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Case No. 11-56164 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

) ) Plaintiffs/Appellees, ) ) v. ) ) ) Orly Taitz, Defend Our Freedoms ) Foundations, Inc., et al., ) ) Defendants/Appellants. ) ) ) _________________________________ )

Lisa Liberi, et al.,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Civil Action No.: 8:11-CV-00485-AG (AJWx)

OPENING BRIEF BY APPELLANT, DEFEND OUR FREEDOMS FOUNDATION

Dr. Orly Taitz, , esq 29839 Santa Margarita ste 100 Rancho Santa Margarita CA 92688 949-683-5411 Fax 949-766-7687 Orly.taitz@gmail.com Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION

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NO.

PAGE

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Statement of Jurisdiction ........................................................................................................................................ 4 Issues Presented ........................................................................................................................................................... 5 Statement of the Case/Procedural History .................................................................................................... 6 A. Parties Background and Related Litigation ................................................. 6 1. 2. B. Summary of Orly Taitzs and Philip J. Bergs Activities .... 6 Lisa Liberis and Lisa M. Ostellas Background and Relationships to Philip J. Berg ................................................................ 8 Plaintiffs Complaint, Appellants anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike and Denial of Such Motion........................................................................ 9 Statement of Facts ................................................................................................................................................... 10 A. Summary of Appellants Alleged Acts in Furtherance of their Rights of Petition and Free Speech in Connection with Public Issues................................................................................................................... 10 Summary of Argument ......................................................................................................................................... 12 I. Standard of Review................................................................................................................... 13 A.

De Novo Standard of Review Regarding Denial of an

anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike Under California Code of

Civil Procedure Section 425.16 .......................................................................... 13

B. Legal Standards Applicable to an anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike Under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 .............................................................................................................. 13

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II.

The District Court, as a Matter of Law, Erred in Concluding that Appellants Did Not Meet Their Burden of Proof Under Section 425.16(b)(1) to Show That Plaintiffs Complaint Arises Out of Appellants Acts in Furtherance of Their Rights of Petition Or Free Speech in Connection with a Public Issue ................................................ 16 A. Appellants Met Their Burden Under Section 425.16(b)(1) Where Plaintiffs Complaint Clearly Arises Out of Appellants Alleged Acts in Furtherance of Their Rights Of Petition and Free Speech in Connection with Public Issues .................................................................................................................................. 16 1. Applicable Legal Standards Under Section 425.16(e)............ 16 a. b. 2. Appellants Right of Petition ................................................ 17 Appellants Right of Free Speech ...................................... 18

Appellants Alleged Acts in Furtherance of Their Rights of Petition and Free Speech in Connection With Public Issues ....................................................................................... 20 a. Appellants Allegedly Made Written or Oral Statement[s] or Writing[s] Made Before a Legislative, Executive, or Judicial Proceeding, Or Any Other Official Proceeding Authorized By Law.... as Required by Section 425.16(e)(1) ...................................................................................... 20 b. Appellants Allegedly Made Written or Oral Statement[s] or Writing[s] Made in Connection With an Issue Under Consideration or Review

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by a Legislative, Executive, or Judicial Body, or any other Official Proceeding Authorized by Law.... as Required by Section 425.16(e)(2) ...................................................................................... 22 c. Appellants Allegedly Made Written or Oral Statement[s] or Writing[s] Made in a Place Open to the Public or a Public Forum in Connection with an Issue of Public Interest... as Required by Section 425.16(e)(3) ................................. 23 . Appellants Allegedly Engaged in Any Other

Conduct in Furtherance of the Exercise of Constitutional Right of Petition or the Constitutional Right of Free Speech in Connection with a Public Issue or an Issue of Public Interest as Required by Section 425.16(e)(4) ...................................................................................... 27 III. The District Court, as a Matter of Law, Erred In Concluding that Plaintiffs Met Their Burden of Proof Under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16(b)(1) to Demonstrate the Probability of Prevailing as Against Appellants ...................................................... 28 A. As a Matter of Law, Plaintiffs Did Not Meet Their Burden Under Section 425.16(b)(1) to Demonstrate the Legal Sufficiency of Their Complaint Where They Made a Judicial Admission That The Complaint was Legally Insufficient ...................................................................................................................... 28

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1.

Plaintiffs Admitted that Their Complaint Was Legally Insufficient and, Thus, as a Matter of Law, Did Not Meet Their Burden Under Section 425.16(b)(1)..................................................................................................... 28 Plaintiffs Failed to Meet Their Burden to Demonstrate that Their Complaint and Each of its Claims were Legally Sufficient Under Section 425.16(b)(1)..................................................................................................... 30 a. Plaintiffs Count One, for Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment [sic] of the United States Constituion [sic], is Legally Insufficient ........................................................................................ 30 b. c. d. Plaintiffs Count Two, For Defamation Per

2.

Se, Slander and Libel, is Legally Insufficient ........... 31

Plaintiffs Count Three, for False-Light Invasion of Privacy, is Legally Insufficient ............... 32 Plaintiffs Count Four, for Harrassment, is Legally Insufficient as well as Not Being a Legally-cognizable Claim ........................................................ 32 e. Plaintiffs Count Five, for False Designations and Descriptions of Facts, is Legally Insufficient ................................................................. 33 f. Plaintiffs Count Six, for Injunctive Relief, is Legally Insufficient and is Not a Separate Claim for Relief ............................................................................. 34 B. Plaintiffs Did Not Meet Their Burden of Proof Under Section 425.16(b)(1) to Present Competent and Admissible

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Evidence Sufficient to Sustain a Judgment in Their Favor on the Complaint ......................................................................................................... 35 IV. PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE PROBABILITY OF

PREVAILING, AS THERE WAS NEVER ANY JURISDICTION IN THE FEDERAL COURT.......................................................................................... 37

Federal Cases

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

American Title Ins. Co. v. Lovelaw Corp. (9th Cir. 1988) Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003)

861 F.2d 224, 226 ........................................................................................................................... 29, 32, 33, 35 333 F.3d 1018, 1026.................................................................................................................................................. 4

California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (1972)

404 U.S. 508, 510 .................................................................................................................................................... 18

Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave. (1st Cir. 2002) Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd (2nd Cir. 1971) Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974)

284 F.3d 302 ............................................................................................................................................................... 34 442 F.2d 686 ............................................................................................................................................................... 34 304 U.S. 64, 78................................................................................................................................. 31, 32, 33, 35 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 ............................................................................................................................................. 19

Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar (9th Cir. 2010) N.A.A.C.P. v. Button (1963)

611 F.3d 590, 595 ....................................................................................................................................................... 4 371 U.S. 415, 445 .................................................................................................................................................... 19

Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co. (3rd Cir. 1958) Rendell-Baker v. Kohn (1982)

255 F.2d 641 ............................................................................................................................................................... 34 457 U.S. 830, 837 .............................................................................................................................................. 9, 30

Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1995)

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64 F.3d 1323, 1328 ................................................................................................................................................. 36

Shelley v. Kraemer (1948)

334 U.S. 1, 13 ...................................................................................................................................................... 9, 30

Troy Group, Inc. v. Tilson (2005)

364 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1153 .................................................................................................................................. 24

United States v. Gilbert (9th Cir. 1995)

State Cases

57 F.3d 709, 711 ....................................................................................................................................................... 36

Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005)

41 Cal.4th 1232, 1250-51 .................................................................................................................................... 18 128 Cal.App.4th 1569............................................................................................................................................ 24

Annette F. v. Sharon S. (2004)

119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1160...................................................................................................................... 16, 24

Averill v. Superior Court (1996)

42 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1175 ................................................................................................................................ 17

Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997)

52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1043 ............................................................................................................... 14, 15, 16

Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002)

19 Cal.4th 1106, 1113, 1115, 1117-18 ....................................................................................... 17, 21, 23 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 651 ...................................................................................................................................... 25 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 ...................................................................................................................................................... 14

City of South Pasadena v. Department of Transportation (1994) ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001)

29 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1293 ................................................................................................................................ 34 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1004 ................................................................................................................................... 15

Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000)

85 Cal.App.4th 468, 472 ..................................................................................................................... 14, 24, 26

Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002)

29 Cal.4th 53............................................................................................................................................................... 25

Kibler v. N. Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. (2006)

