary cessation of arms transfers, the secrecy from within the State Department shows that it was willing to deceive Congress.59 The US Congress reviewed legislation to determine if the United States should eliminate security assistance to Indonesia by amending the Foreign Military Sales Act. In the vote, the House of Representatives rejected the bill but wrote that the policy would change if there was a substantial violation of any agreement relevant between the United States and Indonesia. Despite this legislation, some in Congress such as Rep.
58

US Congress, House Subcommittees on International Organizations and on Asia and Pacific Affairs of Committee on International Relations, Human Rights in East Timor and the Question of the Use of US equipment by the Indonesian Armed Forces, 95th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington: GPO, 1977), 1-7, 11. 59 Brad Simpson, Illegally and Beautifully: The United States, the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 1974-76, Cold War History 5, No. 3 (August 2005): 300.

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Wolff later believed that the State Department did not fully inform him about their temporary suspension of security assistance and the events in the region. Security assistance towards Indonesia resumed, despite its aggression towards a militarily weak neighbor.60 On March 23, 1977 during a subcommittee hearing, Congress examined accusations of atrocities carried out by the Indonesian military in East Timor. Rep. Wolff cited estimates that claimed as many as 100,000 people lost their lives in the conflict. Assistant Secretary Oakley could not verify the numbers but gave much lower estimates. Oakley stated that he received some reports of excesses by the Indonesian military, but with the exception of a few units, the Indonesian military was not intentionally killing large segments of the Timorese population. According to his estimation, only 10,000 Timorese died during invasion. Oakley also stated that Indonesia took a passive defense posture to hold the area around the port, rather than an active offensive search-anddestroy posture. He also asserted that Fretilin, which he believed had only 1,500 to 2,000 soldiers, committed atrocities by using woman and children as human shields. Oakley testified that Indonesia disciplined commanders who committed atrocities and removed them. The State Department claimed Fretilin had the support of 20,000 to 30,000 people of a population of 650,000. Dunn later recalled that Oakleys testimony that denied the deaths of many East Timorese were surely lies. Oakleys interpretation of the events in East Timor demonstrated the State Departments unwillingness to accept that Indonesia was actively killing East Timorese and believing Indonesian statements, rather than investigating the allegations of mass slaughter.61

60 61

US Congress, Human Rights in East Timor, 1-7. US Congress, Human Rights in East Timor, 9-25.

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The US Congress also received testimony that supported the allegation that Indonesia committed widespread atrocities throughout East Timor. James S. Dunn of the Foreign Affairs Group Legislative Reference Service for the Australian Parliament testified at Congress and gave a completely difference analysis of the situation on East Timor. Dunn called the events there the worst decolonization process since the end of World War II. He gave a brief history of East Timor to the representatives and supported the claim that a range of 50,000 to 100,000 East Timorese had died. Importantly, he testified that Indonesian forces conducted covert actions to destabilize Fretilin, which showed that Indonesia had planned for an integration of East Timor months ahead of the December 7, 1975 invasion. Dunn claimed that despite Indonesias wanton slaughter, rape, and torture, the Indonesian military controlled only twenty percent of East Timor. Dunns testimony of mass murder contradicted Mr. Oakleys testimony of a relatively passive occupation.62 Dunn also described the brutality of the Indonesian Army. He spoke of how soldiers shot people indiscriminately, particularly in the mountainside but also in the urban centers. There were instances of entire families being massacred by Indonesian troops. In one instance soldiers killed a family for giving a chicken to Fretilin soldiers and another for possessing a Fretilin flag in their house. Indonesian troops attempted to exterminate the Chinese populations in the villages of Maubarn and Liquica by shooting all the ethnic Chinese they could find. In the villages of Remixio and Aileus, Dunn claimed that soldiers shot all residents above the age of three. He also claimed that soldiers shot 150 men in Suai for defending their women. In Dili, at one point,

62

James Dunn, email, March 21, 2009; US Congress, Human Rights in East Timor, 26-39.

