ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF

IRAN
Public Administration Country Profile

Government type Theocratic republic Independence 1 April 1979 (Islamic Republic of Iran proclaimed) Constitution Ratified 24 October 1979 and amended to 28 July 1989 (in brief) Legal system The Constitution codifies Islamic principles of government Administrative divisions 28 provinces (ostan)
Source: The World Factbook - Iran

In January 1979 the Shah was forced to leave Iran, and Ayatollah Khomeini arrived in Tehran on 1 February 1979. On 1 April 1979 Iran was declared an Islamic republic. Supreme authority was vested in the Wali Faqih, a religious leader, initially Khomeini, appointed by the Shiite clergy. From September 1980 and until a ceasefire came into effect in August 1988 Iran was involved in a long conflict of attrition with Iraq. Ayatollah Khomeini died on 3 June 1989, and was replaced as Walih Faqih spiritual leader by President Ali Khamenei. Rafsanjani easily won the presidential election in July 1989. At the same time, voters in a referendum supported proposed amendments to the Constitution; the most important of which was the abolition of the post of Prime Minister, and a consequent increase in power for the President. In conformity with the Constitution, President Rafsanjani stood down in 1997 after his second consecutive term. In August 1997, President Seyed Mohammad Khatami was inaugurated with a subsequent re-election in June 2001. In recent years President Mohammad Khatamis reformist agenda has met opposition from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and more conservative forces.

2. Legal Structure

Irans Constitution was adopted in 1979, and was amended in 1989 to provide for
the abolition of the post of Prime Minister and consequent increase in power of the Presidency. It states that the form of government of Iran is that of an Islamic Republic and that the spirituality and ethics of Islam are to be the basis for political, social and economic relations.
Source: Immigration and Nationality Directorate (UK) - Iran: Country Report (April 2004)

2.1 Legislative Branch

Unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly or Majles-e-Shura-ye-Eslami (290 seats; members elected by popular vote to serve four-year terms).6 women in parliament: 9 out of 290 seats: (3%).7

The Islamic Consultative Assembly is constituted by the representatives of the people elected directly and by secret ballot among the candidates approved to run by the Council of Guardians. The 1989 Constitution initially provided for 270 members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, allowing an increase of 20 members every ten years. Five seats in the Assembly is reserved for religious minorities. The term of membership in the Islamic Consultative Assembly is four years. The Islamic Consultative Assembly can establish laws on all matters provided they are compatible with the laws of Islam and with the Constitution as viewed by the Guardian Council. All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be sent to the Guardian Council which has ten days to review the proposed legislation. Government bills are presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly after receiving the approval of the Council of Ministers. Members' bills may be introduced in the Islamic Consultative Assembly if sponsored by at least fifteen members. The Islamic Consultative Assembly has the right to investigate and examine all the affairs of the country. In addition, international treaties, protocols, contracts, and agreements must be approved by the Assembly. Whenever at least one-fourth of the total members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly pose a question to the President, or any one member of the Assembly poses a question to a Minister on a subject relating to their duties, the President or the Minister is obliged to attend the Assembly and answer the question. Any one-third of the members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly have the right to interpellate the President. After hearing the statements of the opposing and favoring members and the reply of the President, two-thirds of the members of the Assembly can declare a vote of no confidence in which case the Leader will dismiss the President.
Source: Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran
6 7

Source of fact boxes if nothing else stated: The World Factbook - Iran Inter-Parliamentary Union - Women in National Parliaments

Fact box: elections: Last held 20 February 2004 with a runoff held 7 May 2004 (next to be held February 2008) election results: seats by party conservatives 196, reformers 48, independents 39, seats reserved for religious minorities 5, and 2 seats

unaccounted for

2.2 Executive Branch

cabinet: Council of Ministers selected by the president with legislative approval; the Supreme Leader has some control over appointments to the more sensitive ministries elections: Leader of the Islamic Revolution appointed for life by the Assembly of Experts; president elected by popular vote for a four-year term; election last held 8 June 2001 (next to be held June 2005)

The highest authority in the Islamic Republic is the Leader who exercises the combined supreme political and religious power. The Constitution stipulates that the Leader is to be chosen by the Assembly of Experts, composed of representatives of the people, on the basis of leadership qualifications and the high esteem in which the Leader is held by Iran's Muslim population. The Leader appoints the highest judicial authorities, who must be religious jurists; and is commander in chief of the armed forces. 8 After the office of Leadership, the President is the highest official in the country. The functions of the executive, except in the matters that are directly placed under the jurisdiction of the Leadership by the Constitution, are to be exercised by the President and the Ministers. The President is elected for a four-year term by the direct vote of the people. His re-election for a successive term is permissible only once. The President is obliged to sign legislation approved by the Assembly or the result of a referendum, after the legal procedures have been completed and it has been communicated to him. After signing, he must forward it to the responsible authorities for implementation. Ministers will be appointed by the President and will be presented to the Assembly for a vote of confidence. The President is the head of the Council of Ministers.
Source: Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran

2.3 Judiciary Branch

Supreme Court.