39 Cal.4th 192, 196-98 .................................................................................................................................21, 23

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Martinez v. Metabolife Internat, Inc. (2003) Matson v. Dvorak (1995)

113 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 ................................................................................................................................... 15 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548 ..................................................... 3, 14, 15, 26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37

McCoy v. Hearst Corp. (1986)

42 Cal.3d 835, 859 .......................................................................................................................................... 18, 19

Meister v. Regents of University of California (1998)

67 Cal.App.4th 437, 446 ...................................................................................................................................... 31 M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 623, 629 ...................................................................................................................................... 26

Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter Hampton LLP (2005) Rivero v. AFL-CIO (2003)

133 Cal.App.4th 658, 672 ................................................................................................................................... 15 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 923-24 ............................................................................................................................ 25

Rosenaur v. Scherer (2001)

88 Cal.App.4th 260, 274 ........................................................................... 12, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37

Seeling v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002)

97 Cal.App.4th 798, 807 ...................................................................................................................................... 17

Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress (1999) Taus v. Loftus (2007)

71 Cal.App.4th 226, 236-37.............................................................................................................. 21, 23, 25 40 Cal.4th 683, 713-14 .................................................................................................................................28, 29

Thomas v. Quintero (2005)

125 Cal.App.4th 624-25, 635 .................................................................................................................... 13, 28

Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist. (2003)
Federal Statutes

106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1232-33 ..................................................................................................... 14, 27, 28

28 U.S.C. 1332 ........................................................................................................................................................... 4 Federal Rule of Evidence 103 .......................................................................................................................... 36

State Statutes

Code of Civil Procedure 425.16........................................................................................... 12, 15, 19, 37 Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(a)..................................................................................... 13, 14, 17, 37 Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(b) .....................................................................................................13, 14 Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(b)(1)
........................................................................................... 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 15, 16, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36

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Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(e)............................. 5, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27 Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(e)(1) .................................................................................5, 20, 21, 22 Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(e)(2) ......................................................................................... 5, 22, 23 Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(e)(3) ........................................................................ 5, 24, 25, 26, 27 Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(e)(4) ................................................................................................. 5, 27 Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(j).................................................................................................................. 4 Code of Civil Procedure 527.6 ...................................................................................................................... 33 Code of Civil Procedure 904.1 ......................................................................................................................... 4 Civil Code 1798...................................................................................................................................................... 30 Civil Code 1798.3(a) ........................................................................................................................................... 31 Civil Code 1798.45 ............................................................................................................................................... 31

Introduction This case arises out of an ongoing dispute involving the political dissident movement, including a component known as the Birther Movement, by those challenging the qualifications of Barack Obama to hold the office of President of the United States of America. Defendant and Appellant, ORLY TAITZ (Taitz), is a political dissent leader who, individually and through Defendant and Appellant, DEFEND OUR FREEDOMS FOUNDATIONS, INC. (DOFF) (collectively Appellants), has been and remains the leader of this movement. Litigation is one of this movements tools to advance its goals, including several cases involving Birther causes. [See, concurrently-filed Request for Judicial Notice (RJN).] Such litigation is a form of petition for redress of grievances under the United States Constitution, Article I. Plaintiffs acknowledge Appellants exercise of their right of petition regarding Taitz filing complaints... on behalf of Alan Keyes and other Plaintiffs against the California Secretary of State and other Defendants regarding the Barry Soetoro a/k/a Barack H. Obama citizenship issues. [Volume 1, Excerpts of Record (ER), 258.] Plaintiff and Appellee, PHILIP J. BERG (Berg), is also involved in the political dissident movement. For example, Berg has filed a case challenging President Obamas qualifications to be President, and claims to carry the mantle of the Birther Movement through www.obamacrimes.com. [1 ER, 297; RJN, Exhibit 3.]

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Berg, assisted by Plaintiffs and Appellees, LISA LIBERI (Liberi) and LISA M. OSTELLA (Ostella), have interfered with Appellants websites and internet blogs, created misleading and competing websites such as defendourfreedoms.net, and diverted donations from DOFF to entities controlled

by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have interfered with Appellants political fundraising activities, crucial to fund litigation and other activities in support of this movement. To combat Plaintiffs wrongful acts, Appellants have exposed their wrongful tactics to the movements followers including to reveal that Liberi is a convicted felon who cannot be allowed to control donations intended to advance the goals of the movement. The terms of Liberis parole forbid her from having any involvement with such fundraising. Appellants have informed government authorities of Plaintiffs actions and sought redress for same, including from the United States Supreme Court, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and California Attorney General. Appellants have sought revocation of Liberis parole through the San Bernardino County, California District Attorney. At all times, Appellants have acted as necessary whistleblowers against Plaintiffs wrongful acts which include diversion of political donations, have sought redress of their grievances from the federal and California governments, and have exposed Plaintiffs corruption of such movement. What Plaintiffs mischaracterize as defamation is in fact Appellants exercise of their constitutional rights of petition and free speech on issues of great public interest, including as to leadership of the Birther Movement challenging the qualifications of President Obama to hold the highest office in the United States. Appellants have acted squarely within the protections of Californias anti-SLAPP statute in pursuing acts in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.... California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(b)(1). (Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references herein are to the California Code of Civil

Procedure.) The essence of Appellants alleged actions involve the right to speak on political matters,
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regarded under the anti-SLAPP statute as the quintessential subject of our constitutional protections of the right of free speech. Matson v. Dvorak, 40 Cal.App.4th 539, 548 (1995). Plaintiffs have but one purpose - to silence Appellants whistleblowing in furtherance of the political dissident movement by chilling Appellants exercise of their constitutional rights of petition and free speech. Appellants in their anti-SLAPP motion clearly demonstrated that their alleged acts arose from petitioning and free speech protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiffs improper motives herein include to prevent Liberis criminal record from becoming known to this movements followers, which would in turn deter followers from donating to Berg and his website, as well as to prevent revocation of Liberis probation. Plaintiffs frivolous case is intended to drain, and has drained, Appellants financially and emotionally, thus accomplishing Plaintiffs goal to diminish Appellants standing and influence in this political movement. Plaintiffs action has resulted in the evils which the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to prevent. Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on their Complaint against Appellants as required by 425.16(b)(1). Notably, Plaintiffs admitted that their Complaint was legally insufficient and, thus, that they could not satisfy the first prong of their burden. Plaintiffs also failed to support their (admittedly insufficient) claims with competent and admissible evidence, thus failing to satisfy the second prong of their burden. As demonstrated herein, no legal or factual basis supports the District Courts denial of Appellants anti-SLAPP motion. The order denying such motion should therefore be reversed.

Statement of Jurisdiction On May 4, 2009, Plaintiffs and Appellees, Berg, Liberi, Ostella, THE LAW OFFICES OF PHILIP J. BERG, and GO EXCEL GLOBAL (collectively Plaintiffs), commenced this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Civil Action No. 09-1898; Hon. Eduardo C. Robreno, Judge). Jurisdiction herein is predicated upon diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. 1332. [1 ER, 255.]
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On June 3, 2010, the District Court in Pennsylvania severed the action and transferred the claims to each Defendants home jurisdiction, with a portion of the action being transferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of California (Civil Action No. No. 8:11-CV-00485-AG (AJWx); Hon. Andrew J. Guilford, Judge ). [1 ER, 4.] On June 14, 2011, the District Court denied Appellants joint anti-SLAPP motion to strike the Complaint. [1 ER, 4-9.] On June 27, 2011, DOFF filed its Notice of Appeal from the subject order. [1 ER, 3.] On July 13, 2011, Taitz filed her Notice of Appeal from the order. [1 ER, 1-2.] Denial of an anti-SLAPP motion under California law is an appealable final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003). Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v.

Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 2010). In California state courts, denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is
immediately appealable. California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16(j) and 904.1.

Issues Presented The issues presented herein are: 1. Whether Appellants made a threshold showing that their alleged acts arose from protected activity, specifically any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.... under 425.16(b)(1). Relatedly, by application of the definition of "act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue" of 425.16(e), the issues presented include:
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a. 425.16(e)(1). b.

