2011 605261

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Turkish Studies
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Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey: 1968 as the Mirror of 2008
Doan Gurpinar
a a
Istanbul, Turkey
Available online: 25 Nov 2011
To cite this article: Doan Gurpinar (2011): Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey: 1968 as the Mirror of 2008, Turkish Studies, 12:3, 451-474 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.605261
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Turkish Studies Vol. 12, No. 3, 451 474, September 2011
Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey: 1968 as the Mirror of 2008
DOGAN GURPINAR
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Istanbul, Turkey
ABSTRACT This article discusses the meanings attributed to the Turkish 68 events and how 1968 became an object of contestation in the 40th anniversary of 1968 between socialists and liberals who were all members of the 1968 generation. Arguing that this debate stemmed from immediate political agendas and the struggle between the socialists and the self-styled democrats to uphold the banner of progressivism, the article provides a brief overview of the controversy that erupted in 2008.
2008 marked the 40th anniversary of the Turkish 68. A fervent debate erupted in the rank and le of Turkish self-styled progressives that resulted in the splitting of the group into two rival camps over current political issues and controversies. The debate on the legacy of 1968 became a showdown between these two intellectual camps. This article will briey overview the debate on 2008 and contextualize it within the political circumstances and the course of the transformation of ideological and intellectual dispositions. What was the Turkish 68? In the 1960s, socialism emerged as a new and blossoming political ideology in Turkey. It was particularly appealing to university students and intellectuals. University students who previously had been overwhelmingly sympathizers of the Kemalist Republican Peoples Party (CHP) gradually shifted to radical and socialist politics towards the mid-1960s.1 n The inuential journal Yo (Direction), which began to be published in 1961, aimed at infusing Kemalism and socialism and became one of the leading exponents of ourishing socialism.2 The journal was open to socialism but not explicitly so. It became a forum where progressive intellectuals with different political and n ideological orientations debated. Yo was arguably the venue which best epitomized the afnities of (early) Turkish socialism toward Kemalism.
Correspondence Address: Dogan Gurpnar, Yasemin sokak, Kent Sitesi B-37 Gayrettepe Istanbul, 34349, Turkey. Email: dogangr@gmail.com. ISSN 1468-3849 Print/1743-9663 Online/11/03045124 # 2011 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2011.605261
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The Workers Party of Turkey (WPT, TIP3) was founded in 1961, under the chairmanship of Mehmet Ali Aybar, a lawyer and a reputable socialist intellectual. It emerged as an explicitly democratic socialist party (and not disposed to Kemalism, unlike Yon). Although it was able to obtain only three percent of the votes in the 1965 elections, its impact on the political scene was enormous and extended beyond its constituency. A signicant majority of the Turkish intellectuals supported the party and the party was perceived as in its ascendancy. The anti-communist right was unnerved by the rise of socialist politics in Turkey. Although WPT had afliations with the illegal pro-Soviet Turkish Communist Party (TCP, TKP) and there was no clear party line regarding democratic politics and revolutionism, Aybar espoused democratic socialism and socialism with a human face.4 The pro-democratic stance of Aybar created uproar in the youth section of the WPT. The socialist youth repudiated Aybars espousal of democracy and his belief in the socialist takeover via democracy and the ballot box. Loathing the commitment of Aybar to democratic socialism, the radical youth (the 1968 generation) abandoned the party and organized in alternative independent student clubs to agitate for revolution.5 College students organized numerous protests, marches and demonstrations in which they had to confront police clampdown and assaults of rightwing paramilitary groups. Even so, the socialist character of the revolting university youth and the Turkish 68 was vague and questionable. Arguably what many of them understood from socialism was rst and foremost anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism and antagonism toward the reactionary and collaborating ruling center-right-wing Justice Party (JP, AP) in the name of patriotism, nationalism and genuine Kemalism. But what was observed was the gradual transformation and radicalization of this leftnationalist disposition into a socialist discourse, jettisoning some of the Kemalist premises and retaining some others. The radical turn came with the arming of student leaders such as Deniz Gezmis and Mahir ayan and their espousal of urban guerilla in 1970. The militarys response to the leftist militants and the declaration of martial law in 1971 to suppress them was arguably the end of the Turkish 68 and the democratic socialist visions of Mehmet Ali Aybar and the beginning of (Kemalist-free) Turkish socialism. Nothing New Under the Sun In the 1970s, Mahir ayan emerged as the mythical gure of the Turkish left. Arising leftist fractions all claimed to descend from his discourse.6 He was the link between the romantic 1968 and the militant 1978. His personal trajectory of transforming into a courageous guerrilla as the son of a wealthy family enrolled in one of the most prestigious universities of exemplies how members of the 1968 generation evolved into the youth of the 1978.7 Mahir ayan connected the student protests of 1968 to guerilla activities and programs of the militarized political struggles of the 1970s.8 Given that almost all the Turkish leftist political organizations and movements trace their origins to Mahir ayan (or some to Deniz Gezmis, the other leading guerilla leader executed in 1972 by the military court), 1968 was perceived as sacrosanct
Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey 453 within the Turkish left. It was regarded as a taboo subject. Only a few independent leftist intellectuals developed a critical attitude towards 1968 and its aberrations and shortcomings in the 1970s. The single exception seemed to be the Birikim circle, where issues irrelevant to the priorities and agenda of the Turkish left and the Turkish 68 such as Eurocommunism, parliamentary socialism, and other facets of Western Marxism and socialism were extensively discussed.9 In the pre-1980 issues of the journal, the militancy and empty radicalism of the Turkish leftist political organizations and discourses were criticized and soft peddled.10 These latent criticisms were substantiated after the 1980 coup, which had a devastating effect on leftist political organizations. Murat Belge, one of the prominent opinion leaders of the pre-1980 Birikim circle, shrewdly criticized the Turkish left in the aftermath of the coup of 1980. Murat Belges article, published in the New Left Review under the pseudonym Ahmet Samim, propounded a radical critique of the Turkish left, in general, and the Turkish 68, in particular. Belge provided a detached and dispassionate overview of the Turkish left from its inception to its meteoric rise in the 1960s. He renounced the assumption that the Turkish left was inherently democratic and progressive. He, in a nutshell, expounded a fundamental criticism of the Turkish 68 from a liberal democrat/democratic socialist point of view: May [in the West] signied the beginning of something consciously unorthodox, revolutionary, but not Communist; in Turkey, on the other hand, there was no similar sense of unorthodoxy or a feeling of a break with Stalinism similar to the one experienced by its European counterparts. Instead, there was a profound sense of continuity and a renovation of the national revolutionary tradition. Moreover, the absence of a break with the past (with Stalinism and Kemalism, in particular) contributed to one of the gravest crises of the Turkish left when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia just three months after the rst student occupations in Istanbul and at the height of the new militancy.11 Belge reiterated his views seven years later in an article published in a special issue of Toplum ve Bilim, the academic journal of the Birikim circle, on the twentieth anniversary of 1968. Belge criticized the juntaist tendencies of the 1968 youth who were for him theoretically against any kind of military rule, but were, in practice, supportive of it. Belge also contrasted the Turkish 68 and the Western 68. He stipulated that in Europe the 1968 emerged as a social movement, whereas in Turkey, it emerged as an attempt to seize power. For Belge, the Western 68 was a long-term ideal to transform society, whereas in Turkey it was conned to immanent political program.12 He also argued that the Turkish 68 was blatantly nationalist. For Belge, although the Turkish 68 perceived itself as patriotic (as opposed to being nationalist), a clear distinction between the patriotism of 1968 and nationalism was not tenable. Furthermore, the historical assessments of Turkey developed by the Turkish 68 were mistaken and hardly diverged from the modernist/Kemalist/nationalist paradigms and worldview. For Belge, leftist slogans such as komprador, ambalajc ve montajc
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burjuvazi (compradorial and assembly line bourgeoisie) were merely reiterations of the Kemalist developmentalist discourse. For Belge, this discourse and vocabulary employed by the Turkish left was hardly Marxist and rather derivations of the Kemalist agenda.13 Belge was also critical of the global legacy of the 1968 events discussing the genocidal policies of Pol Pot and Vietnams Stalinist communist regime and the global lefts culpability in sanctioning these communist forms of authoritarianism. Noting that socialism was in crisis (as of 1988), Belge called for a renaissance of the Left which involved the adoption of a moral position rather than the articulation of new, lofty ideas. For Belge, only with such regeneration could socialists cease looking back at 1968 with nostalgia. On the same issue, Sahin Alpay, a journalist in the leftist Cumhuriyet and one of the student leaders of the 1968 published an article which paralleled Belges criticisms. Noting that, he was a part of the Turkish 68, Alpay wanted to contribute to the reappraisal of the Turkish 68.14 For Alpay, many of the legacies of the Turkish 68 were negative. Unlike Belge, Alpay questioned not only the Marxism of Turkish 68 but also the main premises of Marxism. Alpay maintained that not only were the nationalist and militant features of the Turkish 68 culpable, but also Marxism. For him, encouraging the youth to adopt empty slogans, Marxism legitimized ignorance and forsook freedom (opting for an illusionary collective freedom). For Alpay, the costs of the (68) revolt are severe both for themselves [proponents of the 68] and for the society. Alpay further stipulated that the 68 generation renounced the idea of a pluralist democracy protecting the rights and liberties of the individuals.15 Interestingly, while Alpay had an unfavorable view of the 1968 events, he looked favorably upon the 1968ers. Alpay argued that the 1968 generation, by having lived through the subsequent two decades, learned that the suppression and destruction of the rights and liberties of the minorities for the ultimate aim of the liberation and freedom of a class, a people, a majority, a nation ensued the enslavement of the class, people, majority and the nation. Alpay, reiterating John Stuart Mill, pointed out that There is no absolute truth. What today we know as wrong, may turn out to be right. . .therefore, it is unthinkable to give up the freedom to choose among different ideas, policies, and statesmen. Freedom of consciousness to the individual and freedom to change opinion. . .this is, [Alpay thinks] what the majority of 68ers are believing today [as of 1988].16 Sahin Alpay was himself a Maoist who, during the military regime of 1971, had to ee to Sweden, where he was introduced to the liberal canon, particularly John Stuart Mill and Karl Popper, and came to endorse political liberalism in his Swedish exile. Making a liberal autocritique of 1968, he established a linear continuum between the original benevolent and naive ideals of the 1968 generation and his later political and ideologicalconvictions. Interestingly, he projected his personal and intellectual trajectory and transformation onto the 1968 generation as a whole and perceived his intellectual evolution and transformation as contingent upon his identity
Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey 455 as a 1968er. Concerned with being labeled as a turncoat, Alpay portrayed himself as a 1968er who had developed a genuine critique of his previous political commitments and blunders, smoothly endorsing liberal democracy.17 For him, this was not tantamount to a renunciation of his past, but rather an enlightened encounter with his past and his mistakes. It involved evolution and not repudiation. In short, for Alpay, his liberal democratic worldview was inherent to his 1968er identity. Alpays article received scathing criticisms. Two responses, written by Umit Hassan and Busra Ersanl, two academics with 1968er credentials, were printed in the subsequent issue of Toplum ve Bilim. Ersanls argument was an unapologetic defense of the Turkish 68. Affronted by Alpays criticism of the Turkish 68, she reiterated that it was the authoritarian right that had to be blamed for the democratic deciencies of Turkey. For Ersanl, contrary to the arguments of Alpay, the Turkish 68 was an inher ently progressive moment in Turkey.18 Umit Hassan leveled his criticism against Alpays allegations against Marxism and defended Marxism against his charges.19 That same year, Alev Er, another 1968er and a journalist, interviewed the prominent gures of the Turkish 68, who looked back after 20 years. These interviews were printed in the leftist daily Cumhuriyet as a serial and later published as a separate book.20 The interviewees were critical of some and proud of other aspects of 1968. Apparently, the interviewees disagreed on many points. However, these perspectives as a whole provide a critical balance of the 1968 with its pros and cons. These interviewees were looking back relatively dispassionately after 20 years. It was ironic that the special May 1998 issue of Birikim, the most prominent and arguably prestigious socialist journal of Turkey, preferred to approach the issue of 1968 in a different tone. Although critical of many aspects of the Turkish 68, the articles were emotionally charged and apologetic and mystied the Turkish 68 events.21 This was in contrast to the critical and dispassionate reappraisals of Murat Belge and others in the 1980s. It may be argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of socialism as a feasible and realistic alternative forced the Left to become more conservative in its engagement with its past. Whereas the critical attitude toward 1968 in the 1980s stemmed from an endeavor to refashion a new left after observing reformed communism in Europe and the collapse of the left after the military coup of 1980, the left became defensive in the face of the collapse of its dreams and hopes in 1989 and thus aimed to protect what it still held in its hands. As the left was marginalized in terms of its constituency, it became less critical of 1968 and obfuscated the earlier critical attitudes within the left to the Turkish 68. As this article attempts to demonstrate, this attitude became clearer after further disappointments in elections and the emergence of a new, non-leftist intelligentsia culminating in the launching of the daily Taraf in November 2007. The Emergence of a Non-Leftist Political Space: Islamists and Liberals These critiques of 1968 were very briey summarized to establish that in 2008, almost nothing new was articulated. What was new, however, was context and the
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circumstances. The self-condence of the left had signicantly eroded and the emerging liberal/left intelligentsia was gradually dissociated from socialist/leftist intelli` gentsia and cultivated self-esteem vis-a-vis the left. Furthermore, what was legitimate in an intra-left debate within an intellectual space monopolized by the left was not perceived as legitimate and well-intentioned in a debate where the left was perceived as being under assault. Although the left reacted as if the sacred 1968 had been criticized and slandered for the rst time, the intra-left reappraisals and criticisms of 1968 were rampant even by the 1980s by those who were critical of conventional leftism but still a part of the socialist epistemic community. Thus, the 1968 debates are meaningful only when they are contextualized and located within space and time. Although the Turkish left was marginal in terms of its constituency, it held intellectual power in Turkey. The fact that the left in Turkey is politically weak does not mean that it does not possess power and inuence in other realms. Given that intellectuals were overwhelmingly socialist, the left in Turkey dominated intellectual capital. Although other political views had cultivated their own intellectual capital, they remained much less prestigious and inuential. In a country where organized labor and the workers movement remained marginal, it was associated with petty bourgeois radicalism and intellectualism. Endorsed predominantly by intellectuals and professionals, the left was assumed to be inherently more intellectual, more universal, and more progressive. In the 1970s, being an intellectual amounted to being a leftist. Socialism in Turkey, different from that in Europe, where it emerged and developed in relation to and interaction with working-class agitation, meant rst and foremost intellectual socialization and the political expression of being an intellectual.22 One signicant development observed in the second half of the 1990s was the rise of Islamist intellectual capital.23 As political Islam faced repression in its democratic expression,24 Islamists discovered and began to espouse the merits of democracy. To be able to speak the language of democracy and uphold civil rights and liberties, Islamists incorporated modern western epistemology. Islamic intellectual capital ourished and made the transition from being parochial and inward looking, with a reference and value system of its own, to being open intellectually, eagerly following and engaging in contemporary western theoretical debates. Western epistemology had replaced the self-referential epistemology of Islam as the principal reference system.25 Before this intellectual watershed in the late 1990s, Islamic worldview and ideology was a closed world to outsiders. Lacking any encounters and interactions, the Islamist and leftist intellectual worldviews were indifferent and mutually exclusive to each other. What happened beginning in the late 1990s was that the interaction and intersection of Islamic, leftist, and other non-Islamic discourses burgeoned. This process initiated the opening of new intellectual channels. This transformation, accompanied by the rise and transformation of Islamist politics,26 led the Islamist/ Islamic intelligentsia to challenge the leftist intelligentsia and to claim to represent the principal political opposition to the Kemalist establishment. In short, the advancement of the Islamic intellectual sphere shook up the Turkish intellectual scene.
Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey 457 The second half of the 1990s also witnessed the emergence of a secular non-leftist intellectual space. It is very hard to specify its exact characteristics because various individuals and circles have pursued distinctive agendas and trajectories. The most elementary observation that can be made with regard to this new thinking is that it initially evolved within the Turkish left. In fact, it may be dubbed as leftist revisionism. After the collapse of statism and economic utopias, the discrediting of alternatives to the market and capitalism, and the acknowledgement of the poor democratic and humanitarian records of the socialist experiments, many on the left began to give priority to democracy and liberties than to discredited economic messianism. Some refrained from calling themselves liberals but pursued vague third ways (between socialism, capitalism, and liberal democracy). Some ex-leftist intel lectuals such as Etyen Mahcupyan and Ali Bayramoglu identied themselves as democrats as subscribers and proponents of a new, credible and alternative vision at variance with both socialism and liberalism.27 Some made their peace (or armistice) with capitalism. Some rediscovered the merits of liberalism and capitalism and became passionate liberals.28 Others went further and reinterpreted capitalism as an emancipatory power replacing the communist utopia of Marx.29 The paradigm/vision of a second republic advocating the replacement of the Kemalist, authoritarian, and state-centric rst republic with a liberal and fully democratic second republic30 became an umbrella term (employed predominantly by their antagonists to discredit its subscribers with a label with negative connotations) subsuming all the heretic leftists and turncoats with diverse political leanings and commitments. A few attempts were undertaken to create liberal left venues in the media. For example, in the early 1990s, Hasan Cemal, the editor of the leftist daily Cumhuriyet, attempted to transform the daily into a liberal/left newspaper but met with strong opposition and failed.31 Yeni Yuzyl was launched in the second half of the 1990s by the media tycoon Dinc Bilgin to address leftists and ex-leftists by espousing a liberal democratic/liberal left agenda, although the daily failed to follow a democratic line against the militarys intervention in politics in the end of 1990s to encounter the rise of political Islam. These two instances can be regarded as early manifestations of an emerging political/intellectual axis. Although this new thinking was apparently distinct from the leftist premises, it was explicitly assumed that there was compatibility between them. It was long treated as the unruly and heretical child of the traditional left. It continued to be subsumed under the label left. This assumption had been abandoned by the second half of the 2000s when the ideological differences between them became apparent and irreconcilable. In the second half of the 2000s, the hegemony of the left over this new thinking eroded. The revisionists on the left self-identied themselves as democrats, a concept rst coined by Mahcupyan in mid-1990s, and gradually disassociated them selves from both socialists and liberals. After a period in which prominent proponents of democrats individually expressed their views in different settings, the daily Taraf, which began to be published in November 2007, became their principal site or semiofcial medium. After several months of faltering, Taraf overwhelmed the inuential