The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary. In order to fulfill the responsibilities of the judiciary, the Leader appoints a man as head of the judiciary for a period of five years who is the highest judicial authority. The Head of Judiciary is responsible for, inter alia, employment of judges, their dismissal, appointment, transfer, assignment to particular duties, promotions, and carrying out similar administrative duties. The Minister of Justice owes responsibility in all matters concerning the relationship between the judiciary on the one hand and the executive and legislative branches on the other hand. He is elected from among the individuals proposed to the President by the head of the judiciary branch. The Constitution provides for a Supreme Court, Military Courts, and a Court of Administrative Justice. Formation of additional courts and their jurisdiction are determined by law. The Supreme Court supervises the implementation of the laws by the courts, ensuring uniformity of judicial procedure, and fulfilling any other responsibilities assigned to it by law, on the basis of regulations to be established by the head of the judicial branch. The military court investigates crimes committed in connection with military or security duties by members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary Guards.
Source: Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran

In general, the two most active are the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses, and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. The latter try offenses viewed as potentially threatening to the Islamic Republic, including threats to internal or external security, narcotics and economic crimes, and official corruption.

A special clerical court examines alleged transgressions within the clerical establishment. The clerical courts are overseen directly by the Leader. A press court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers in the media. The Supreme Court has limited review authority.
Source: U.S. Department of State (Background Notes) - Iran (edited)

A 12 member Council of Guardians was established in 1980 that supervises elections and ensures that legislation is in accordance with the Constitution and Islamic precepts.9 Of the 12 members, six religious men are appointed by the Leader, and six jurists are elected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power. The Council of Guardians, in turn, certifies the competence of candidates for Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the Presidency and the Islamic Consultative Assembly and Local Councils. Members of the Guardian Council are elected to serve for a period of six years.
Source: Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran10

2.4 Local Government The present administrative structure of Iran is characterized by its strongly centralized system of control. There are 25 ostans or administrative provinces, further divided into 195 governorships, 5001 divisions, 496 cities and 1581 villagedistricts.
Source: UNDP (Iran) - Iran Facts

The Constitution provides for the administration of each village, division, city, municipality, and province by a council to be named the Village, Division, City, Municipality, or Provincial Council. Members of each of these councils will be elected by the people of the locality in question. The Supreme Council of the Provinces has the right within its jurisdiction, to draft bills and to submit them to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, either directly or through the government. These bills must be examined by the Assembly. Provincial governors, city governors, divisional governors, and other officials appointed by the government must abide by all decisions taken by the councils within their jurisdiction

Definition of Political Development Among the numerous but narrow definitions of political development, a number of development studies scholars have considered development as in relation to the question of power and its distribution. A developed society is characterized by the distribution of various sources
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71 of power. Specifically, three sources of power may be identified in every society: 1) Economic power; 2) Scientific power and professional skills; and 3) Power to use physical force and coercion. In societies where sources of power are wielded by a limited number of people, political power will be concentrated on the hands of a particular group of people as well.(1) So, if we take democratization as meaning the distribution of power sources among various social forces, we may assume it as the necessary and sufficient condition for political development. This is a minimalist definition of political development. The definition presented in this writing refers largely to political sociology of power. However, there is a presumption that political sociology is not simply restricted to the relationship between the state and society. Given the definition of politics offered by post-structuralists and constructivists, it is assumed that the realm of politics includes marginalized groups as well as

