Enzo Paci - Phenomenological Diary

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En o Paci: Phenomenological Diar
EN O PACI PHENOMENOLOGICAL DIAR

1961 edition with 1973 Introduction [Diario Fenomenologico, Bompiani, I Satelliti, 1961] [Translated from the Italian by Luigi M Bianchi 1998 Luigi M Bianchi] D af . N be c Re i i 02. ied, di ib ed, ed, he i e e d ced.
1973 INTRODUCTION The term phenomenology was used for the first time by J.H. Lambert in 1764, and later by Kant, Hegel and Husserl. As we understand it today, phenomenon is what appears, what we see as we see it and we can faithfully describe, without judging it before we can see it precisely as it is. To pre-judge means to express a judgment on things before seeing them; in other words, it means to subject ourselves to a prejudice. That is why it has been said that phenomenology is a return to "the things themselves." It is also a return to the subject, to the cogito not to the subject as an artificial category, but to the [real] subject proper, in the first person: to that subject which each one of us is, which is neither an abstract category nor pure thought. In order to accomplish this, it is necessary to suspend any knowledge, and any judgment made before experiencing acts and facts as they are lived; in other words, it is necessary to undertake the exercise of suspension which the Greek skeptics called epoch . It is necessary not to repeat abstract notions or categories, but to begin all over again and always to carry out the operations which found any knowledge and any science. A science which is based on the inheritance of results already acquired and not re-lived, is a science which enters a state of crisis in the sense described by Husserl in The Crisis of the European Sciences. We must not think that Husserl is against science that would obviously be a very naive position. Husserl criticizes that science which is not founded on operations and thus posits the problem of foundations. Even Galileo's science, like contemporary science, can always forget its own discoveries, and thus rediscover itself. Husserl not only defends the concrete operations on which science is founded, but, in Logical Investigations, he analyzes the linguistic and semantic terms essential to science, and his ideal is that of philosophy as rigorous science. The final idea is truth, and it is truth which gives a rational structure to the world and to history. Truth is not static being, but a lived meaning, to be found over and over again in the exercise of epoch , in the acts, always renewed in time, which each of us performs, yet often forgets. What do we really do, how do we really live every day? This very question allows us to understand how, in a particular sense, phenomenology can make a diary possible, a diary in a new sense, where abstract words tend to disappear in order to make room for what words indicate but are not. A diary is not yet a phenomenology, but can be the introduction to phenomenology, and to this end I have picked my own diary, from 1956 to 1961, which may allow
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the scholar, or the reader who wishes to form an idea of phenomenology, to understand how one can arrive at it, and how I arrived to it. Those who wish to understand the path I followed can read, after the Diary, Tempo e verit nella fenomenologia di Husserl [Time and truth in Husserl's phenomenology] (Laterza, Bari, 1963) and Funzione delle scienze e significato dell'uomo (Il Saggiatore, Milan, 1963) [The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1972]. These works will be followed by Idee per una enciclopedia fenomenologica [Ideas for a phenomenological encyclopedia], which is about to be published by Bompiani, Milan. At some point it occurred to me that phenomenology could be brought close to Marxism, and the Diary documents it. The first hint of such a rapprochement can be found in the essay Fenomenologia e obiettivazione [Phenomenology and objectification], published in "Giornale Critico della filosofia italiana", II, 1961. Later, I talked about it at a conference held in Prague on October 24, 1962, and published in "Aut Aut", n.73, 1963. The words used in the debate between phenomenology and Marxism are varied. I notice that "objectification" is meant in the sense of "reduction of man to a thing," in the sense of man exploited, alienated and negated as an acting, working subject. This appears also in the Diary, but in 1961 alienation, a theme which has since been much discussed within and without Italy, was addressed only incidentally. As far as I am concerned, this debate was also encouraged by the Spanish and English translations of Funzione delle Scienze. The goal of phenomenology, its telos, becomes a society in which no subject, no concrete man, exploits another man. It is not just a question of humanistic Marxism, but of a new synthesis, of a new totalization, as Sartre would say, of a new encyclopedia, as I say. Encyclopedia is not just a relationship among the sciences, but the totality and the fullness of man and his actions. I spoke of phenomenology for the first time in Principi di una filosofia dell'essere [Principles of a philosophy of being], Guanda, Modena, 1939. It was then a question of a dialectical, antinomic being, like the one Plato discusses in Parmenides. But all too often being is understood dogmatically, as something fixed, immobile and, at the same time, generic. My philosophy is different, it is not a theory of static totality, it is not an ontology, but a philosophy of concrete things and of men, and being, as meaning and truth, becomes a rational direction, the sense of all "morality," of all the subjects. The word being is to be interpreted rather as existence and truth of existence this is how phenomenology founds existentialism, but when existentialism becomes ontology and forgets truth, rationality, logic, then phenomenology reclaims its rights ("the meaning of truth") even as it does not forget the concreteness of existence. That is why I speak of time and truth, and not, like Heidegger, of time and being. These are the terms where all the currents of contemporary philosophy meet. I realize that the terminology is subtle, but it is the reflection of a situation. And this happens on many levels: for example, the term being is usable also in the sense of reality, as against idealism, and there is no doubt that there is also a reality of the rational and of the logical. If the Diary has been widely read, it is also because it replaces a subtle discourse, such as the one we are engaged here, with daily experience. Above all, in the Diary there appears the sense of time, the incarnation
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Piazza Leonardo da Vinci, isolated, almost enclosed. The rough-textured, reddish medieval towers. Swallows surround them. Centuries of silence. I sit on a lonely bench, after my lectures at the University. I feel I must begin again, I have been wrong, I have not pursued clearly, resolutely, deeply what I was searching for. It's true: in ever fact, in ever isolated thing, there appear connections with all the things, with all the other facts. In time, in the time of nature and of history. And each fact is individuated, even if it has the form of all the other facts of its type. Individuation? What can it possibly mean? The individual is unique, yet he is everything. Philosophy begins when this onesingle discovers it has within itself typical, essential relationships with everything else. No fact is merely individual, no fact is merely universal. Such necessary mediation of the fact is not a thing nor an idea, just as man is neither beast nor angel. Each reality is something more than abstract universality and something less than absolute reality singular or total. I, the subject, am the first fact. Not the subject of idealism, not the absolute, but the concrete encounter of finite and infinite, of light and shadow. I, as a man, as man, who has within himself the world, even the world he does not know. Man: "dignum omni admiratione animal," "medium mundi." Neither celestial nor earthly, he can re-enter darkness or rise to the truth. Not by himself but with all the others, living and dead in a relationship with everyone else, with all the subjects. He can choose reason, life, or he can choose death, atomic selfdestruction. But he is "dignum omni admiratione" because he carries within himself truth, because he has within himself the evidence of truth, because to be able to speak of evil he must have within himself good, good's life [?], a life he can not negate because it is his own intentional life in the first person, his being subject, his emerging as subject. But this is Husserl, and it is the contrary of the absolutization of the I because it is the relational mediation, the self-recognition of the truth which man carries within himself and which must be realized in history, in time, in the world. Individuation as the meaning of truth. Truth which becomes task, which negates the pre-constituted world in order to constitute it, to make it alive. A radical transformation for man: to become man as he has never been yet. But isn't this Husserl's return to the cogito? Will my relationism be possible without a revival of phenomenology? Existentialism is a sort of situation of factual doubt. It was correct to show that negativity is not even conceivable without the positivity of the truth we carry within ourselves, even if we fail to recognize it. We live in our own historical period, and within us there struggle its contradictions. its truths, its errors. We must begin all over again, with resolve and with patience, take up again our search, correct ourselves, burn away the "impure consciousness [?]" in order to re-discover in ourselves the sense of truth, the world's telos. As soon as we reflect on the path we have followed, we are brutally faced with the narrowness of our incapacity: we sense that error, darkness, vanity, superficiality, are in us, that we carry them within ourselves. But within ourselves there are [also] truth and life. The Greek world. Pericles. Athen's mistake. The conversation with the Apple-Trees in Thucydides. Sophocles feels madness' presence. Euripides seeks refuge in Thrace. Better stay with foreigners, if Athens becomes foreign to herself. Machiavelli questions the ancients, and "they reply with their humanity [?]." A new Renaissance? A Renaissance for all mankind? April 2, 1956
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The towers. The past. To sense their meaning, their reason. Their history in the world in which they have lived and [continue to] live, in the relationships which constitute them and which constitute me. To allow them to become documents, to allow their silence to ripen into a name. To awaken them, to awaken us.
April 10, 1956 These ancient medieval towers, this solid past. The hard and impenetrable alterity of the object. Are they unresolvable into [in?] my subjectivity? But nature and history are not separate from us. We are asleep, objectified in them. We who await to be awakened. Milan, April 12, 1956 We and things are linked by a mysterious pleasure, "ce plaisir special" Proust talks about with regards to the steeples of Martinville. "En constatant, en notant la forme de leur fl che, le dplacement de leurs lignes, l'ensoleillement de leur surface, je sentais que je n'allais pas au bout de mon impression, que quelque chose tait derri re ce mouvement, derri re cette clart, quelque chose qu'ils semblaient contenir et drober la fois." Not something "behind," but something which has been concealed or which has sedimented, and which now must be unconcealed, in the present, for the future. Our entire life, as evident presence, is the reawakening, the clearing of the past it is temps retrouv. The truth, which was asleep, is transformed, becomes typical truth, essential figure. But, as it awakens, it continues to seek itself, to correct itself in the mutual relationships which constitute it, to seek fulfillment, a telos. April 13, 1956 At each instant we perceive, because at each instant we live that which for the intellect is a paradox: the consumption of our life, which is new life. But, precisely because we perceive it, it is necessary for the past that we consume, like the coal produced by the amalgamation of the forests of the Paleozoic era, to be a reality; for that past, which formed them and gave rise to them, consumed them and killed them, and finally transformed them into coal, to have been a reality. And it is in fact this very reality which we perceive: the perception of the heat that today warms me is also the perception of the reality of those forests which lived before me, about three hundred million years before man appeared on earth. And if I do not dogmatize my perception into an abstract discourse, I feel, even when I do not know what it was, that there has been an existence on earth before man, an existence before what we usually call life, an existence which has always been preceded by another existence. Another existence before mine, before man's life, before the existence of the earth, of the solar system, of the galaxies. Perhaps because of this, today I can feel as mine the existence of what is other than I.
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of labor is the most typical expression of a general unnatural use of technology. These instruments precisely because of the agreement[?] between labor and nature and between sense and logical order, between sensibility and category, an agreement they require in order to be constructed; precisely because they too are the expression of the hidden art of nature of which Kant spoke with regard to transcendental schematism require a noncontradictory behavior with regard to the rational sense of life expressed in them and, above all, a behavior which does not consider them merely as means and abstract and separate functions, a human behavior which does not lower the life of the others, the real "subjectivity" of other men, to the level of mere means. By negating such "subjectivity," human society falls into a contradiction with its own means of production, isolates technology in a formal universe, concluded in itself and autonomous. With the pretense of using the instrument without realizing a behavior grounded in social relation and rationality, which it requires in order to be truly positive, with the rejection of the agreement with the intentionality of history, man in fact ends up using the instrument against himself. May 2, 1956 The illusion of the return, of the victory over irreversibility, is the magical incantation with which the eyes of the serpent, which like the Maya serpents incarnates the temporal cosmic cycle, fascinate us. We wish to return to the primordial mother, to the darkness and the peace of the maternal womb. But, since it is impossible to go back, and we proceed in any case toward the future, it is the future that becomes primordial peace, negation of life's labor, of the "discontent of civilization" [disagio della civilt], as Freud said. This future, lived in this way, is self-destruction. It is suicide raised, as with the Mayas, to divine deed. The forest, in Amazonia. Its magic. "Stay here" [Resa=Resta?], it says. And it devours you. The absurd of Recife's equatorial climate. The city's bustle against a background that wants to convince you that everything is useless, that each step forward toward truth is also a step backward toward error. May 4, 1956 Valry: "Notre esprit est fait d'un dsordre plus un besoin de mettre en ordre." The struggle against disorder, obscurity, oblivion, fetishism, injustice, evil, incomprehensibility. There is something in the universe which seems to resist, which opposes awakening. A deep sleep. To side with the awakened consciousness, with the intentionality of truth, with reason, which always goes beyond itself. But reason is not a word or a set of unconscious, mechanical operations. It is life itself, it is logos. Intentionality is the living logos. In a non-abstract sense, it is logic. The danger of killing the life of logic with formalization, with logicism. Logos as continuation of life, beyond everything, despite everything. Once again Valry: "Continuer, pour suivre quelque chose, c'est contre tout. L'univers fait tout ce qu'il peut pour emp cher une malheureuse ide d'arriver son terme." June 13, 1956
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I read once more the Critique of Pure Reason (dialectic). Antinomies. The first antinomy. Thesis and antithesis, says Kant, are not abstract and formal, "legalistic", but depend on "the nature of the thing." Space and time are not "objects." The synthesis can not be completed. Infinity. Transcendental infinity. Dialectic therefore is not an abstract construct. Reason the plane of dialectic should therefore, against intellect, be located on the plane of sensibility. Kant did not see this substantive commonality between sensibility and reason. Man feels reason. He feels the past that precedes him as infinite. He feels that before him there has been a history of the earth and of the universe. He feels that he can not bear infinity, the undetermined, the apeiron; that in it he could lose his own existence. He reacts. In the same feeling of the apeiron there is the feeling of the limit, of the peras (relationships with the "sublime" in the Critique of Judgment). He feels that the implication of the finite and of the infinite is not static, but has a temporal and intentional direction. All this applies to a phenomenology of perception. June 14, 1956 Against infinity, which would ultimately be total indetermination, nonexistence, what exists stands as permanence, rhythm, beat, temporal becoming which turns into figure. Scansion. Figurative structure. Rhythm eschews identity, remaining within analogy. Gradual variations. Birth, gradual duration. Maturation. Gradual dissolution. Intersection, conjunction, resonance, harmony. This is true of all that we perceive, of a phenomenology of the givenness of things, of their way of being phenomena. Rhythm, the rhythm in things, arranges itself both in different times and in different spaces. The shifting of rhythm. Kinesthetic analyses in Husserl. Figures, geometric figures in motion. Topology. Spatial resonances and analogies. Proportions. Fullness and emptiness. Volumes. Masses. All this is on the plane of the Lebens elt, not of theoretical abstraction. Idealization in order to arrive at geometry as science, and also to constructive technology.