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n socialist daily Birgu in daily circulation gures.32 Tarafs bombastic agenda-setting headlines based on leaks from the military provided Taraf publicity which no leftist periodical or daily could attain. Taraf became the principal venue where oppositional politics were articulated and upheld and thus emerged as the most prestigious newspaper of the (liberal-minded) intellectuals as opposed to the popular media. This represented a critical moment in the transformation of the self-image of the democrats. Their recruits and promoters, feeling secure in the respectability they had acquired within the narrow intellectual community and self-assured by their intellectual rigor (in comparison to the mediocrity of the left) and proud (even arrogant) of their credentials (in contrast to the wavering democratic record of the left), began to openly dissociate themselves from the left. This dissociation seemed not to be intentional; it developed spontaneously. Although leftists argued that Taraf had been contemptuous of their ideology from the beginning, in its earlier months, the newspaper had preferred taking a proleftist perspective (especially with its daily cheers to Chavez on its international pages). Taraf, in particular, and the new thinking, in general, was forced to dissociate from the left as they and the left adopted different stances on the showdown between the JDP and the military.33 Although a comprehensive anthropology of the Turkish left has yet to be undertaken, it can be observed in Turkey, as suggested above, that the left perceived itself as inherently democratic and progressive. This was taken as an axiom rather than as a hypothesis. The left was perceived, by its very denition, as the only legitimate address of democratic and progressive politics, whatever the actual practice of the left may have been. This assumption did not necessarily correspond to reality. The left also regarded itself as intellectually superior and unwavering in its progressivism. The ideology in Turkey was associated with intellectualism in a country where no considerable grassroots social movement had developed,34 especially after the demise of the left as a popular political movement in 1980s. In fact, as argued above, in Turkey, being leftist was tantamount to being intellectual, rather than referring to a certain political ideology. Tarafs contestation for an alternative intellectualist venue was viewed by the left as a challenge to its monopoly of intellectual supremacy and its status as the natural site of progressivism. Therefore, it is argued here that these were the principal motives for the Left to cultivate hostility and contempt toward Taraf. Feud within the Progressives The assaults of the new thinking on the left were observed on many occasions. One clash emerged with regard to the different responses given to the militarys ultimatum on April 27, 2007 denouncing the candidacy of Abdullah Gul for presidency. The democrats espoused for an unconditional and uncompromising rebuff of the militarys interference in politics whereas for the leftists JDP did not deserve such a support due to its undemocratic credentials. For democrats, the lefts hostility toward the JDP and its conservative worldview precluded the socialists from
Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey 459 developing an unequivocal renunciation of the involvement of the military in politics.35 For the democrats, the left did not have a genuine conceptualization of democratic politics. Furthermore, its reluctance and half-hearted support of the maintenance of democratic politics exposed latent Kemalism, a charge that infuriated the socialists.36 Another assailment of the democrats came after the JDP amended the constitution to allow headscarves on university campuses in February 2008. A group of academicians circulated a petition calling for the outright abolishment of the ban on headscarves on university campuses.37 A few days later, leftist intellectuals and academicians circulated another petition supporting the end of the ban on headscarves on university campuses provided all other rights and liberties were broadened and social conditions of laborers enhanced.38 To the democrats, this was conditional and reluctant support and, therefore, yet another sign of the lack of the commitment to democracy and the prejudices of the left.39 Another controversy erupted with regard to the stances taken in the prosecution of those (including several four-star generals) who were indicted for organizing a military coup beginning in 2008. Whereas Taraf became the chief supporter of this controversial prosecution, known as the Ergenekon Trial, perceiving it as an important n milestone in the democratization of Turkey, Birgu was indifferent to the prosecutions and perceived the Ergenekon Trail as a strategy of the JDP to eliminate its n, opponents and, subsequently, to establish its dictatorship. For Birgu this prosecution was merely an intra-capitalist skirmish between neo-liberal and conservative JDP and the militarist and Kemalist wing of the capitalist bloc. Thus, it had no relevance for the advancement of democratic standards in Turkey. This attitude was manifested crystal-clear in the headlines of the March 22, 2008 issue of Birgun, which generated fury among self-styled democrats. The headlines read: Yiyin Birbirinizi (Go Molest Each Other), implying a neutral stance between the Kemalists and liberals and endorsement of an indifferent attitude. The impact of these headlines was so devastating that it also generated heated discussions in the columns of Birgun. Several of its columnists criticized the headlines of the newspaper while others defended it. The newspaper was forced to clarify its editorial stance.40 1968 Events as the Mirror Of 2008 As the self-condence of the democrat intelligentsia enhanced, the new democrat intelligentsias critique began to include the left along with nationalist and Kemalist ideologies. Divulging their disassociation from the left, they ceased being timid toward the legacy of Turkish socialism. With the consolidation of non-leftist intellectual space, the new intelligentsia attempted to take over the intellectual hegemony rigorously maintained by the left. It is argued that the changing dispositions within the intellectual space determined the modalities of the reappraisal of 1968 as well as the repercussions of the debate on 1968. By 2008, this new political/ideological axis, known as democrats,41 constituting an alternative (and inuential) intellectual space had been crystallized. These
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self-styled democrats subsequently denounced leftist politics in general and the attitude of leftist intellectuals and the organized left to the political tension between the Turkish military and the JDP government, in particular. The left responded to these charges with equal vehemence. Within such a context, a public debate over the character of the Turkish 68 erupted. One particularly signicant aspect of the sequence of polemics throughout 2008 was that it was the rst time that the left had been criticized by a non-leftist intellectual axis (even though many adherents of the democrat stance would dene themselves as leftist, and they may be labeled legitimately as semi-leftist or quasileftist), which the left was compelled to take seriously, unlike the case of the antileftist rhetoric of rightists and conservatives during the Cold War. Those were merely indictments of the left that employed simplistic, militant, and aggressive jargon and were, therefore, never taken seriously by the left, but only ridiculed.42 ` Given that the Turkish left was condent of its intellectual superiority vis-a-vis the right, the previous, crude indictments from the right never really disturbed the left. What was different in the debate over 1968 was that it was a battle for intellectual hegemony between the leftist intellectual axis and the newly emerging democrat intellectual axis. Thus, the reaction of the left against the criticism of the self-styled democrats was different. The unease of the left stemmed from the acknowledgement of the intellectual caliber of the new criticism, the fact that the language and the vocabulary employed by the self-styled democrat intelligentsia were drawn from the leftist vocabulary and language and that the intellectual roots of the new criticism lay within the left itself. In short, there was a close afnity between the leftist and the democrat intelligentsia. The new democrats comprised disillusioned ex-leftists (although many of them continued to call themselves leftists). The articulation of these criticisms and charges coincided with the retreat and collapse of the left.43 Thus, the left could not respond to these criticisms self-condently. This was mostly because the left had been forced to assume a defensive stance after the collapse of socialism in the world and the brutal suppression of the left after the coup of September 12, 1980.44 In Turkey, no liberal center had emerged which might have challenged the monopoly of the left over its self-styled progressive rhetoric until the 1990s. As liberal ideas gained prominence, respectability, and recognition in the 2000s, the Turkish progressive political and intellectual sphere split into two. What was observed during the 40th anniversary of the 1968 was a challenge to the monopoly of the left over the production, reproduction, and marketing of progressivism, as well as knowledge and ideas, for the rst time by a newly emerging axis of the intellectual/political intelligentsia.45 Although heavily inuenced by liberal philosophy and ideas, the new intellectual axis (consisting of disillusioned leftists and/or ex-leftists) refrained from endorsing the labels of liberalism which carried negative connotations in Turkey and opted for the endonym of democrats. Self-styled democrats cultivated a self-esteem ` and self-assurance that was not unlike what the left had enjoyed vis-a-vis its ideological rivals. The principal motivation of this war of attrition between the left and the
Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey 461 self-styled democrats was the aspiration of both sides to capture the pole position of progressivism. Both sides argued that they were the only credible progressives, standing in opposition to the false progressivism of the other party. It was this emerging political/intellectual space over which the ruthless battles of attrition over 1968 had been waged.46 Remembering 1968 after 40 Years As argued above, the 1968 debate surfaced at a specic political conjecture in which liberals and socialists diverged sharply over their attitude with regard to the ruling reformist Islamist JDP. Although most of the criticisms leveled at the 1968 events in Turkey were not new, their impact became much more devastating and imposing due to the increasing vulnerability of the left and competition between left and the democrats. The myth of 1968 arguably had been upheld to establish the selfstyled progressivism of the left. Thus, the myth of 1968 turned out to be a strategic target to be eradicated for the democrats, given that in their eyes the destruction of the myth of 1968 would reveal the democratic inadequacy and sectarianism of the left. As discussed above, the rhetoric of the Turkish 68 was awash with blatant Kemalism and nationalism.47 It included, for example, the slogan fully independent Turkey the depiction of Turkey as militarily occupied by the USA (distinct from the classical Marxist scheme of economic imperialism), and the holding of rallies like the Mustafa Kemal rally organized in 1968 by socialist youth, which became the principal inspirations for the neo-nationalist left in the 2000s. Distinct from the historical cultures of the western socialisms, the Turkish 68 was molded within the worldview of Kemalism and the discourse of Turkish nationalism. Although the left had been transformed since then, 1968, as the ethnogenesis of the Turkish left, remained a taboo and retained its sacrality. With the hindsight of 40 years, a new and critical reinterpretation of the Turkish 68 is apparently pertinent. This sentiment was expressed by many who participated in the Turkish 68, but who had become disillusioned by the course the socialist movement took and broke away at some point. Nevertheless, it was the embracing of the Turkish 68 and the transformation of Deniz Gezmis and Mahir ayan into mystical gures by marginal neo nationalist leftist circles that had given rise to the controversy. The extent of the substantiality of this association became a matter of dispute. The socialists deliberately trivialized any afnity whereas many identied resemblances and discursive afnities/continuities. It is ironic that the neo-nationalist interpretation of 1968 and the criticisms of (ex-leftist) liberals such as Hasan Cemal are in congruence. Whereas neo-nationalists exalt the Turkish 68, liberals condemn it for the very same reasons. The nationalist and authoritarian features of the Turkish 68 have to be assessed in a separate paper. It is apparent that the Turkish 68 hardly resembled the Western 68. It went along with the leftication of Kemalism or the adaptation of the Kemalist antiimperialistic jargon to the socialist and Marxist ideology and worldview. What is