transnational forces like the globalization of capitalism and the statesociety relation is defined in light of broad area of politics.(2) In general, the reasons for the failure of democracies may be classified as structural and process types. Structural obstacles are meant those ones which, according to Marxist definitions, are mainly characterized by long-term durability. In this situation, it is conceived that structural characteristics of the society and socioeconomic infrastructures act as restricting factors and limit the actors choices. In the second case, it is conceived that political actors are faced with specific choices in order to achieve democracy which may increase a political systems likelihood of survival and stability.(3) On this basis, it can be suggested that there is a possibility of transition to democracy and political development in the specific periods of history, but the inability of actors, and in other words, the lack of sufficient political capacity in them for any efficient political participation cause the failure of such transition. This writing takes mainly structural obstacles to development into account and meanwhile emphasizes the structure of political power and its reproduction. But it should be reminded that obstacles to political development are different from a society to another one. Accordingly, the role of every factor differs in various societies.
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72 Political Development and Closed Power Circuit in Iran As mentioned above, this article regards the main factor in Irans political underdevelopment as the persistence and reproduction of something that can be labeled as the closed power circuit. This concept implies that in Iran (notably during the past century) political power has persistently taken precedence over economic power and has been viewed as the sufficient condition for its acquisition. Due to its domination over the bulk of power sources, the state represents the principal force behind the continuity and reproduction of the closed power circuit. Different writers and scholars have described it in different ways. Iranian despotism and absolute state are the two prevalent descriptions of this concept. The main argument here is that following the Constitutional Revolution in Iran the structure of authoritarian state has appeared despite the superficial legal constraints on power, and the sources of coercion have expanded and were concentrated on the hands of the government using a multitude of reasons or excuses including the consolidation of national unity and single national identity, the acceleration of economic development and so on. Naturally, the governments control on the sources of non-coercive power (including financial resources, mass media and educational apparatus) strengthens the degree of authority and concentration of power in the government and therefore undermines the chance for political competition and participation.(4) Three important issues respecting the closed power circuit involve the reasons for its formation and the state support for it, the quality of this support and the consequences thereof. According to the articles presumptions, the paradoxes inherent in the

Iranian state particularly the modern state account for its support for the reproduction of the closed power circuit. Due to its inability to acquire hegemony as well as modern bases of power such as economic and technological power, this state is forced to resort to mental and ideological sources of power. In this direction, in order to gain legitimacy, the state intervenes in the society excessively and generates the dependent classes. Such an intervention leads to the heightened inequality and consequently to the weakness of national identity envisioned by the state and will bring about the grounds for the decrease in the state legitimacy.(5) From
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73 this perspective, state support for the closed power circuit results in the dependence of the classes on the state on the one hand and the state dominance on the sources of power for preserving the status quo on the other. For instance, under the Qajars, many of the prominent businessmen established interlocking relations with the city officials and granted them a share in their commercial activities. Hence, common interests were created between the major businessmen and the government officials which led the government to protect the businessmen and the traders to partially finance the governments financial needs, and on the other hand made businessmen dependent on the government and prevented the emergence of an autonomous and self-governing class of urban businessmen.(6) The political system in Iran has persistently subjected the economic system to its control. In an overview of Iranian history, it is always visible that just those people could become wealthy and possess economic power who could also build contacts with the political system and the governments officials and proceed to conduct their economic plans and actions with their approval. Under the Pahlavi regime, the political system made utmost attempts in order to further enhance the dependency of the economic structure on the political one more than any other time, because the regimes leader, contemplating on the Qajars experience and the advent of the Constitutional Revolution and subsequently during the nationalization of oil affair, learnt clearly that the presence of a minimum degree of autonomy for the groups existing in the economic system might cause heavy costs for the government.(7) On the other side, it is important to note that the state in the Oriental societies has always been more powerful and robust than society. Perhaps in the certain periods of history, the weakness of society itself has led to such a situation, but this very state is considered as a weak state compared to the Western and developed states. Thus, the state willingness to gain exclusive power has firm historical roots, though in the certain periods of history, the state has been unable to realize this willingness because of its internal paradoxes. Among the other clear characteristics of the state in Iran is its domination on social classes. In the social formation prior to capitalism in Iran, landowners were weak as a class and dependent on the
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74