July 5, 1956 Perspectivity of nature. Nature, in the web of its relationships, contains both the forms which in it will emerge in the eyes of an insect, and those which will emerge in the eyes of man. Structure and rhythm can be translated into many languages, into many emergent forms. The problem of the translatability of the Gestalt. Between permanence and emergence there is a dialectical jump which makes "no man's land" possible. What Mereleau-Ponty says in his essay on Czanne reminds us of Kirkegaard's Fear and Trembling. July 23, 1956
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To sleep. Thought seems to agree with the body: it does not emerge from the body. While asleep, do I live only as subject? Not only as dream, in any case. I am in deep touch with a kind of anonymous corporeity. While awake I begin to look, to move. My body becomes one of my expressions. While asleep such expression is disincarnate, is not realized in real movement but in a phantasm. Only in wakefulness is there a kinesthetic expression, a gesture which is actually performed. Language itself has its origin in gesture, in the life of the body. Gestural language. Senigallia, August 8, 1956 On the Rocca dei Della Rovere . "Piazza del Duca." When I was three and a half, I used to live in a house on this square. From my window I could see the towers, the moat, the drawbridge. On the same square, the palace which today belongs to the Baviera. The palace in which Valentino had Vitellozzo Vitelli and the others assassinated. The city bastions. I am thinking of the morning when Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta, whose effigy Pius II had ordered burned a few months before, discovered to his amazement that Federico di Montefeltro's army was encamped around the town. Federico's troops had covered forty-five kilometers in one night. Sigismondo's defeat near the Cesano, shortly before the final defeat following the fall of Fano. The Cesano is a stream with a very wide bed. If I cross it and climb toward the interior I find the town where I was born. After the Cesano, the Metauro, and after the Metauro, Urbino. Urbino is the capital of the hills, of all the Marche's hills, to which the full meaning of this line applies: "The shimmering shoreline, from afar." Urbino was not a marine town and did not worry Venice. It always managed to play its cards well with the Pope. Towns that lived on, like that always somewhat teetering, as if in a gamble, without a proper ci itas. There remain, beyond violence, the symbolic dreams: Malatesta's Temple, Federico's Castle. Milan, September 22, 1956 To place between brackets, to reduce to subjectivity, is an act required by life, by a life which wants to be meaningful, which wants to choose its own meaning, the meaning of the others, the meaning of the world. To live is always to live beyond, to project oneself into transcendental figures, figures which are typical, essential forms of meaningful life, of true life (which are, for Husserl, the essences, the eide).
Reflection. Reflection lives in time and projects itself ahead of itself, with an intentionality aimed at something beyond itself. What it discovers is truth, a truth which was in me, but asleep, forgotten. The gaze, projected into the future, is the same gaze which re-awakens the past and discovers the
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sense of the reality of the present. November 6, 1956 I experience things as hard, impenetrable. Space constricts me, limits my freedom. So does time. It seems obvious that I can not go back, that I am not allowed to experience irreversibility. I am not speaking of the technical concept of irreversibility, but of a lived, preconceptual, precategorical experience, of the impossibility of a return. For years I have been insisting on this point, but [some] pretend to believe that I mean to speak of the second principle of thermodynamics, in the sense that physicists use. I am speaking instead of an experience which precedes physics as a science, of an experience of the life-world, of the Lebenswelt. Irreversibility is one of the fundamental structures of the Lebenswelt, just like economic need, which does not wait for economics as a science in order to exist: in fact economics would not exist if there were no "economic structure" (Marx, [A Contribution to] The Critique of Political Economy). Husserl did not see this point except in relation to individuality, when he notes that the individual does not repeat himself and exists only once.
February 8, 1957 Myth, like the word, is the most dangerous of gifts. It can reveal the horrendous world of indistinction, the lack of difference between truth and error, between life and death. Such indifference [?], in Dostoevsky's The Devils appears as the foundation of the demonic. But myth reveals to us that we can not not detach ourselves, that we must detach ourselves from the nostalgia of the mother's womb. Since it is not possible to go back, the pain for the loss of the mother appears as need, as eros, as direction toward truth, as intentionality. Life as logos and faith, faith in the possibility of harmony. Tension of the senses and of the psyche toward truth, the daily labor needed to realize it. Those who had been initiated in the mysteries must have felt something similar to this faith, when the cut ear of wheat was shown to them, in silence. April 14, 1957 If we really think about what we say to many persons with whom we speak every day and who perhaps call themselves friends it may seem we live in a desert. It is almost always clear what they want, what they wish you to say or do. It is especially clear when they believe it is not. We ourselves are like that to the others. An authentic encounter is a rare event. When it happens it is as if the root of the world had been reached a solid, yet fragile, root which allows the world to make sense. Communication is sensing, consenting, reciprocal sensing (Einf lung). It is not a theory of communication. Philosophers of communication often do not make it possible. For the most part of men, for each one of us because we are such part life is diplomacy.
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April 16, 1957 The word detached from the body and from its history does not exist. The written word does not exist: by reading it we bring it back to its original incarnation, to ours, if we fail to imagine the living person who wrote it. The disincarnate word, if it were possible, would have no meaning. That is why sometimes we realize that a person who is speaking to us, if we look at him, if we see the play of his physiognomy, if we make present in us, in our body, the rhythm of his discourse, and the pauses, the stresses, the sudden suspensions, the silence, is pretending. April 18, 1957 An encounter does not have a purpose only for one and the other. The purpose transcends those who meet. It is in the en e of the relationship. Both live for the meaning. They are themselves, and truly themselves, if neither is only himself. The gaze (Sartre). The other's gaze. I live in his gaze, and I know it. He sees me, he listens to me. Reciprocal incarnation in the sexual act. Both closing in, each one in himself, or each one losing himself in the other both becoming, once again, solitude. April 22, 1957 His entire person is expression. His body: a way of living the feeling. Language which becomes physiognomy, gesture, communion of Leib and Seele. There is a style, a music which remains always the same in life. Even while waiting for the unexpected, which is present, in fact, precisely in the waiting. April 30, 1957 Saint-Exupry. A man who did not want to analyze but to realize himself. The dangerousness of his need for challenge. He wants to risk his life because for the joy of finding himself alive again. It is clear in Pilo e de g e e. It is striking that he describes an action in which he managed to save himself, when we can presume that he lived a very similar adventure in the 1944 action in which he died. He seems to have described his own end. Rome, May 1, 1957 Saint-Exupry's Ci adelle irritates me for its moralistic attitude and for its sententious, artificial style. In order to have a sense of himself, SaintExupry had to reach the limit of risk. Do we have a better sense of ourselves when we are in danger? Is the sense of our subjectivity more intense? Two years ago, after the car accident, it was precisely as I was recovering my memory that there grew in me the fear of having lost it, of not having been
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there [?]. But that I had not been there I learned it later, when I could remember. The terror of losing one's presence is possible only in the presence. I remember very clearly that I could not give up analyzing myself. What does it mean to realize now that in a previous time we were not conscious, that we did not feel? Presence of non-perception within perception. Milan, May 8, 1957 Reality and dream. It is not so easy to distinguish between them on the factual plane or on the logical plane. Will the distinction be in terms of the various degrees and ways of feeling that toward which we tend, that toward which we go beyond ourselves, thus in terms of the degrees and ways of intentionality?
Turin, May 15, 1957 On the Milan-Turin expressway, in full sun. The plain left the green in the background; its presence was in the yellow, overly harsh patches. Light which bends shapes and lines. Excessively strong presence of perception. Is abstraction a defense? Milan, May 18, 1957 It's three thirty in the morning. I look out of the window. Faraway rumble of trucks. Houses are incomprehensible. It seems impossible to me that they remain there, indifferent, with so much human life enclosed within their walls. A drunk man walks by. Screams. The philosopher: not only does he think the world always anew, but he lives it, he perceives it always anew with all of his senses, as an incumbent problem. Words and screams which demand an impossible solution? Then silence arrives. A full, vibrant silence. A background against which things are drawn as if they were virgin, just born now, in this moment. And they acquire a meaning, they become translucid, they allow a glimpse of their sense of truth. Be calm, therefore. Don't force things. Let them introduce themselves. You are not their owner. May 20, 1957 The truth of the body, in the body. The idea of a deeper understanding of the phenomenology of Leib all the way to the problem of Einf lung among different types of humanity. Memory of the Brazilian forest and the days spent in Bahia. The sense of a nature that penetrated me? My wake in front of the ocean? A black man singing in that solitude, playing a string instrument unknown to me. A song that made me think of long years of suffering and slavery or of the land of the ancestors, of the ancestors transported in chains, of a land
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that black man had never known. May 21, 1957 The black man. Africa's awakening. It offers us a face of our humanity that until now we did not want to recognize. I feel he disturbs me deeply. Einf hlung: if I feel in him, in the black man, then something of myself is revealed to me which otherwise might have remained hidden forever. As man, therefore, I am also black, even though I never knew it. At first this frightens me, it makes me lose the sense of my life-ground, of the history which has sedimented in me. The discovery of the logos in Greece. But this logos, in order to be real logos, must not be just Greek. It can not renounce itself, but in order to be itself it must feel itself as part of an alterity which it had not yet recognized. A wider and wider, deeper and deeper, more and more difficult constitution of human intersubjectivity. There is an African civilization, an African thought. There is an Indian civilization, an Indian thought. There is a Chinese civilization, a Chinese thought. And our Greek thought, in order to be itself, must discover itself in the other thoughts. To renew itself, to become other, in order to remain, to become logos again. May 22, 1957 Is black man primitive? And what does "primitive" mean? Durkheim, Lvy-Bruhl. Husserl's unpublished K III 7 and his interest in Lvy-Bruhl. From a certain point of view (but it is only one of the many points of view), what is "primitive" is "precategorical", and in this sense it is not made obsolete or negated by "civilization," but continues in "civilization." I put "civilization" between quotation marks. In fact it is precisely to the extent that our categorical civilization is abstract that it is in a crisis. It has "concealed" its own origins, because it no longer knows how its concepts have been formed, it no longer knows what their purpose is, their meaning. Our concepts are valid in this or that field, but we no longer know if they are valid for man, for the subject who operates in all fields. Yet, in some sense, it is true that primitive man is "barbarous;" like us however, like us Europeans of the two world wars. If primitive man must free himself from his barbarism, from sado-masochistic relationships, from aggressivity, if this is true, to the extent that it is true, then we too must free ourselves from barbarism. If primitive man is abnormal, if his way of feeling is pathological, then we too are pathological. The sense of the cult of Asklepiades in Sophocles: mankind is ill, like Philoctetes, and Sophocles knows that even illness, if recognized, can have a positive function. But we Europeans have we recognized our illness? We, the children of Hellas have we understood what Sophocles had understood? We all. white, black and yellow, are faced with the task of a radical transformation. The radical transformation, which on the static plane appears in Husserl as the return to the cogito and as constitutive intersubjectivity, on the genetic and historical plane presents itself as a revolution, as the task of establishing a rational humanity, of constituting man in his human essence.