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Indonesians killed 500 men and, on the first day of the attack on the capital, Indonesians killed 500 Chinese. Many starved because they could not purchase or obtain food. Dunns research led him to a church in Indonesia that estimated 100,000 people died in East Timor. Dunn presented a case that portrayed the Indonesian occupation of East Timor as one of the bloodiest in the twentieth century.63 After Dunn issued his part of the testimony, the representatives questioned him about his experiences and the validity of his claims. At one point during his testimony, Dunn spoke of weaponry that Indonesia imported from other nations and used in East Timor. These included a warship that fired on East Timor on October 16, 1975, spare parts, Saber aircraft, and Nomad aircraft. One representative called his report hearsay and Dunn received questions as to who paid for his trip, potentially as an attempt to discredit him. Although Dunn testified that he came on his own expense, he also testified that Community Aid Abroad sponsored his trip. Rep. Goodling heavily questioned Dunns report, calling the atrocities past history. The Indonesian government desperately tried to discredit Dunn directly. Malik proclaimed that Dunn was bitter for being expelled from East Timor, but Dunn countered that the Indonesians never expelled him and that his testimony did not represent the Australian governments views. Rep. Fraser commented that East Timor possessed a representative assembly and allowed the foreign press to visit. Dunn refuted the latter part of the claim by stating that during these press events, soldiers temporarily left or disguised themselves as civilians. Ultimately, Fraser asked if the US interests with Indonesia overrode the interests with the East Timorese people. Dunn replied that the United States should encourage to the moderates within the Indonesian government, who had received little sympathy. Fraser thanked
63

US Congress, Human Rights in East Timor, 26- 38.

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Dunn for coming to the United States to testify, which created a stir in the subcommittee.64 After Dunn testified, two people from East Timor testified, but these Timorese did not necessarily reflect the views of their countrymen. Mario Carascabo of the UDT and Dr. Jos Goncalzes of the provisional government in East Timor testified that Indonesia did not oppress the Timorese people. Carascabo even denied that regular Indonesian forces assaulted the capital at all. The two repeatedly made statements that contradicted to the State Departments assertions. As much as the representatives would have liked to believe the statements of Carascabo and Goncalzes, it is improbable that anybody in the subcommittee believed them.65 Congress decided to reinvestigate and reconsider US policy with regard to East Timor in 1992 after evidence appeared of a recent massacre by Indonesian forces. In this hearing, Congress took a completely different attitude toward the Indonesian presence in East Timor. The chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated that, contrary to Suhartos statement that events on East Timor were a small matter, they were actually no small matter. The chairman continued with this statement by declaring that the occupation of East Timor was illegal and that the United States does not recognize it. New questions emerged about the occupation. For example, why did Indonesia need 10,000 soldiers in East Timor to quell a rebellion by a reported 150 rebels? Indonesian soldiers savagely beat US reporter Allan Nairn when he attended a rally. Former Bishop Paul Moore visited the territory and spoke of Indonesian brutality

64 65

US Congress, Human Rights in East Timor, 39- 46. US Congress, Human Rights in East Timor, 47-57.

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to Congress. What Moore saw and heard in East Timor disturbed him greatly. Congress could no longer ignore the blood that Indonesian forces had spilled in East Timor.66 The incident that brought the committee to order was the massacre at Santa Cruz on November 12, 1991. According to Geoffrey Robinson of Amnesty International, this was not the first time such an incident occurred. The National Commission of Inquiry looked into the Santa Cruz massacre and discovered that conducting an investigation was difficult because most East Timorese were too scared to testify. The inquiry discovered that the massacre was not a spontaneous slaughter but a massacre planned well in advance. One estimate totaled the victims of the massacre at an estimated one hundred people. Allan Nairn, a freelance writer for The New Yorker was present at the event. His testimony, along with others, informed Congress of the illegal and brutal repression. Indonesia government forces seized Sebsatiao Gomes and shot him in the gut with a pistol inside East Timors flagship church. The Catholic Church was the only Timorese institution left at the time. As a result, the shooting particularly offended many Timorese. Indonesians shot children and adults alike during the funeral of Gomes at Santa Cruz. Soldiers beat another reporter, Amy Goodman, and another took his M-16 and bashed Nairns head with it. Nairn, however, shouted, America, America, America! while showing his passport and the soldier left him alone. The two reporters among others survived to spread their reports and video to the world.67 On March 6, 1992, the State Department sent Kenneth Quinn, the Acting Assistant for East Asian and Pacific Affairs to explain the State Departments view of the
66

US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Crisis in East Timor and US Policy toward Indonesia, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington: GPO, 1992), 1,2. 67 US Congress, Crisis In East Timor, 8-39, 67; You Tube, Massacre Santa Cruz 12/11/91, http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=_gVsjzKid9U&feature=related.