state. With the emergence of capitalist relations of production, modern bourgeoisie was forged by the state and was dependent on it. This allowed the state to impose its policies on this class without facing any serious obstacle on the part of the modern bourgeoisie.(8) We witness such a condition in various periods of the Iranian history especially in the contemporary age. The political elites and the supreme authority were on belief that they have to fully concentrate power in the state institution in order to implement their plans and objectives and ensure their security in this manner. On the other side, since the reproduction of state power and sovereignty did not rely on material and economic bases in the long term, differing interpretations and versions were made of the foundations of power and consequently of legitimacy. Distrust of the disciples grew in the ruler and the tendency to monopolize power was intensified. Under the Pahlavi regime when the state managed to further strengthen its autonomy from the society through selling oil, tendency to monopolize power became more apparent than in the past. The Iranian traditional civil society was suddenly marginalized under the Reza Shahs rule due to the despotic central governments attack on the traditional groups and more apparently on the Ulema and the bazaar businessmen as well as rapid modern reforms launched by an authoritarian state. The Ulema came back to Mosques and the bazaar merchants were forced to accept undesirable aspects of the modern economic system.(9) One of the main reasons behind such actions was Reza Shahs preference for the weakening of resistance centers vis--vis the governments power. It was also apparent under the Mohammad Reza Shahs rule .With his modernization project, the Shah intended to fully remove the former dualistic system based on the dual leadership of the clergy and the state and establish a system based on the exclusive centralized power of the state.(10) Considering the quality of state support for the closed power circuit, it may be argued that the state has consistently sought to reproduce the closed power circuit by creating and reinforcing dependent classes on the one hand and by making efforts to regulate its relations with foreign forces on the other. The reason was that the ruling elite maintained that there was a close and direct relationship between the reproduction of
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75 the closed power circuit and the protection of the political system. Therefore, the state would be able to reduce its tendency to preserve the closed circuit in question just when the maintenance of the system is not substantially threatened. Political reforms in the contemporary Iranian history can be better understood within this context, i.e. the ruling elite surrendered to reforms when they thought that 1) the preservation of the system hinged on the acceptance of such changes, and 2) this change cannot be a threat to the system. The monopoly of power sources particularly economic and physical sources, i.e. oil and security forces are the two important elements in the continuation of that circuit. The state exploits the rents coming from oil in order to reproduce circuit through

the creation of the dependent classes and the suppressive security forces. In this relation, bureaucracy is a rent for the recruitment of the dependent classes on the one hand and an instrument for further concentration of power in the hands of the state on the other. When the interests of transnational forces (capitalist states) were not threatened because of the reproduction of this circuit, the state was able to retain its power by regulating its relation with transnational forces. Along with the aforementioned actions, the state has always been attempting to marginalize the independent classes (middle class in particular), groups and the individuals opposing the existing circuit. Hence, the Iranian state has always been close to its periphery namely marginalized social groups and individuals and to control this periphery has constituted one of the main concerns of the state for the preservation of political system. These marginalized groups have also been waiting for the appearance of internal paradoxes of the state and its weakened control on the sources of power. In this course, intellectuals were included in the governments blacklists more than any other social group, because they represented the main group opposing the monopolistic concentration of power in the hands of the state. Furthermore, social groups were suppressed in this course. Under the Reza Shahs reign, the ceaseless personalization of power by using police state and military forces enabled him to suppress brutally any social movement. Indeed the reforms initiated by Reza Shah could not contribute to the establishment of a
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76 viable state structure not dependent on the Shah himself. Reza Shahs scornful and cruel governance style, thinking full of suspicion, and violent political tendencies led to the removal of all competent politicians from the political scene, politicians who were not obedient enough in his opinion.(11) One of the other ways to reproduce the closed power circuit in Iran includes the exploitation of religion in order to legitimize the ruling regime. This is usually done through the development and dissemination of religious versions compatible with the ruling ideology. In this situation, the version in question is of such a quality that both presents a religious feature of the existing power structure and supports the status quo and indeed the continuation of the governing system. The despotic government has persistently tried to take advantage of the ideologized religion as a means to make people ideologically dependent on the state. People in their constant encounter with such measures have explained their ideological detachment from the government and have advanced every kind of social movement with a religious cloak, which was separate from that of the government.(12) The result of such a condition and the state sponsorship of the closed power circuit in Iran has been the state entanglement in the paradoxes of the Iranian state. One of the aspects of such paradox is the exacerbation of state legitimacy resulting form the actions the state conducts to improve its legitimacy and security. That is to say that the

