ARTICLE IN PRESS

Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 19 (2006) 399408 www.elsevier.com/locate/jlp

Aspects of risk analysis associated with major failures of fuel pipelines

M. Dziubinskia,, M. Fratczaka, A.S. Markowskib
Department of Chemical Engineering, Faculty of Process and Environmental Engineering, Technical University of Lodz, dz lczan ska 213, Poland 93-005 o , ul. Wo b Department of Environmental Engineering Systems, Faculty of Process and Environmental Engineering, Institution of Process and Ecological Safety, dz lczan ska 213, Poland Technical University of Lodz, 93-005 o , ul. Wo Received 1 December 2004; received in revised form 20 June 2005; accepted 7 October 2005
a

Abstract This paper presents a methodology of risk assessment for hazards associated with transportation of dangerous substances in long pipelines. The proposed methodology comprises a sequence of analyses and calculations used to determine basic reasons of pipeline failures and their probable consequences, taking individual and societal risk into account. A specic feature of this methodology is a combination of qualitative (historical data analysis, conformance test and scoring system of hazard assessment) and quantitative techniques of pipeline safety assessment. This enables a detailed analysis of risk associated with selected hazard sources by means of quantitative techniques. On the ground of this methodology typical problems that usually pose serious threat and constitute part of risk analysis for long fuel pipelines are also presented. To verify above methodology, complete risk analysis was performed for the long distance fuel pipeline in Poland. r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Long pipeline; Risk analysis; Methodology; Failure; Consequences

1. Introduction Transport of liquid and gas materials in pipelines is a signicant element of modern technological solutions applied in various branches of industry. The main hazard for safe transportation of substances is a pipeline failure taken as a loss of its tightness and release of the transported medium to the environment. Although transport in pipelines is considered one of the safest methods of long-range transport, the databases of accidents reveal that the risk associated with pipeline operation is often on the same level as that of stationary renery installations (The Accident Database Software, Version 4.1). A general classication of methods used for risk analysis is shown in Fig. 1. To perform risk analysis and so an estimation of level of accident risk, three methods, qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative, can be used. The semi-quantitative
Corresponding author. Tel.:+48 42 631 37 34; fax: +48 42 636 92 51.

E-mail address: dziubin@wipos.p.lodz.pl (M. Dziubinski). 0950-4230/$ - see front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jlp.2005.10.007

methods are applied to identify hazards and to select the so-called creditable failure events. Main tools used for this purpose are HAZOP, PHA and What if methods (Markowski, 2000). Results given in the form of relevant risk categories enable an easy identication of risk levels. The qualitative methods are used rst of all in the verication of concordance of a safety level with valid principles contained in legal regulations and standards. These rules usually refer to separate devices and represent minimum requirements that must be satised to reach some acceptable safety level. However, for long pipelines, it is often required that risk assessment be made using quantitative (probabilistic) techniques based on the concept of risk. The quantitative risk assessment is a complex series of analyses and calculations that employ many simulation models, particularly in the analysis of physical effects. A full risk analysis of a selected object is a complex task that requires specialist software (i.e. PHAST, EFFECT, SAFETI) and intensive training in theory and practice of risk analysis to interpret results correctly (Arendt & Lorenzo, 2000).

ARTICLE IN PRESS
400 ski et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 19 (2006) 399408 M. Dziubin
RISK ASSESMENT
Historical data Pipeline identification Failure frequency data

Quantitative
(Probabilistic)

Semi-quantitative Creditable accident scenario

Qualitative
(Deterministic)

Creditable accident scenario

Creditable accident scenario

Conformity test

General hazard estimation

Calculations: - consequences - probability

Classification: - consequences - probability

Are the safeguards sufficient for control creditable accident scenario?

Identification of Creditable Failure Event

YES

NO

Consequences

Consequences

Layer of protection analysis

Calculation of Creditable Failure Event frequen c y

Consequence analysis

Risk analysis

Probability

Probability Risk must be reduce im mediately Risk is undertaken only if a benefit is desired, action is based on ALARP principle Any activity not be required

Estimation of failure frequency

Acceptable

Unacceptable risk

Individual and societal risk Unacceptable

Tolerable risk

Acceptable risk

Acceptable

Additional safety measures

Safety assurance

Risk assess ment

Fig. 1. General division of methods for risk analysis.