Whether Appellants made any written or oral statement or writing made before a

legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.... Section Whether Appellants made any written or oral statement or writing made in

connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.... Section 425.16(e)(2). c. d. Whether Appellants made any written or oral statement or writing made in a place Whether Appellants engaged in any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.... Section 425.16(e)(3); or the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. Section 425.16(e)(4). 2. Whether Plaintiffs met their burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on their

Complaint as against Appellants as required by 425.16(b)(1), by demonstrating the legal sufficiency of the Complaint and establishing facts via competent and admissible evidence to sustain a favorable judgment. Statement of the Case/Procedural History A. Parties background and related litigation 1. Memorandum: Summary of Orly Taitzs and Philip J. Bergs activities

Judge Robreno succinctly summarized Plaintiffs and Appellants history in his December 23, 2010 In sum, Plaintiffs and Defendants are part of the birther movement, which is comprised of individuals who believe that President Obama is ineligible to be President of the United States because he was born in Kenya. At one time, Plaintiffs and Defendants worked together to attempt to prove President Obamas illegitimacy but infighting among them led to this lawsuit. [1 ER, 238.]

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Judge Robreno correctly noted: Some of these parties have a long and complicated litigation history. See e.g., Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234 (3d Cir. 2009)... This litigation appears to be part of this overall dispute among the parties. [1 ER, 238, fn. 1.] Plaintiffs wish to silence Appellants whistleblowing activities toward advancement of this movement, including as to Plaintiffs diversion of donations from the movements followers, by chilling Appellants exercise of their rights of petition and free speech. A brief history of the parties involvement is necessary to understand their relationships, and reveals Plaintiffs improper motives driving this case. Taitz has been and remains the leader of this movement, both individually and through various websites and blogs, including through DOFF and its former website. Taitzs primary website is www.orlytaitzesq.com. (RFN, Exhibit 1.) It is the Worlds Leading Obama Eligibility Challenge Web Site. Donations from followers of this movement are necessary to fund its petition and free speech activities, including litigation advancing the causes championed by Appellants. Taitz has been featured globally in thousands of television, radio and newspaper interviews and documentaries. Plaintiffs scheme forced Taitz to abandon DOFFs original website, which included their creation of misleading websites such as defendourfreedoms.net designed to confuse the movements followers and siphon-off donations that otherwise would be received by DOFF. (This topic, including Taitzs alleged statements to defend her rights to express her political views through DOFF, is a subject of Plaintiffs Complaint discussed below.) Appellants subject website lists numerous cases brought by Taitz advancing the political dissident movement. One example is Keyes, et al. v. Barack H. Obama, et al., U.S.D.C., Central District of California Case No. SA-CV-00082 (RFN, Exhibit 2.) Taitz represents all Plaintiffs in such case, including former Presidential candidate Alan Keyes. Appeal in such case is pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Berzon, Fisher and Pregerson). Berg purports to occupy a leadership position in this movement. For example, he maintains
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www.obamacrimes.com. (RFN, Exhibit 3.) Berg touts himself as the first Attorney who filed suit against Barack H. Obama on August 21, 2008 challenging Obamas lack of Constitutionally Eligibility to serve as President of the United States.... (RFN, Exhibit 3.) Berg solicits donations to offset the cost of the cases concerning the eligibility of B.H. Soetoro/Obama.... (RFN, Exhibit 3.)

Like Taitz, Berg has pursued this movements agenda via litigation. For example, Berg has filed cases challenging President Obamas eligibility. (See, Berg v. Obama, U.S.D.C., District of Columbia Case No. 1:08cv-01933; RFN, Exhibit 4.) 2. Lisa Liberis and Lisa M. Ostellas background and relationships to Philip J. Berg Liberi is a convicted felon working with Berg as a paralegal and in connection with his activities in the political dissident movement. Appellants submitted with their motion documents evidencing Liberis criminal record, including convictions for grand theft, forgery, and forgery of an official seal under Californias Penal Code. At least twenty-three criminal charges were brought against Liberi for multiple felonies. [1 ER, 191204.] Liberi was sentenced to thirty-six months supervised probation on various terms, including the following: Not maintain a checking account or complete or endorse any checks unless made payable to you and not have any blank checks in your possession without permission of the probation officer... Neither possess nor use any credit card without permission of the probation officer... The Defendant is not to file any lawsuit/legal action without prior contact with probation officer.... [1 ER, 196-197.]

One of Plaintiffs improper purposes herein was to silence Appellants whistleblowing to the political dissident movement about Liberis criminal record, her terms of probation, and violation of such terms in connection with her involvement in diverting donations away from Appellants and fundraising activities for Berg. Plaintiffs were fearful that if such information became publicly known it would make
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donations to Berg impossible, as no rationale follower of this movement would place money in the hands of a convicted felon such as Liberi. Liberis personal improper motivation herein was to prevent revocation of her probation, which would result in her serving an eight year prison sentence, as a result of Appellants whistleblowing and cooperation with officials toward revocation of such probation. Ostella formerly worked as a webmaster for Taitz in connection with DOFFs former website. Ostella is responsible for interfering with Appellants websites and internet blogs, creating misleading websites and diverting donations from DOFF to entities controlled by Plaintiffs. [1 ER, 259.] B. Plaintiffs Complaint, Appellants anti-SLAPP motion to strike and denial of such motion Plaintiffs filed their 81-page Complaint on May 4, 2009. [1 ER, 252-335 .] Although it is largely incomprehensible, the gravamen of the Complaint appears to be defamation and invasion of privacy. The Complaint is not a required short and plain statement of Plaintiffs claims in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). It is blatantly improper in substance and format, containing numerous instances of evidence (e.g., emails and photographs) being pasted into the pleading, and which are replete with frequent profanity and Plaintiffs irrelevant editorial commentary. Plaintiffs admitted that their Complaint was legally insufficient. [1 ER, 125: 5-8.] Representative of Plaintiffs improper claims is the Complaints Count One for Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [1 ER, 311-316.] As a matter of hornbook law, neither the First nor Fourteenth Amendment apply to private conduct. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982).

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).

On April 25, 2011, Appellants filed their anti-SLAPP motion. [1 ER, 155-188.] On May 5, 2011, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to said motion. [1 ER, 117-141.] On May 27, 2011, Appellants filed their reply
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memorandum with supporting documents, including memoranda of evidentiary objections to the declarations of Berg and Liberi. [1 ER, 32-106.] On June 13, 2011, the Court conducted a hearing on the motion. [1 ER, 10-24.] On June 14, 2011, the Court issued its order denying the motion. [1 ER, 4-9.] DOFF filed its Notice of Appeal on June 27, 2011. [1 ER, 3.] On July 13, 2011, Taitz filed her Notice of Appeal from the order. [1 ER, 12.] Statement of Facts A. Summary of Appellants alleged acts in furtherance of their rights of petition and free speech in connection with public issues Plaintiffs Complaint contains numerous instances of Appellants alleged acts in furtherance of their rights of petition and free speech in connection with public issues. A sampling of such allegations includes the following: Appellants allegedly published reports on the internet of Plaintiffs interference with Appellants websites and internet blogs, creation of misleading websites and diversion of donations from DOFF to entities controlled by Plaintiffs. Ostella used DOFFs website to criticize Taitz and promote Berg to the political dissident movement. Plaintiffs allege that Ostella changed the PayPal script in the donations button to reflect her own account and removed Taitzs accounts from the site. [1 ER, 264.] It was in the publics interest, particularly the many adherents of this movement including its Birther component, to know of Plaintiffs usurpation of Appellants website including their scheme to divert donations from Appellants and to Plaintiffs. [1 ER, 259-277.] Per Plaintiffs, Taitz wrote to the U.S. Supreme Court Justices seeking help in an investigation

regarding a criminal complaint she had filed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding hacking into her websites and tampering of her PayPal accounts... Taitz sent this same letter to the Secret Service and other Governmental Law Enforcement Agencies. [1 ER, 262.]
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Appellants allegedly published the criminal record of Liberi. [1 ER, 268.] Liberi has an