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massacre. Yet, Quinns testimony is remarkably similar to that of his predecessor, Oakley. Both attempted to underline the strategic importance of Indonesia. Oakley stated that Indonesias strategic location by the Strait of Malacca and massive population were important. He also explained that it had oil reserves, tin mines, and rubber plantations. Although Quinn did not speak of these specific interests, he spoke of contract with AT&T that would eventually be worth two billion dollars. In his testimony, Quinn described the US economic relations with Indonesia as having a two-way trade worth six billion dollars and US investment worth $2.5 billion. Quinn attempted to espouse the benefits of the Indonesian occupation by explaining that new roads, churches, hospitals, and various other forms of infrastructure had been developed because of Indonesian developmental assistance. The US State Department did not change its position on East Timor very much since 1977.68 Quinns testimony was remarkably pro-Indonesian. The Chairman and Senator Pressler inquired about the military strength of the Indonesian Army and Fretilin forces, which Quinn numbered at 10,000 and 500, respectively. The senators tried to determine why such a large force was needed to quell 400 to 500 soldiers and Sen. Pressler received the impression that the majority of the population of East Timor supported Fretilin. This demonstrates that Quinn either lied or did not really understand the amount of backing that Fretilin possessed. Although he did not outright deny the massacre at Santa Cruz, he tried to justify the Indonesian occupation.69 Congress passed into law new regulations on the relationship between the United States and Indonesia and recognized the tragedies that happened in East Timor. It urged
68

US Congress, Human Rights in East Timor, 17; US Congress, Crisis In East Timor, 74-96. 69 US Congress, Human Rights in East Timor, 17; US Congress, Crisis In East Timor, 74-96.

52

the president to encourage the Indonesian government to expand access of foreign journalists in land under its control and to help reunite families with the help of the Indonesian government and international relief agencies. Congress also prohibited funds from being used for training Indonesian officers in the IMET program and for the Indonesian military generally, although Congress did allow exceptions. Congress recognized that many 10,000s perished from killing, starvation, and disease, of a total of 700,000 East Timorese. Not only did Congress recognize the torture, arbitrary arrests, and extremely limited freedom of expression for East Timorese, it demanded that the president urge Indonesia to end these violations of human rights. Congress determined that the United States should assist the United Nations to address and resolve the fundamental problems that caused the conflict in East Timor in a manner that was acceptable to the international community. These laws demonstrated a reversal of Congress policy toward Indonesia and East Timor, regardless of the State Departments warnings.70 Australia showed a particular concern over events in East Timor. Australian Foreign Minister Andrew S. Peacock rejected the idea that Fretilin represented the will of the East Timorese people and Australias refusal to recognize the declaration of independence enacted on November 28, 1975. Although Australia did not attempt seriously to prevent the Indonesian December 1975 invasion or force Indonesian troops out of East Timor, the initial reaction was not to condone the invasion. Instead, its government called for a cease-fire. Australia supported a vote in United Nations Fourth Committee condemning the assault on East Timor and a resolution passed through the
70

US Congress, Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1992 Vol. I, Senate and House of Representatives, (Washington: GPO, 1993), 499, 625, 656; US Congress, Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1992 Vol. II, Senate and House of Representatives, (Washington: GPO, 1993), 121-122.