Unacceptable

2. Methodology of risk assessment for long pipelines The proposed methodology comprises a sequence of analyses and calculations used to determine basic reasons of pipeline failures and their probable consequences, taking individual and societal risk into account. A specic feature of this methodology is a combination of qualitative (historical data analysis, conformance test and scoring system of hazard assessment) and quantitative techniques of pipeline safety assessment. This enables a detailed analysis of risk associated with selected hazard sources by means of quantitative techniques. A general scheme of the risk assessment methodology for long pipelines is shown in Fig. 2. Below, some steps of risk analysis methodology are discussed briey with reference to the methods and techniques used to perform it and to necessary information. It is worth stressing that each step of the analysis may consist of several stages. This refers specially to the analysis of physical effects and consequences. 2.1. Pipeline characteristics This is a stage at which the pipeline data are collected. To do this, the installation should be checked over. In the case of long pipelines, this is quite complicated because of the pipeline length and its position (e.g. underground). The main data source is the documentation.

Fig. 2. Methodology of risk assessment for long pipelines.

The collected data are necessary for starting the work on the second stage of risk analysis, i.e. the identication of hazard sources. 2.2. Identication of general hazard sources To identify hazard sources, we should consider all factors that may be potentially a source of hazard for a pipeline, personnel and environment which can be done using an experts assessment method based on

  

historical data survey, conformance test of the technical documentation with legal requirements and scoring methodology for relative risk assessment.

2.3. Historical data The historical data comprise the information on accidents and failures that involve hazardous substances which have occurred so far and are stored in the world databases, e.g. The Accident Database Software, Version 4.1, Institution of Chemical Engineers.

ARTICLE IN PRESS
ski et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 19 (2006) 399408 M. Dziubin 401

2.4. Conformity test The conformance test is a check list (a set of questions or checking procedures) that covers all stages of the pipeline life (designing, construction and operation) affecting its safety. The basis for preparation of the control lists are legal requirements and a number of standards (e.g. API, ASME, ANSI) related to long pipelines. A result of the test is a list of regularities and departures from regularity following from the standards or legal requirements. 2.5. Scoring methodology for relative risk assessment The main causes of pipeline failures are specied and next scored depending on the applied safety measures. This system can be used for determining priorities of repairs and exchange of particular parts of the pipeline. A detailed description of scoring system of hazard assessment for pipelines can be found elsewhere (Muhlbauer, 1996; Borysiewicz & Potempski, 2001). 2.6. List of creditable failure events On the basis of the above-mentioned hazard assessment methods, a list of main sources of hazards is prepared. It species potential locations of releases of the hazardous substances for a given pipeline type. Due to a possibility of repeated listing of the same events within one segment of the pipeline which differ only, e.g., in the spot where they take place, the list is reduced to the list of creditable failure events which represent the worst consequences and probability of their occurrence. The creditable failure events are then subjected to failure scenario modelling (Markowski, 2000). Creating this representative set of creditable failure events, we used our experience and information from historical records, e.g. The Accidents Database. A detailed description of selection of accidents can be found in the study (Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, CCPS, AIChE, 2000). 2.7. Layer of protection analysis Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a simplied risk assessment used to identify safeguards to meet the risk acceptance criteria. Safety and protection measures in pipelines are formed into a multi-layer protection system which functions in a specied sequence. In a multi-layer protection system, three main types of protection layers can be distinguished, namely prevention, protection and counteraction. The aim of these layers is to prevent initiating events which can lead to fuel release from the pipeline, to protect the pipeline and employees against consequences of the release, and to minimise consequences of short releases. The LOPA assumes that no layer of protection is perfect; every layer has some probability failure on demand (PFD). Therefore, the risk of the occurrence of unwanted consequences depends on the