extensive criminal record, including convictions for grand theft, passing checks on insufficient funds, forging instruments for filing with government agencies, and forging an official seal. Liberi has been charged with numerous other crimes. [1 ER, 272-280.] Appellants allegedly informed Berg (believing at the time he was unaware of Liberis criminal history) of same, including that Liberis husband was on parole and had set up two accounts accepting credit card donations for Bergs foundation. It was in the publics interest to know of Liberis criminal record, particularly to protect donors against Plaintiffs possible theft of such donations, including potentially toward payment of Liberis obligation for criminal restitution. Appellants allegedly contacted Liberis probation officer in New Mexico, and the San Bernardino County District Attorney, informing them of Liberis violation of the terms of her probation, including that Liberi could not possess nor use any credit card without permission of the probation officer. [1 ER, 268, and 275-279.] By any measure, and based on Plaintiffs own allegations, Appellants alleged acts were done in furtherance of their rights of petition and free speech in connection with public issues all focused upon the right to speak on political matters, regarded under the anti-SLAPP statute as the quintessential subject of our constitutional protections of the right of free speech. Matson, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548. Summary of Argument The order denying Appellants motion should be reversed. Appellants clearly met (and in fact exceeded) their burden under 425.16(b)(1) to demonstrate that Plaintiffs Complaint arises out of Appellants alleged acts in furtherance of their rights of petition and free speech in connection with a public issue. Appellants demonstrated protected activity coming within each subpart of 425.16(e) describing "act[s] in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech.... Conversely, Plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden under 425.16(b)(1) to demonstrate a probability of prevailing as against Appellants. Notably, Plaintiffs made a judicial admission that the Complaint was
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legally insufficient. This admission was dispositive where a plaintiff must demonstrate that its complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a prima facie factual showing. Rosenaur v. Scherer, 88 Cal.App.4th 260, 274 (2001). Plaintiffs also failed to satisfy their burden to present competent and admissible evidence making the required factual showing. The District Court as a matter of law erred in misinterpreting and misapplying Appellants and Plaintiffs burdens under 425.16. Its order should be reversed.

Legal Discussion I. Standard of Review A.

De novo standard of review regarding denial of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike under

California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16

The Court of Appeal in Thomas v. Quintero, 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 624-625 (2005) held: A ruling on a special motion to strike under 425.16 is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] This includes whether the anti-SLAPP statute applies to the challenged claim. [Citation.] Furthermore, we apply our independent judgment to determine whether [the plaintiff's] causes of action arose from acts by [the defendant] in furtherance of [the defendant's] right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. [Citation.] [Only when] these two conditions are satisfied, [do] we then independently determine, from our review of the record as a whole, whether [the plaintiff] has established a reasonable probability that he would prevail on his claims. [Citation.] (Emphasis added.) B. Legal standards applicable to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike under California Code of

Civil Procedure section 425.16

The California Legislature has declared that freedom of speech and the right to petition the
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government for redress of grievances shall not be discouraged through abuse of the judicial process. Section 425.16(a) and (b) state: (a) The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly. (b)(1) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (b)(2) In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based." (Emphasis added.) A defendant bringing an anti-SLAPP motion makes an initial prima facie showing that plaintiff's suit arises from an act in furtherance of defendant's right of petition or free speech by demonstrating that the acts underlying plaintiff's cause fit one or more of the categories spelled out 425.16(e). Braun v. Chronicle

Publishing Co., 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1043 (1997).

The definition of public interest within the anti-SLAPP law is broadly construed to include private conduct that impacts a broad segment of society. Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 472 (2000). Relatedly, public discussion about the qualifications of those who hold or who wish to hold positions of public trust presents the strongest possible case for applications of the safeguards afforded by the First Amendment. Matson, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548. A cause of action arises from protected activity where the act underlying plaintiff's cause of action, or the act which forms the basis for it was itself an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.

City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 (2002). The Courts determination on this issue is subject to de novo review. Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 106 Cal.App.4th 1219,
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1232 (2003). The "arising from" prong encompasses any action based on protected speech or petitioning activity, as defined in 425.16(e), regardless of whether plaintiff's lawsuit was intended to chill, or actually chilled, defendant's protected conduct. Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc., 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 187(2003). The phrase "arising from" in 425.16 (b)(1) has been interpreted to mean that "the act underlying the plaintiff's cause" or "the act which forms the basis for the plaintiff's cause of action" must have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech. Braun, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 1043. If a Court finds that defendant has made the threshold showing, it then determines whether plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. Section 425.16(b)(1). In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim, a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of

facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. Matson, supra, 40
Cal.App.4th at 548; emphasis added. A complaint combining allegations of protected and nonprotected activity is subject to 425.16 if at least one of the alleged underlying acts is protected conduct. Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin

Richter Hampton LLP, 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 672 (2005). An anti-SLAPP motion may be granted as to some
causes of action, and denied as to other causes of action of a Complaint, as its requirements are to be applied and determined as to each of plaintiffs claims. ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1004 (2001).

II. The District Court, as a Matter of Law, Erred in Concluding that Appellants Did Not Meet Their Burden
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Under Section 425.16(b)(1) to Show that Plaintiffs Complaint Arises Out of Appellants Acts in Furtherance of Their Rights of Petition or Free Speech in Connection with a Public Issue A. Appellants met their burden under section 425.16(b)(1) where Plaintiffs Complaint clearly arises out of Appellants alleged acts in furtherance of their rights of petition and free speech in connection with public issues 1. Applicable legal standards under section 425.16(e) A defendant meets its burden under 425.16(b)(1) by demonstrating that the acts underlying plaintiff's cause fit one or more of the categories set out in 425.16(e). Braun, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 1043. 425.16(e) provides: As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue" includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. In determining whether a cause of action falls within the scope of subdivision (e), courts must broadly construe the anti-SLAPP statute. Annette F. v. Sharon S., 119 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1160 (2004); emphasis added.

The categories enumerated in 425.16(e) are not all-inclusive. Because the subsection is preceded by the word "includes," other unmentioned acts are also protected under the statute. Averill v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1175 (1996). Such a threshold showing can be established in several circumstances, including if the moving party demonstrates that it made the alleged statement in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest. 425.16(e)(3). Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting
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Corp., 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 807 (2002). Appellants submit that they clearly satisfied this burden, and in fact
exceeded it, where their alleged acts fit into all four categories of 425.16(e). The District Courts order contains no analysis or findings on the issue of whether that the alleged acts underlying the Complaint fall into one or more of the categories set out in 425.16(e); there is merely a conclusion that Defendants have failed to make a prima facie showing that the acts complained of fall into any of those four categories of 425.16(e). [1 ER, 8.] No alleged acts set out in the Complaint are analyzed with regard to the four categories. In reaching its unsupported conclusion, it is clear that the District Court applied an impermissibly narrow standard as to Appellants exercise of their rights of petition and free speech, as well as the meaning of in furtherance of such rights and in connection with a public issue" in contravention of the legislative directive that this section shall be construed broadly. Section 425.16(a). a. Appellants Right of Petition The California Supreme Court has declared that [t]he constitutional right to petition includes the basic act of filing litigation or otherwise seeking administrative action." Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope &

Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 (1999). Federal law is in accord. For example, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972), the Supreme Court held: The right of
access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition. Section 425.16 (e) defines an act in furtherance of a persons right of petition to include: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.... Communications made in preparation for or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding fall within the ambit of these subdivisions. Action Apartment Assn.,

Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1250-1251(2007).

It is axiomatic that the qualifications of a declared candidate for public office raise a public issue.
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McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 42 Cal.3d 835, 859 (1986). The core of the dispute herein involves the Birther
Movement challenging the qualifications of President Obama. Plaintiffs seek to silence Appellants whistleblowing to the political dissident community and influence such movements primary tool to advance its goals - litigation and other petitioning activity spearheading a nationwide debate on such public issue. Appellants have thus clearly demonstrated act[s] in furtherance of [their] right of petition under the anti-SLAPP law. b. Appellants Right of Free Speech The United States Constitution, First Amendment provides: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. The constitutional protection for free speech does not turn upon "the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered." N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963). Under the First Amendment, "[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-340 (1974). The central subject of Appellants free speech at issue involves the Birther Movement challenging the qualifications of President Obama. Such protected speech as a matter of law concerns a public issue.