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important to address here is why the democrats in 2008 were inclined to highlight the nationalist and authoritarian features of the Turkish 68 while the left opted to obfuscate them. Sahin Alpays 1988 analysis of 1968 was shared by many turncoat 68ers who had made the transition to liberal democracy. Actually, many members of the Turkish 68 were keen to reappraise their past. Some vehemently repudiated their past. Hadi Uluengin, a 68er and columnist in mainstream daily Hurriyet, remembered his Maoist days as his years of insanity went as far as to denounce 68 as counter revolutionary.48 Gulay Gokturk, another columnist with 1968er origins argued that there was no such thing as a Turkish 68 apart from myths and empty hagiographies.49 Others highlighted and criticized the nationalist and authoritarian tenets of the Turkish 68 events, but abstained from renouncing them outright.50 In many regards, this debate was an intra-1968 debate. People who were actual members of the Turkish 68 disagreed on its legacy. Whereas some leftists later adopted a post-socialist liberal outlook and denounced their pasts, others empathized with and domesticated their pasts by dissociating themselves from the visions and utopias of 1968 and the 1970s, while still exalting the idealism of 68. Cengiz andar joined Sahin Alpay after 20 years. andar reclaimed his past as a 1968er. Dismayed with those who were disparaging 1968 and indicting it as the precursor of neo-nationalism (ulusalclk), he argued that the Turkish 68 was, rst and foremost, a form of sincere patriotism. Identifying himself as a proud member of 1968, he depicted himself as standing where 1968 meets 2008, where the idealism of 1968 meets the liberal democracy of 2008 since for andar, the spirit of 1968 can only be realized in 2008 by promoting democracy and struggling against neonationalism.51 One obvious motivation for the democrats to renounce the Turkish 68 was to expose the democratic shortcomings of the left. Just as they had called into question the democratic credentials of the founding moment and the founding myth of the Turkish left, the democrats expressed their reservations regarding the democratic credentials and claims of the left in 2008. Furthermore, they aimed to demonstrate that the left cannot legitimately oppose nationalism and authoritarianism given that the left cannot come to terms with its own authoritarian legacy. What is more, it continues to reect this authoritarianism through its poor record in countering military involvement in Turkish politics and in upholding human rights and freedoms. For the democrats, the left has to question itself and confront its past before painting itself in democratic colors. In that regard, such a concern partially resembles the European turncoats who abandoned the communist movement in disillusionment and published black books on Stalinist communism, revealing the God that failed and renouncing the hypocrisies of the left.52 Beginning with the denunciations of communism as totalitarianism by Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, Whittaker Chambers and Stephen Spender in the late 1940s, in the latter half of the 1970s a critique of left-wing totalitarianism took French intellectuals with storm. In books and pamphlets, in the press and on television, antitotalitarian intellectuals loudly and dramatically denounced
Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey 463 Marxist and revolutionary politics as fatally afliated with totalitarianism.53 Pierre Rosanvallon, Jacques Juillard and others established the contours of a new genre of antitotalitarian discourse. Francois Furet wrote a history of communism to come to terms with his communist past and his unquestioning loyalty to Soviet Union.54 For him and others, it was an ethical duty to encounter and renounce their inglorious past. As maintained by Michael Scott Christofferson who criticized the approaches of scholars of French left such as Tony Judt and Sunil Khilnani, the antitotalitarian moment was also heavily ideologically charged and had to be treated as such.55 Such a full-edged assault, with its philosophical and time-historical dimensions, was not undertaken in Turkey. Nevertheless, although socialism was never as powerful as in France, the antitotalitarian moment in Turkey merged the denunciation of communism with an exhaustive denunciation of Kemalism and aimed to demonstrate the inherent Kemalism of Turkish socialism and its pseudo-progressivism. Some participants in the 1968 debates employed these polemics as an opportunity to develop their own autobiographical black books. The man who came closest to writing such a piece was arguably Hasan Cemal, who penned his memoirs to disown his past as a 1968er back in 1997. Halil Berktay, an eminent historian and a 1968er undertook an exhaustive critique of Turkish socialism, Marxism, Kemalism inherent in Turkish socialism and attested the afnities between them in his column in Taraf from 2008 to 2011.56 Hasan Cemal wrote several articles in May 2008, the 40th anniversary of the May events in 1968.57 In these articles, he reiterated the views he had previously articulated in his book Kimse Kzmasn, Kendimi Yazdm (No Offense, This is My Story)58. Cemal, in his ve articles penned in May, briey criticized the romanticization of the 1968 events and argued that such romanticization obstructs a genuine encounter with the actuality of 1968. Hasan Cemal, who was in 1971 the co-editor of the leftist daily Devrim (Revolution), claimed that he was also burdened with personal responsibility in the killing of Deniz Gezmis. Nevertheless, he argued that it was not only erroneous, but also dishonest to take Deniz Gezmis as merely a heroic revolutionary. Cemal stipulated that Deniz Gezmis was not a naive romantic, but simultaneously a pawn and an actor engaged in power games played in the rank and le of the military in close cooperation with the juntaists in the military attempting to forment a left-wing coup. Cemal asserted that it was these murky realities that had sent Deniz Gezmis to the gallows. Furthermore, for him, the rightist coup of 12 March should be analyzed in interrelation to the abortive leftist coup of 9 March. In fact, it was the attempt of a leftist coup that had prompted a rightist coup. Deniz Gezmis brutal persecution cannot be regarded simply as a massacre of the inno cents in which there were evil perpetrators on the one side and innocent victims on the other. It was rather a brutal end to the showdown between equally vicious parties and juntaist groups involved in a violent struggle. It was the plans of Deniz Gezmis and his colleagues that had paved the way to their deaths. In short, for Cemal, the 1968 was not a romantic and idealist adventure, but a process that nurtured a perilous and authoritarian ideology and destroyed a generation and a country. Of course, one of the principal motives for Hasan Cemal in writing these rather stern
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articles, as he expressed in them, was his response to the championing of Deniz Gezmis by the neo-nationalists opposing the JDP. At a time when many left-wing (and right-wing) nationalist gures were arrested for their alleged plans to overthrow the JDP government by illegal means in the Ergenekon Trial, Deniz Gezmis was pro pelled by the left-wing nationalists and hard-line secularists as their hero and pioneer. For them, Deniz Gezmis was a role model who had espoused an independent, secular, and anti-imperialist Turkey, following the path of Ataturk. Hasan Cemal established an afnity between Deniz Gezmis and the left-wing neo-nationalists, not only in their political pursuits but also in their ideology. This was too much for the non-Kemalist socialists. For them, the fact that Deniz Gezmis and the Turkish 68 were endorsed by the Kemalists did not mean that Deniz Gezmis was himself a Kemalist seeking a military regime. For them, Deniz Gezmis was an uncorrupted genuine revolutionary, regardless of the fact that he had been hijacked and abused by the neo-nationalists.59 Deniz Gezmis was apparently not a democrat. His socialist worldview was limited to a few slogans. His anti-imperialism can hardly be regarded as socialist. It was arguably a derivation of Kemalist nationalism. However, it also has to be maintained that 1968 was not a static moment. From the nascent student unrest of the early 1960s to the cumulative radicalization of early 1970s, it had been transformed in time. Deniz Gezmis was learning socialism, not from books but from a process of spontaneous political socialization and radicalization. This was equally true for Mahin ayan, who had changed his ideas every time he penned a new article.60 By the time he died, he had transformed into a socialist of the book or a scientic socialist through his impressive repertoire of Marx and Lenin quotes in his theoretical articles although his Kemalist twists in his exegesis of Mao, Lenin and Marx are unmistakable. Arguably, 1968ers gradually became true believers of Marxism Leninism. It is also valid to ask if, after the 1968ers were drawn into the maelstrom of Marxism Leninism, their Kemalist and nationalist perspectives were marginalized and extinguished. Another question that may be posed is whether it is legitimate to associate and relate Deniz Gezmis to the developments of the following decade, through which he never lived. Deniz Gezmis in 1971 was an amateur playing the game of revolutio narism inspired by the genuine revolutionary movements in the third world. In May 2008, a series of provocative articles were published in Taraf, by Rasim Ozan Kutahyal in the op-ed pages of the daily.61 These articles more or less reiterated what Hasan Cemal had said with a sharper tone. Kutahyal also charged the Turkish 68 with authoritarianism and nationalism and expounded Hasan Cemals perspective, widening the liability to the Turkish left in general. He also argued that Deniz Gezmis ideology was ulusalclk per se. For him, the ideology was invented by Deniz Gezmis and his generation, and therefore it is contradictory to endorse and extol Deniz Gezmis and to oppose militarism, juntaism, and Turkish Gladio62. For Kutahyal, the left lacked the moral base to oppose Gladio given that the ideology of Gladio resembles the ideology of the Turkish left. His tone was aggressive, uncom promising, and smacking of an abhorrence of the left. Kutahyal went further than Cemal in his depiction of the entire Turkish left as the lackeys of ulusalclk.
Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey 465 Kutahyal argued that even those who perceived themselves as anti-nationalists were also susceptible in terms of their afnity with nationalism and authoritarianism. Kutahyals articles outraged the socialists. In a very short time, Kutahyal became a hate gure for the left. He was accused of being a rightist, a reductionist, a careerist, etc. Although Kutahyals articles suffered from anachronistic to a considerable extent, the responses from the left printed in Taraf did not respond to the questions raised by Kutahyal and other 1968 skeptics and remained eulogies to Deniz Gezmis and the other leftist executed or massacred in the 1970s.63 Although Taraf did publish these commentaries responding to the charges of Kutahyal and printed almost no supportive commentary to Kutahyal (due to the fact that they did not nd any64), the left maintained that Taraf intentionally leveled an assault on the left.65 Ironically, Taraf became an even more immediate enemy than the neo-nation alists in the eyes of many leftists and the socialist daily Birgun. According to this interpretation, the liberal Taraf was in the service of the JDP and neo-liberalism and had been commissioned to defame the left. There was resentment towards the left with regard to the followers ambiguous attitude in espousing democratic politics in Turkey. When Taraf began to be published, leftists were regarded as the most prospective bloc of subscribers to it. At least this was what the publishers of the Taraf assumed. However, Taraf did not nd as many leftist subscribers as it had anticipated. Kurds embracing their ethnic identity and Muslims identifying with their religious identities constituted the bulk of its subscribers.66 The circulation gures rose from an average of 10,000 in the rst year of the daily to 50,000 in the second year of the daily thanks to Kurds and conservative subscribers who regarded Taraf as congenial to their concerns.67 In time, this development resulted in a disassociation. This resentment gradually became enhanced as the left was seen as aloof from the primary preoccupations, priorities and concerns of the daily Taraf. However, this seemed hardly an intended development, but rather a process in which there was cumulative radicalization of both parties. Within these circumstances, liberalism and neoliberalism acquired an unprecedented notoriety within the left.68 Neoliberalism began to be perceived as the mother of all ills, and liberalism was interpreted as being subordinate to the forces of neoliberalism (in the disguise of benign advocacy of democracy and freedom) and as serving to legitimize neoliberalism. Furthermore, an intra-left debate in which many leftists questioned the leftist credentials of those who sided with liberals, the daily Taraf, and the JDP in the name of opposing the involvement of the military in politics in Turkey burgeoned.69 It may be argued that this strain was an outcome of the erosion of the monopoly of the left over progressivism. Thus, alternative claims for progressivism had to be defeated intellectually. Many articles discussed and revealed the deciencies, failures, and hidden agendas of the supposedly democratic discourse of the democrats. For the left, what liberals (and liberal socialists) were doing was merely whitewashing the neoliberal agenda of the JDP and capitalism. For them, what the democrats were advocating was not democracy, but a beautication of merciless neo-liberal capitalism.70 Strikingly, liberalism gradually emerged as the main
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adversary of the left. It is as if liberalism, and not Kemalist authoritarianism, was responsible for the problems in Turkey for decades and it was liberals who had suppressed Turkish socialist movement for many decades. In this argumentation, the defamation of 1968 was perceived as a deliberate agenda of liberals to discredit the left as a whole. In an environment of neo-liberal assault, 1968 turned into a Holy Grail of the left in order not to allow 1968 to be destroyed at the hands of liberals and neo-liberals (in alliance with the reactionary JDP).
A Third Way: The Middle-Ground Interpretation of the Turkish 68

Thus far, two distinct and contending leftist depictions of 1968 have been presented. The rst was the 1968 of the orthodox socialists. For them, the Turkish 68 epitomized the emergence of a vigorous leftist movement that had evolved from student protests to a full-edged socialist movement until the rising socialist movement was crushed mercilessly by the coup of 1980. The second narrative presents the Turkish 68 as the rediscovery and reproduction of Kemalist ideology by the youth. This narrative takes it for granted the notion that Kemalism and socialism complement each other. The socialism of the late 1960s was a natural outcome for the progressive and enlightened few. Kemalism, the progressive ideology of the Turkish revolutionaries, was complemented by a socialist outlook which was in fact no less than the perfection of Kemalism. As naive bourgeois progressivism and republicanism were transformed into Marxism and socialism in the mid-20th century (as a law of history), Kemalism was to be fully realized in the progressive ideology of socialism. In short, for them 1968 was the nationalist-cum-socialist protest of Turkish progressive youth. The third way interpretation of the left (endorsed by liberal leftists) depicted 1968 as a courageous, heartening, and noble revolt. However, after 40 years, it has to be acknowledged that it had many aws, and, thus, an uncritical exaltation of the Turkish 68 would not only bring about a repetition of the mistakes of 1968, such as its proneness to violence and militarism, but also would be reactionary. It is ironic that sociologist Ferhat Kentels article which was highly critical of the record of 1968 was entitled After 40 Years. . .More 68s, an allusion to the renowned 1968 slogan referring to Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh.71 Apparently, Kentel endorses the spirit of 1968, but renounces its context. Kentel avows the idea of 68 as an abstraction, but disavows the course it took. This middle-ground approach can be dubbed as the third way interpretation, extolling 1968, but not endorsing any of its legacies. Ironically, for Kentel, not unlike andar, the 1968 of today is to be embodied in a non-belligerent, non-sectarian, and peaceful defense of democracy and the promotion of rights and liberties. Ferhat Kentel, who considers himself a democrat, rejecting socialism and liberalism as modernist ideologies unable to advance democracy and liberties, displays the ambivalence of those who are critical of their pasts72 (although Kentel is a 78er73) but cherish its idealism and sincere utopias, and establish an afnity with that past.
Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey 467 Ethnogenesis of the Left In 2008, many books on the Turkish 68 were published. Half of these publications represented 1968 as a precursor of the neo-nationalism of 2000s, whereas the other half rechristened 1968 as an inherently socialist movement and trivialized its Kemalist and nationalist motivations and overtones.74 Both narratives established linear and deterministic paths from the year 1968 to their respective ideological positions in 2008. Thus, each invented genealogies for itself. However, it is important to note that the two alternatives have their relative truths, but argues that each of the interpretations ignores the fact that 1968ers aged and over time transformed their views and political/ideological stances. They parted ways. Some became neo-nationalists who, in their perceptions, evolved into neo-nationalism as a natural sequel of their formative years as 1968ers. Some others transformed into orthodox socialists/Marxists in the1970s as a corollary of the cumulative radicalization of 1968 and its inevitable break with Kemalist nationalism and ideology at some point (although the degree of this break is disputable). These socialists also imagined a continuum in their intellectual and ideological progress. Some socialists of the 1970s evolved into liberal and/or critical socialist positions in time, and some did not. Some acknowledged the failure of their socialist project after the brutal suppression of the left by the military junta of the 1980 coup and revised their orthodox socialist views. Others became more reactive as a response to the brutality of the junta. They all experienced their two or three decades of political and intellectual trajectories as the natural offshoots of their formative years and politicization as 1968ers. The Turkish 68 established the main facets and vocabulary of the subsequent ideologies, dispositions, and political orientations, and thus it is impossible to dissociate one from the other because they were constituted within a shared ethos and habitus. Furthermore, they were not constituted and developed exclusively to each other. Thus, it seems legitimate for people to imagine their own 1968s, claim 1968 exclusively for themselves, and perceive 1968 as a zone of conict to be able to discredit the claims of the others on the Turkish 68. For the adherents of these ideologies, 1968 was no different from the mythical ethnogenesis of nations. As all nationalists claim an ethnogenesis that legitimizes and eternalizes their distinctiveness and their claim for autochthonism to delegitimize other contenders in the land in which they dwell, 1968 was to serve the same purposes for the left (and the democrats). Thus, it was a contested territory in an entirely different political context in 2008.
Conclusion In short, three alternative assessments of 1968, expounded by the adherents of the traditions evolving from 1968 have competed with each other. The rst represents the Turkish 68 as a response to imperialism, its collaborators holding political power, and their capitalist lackeys. The second interpretation portrays the Turkish 68 as a genuine precursor of non-Kemalist socialism and thus argues that the legitimate
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heirs of Deniz Gezmis and Mahir ayan are the Turkish socialists of today (and per ceives ulusalcs as renegades from the ideals of 1968). The third approach distinguishes between the positive and negative aspects of 1968 and endorses only its positive aspects. Thus, what is seen is a partial and selective embracing of 1968, not addressing the critical questions of what to do with the negative aspects and how to endorse 1968 by only highlighting its positive aspects. Criticizing it for its crude political vision, its afnity with Kemalism, and its proneness to violence, this line of thought opted to sanction it for its ultimate (benevolent) ideals, which for the adherents of this line contributed to the development of progressive thought and politics in Turkey. Apparently, the Turkish 68 set the ground for the emergence of a new political language. This article attempts to discuss 1968 as a site of confrontation in which both parties found enough convincing evidence to prove their points and omitted any unsupportive evidence. The reason why each party could espouse views that conicted with and were so contradictory to one another is that 1968 was only a beginning and not an end. 1968 was not simply an idealistic rebellion of youth who were crushed ruthlessly. It cannot be reduced to a tool manipulated by the juntaists, either. It was one of the constitutive moments of modern Turkish thought, not only for socialist and socialist-cum-Kemalist thought, but also for the Turkish right given that the Turkish Right emerged as an autonomous movement as a response and reaction to the rise of socialist politics in the late 1960s.75 The language and vocabulary of the Turkish 68 inuenced and reconstituted Turkish right-wing ideology as well in terms of providing it with a certain vocabulary and grammar. It can be observed that the neo-nationalist right of the 2000s incorporated heavily the discourse and vocabulary of 1968, deriving it from the neo-nationalist leftists. It may be argued that the two principal avenues from the Turkish 68 are neo-nationalism and orthodox socialism. Arguably, the third bumpy road may lead to liberal socialism and liberalism. 1968 also may have planted the seeds that grew into the post-socialist liberalism and/or liberal socialism, as andar and Alpay were inclined to believe. However, the common 1968 origins of these two main avenues (in terms of their perceptions of Islam, the JDP, and imperialism) also reveal the afnities between these two dispositions Given that this is not a postmodernist article, the article does not conclude that there are as many 1968s as there are commentators on 1968 or there is only text. Rather, it only suggests that the legacy of 1968 is a complicated issue that dees simple categorizations. The study of 1968 and its legacy require a dispassionate investigation that disawows ideological agendas.