failure of the safeguards. In the determination of the nal risk level for a selected accident scenario, the event tree method is applied. The application of LOPA for pipelines risk assessment as a alternative method to QRA is given by Markowski (Markowski, 2003). 2.8. Failure event frequency Failure event frequency to be determined based on reliability models using fault and event tree analysis. It requires number of frequency data for initiating events which are very difcult to establish for pipelines. Each failure scenario must take into account protection layers and specied conditions, mainly environmental ones, that would determine further development of the scenario. To determine the probability of failure scenarios reliability models, generic data available in literature (HSE, Contract Research Report 210, 1999; HSE Contract Research Report No. 82, 1994; HSE Contract No. 3273/R73.05) are used. A detailed description of the application of reliability models can be found in the study Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures (1992). 2.9. Consequences analysis The analysis of physical effects and consequences consists in determination of the consequences of particular physical effects in hazard zones. A hazard zone is the region in which physical effect of the hazard exceeds critical threshold values and induces negative effects for people, environment and property. Type of the hazard and related physical effects and consequences depend on many factors, rst of all on the properties and volume of released substance, the state of aggregation, process conditions, the way of release and possible interactions with the environment (Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 1998). The model of physical effects and consequences analysis is shown in Fig. 3. It is worth noting that real hazard zones caused by overpressure (explosion) and thermal radiation (re) are circular areas of a radius equal to the assumed threshold value. In the case of release of ammable and toxic substances without ignition, the hazard zones will depend on wind direction. As it is difcult to predict wind direction in the moment of failure, hence in the analyses, all possible

Physical effects analysis Release source data Dispersion models Hazard zones

Consequence analysis Consequence analysis

Vaporization rate

Topographic models

Rescue plan

Sensitivity models

Fig. 3. Structure of model for calculation of potential consequences.

ARTICLE IN PRESS
402 ski et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 19 (2006) 399408 M. Dziubin
Boundaries of potential hazard zones Dominant wind direction
Leakage into the ground Pipeline failure

Leakage on the surface of water Physical effects

RA Place of failure
Directional hazard zone for substance A Direction al hazard zone for substan ce B
Hazard zone for substance A, radius RA Hazard zone for substance B, radius RB
Is there ignition? YES Pool fire Flash fire Explosion Fire on the surface of water

RB
NO

YES

Is there ignition?

NO Is the ground permeable? NO Liquid pool formation on the ground and spillage into the sewers Liquid pool formation on the surface of water and pool transportation with water

Fig. 4. Potential hazard zones for accidental release of a dangerous substance to the air.

YES

wind directions should be considered. Next, taking wind rise into account, relevant directional hazard zones should be specied (Fig. 4). In this way, one can distinguish a potential hazard zone which encompasses a circle of a determined radius which corresponds to the threshold concentration and a directional zone of real hazard depending on the current wind direction (Users Manual for PHAST v. 6.1, 2002; Fratczak & Markowski, 2003; Nieuwstadt, 1982). Fig. 5 shows a general diagram of the formation of environmental consequences of an accidental fuel release from a pipeline. It should be kept in mind that the range of undesirable effects of chemical hazards need not only cover a given pipeline but can refer to the regions which are not in an immediate neighbourhood of the pipeline system. As follows from historical data, the probability of explosion caused by a release of fuel (gasoline or diesel oil) from a long pipeline is statistically very small and is related to a probable occurrence of an ignition source (96% of gasoline or diesel oil pools does not ignite) (HSE, Contract Research Report 210, 1999). This is due to the fact that pipelines are laid underground and on sparsely inhabited areas. Among various types of re, pool re is most prevalent. Estimation of re impact on the environment is based on the assumption that in the re region, i.e. in the immediate re region, the effects are catastrophic. It is necessary to analyse the consequences beyond the immediate hazard zone, where potential losses depend rst of all on the distance from the release source. This refers mainly to degradation of soil, underground and surface water. It follows from long-term observations that grounds situated up to 400 m from the pipeline are 100% contaminated, i.e. a band 800 m wide along the pipeline should be treated as a hazard zone. In the case of grounds with soil of high moisture content, it is assumed that the hazard zone is a 1100 m wide band of land around the pipeline (Borysiewicz & Potempski, 2002a, b). Many research projects aim at determination of the time of the pool edge transport, identication of regions where

Is there pollution of ground water?

NO

Soil pollution

YES

Is the connection between system of underground and ground water ?