McCoy, supra, 42 Cal.3d at 859. Appellants free speech activities were without question entitled to
protection under 425.16. The only logical explanation for why the District Court found to the contrary is that it dismissed Appellants activities and speech, all in connection with leadership of the Birther Movement, as trivial, pernicious .However, the Courts apparent view has no place in ruling upon Appellants motion. No matter how provocative or unpopular Appellants political activities may be, they still, as a matter of law, are entitled
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to protection under the First Amendment including via an anti-SLAPP motion under 425.16. N.A.A.C.P.,

supra, 371 U.S. at 445. Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 339-340.

2.

Appellants alleged acts in furtherance of their rights of petition and free speech in connection with public issues a. Appellants allegedly made written or oral statement[s] or writing[s] made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.... as required by section 425.16(e)(1)

Plaintiffs allege that Taitz wrote to the U.S. Supreme Court Justices seeking help in an investigation regarding a criminal complaint she had filed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding hacking into her websites and tampering of her PayPal accounts... Taitz sent this same letter to the Secret Service and other Governmental Law Enforcement Agencies. [1 ER, 262.] Taitz allegedly sought redress for Plaintiffs actions from numerous government officials including Attorney General Eric Holder and Solicitor General Elena Kagan.... [1 ER, 272.] Appellants also allegedly contacted Liberis probation officer in New Mexico, and the San Bernardino County District Attorney, informing them of Liberis violation of the terms of her probation, including that Liberi could not possess nor use any credit card without permission of the probation officer, all for the purpose of seeking redress for Liberis violation of her probation in connection with Plaintiffs interference with Appellants websites and diversion of donations. [1 ER, 268, and 275-279.] Appellants alleged statements were unquestionably made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.... as required by 425.16(e)(1) and thus per
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se protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.

Under the unambiguous language of 425.16(e), an action may be a SLAPP suit under subparts (1) and (2) without any separate demonstration by defendant that its speech or petition concerned an issue of public significance. Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1113. Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress, 71 Cal.App.4th 226, 236-237 (1999). The California Supreme Court in Briggs held: At least as to acts covered by clauses one and two of section 425.16, subdivision (e), the statute requires simply any writing or statement made in, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by, the specified proceeding or body. Thus these clauses safeguard free speech and petition conduct aimed at advancing self government, as well as conduct aimed at more mundane pursuits. Under the plain terms of the statute it is the context or setting itself that makes the issue a public issue: all that matters is that the First Amendment activity take place in an official proceeding or be made in connection with an issue being reviewed by an official proceeding. Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1116; emphasis added. By contrast, subparts (3) and (4) of 425.16(e) include an express limitation to "issue[s] of public interest" but that limitation is not stated in subparts (1) and (2). Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1117-1118. Thus, the first two subparts of 425.16(e) require simply any writing or statement made in, or in connection with, an issue under consideration or review by the specified proceeding or body. Kibler v. N. Inyo

County Local Hospital Dist., 39 Cal.4th 192, 196-198 (2006). Appellants burden under 425.16(e)(1) thus
did not include to show their speech or petition activity concerned an issue of public significance. Briggs,

supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1113. Sipple, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at 236-237.

Appellants were required to demonstrate statements made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.... as required by 425.16(e)(1). Appellants clearly met this burden. Thus, the District Courts conclusion that Appellants failed to make a prima facie showing that the acts complained of fall into any of those four categories of 425.16(e) is clearly erroneous under 425.16(e)(1). [1 ER, 8.] b. Appellants allegedly made written or oral statement[s] or writing[s] made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
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legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.... as required by section 425.16(e)(2) Appellants alleged statements qualify as statements made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.... under 425.16(e)(2) for the same reasons, explained above, that they are protected under 425.16(e)(1). For example, Plaintiffs allege that Taitz wrote to the U.S. Supreme Court Justices seeking help in an investigation regarding a criminal complaint she had filed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding hacking into her websites and tampering of her PayPal accounts.... [1 ER, 262.] Such complaint was thus made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a... judicial body.... as well as with regard to any other official proceeding authorized by law.... Similarly, Appellants alleged contact with Liberis probation officer in New Mexico, and the San Bernardino County District Attorney, informing them of Liberis violation of the terms of her probation, was made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a... judicial body as well as any other official proceeding authorized by law.... [1 ER, 268, and 275-279.]

The requirements of 425.16(e)(2) are construed broadly, and even cover an official proceeding authorized by law before a non-governmental entity. Kibler, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 198. Here, Appellants alleged acts were in several official proceeding[s] authorized by law before multiple governmental entities. Appellants alleged statements were thus per se protected activity under 425.16(e)(2). Appellants burden under 425.16(e)(2) did not include to show their speech or petition activity concerned an issue of public significance. Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 1113. Sipple, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at 236-237. Appellants met their burden under 425.16(e)(2). Thus, the District Courts conclusion that Appellants failed to make a
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prima facie showing that the acts complained of fall into any of those four categories of 425.16(e) is clearly erroneous under 425.16(e)(2). [1 ER, 8.] c. Appellants allegedly made written or oral statement[s] or writing[s] made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.... as required by section 425.16(e)(3) Plaintiffs allege that Taitz engaged in whistleblowing via publishing statements on various websites and internet blogs reporting that Plaintiffs interfered with Appellants websites and internet blogs, created misleading websites and diverted donations from DOFF to entities controlled by Plaintiffs. [1 ER, 264.] Plaintiffs also allege that Taitz published statements were copied by various websites and blogs regarding the criminal record of Liberi. [1 ER, 268.] As a matter of law, such alleged activities constituted written... statement[s] or writing[s] made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.... under 425.16(e)(3). Web sites where members of the public may read the views and information posted, and post their own opinions, as a matter of law are a public forum for purposes of 425.16(e)(3). Ampex Corp. v. Cargle, 128 Cal.App.4th 1569 (2005). The Court of Appeal held: When [Defendant] decided in August 2001 to join the conversation about the fortunes of Ampex, he did so by posting messages on the Yahoo! message board for Ampex. The question here is whether such postings were made in a public forum, traditionally defined as a place that is open to the public where information is freely exchanged. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006.) The term public forum includes forms of public communication other than those occurring in a physical setting. Thus the electronic communication media may constitute public forums. Web sites that are accessible free of charge to any member of the public where members of the public may read the views and information posted, and post their own opinions, meet the definition of a public forum for purposes of section 425.16. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, supra, at p. 1007.) Thus the Yahoo! message board maintained for Ampex was a public forum. Id. at 1576; emphasis added. Ninth Circuit cases interpret public forum under 425.16(e)(3) to include websites. (See, Troy
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Group, Inc. v. Tilson, 364 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1153 (2005).) Thus, Appellants met their burden under
425.16(e)(3) on its public forum component. Appellants alleged statements were made in connection with an issue of public interest.... as required by 425.16(e)(3). This language is interpreted broadly. Annette F., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at 1160. Under California law, to constitute or concern a public issue, the involved conduct must either impact a broad segment of society or affect a community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity. Damon, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at 479. Appellants alleged statements, all made in furtherance of the political dissident movement and its Birther component, certainly impact a broad segment of society by stirring important public debate regarding the qualifications of highest political leaders to hold office as well as generate considerable media coverage. This broad segment includes, but is not limited to, thousands of adherents of the Birther Movement, as well as millions who follow media coverage of such political debate. The Court of Appeal in Rivero v. AFL-CIO, 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 923 (2003) surveyed cases interpreting the meaning public interest under the anti-SLAPP statute and held that covers a broad range of protected conduct: None of these cases defines the precise boundaries of a public issue, but in each of these cases, the subject statements either concerned a person or entity in the public eye (see Sipple, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 239 ["nationally known figure"]; Church of Scientology, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 651 [extensive "media coverage"]; Seelig, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 807-808 [discussion of participant in "a television show of significant interest to the public and the media"]), conduct that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants (Damon, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 468; Ludwig, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 8; Dowling, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 1400; Church of Scientology, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 650-651) or a topic of widespread, public interest (see M.G., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 629). Rivero, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at 924. Appellants clearly engaged in protected conduct in connection with an issue of public interest.... as required by 425.16(e)(3). Taitz as well as Berg are nationally known figure[s] as discussed in Sipple, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at 239. The political issues in discussion, most notably the goals of the Birther Movement, generate extensive media coverage as discussed in Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 651 (1996), disapproved on other grounds in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53,
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(2002). Such movement, and the underlying controversy arising out of Plaintiffs attempts to silence Appellants political speech, inherently concern a topic of widespread, public interest as discussed in M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 89 Cal.App.4th 623, 629 (2001). Moreover, Appellants speech at issue qualifies for the highest protections of the First Amendment. The right to speak on political matters is the quintessential subject of the constitutional protections of the right of free speech, and public discussion about the qualifications of those who hold or who wish to hold positions of public trust presents the strongest possible case for applications of the safeguards afforded by the First Amendment. Matson, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548. "Public discussion about the qualifications of those who hold or who wish to hold positions of public trust presents the strongest possible case for applications of the safeguards afforded by the First Amendment." ' [Citations.]" Damon, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at 479. At its heart, this case concerns the activities of the political dissident movement including the Birther Movement, involving public discussions challenging the qualifications of President Obama to hold the highest office in the United States. This case directly implicates control over that movement, particularly as to crucial fundraising activities, including over its primary method to achieve its goals, litigation challenging President Obamas qualifications. It presents the strongest possible set of facts squarely presenting free speech and petition activity protected per se under 425.16(e)(3). Thus, the District Courts conclusion that Appellants failed to make a prima facie showing that the acts complained of fall into any of those four categories of 425.16(e) is clearly erroneous under 425.16(e)(3). [1 ER, 8.]

d.