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The task is the same, for us and for the so-called primitive man. There is a rational entelechy of humanity, as Husserl puts it, which is yet to be established. There is therefore no distinction between the barbarous, primitive man and the civilized European. Despite the accomplishments of science and technology, European man must recognize his own barbarity, sometimes tamed, but often erupting (Freud). Primitive man discovers that his own world, the precategorical, non-abstract world, is more than ever necessary to European man, who has lost it, because he has lost what L vy-Bruhl called participation, that is the universal correlation, the relational life, the connection of our thought with the body, with lived nature, with the "secret art of nature" (the inexhaustible fecundity of "transcendental schematism"). Thus the valorization of the primitive is not the return to the barbaric and the irrational. That is what European man, who considers himself definitely civilized, thinks. Both, European man and primitive man, must find a deeper rational essence of man. To discover the "primitive world" is to discover the rooting of logos in matter, in nature, in corporeity, in the concrete precategorical operations from which scientific categories originate (the value of rhythm: all that we indicate abstractly, primitive man lives). It means to discover the life of reason, relational reason rooted in concrete relationships, constituted by concrete operations. It means to keep life concretely lived in logic and to understand logic as the expression of real operations. European man is in a crisis because he no longer knows how to find in himself what is valid in primitive man, in the "total" world in which primitive man lives. And, in turn, primitive man must arrive at logic, at science, not fetishized science, but that science of sciences according to which mankind must realize itself (the science of history? phenomenology?). We must teach primitive man our science, if we do not fetishize it, and our technology, if we free ourselves from our barbarism, from our irrationality. Primitive man can teach us his own way of feeling and of living in participation, in relationship, in communion, if he frees himself from his barbarism, from his irrationality. But it is a question of mere reciprocity. Primitive man has become aware that his view of life is necessary to European man, much as in Hegel the servant becomes aware that without his own labor the master can not live ("servile consciousness" [?]). To the extent that European man does not understand primitive man, he does not understand himself, and the revolt of primitive man is the self-alienation of European man, the self-destruction of European "civilization." The black man disturbs me because my barbarism is projected onto him; he disturbs me because I have lost myself as man; because I have not yet become man; because I find myself still in the prehistory of mankind. May 23, 1957 African man to whom [Richard] Wright dedicates Black Po er: A Record of Reactions in a Land of Pathos [New York, HarperPerennial, 1995 ?]. African man considered as a "thing" to buy, fetishized, objectified. Not considered as a subject, as my alter ego. He is the African man who, "isolated in the forests of Western Africa, created a conception of life terrifying in its great simplicity, yet irreducibly human. [check!]" Object. For Husserl society is human and rational insofar as it is a society of subjects. Wright quotes Husserl (in the English translation of Ideen
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I). It is clear why he quotes him, even though it is better to read the quotation in the German text (cf. Ideen I, Husserliana 3, edited by Walter Biemel. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinas Nijhoff Publishers, 1950, p.110) [check!]. Wright understood that it is possible to think, to imagine a world in which perception, as world lived and felt in the first person, with "participation," as L vy-Bruhl would say, by the subjects (in Durkheim's "social life"), is the world as always given, the o gegebene Wel , a world not reduced to the abstract categories assumed to be concrete. One may think, says Husserl, that things, as they are given to us in perception, can not be reduced to mere physico-mathematical concepts. Even if the latter. according to Husserl, originate precisely from the precategorical, from the complete fullness of experience. The problems of paragraph 47 in Ideen I are taken up again and clarified in K i i . What is incredible is that Wright was able to see and foresee in it precisely what Husserl will say later. It is significant that a black intellectual can teach us how to read Husserl. Remember in L vy-Bruhl and in Durkheim the relationship between the primitive and mythical world and the problem of the origins of categories. Durkheim's entire work could be reassessed if we could see in his "society" the ideal of an intersubjective society, of an intentional society. May 24. 1957 Remember in Durkheim the "social" origin of categories, that is, in phenomenological language, the origin of categories from intersubjective, precategorical life. It is because they derive from intersubjective perception that for Durkheim categories are founded on "the nature of things." Durkheim's idea that the o em is the presence of the specific in the individual. The o em, in phenomenological language, is the eido of a group, of a clan. And it is true that it is the projection of the links which unite the clan, namely [the projection] of the operations of the same type, of the typical-social operations immanent in each individual. The relationship, in Husserl, between eido and the operations, Lei ngen, typical of the subject and of the subjects. Cult of animals in the Egyptian religion. The hypothesis that Egyptians saw in animals the lack of individuality, the lingering of a specific essence (as in angels), the eido . May 25, 1957 Husserl between static phenomenology and genetic phenomenology. In the former the original is the actual subject. In the latter the genesis of the subject. In the former it is intersubjectivity that reflects upon itself; in the latter it is the rediscovery, in reflection, of the genesis that has allowed us to arrive at reflection. Discovery and re-presentification of the childhood I have in me. Discovery of the primitive life I have in me, of that life which I must representify in order to understand the meaning of the present. All this is grounded on the phenomenology of time. Since the subject lives in the body, since subjects are animate[d] beings and live in their own natural, cultural worlds (Um el en), genetic phenomenology is a phenomenology of the genesis of concrete men, and in this sense it is anthropology. Husserl's letter to L vy-Bruhl (March 11, 1935).
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Einf hlung of our society with another society. To comprehend its world in ours and to feel ours in its world. Can we presentify Lvy-Bruhl's primitive life? Is it a life which is only pure flowing presence, nur strmende Gegenwart? In us too there is sometimes a pure flow of life which does not retain anything (absence of retention; in a certain sense: unconsciousness). Pause of consciousness in the time of our life. These pauses (like sleep) divide us into many I's: we ourselves, unique, are intersubjectivity. That is why intersubjectivity is possible in time, and in time we find ourselves, as actual humanity, with another humanity divided from us by the pauses of awareness. I believe this is one of the most important aspects of Husserl's thought. We must meet ourselves for [?] the sense of concordance [?] of our life and [but?] we have forgotten ourselves, this and that time of our life and of our history. Thus mankind must find itself by feeling that it is also primitive mankind or black mankind. Otherwise it loses its own sense of concordance [?], its own meaning. Did Husserl really think this way? I am reconstructing [it?] using my intuition and attempting a new development...But the problem is the very same one which in Krisis presents itself as the problem of the encounter between men of different eras (history, historiography). May 27, 1957 [Lao (Lie) Tzu?] Lie: "Can we say emptiness, can we say peace?" This emptiness and this peace have been known... Then we wanted to take and give them [?]. They have been replaced with abstractions, like "goodness" and "equity." But the peace which "had always existed" is not behind us. It is before us. The danger of Taoism. The profound sense of its dialectic: not to lose oneself in the words that replace things. Meaning is hidden in things and expresses itself in words. But it is also after, in that which words indicate, in that which must be done so that words may not remain words. May 28, 1957 Karma as "life impulse" [Bergson's lan vital ?] seems ruled by a law which causes each impulse and each manifestation to tend to exhaust themselves. Stcherbatzsky (The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Leningrad 1927) compares karma's law to irreversibility and entropy. For Rosenberg (Probleme der Buddhistisch Philosophie, Heidelberg 1924) karma is will but also the product of the will. Karma is what remains of what precedes. It is the fact that there is always a future. If time continues it is because of the universal correlation. Two crossed conceptions of time: 1) time as residue of the past and thus as non-ineliminability of the future; 2) time always consumes itself, always dies. Continuous becoming, dhava. Relationality in the open totality, sarvam. Is nirvana the attempt to suppress the world? Of the world or of the mundane? Of the mundane as objectification, perhaps as a chain of objectifications. Nirvana must not be the will of the negation of the world but, precisely because it must not be artificial will, it must discover in the world something which is world without being mundane. That is why Gautama ends up condemning ascesis as will that fights the body (the seven years preceding the Sermon of Benares). Nirvana should lead to non-will, that is to spontaneity, to the spontaneous life of the body. The paradox is that only by not seeking the mundane is it possible to discover in ourselves the spontaneity (the subjectivity) of the life of the world. Time must then become
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continuous deliverance, perennial presentification, infinite becoming of presence. May 29, 1957 The effort of rethinking Buddhism. The attempt to appropriate remote experiences. The profound affinity of relationsim with Jainism (Mahv ra Vardhamna). Reality is not constituted by substantiality but by the modalities of attributes, of relations. No existence or, better, no "situation" is in itself independent of environmental relations. A situation resolves itself in the modes of its possibilities (sy dv da). Each thing which exists, or does not exist, which exists and does not exist, is in a relationship with something other than itself. May 30, 1957 Glory has no meaning, power has no meaning, your personal success has no meaning. Vanity. That vanity which Husserl always fought. And he was sincere. He did indeed love truth and live for truth. Glory is the mundane, and the meaning of life reveals itself only in the negation of the mundane, in operating within the world without being prisoner of the world. I firmly believe it. It is not a renunciation to operate in the world, to live in the world: it is the desire for those actions whose meaning is truth. We must be capable of this, we must want to live thus, we must try to live thus. Tolstoy: "Looking into Napoleon's eyes, prince Andrea was thinking of the vanity of greatness, the vanity of life, whose meaning nobody was able to understand. and of the even deeper vanity of death, whose meaning nobody alive was able to understand or explain." [check!] It is precisely because of this acknowledged incomprehensibility of the mundane, of this renunciation, of this refusal to accept it, that in the end Andrea discovers "an undetermined, unconceivable force which can not be expressed in words," "something incomprehensible and more important than anything else." [check!] But it is not a question of some thing, or of some being or of nothing. And it is not a question of some inexpressible thing, but of the root itself of expression, of the fansis of each phenomenon, of the logos which wants to live and reawaken and which can not re-awaken if it is prisoner of the will for power, the will for domination, of the thirst for glory and vanity, of fetishization, of objectification. The logos which always lives in us, in us as subjects in the first person, human beings evident to themselves, in a truth so close, so ours, that we ignore it because it is so close, so much here, now, clear, evident, present. Rome, June 11, 1957 How few things we know how to say, how little we know how to write that is worth being written. For those who really count, humble but authentic, anguished but unable to express themselves with the word anguish, defeated
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but truly the only salt of the earth, even if we do not know their names. Perhaps there is something in the universe such that real suffering or acts of authentic truth are never lost. Perhaps these are stronger than the power of atoms. To be able to live thus, to incarnate ourselves in this conviction, to feel really that everything mundane is vanity, to feel finally that even the desire of nothing as Gautama said so wonderfully is impure desire. Will we succeed some day in understanding that it is the simplest things which give us the meaning of life? We must believe that this is our path, that mankind's path, often so terrible, is toward this, that life is life for this, that things, stones, flowers, animals, men are there because of the meaning of truth which awaits to be revealed, because of intentional truth. June 12, 1957 Villa Borghese. Instead of preparing for the conference on Mann, I am thinking of Proust. Sedimentation. Past which constitutes itself, makes itself, condenses and then reveals itself in a gesture of the present. It is not merely a time lost and found. It is a time that was ripening and now blooms in a music which has become visible, corporeal. One can hug it, in the surprise of finding it over and over again, of feeling it precisely as it is, in the happiness of its presence. What is sedimentation? Sleeping meanings which are waiting, meanings imprisoned, yet ready, intent on a call that will awaken them, renew them. How often the occasions of our life are not lost. They are imprisoned. By chance, by a word, by a telephone number, by a train's delay. Imprisoned by a spell, like the souls in the Celtic myth Proust talks about. "Captives...dans une chose inanime, perdues en effect pour nous jusqu'au jour...o nous nous trouvons...entrer en possession de l'object qui est leur prison." Sedimentation is in the object, but it is not the loss of meaning: it is rather the preservation of meaning. It is not therefore objectification. Husserl speaks at length of sedimentation and assigns to it enormous importance. But it is a theme that needs to be explored further, to be taken up again. We encounter objects. That is, objects gives themselves to us in a very special way when within them they contain sedimentation. We then discover that there are imprisoned in them occasions which still want to offer a possibility, want to be expressed, to be realized, to live. They are prisoner of the objects as if they were really, forever lost. It is a singular form of objectification which may throw some light on the entire problem of objectification. The imprisoned occasions, "tressaillent, nous appellent et sitt que nous les avons reconnues, l'enchantement est bris. Dlivres par nous, elles ont vancu la mort et reviennent vivre avec nous." The sense organs are the deposits of sedimentations, and the places and times of our living enclose the occasions. They retain the present of the past, they ripen it for the future. for its possible future. All things are deposits of a new possible life and of a new encounter. This is a particular function of the sense organs and of things, a function linked to matter, which seems to enclose in itself a future life, a life that is yet to bloom.
18/71
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Milan, June 14, 1957 Lulli is dancing. A dress with green and amaranth stripes drapes her, as she moves, with colored phantasms (phantasms in Husserl's sense). Her happiness is entirely in the rhythm. I live in her, I feel myself in her movements, in the body she animates, in the whole environment which in her becomes present and hers. The world is no longer incomprehensible. We feel it in our body and in the reciprocal feeling of our bodies. It is a world which moves from within, which e presses itself. And the more within the more it expresses itself, the more it is alive in e teriorit . July 22, 1957 Today Banfi died. They called me suddenly. At the clinic I found his other friends. I thought of all of us of all of us before this death. It will be difficult to take it in. His entire work, from now on, acquires a different meaning and I feel it requires a new assessment. In these last few months I often talked with him. He lived as if he were not ill. And one could not speak to him about his illness. The last authors he mentioned: Galileo, Husserl, Simmel. And all this was resolved in his communism. With his attitude he wanted to say, to the very end: life is more important than death (Husserl: Ohne Leben kein Tod). July 31, 1957 It is to Banfi himself that I apply what he wrote on Galileo: "Such is Galileo's exuberant nature, his curiosity for each actual, concrete problem, his thirst for a pleasant and free life..." Galileo's telescope is not only a scientific instrument but the symbol of a new philosophical orientation, of the defense of common experience, "despite all philosophical claims about its subjectivity and relativity." The eye, made sharper, discovers in experience "an infinity of new elements and structures." Experience "no longer appears as mere illusion" but as "a field of progressive, infinite riches, in the development of which the forms, the relations, the very concepts normally established reveal themselves as provisional." For "vision," for what Banfi, drawing from Husserl, calls the visual, "eidetic" dimension, the relation between experience and reason is possible. "What Galileo, first among all men, saw was the schema, mysterious in its remoteness, of a lunar dawn: the splendor of the sun on the peaks high over the shade and the spreading of light through the valleys and planes open to the serene clarity, while behind the mountains, against the light, their shadows are outlined as if their luminosity had faded ever so slightly." For Banfi, Galileo's experience was above all the dynamic synthesis between sensibility and reason and, at the same time, the translation of "the thing" into rational structure. Demonstrations for Galileo are not didactic exercises, but interpretations of experience which, under the appearances, reveals its universally objective structure or, to use a common phrase, the "reality of things." The "reality of things" or "the things themselves" of Husserl.
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,A I
4, 1957 , , : : , Cartesian Meditations. T .T , . , E .I , , , , , ' .H , P , [*]: , , .I .N .D : , : . , , . .T :
, , T
eros
, .
[*] "The personification of Povert , she has onl one m th, and that comes from Socrates, reporting the words of Diotima, priestess of Mantinea, in the S : after a feast among the gods Penia married Poros and b him gave birth to Eros." F P G , The Dictionar of Classical M tholog . B P ,O , 1996. (T ' N ) A T , 8, 1957 , P : H , Krisis , , , , ,
.T ,
.T Lebenswelt. P
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.E .