NO

Ground water pollution

YES Underground water pollution

Fig. 5. General diagram of formation of the environmental consequences due to pipeline failure.

hazardous compounds can accumulate and estimation of the residence time of substances at a given concentration in water (Fafara, 2002; Markowski & Petera, 2001; Nagy & Macuda, 2001). However, the loss estimation can be dubious because results presented in the reports refer only to the time of failure (the so-called short-term consequences, e.g. casualties in the personnel and uninvolved people, wounded peoplecosts of hospitalisation) and do not cover future losses (the so-called long-term consequences, e.g. costs of production losses in the company, costs of environment decontamination/treatment, regions of contaminated soil, underground and surface water) that occur in subsequent years (Borysiewicz & Markowski, 2002). 3. Application of risk analysis method for long pipelines A complete risk analysis was performed for the fuel pipeline located in central part of Poland. The pipeline is under soil surface at the depth from 1.4 to 1.5 m and serves for the transportation of gasoline, heating and diesel oil. The total pipeline length is about 200 km, inner diameter 400 mm and rated pressure 6.3 MPa. Along the pipeline,

ARTICLE IN PRESS
ski et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 19 (2006) 399408 M. Dziubin Table 1 Assumed times of fuel release Kind of release Detection time Time to stop pumps and close the gate valve 140 s Time of pressure phase Time of drainage phase Total time of fuel release Depends on the segment 42 h 426 h 403

Full bore rupture

20 s

160 s

Leak (1%) Leak (0.01%)

20 s 424 h

140 s 140 s

300 s 424 h

Release of the complete section inventory of pipeline 2h 2h

there are 23 gate valve stations which form separate segments for analysis. By experts estimation method, places of probable leakage from the pipeline caused by external factors were identied. Twenty-three failure release points were specied. Places of potential hazard of a pipeline failure are, among the others,

Table 2 Generic data used in calculations Kind of failure event Full bore rupture Leak ( 1%) Leak (0.01%) Pool formation from spray release Spillage into the rivers, sewers Ignition Accident frequency 0.051 [1/1000 km year] 0.164 [1/1000 km year] 0.206 [1/1000 km year] 0.5 0.08 0.050.12

   

passing of the pipeline near buildings, gate valve stations, crossing of the pipeline with existing pipelines, roads, railways and infrastructure, crossing over watercourses, meliorated and drained grounds and passing through the grounds with high groundwater level.

Software (2002); Nieuwstadt, 1982). Using classical relations of uid mechanics, the volumes of released substances were calculated. Calculations were made for 23 creditable failure events for gasoline and diesel oil. 3.2. Probability of results of fuel release As can be seen from fault tree presented in Fig. 6, the frequency of the pipeline failure depends on many basic events which cannot be quantitatively established. Using the event tree technique and taking into account the historical data that refer to the fuel release phenomenon (HSE, Contract Research Report 210, 1999; HSE Contract Research Report No. 82, 1994; HSE, Contract No. 3273/ R73.05), diagrams representing formation of actual failure scenarios and probability of their occurrence were developed. An event tree is shown in Fig. 7, while total data obtained from the event tree are given in Table 3. Numbers on particular branches of the event tree denote the probability of occurrence of the conditions describing the tree branch. For a branch describing success (yes), the probability of success PS is assumed, while for the branch standing for failure (no), the probability PN 1PS is assumed. The probability of single scenarios is a product of probabilities of conditions describing a given branch. Final probability of potential consequences is obtained by summing up partial probabilities for a given type of consequences. A detailed description of reliability model applications, formation of actual failure scenarios and probability determination can be found elsewhere (Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures, 1992). Table 3 provides summary data for particular selected segment of the pipeline.

3.1. Assumptions for calculation The following assumptions were made to calculate release from the pipeline: 3.1.1. Hole sizes

 

Full bore rupture: release through the whole pipe cross section, Leak: release through a hole of surface area equal to 1% and 0.01% of the pipe cross section.

3.1.2. Determination of time of accidental fuel release Assumed times of fuel release result from sensitivity of leakage detection systems on the pipeline and necessary time to stop leakage by emergency services (Table 1). 3.1.3. Generic data To determine the probability of failure scenarios and to calculate the risk of specic environmental consequences we used generic data available in literature (HSE, Contract Research Report 210, 1999; HSE Contract Research Report No. 82, 1994; HSE Contract No. 3273/R73.05) (Table 2). Mean air temperature 10 1C and its humidity equal to 70% as well as two types of weather conditions, typical ones with stability class D, wind velocity 5 m/s, i.e. D5, and unfavourable ones with stability class F and wind velocity 2 m/s, i.e. F2, were assumed (DNV Risk Management

ARTICLE IN PRESS
404 ski et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 19 (2006) 399408 M. Dziubin

Pipeline failure

OR

Decrease of the strength of the pipeline

Water hammer (Operational error) A

OR

Corrosion

Errors in construction

Design factors

External hazards

OR

OR

OR

OR

External B

Internal C

Buried pipe D

Defect of wall material E

Badly weld F

Bad selection Bad selection of wall of material thickness G H

Natural hazards

Third Party Activity

OR

OR

Ground settlement I

Earth pressure J

Ditching, bulldozing K

Sabotage L

Fig. 6. Fault tree for pipeline failure.