Appellants allegedly engaged in any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of
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public interest as required by section 425.16(e)(4) Appellants alleged statements qualify as conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest under 425.16(e)(4) for the same reasons, explained above, that they are protected activity

per se under 425.16(e)(3).

The meaning and application of public interest under 425.16(e)(4) is the same as that under 425.16(e)(3). Tuchscher, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at 1233. As discussed above, this case presents the strongest possible set of facts squarely presenting free speech and petition activity protected per se under 425.16(e)(4). Thus, the District Courts conclusion that Appellants failed to make a prima facie showing that the acts complained of fall into any of those four categories of 425.16(e) is clearly erroneous under 425.16(e)(4). [1 ER, 8.]

III. The District Court, as a Matter of Law, Erred in Concluding that Plaintiffs Met Their Burden Under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16(b)(1) to Demonstrate a Probability of Prevailing as Against Appellants A. As a matter of law, Plaintiffs did not meet their burden under section 425.16(b)(1) to
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demonstrate the legal sufficiency of their Complaint where they made a judicial admission that the Complaint was legally insufficient 1. Plaintiffs admitted that their Complaint was legally insufficient and, thus, as a matter of law, did not meet their burden under section 425.16(b)(1) Review of the issues discussed in this Section III are governed by the de novo standard. Thomas,

supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at 624-625. Tuchscher, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at 1232.

A plaintiffs burden under the second prong of 425.16(b)(1) is two-fold: "[T]he plaintiff 'must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.'" Matson, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548; emphasis added. Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 274. As a matter of law, it is insufficient for a plaintiff to merely argue that it has made an evidentiary showing of merit in opposition to an anti-SLAPP motion. [T]he plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited. Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683, 713-714 (2007). Plaintiffs admitted that they did not satisfy this first requirement of their burden: The second prong is whether the Plaintiffs have demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim. Plaintiffs agree they must amend their Complaint to bring it in compliance with the California Laws. [1 ER, 125: 58; emphasis added.] Under Ninth Circuit law, "[j]udicial admissions are formal admissions in the pleadings which have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of that fact."

American Title Ins. Co. v. Lovelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiffs judicial admission in their opposition that they did not satisfy their burden under 425.16(b)(1) to demonstrate the legal sufficiency of their Complaint required, as a matter of law, that the antiSLAPP motion be granted. Matson, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548. Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 274.
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Taus, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 713-714. The District Court ignored this essential component of Plaintiffs burden;
the Court held Plaintiffs have sufficiently made a prima facie showing of facts that would, if proved, support a judgment in their favor. [ER, 8.] This holding expresses a logical impossibility; without possessing a legally sufficient Complaint, Plaintiffs could not make a prima facie showing of facts [to]... support a judgment in their favor. In the parlance of the anti-SLAPP law, and its two-pronged test for an opposing partys burden under 425.16(b)(1), Plaintiffs had to first demonstrate that the complaint is... legally sufficient before the Court could reach the issue of whether Plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment.... Taus, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 713-714.

The District Court impermissible bypassed the first prong of this test, and focused exclusively (and improperly) only on the second prong. [1 ER, 8.] By analogy, the Courts disregard of Plaintiffs burden under the first prong of this test, after they made a judicial admission of the insufficiency of the Complaint, is similar to a Court considering the merits of a complaint in the face of a plaintiffs admission that its complaint is barred by a statute of limitations. Once such a dispositive judicial admission is made, no further inquiry is necessary or allowed. Neither the anti-SLAPP statute nor case law decided under it permit a Court to bypass a plaintiffs burden under the first prong of this test. The Court failed to consider the legal sufficiency of the Complaint, admitted by Plaintiffs to be insufficient, and thus as a matter of law committed reversible error. 2. Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to demonstrate that their Complaint and each of its claims were legally sufficient under section 425.16(b)(1) a. Plaintiffs Count One, for Violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment [sic] of the United States Constituion [sic], is legally insufficient
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Plaintiffs' first claim has no legal basis. [2 ER, 311-316.] The Fourteenth Amendment cannot apply to private conduct. Shelley, supra, 334 U.S. at 13. The First Amendment does not apply to private conduct either. Rendell-Baker, supra, 457 U.S. at 837. Where Plaintiffs allege only private conduct, and not required governmental invasion of privacy, their first claim as a matter of law must fail. Plaintiffs first claim is also based on a jumbled smorgasbord of various California, Pennsylvania and federal statutes. [2 ER, 314-315.] None of these laws support Plaintiffs claim. For example, California Civil

Code section 1798 et seq. (California's Information Practices Act of 1977) requires government agencies to
protect the privacy of personal information maintained by state agencies. See, Civil Code 1798.3(a) and1798.45, and Meister v. Regents of University of California, 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 446 (1998). Plaintiffs cannot state a claim against Appellants under California's Information Practices Act of 1977 where they are not a governmental "agency" as defined under such Act. Moreover, Plaintiffs agree they must amend their Complaint to bring it in compliance with the California Laws. [1 ER, 125: 5-8.] Thus, per Plaintiffs, their Complaint states no sufficient claim under California law. Appellants are not subject to the Pennsylvania Privacy Acts cited in the Complaint where they are not residents or citizens of the State of Pennsylvania, but instead residents and citizens of the State of California. [1 ER, 256.] None of the federal statutes cited in the first claim support the claim. For example, 18 U.S.C. 251022 are criminal law statutes not providing for civil remedies. b. Plaintiffs Count Two, for Defamation Per Se, Slander and Libel, is legally insufficient Plaintiffs common law claims are based on California law, given that the case is pending in California and Appellants are alleged to be, and are, residents and citizens of California. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Thus, Plaintiffs common law claims for defamation per se, slander and libel are based on California law. [2 ER, 317-320.] Again, Plaintiffs agree they must amend their Complaint to bring it in compliance with the
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California Laws. [1 ER, 125: 5-8.] Thus, per Plaintiffs, their second claim fails to state a sufficient claim under California law. The insufficiency of Plaintiffs second claim is demonstrated in detail in Appellants anti-SLAPP motion and supporting papers. However, Plaintiffs judicial admission that such claim is insufficient is binding. American Title Ins. Co., supra, 861 F.2d at 226. Plaintiffs judicial admission is dispositive in establishing their failure to satisfy their burden under 425.16(b)(1) to demonstrate the legal sufficiency of their second claim. Matson, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548. Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 274. c. Plaintiffs Count Three, for False-Light Invasion of Privacy, is legally insufficient Plaintiffs third claim is based on California law. [2 ER, 320-323.] Erie Railroad Co., supra, 304 U.S. at 78. Where Plaintiffs agree they must amend their Complaint to bring it in compliance with the California Laws, their third claim fails to state a sufficient claim under California law. The insufficiency of Plaintiffs third claim is demonstrated in detail in Appellants anti-SLAPP motion and supporting papers. However, Plaintiffs judicial admission that such claim is insufficient is binding.

American Title Ins. Co., supra, 861 F.2d at 226. Plaintiffs judicial admission is dispositive in establishing their
failure to satisfy their burden under 425.16(b)(1) to demonstrate the legal sufficiency of their third claim.