Notes
1. For an autobiographical account of one of the prominent student leaders; see Harun Karadeniz, Olayl Yllar ve Genclik (Istanbul: May Yaynlar, 1975), pp. 9 13. 2. For the journal Yon, see Ergun Aydnoglu, Turk Solu, 1960 1971 (Istanbul: Belge Yaynlar, 1992), pp. 38 46; Igor P. Lipovsky, The Socialist Movement in Turkey, 1960 1980 (Leiden; New York;
Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey 469

Koln: E.J.Brill, 1992), pp. 85108; Hikmet Ozdemir, Kalknmada Bir Strateji Arays: Yon Hareketi (Ankara: Bilgi Yaynevi, 1986); Gokhan Atlgan, Yon-Devrim Hareketi (Istanbul: TUSTAV, 2002). For WPT, see Artun Unsal, Turkiye Isci Partisi, 19611971 (Istanbul: Tarih Vakf Yurt Yaynlar, 2002); Sadun Aren, TIP Olay, 1961 1971 (Istanbul: Cem Yaynevi, 1993); Igor P. Lipovsky, Ibid., pp. 9 82; Ergun Aydnoglu, ibid. For Aybar and his thoughts, see Bars Unlu, Bir Siyasal Dusunur Olarak Mehmet Ali Aybar (Istanbul: letisim Yaynlar, 2002); Mehmet Ali Aybar, Bagmszlk, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm: Secmeler, 1945 I 1967 (Istanbul: Gercek Yaynevi, 1968); Mehmet Ali Aybar, Marksizm ve Demokrasi Uzerine Dusun celer (Istanbul: letisim Yaynlar, 2002); Ugur Mumcu, Aybar ile Soylesi: Sosyalizm ve Bagmszlk I (Istanbul: Tekin Yaynevi, 1990); Bars Unlu, Mehmet Ali Aybarn Mudafaalar ve Mektuplar, 1946 1961 (Istanbul: letisim Yaynlar, 2003). I Artun Unsal, (2002), p. 336. For a critique of the sacralization of Mahir ayan even in the relevant article in the supposedly academic edition of Iletisim Publishing House on the modern history of Turkish left, see Ergun Aydno glu, Sol Hakknda Her Sey mi ? (Istanbul: Versus, 2008), p. 344. For the two criticized articles, see Sureyya Kozakl, Mahir ayann Siyasi Dusuncesi, in Murat Gultekingil (ed.), Modern Turkiyede Siyasi Dusunce-Sol (Istanbul: letisim Yaynlar, 2007), pp. 500509; Sureyya Kozakl, Mahir I ayann Miras, in Murat Gultekingil (ed.), Modern Turkiyede Siyasi Dusunce-Sol (Istanbul: letisim Yaynlar, 2007), pp. 510516. I For a biography of Mahir ayan, see Turan Feyizoglu, Mahir (Istanbul: Su Yaynevi, 1999). For Mahir ayans theoretical essays and policy programs, see Mahir ayan, Toplu Yazlar (Istanbul: Su Yaynlar, 2008). For the Birikim of the 1970s, see Sukru Argn, Bir Sosyalist Dusunce Platformu: Birikim, in Murat Gultekingil (ed.), Modern Turkiyede Siyasi Dusunce-Sol (Istanbul: letisim Yaynlar, 2007), I pp. 967 988. For a criticism of the Turkish 68 and student movements in Turkey, see Murat Belge, Universitelerde Devrimci Genclik Sorunu, Birikim, No 1 (March 1975), pp. 56 65. Ahmet Samim, The Tragedy of the Turkish Left, New Left Review I/126, (March April 1981), p. 70. Murat Belge, 68 ve Sonrasnda Sol Hareket, Toplum ve Bilim, Vol. 41 (Spring 1988), p. 154. Murat Belge, Ibid., p. 160. Sahin Alpay, 68 Kusag Uzerine, Toplum ve Bilim, Vol. 41 (Spring 1988), p. 168. Ibid., p. 184 Ibid., p. 185. Alpay reiterated his views in 2009. See Nadire Mater (ed.), Sokak Guzeldir: 68de Ne Oldu? (Istanbul: Metis Yaynlar, 2009), pp. 181 182. A similar view was held also by Maureen Freely, both in ction and in non-ction. Maureen Freelys novel Enlightenment recounts the story of a half-imaginary, half-real Maoist cell in Robert College whose members in the coming three decades became human rights activists with liberal democrat/ democratic socialist credentials. I would criticize the book in its depiction of this trajectory as a very smooth one, failing to observe the breaks and ideological ruptures. However, I would agree with Maureen Freely that one segment of Turkish left, who came from relatively aristocratic and bourgeois origins and turned to Marxism in their youth, later renunciated Marxism very sharply and in many cases socialism of any sort in favor of liberal democracy, had a continuum in their life circles, not in their ideological outlook but in their ideals, class-identities and class-bound socializations. See Maureen Freely, Enlightenment (London: Penguin, 2008). Freely identies her ctional almost heroic liberals of Turkey as follows: Like so many others of their generation, they did not just survive two bouts of imprisonment and torture; they picked themselves up, continued their lives and ourished, not just as professionals but as Turkeys leading pro-European democrats. For these are the people whotogether with Pamukbroke Turkeys 82-year ban on open discussion of the Armenian question. . . .Who are they? They come for the most part from the urban bourgeoisie. Most are Turkish Muslims, with the complex family histories that are the legacy of Ottoman multiculturalism. The rest belong to Istanbuls Greek, Jewish or Armenian minorities. Whatever their
3.
4.
5. 6.
7. 8. 9.
10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.
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18. 19. 20. 21. 22.
23.
24. 25.
26.
27.
28.
29. 30.