state marginalizes autonomous social groups and classes in the short term to protect its power, whereas in the long run these groups and classes challenge states legitimacy through gaining help from the transnational forces. From this view, another circuit apart from the closed power circuit can be considered which is largely in contradiction with the closed power circuit and has been often formed by marginalized social forces. While the first circuit is the continuity circuit, the second one may be called the change circuit. The state treatment of this circuit has differed over various historical periods. The Iranian states have consistently attempted to undermine this circuit or bring it under their control by regulating their relations with the transnational forces. In addition to the grand levels noted above, the impact of the confrontation of the closed circuit with the
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77 change circuit and state willingness to reproduce the the former circuit might be studied at other levels. Personalization of power is amongst the apparent results of such a condition, because the preservation and reproduction of the said circuit in terms of decision-making demand prompt decisions for the execution of punitive and award power. This will normally require that one single person make such decisions, for decisionmaking in democratic and impersonal systems is a lengthy process. A writer describes the situation under Reza Shah as follows: Provincial governors, heads of governmental departments, director-generals, principals of banks, ambassadors and actually all were Reza Shahs agents. No one could say Reza Shah was either in the position of decisionmaking or implementation. Reza Shah made decisions, issued orders, appointed and dismissed persons, determined affairs, and in short he ruled in a true sense.(13) Distrust of attendants and attempt to remove any political alternatives, either individual or collective, were other consequences of the personalization of power. The same writer suggests: No organized force, political grouping, social institution and political current was able to become prepared for filling the power vacuum after Reza Shah. Moreover, his rule lacked alternative and shadow power, considering the dominant political structure.(14) Marvin Zonis describes eloquently the said sense of distrust. To him, the further one takes part in political system and the more power one gains, the higher his feeling of insecurity and subsequently suspicion and mistrust will become. Thus, power produces the feeling of insecurity and mistrust, because the process of power is not constrained on specific institutions and regulations but subject to the inclinations for the power holders. For administrative development:
http://www.jstor.org/pss/3441871

Major Constitutional Development in Iran Constitutional History Date Event Description

1905-06 First Constitutional Movement In objection to the government unfair actions, people and clergies took sanctionary in Abdol-Azim. It ended with the Shah's promise to dismiss the prime minister and establish the House of Justice. 1906 Second Constitutional Movement Two Sayyeds (Tabatabaei and Behbahani) strike in the holy city of Gom and people gathered in British embassy/ Tabriz movement 1907 Shah signs the Constitutional order and establishment of the first parliament The unrest ended when the prime minster resigned and Shah signed the Constitutional order. The Constiutional Assembly got elected and decided mainly the parliament structure, duties and regulations. 1907 Constitution Amendments Separation of the power among the branches of government/ increase the degree of accountability of the minsters/ Islam became the official religion of the country and necessity of approval of regulations by clergies 1907 Artillery fire against parliament Mohammad Ali Shah, who became the king after death of his father refused to accept the constitution and finally ordered the destruction of the parliament building and closing the parliament and murder of the representative 1909 Restoration of the Constitution and parliament Extensive revolt through out the country and Constitutionalist march to the capital restored the constitution and and abolished the shah. Ahmad mirza became the king. 1925 Constitutional reform ends the Qajar dynasty Reza Khan forces the gathering of the constitutional assembly which reformed article 36, 37 and 38 of the constitution, declaring Reza Khan the King 1928 Modernization Reform 1941 Occupancy of Iran by Britain and Soviet Union Reza shah's abolishment/ Mohammad Reza Shah became the king 1948 Constitutional reform to increase the shah's power Mohammad Reza shah asked for gathering of the constitutional assembly which reformed articles 44-48 and gave the shah the power to cancel each or both of the parliament and senate 1951 Military Coup After nationalization of oil industry and increasing the power of the prime minster, Dr. Mosadegh, Mohammad Reza shah organized a military coup against him with the help of CIA and British SIS. 1963 White Revolution Mohammad Reza shah liberal reform including land reforms/ infrastructural, educational and health reforms and women suffrage 1979 Revolution and adaptaion of the constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran 1989 Constitutional Reform Article 5, 107, 109, 111

the constitutional history of Iran and Turkey and the attempts to restructure and

reform these countries political structure. Iran and Turkey, which never became colonized, adapted their first official constitution endogenously around the same time and had similar economic and political structures that make them an interesting case study. Now after a century, not only the constitution of these countries are far from the western standard of democracy, but also are very different from each other. The Congleton king and council model of bargaining best describes the experience of these countries. We expand this model to explain the constitutional bargaining between different interest group as well as between the executive and parliamentary powers. This research is mainly uses the historical narrative until now. Although the empirical studies in the 20 political economy is not an easy task because of the difficulties to measure the political factors, limited data and large number of factors which affect the political structure of a country, we hope to find the way to test both the effect of the constitution and regime changes on the economy of these countries and our hypothesis of constitutional bargaining. 21