Matson, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548. Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 274.

d. Plaintiffs Count Four, for Harassment, is legally insufficient as well as not being a legally-cognizable claim Plaintiffs fourth claim is for harassment. [2 ER, 323-326.] There is no legally-cognizable claim for relief for damages entitled harassment. If and to the extent there is such a legally-cognizable claim (limited to injunctive relief), it would be based on California law. California Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Erie

Railroad Co., supra, 304 U.S. at 78. Plaintiffs seek damages on this claim. [2 ER, 324.] Where Plaintiffs agree
they must amend their Complaint to bring it in compliance with the California Laws, their fourth claim fails
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to state a sufficient claim under California law. The insufficiency of Plaintiffs fourth claim is demonstrated in detail in Appellants anti-SLAPP motion and supporting papers. However, Plaintiffs judicial admission that such claim is insufficient is binding.

American Title Ins. Co., supra, 861 F.2d at 226. Plaintiffs judicial admission is dispositive in establishing their
failure to satisfy their burden under 425.16(b)(1) to demonstrate the legal sufficiency of their fourth claim.

Matson, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548. Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 274.

e. Plaintiffs Count Five, for False Designations and Descriptions of Facts, is legally insufficient Plaintiffs fifth claim is for false designations and descriptions of facts. [2 ER, 326-329.] Plaintiffs cite to 15 U.S.C. 1125 as supporting this claim. [2 ER, 327.] This section is part of the United States Trademark Act. Section 1125(a)(1) refers to: Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact.... Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts in this claim that Appellants used in commerce any word.... as required by 1125(a)(1). Moreover, to come within 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. 1125(a)), covered activities must relate to goods or services which have some effect on interstate or foreign commerce within control of Congress. Parkway Baking Co. v Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3rd Circ. 1958).

Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302 (1st Circ. 2002). Plaintiffs in their fifth claim
fail to allege this essential element of provision of goods or services in interstate commerce, or any effect on interstate commerce. Congress' purpose in enacting 43(a) of the Lanham Act was to create a special and limited unfair competition remedy exclusively to protect the interests of a purely commercial class against unscrupulous commercial conduct. Colligan v Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2nd Circ. 1971). Plaintiffs fail
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to allege any facts establishing the essential element of unfair competition as between them and Appellants, nor that Appellants engaged in any unscrupulous commercial conduct. Thus, Plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden under 425.16(b)(1) to demonstrate the legal sufficiency of their fifth claim. Matson, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548. Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 274. e. Plaintiffs Count Six, for Injunctive Relief , is legally insufficient and is not a separate claim for relief Plaintiffs sixth claim is for injunctive relief. [2 ER, 329-332.] This is not a separate claim for relief; it is merely a type of remedy dependent upon the existence of a separate, supporting claim for relief. City of

South Pasadena v. Department of Transportation, 29 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1293 (1994). As discussed herein,
and demonstrated in Appellants anti-SLAPP motion and supporting papers, Plaintiffs failed to state any sufficient claim upon which their sixth claim could be based. Further, it appears that Plaintiffs sixth claim is based on California law. Erie Railroad Co., supra, 304 U.S. at 78. Where Plaintiffs agree they must amend their Complaint to bring it in compliance with the California Laws, their sixth claim fails to state a sufficient claim under California law. The insufficiency of Plaintiffs sixth claim is demonstrated in detail in Appellants anti-SLAPP motion and supporting papers. However, Plaintiffs judicial admission that such claim is insufficient is binding.

American Title Ins. Co., supra, 861 F.2d at 226. Plaintiffs judicial admission is dispositive in establishing their
failure to satisfy their burden under 425.16(b)(1) to demonstrate the legal sufficiency of their sixth claim.

Matson, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548. Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 274.

B. Plaintiffs did not meet their burden under section 425.16(b)(1) to present competent and admissible evidence sufficient to sustain a judgment in their favor on the Complaint Appelantz submits the following argument without waiving, and with a full reservation of, her above argument that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden under 425.16(b)(1) where they admitted that the
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Complaint was legally insufficient. A plaintiffs burden under 425.16(b)(1) includes to make a prima facie showing via competent and admissible evidence of facts sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. Matson,

supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548. Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 274.

Plaintiffs did not satisfy that burden where they failed to submit competent or admissible evidence supporting their opposition. Plaintiffs Liberi and Berg submitted declarations with Plaintiffs opposition. [1 ER, 142-154.] Appellants submitted memoranda of evidentiary objections to such declarations. [1 ER, 47-56.] The District Court failed to rule on such objections, instead stating that the Court has reviewed the objections filed here and relies only on admissible evidence. [1 ER, 6.] The Court thus tacitly overruled Appellants objections. Rule 103 of the Fed. R. Evid provides in relevant part: (a) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party and: (1) if the ruling admits evidence, a party, on the record: (A) timely objects or moves to strike; and (B) states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context; or (2) if the ruling excludes evidence, a party informs the court of its substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context. Here, Appellants filed timely evidentiary objections to the declarations of Liberi and Berg. The District Court tacitly overruled the objections. Such error affects a substantial right of Appellants where, as shown in the objections, Plaintiffs failed to submit competent or admissible evidence and the Court relied on such insufficient evidence to find that Plaintiffs have sufficiently made a prima facie showing of facts that would, if proved, support a judgment in their favor. [1 ER, 8.] Appellants have thus preserved their rights to seek appellate review of the District Courts overruling of their objections. Whether a district court correctly construed the hearsay rule is a question of law reviewed de novo.

United States v. Gilbert, 57 F.3d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1995). Appellants objections included hearsay objections
under Fed. R. Evid. 801 et seq. [1 ER, 47-56.] Thus, as to the District Courts overruling of these objections, the

de novo standard applies. As to the remaining objections, the abuse of discretion standard would apply.
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Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir. 1995).
The District Court committed reversible error in overruling Appellants objections. Where Plaintiffs did not submit competent and admissible evidence, they failed to satisfy their burden under 425.16(b)(1). Matson, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 548.

Rosenaur, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at 274. For these reasons, the District Courts order should be reversed.
IV. PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT DEMONSTRATE PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING, AS THERE WAS NEVER ANY JURISDICTION IN THE FEDERAL COURT Lower court erred in not addressing lack of jurisdiction and part of the AntiSLAPP, which sought the complaint to be dismissed based on 12B1, lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs filed the legal action at hand based on diversity of citizenship, providing Berg's business address in PA as Liberi's address. Liberi's address is at issue for two reasons: a. The case was filed in the federal court, in the Eastern District of PA based on diversity of citizenship. Lead Plaintiff Lisa Liberi provided Plaintiff Berg's business address in PA as her address, according to pleadings she was residing in PA. Taitz immediately filed motions to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction, arguing that not only there is not a shred of evidence of Liberi residing in PA, but she is not allowed to reside in PA based on her probation. From March 2008 until March 2011 Liberi was serving her three year probation based on her 8 year prison term, based on her conviction by the Superior Court of San Bernardino county, California. People of the State of CA v Lisa Renee Richardson (aka Lisa Liberi) FWV-028000. Case at hand was filed, while Liberi was subject to Jurisdiction of the Superior court of California, there was no diversity and the case was supposed to be dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. (Excerpt of Records # 1, antiSLAPP motion to dismiss, and reply to opposition exhibit criminal record of Liberi ER 32-106, 155-188) While the case lasted for two and a half years now, the issue of jurisdiction was not adjudicated on the merits yet. Several motions to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction filed by DOFF an Taitz were denied WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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During August 7, 2009 motion hearing Judge Robreno, who initially presided over this case in the Eastern District of PA, ordered Liberi and her attorney and co-plaintiff Berg to file with court Liberi's identification records, as proof of her citizenship for the purpose of sustaining jurisdiction in diversity. (Excerpt of records #2/7 Transcript of 08.07.2009 hearing before judge Robreno.) Since August 7, 2009 Plaintiff/Appellee Liberi and her attorney and co-Plaintiff/Appellee Berg have been in contempt of court and never filed with court proof of Liberi's state citizenship, as ordered by Judge Robreno. For that reason alone this case has to be dismissed, as Plaintiffs never established Liberi's state citizenship for purpose of sustaining jurisdiction, which shows that the case had to be dismissed under 12b1 and under antiSLAPP, as Plaintiffs could not satisfy the second prong of the antiSLAPP, they could not sustain their case in federal court. Not only this case needs to be dismissed, but appellant is moving this court to use its' inherent jurisdiction to severely sanction the Appellees for two years of contempt of court as well as for filing the legal action at hand based on fraud and for the purpose of harassment of the whistleblower, as their complaint is based on their assertion of Liberi being a resident of Pennsylvania, and was filed with a clear malicious intent to defraud the public and the court in creating an impression, that Liberi is a different person residing in Pennsylvania. In summer of 2010, when this case was ordered by judge Robreno to be transferred to CA, Taitz filed multiple motions for reconsideration, request to finally address the issue of lack of jurisdiction and rule on the merits on 12b(1) motion. As Judge Robrenoin the eastern District refused to rule on 12b(1) with prejudice, Taitz filed an appeal to the Third Circuit court of Appeals, arguing that it was an error by Judge Robreno to allow this case to go on for over a year without ruling on the merits on 12b(1) motion to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction in federal court.