background, they were all required by law to attend Turkish primary schools. Most moved on to study at one of the foreign lycees that were established during the Ottoman Empire in the mid to late 19th century, and that remained in place after the founding of the republic to educate its westernizing elites. Many from this generation went on to further education in Europe or the USA. Some returned to take up university posts in Turkey. Others stayed in the west. Maureen Freely, Turkeys Liberals, Prospect, April 2007, issue 133. Of course, a very important point we have to be aware of is that Maureen Freely dissociates the popular left, the recruits of Dev-Yol, Kurtulus and others, from the college leftists. Many leftists of aristocratic and bourgeois origins, educated in the prestigious schools of Istanbul (and Ankara), had in their later life openly or tacitly converted to liberal democracy. These conversions may be regarded as class-bound acts, whereas many leftists of popular origins have persisted in keeping their faith in socialism of any kind, including ulusalclk, a peculiar Turkish derivation of the Turkish left. Coming from a relatively afuent family, Alpay ts into the scheme of Maureen Freely and illustrates this pattern by claiming a continuum in his political formation while making a complete rupture with his Maoist/Marxist education. Busra Ersanl, 1968-1988: Yirmi Yln Tad, Toplum ve Bilim, No 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 147152. Umit Hassan, Kesbsiz Ta O Kadar Cehl Olmaz, Toplum ve Bilim, No 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 137 145. Alev Er, Bir Uzun Yuruyustu 68 (Istanbul: Gendas, 1998) (original publication 1988). Kursat Bumin, 68 Turkiyede Yasand m ?, Birikim, No 109 (May 1998), pp. 6163. Such a perception of the Left was not peculiar to the Turkish case. For Tudeh and the Iranian left as a movement of intellectuals and professionals, see Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 256 257. Buket Turkmen, Muslim Youth and Islamic NGOs in Turkey, in Nilufer Gole and Ludwig Ammann (eds.) Islam in Public (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2006), pp. 242246; Ugur Komecoglu, New Sociabilities: Islamic Cafes in Istanbul, in Nilufer Gole and Ludwig Ammann (eds.), Islam in Public (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2006), p. 183. For the published text of the public attorneys bill of indictment demanding the banning of the Welfare Party, Refah Partisi Kapatma Davas (Istanbul: Kaynak Yaynlar, 1998). For this transformation, see Kenan ayr, Islamic Literature in Contemporary Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Nilufer Gole, Melez Desenler (Istanbul: Metis Yaynlar, 2000); Nilufer Gole (ed.), slamn Yeni Kamusal Yuzleri (Istanbul: Metis Yaynlar, 2000); Ferhat Kentel, I 1990larn Islami Dusunce Dergileri ve Yeni Musluman Entelektueller, in Yasin Aktay (ed.), Modern Turkiyede Siyasi Dusunce: slamclk (Istanbul: letisim Yaynlar, 2004), pp. 721 781. I I For some academic assesments of the JDP, see Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Hakan Yavuz (ed.), The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Party (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006); William Hale, Christian Democracy and the AKP, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (2005), pp. 293310; Ihsan Dag, Transformation of Islamic Identity in Turkey, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005), pp. 2137. Fulya Atacan, Political Islam in Turkey, Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005), pp. 3 19. Etyen Mahcupyan, Bir Demokrat Manifestoya Dogru: deolojiler ve Modernite (Istanbul: Patika, I 1996); Etyen Mahcupyan, Bir Demokrat Manifestoya Dogru: Osmanldan Postmoderniteye (Istanbul: Patika, 1996); Etyen Mahcupyan, Buyuk Travmann Esiginde (Istanbul: Patika, 2000); Ali Bayramo glu, 28 Subat: Bir Mudahalenin Guncesi (Istanbul: Birey Yaynclk, 2001); Etyen Mahcupyan, Batdan Doguya Dunden Bugune Zihniyet Yaplar (Istanbul: Patika, 2000). Sahin Alpay, Liberal Olmak Ne Demek, Zaman, January 20, 2005; Sahin Alpay, Liberal Olmak Zorlasyor mu ?, Zaman, January 22, 2005; Cengiz andar, Once 301; Sonra Yeni Anayasa. . ., Hurriyet, September 17, 2007. Mehmet Altan, Kapitalizm Bu Koye Ugramad (Istanbul: Afa, 1994); Mehmet Altan, Marksist Liberal (Istanbul: Ithaki Yaynlar, 2002). The term second republic was employed for the rst time by Mehmet Altan in an article in Sabah in January 31, 1991. Also see Mehmet Altan, Ikinci Cumhuriyetin Yol Hikayesi (Istanbul: Hayykitap,

2008), pp. 127148; Mehmet Altan: Sorun Politik Devletten Liberal Devlete Gecememektir, in Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar (eds.), 2. Cumhuriyet Tartsmalar (Istanbul: Basak Yaynlar, 1993), pp. 33 59; Sag Yanmda Yare Var, Sol Yana Donder Beni, Nokta, October 11, 1987, no: 540, pp. 1219. See Hasan Cemal, Cumhuriyeti ok Sevmistim! (Istanbul: Dogan Kitapclk, 2005). The weekly circulation gures of Taraf can be followed from http://medyatava.com/tiraj.asp (retrieved on 19 August 2008). While Taraf struggled between 20,000 and 10,000 in its rst months, by the summer of 2008, it reached an average of 40,000 50,000 daily circulation whereas Birgun consistently had a circulation gure of 5000 to 10,000. For the struggles and alliances between Islamists, Kemalists, and liberals, see Nora Onar, Kemalists, Islamists, and Liberals: Shifting Patterns of Confrontation and Consensus, 2002-2006, Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, No 2 (2007), pp. 273288. As argued above, this is not peculiar to Turkey, but observable in countries where no strong grassroots working class agitation developed. See Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966). Of course, the socialism subscribed to by middle-class intellectuals, distinct from socialist working-class agitation, is itself an intellectual phenomenon. See Stanley Pierson, Marxist Intellectuals and the Working-Class Mentality in Germany 1887 1912 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 1 10. Etyen Mahcupyan, Aman AKPli Gozukmeyin, Taraf, Agustos 5, 2008; Etyen Mahcupyan, Cemaatci Solun Duzeyi, Taraf, August 17, 2008. Yldray Ogur, AKP demokrat Degil Anladk, peki Siz ?, Taraf, May 22, 2008; Yldray Ogur, Sol icin Son Aksam Yemegi, Taraf, June 29, 2008. Demokrat Akademisyenlerden Kars Bildiri, Zaman, February 2, 2008; Ozgur Universite Istiyoruz, Star, February 24, 2008. Universitelerde Uc Gorus, Milliyet Internet Edition, February 10, 2008. Erol Katrcoglu, Solun Tavr, Radikal, February 23, 2008; Erol Katrcoglu, Ucuncu Yol Siyaseti, Radikal, February 16, 2008; Etyen Mahcupyan, Ortak Sizofreni, Taraf, February 19, 2008; Yldray Ogur, Basitsiniz, Ucuzsunuz, Pacozsunuz, Fasistsiniz, Taraf, March 3, 2008; Saban Kardas, Ucuncu Yol ve Ozgurlukler, Taraf, March 3, 2008. Editorden, Birgun, March 23, 2008. For a defense of the controversial headlines, Metin Altnok, Evet Birbirlerini Yiyorlar, Birgun, March 25, 2008; Metin Altnok, Yazarmz Yldray Ogur Taraftan Yldryor, Birgun, July 29, 2008. The polemic based on these provocative headlines had lasting repercussions. For example, see Ertugrul Kurkcu, AKPnin Demokrasisi Genelkurmayn Kapsna Kadar, Radikal, July 6, 2008; Murat Belge, Vazgecilmez Olmak, Taraf, August 23, 2008. Birgunden Zorunlu Bir Acklama, Birgun, August 23, 2008. In this article, ambivalent terms such as left and democrats are employed. Although a considerable academic output scrutinizing Kemalism, Turkish nationalism, and Islamism has been produced, we lack substantial academic works on the Turkish left and Turkish liberalism. These ideologies and dispositions are yet to be objectied and transformed into academic objects. Because this article does not delve into the self-perceptions and dispositions of these stances and there is not enough space to articulate on the intricacies of nomenclatura, no comprehensive and authoritative operative denitions of these terms are presented. Moreover, the usage of these terms conceals more than it reveals. There are no agreed-upon authoritative and overarching denitions of these labels. Unless specied, they are bound to remain only generic names. Given that there is no representative and ideal-type left, the employment of the label left has to be qualied. Here, left refers to the socialists who adhere to the conventional Marxian scheme and are skeptical of leftists who develop a pro-liberal line. In the eyes of this author, this attitude is fairly representative of the bulk of Turkish socialists. ODPs split into two factions with one faction advocating a pro-liberal socialism and the other faction defending a distanced stance to liberals displays the extents of this division. Ufuk Uras who endorsed a proliberal stance lost the race for the chairmanship of the party against the liberal-skeptic socialists and subsequently resigned from his party. ODPde Ergenekon atlag, Radikal, November 13, 2008; ODPde kinci Kozanoglu Donemi, Radikal, February 2, 2009. Many leftists endorsed a liberal I
31. 32.
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42. 43.
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leftist stance and became critical of orthodox lefts assaults on democrats and liberals. Though many prominent leftist gures endorsed such a stance, they remained marginal within the mainstream left and the organized left. For a detailed analysis and discussion of the great divide within the Left, see Dogan Gurpnar, Neoliberal Saldr, Foucault Etkisi, Birikim, February 2009; The Collapse, Transformation and Refashioning of Turkish Progressivism paper presented in MPSA, Chicago, April 2009. Ulusalcs (neo-nationalists) who endorse an extreme version of Turkish nationalism but perceive themselves as anti-imperialist leftists are also not taken into consideration for reasons of practicality and limiting the scope of the paper. Similarly, the vague label democrat is hardly explanatory. This is an umbrella term used for people who prioritize advancement of the level of democracy in Turkey, support enhancement of civil liberties, and endorse a pro-Kurdish stance without necessarily implying an explicit political commitment. Originally, the label democrat was claimed by indepen dent intellectuals such as Etyen Mahcupyan and Ali Bayramoglu in the late 1990s, but in time it began to subsume a wide political space covering the area between left and liberalism. As a result, many intellectuals began to be dubbed as democrats for the reason that they do not t into any conventional ideology. For the endorsement of a democrat stance and its manifesto, see Ahmet Altan, Dindarlar ve Demokrasi, Taraf, July 11, 2008. In this article, the label democrat is