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15, 1957
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The sense of living history does not allow the reduction of history to historiography. Historical narrative must not substitute for historical life. The schemata of historiography must not be badly [?] concretized and assumed as real historical things. In order to reach historical life, it is therefore necessary to apply the epoch to the historiographic "things," to free ourselves from historical-ideological fetishization, from the abstractions of the grand general schemata. In daily labor, in the contact with nature, we thus recover Husserl's "thing itself" as concrete human life. We recover and live again the sense of simple life, the value of humility. Whitehead: true historical life is "in the real, individual feelings of quiet people who live on secondary roads and in country towns" (Essays, 1948, p.18) [check!]. October 20, 1957 Val ry in Lonard et les philosophes: "Peindre, pour Lonard est une opration qui requiert toutes les connaissances et presque toutes les techniques...Il se meut en quelque sort partir des apparences des objects..." The "appearances" are Husserl's phenomena, and Leonardo's attitude is thus a phenomenological attitude. To paint is to see phenomena. The painterly vision, even the vision of what is not normally visible, is precious for knowledge. There is thus a kind of reciprocity between the vision of the phenomenon and science, between the action which realizes vision in technology, and knowledge. Val ry again: "Cette rciprocit remarquable entre la fabrication et le savoir par quoi la premire est garantie du second est caractristique de Lonard, s'oppose la science purement verbale, et a fini pour dominer dans l're actuelle, au gran dtriment de la philosophie, qui apparat chose incomplte, parole sans action." Vision affords therefore a correction of philosophical verbosity: the word becomes action. In reality the active word is the natural technology, the extension of nature into technology. We must study Leonardo again in order to insist on the visual, eidetic value of painting. Painting contains both the "forms which are" and "those which are not in nature." "His drawings are so excellent that they explore not only the works of nature, but infinitely more than the works of nature." Leonardo always has a sense of the vision of "possible forms." And when he talks about experience as mediation, "the interpreter between industrious nature and the human species," he is thinking of visual experience, which is the model on which any other experience is based. Painting realizes form physically: in painting there is a proof of the possibility of a synthesis between the sensible and the ideal. Leonardo is sure that reason and ideas operate within nature because they are infused in her. Man "sees" them and can reduce them to abstract reasoning. But their operation is possible because reasoning, before being such, is vision, and before being vision is natural relation (in Kant it is the secret art of schematism that lives in nature). The necessity of natural operation is the necessity of the relation among ideas: nature operates as reason teaches to operate, and reason teaches to operate according to natural necessity. Schematism is here the actualization of the rational in the work. The mediating experience reveals to us that nature "operates under necessity, and can not operate otherwise than as reason, her steering force, teaches her."
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No embe 18, 1957 Phenomenolog , ela ion im, mo al p oblem. The impo ance of he fac ha in an pe cep ion i i po ible o ee a pe, an e ence. E ence a e al a ela ed and " ocial." Ne a pec of H e l' di co e on olip i m. I i p eci el in olip i m ha he I find e en ial c e ha link him o he o he . To kno mean o di co e , in he indi id al, model , pe , no m . Decembe 15, 1957 Spa e d op of ain a e falling on he moo h face of he pa emen , f ee of idge , of elief, of ace . Ca a e d i ing b , ec e and anon mo . The e n of nigh . The ga age and i neon ligh , he ai fo omo o ' labo . E e da ggle fo he idol . I go and ha e a gla of ine i h a g I don' ecogni e, b i h hom I feel pe fec l fine.
Jan a
8, 1958
The cobbled pa emen on hich I am alking...The ha dne , he compac ne , he impene abili of hing . To he philo ophe , o he man ho li e in he philo ophe , all hi ma become enigma ic, become enigma ic. E e hing: he ci , hi o n home, he able a hich he o k . And all he e en in hich he li e , and he people. The a e he e. B in ome a I nega e he e en and he people and he hing . Thi nega ion i f ndamen al. I can no nega e ha i he e, I can no nega e he o ld in hich I li e. Ye , I a no. I do no accep he impene abili , he opaci of hing . To a no i , phenomenologicall , " o p be een b acke ," o e e ci e he epoch , he pen ion of one' j dgmen . When I b acke he o ld, I find m elf in a ange i a ion. I i ill a i a , b I look a i , I feel i , I "e pe ience" i in a diffe en a . The o ld? No he o ld, b he pa ic la a pec of he o ld ha I o ch, ha I ee, ha I hea . I am a he cen e of an infini of pe pec i e , I am a poin in hich an infini of line c o , h o gh me, di appea ing e e he e in he infini . I, he bjec , am he cen e of an infini of ela ion . Ye all he e line , all he e ela ion , all ha I o ch, ha I look a , ha I hea , e e hing, and he li ing being , he plan , he animal , he people, a e a if pended, ai ing. I en e hem, I look a hem, i h infini e ama emen . No onl a if I e e eeing hem fo he fi ime. I i a onge , deepe e pe ience. The ee doe no li e an longe in he ai , i ha c alli ed, and i h he ee e e hing el e. I i ai ing. I e i in hi ai ing. I no longe ha an ob io , e e da meaning. I m gi e i i meaning. I, he bjec , am he f om hom he o ld i a ai ing i en e, i meaning, i p po e. I am he in men b hich he o ld can become e, can an fo m i elf in o h. I m ee i he efo e a i appea o me, I m
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de c ibe i ,
n i in o e ela ion, phenomenon.
The o ld i he e: i a c ea ed, a he aid. The o ld i he e and n il no I ho gh i a na al, ha i being he e a ob io . No I kno ha i being he e i ob c e, enigma ic, hidden. M no i he no o a o ld i ho a meaning fo me, e en if i ha had a meaning fo o he , e en if i oil ca ie he ace of o he ep and i loaded i h he edimen of he inn me able meaning i ha had fo he o he . B he e meaning a e c alli ed, a e leeping. I m a aken hem. To a aken hem I m a no o e e hing hich i a leep, hich i ob c e, concealed. I m a aken m elf, become a ake a I ha e ne e been n il no . To find again in me and in he o ld hich p ing f om me, he o ce of all meaning . The o ld i bo n in me, i bo n in me fo he fi ime, beca e fo he fi ime I find i meaningf l. I am ali e in he a akened life, in he Wachleben, a H e l a . F om no on, in me, and in he o he ho a e a ake i h me, ho ope a e i h me, he o ld ill be an fo med in o a e o ld. Thi h eache be ond me, i appea o me a an infini e idea hich I keep ing o app oach. Th I ha e made a e ol ion. Wha a he e, he o ld ha a al ead he e, i no in f on of me: i i no longe a o ld al ead made, b o be made. I ha become a a k, a goal hich gi e meaning o life, o m life and ha of he o he . The epoch ha allo ed me o di co e a life hich goe be ond ha I ha e al ead li ed, a life hich keep eaching be ond i elf, hich al a an cend i elf b an fo ming ha ha al ead been done in o a a k, in o meaning of h. Thi life in hich I eall li e i intentional life. In en ionali con in o l e ol e he ob c e and he impene able in o a clea i ion, in o a meaningf l ho i on, in o an e en ial fo m of h. Wha phenomenolog aim fo i no he efo e he ea ch fo being, of a being hich o ld be behind hing . I goal i he h hich i no behind b in f on of . and hich i al ead p e en in he al ead made hing of he o ld, b a leep. To a aken hing , o become o el e hi a akening in hich e e hing a aken , i o e n o he a hen ic life of he I, o i con in o elf- an cending, o he pa ado of in en ionali . To return to the subject, o o el e , o m elf. To a aken con in o l in he ama emen a he land cape of he o ld.
Feb
5, 1958
Toda Fa he Van B eda a i ed. Rognoni and I en o pick him p a he a ion. In o con e a ion a lo app oach o H e lian p oblem , e peciall h o gh he F ench in e p e a ion . Ne abo he "A chi e ." Feb a 8, 1958
Fa he Van B eda' lec e : in Milan on he 6 h and in Pa ia on he 7 h. The diffic l of nde anding he p oblem of in en ionali in i p ope en e. Van B eda a ha n il he end of hi life H e l ef ed o in e p e phenomenolog a a me aph ic . Pe hap i i a me aph ic , b no of he ens qua ens, b of he ens qua verum. I like he fo m la, b i ho he ens. In o he o d , I hink ha in H e l being e ol e i elf in he in en ional ho i on of h and he efo e ha phenomenolog can be con ide ed nei he a
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metaphysics nor an ontology in the traditional sense of the two terms. It seems to me that the problem is that of the relation between time and the horizon of truth of time. March 11, 1958 Lebenswelt is not "misplaced concreteness" [Whitehead, translator's note] or substantiation of a category. There is no spontaneity in nature, for man, except through the exercise of the epoch , that is except through transcendence reaching beyond life as we are exposed to it in what Husserl calls a "naturalistic" stance. Relationship with the religious problem,. Only he who reaches beyond life conquers it [Rilke? translator's note]: he who wants to remain in life, instead, loses it. A second birth, and thus Lebenswelt, even simply in its corporeal aspect, as second life. March 12, 1958 Relationist phenomenology is not "vitalism." The paradox is indeed this: that life as positivity can be recovered only after the epoch . Once we negate any mundane sense in the suspension of judgment, once we reach beyond the world in vision, then we find life again, because it has always been there but we recover it with its sign changed. 13 March, 1958 Not to confuse the original with the barbaric. The original is after the epoch and we reach it through education and civilization. The barbaric is cruelty, the ingens sylva from which we must extricate ourselves with a continuous struggle, because its function is that of a "challenge." Critique of Rousseau.
March 14, 1958 The man who was born blind, in John. Sense of vision: the Husserlian eidos. Verse 39 of chapter IX is amazing: "I came into this world...so that those who do not see and those who see may become blind...": [check!] let them realize therefore that they can not see and let them understand that they have never been able to see, that they were born blind. The sin of the Pharisees is their belief that they are not blind, that they can see. And they ask themselves: are we still blind? And Jesus (IX, 41): "If you were blind you would be without sin, but you say 'we can see;' therefore your sin remains." Open your eyes. Learn to see. Do not believe you can already see. March 15, 1958 The original, the authentic, is not the return to the starting point, it is
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not going back (the irreversibility of life prevents it), but the rediscovery of nature, new, after the epoch. In the process of the epoch, by means of the Weltvernichtung, what used to be sure becomes anguish. But the epoch is not only a cognitive process. It is the insertion of oneself in a lived reality, in the temporal process. March 16, 1958 When I use the verb "to feel," I am thinking of Husserl's Einf hlung. Philosophy is born from the amazement that there exist Einf hlung, from the marvelous fact that we live in the others and feel their suffering and their entire life which adapts [?] them to the present, to their perceiving, seeing, hearing, to their Stimmung, which agrees with ours. That is how we live with the others within us. It is possible for us not to let this Stimmung, this profound coherence happen in us we can do so to defend ourselves, not to make ours the pain of the others. Is the ego perhaps constituted also by defensiveness? Or, by closing ourselves to the Einf hlung, do we lose, in the end, ourselves, just as we lose ourselves if we annihilate ourselves in the other? March 17, 1958 In the "projection" onto the physical object, reality is lived as active, as subjective, as human. The projection must be connected to Merleau-Ponty's subject-object ambiguity, which must be meditated again and corrected with regard to Husserl's unpublished work on time. With respect to the Einf hlung the association must not be confused with traditional psychological associationism. To associate means to agree in a Stimmung. But association and agreement presuppose a fundamental schema. Schema is here understood in a Kantian sense: figure, Bild, image. Reality is lost as it is given, but must be recovered as eidetic figure, as intentionalized [?] essence, as agreement for the future project, for the telos. We find reality again in the common, relational, agreed, associated goal: for the aim and sense of existence. Without the Stimmung for the teleological intentionality we lose our presence in the world. The world becomes dream (Hamlet, The Tempest).