53

United Nations Security Council. Although Australia claimed it pursued a policy that opposed the invasion, eventually it became clear that Australia would pursue a policy that supported Indonesias claim to East Timor.71 Although at a glance it may seem that the Australian Foreign Ministry was angry over the invasion, in reality it could have prevented it. According to James Dunn, the United States along with Australia backed the Suharto regime because of its anticommunist policies. He also claims that despite knowing of an impending invasion, they did not seriously attempt to dissuade the Indonesians from occupying East Timor. Suharto only gave the go-ahead with the invasion plans if he knew that the United States and Australia would not seriously object and that the two nations would not punish Indonesia. Dunn wrote that part of the concern, particularly with some legislatures, was the fear that, with Hanois victory in Vietnam, communist influence could spread to more territories in Southeast Asia and might exacerbate the strategic situation in the region. This analysis supports the idea that most of the disapproval from major powers was just a show and that Australia was not willing to do anything to prevent the occupation.72 Australia decided to change its policy over East Timor, which undoubtedly pleased Indonesia. In 1978, Peacock announced that Australia would de facto recognize the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. Although Peacock did not say that the invasion was correct, he blamed Portugal for failing properly to decolonize East Timor. His reasoning was that to help the Timorese people by reuniting separated families and to establish peace, his government needed to deal with the Indonesian administration in East Timor. Peacock claimed that he was merely recognizing the reality on the ground.
71

Statements by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. A. S. Peacock in December 1975, Heike Krieger, Dietrich Rauschning, East Timor and the International Community, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 329-331. 72 James Dunn, email, March 20, 2009.

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Although the opposition Labor Party in Parliament refused to recognize de facto Indonesian administration of East Timor or to acknowledge conquest as a legitimate form of integration, Peacock believed that dealing with Indonesia directly as the sovereign over all of Timor was correct.73 Peacock announced two separate but remarkably complementary policies that may explain why Australia became even friendlier with Indonesia at the expense of East Timor. The government of Australia began plans to delineate the border between the East Timor and Australia and it decided to give de jure recognition to Indonesian administration of East Timor. Peacock wrote that the two events must not be assumed to be related, but how could a nation delineate an official border without officially recognizing who controls the other side of the border? De jure recognition of the occupation of East Timor came in 1979. Australia and Indonesia became closer at the expense of the Timorese.74 Officials for Australia and Indonesia met from 14 to 16 February in Canberra to negotiate the treaty on border delineation. In 1971, the governments had reached an agreement over the boundaries gave each nation access to resources within their border and rights of sovereignty in the Timor Sea. In 1989, the two nations reached an agreement that divided the possession of the hydrocarbons, including those off the shore of East Timor, in manner that was mutually beneficial to Indonesia and Australia. In one area, the nations shared the income tax collections. In two others, Indonesia was to pay ten and seventeen percent respectively to Australia. Also, Indonesia agreed to pay ten
73

Announcement Made By the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. A. S. Peacock, 20 January 1978, Heike Krieger, Rauschning, East Timor and the International Community, 333, 334. 74 Announcement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. A. S. Peacock, 15 December 1978, Heike Krieger, Rauschning, East Timor and the International Community, 333, 334.

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percent of the contractors income tax. Australia officially recognized East Timor as another province of Indonesia, most likely for access to oil reserves in the Timorese Gap.75 Australia was more inclined to negotiate with Indonesia because it was in control, and if the East Timorese received independence, they would be tougher to bargain with. After independence East Timor negotiated for access to the hydrocarbons with Australia. Prime Minister Alkatiri stated that the oil was a matter of life and death for East Timor and in 2002 East Timor and Australia reached an agreement that changed the revenue sharing from being equal to East Timor receiving ninety percent to Australias ten percent. An independent East Timor would have rejected the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty, if it possessed self-determination and a government.76 The governments of the United States and Australia were duplicitous in their dealings with East Timor and Indonesia. Although both governments condemned the invasion, neither attempted to amend the situation or punished Indonesia for the blatant act of aggression. The US State Department was either far too ignorant of what occurred in East Timor or intentionally deceived Congress in order to protect Indonesia. The United States government continued to give Indonesia military support until 1992, despite knowing that Indonesian soldiers used US weapons illegally during the invasion. Australia eventually decided to recognize the occupation fully, probably to secure handsome revenues on drilling petroleum deposits. The United States and Australia
75

Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries, Done at Canberra, 18 May 1971, Treaty between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province and Northern Australia, Done over the Zone of Cooperation, 11 December 1989, Krieger, Rauschning, East Timor and the International Community, 335- 346. 76 Clive Schofield, Imade Andi Arsona, The delination of maritime boundaries a matter of life and death for East Timor? Damien Kingsbury, Michael Leach, East Timor: Beyond Independence, (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2007), 67-74.

56

pursued a policy for too long that supported a nation that slaughtered over 100,000 people for reasons that were short-sighted and damaging in the long run.

