A GAME THEORETIC POWER CONTROL

APPROACH FOR MIMO MC-DS/CDMA

SYSTEMS
V.Nagarajan and P.Dananjayan †
Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering,
Pondicherry Engineering College, Pondicherry -605014, India
nagarajanece31@rediffmail.com,pdananjayan@rediffmail.com †
† Corresponding author

ABSTRACT
A major challenge to enhance the performance of multiuser multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) multi-carrier direct sequence code division multiple
access (MC -DS/ CDMA) system relies on the effective multiple access
interference suppression. In this work a novel distributed non cooperative power
control game with pricing (NPGP) is considered for utilizing the system resource
more efficiently. The ratio of throughput versus power is referred to as the utility
function which should be maximized by combating the multiple access
interference (MAI). Simulation results show that the propounded scheme achieves
significant performance improvement, compared with the conventional system
without NPGP.

Keywords: Game theory, power control, pricing, MIMO, MC-DS/CDMA.

1 INTRODUCTION economic model has been proposed [3]. In [3] game

The enormous growth of wireless services
during the last decade gives rise to the need for a
bandwidth efficient modulation technique that can
reliably transmit high data rates. As multi carrier
technique combine good bandwidth efficiency with
an immunity to channel dispersion, these techniques
have received considerable attention. To able to
support multiple users, the multicarrier transmission
technique can be combined with a CDMA scheme.
In tandem the demand for wireless services increases,
efficient use of resources has gained a significant
importance. Ever increasing need for wireless
systems to provide high data transmission rates need
a system which performs well under severe fading
conditions. Though MIMO MC-DS /CDMA seem to
be an excellent candidate for high data rate
communication, its performance is limited by
multiple access interference (MAI) and near-far
effect. The power control algorithm plays a
significant role in combating this effect. Compared
with single antenna MC-DS /CDMA, MIMO MC-
DS /CDMA exhibits better performance, but it has
the traditional impairment as the single carrier
system [1,2]. Hence the performance of a MIMO
MC-DS /CDMA consequently lies in the area of
interference suppression and power control in multi
user scenario.
Recently, an alternative approach to the power
control problem in wireless systems based on an
theoretic approach is employed to study the power
control in the multi user scenario for the proposed
model. It is a powerful tool in modeling interactions
between self-interested users and predicting their
choice of strategies. Each player in the game
maximizes some function of utility in a distributed
fashion [3, 4]. The game settles at Nash equilibrium
if one exists. Since users act selfishly, the
equilibrium point is not necessarily the best
operating point from a social point of view. To
circumvent this, pricing the system resources appears
to be a powerful tool for achieving a more socially
desirable result [2,3]. In the MC-DS/CDMA, raising
one’s power not only increase their signal-to
interference-and–noise ratio (SINR), but also
increases the interference observed by other users,
thereby declining their SINR, each tend to increase
their own power levels, thereby reaching the Nash
equilibrium. To overcome this situation a distributed
game theoretic power control algorithm to provide
efficient use of the radio resources in CDMA system
has been established [4,5]. The power control
problem in multi-user MIMO CDMA system, using
game theory framework has been proposed in [2,6] is
considered in this work. A new utility functions for
the NPG by using singular value decomposition
(SVD) is proposed to solve the problem. The new
utility functions, which are based on MIMO MC-DS
/CDMA system for wireless data, refer to the
spectral efficiency and power efficiency is
considered. The utility functions also reflect to the convenience. Since each antenna can
quality of service (QoS) that the data users get, accommodates sub carriers, the total throughput
where utility is defined as the ratio of throughput to will be the summation of the throughput of
transmit power. Then Nash equilibrium and the individual carrier. In order to solve the power
performance of the power control games in a single control problem in the MIMO MC –DS/ CDMA
cell MIMO MC- DS/ CDMA system is considered system, a marginal utility function which is
which seems to be an ideal solution to use the system expressed in Eq (3) is established.
resource more efficiently.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 um = T / P
i i i
explains MIMO MC –DS/ CDMA system and the