used in quotation marks given that this label is an endonym and does not necessarily imply superior democratic credentials. For the anti-communist discourses of the Turkish Right during the Cold War, see Yuksel Taskn, Milliyetci Muhafazakar Entelijansiya (Istanbul: letisim Yaynlar, 2007). I The Turkish left is characterized by its marginality and lack of substantial constituency in Turkish politics since the coup of 1980, which repressed the left severely. The collapse of global socialism in 1989 was an aftershock for the Turkish left. At the time, the Turkish left was trying to reestablish itself as a considerable political force and unite, leaving factional disagreements and enmities behind. The collapse of global socialism crippled the left at a time when hopes were relatively high regarding a reunication of the left and organizing a comeback. After some more years of chaos and factional strife, ODP was founded in 1996 as the united front of Turkish socialism. However, by that time the left and socialism were already remnants from the past. Nevertheless, the founding of the party, hailed as the party of love and freedom unleashed waves of optimism. After a poor electoral perform ance in the 1999 elections (0.8 percent), ODP lost its appeal and its nest hour. It was no more perceived as the symbol of revival, hope, and prospective comeback. By the late nineties, the left represented no future and had no political prospects. For the process of unication of the Turkish left, see Sey Ongider, Solda Birlik ve Yeniden Yaplanma Sureci, in Modern Turkiyede Siyasi Dusunce: Sol (Iletisim Yaynlar, 2007), pp. 9991003; Ergun Aydnoglu, Selcuk Eralp and Demir Kucukaydn, Birlik mi? Rekompozisyon mu? Birlik Tartsmalar Icin Tebligler ve Degerlendirmeler (Istanbul: Koral, 1990). For a self-portrayal of the ODP, see Belgin Demirer (ed.), ODP Kendini Anla tyor (Guncel Yaynclk, 1996). Also see the special issue of Birikim, the leading Turkish intellec tual journal on the ODP with a highly optmistic presentation on November 1997. Birikims 146. ssue I on June 2001 was again evaluating ODP. However, this time the disappointment with the partys political stance and political performance is highly evident. For the extent of the crash of the left under military rule, see Sezai Saroglu, 12 Eylul Sonras Devrimci Sosyalist Hareket Uzerine, in Modern Turkiyede Siyasi Dusunce: Sol (Istanbul: letisim I Yaynlar, 2007), pp. 10041030. As was noted above, although there is a considerable academic study on Islamism, nationalism, and Kemalism, academic studies of the left are almost non-existent. Therefore, this article suffers from a paucity of sound academic quotations. For a comparison, see some valuable academic works on the culture and cultures of the Left. Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals 1944 1956 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Sunil Khilnani, Arguing Revolution: The Intellectual Left in Postwar France (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1993); David Kertzer, Politics & Symbols: The Italian Communist Party and the Fall of Communism (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1996); Cyrille Guiat, Comrades and Culture: The French and Italian Communist Parties (London; Portland: Frank Cass, 2003); Stephen Gundle, Between Hollywood and Moscow: The Italian Communists and the Challenge of Mass Culture, 1943 1991 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000);

David Kertzer, Comrades and Christians: Religion and Political Struggle in Communist Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Anneie Kriegel, The French Communists: Prole of a People (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972). For a more detailed assessment of the emergence of a non-left intellectual space, see Dogan Gurpnar, The Collapse, Transformation and Refashioning of Turkish Proggressivism, paper presented in MPSA, Chicago, April 2008. In spite of all the polemics, commemorations, memoirs, and journalistic accounts, 1968 is an under studied subject in academia. For the actuality of 1968, see Bags Erten, A Comparative Analysis of the 1968 Movement in Turkey, unpublished MA thesis, Bogazici University, 2004; Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mucadeleler Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul: letisim Yaynlar, 1988), Vol. 7, pp. 2068 2107. I Hadi Uluengin, Mays Yazlar (son), Hurriyet, May 24, 2008. Also see his Mays Yazlar (I), Hurriyet, March 20, 2008; Mays Yazlar (II), Hurriyet, May 21, 2008; Mays Yazlar (III), Hurriyet, May 22, 2008. Gulay Gokturk, 68 Hikayeleri, Bugun, May 11, 2008. For a detailed, critical, and insightful account of not only 68, but the 1970s as well, see Gun Zileli, Yarlma (Istanbul: Ozan Yaynclk, 2000). Cengiz andar, 68 Kusag, Deniz Gezmis, Biz, Hepimiz. . ., Referans, June 3, 2008. Stephane Courtois, Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Richard Crossman (ed.), The God That Failed (London: Hamilton, 1950). Also see Jorge Semprun, Frederico Sanchezin Ozyasamoykusu (Istanbul: Iletisim Yaynlar, 2003); Arthur Koestler, Arrow in the Blue (London: Collins, 1952); Arthur Koestler, The Invisible Writing (London: Collins, 1952); Whittaker Chambers, Witness (New York: Random House, 1952). Michael Scott Christofferson, French Intellectuals Against the Left: The Antitotalitarian Moment of the 1970s (New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books), p. 1. Francois Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). Also see Franz Borkenau, World Communism: A History of the Communist International (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962); Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975). Also see Abbott Gleason, Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Halil Berktays articles published between 2008 and 2011 criticizing the legacy of the Turkish and global left were compiled in two volumes. See, Halil Berktay, Weimar Turkiyesi (Istanbul: Kitap Yaynlar, 2009); Halil Berktay, Ozgurluk Dersleri (Istanbul: Kitap Yaynlar, 2010). Hasan Cemal, Ben O Ruyadan Uyandm, Yoksa Siz Hala Uyuyor musunuz ? Milliyet, May 9, 2008; Gezmislerin Idamnda Sorumluluk Paym, Milliyet, May 8, 2008; Gercekleri Makaslamak, Halnn Altna Supurmek, Milliyet, May 7, 2008; Deniz Gezmislere Msr Patlatr Gibi Bomba Patlattranlar, Milliyet, May 15, 2008. Hasan Cemal, Kimse Kzmasn, Kendimi Yazdm (Istanbul: Dogan Yaynclk, 1997). Ertugrul Kurkcu: Silahl Mucadele Yoluna Darbeden Sonra Girildi, Yeni Aktuel, no: 151. For the oscillations and change of views of Mahir ayan between 1970 and his death in 1972, see Ergun Yldzoglu, Sol Hakknda Her Sey mi? (Istanbul: Versus, 2008), pp. 346 355. Rasim Ozan Kutahyal, Denizlerin Yolu Bizi Nereye Goturur, Taraf, May 17, 2008; Rasim Ozan Kutahyal, Denizlerin Yolu, Ulusalclk ve Marksizm, Taraf, May 31, 2008; Rasim Ozan Kutahyal, Denizlerin Yolu ve Ergenekon Zihniyeti, Taraf, May 24, 2008; Rasim Ozan Kutahyal, Tam Bagmszlk, Tam Barbarlk Demektir !, Taraf, June 7, 2008. For the Turkish section of the counter-espinonage organization directed and coordinated by the CIA, organized to counter communist threats throughout the Cold War and known in Turkey as Gladio, from the name of its Italian section revealed in the late 1980s, see Daniele Ganser, NATOs Secret Armies (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 224244; Ecevit Klc, Ozel Harp Dairesi (Istanbul: Turkuvaz, 2009). Bengul Gungormez, Ilericiligin Gerici Retorigi, Taraf, June 5, 2008; Yuksel Isk, 68den Geriye Kalan ve Kemalizm, Taraf, May 30, 2008; Mustafa Lut Kyc, Kemalist Dedikleriniz Proleter Devrimciydi, Taraf, May 29, 2008; Selcuk Polat, Simdi 68li Olma Zaman, Taraf, May 27, 2008.
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64. Anonymous Taraf employee A. 65. For the endorsement of the views of Kutahyal by Yasemin ongar, the assistant executive director of Taraf, see Ideolojik Bilim, deolojik Yarg, deolojik Sol. . ., Taraf, May 27, 2008. I I 66. Anonymous Taraf employees B, C. 67. Anonymous Taraf employee B. 68. See Halil Berktay, Liberalizm ve Cehalet Uzerine, Taraf, July 3, 2008. Also Etyen Mahcupyan, Neoliberal Donemde Neosol, Taraf, October 19, 2008. 69. Necmi Erdogan, Liberal Kisilik Nedir? Solla Ne Derdi Vardr ?, Birikim, December 2008 January 2009; Tanl Bora, Sol, Liberalizm ve Sinizm, Birikim, October 2008; Omer Laciner, Yolun Sonu/ Baslangc, Birikim, August September 2008; Omer Laciner, Devrimci/Sosyalist Olma Tarts mas, Radikal 2, August 3, 2008; Mustafa Kemal Coskun, Sol-Liberalizmin Dogas, Radikal 2, May 25, 2008; Sungur Savran, Marksizmle Tartsma agrs, Radikal 2, May 11, 2008. 70. Melih Pekdemir, Oryantal Despotizm ve Oryantal Liberalizm, Birgun, October 20, 2008; Melih Altnok, Allah Kerim Tek Yol Neo-liberalizm, Birgun, September 9, 2008; Melih Pekdemir, Turban, Anayasa Degisikligi ve Sol Politikann Acmazlar, Birgun, February 9, 2008; Melih Pekdemir, Liberal Degisim Surecine Kars Sol Politikann Acmazlar, Birgun, February 10, 2008. 71. Ferhat Kentel, 40 Yl Sonra. . .Daha Fazla 68, Taraf, May 24, 2008. 72. For Kentels criticism of socialism and liberalism and his alternative position, see his Ehlilesmemek, Duzlesmemek, Direnmek (Istanbul: Hayykitap, 2008). 73. The socialists who mobilized in the 1970s are called 1978ers, which experienced a different process of political socialization than the 1968ers. 74. Sukran Soner, Bizim 68liler (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitaplar, 2008); Bedri Baykam, 1968 Hatr lyorum (Istanbul: Literatur Yaynclk, 1997); Mahir, Deniz, bo (Istanbul: Kalkedon Yaynclk, I 2008); Aydn ubukcu, Bizim 68 (Istanbul: Evrensel Yayn Dagtm, 2004); Deniz (Istanbul: Ileri Yaynlar, 2008); Mustafa Balbay, 78liker ve 12 Eylulun Sol-Krm (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitaplar, 2008); Hasmet Atahan, 68 Baskaldrs (Istanbul: Sosyal nsan Yaynlar, 2008); Ergun Aydnoglu, I Sol Hakknda Her Sey mi ? (Istanbul: Versus, 2008); Nadire Mater (ed.), Sokak Guzeldir: 68de Ne Oldu ? (Istanbul: Metis, 2009). In 2008, the Robert Frasers and Mark Kurlanskys books on the 1968 were also translated into Turkish. 75. For a history and overview of the emergence and rise of the Turkish right and extreme right, see Jacob M. Landau, Radical Politics in Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1974).

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Turkish Studies Vol. 12, No. 3, 451 474, September 2011

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A Third Way: The Middle-Ground Interpretation of the Turkish 68

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Myths and Memories of the 1968 Events in Turkey 469

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