57

Conclusion

Scott Abel

58

The United States and Australia split on foreign policy during the aftermath of the Santa Cruz incident, but neither nation resolved the situation in East Timor decisively. Economic recession, incompetence, and will the of the East Timorese people led to the withdrawal of the Indonesian military from East Timor along with the end of the Indonesian occupation. This chapter examines the conclusion of the Indonesian occupation, the intervention by foreign powers, and analyzes Australias and the United States policy towards East Timor. The US State Department and Australian Foreign Ministry crafted a policy that could not be sustained and ultimately required their nations intervention. Indonesia continued its bloody rule of East Timor despite calls from the European Union and the United States to end the bloodshed, but there was evidence of Indonesias faltering grip on East Timor. In East Timor, riots increased throughout the mid-90s, and the Indonesian economy collapsed. The Indonesian Rupiah lost its value and with the economy faltering, Suharto finally resigned on May 20, 1998. The head of the US Congress Sub-Committee for International Affairs and Human Rights Rep. Christopher Smith visited Indonesia to pressure Indonesia to release political prisoners and raise East Timor as an important topic. The US Congress continued with a yearly ritual to condemn Indonesia for its actions in East Timor. Also in 1998, the European Union released a statement about the want for a peaceful change in line with the principle of selfdetermination for East Timor. The European Union condemned the occupation by calling for a withdrawal of Indonesian forces in 1988. Furthermore, the Indonesian territorial commander died in a helicopter accident, along with ten of his staff. As a result of these problems, Indonesias new leader, President Habibie, began to offer East

59

Timor deals such as a special status in the nation and offered to withdrawal troops gradually. The provincial legislatures and the Bishop of Dili, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, rejected these offers of autonomy. For these reasons, Indonesias policy in East Timor became untenable.77 Despite the international pressure, it remained unclear if East Timor was to remain an autonomous province or a full-fledged state. In December 1998, Prime Minister Howard of Australia wrote to Dr. Habibie stating the government of Australias position that a long transition period was necessary for an independent East Timor to be viable. He predicted it would initially please the critics of Indonesian policy but would be unsustainable in the long run, and the East Timorese would eventually be deterred from declaring independence from Indonesia. According to Katharina Coleman, despite reiterating this prediction, Habibie appeared to be offended by this treachery by his Australian Allies. Habibie rejected the idea of a long transitional period. Rather he refused to spend his nations resources on East Timors transition. On May 5, 1999, his government signed an agreement to allow United Nations to hold a referendum that would determine if East Timor was to be an independent state or to have special autonomy within Indonesia. According to Simon Chesterman, Indonesia did not plan well for the vote because the Indonesian cabinet believed that a referendum would result favorably for Indonesia and that there was not much coordination with the military to work for the general peace and security of the territory. The result of this referendum became the most pivotal in East Timorese history.78
77

Douglas Kammen, The Trouble with Normal: The Indonesian Military, Paramilitaries, and the final solution in East Timor, eds. Benedict Anderson, Violence and the State in Suhartos Indonesia, (Ithaca: Cornell U. P., 2001), 157, 160, 167-175; East Timor, Common Foreign and Security Policy, http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/9806/p104027.htm. 78 Simon Chesterman, East Timor, eds. Mats Berdal and Sypros Economides, United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004, (Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 2007), 194-195;

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The referendum proved both positive and negative for the East Timorese people. With the May 5 agreement between Indonesia, Portugal, and the United Nations, East Timor would either choose special autonomy within Indonesia or gain independence under the temporary authority of the United Nations. With the backing of the UN Security Council, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) prepared the territory for the vote, and 451,792 people registered for the referendum. Ninety-eight percent of the registered voters participated on the August 30, 1999 referendum. Of these people, 78.5 percent of the registered Timorese voted for independence in a clear landslide victory for Fretilin. With these results clear, many pro-Indonesian militias and other groups killed perhaps more than 1,000 Timorese with most infrastructure and building in ruins or heavily damaged. Although most UNAMET personnel departed for Darwin because of the violence, a brave few remained behind in Dili under the charge of Brigadier Rezaqul Haider. Despite the violence, foreign nations decided that East Timor could not longer be ignored and that action was required.79 The events that followed represented a complete reversal in policy by the Australian government from being Indonesias staunchest supporter to the main contributor to International Force East Timor (Interfet). As a reaction to the violence, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264 on September 15 to end the violence and restore peace in East Timor by any means necessary. The resolution authorized and encouraged nations of the world to intervene on behalf of the Timorese people. Interfet troops responded and landed on the island on September 20 to enforce the UN mandate.
Katharina Coleman, International Organizations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy, Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach, eds., East Timor: Beyond Independence (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2007), 242, 243. 79 Michael Smith, Peacekeeping in East Timor, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 42-44; Chesterman, East Timor, 194.