March 18, 1958 Hamlet: fear of something after death, fear that even the slumber of death be full of dreams: to sleep, perhaps to dream. Hamlet's madness is also the indication of a modal sense of life, of life dominated by death, incapable of action because it senses the enormous importance of the fact that man dreams. Man dreams and imagines, because he can not not dream and not
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imagine, faced i h ha he doe no kno . The nkno n eem o allo onl d eam , and man can ne e li e in f ll eali . Life conf e i elf in he face of infini , of he undiscover'd country from whose bourn No traveller returns. If dea h e i and i p e en in , he o ld can al a e ol e i elf in imagina ion, in d eam, in a . I a an ac of c i ical in e p e a ion o i e on Shake pea e' ceno aph P o pe o' od : And, like he ba ele fab ic of hi i ion, he clo d-capp'd o e , he go geo palace , he olemn emple , he g ea globe i elf, ea, all hich i inhe i , hall di ol e, and, like he in b an ial pagean faded, lea e no e a ack behind. We a e ch ff a d eam a e made of... O inco po eal life i like a hea ical ho : idolum theatri. We d eam, e ep e en , e eci e life. Pe hap i can be a ed onl b he en e of heological eidos, b meaning a H e l e eal i o in he Krisis. D eam, in eidos, become h, e en ho gh all ha i h man and co mic i onl a d eam. Philo oph appea a al a ion in h (i hi no one of he mo ec e en e of phenomenolog ?). In d eam he e i he hope of h. The ill ion of " eali m" i he ill ion of a h mani i ho d eam . Pe hap hi i ha Shake pea e an ed o ell i h he cha ac e of Caliban. I am hinking of he old Shake pea e, ho eno nce all hi o k fo an nkno n h, j a P o pe o eno nce hi magic a : No m cha m a e all o'e h o n, and ha eng h I ha e' m o n, hich i mo fain : no ' i e, Im be he e confined... Man' i land i hi h man e i ence hich, on he o he hand, can ha e a en e of h p eci el beca e of i limi , of i bo nda ie . Ma ch 25, 1958 The phenomenological ance ome ime make o hink, allo li e philo oph , b i doe no di po e o o i e, " o e do n" o idea . In hi en e, e en in hi en e, i i Soc a ic. Ma ch 26, 1958 S ddenl , on he e plane, he hining g een of he g a . The oil gi ing in nde o fee , he fi e li b he fa me and he hick and lo a e ing of he moke. In he f ion of he colo of he co n ide, he ho e , he oad , he elephone pole cha ing each o he ...: indiffe ence, a if no hing e e happening. Things. The indiffe ence of hing i f igh ening beca e i i he iffening of life. The ick, in a ho pi al: he p ngen a e of a ai ing oli de, of a hoping pain, of a nbea able and ne plainable nigh . O ide, e e bod
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a d, e e i i gfe h e e di c e i g deci i . T fe i hi ed. W d.
d e hi g e e. I h i a ,a a ,e e he e i he da a d e e igh , he ic a e he e. Thei ife i ba e, i e he h i g h gh he i . The habi a , eci e, echa ica f he e , f he d c . Defe e f a ai abi i , f ife i efi ai , i he i e ifica i f i e i each i a ' fi d he d , d hich a i e, hich a be e i a ife, a e e i f he ea i g f he
d, logos, a i
Ma ch 27, 1958 Via de a Pa i e. A he e d f he ee , he ch ch, i h i S e dah ia a d hich de e i e a a i e a d c ai ed [ ica ] ba i he ech fa a hich i i ee hea agai . B I a i a h ,a a ch i a h . Ig h gh he a e ee , bac a d f h, he a e ee ca , he a e b e . The e f ede e i ed i i e a ie e e d e he ci a d he " i e" hi (i H e ' e e) f h a bei g h gh i . I ee a if hei ga e ea e e hi g a g he ee , a g he a f he h e . The e e be ha i g a ed, f ea , b he a e b i di g b he a e e. T ea h ag , he he i had h e, had a h e, a d e e ai i g f ha did ha e , e e a i g he e e ha ha f e igh be ha i e e , ,i f f ha b i di g ha e. Ma ch 28, 1958 Ia hi i g agai , f he i f ie f he Krisis, ab egi a gie , ab a e e defi i i e, eide ic, i a a d a he a e i e a ce de a i f edge. Re-e a a i f eide ic i i i , hich gi e i e a e f fPa i a d f he a e f a i a c a i a idea g a , a e e f hi a d ci i i a i . The i i fa ga ic edge, i e i a i hich e a i i f e e e , i c e a ed i h he c i ec e f he Lebenswelt. Epoch , eci e beca e i e a e h i ,a i e i he c c e e e f e e ie ce. E e ie ce a d a i a i i a e i fi i e, a i fi i e i he a a d i fi i e i he f e: i fi i d a e hi g e ia a d b c e, a d e i i e i he c c e e e f fi i e i e. Thi gge i , d a f H e ,i ga ic a d ie ed: f hi i f ie i i i h a a gie Whi ehead' hi hica e ec i e. N I ha , ea ag , I h d ha e i e ab Whi ehead. Whi ehead' feeling i Lebenswelt. I feeling he i e e i c c ded i a fi i hed he . I ea i e i e f i a ce , i he hi f he a i i e ,i a i e ea i fe e i i e. Thi g bec e e ad , i he a a d i he f e, i ed a i fi i f he ad . The e ad , eci e beca e he a e a i - e a ce e , c ed ad , i e ec a d e c e each he . S cia i fe e ,g f e e hich e a e he g fe e i i e a d ace. H e '
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The original has a temporal direction which must become meaningful: man's work is a solution to the problem never resolved once and for all. Acting in time is not just living, but living according to a meaning in front of the inexhaustibility of the problem. Thus historical, temporal solutions, eidetic solutions, the complex of a civilization's solutions, precisely because they are limited, are solutions forever. June 3, 1958 In the cool wind that blows in the night and our hopes and our pains are sometimes linked to seasons and seem to fuse with rain, with snow, with the awakening of spring perhaps a thread of trust is revived: that life's horrors may be forgotten, and that its labyrinthine and tortuous problems may be transformed into values, with the passing of time, with acceptance, with patience, along the slow and irreversible path toward death. A smile consoles you, a gesture of affection reaches you, even if it does not know your anguish. June 4, 1958 One ought not to underestimate the fact that Husserl placed the Cartesian cogi o at the center of the phenomenological method. However, one ought not to be mistaken about the meaning of such centrality. The fact that the philosopher must begin with the cogi o is not the reduction of the field of philosophy to the analytical-mathematical method. The philosopher begins with the cogi o because he, and man, only in himself, finds, in the experience of his own egoity, a life that presents itself the way it is, in its evident actuality. Here too one ought to notice right away that evidence is, before anything else, the direct and full presentation to us, in an indisputable way, of all the contents of our living: sense, feeling, memory, image, vision. There is therefore a distinction, from the very beginning, between that which presents itself to us indirectly, and that which we live directly. Indirect is that which is not lived by us in flesh and bones, which is not leibhaf . It is that which is received and accepted on behalf, as a testimony of others, or as the result of an activity which is not ours. That which is lived by us directly, instead, is indisputable and h alive. Those experiences which we know vicariously are not li ed. The meaning of the preliminary distinction between direct and indirect is in everyday life. It often happens that we "understand" a fact, or a theory, perhaps in a way that we can recount them, and we are sure we have "understood." Yet, we may realize, later, that we have not made such fact or such theory ours, that they have not entered us, that they have not been lived by us as evident. The distinction between what we experience as lived and what we do not experience as such is important not only in "theory," but above all in our way of living. Undoubtedly in our experience of life we experience the fact that there is nothing which is totally and fully alive; just as there is nothing which is totally and fully dead. In other words, there is no sharp cut between life and non-life such that on one side of it one might situate what is directly lived and on the other what is not lived: life on one side and death on the other; being on one side and non-being on the other. In reality we experience the fact that
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of truth, it is necessary to demonstrate that nobody must have had it and nobody should have it." This is a demonstration with a very compromising pretense. Culture is full of works which do not pretend at all to demonstrate that they are decisive truths and which present themselves "naturally," as impressions, sensations, fantasies, observations, considerations, feelings and resentments. In his dialogues, Plato presents each philosophical thesis as improvised and as the "impressionistic" discourse of a character facing another, in a certain situation relative to certain temporary references. In films there is the usual warning: "Any reference to real persons or events is purely coincidental." [check!] In order to satisfy the crypto-dogmatic defenders of anti-dogmatism, it would be sufficient to preface each book with the following note: "Any statement contained in the present work should be considered as a pure suggestion and as a working hypothesis." [Bohr, translator's note] With such note it is possible to let through, without alterations, any dogmatism. Camogli, July 1, 1958 Strangely related reflections. Is Schelling's reference to Boehme not the reference to an ambiguous fundamental principle in which good and evil, light and darkness, are confused? Is man's freedom the possibility to overcome ambiguity? It is against this ambiguous background that I see the positive sense of Husserl's Lebenswelt, insofar as it is joined, in presence, with evidence. Transformation of the world into visible essences in which everything, even the fantastic, even dream, can become reality. Perhaps these were the thoughts that led me to rediscover the echo of Val ry's Cimeti re marin: "Le temps scintille et le songe est savoir." The small cemetery in Sori, near Camogli: the joy of the sea: "changement des rives en rumeur." Connections of these impressions with my thoughts on life as an answer to an inexhaustible problem. Val ry reacts to the idea that life may spring from death, yet even his poem springs from death and transforms it: it is a live answer to death. Therefore not the "maigre immortalit noire et dore," but the sense that any live answer, precisely in its finity and in its temporality, precisely because it can not be repeated, is eternal. Passion for the sea. Not only "recompense apr s une pense," but rupture, the epoch of the system, of books, of the crystallization of the world in abstract thoughts: Envolez-vous, pages toutes blouies! Rompez, vagues! Rompez, eaux r joiies, ce toit tranquille ou picoraient des focs.
July 3, 1958 To describe what happens in us when we think? To describe: to see the shape of thought in motion: the universe which thinks itself in us, and in us it
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struggles to become clear, to come to light? Not autobiography, but history of what happens in us when we think. A philosophical system is perhaps an artificial pause, deliberately made static, in a more profound dynamism of truth which emerges from our body, from the world, from the movement of the "open" infinity which is temporalized in us.
Arenzano, July 5, 1958 Meditations on Husserl's Ideen III, especially on the Nachwort and on a few Beilagen. The first: on the Einf hlung. The pure subject has its own Umwelt, its being here and now (p. 109): it is clear that everything is grounded in time and that the sense of constitution is strictly linked to corporeal inter-monadicity. Defense of the intuitive and its distinction from the mystical (p. 45). Notice how Husserl's intuitive is analogous to the schematic, where the Kantian schema is understood also as model. Schematism allows, in the end, experimentalism (p. 52). The importance of Husserl's intuitionism vis- -vis the technologism of our century: "evidence" reacts to technologism as such and finally leads to intentionality, in fact it is the proof itself of intentionality (pp. 95-97). Milan, July 7, 1958 A few ideas, in the afternoon, on Lucretius' De rerum natura and on Empedocles' influence. In Lucretius eros is a dominating theme, and it is precisely in book VI that it transforms the poem from epic celebration of science to dramatic perception of ambiguity. The history of human civilization is also the history of the purification from ambiguity. The plague in Athens makes us think of the relationship between Thucydides and the physicians: nature as illness and as healing (what Jaeger calls "Hippocrates' axiom:" nature heals itself). Lucretius felt a secret relationship between illness and civilization and, perhaps, between madness and civilization. The myth of his insanity is strictly related to the poem. In Lucretius are reflected Empedocles' contradiction between man and nature, and between hatred and love: in the end Empedocles' influence is stronger than Epicurus'. Lucretius and Catullus: there is a religiosity in Lucretius as there is in Catullus (Carmen 76) and the eros in book IV of De rerum natura makes us think of Attis. Lucretius discovers anguish, like Caesar. Caesar's answer is Roman civilization, Cicero's the epic of the law (the XII tables to preface the philosophical "libraries"). Catullus? After all, does the glory of Rome and of Ciceronian res publica with the Somnium Scipionis matter to Catullus as an answer to death? I, Catullus, in love with Lesbia [?], am singular, an individual. Catulluswww. orku.ca/lbianchi/paci/diar _ver_02.html 33/71
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Ki kegaa d, p ole a ian of eros, e en if Ca ll a able o lo e and Ki kegaa d a no . Ca ll a k he god fo g ace fo hi pain [??]. Mo e p ofo ndl han Ki kegaa d he li e he ambig i of eros and i dialec ic, imila o ha of L c e i : comm nion and non-comm nion of he bodie , olip i m. Ye L c e i he po i i e p inciple of life: Ven . Time of de a a ion: Ma i , Silla, Cae a , L c e i , Ca ll , Clodi and Clodia: a bea if l heme fo Sa e and e en fo Thoma Mann. Dic a o hip. The pa romana a ol ion fo a ild, oo diffic l age. Then Taci : solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant. Thi , oda , o ld be peace, af e a a fo gh i h a omic eapon .
J l 8, 1958 Machia elli p e ppo e ha "all men a e g il ." [check!] "Men ne e do an hing good, e cep o of nece i :" [check!] la a i e beca e he e a e no good habi (Discorsi, I, 31). I am hinking of Hobbe and, al o, of Vico' ingens s lva. The idea of appl ing he e ho gh o he h ea of a omic eapon : men ho ld be compelled (in eali , hing a e like ha no ) b he a omic bomb no o engage in an a omic a . Thi p e ppo e ha he op fo life, ha he po i life a al e. I i no ce ain ha he ma be able o con in e o op fo life. Fo hi ea on he a e mad. J l 9, 1958 Ca i e : apa f om he effec i had in hi o , he Prince emain a m e . The m e i he p oblem of e il, of Kan ' adical e il hich We e n man an o o e come i h echnolog . Le no fo ge ha B ddha' ni ana i ac all g o nded on he e pec fo life, on he choice of life a al e. The o iginal ba ba i m. Hobbe , Vico, Machia elli: "In he beginning of he o ld i inhabi an , being fe , li ed fo a ime ca e ed like bea " [check!] (Discorsi, I, 2). Thi i L c e i ' life more ferarum. The dange of he conf ion be een he o iginal and p imi i e ba ba i m. E en "ci ili ed" mankind, hen i en e i elf a i i , eali e he amo n of ba ba ic a chai m i con ain . The e en e of Ro ea ' p oblem: o po i i i of he o iginal. The ambig o i Ro oge he . cceed in di co e ing he ea and Machia elli aken
The ol ion of o ime: e e da F ank Ro enbla anno nced he con c ion of he 704, he ne elec onic pe -b ain. The p inciple ed in he 704 allo he con c ion of "pe cep on ," hich a e capable of ecogni ing h man face , of doing an la ion , of peaking. "Pe cep on ," Ro enbla decla e , ill be able o lea n o ep od ce hem el e and ill be able o become con cio of hei o n e i ence. He add , a a ma ginal no e, ha he ma al o "mean de c ion o i al in a mode n a ." Doc o Joan Henle , back f om Mo co , decla e
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a ead e hei The a aged e A e ica ae 2 i J a 24, 1958 A e e
a e fec he echi e f he " e ci a e a d g hich had bee dead f 5 e behi d.
f i
dea h." e . The
f i e, f i a ce ha f S a Ma ce , c a ed f he i e ee h ce . Pa e: e , S a ' e f a , b a "dolce stil nuovo." Th he a , he a , f ee ee i age , "eide" f he he . The begi i g f a e ca be epoch : he di c e fa e e e f ife. Pa e : di c e ha ea i i diffe e : fac ici .