(Liberi v Taitz , Appeal by Taitz and DOFF 10-3000 Third Circuit Court of Appeals) Berg filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal, claiming that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the ruling made by judge Robreno. On 09.09.2010 a three judge panel of judges Barry, Fisher and Greenaway denied Berg's motion to
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dismiss the appeal filed by Taitz ruling "The foregoing Motion by Appellees, Lisa Liberi, Lisa Ostella, Philip Berg, Esq., Evelyn Adams, excel Global, and the Law offices of Philip Berg, to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction is DENIED. Judge Greenaway would have granted the motion to dismiss." Appeal lasted for some eight months and thousands of pages of pleadings and documents were submitted mostly by the Appellees, who submitted over 900 pages Appellee's brief with mostly irrelevant, slanderous and unauthenticated material. During the appeal Plaintiffs/Appellees filed yet another ( fifth) motion for injunction/restraining order, where they mostly sought to silence Taitz. This motion was forwarded by the court of Appeals back to Judge Robreno. All of the motions for injunction/restraining order seeking to silence Taitz were dismissed by all the courts, which were involved in this case: Eastern District of PA, Third Circuit and the Central District of CA. During 12.20.2010 motion hearing Liberi admitted that she indeed was a felon convicted in CA and Ostella admitted that she indeed locked Taitz out of the website for her foundation, she admitted to forging Taitz signature by cutting and pasting it on multiple documents, but claimed that Taitz allowed her to forge her signature. She also admitted that the most slanderous accusations, where Plaintiffs claimed that doctor and attorney Taitz attempted to hire a hit-man to kidnap children of Ostella were simply made up by Liberi and Berg, Ostella admitted that she never made those accusations and assertions. Cross examination of Ostella was the most damaging evidence. It showed Berg and Liberi making up the most vile accusations of capital crimes. (ER2/2, ER2/3 Transcript of 12.20.2010 hearing before judge Robreno) Taitz ordered the transcript of the proceedings. She paid extra for expedient processing. After multiple demands she finally received a certified transcript from the court reporter Dona Anders. To her horror Taitz found out that the certified transcript was falsified, the most damaging evidence, the whole cross examination of Ostella was removed from the certified record and examination of the next witness was neatly arranged in the middle of the page, as if the cross examination of Ostella never took place. Taitz immediately complained and advised Anders that she will file with the FBI, Inspector general
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and the House Judiciary committee a criminal complaint of obstruction of justice and falsification of court records by the employees of the Eastern District federal court. Finally under pressure court reporter Dona Anders e-mailed Taitz a full transcript. It showed that 15 pages from page 118 till page 133 were removed in the transcript previously sent to Taitz by Dona Anders. Taitz filed a complaint with the Inspector general of the department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General forwarded the complaint to Chief judge of the Circuit, Theodor McKee. Taitz provided evidence of manipulation of the docket, refusal to rule with prejudice on multiple motions to dismiss due to lack of jurisdiction and most importantly flagrantly criminal behavior of the employees of the court itself, who removed 15 paged of transcript and arranged the pages to make it look, as if the whole cross examination of Ostella did not exist. Taitz demanded investigation of court reporter Dona Anders and audio operator Joseph Matkowski. In response the Third Circuit simply reshuffled the panel and replaced two judges, Fisher and Barry, who initially decided that the Third Circuit had jurisdiction, kept one judge, recent Obama appointee, Judge Greenaway and suddenly after eight months decided that the prior panel erred, reversed the decision of the prior three judge panel and decided that the Third Circuit does not have jurisdiction to hear the Appeal and that all pending motions are to be heard by the transferee court. As such the record from the Third Circuit became part of the record of this court, as a transferee court. (Excerpt of Record #2/ docket of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ). Chief Judge Theodor McKee, Obama supporter, simply buried the whole case and the complaint filed by Taitz. McKee buried the fact, that his own employees, employees of the federal court acted in a criminal manner, falsified certified court record, tampered with evidence, obstructed justice in an effort of aiding and abetting a dangerous felon, convicted forger and thief Lisa Liberi and her employer attorney Philip Berg and in order to continue harassment and persecution of a civil rights leader attorney Taitz, who brought to court evidence showing sitting president Barack Obama using a stolen Social Security number and a forged birth certificate. After the case was transferred to the Central District of California, judge Guilford denied antiSLAPP, which contained 12b (1) motion as part of the argument.
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Above chronology of the events shows a clear pattern of the federal court system being used a tool of harassment of a political dissident, when the court never had any jurisdiction and the issue of jurisdiction, which is usually decided on the merits at the onset of the case, was not ruled upon with prejudice for over two years. This is a dangerous development and in line with other cases, where since the civil rights movement of the sixties the federal court was used as a tool of harassment of political dissidents. Recently, we've seen the Congress passing and Barack Obama signing NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act), which would allow not just harassment of dissidents, but indefinite incarceration of the U.S. citizens without trial, as long as anyone in the government just suspects a citizen of being a terrorist. Taitz has seen dissidents being deemed terrorists or enemies of the state in her country of origin, Soviet Union. At a December 15,2011 debate some leading presidential candidates were openly calling for the disbanding of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, this very court. One of the Presidential candidates called for judges to be arrested by marshals. What if this court is disbanded and the dissident judges are deemed domestic terrorists and incarcerated indefinitely without trial? The same federal judges, who are allowing a dissident to be harassed with a bogus law suit by a dangerous criminal in a court with no jurisdiction, will allow tomorrow indefinite incarceration of citizens without trial, just to please the ruling regime, to go along with the program. The same judges will turn a blind eye to multiple Habeas Corpus petitions. What was done to Taitz and DOFF in the last two and a half years goes beyond a judicial error, it was an extreme bias and abuse of judicial discretion. Actions by the judiciary were against the public policy, as the federal judiciary was complicit in allowing a criminal, a recently convicted felon on probation to hide her identity for two years by refusing to rule on the merit of the 12(b)1 motion. The fact that Ostella's admissions of cutting and pasting signature of attorney Taitz went without recourse, as well as the fact that the court reporter removed 15 pages out of the certified transcript with impunity, shows that there is bias against Taitz, as a dissident. Carbon copy of this brief is forwarded to the Inter American Commission for Human Rights as well as the UN Commission for Civil Rights defenders.

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Conclusion Californias anti-SLAPP statute declares: The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. Section 425.16(a). This case falls squarely within the protections of this statute where Plaintiffs frivolous action is solely intended to chill Appellants exercise of their rights of free speech and petition, and to discourage their participation in matters of great public importance. For the reasons stated herein, the District Court, as a matter of law, erred in denying Appellants antiSLAPP motion to strike under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. For the reasons stated herein, Taitz respectfully submits that the order denying that motion should be reversed and an order granting said motion be entered. Dated: December _19__, 2011 By: _______/s/

/s/ Orly Taitz

Taitz______________________

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This brief does not exceed 14,000 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. Rule 32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

Dated: December 19 ___, 2011

By:

________________________________ /s/ Dr. Orly Taitz, ESQ

counsel for DOFF I, Orly Taitz, declare, that I served all parties to this appeal via ECF /s/ Orly Taitz

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