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The next day, the Australian Parliament received a briefing that gave an estimate on the cost of helping East Timor. The briefing stated that following intervention could involve the entire Australian military over time and amount to a billion dollars a year along with igniting a possible conflict with Indonesia. No one actually knew how much the intervention would cost, but Australians forced their politicians into action. Throughout 1999, Australia paid for 1.482% of the peacekeeping budget, but that changed once Australia began to take a much larger share of the peacekeeping process.80 Australian voters decided that they should pay for most of the peacekeeping efforts. Eventually, Australian expenditures increased twenty-eight fold and paid for 98.518 percent of the peacekeeping costs. One conservative estimate placed the cost at 420 million US dollars and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade estimated a cost of 481 million US dollars. The Australian government did not turn to the United Nations for assistance with the intervention. In an Australian opinion poll, 82 percent of the participants favored an intervention in East Timor, perhaps because of guilt over the role Australia played in keeping East Timor a province of Indonesia. Another reason why the Australian government decided to pay such a large share of the price was because it wanted international respect and attention from the United States. Australia continued to be the main foreign nation involved East Timor for years to come not only because of its geographic proximity but complicity in forsaking the people of East Timor.81 The United States also played a role in the development of East Timor as an independent nation. President Clinton authorized the deployment of US military forces
80

Coleman, International Organizations and Peace Enforcement, 244-254. UN Security Council, Resolution 1264 , September 15, 1999 81 Coleman, International Organizations and Peace Enforcement, 243, 255-265

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and civilians to help with administration among other tasks such as logistics, intelligence, and humanitarian assistance. As of August 25, 2000, the United States had three military observers and during June and July of that year a judge advocate general served in the territory. The United States also deployed around thirty people to coordinate US assets as part of the US Support Group East Timor (USGET). Clinton authorized naval vessels to make regular visits to East Timor to provide support to the local population. One such warship that made visits was USS Peleliu, an amphibious assault carrier, which from 15 to 17 September 2001 assisted in Operation Stabilize and Operation Handclasp. During her stay in East Timor, she unloaded fifty four pallets or twenty seven short tons of supplies. She unloaded 372 passengers and thirty vehicles that eventually returned to the ship. Peleliu embarked to respond to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and could not continue with assisting East Timor. This departure is symbolic of US policy toward East Timor; the United States remained too distracted in global affairs to play the role on the scale that East Timor needed. Fortunately, this time Australia and other nations continued to support East Timor with the assets that the new nation required. Although the United States ultimately did not act as the primary aide-giver, it should not be interpreted as neglect this time because the United States still played an important role in assisting East Timor.82 One contribution the United States made flew in the face of everything Kissinger had tried to avoid decades earlier. Indonesia was very hesitant to let an international force into East Timor, but President William Clinton would not have the Indonesian government block the will of the international community this time. Clinton threatened
82

William Clinton, Report on the US Armed Forces in East Timor, (Washington: GPO, 2001); Dennis Dubard to Chief of Naval Operation, April 30, 2002, 2001 Command History forUSS Peleliu (LHA 5).