utility function of the power control game. Section 3 {
min Mt ,Mr N 1 }
( ( ))
L
shows the two NMPCGs for the MIMO MC– log M 1 BER
2 k ,i k ,i
DS/CDMA system. Section 4 discusses the existence k=1 S=1
and uniqueness of the games and the algorithm to =
reach the Nash equilibrium. Simulation results are {
min Mt ,Mr N 1}Pk ,i
(3)
k=1
given and discussed in section 5. Finally, Section 6 S=1
draws the conclusion. The power control utility function is given in Eq
(4)
2 MIMO MC –DS/CDMA SYSTEM AND
UTILITY FUNCTIONS
{
min Mt ,Mr N 1 }
( ( ))
L
The uplink of a single cell N-users MIMO log Mk ,i 1 2BER
2 k ,i
MC- DS/ CDMA system with feedback is k=1 S=1
u =
considered for our analysis. Each user is assumed to
have Mt transmit antennas and the base station is
i {
min Mt ,Mr N 1 }
Pk ,i
k=1
equipped with Mt x Mr antennas. Each antenna is S=1
capable of transmitting 1x Mr Subchannel.
{
min Mt ,Mr N 1 }
( )
subcarriers and processing gain G are considered. In
this system, the user's bit stream is demultiplexed log Mk ,i f
2 k ,i
k=1 N=1 (4)
among several transmitting antennas, each of which =
transmits an independently modulated signal, {
min Mt ,Mr N 1
Pk ,i
}
simultaneously and in the same frequency band. The k=1
base station receives these signal components by an S=1
antenna array whose sensor outputs are processed
such that the original data stream can be recovered. where, f( k,i) =(1-2BER(( k,i))L is called efficiency
Assume that the channel state information (CSI) is function. The frame successive rate (FSR) is
perfectly known to receiver, and the transmitter can approximated by, f( ,i), which closely follows the
get the CSI through feedback. Assume H, which is behaviour of the probability of correct reception
the channel matrix of user i can be decomposed while producing FSR equals zero at Pi =0.
using SVD is given in Eq. (1).
The pricing mechanism was introduced into
{
m in M t ,M r } the CDMA non-cooperative power control game
H i =U i iV i = U i ( k ) i ( k )V i ( k ) (1) [4]. By using the pricing mechanism, the power
k =1 control game was more efficient. A new utility
where U i( k ) and Vi( k )are M r×I and function with pricing in MIMO MC- DS/ CDMA
M t×I unitary vectors, respectively, power control game is developed. It is expressed in
Eq. (5)
and i ( k ) are the singular values of Hi. The per-
user attainable normalized throughput, in bit per
{
min Mt ,Mr N 1 }
second Hertz, of MIMO MC- DS /CDMA system
is the sum of the normalized throughputs of the c k =1 S =1
log Mk ,i f
2 ( k ,i )
min (Mt, Mr) decoupled sub channels. Then the u = tP
i Pi i
normalized throughput of ith user is given in Eq (2).
{
min Mt ,Mr } { }
min Mt ,Mr N 1
( ( ))
L
T = Tk ,i = log Mk ,i 1 BER ,i
(2) (5)
i k=1 k=1 S=1
2 k
{
min Mt ,Mr N 1
Pi = k =1 Pk ,i
}
where k,i is to represent the SINR of ith user in kth S =1
where Pi is the total transmitting power of the ith
sub channel, which is using sth sub carrier for
user, and t is a positive scalar. This proposed utility no user may gain by unilaterally deviating Nash
function, which gives attention to both spectral equilibrium. Hence, Nash equilibrium is a stable
efficiency and power efficiency, are based on operating point because no user has any incentive
MlMO MC- DS/ CDMA system. to change strategy [3]. The Nash equilibrium of
. proposed NMCPGs are given in sec 4.1 and 4.2.
3. NON COOPERATIVE MIMO POWER
CONTROL GAME 4.1. The NMCPG, GI, G2 are supermodular games
with appropriate strategy space Ai = P i , Pi
Let G = N ,{ Ai},{Ui (.)} denote the non respectively [8,9].
cooperative MlMO power control game (NMCPG)
where N = {l, 2... N} is the index set for the mobile Consider the game G1 first.
users currently in the cell. The ith user select a total
transmit power strategy Pi, such that Pi Ai where
Ai, denotes the strategy space of ith user. Let the
uli 1 min Mt,Mr N 1{ } f k,i ( )
vector P =( P1,........, PN ) denote the outcome of the = log2Mk,i k,i f k,i ( ) ( )
game in terms of the selected power levels of all Pi P2
i k=1 S=1 k,i ( ) (8)
users, and P-i, denotes the vector consisting of
elements of P other than the ith element. The
strategy space of all the users excluding the ith user
is denoted A-i. According to the analysis, two
NMCPGs are established. These games have the 2u min Mt,Mr
N=1 { } 2f
( k,i )
( k,i )
li 1 k,i
= 2 log2 Mk,i
same player space and strategy space, but different
utility functions
Pi Pj P
i k =1 S=1 ( ) 2
k,i
Pj
(9)
The game G1 is given by,
f ( k ,i )
2 2
If 0 , it can be concluded that
u li
for
{ }
min Mt ,Mr N 1 ( 2 k ,i ) Pi P j

k=1 S=1
log M f
2 k ,i k ,i ( ) all jKi. Assume there exists a P-i such that 0<P-i < Pi
G1 = max U1i( Pi ,P i ) =
Pi Ai Pi which is derived form
2f
( k ,i ) , it can guarantee
( )
0
2
(6) k ,i
2u
li
0
for all jKi.So, it can be concluded that with
Pi P j