Spillage to water Spillage Failure Jet Liquid event release Ignition pool Ignition to sewage systems (rivers, drainages) systems 0.05 0.16 0.95 0.08 1.0 0.92 Pipeline Failure 0.5 0.88 0.08 1.0 0.84 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.08 1.0 0.92 0.1 0.9 0.92 0.1 0.12 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.9

Late ignition Jet fire 0.1

Consequences

Probability

8.0x 10-3 0.0 0.0 1.2x 10-3 1.1x 10-2 1.4x 10-1 5.0x 10-2 0.0 0.0 3.0x 10-3 2.7x 10-2 3.4x 10-1 0.0 0.0 3.4x 10-3 3.0x 10-2 3.9x 10-1

Explosion in sewage system Sewage system pollution Fire on the water Water pollution Ground pollution Pool fire Flash fire Explosion in sewage system Sewage system pollution Fire on the water Water pollution Ground pollution Explosion in sewage system Sewage system pollution Fire on the water Water pollution Ground pollution

Fig. 7. Event tree for pipeline failure.

3.3. Estimation of the consequences of released substance propagation in soil The size of a pool of released substances was calculated according to the method quoted in the study by Litlle (1996). Local conditions concerning soil permeability were not considered in the calculations. It was assumed that

along the pipeline, the soil consisted of ne sand with constant permeability coefcient equal to 104 m/s. As the calculations made for the pipeline full bore rupture and permeable soil show, the pool diameter is 31.3 m in the case of immediate ignition, and 43.3 m for delayed ignition. For 1% leak, the values are smaller and reach 25 m from the pipeline axis, and for 0.01%, do not exceed 23 m.

ARTICLE IN PRESS
ski et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 19 (2006) 399408 M. Dziubin Table 3 Probability of results of fuel release No. 1. 2. 3. 4. Type of consequences Ground pollution Water pollution Fires/explosions Fires on the surface of water Probability 1.4 101+3.4 101 +3.9 101 8.7 101 1.1 102+2.7 102+3.0 102 6.8 102 8.0 103+5.0 103 1.3 102 1.2 103+3.0 103+3.4 103 7.6 103 405

Table 4 Results of calculations of depth of fuel penetration into the ground Full bore rupture Product Volume of released product (m3) 23.4 447 1114 20.8 444 1111 Leak 1% Depth of seep into the ground (m) 1.67 1.75 0.42 0.47

Table 5 Range of hazard zone of oil spill on rivers surface Rescue service Range of hazard zones (km) response time (h) Rivers Wisla 12 24 14.1 28.2 Warta 6.3 12.6 Ner 4.4 8.9 Skrwa 4.9 9.9 Prosna 5.4 10.8

Depth of seep Volume of into the released ground (m) product (m3) 3.2 15.2 21 0.18 3.8 10 24 28.1 12.8 22.8

Gasoline

Diesel oil

3.5. Calculation of thermal radiation and blast wave hazard zones Calculations were made using a PHAST v.6.1 software for a constant value of mass stream characteristic of pipeline rupture and three values of mass streams of spilled gasoline for full bore rupture, 0.1% and 0.01% spills. Examples of printouts are shown in Figs. 8 and 9. Table 6 gives results for gasoline. Results based on equivalent spill values and meteorological conditions reveal more severe failure consequences for gasoline than for diesel oil. As can be seen from Table 6, heat radiation effects are limited to radii 3050 m whereas the overpressure effects are within 200600 m. 3.6. Calculation of individual and societal risk Calculations were made using SAFETI Micro software for 19 cases which correspond to the number of rural districts situated along the pipeline path. The necessary population data were obtained from real population density in every rural district. Individual and societal risk was calculated for the population satisfying the following conditions:

The maximum oil seep depth was calculated using the relation presented in the study by Michalowski and Trzop (1996). Results are given in Table 4 for one selected segment of pipeline. In view of a big number of data on released liquid volume, in the calculations, three different volumes for a rupture and two for 1% leak were taken (the least, mean and the biggestsee Table 4). This seems reasonable for a holistic approach to the problem. Selected data can be treated as creditable because they determine small, mean and biggest environmental impacts induced by accidental release of hazardous liquids from a pipeline. The depth of seep for 0.01% leak was not calculated due to a small volume of the released substance, the seep depth did not exceed several centimetres. 3.4. Estimation of released substance propagation on a river surface Calculations were made using a model applied by EPAUSA (40 Code of Federal Register, Ch I (7-1-97 Edition)). It is assumed that fuel spill reaches the same velocities as water current when no wind activity is observed. This model takes only the effect of water ow rate and roughness coefcient into account. The size of pool and wind velocity are not considered. Calculations were made for ve rivers crossed by the pipeline, namely the Wisla, Warta, Ner, Skrwa and Prosna. Results obtained for hazard zones for the rivers are given in Table 5. The zone range was calculated considering the rescue system response time, i.e. the time at which a dam was made to stop the oil spill (12 and 24 h alternatively since the moment of the pipeline failure).

  

people are always present (100% inhabitants), people spend 10% of their spare time outdoor and 90% indoor and people live in typical houses.

Percentage of day (0.7) and night (0.3) was considered. Examples of printouts concerning individual and societal risk (FN curve) for Plock town are shown in Figs. 10 and 11. Results of studies on individual and societal risk caused by gasoline and diesel oil reveal that the risk is variable

ARTICLE IN PRESS
406 ski et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 19 (2006) 399408 M. Dziubin

Fig. 8. Range of heat radiation from pool re in case of pipeline rupturethe weather conditions F2.

Fig. 9. Range of overpressure wave from explosion of steam cloud in case of pipeline rupturethe weather conditions F2.

along the pipeline path and ranges from 105 to 108 l/year, depending on the rural district. To calculate the probability of specic consequences, the quantitative analysis of event tree and data from Tables 2 and 3 were used. By multiplying values characteristic of failure frequency for rupture and spill by the probability of

specied consequences, one can obtain the value of risk of these consequences. Results of calculations are given in Table 7. Results of risk studies show that the risk of specied consequences is variable depending on the type of impact. One can say that, for instance, the frequency of soil

ARTICLE IN PRESS
ski et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 19 (2006) 399408 M. Dziubin Range of ash re (m, F2/D5) 407

Range of overpressure caused by explosion (late ignition) (m, F2/D5)

0.2 bar 0.14 bar

338/60 307/60 279/60 234/45

316/56 283/56 257/56 215/42

246/45 200/45 185/42 153/37 7/7 6/7 6/6

Fig. 10. Results of individual risk calculations for Plock town.

Levels of overpressure

0.02 bar 37.5 kW/m 12.5 kW/m 4 kW/m

2 2 2

Range of thermal radiation from pool re (m, F2/D5)

Levels of heat ux

48/48 50/51 47/47 41/41 18/17 17/16 15/14

32/34 33/36 31/33 27/29 12/12 11/12 10/10

627/118 613/118 562/119 477/89

Fig. 11. Results of societal risk calculations (FN curve) for Plock town.

Table 6 Results of calculations of the physical effects for fuel pipeline failure

Cloud range at lower ammable limit concentration (m, F2/D5)

247/45 200/45 185/42 153/37 7/7 6/7 6/6

pollution due to pipeline rupture is 9.48 103 which means that such an event can occur 9.48 times per 1000 years or once per 105.4 years. Other risks such as water pollution, res, explosions and res on water surface can be interpreted in a similar way. These data refer to the entire pipeline length. 4. Conclusions

Mass release rate (kg/s)

A methodology of risk assessment for hazards associated with hazardous substance transport in long pipelines is discussed in this paper. Taking this methodology as example, subsequent stages of risk analysis are considered paying special attention to the applied techniques and calculation models. A specic feature of this methodology is a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques which offer a possibility of a full risk assessment for long pipelines. A complete risk analysis was made for a

Leak (0.01%)