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to block US financial aid through the International Monetary Fund that Indonesia needed to recover from the financial crisis that paralyzed much of Asia in the 1990s. The little military assistance Indonesia received from the United States ceased. This included an annual $470,000 officer exchange program. According to General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States had no security interest in East Timor, but American credibility was on the line. He stated that the action was a response to moral concerns and the need to protect American standing and leadership in the region. Although Clinton did not want to offend Indonesia too much, it became US policy to make sure Indonesia did not block the will of the United Nations.83 Official independence finally came on May 20, 2002 when East Timor joined the United Nations, with President Xanana Gusmo of East Timor and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan present for the East Timorese flag raising in New York. Former President Clinton attended the US Embassy opening in East Timor to mark this auspicious occasion. These events mark the end of the struggle for East Timors independence and the realization of a dream. The same entities that allowed the occupation then became some of East Timors greatest benefactors.84 This shift in policy was not an adaption of realpolitik or an attempt to cast Indonesia aside. It was rather an attempt to make up for past policies and gain prestige. The earlier policies of Kissinger should be understood in order to truly understand the reversal of US policy. US policy changed to adapt to the new era of post-cold war politics when the suffering and will of the Timorese could no longer be ignored, because
83

Philip Shenon, President Asserts Indonesia Must Act or Admit Troops, New York Times, September 10, 1999. 84 Simon Chesterman, East Timor, 192; Brad Simpson, Illegally and Beautifully: The United States, the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 1974-76, Cold War History 5, No. 3 (August 2005): 281

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there was undeniable proof of the Indonesian atrocities along with subsided fears of communism. The following sections will attempt to summarize and analyze the reversal of US and Australian policy from the years of Kissinger to Clinton. To Kissinger, East Timor was just a pawn that could be sacrificed and comparatively insignificant when considered against the benefits of a cordial relationship with Indonesia. The US State Department and Australian Foreign Ministry saw three options for East Timor: independence, colonialism, or integration. In his doctoral thesis, Kissinger states that, for a nation to rely on another nation for goodwill is a confession of impotence, demoralizing, and a sense of weakness in the dependent state. Colonialism required that Portugal continued to spend millions on upkeep and receive little in return. Such was the dependence Kissinger speaks of in his book. Portuguese Minister Santos expressed his desire to relinquish control of his nations territory in Timor, arguing that Portuguese Timor could not be independent because of its poverty and undeveloped economy. Surely independence would require the assistance of other nations to prevent the emergence of a failed state. The only option that remained was integration into Indonesia, which could provide many more resources than Portugal to the Timorese people. If this worked, the United States and Australia would reap the benefits of stability along with little fear of the emergence of a vacuum that communism might fill. Although this conclusion seems reasonable and pragmatic, there are more factors that made the decision more complicated.85 There were major problems with integration, and nations such as Portugal, Australia, and the United States were hesitant to acknowledge that it was the only real
85

US Department of State, Visit By Portuguese Minister Santos Begin, October 21, 1974; Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957): 316.

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option. In order for integration to viable as a politically acceptable solution, the people of Portuguese Timor had to accept Indonesian authority in an internationally recognized legitimate referendum. The prospects for accepting such a referendum did not look bright because the territory had been settled by Portuguese for centuries. Java and East Timor had little or no common historic bond. No Hindu or Islamic empire ever controlled the island of Timor. The most common language in East Timor, Tetun, was not an Indonesian language. Roman Catholicism became an important aspect of East Timorese nationalism because it helped symbolize the resistance to Indonesian domination as Indonesia was composed primarily of Muslims. Such factors demonstrate the differences in the two populations that many officials chose to ignore, despite the fact that Kissinger once stated, No significant conclusions are possible in the study of foreign affairs -the study of states acting as units- without an awareness of historical context. The absorption of East Timor into Indonesia was implausible because both had different historic backgrounds and cultures.86 The United States wanted a mutually beneficial relationship with Indonesia that could limit the influence of communism and act as a supporter of US policy. Indonesia acted as a bulwark against communism and became even more important after the fall of Saigon in April 1975 to North Vietnamese forces. Communists won major victories in Laos and Cambodia which made many in Western and Asian capitals nervous. The communist victories did improve the prospects of independence for East Timor. The fear of the spread of communism influenced legislators in Canberra and Washington, who did not want to chance the possibility of a political vacuum in East Timor that communism
86

Jos Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor, (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1987): 2, 3, 1619; Kissinger, A World Restored, 331.