The game G2 is given by, the strategy space Ai = P i , Pi where P-i is derived

{ }
min Mt ,Mr N 1
log2 Mk ,i f
k=1 S=1
G2 = max U2i( Pi ,P i ) =
Pi Ai Pi
for all i N
In outdoor, macro cell with the typical
parameters of outdoor channel, the maximum
singular value i ( k ) and U i ( k ) , V i ( k ) can
successfully approximate Hi . In the NMCPGs,
that each user is assumed rational and selfish.
Users always maximize their own utilities by
selecting the best transmit power strategy, which
depends on the transmit power strategies of all the
other users in the system. In the games, a set of
powers can be found where the users are satisfied.
4. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Nash equilibrium is the most widely used
solution in NPG [4]. It is an action profile in which
from
2f
( k ,i ) , the game G1 is supermodular.
( )
0
2
k ,i
k ,i The following theorems, proven in [9, 10],
tPi
(7) guarantees the existence and the uniqueness of a
nash equilibrium of supermodular game, and give
the algorithm that can converge to the equilibrium.
4.2. The set of Nash equilibrium of a supermodular
game is nonempty.
The best response is
BR ( P i ) ={ pi Ai :ui ( pi , P i ) ui ( p 'i , P i ) ! P ' Ai (10)
Assume that for all i=1, 2,…N, Ai are compact,
convex, lower semi continuous in its argument, and
hold scalability property. Further assume that for
each i=1,2,…..N, BR(P-i)>0 for all Pj Aj, j " i.
Then the Nash equilibrium is unique and general
updating algorithm converges monotonically to an
equilibrium whose convergence holds for any initial
policy in the strategy space. It can be concluded that
each of our NMCPGs has unique Nash equilibrium
point and then the asynchronous power control
algorithm, we considered in this work, converges to
a unique Nash equilibrium point. In this algorithm
users update their transmission powers in the same for k =1 to K.
manner as in [2].Assume user i updates its
{
transmission power at time instances in the set Ti
={ti1 ti2 …..}, with tik< tik+1 and ti0 for all i € N. Let for S =1 to N-1(IFFT size)
T={t1,T2,…} where T=T1 # T2 # …… # TN with {
tk<tk+1. The NMCPG generates a sequence of power eff. function of k th subchannel of
vector following the iterative procedure as follows. user1 =(1-BER ( k,i))L/** L=frame size. }
The power vector P(0)=P is set at time t=0. For all
i N. Calculating ri ( tk ) = argmax p p ui ( pi, p t (tk t ) ) . Given end for
i
}
that pi(tk)=min(ri(tk),pmax).If p(tk) equivalent to p(tk-
1),the iterative procedure ends and Nash equilibrium end for
power vector is divided to be p(tk).If it is not the calculate throughput of user ‘i’at transmit_
case the iterative procedure is repeated the power ‘t’.
predetermined number of times until p(tk)=p(tk-1).
calculate utility of user ‘i’ without pricing at
transmit_ power ‘t’.
4.3. Proposed game theoretic power control
if utility1(t)=utility max ‘t’.
algorithm for MC- DS/CDMA
{
Assuming ‘N’ users in a single cell, the SINR power for ith user power(i)= t.
is estimated for all the ‘N’ users participating in power for ith user utility(i) = utility(t).
the game. Suppose if a particular user increases the }
power level beyond the required threshold, then
end if
access to that particular user will be denied so as to
keep the interference level well within control. }
This procedure is followed for all the users end for
whoever tend to increase the power level thereby Power_subchannel =Power(1/K) .
contributing to the MAI.This scheme is called
power_ iteration =Power(iteration-1).
pricing whereby allowing all the users. Simulation
results have shown that by employing this pricing }
scheme, the overall utility of a particular user end while.
achieves significant performance amelioration, by Results: Power without pricing (power), Utility
mitigating the MAI.
without pricing (Utility)

Iterative algorithm 1:
Iterative algorithm 2:

Initiliation ()
Initiliation ()
Distance d; Mr -Transmitting antenna;Mt-
Distance d; Mr -Transmitting antenna; Mt -
Receiving antenna; S-IFFT size;
Receiving antenna; S-IFFT size;
Generate Channel Matrix H;
Generate Channel Matrix H;
iteration
iteration
while(Power " Power iteration) /**Initially
while(Power " Power iteration) /**Initially Power
Power iteration is a random matrix.
iteration is a random matrix.
iteration =iteration+1.
iteration =iteration+1.
for k =1 to K. /**k=min (Mr Mt)
for k =1 to K. /**k=min(Mr Mt)
{
{
for txt power(t)= Min_power to Max_power
for txt power(t)= Min_power to Max_power
{
{
Power_subchannel =Power/K /**k=min (Mr Mt)
Power_subchannel =Power/K /**k=min(Mr Mt)
for k =1 to K.
for k =1 to K.
{
{
Calculate SNR of Kth subchannel of user i( k,i ).
Calculate SNR of Kth subchannel of user i( k,i ).
}
}
end for
 end for scatter components and is a zero-mean unit-
variance complex Gaussian random variable [11].
for k =1 to K.
The following parameters are considered for
{ simulation.
for s=1 to N-1(IFFT size)
eff. function of k th subchannel of Table 1 Simulation Parameter
user1 =(1-BER ( k,i))L/** L=frame size.
Parameters value
}
Distance in meter 260,330,450,
end for (d) 560,660,800,
} 900, 950, 1000
end for Block size(L) 80 bits
calculate throughput of user ‘i’at transmit_ power Maximum total 2watts for each
transmit power user
‘t’.
constraint Pi
calculate utility of user ‘i’ without pricing at
Path loss exponent T 3.6
transmit_ power ‘t’. Median of the mean 0.097
if utility1(t)=utility max ‘t’. path gain c
{ AWGN power at 5 × 10-5(watts)
power for ith user power(i) = t. receiver U2
Spread gain G 100
power for ith user utility(i) = utility(t).
Users 9
} IFFT size 512
end if
}
end for
Power_subchannel =Power(1/K) .
power_ iteration =Power(iteration-1).
}
end while.
Results: Power with pricing (power), Utility with
pricing (Utility)

5. NUMERICAL RESULTS

Consider a single cell wireless data MIMO MC–

DS/CDMA system with stationary multi-user,
fixed frame size, no forward error correction, with
Mt=Mr=2 and Mt=Mr=4 The channel matrix of
the MlMO system is given by
H i=
(i )
hm n ;1 m M r ,1 n M t
where hmn is the complex signal path gain from
transmitter n to receiver m. This gain is modeled
by
(i)
h m n = c / d i$ s Z m n
where di, is the base-mobile distance in
kilometer of ith user is the path loss exponent, c is
the median of the mean path gain at a reference
distance d = 1 km, s is a log-normal shadow fading
variable, where 10log(s) is a zero-mean Gaussian
random variable with standard deviation % and
Zmn represents the phasor sum of the multi path
Fig.1.Performance of MIMO MC-DS/CDMA with
and without Pricing Distance vs. equilibrium power
(11)
Fig.1 and Fig.2 elucidates the equilibrium utility
for a function of distance between a user and the
base station. It is discerned that, as the number of
antennas increases, the equilibrium utility for a
particular user at some distance away from the base
(12) station decreases. By introducing the concept of
pricing, the equilibrium utility increases. Thus the
equilibrium utility without pricing, for a user with
two antennas is lesser than that with pricing. With
pricing, a user with four antennas has higher utility,
when compared to the user with two antennas. Thus
users with four antennas have more utility than that
of a user with two antennas.
 the overall system to keep the interference level as
low as possible to achieve better overall performance.
Here, in MIMO the number of transmitting and
receiving antenna is assumed to be two and four. For
a particular user at some distance away from the base
station, the equilibrium power increases. By
introducing the concept of pricing, the equilibrium
power decreases. Thus the equilibrium power with
pricing, for four antennas is lower than that without
pricing and it is also comparatively lower with the
equilibrium power of the user with two antennas.
Comparison of Distance Vs equilibrium utilities
performance and Distance Vs equilibrium power
performance of MC-DS/CDMA system is given in
table 1 and table 2.

Fig.2.Performance of MIMO MC-DS/CDMA

with and without Pricing Distance vs.
equilibrium power

Fig.4. Performance of MIMO MC-DS/CDMA

with and without Pricing Distance vs.
equilibrium Utility

Table 1 Comparison of Distance Vs equilibrium

utilities performance of MC-DS/CDMA system.

Number of Distance Without With

antenna in meter pricing pricing
(bits/s/ (bits/s/
Fig.3.Performance of MIMO MC-DS/CDMA Hz/W) Hz/W)
with and without Pricing Distance vs. 260 105.2 106
equilibrium Utility TX=2 and
RX=2 330 105 105.7
Fig.3 and Fig.4 elucidates the performance of MIMO 450 104.2 105
MC-DS/CDMA with and without pricing to the
overall utilization. It can be discerned that utilization 260 106.2 107.4
of power with pricing is less compared to the scheme TX=4 and
without pricing. This represents the performance Rx=4 330 106 107
bound for power allocation in a MC-DS/CDMA 450 105.4 106.4
system which is mainly controlled by the pricing
scheme with the aid of Nash equilibrium. Thus the
performance bound derived can be generally used for Iterations: 1,000
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