Pa h ee: he a e a e e i f he he , bec e he f he he , ed ci g he he thing. Na a he he , ha i g bec e hi g, a e e i ib e. C ci e f he i e ib e i i be ee he egos. The i ib e c he e ce f ce he e c e he da e e . h i e J c Pa f : e he e e ce h gh a , he e , i ge e a , gh c e. O ce agai e e ce i eb , a a gi e , b a e ib e e e f he d. 28, 1958 T d he e a i f ed J gia be he Pe e , hi f he ego a d f H f i di id a i a d h e ' ad f he Selbst. e fa he
igi a i age , animus-anima, a g .
I J g i di id a i ie f ee he Selbst f he fa e fe i hi a i f he e a df he ega i i f he gge i e i gf he c ci " hich ha de a e he epoch ." T e- ead J g i de a c ibe, a d c ec i a he e gica e e, he animus-anima i Bi a ge ' d a e a i hi . T ee he he ibi i f a he e g fg de da da i ie f e i e ce, cha ac e i ed b he a i hich H e ' ad, i h i Umwelt, i e i efi e a i a d i he ee gica i e i a i f he Krisis. The Selbst, de d a i eg a i fc ci e a d he c ci ,a d h a ee gica c e a i , a i ed idea. The Selbst i a " e ," a ai hich i e e achie ed i fac , a d h idea : e ca de a d i a d e ca ea i e i beca e e a e a f i . T e ab i h a ea i hi be ee he dia ec ic f he Selbst a d he a g- i . I i c i ha he a i a igi f hi be i be f di H e ' die gic, eci e i he hi d f he Logische Untersuchungen (de ed he a a d he h e). Be a ia, A g 12, 1958
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The haping of o pe onali i h he epa a ion f om he mo he . Con i ion of he ego and of he olip i ic oli de. The en e of he ma e nal, ine i abl lo , p ojec i elf in f on of a he image, a he eido of he female. The analogo fo man he eido i con i ion of oman. The need fo fe ili a ion, hile he image of he mo he no fe ili ed b o be fe ili ed.
The comple dialec ic of he ego inca na e i elf no onl in he bod , b al o in he pai ing, nde ood in he a io mode of e o , f om e ali o poe and o ho gh . Pai ing in he end i Bin ange ' "d al" e i ence, hich H e l deno e i h he e m Paa ng. The ela ion hip i h one' child en, in hom he impo ible e n o he ma e nal omb (impo ible beca e of i e e ibili ) become in fac a ne beginning, a ebi h (I keep hinking of Nicodem , John, 3, 3). In he p choanal ic dialog i elf, he dialec ic of he Oedip i made comple el a ic if i become he p e en e of a e n. A g 16, 1958 comple
Sen ible elf-con cio ne . The o e m ,j apo ed, p e ppo e he en i e p oblem of chema i m, he p oblem of al e i (of in e -monadici ) and he efo e he o e coming of olip i m. Scien ific di co e , if one nde ake he phenomenological ed c ion, appea a di co e in hich bjec emain olip i ic (Wi gen ein). I i nece a o g o nd fo mal logic i elf phenomenologicall (acco ding o he H e lian p e c ip ion). "Feeling," a f ndamen al e pe ience, i al a he pa ado of feeling he o he a ome hing hich i no impl he objec of m feeling. Wi hin a H e lian f ame o k, he a ing poin i he cogi o hich gi e in en ionali o he cogi a a. B he cogi a a a e an cenden al ela i e o he cogi o, e en ho gh he ecei e hei in en ionali f om he cogi o, onl hen he p oblem of he pl ali of he cogi o i e ol ed, ha i hen he ego an fo m i elf in o monad (in he en e ha H e l a ign o he e m monad in he Fif h Medi a ion). A g 17, 1958
A he beginning of hi Medi a ion , H e l peak of phenomenolog a a fo m of neo-Ca e iani m, eeking he al e, al a ele an , of he Ca e ian Medi a ion . When H e l emind ha De ca e i eeking ab ol e fo nda ion , i i nece a no o fo ge ha in H e l' lang age ch fo nda ion a e "in i ion " be ond hich i i impo ible o go. I i in hi en e ha in i ion a e o iginal. And i i beca e he a e o iginal ha in i ion a e e iden . When f om hi po i ion he e de elop he ego cogi o cogi a a a cogi a a p inciple, i i nece a o eali e ha , if on he one hand he cogi a a a e, o o peak, in e nal o he cogi o, on he o he hand he a e al o e e nal in he en e ha he a e an cenden al. The p ofo nd en e of
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tautology is considered as foundation of technology, man self-destructs for the sake of technology, just as in Heidegger man self-destructs for the sake of being. The transformation of the solipsistic I or of solipsistic pluralism (of solipsism la Wittgenstein, without subjects), in reality fetishism, is substantially the extreme aspect of what Whitehead called "misplaced concreteness." The reality in which the methodological concept is mistakenly concretized ends up annihilating the very existence of the I. This is one of the facets of the contemporary world: men are annihilated by what man has built. Technology tends to annihilate its builders. Man anihilatess himself by becoming instrument, by becoming the moment of a method, the link in a methodological operation. The extreme form of alienation and fetishism.
August 18, 1958 What Husserl calls the tendency to transcendental subjectivism is for him a task that is identified with the need for coordination in western philosophy. Confronted with the irrelativeness and the disorder of contemporary philosophy, we find ourselves as Descartes did in the cultural and scientific situation of his time. This situation dictates a radical search which finds expression in this question: what is the foundation of a true philosophy? The first answer is not a solution, but the perspective of a search that considers the foundation as evidence rooted in the subject. The path of transcendental phenomenology presents itself at the beginning as the search for the meaning of a radical return to the cogito (but we ought never to forget that the cogito, in the end, is operation, the Leistung of cogitare, immanent in time and in the body). The search is a meditation in the Cartesian sense, but Cartesianism is radically transformed. Descartes, according to Husserl, was not able to avoid certain seductive errors. A radical beginning is the beginning that each one of us finds in himself, if he lets go of the convictions he accepted before undertaking the epoch . But this means, above all, to let go of the so-called scientific "truths." Science is bracketed precisely because we are looking for philosophy as rigorous science. Philosophy as rigorous science is therefore not such in the sense in which the sciences Descartes is thinking of, namely geometry and mathematical physics, are rigorous. It seemed obvious to Descartes that science should have a deductive character. In this way the certainty of the cogito becomes for him an axiom and fulfills in Cartesian philosophy a function analogous to that of the axioms in geometry. It is clear that Descartes offers a pre-established judgment of science, and it is in conformity to such judgment that he constructs his own philosophy. What he did not understand is that in a radical philosophical beginning it is mathematical science itself which is doubted. Husserl can not accept any pre-established judgment of science, and thus of philosophy itself, while on the other hand he does not want to give up the requirement of providing a foundation to science and philosophy. The new meditation will be directed precisely by this requirement: such requirement points to a goal which must surface in the course of the meditation. Science does not give us the idea of philosophy as rigorous science, but
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e can fo m la e he h po he i ha in he cience oo he endenc o a d a goal i a o k. S ch goal ill indeed be he fo nda ion. A i i clea f om he hi d pa ag aph of H e l' Medi a ion , he h po he i ha he cience a e g o nded on a igo o philo oph , hich in ni ch in ofa a i p e en i elf pa ado icall a fo nda ion, i a h po he i hich appea and "i li ed" a an idea. We a e no in po e ion of philo oph a igo o cience, b e ha e an idea of i , hich i in fac he elo o a d hich bo h cience and philo oph end. In he al cien ific lang age hi "ha ing an idea" i e p e ed, in fac , a he fo m la ion of a h po he i . In hi a H e l a i e a he i ion of an idea hich di ec cience. Thi idea i no onl "legi la i e" in he en e of he Ma b g chool, beca e i i al o " een" and in i ed a e ence o , mo e p eci el , i i li ed a e ence. Science i elf, acco ding o H e l, li e beca e he e i in i implici i ion. Vi ion a "p e en e" e ol e i elf in o in en ionali , in he elo of cience. B hen he p e en e i e ha ed in po e ion, hen an e i ing cience con ince i elf ha i ha eali ed he idea, he e i bo n he c i i of he cience and of philo oph i elf. In hi ca e cience and philo oph , a he K i i eache , de o hem el e beca e he lo e philo ophical in en ionali . A g 19, 1958
Pe hap in d eam he e face no onl li ed e en , b al o ho e ha e e no li ed, ha e co ld ha e o co ld li e. Pa i a ion do face, b m e io l n he i ed i h all he i a ion ha ha e happened and e en i h ho e ha co ld ha e happened. O pe onali i no a able, defined I: he I ha i eali ed hi o icall i he fini i a ion [?] of an infini e o ld of po ibili ie onl of hich a e eali ed. The hi o ical I, a I of akef lne , i he p od c limi a ion impo ed b hing , b fac , b o deci ion . In d eam he e appea a diffe en "co mic" I, m ch f ee han he one linked o he con of e e da e en . Wha a ejec ed and no eali ed eappea , and diffe en in en ion , of en oppo i e o ho e eali ed and li ed.
ome of a in i o do
Ana ago a aid ha e e homoeome con ain a ep e en a ion of all he o he : e e homoeome i infini e and con ain all he o he infini e homoeome ie . In hi en e one can a ha i i co mic. The ac ali a ion, he happening of fac , he eali a ion of he infini e homoeome ie in he fini e, a a igned b Ana ago a o he In ellec . The In ellec fo him f lfilled a ole analogo o he p inciple of fficien ea on and h ac ali ed he homoeome ie in empo al e i ence. In o he o d , he fac ha he co mic I li e in he infini e compel i o con i e i elf in a hi o , ho e e en , once he happen, a e condi ioned. In ha en e empo al hi o i con i i e a gene i . Fan a and d eam can imagine a life diffe en f om he li ed one, and ch imagina life can be, in d eam , ffe ed o li ed, hile he bod ha li e in akef lne con in e o g o old, o be nable o e n o he pa , o die. B he e fan a ie , a fan a ie , infl ence o life, e en if ncon cio l . In hi a o life of oda no onl i infl enced b ha e ha e ac all been, b al o b ha e ha e no been, b ha e ha e been
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ab e
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bee
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be.
The e a ab e c e e ce f he ab e i ha he - i ed, he bei g f ac a i ed hi ica ife, i e e a a non-being which is. I i a -bei g hich hi ica ha bee a d hich, eci e beca e f ha , ca e e i ef a d ea , a fa a , a i age. The i age he i , a g he hi g , he e e i f ha hi ica e ha e bee a d f ha e ca ge be. If each ego, i e he h e e f A a ag a , ha i i e f i fi i e e e e a i a d ibi i ie f he egos, he fa a e e e i he ib e egos. The c ic ego ca e e i ef( e c i e )a ibi i : he hi ica ego i he i i a i f ibi i . E e ea i a i f i a no aid he i e hich e c d ha e i ed a d hich f ae -bei g. Pe ha he i e e di ca d i de be e e , he i e ha e f ee di ca d, b he fac c e di ca d, a e he other lives ( he ego a he he a d he a ge i H e ' Fifth Meditation), hich a e e e i a he bei g f -bei g. The e he i e ha e bee i ed i he a , i he hi ica e i d ; he i e i he e e , i i a i diffe e f : he i i e i he f e. It is the presence of the being of non-being of our personality and thus the negative presence of the other personalities in us which allows us to understand the others. The he ca e e he e e h ,a ha e ha e ef ed e e i de each i di id a i . E e e ai face agai he bac g d f he c ici f he ib e eg i e e i a . The principium individuationis i a c e a be ee he -bei g f a he he e a i ie a d he fac a e i e ce f e a i . Thi i a i a ea e a a ebi h f he dia ec ic i he Sophist, hich a a e ee a b i ef he be f eg g a d fi e adici (i a a ead e e , af e a , i Esistenza ed immagine, gge ed b T.S. E i ). A g 22, 1958 i ,i he di a ce, f igh i g, b e he ea. I c he h de did d
T igh a e e e h de ee, ea he h i , he cce each hi fa .