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might fill. Although these fears were unreasonable and unsubstantiated, policy-makers acted on them, any opposition was too little to overcome the majority that acted on the belief that a communist Timor was a possibility. Kissinger wanted Indonesia to help maintain a favorable balance of power against the communist powers of Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union. He was unwilling to risk offending the strategically important Indonesia for the sake of a nation that only comprised of half an island. The perceived threat of communism and the balance of power between communist states and capitalist nations allied to the United States played an important role in the policy-making process.87 The split between the officials and policy-makers created a schism that eventually divided both Canberra and Washington. The US Stated Department split mainly between the lower levels of consulates, particularly the consulate in Surabaya, and the higher-ups in Washington. The lower-level consulates possessed a much more accurate idea of the situation in East Timor and Jakarta that Kissinger and others either refused to see or dismissed entirely. This information included information of the defensive strength of East Timor, invasion reasoning, politics of the New Order, and various other valuable pieces of information. Lower-level officials researched East Timor thoroughly enough to come up with a prediction that the Indonesian military would have great difficulty there. They listened enough to find that Suharto was not enthusiastic about an invasion of East Timor and that high ranking officials feared an independent East Timor would weaken their power over the Indonesian archipelago. Despite receiving this information, the US State Department made decisions that seem contradictory to this information. Kissinger

87

James Dunn, Email, March 20, 2009; Brad Simpson, Illegally and Beautifully, 282, 305.

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admitted, On the Timor thingthat will leak in three months and it will come out that Kissinger overruled his pristine bureaucrats and violated the law Kissinger ordered that US officials were to cease transmitting intelligence on East Timor, perhaps to have plausible deniability. The refusal to acknowledge information did not lead to better policy decisions; rather it led to many dead Timorese.88 Kissinger justified these actions to himself by recognizing the situation in East Timor as revolutionary, which he defines as the result of the effort to identify the legitimizing principle of the international order with a parochial version of justice.89 Yet the concept of self-determination is hardly parochial, and Indonesia had no legitimate claim over East Timor. Kissinger viewed Indonesia as much more important than East Timor, so supporting Indonesia was more important than a sovereign East Timor, because of its vast resources, huge population, important location, and considerable amount of geography. Kissingers words and actions demonstrated that the priority lay with Indonesia not East Timor. Yet backing Indonesia on this issue was a mistake, because ultimately no nation benefitted from the conflict in East Timor. Indonesia spent vast sums of its treasury on the occupation of East Timor, whereas the East Timorese lost around a quarter of their population fending off the Indonesian aggressors and suffered the destruction of their nation. After the withdrawal of the Indonesian military, the United States, Australia, and much of the international community bore the costs of making East Timor a viable state. Kissinger and the rest of the US State Department may have overestimated the effect of
88

US State Department, Current Developments in Portuguese Timor, December 18, 1974; US State Department, Indonesian Intentions in Portuguese Timor, March 10, 1975; US State Department, Indonesia and Portuguese Timor- Australian View, March 12, 1975; Brad Simpson, Illegally and Beautifully, 300. 89 Brad Simpson, Illegally and Beautifully, 300; Kissinger, A World Restored, 328.

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the sternly objecting to an invasion of East Timor, because Suharto needed the United States to update his military more than he needed to secure East Timor. The National Security Council, which Kissinger belonged to, believed that pressuring Indonesia to stop an invasion of East Timor would have created more damage to the US-Indonesia relationship than it actually would have. According to the former Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby, Indonesia would likely have been at odds with the United States with only a few weeks of diplomatic tension.90 If Indonesia reacted similarly to the way it did upon receiving pressure from the United States to let peacekeepers into East Timor in 1999, it would have not been an overly damaging incident. Therefore, a serious break in diplomatic relations if the United States had acted in East Timors favor was unlikely. If no one benefitted from the conflict in East Timor and the Western nations would not have suffered too much from disagreeing with Indonesia on this issue, then US policy with regard to East Timor from 1975 to 1991 was a complete failure. US and Australian policy makers acted with pragmatism in regard to East Timor, but the policy-makers were nave to believe that integration with Indonesia was feasible and that Suharto could somehow keep the violence hidden from the world indefinitely. They were myopic in that their vision only addressed the demands of select Indonesian officials rather than seeking a broader understanding of the situation. Ultimately, international involvement in East Timor only came about from the moral outcry over the pointless deaths of so many innocent people, the culmination of which took nearly a quarter of a century to manifest itself as a strong force for humanity.

90

Brad Simpson, Illegally and Beautifully, 305.

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