Failure type

Rupture Leak (1%)

108.8 74.8 63.7 47.4 0.75 0.63 0.47

ARTICLE IN PRESS
408 ski et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 19 (2006) 399408 M. Dziubin Table 7 Risk values for specied environmental consequences Consequences type Probability Failure frequency, fa: (a) Risk as a result of full full bore rupture (1/year), bore rupture (1/year) (b) leak 1% (1/year), (c) leak 0.01% (1/year) (a) 1.09 102 (b) 3.5 102 (c) 4.4 102 9.48 103 7.41 104 6.32 104 8.28 105 Risk as a result of leak, 1% (1/year) Risk as a result of leak, 0.01% (1/year)

Soil pollution Water pollution Fires /explosions Fires on surfaces of water

8.7 101 6.8 102 5.8 102 7.6 103

3.04 102 2.38 103 2.03 103 2.66 104

3.8 102 2.99 103 2.55 103 3.34 104

200-km-long fuel pipeline in Poland. The authors realise that the environmental hazard assessment for long pipelines requires individual approach in every case. This is determined mainly by a changing specicity of pipeline location. It refers particularly to the calculation of consequences of hazardous substance release for particular ecosystems (air, water, soil). A computer aid is required for efcient data acquisition, their storage and processing at every risk assessment stage. The available software, e.g. PHAST, EFFECTS, enables modelling of consequences of hazardous substance release from pipelines. However, a practical implementation of this software, and especially interpretation of simulation results, requires competence in risk analysis. References
Arendt, J. S., & Lorenzo, D. K. (2000). Evaluating process safety in the chemical industry. A Users Guide to Quantitative Risk Analysis, CCPS. Assessing the risk from gasoline pipelines in the United Kingdom based on a review of historical experience. Prepared by WS Atkins Safety & Reliability for the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Contract Research Report 210, 1999. Borysiewicz, M., & Markowski, A. S. (2002). Risk acceptability criteria of major industrial failures. CIOP-PIB, Warsaw. Borysiewicz, M., & Potempski, S. (2001). Methodology of risk assessment for long pipelines. Institute of Atomic Energy, Otwock-Swierk. Borysiewicz, M., & Potempski, S. (2002a). Fifth national technical conference risk management in pipeline operating. 2324 May, Plock (p. 19).

Borysiewicz, M., & Potempski, S. (2002b). Risk of major failures of pipelines transporting dangerous substances. CIOP-PIB, Warsaw. DNV Risk Management SoftwareUsers Manual for PHAST v. 6.1, 2002. Fafara, Z. (2002). Wiert. Nafta Gaz, R. 19, cz.1 (pp. 6978). Fratczak, M., & Markowski, A. S. (2003). Second national technical conference technical safety in industry. 45 June, KedzierzynKozle (p. 40). Guidelines for chemical process quantitative risk analysis, CCPS, AIChE, 2000. Guidelines for ecological risk assessment, EPA/630/R-95/002F, April, 1998. Guidelines for hazard evaluation procedures, CCPS, AIChE, 1992. Litlle, A. D. (1996). Risks from gasoline pipelines in the UK. HSE books. Markowski, A. S. (2000). Loss prevention in industry. Part IIIManagement of process safety. Technical University of Lodz. Markowski, A. S. (2003). Centre of Excellence Manhaz, 1721 October, http://manhaz.cyf.gov.pl. Markowski, A. S., & Petera, J. (2001). Second national technical conference risk management in chemical and process industry, 2324 October, Lodz (p. 211). Michalowski, W., & Trzop, S. (1996). Long pipelines. Warsaw: ENERGOPOL. Muhlbauer, W. K. (1996). Pipeline risk management manual (2nd ed.). Gulf Publishing Co. Nagy, S., & Macuda, J. (2001). Wiert. Nafta Gaz, R. 18, cz.1 (pp. 149161). Nieuwstadt, F. M. (1982). Atmospheric turbulence and air pollution modeling. Boston: Riedel. Risks from gasoline pipelines in the United Kingdom. HSE Contract Research Report No. 82, 1994. Risks from gasoline pipelines in the United Kingdom. Health and Safety Executive Books (HSE), Contract No. 3273/R73.05, 1999. The Accident Database Software, Version 4.1, Institution of Chemical Engineers, 2001.