L i g he bed, he i d e a d he ea, hich i fif e e a a ,I a i e i g he c e h f he a e . A a ce ai e I h gh I a hea i g e fa a a g. Wh a i gi g? I ee ed a ch .W e ice , e high i che , h gh a ge c cea ed, a ec e . I a ib e e a a he d f he a e a d he g. Thi ga e i e i e a e e f a ie , a if h a ice e e bec i g a a d ,a d a a d h a ice . Pe ha , I h gh , i i ha g f Ge a I ef i he di i g . The e e d i i g: e ha he ha e a ed i gi g ge he . The e a e i g f : hi i bab h I a hea i g a fe a e ch i . Af e a hi e Ig . The e a i e ce h gh he h e . The di i g a e a d da . The ch i e i gi g. I ied i e i ca ef , a a i g he
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sounds: the waves, the wind, a diffused echo in the night air, which resonated in a subdued way, a succession of chromatic notes, continuously repeated. Clearly the circular repetition of a them entrusted to the cellos. The orchestra was developing it into an insistent call, with an unknown kind of trumpet which surfaced from a sea of harps. A call, an invitation which might have meant: "Stay here, don't seek any more, don't go any further: here, in eternal repetition, there is peace, joy, appeasement. Here man is nature and nature is man: here there is no longer any aiming for, the pursuit of images and ideas, the goals which always reveal new goals, the horizons which promise a limit which appears always farther away, beyond. Here there is no longer intentionality, there is no more life." Peace in the perfect repetition of the wave in a circular chromatic theme more and more subdued, in undifferentiated identity. It was the song of the Sirens. August 23, 1958 It is true: perception is ambiguous, but it is not identical. The return to the perfect identity between subject and object is death. But subject and object are not the absolutized terms of idealism and of realism: they are inherent in the dialectic of time, in permanence and in emergence, in the consumption of existence and in its revival according to an intentionality which is anguish, but also love of truth as life and of life as truth. The danger of interpreting the return to "the ambiguity of perception" (Merleau-Ponty) as a return to the indistinct, to the unconscious, to the primordial, to death. It is not and can not be (because of irreversibility) a question of a return, but of going ahead toward the other and toward the future: time and truth. In the sweet song of the Sirens there is no distinction left between past and future, and the present dissolves in the eternal and in nothingness. But the eternal is eternal only because it is in time, between an unlimited horizon behind us and an unlimited horizon in front of us, or between a Kern and an unlimited horizon around us, in which intentionality must be recovered. What has happened is here, irrepressible, present in us. What has happened is the inevitable side of what has already been lived. The future is the possibility of change, of redemption, of rebirth. And it is also the legacy which was left to us by those who have lived and which we will leave to those who will come: Sovenha vos de ma dolor. August 27, 1958 In the limpid afternoon, due South, there appear the promontory of Pesaro and then, farther away, mount Conero, Ancona. Due North, the pine forest of Cervia. My thoughts run through to Ravenna. Due South-West, San Marino. Mountains which become hills. Difficult and dangerous lives...: the Malatesta, Federico da Montefeltro. The unbelievable Urbino and the Malatesta Temple take me back to m Renaissance, as seen from here, from the arcane shores of the Adriatic. Towards the sea, the golden promises of the Orient. In all this meridian light, the sense of desolation of the waves breaking against the rocks of an ancient tower like at Porto Nuovo di Ancona.
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Leopardi's song, millenary, cosmic, descends on the Mausoleo di Teodorico, on the Battistero degli Ortodossi and S. Apollinare in Classe, on the Castello di Federico, on the Tempio di Isotta, on the Rocca Della Rovere, suspending everything. An "epoch ," a suspension that turns things into figures, poetry into "eide."
August 28, 1958 I am writing in the light of the moon, in solitude, in front of the sea. Its rhythm is mine. I do not feel it as something which stands opposite to me; yet it is there, transcendent. The light is too strong and the stars disappear. I find up there, above my head, Vega, but I can not make out the constellation of Cygnus. On the moon there is no atmosphere to diffuse the sunlight into the blue: blindness in the impenetrable blackness. Solitude without color. The legend of the werewolves. The light of the moon mirror of the sun, like death is the mirror of life, as nothing is the mirror of being penetrates deeply into the mind. The epileptic, in the reflected light, howls like a hungry wolf, without hope. The "why" of existence screams without holding back any longer: expressionism. Milan, September 10, 1958 My attempt is to influence Italian philosophy and culture with phenomenology. Mine is relational phenomenology which would take into account the entire history of phenomenological thought and go beyond existentialism. The central points are: time, as it was understood by Husserl since 1904-05, and relation, as it appears in the Fifth Meditation and in the Krisis. Some unpublished manuscripts of Husserl's on time are an answer to Sein und Zeit. By now we can no longer do without such answer. Positive existentialism transforms itself into phenomenology as relationsim. Venice, September 12, 1958 Conversations with Stravinsky and with Rognoni (to whom I owe my acquaintance with Stravinsky). The problem of the relationship between twelve-tone music and the latest works by Stravinsky. Stravinsky explains to us how the idea of the Lamentationes came to him. September 18, 1958 Venice: the past which becomes, in Husserl's sense, presentification and which, at the same time, preserves the lived horizon. Continuous comparison between today and yesterday, presence of all that has happened here, known and unknown. Venice seems to return any gaze which was ever cast on her and
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to communicate to us secret messages of unknown lives which reach us as if they had remained somehow inside the stones of the great palaces, in the labyrinth of the narrow alleys, on the thresholds worn out by the waves. In San Canciano I sleep in a trecento house. My room looks down on a canal: the infrequent sound a distant steps makes the silence feel even more alive ("lived" silence). I look out of the window: the canal is crossed by a large stone bridge on the right, and by a small iron bridge on the left. Down there, where the canal turns, a song can be heard. It is an ancient dirge, which follows the rhythm of the oar. Finally a merchant gondola arrives, loaded with fruits and vegetables. The gondolier continues to sing while he crosses my zone of silence. After he disappears, at the other bend, I can still hear, for a while, the dirge, which then fades in the darkness and merges with the water, with the houses, with the bridges, absorbed by the worn-out stones, transfused in an imprint of time.
September 19, 1958 This afternoon it was my turn to give a lecture at the "Symposium on Esthetics." I made reference to Gilson's talk, and especially to that of Ingarden. Gilson had remarked that judgment, in general, follows the principle of non-contradiction. Esthetic judgment, instead, is contradictory relative to the traditional model of judgment. Without realizing it, Gilson posed the problem of the relationship between logical judgment and factual experience, between logical verification as the logical positivists would say and Lebens elt. Calogero addressed all of this, in his own language, stating that esthetic judgment does not require a theoretical identity, but a dialog. Referring in part to Imgarden's talk, I tried to bring the discussion back within Husserl's horizon. Esthetic experience is not tautological, because it is rooted in the Lebens elt and because it poses the problem of the real body, of the experience of the other, of the world which constitutes itself in intermonadicity (Fifth Meditation). Milan, September 26, 1958 A more and more vivid impression of Stravinsky's Lamentationes. This evening, however, I listened to Schnberg's Quartet opus 37, and as I am writing, the beginning of the third movement lingers in me, a felicitous harmony of expressive intensity and constructive form. I believe the true value of Schnberg lies in the transformation of expressionistic disorder into an amplification of harmony, which tries to transfigure anguish into a more ample opening to communication and to love. September 27, 1958 Solipsism and expressionism. Not to confuse the "original" of cubism and neoclassicism with the "original" of expressionism.
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K K A , ,
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B " ", Cartesianische Meditationen,

. 125). T
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Husserl in the fifty-first paragraph: the "dual" is the pairing, the Paarung a fundamental concept in intentional psychology (cf. Ideen III). "The Paarung is the configuration as Paar, which will later become the configuration of groups, of multiplicities it is a universal phenomenon of the transcendental sphere (and, at the same time, of the intentional-psychological sphere)." [check!] A phenomenology of the Paarung, and later, of groups (which are in a dialectical relation with one another) is thus possible. In the Paar, in the original pairing, the creative presence, the lebendige Gegenwart, which is never possible in solipsism (dialectic of eros in Plato's Symposium, later continued in the dialectic of the Sophist) is finally actualized. The original is always living, is always gegenwrtig. The other is never identifiable with the ego. The other can never be completely given in an original perception (Proust wants Albertine to be his, his possession: in this way, as Sartre saw, the Hegelian dialectic of servant-master enters eros. That the other can never be assimilated to me (and vice versa) is the guarantee of freedom. Erotic possession, the identification of one and the other in eros, is thus fetishism, which tends toward the destruction of the person in the Paarung (and then in groups, in ideologies). In Husserl there is no analysis of the Paar as male-female relationship. For this reason phenomenology must re-examine the history of psychoanalysis without falling into dogmatism. For the Krisis [?]: just as the crisis of civilization derives from the pretense of the possession of truth on the part of science and technology, so there is a crisis when there is a pretense on the part of the Paarung, to incarnate an identity, a perfect love. A Daseinsanalyse of the collective, a psychopathology of history must be possible. Contemporary art and philosophy denounce a collective psychopathological situation, but provide also an indication for going beyond it. By association, I must say that the analysis Adorno gives of music lacks the sense of intentional direction, of the sense of "telos" (Adorno has not understood at all the meaning of Husserl). That twelve-tone music participate in the demonic and Stravinsky in the schizophrenic must be understood in this way: it is the participation of the physician in the illness, so that the illness may be "expressed." Expression, already in Kirkegaard, is liberation of the truth, not fall in the mortal illness. The mortal illness is the extreme dialectical limit: its intentional sense is that of a passage, if there is no other means, from the negative in order to arrive to truth. The diabolic is the pretense that only the negative can lead to salvation; that is, the conviction that good is a function of evil. Instead, one can not understand evil except in terms of good, and this is true also for psychopathology. It is necessary, therefore, to ask ourselves: which is the positive telos, the truth that neurosis wants to reach? Which is the good that gives a meaning even to madness? Proust intuited this point with regard to Charlus: "Or les aberrations sont comme des amours o la tare maladive a tout recouvert, tout gagn. Mme dans la plus folle, l'amour se recoonat encore. L'insistance de M. de Charlus demander qu'on lui passt aux pieds et aux mains des anneaux d'une solidit prouve, rclamer la barre de justice et, ce que me dit Jupien, des accessoires froces qu'on avait la plus grande peine se procurer, mme en s'addressant des matelots car ils servaient infliger des supplices dont l'usage est aboli mme l ou la discipline est la
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plus rigoreuse, bord des navires au fond de tout cela il y avait chez M. de Charlus tout son rve de virilit, attest au besoin par des actes brutaux, et toute l'enluminure intrieure, invisible por nous, mais dont il projetait ainsi quelque reflets, de croix de justice, de tortures fodales, que dcorait son imagination moyengeuse." (III, p. 840). Compare it to the Middle Ages of Mann's Doktor Faustus, represented above all by Adrian Leverk hn's home town. The ideal of virility of Charlus is analogous to that of Saint-Loup, brave, aristocratic, idealistic (Saint-Loup dies in the Great War). The ideal of virility, in turn, is the aberration of normal love, is the rejected good which returns under disguise. Charlus is dominated by the animus, insofar as, in fact, he [?] is a woman. The animus-anima labyrinth characterizes Proust's entire work. But it also goes back to the sense of the collective, not so much to the archaic myth as to the psychology of groups and populations. The collective is not an abstraction (which, as such, must be subjected to the epoch, but lives in the dialectic of "groups." The Krisis must give us the possibility of lived life to transform itself into phenomenology and vice versa. It must help [?] us to go beyond the abstract collective, badly characterized and fetishized. Once again, an indication in Proust (related to the discourse on Charlus): "Ainsi change la figure des choses de ce monde; ainsi le centre des empires, et le cadastre des fortunes, et la charte des situations, tout ce qui semblait dfinit est-il perptuellement remani, et les yeux d'un homme qui a vcu peuvent-ils contempler le changement le plus complet l o justement il lui paraissait le plus impossible." (III, p. 1019). The psychology of the collective is not, as psychology of living and present men, the fetishism of the method of psychological (Husserl would have said "naturalistic") science. Even from this point of view the old Husserlian struggle against psychology's "naturalism" becomes more and more important. For analogous reasons, Marx fought the "naturalism" of political economy (as falsified science) in order to capture what is not fetishized in economic life. We can never grow too tired of repeating that for Husserl the rigor of science is an idea, a telos, not a conquered reality: rigor is teleologicalintentional truth. Science, as understood by the logical positivists, is fetishism, from Husserl's point of view. Perhaps Husserl himself ran the risk of fetishism (I often imagine he might have "seen" the symbolic figure of Galileo while thinking of himself). But in reality Husserl's intentionality was never the dark side of Galileo, just as Husserl's "living history" is not the history of historiographic schemata and of fetishized collectives, but the history of the lives of men and of the philosopher, the living sociality constituted by the ground relations of the egos, of the groups, in the historische Zeitlichkeit (Krisis, p. 494). The philosopher lives in intentionality, and in this sense his Dasein is geschichtlich (p. 488): with intentionality he individuates himself, with the others, in the lebendige Gegenwart (p. 489). It is from this point of view that evidence is profoundly joined to life and that phenomenology truly finds in evidence a beginning, a method and a goal (Brand). October 30, 1958 How to teach phenomenology? How and in which sense it can be transmitted? Certainly many approaches are possible. But perhaps the one
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hich ha been ed mo e of en i he in i a ion o de c ip ion. When, af e eading i ho fficien nde anding he Cartesian Meditations, in 1933, I a ked Banfi o help me, he did no peak o me abo he con en of ha book. Thi fac i ignifican . Fo phenomenolog , book a e mean fo li e, o al comm nica ion. W i en o d (m h of The h in Pla o' Phaedrus) ha e hei o n nega i e ide, if he do no p od ce a ne di co e, if he a e no e-a akened and made p e en . Banfi aid ome hing e imple. We e e in hi d . "Do o ee hi a e of flo e ? T o a , o de c ibe ha o ac all ee." I did no an o accep hi gge ion, and p opo ed in ead he adi ional p oblem of philo oph . No I kno e ell ha Banfi an ed o a and I kno ha i mean o me. I co ld a ha he a e of flo e i a c linde . In eali , ho e e , he e m "c linde " i oo comp omi ing beca e i come f om a cience I kno , b of hich, fo me hodological ea on , I m no a ail m elf. I i be e ha I "look" a i f eel and o e and ef e h common lang age. Fo e ample: he face of he a e, in he cen e appea o me clo e , hile g ad all o a d he ide i i fa he . I ecede i h he modali ie pical of a c e, in ch a a a o gi e me he idea of o ndne , and I can presume ha ch idea ill be confi med if I mo e and ee ho i appea o me, ho he a e e eal i elf o me, a I keep looking a i a I mo e. B he a e i no impl a fo m. I i a olid, i ha colo . I i loca ed in a ce ain ligh , in a ce ain chia o c o. If I app oach i , I can o ch i . The i al en a ion a e in a pecific ela ion o he ac ile en a ion . I can mo e i , and p i back in i place. I i locali ed ela i e o me. In o de o ca o he e ope a ion I need ime. Time o look a i , ime o o ch i . I can in e p hi ime, clo e m e e and op o ching i . B if I clo e m e e , ome hing of ha i ion emain in me ( hi emaining i retention), ome hing hich I find again hen I open m e e . I find again ha I a , he e i a : I a i doe no mo e. If I find i ome he e el e, I a i mo ed. If I mo e clo e , i h m e e clo ed, I find he a e again e en if, f om he po i ion in hich I opened m e e , I had ne e een i . Thi p e ppo e ha , een f om he ide oppo i e o he one f om hich I am looking a i , and f om hich I ha e ne e looked a i befo e, he a e ill p e en i elf o me in a ce ain a : I am ai ing, I am in he ime of ai ing (in protention). I ma be ha he a e i no he a I ho gh i a .I eali e hen ha I ha e no een ha I e pec ed o ee, ha m p e mp ion ha i a in a ce ain a ha no been confi med. Ho man fac o a e in ol ed! The one I men ioned a e j a fe indeed. In eali , ha i in ol ed i he a in hich I e pe ience eali , m Erlebnis of he hing, he a in hich he hing gi e i elf o me, ho i gi e i elf o me. Phenomenolog i he cience of he modali ie of ch gi ing, i he cience of he "ho ." I allo me o ee ho I "con i e" hing , he o ld. B he e i mo e. I e pe ience m pe cep ion , m feeling , m bod , he impene abili and he ma e iali of hing , he pec lia i of li ing bodie (of he Leiber), of all hei ope a ion and of he hi o of hei ope a ion , incl ding c l al and ocial ope a ion . I lea n ha i mean , fo me di ec l , and hen fo me and fo he o he , fo a face o be in ela ion o a colo , fo a hing o be in an en i onmen in hich i i o nded, "ci c m an ia ed," b he o he hing . I lea n ha i mean fo i o be caused, fo an o ganic bod o be conditioned, fo a h man
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being o be able o ac acco ding o di e e motivations. I di ing i h be een ha I m call ill o and ha i eal. I lea n o co ec m e pe ience g ad all , o ee ho he can adap o each o he and change in o de o each a conco dance. I become a a e of he e i en and he non-e i en , of he p obable and he imp obable. I e pe ience he fac ha of en hing a e no a I ho gh . When he a e een ell, "li ed" ell, de c ibed i ho commi ing hem, a fa a po ible, o obli ion, he con in all fo ce me o co ec m imp e ion , no o hem ncondi ionall , o ee hem again a I e-li e hem in m memo . E en ha ing ai ed fo ha did no happen ha a meaning fo me, fo ha con i e i elf in me, fo he ag eemen o he lack of conco dance of all m e pe ience , of all m Erlebnisse (Music of life: Whi ehead, Jo ce, P o ). No hing i epa a ed f om he o he , e en if he mode of he ela ion o of he enco n e a e e diffe en . In each hing I cceed in de c ibing, e en if i h a p o i ional cla i , he e i a "fo m," a cha ac e , a mode of p e en a ion, an eidos hich ha a ni of i o n, de pi e he al a po ible co ec ion . S ch ni i t pical, I find i again in o he hing , o ha he colo of hi flo e i gi en o me, ni ed o a ce ain fo m and o a ce ain pe f me, b all he flo e of he ame pecie . I ecogni e flo e a flo e p eci el beca e he all ha e a ce ain eidos, he ame e ence. Each indi id al hing, e en if in i indi id ali i doe no epea i elf (no flo e i he ame flo e , no e pe ience i he ame e pe ience), ha a pe manen e ence, a le, de pi e obli ion, de pi e co ec ion . I, and each e i ing indi id al, e i a indi id al , a e n epea able, li e once and for all (and in hi en e e a e e e nal). B he analogo indi id al ha e an e i ence of hei o n, and he a io e ence , pe manen and eme gen , ancien and ne , a e all linked one o he o he , all in me a I am in he o he ho ha e been, ho a e, ho ill be. Phenomenolog i he cience of e en ial pe manencie and of he modali ie of hei a ia ion . I i he cience of he le of life and, like le, i mod la e i elf in a con in ing and ef e hed de c ip ion of all ha e eal i elf in he flo of m e pe ience , in m bjec i i , in he bjec i i of he o he . I i he cience of p imal e ela ion, of he o iginal e ela ion: he cience of phenomena, of he fansis. Each e pe ience i ela ed o all he o he , e all e pe ience , and he co ela ion hich hold among hem, m al a be in e iga ed and e ified again and again. No comple e, ab ol e hing i e e gi en o me: i i an ideal limi . The ela ion among hing , among he hing hich a e clo e and ho e hich a e fa , he mo di an one , end o a ni e al co ela ion, o a goal hich al a confe meaning o he con i ion of he o ld, in me and in he o he . I i he connec ion among all he bjec , among all he monad ( h he h of me, of he o he , of he o ld). Wha I an o cla if , make a ional, i he ac ion aimed a hi conco dance (cogni i e ac ion, cien ific ac ion, o k and echnical ac ion, in all i mode ). I want o b ing i o ligh , o eali e i a phenomenon, a en e and ea on of a o ld al a in fieri. Thi ill, hich i ea on, and hi life, hich i h, anno nce hem el e in e e e pe ience of mine. The de c ip ion of he a e con ain in i elf he meaning of he o ld, of m life, of he life of e e bod . I ha i in i elf a a h hich m be li ed,
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g ad all eali ed, con i ed acco ding o an infini e telos. Infini e, e po en iall p e en in each of m e pe ience , if I ake he ime o e amine i , o n i in o a phenomenon. Wha I ee, a i gi e i elf o me, ha i e iden , i ead o offe me a gif . I can and I m p epa e m elf o ecei e i . Thi gif i he meaning of m life, of he life of he o he , of he life of he o ld, al a ef e hed and al a capable of being ef e hed. T h i he e and no (in e idence, in p e ence), clo e, mo e han clo e. I i in each fac , e en in he h mble of all. I i he e, enclo ed, concealed, po en ial. I i limi ed, b i i p e en . I i fini e, b i i he poin e o an infini e a k. I, I m elf, i h all m momen of fa ig e and of e o , can no in an ca e nega e m elf a p e ence. An nega i i , an adne , an e il, i e il beca e i p e ppo e he good, a good e all po e , if e onl an o ackno ledge i , a good nobod can p cha e, hich can no and m no be ed ced o a commodi , o fe i hi ed objec . I i a good hich e can onl li e, if e accep i a a gif .
Jan a
12, 1959
Con in ing d of H e l' e . Lec e . I i e do n he lec e o an fo m hem la e in o e a hich one da I ma collec , oge he i h ho e al ead i en, in a book. The heme al a emain ha of he ela ion be een ime and h. Pad a, Ma ch 12, 1959 H e lian Da . Impo an di c ion i h Ga in, ho ga e a hi o ical p e en a ion of he p oblem of phenomenolog . We feel i i no e likel e can cceed in e plaining o el e o a p blic fo hich phenomenolog i no hing b an occa ion fo polemicall a ing once again o o n con ic ion . Ga in' , P ini' and m lec e ma be p bli hed nde he i le: Bilancio della fenomenologia e dell'esisten ialismo. Milan, Ap il 10, 1959 A on G i ch a he e in Milan fo a confe ence on H e l. Of Li h anian o igin, he a la e a di ciple of H e l in Ge man . He ha con ib ed mo e han e hink o he diff ion of phenomenolog in F ance, he e he li ed f om 1933 o 1940. La e in he Uni ed S a e , a Ha a d, and no a B andei . G i ch a happ o alk abo H e l i h o ng people. He ecalled he diffic l ie phenomenolog ha enco n e ed e e he e. In F ance, he a , he e a no hing. Hi pe onal memo ie of H e l. Ma 6, 1959 The o d "life" a i i ed b phenomenolog . The non51/71
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alone, and thus presence of nothing, if it were not linked to the past and the future, to memory and waiting. The continuity of my I in time is a relation that stems from a past Paarung and tends to a future and teleological Paarung, which then has a sense not only for my history and the history of the other person, but for the history of the community, of humanity. Thus the problem of the Paarung becomes fundamental also for the sense of history, not "fetishized" history, but non-alienated history, which always rediscovers, at the origin of facts, the living persons. October 8, 1959 Today I delivered to Il Saggiatore the essays which will be part of the volume Omaggio a Husserl. A first act of trust in the rebirth of phenomenology in Italy. There will be translations of Ich, Welt und Zeit by Brand, and of the Krisis. But it will be difficult to make those who love only ready-made phrases and formulas, understand Husserl. November 12, 1959 What I live, what I "experience," are the lived things, the Erlebnisse. Erlebnis is that of which I have evident experience in the first person: it is, in fact, my having experiences. My living the visions, my touching, my hearing, and so on. The protagonists of Joyces's Ulisses are the Erlebnisse. They are the life of his characters-character, of Joyce as writer, of me as reader. They are in Joyce's internal stream of consciousness of time, in the consciousness stream expressed in his characters, in my consciousness stream. The Stream of Consciousness (James), the Erlebnissstrom (Husserl) flows in me continuously. I live everything in the stream of consciousness. I do not live casually the sensations, the perceptions of which I am aware (in me there live also those which are not conscious implied in those which are conscious, but in a second, third plane that ends up in the background which is the sleeping world of matter). They are one inside the other, one next to the other, one after the other. They are in a temporal order of their own, and not in a different one. Past perceptions have their own "places," just like the present ones, which are about to pass. They happen in such a way as to happen only once. Husserl says they have their own Einmaligkeit. They do not repeat themselves. They are individuated because they are irreversible (necessary connection between individual and temporality). I hear an A on the piano. There is a necessary time for me to be able to hear it. The A resounds once. It is individuated as A. Pause. Other notes. I hear the A again. The same note is repeated, I say. In reality it is another A, not the one I had already heard. But it is also the A that resounds a second time. The second A is also individuated. I realize that the two have a common essence. The first had it even before I heard the second. How strange: the individual, in what characterizes it (its being an A), in its individual essence, is such as to share that essence with another individual. That is why I speak of common essence. More precisely, I should say: t pical essence. The individual remains individual in its irreversible position in time. The earlier A is the earlier one, not the current one. But in each irreversible position, in each Einmaligkeit, there is present a typical essence common to the individual and to all the individuals of its species. Phenomenology is the
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survey, the description of each typical, individual essence. The essences of all the individuals are connected, even if the individuals have different essences. Not only the A has an essence, but also the white of the key. And the white is linked, as a color, to the surface, and this to the solid, and so on. In each individual, therefore, there is immanent the universal correlation of the essences, precisely because the individual is such, that is because it has its own unrepeatable (or "absolute," as Husserl said sometimes) place in time. Thus the flow of Erlebnisstrom makes both the individual and the essential possible, in a necessary connection.
January 21, 1960 Intentional meaning, sense of truth, in every field, even in art, even in painting (this is the "rationality" of art). Epoch in Czanne: "We must render the image of what we see, forgetting everything that has been there before us" [check!] (Letter to E. Bernard, October 23, 1905). Constitution of the world. In Czanne's language: construction. True construction, possible only if "everything that has been there before" is bracketed. Until the end of life. Nine days before his death, he writes to his son: "Only oil painting brings me relief. I must work, keep going. I must paint sketches and canvases...: if I painted them, they could only be constructed from life" [check!] (October 13, 1906). This truth is not the reality of the world in the mundane sense. Czanne has "forgotten" the world in this sense. For him, a painter, the truth of the world is not something to be reproduced, to be imitated. His world is the one he experiences phenomenologically, the one that constitutes itself in him. He draws this world his own world, because of the phenomenological principle according to which in the individual there is always the typical from the typical, "scientific" structure of the Lebenswelt. The radical will of his epoch allows him to capture the essence, the logos, a truth which will be valid for all those who have the courage to accept his gift. For a phenomenological esthetics: the eidos in art. Not only visual, but tactile, auditory, kinesthetic eidos. Variations of the image and perceptions. Phantasms and real things. Presumption and realization. Esthetic Erf llung. Transcendental esthetics. February 4, 1960 In the biblical covenant between God and man there is a fundamental clause: "Let it be clear," says God, "that I am the only creator. I not you created you. In this matter, I am a jealous God." Where can a thought such as this have originated from? In terms of a phenomenological analysis I see two ways. The first is the projection of the father unto God. The child, in order to be man, must rebel against the father. It is the way of the oedipal complex, Freud's way. Obviously the projection appears as prohibition and as jealousy precisely because the prohibition must be overcome. Man becomes "virile" by violating the prohibition. If the father is God, man reaches the maximum of human virility, and thus becomes God. This position is naive. In fact the father
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is always divinized. The replacement of the father is heroic: the child becomes either God or the Devil. Man's maturity as man is reached precisely when the divinization of the father ceases. If the father becomes man, the child too becomes man. Usually this happens when the child, in fact, becomes the father of a new child, and so on. Confronted with his own child, the child having become a father makes peace with his own father: now he can. It is his turn now to be divinized. The second way. In the procreant sexual act I do not engage in it in order to have a child. In the experience of myself in the first person and of the other in the sexual act I do not feel I am procreating, I do not have the experience in the first person of "causing birth." Sexual evidence is the evidence of the other in me and of myself in the other. It can not be the evidence of the child who is not there yet. I will know only la e if the consequences are procreative, observes Husserl. But I can ask myself this: "How does it happen?" Phenomenologically, this "how" must be experienced by the subject. But the subject is the subject who begins his own birth following fertilization. It is not I, it is my child, or it is I, but in the act of my own birth. There is a separation here. The separation which begins immediately, as soon as the sexual act is concluded. The woman too estranges herself from me. What she has of me in herself is still mine, but it is not I. In love, at the beginning, I projected myself unto her: she has become "my life." Precisely because of this I must possess her: in order to "recover my life." But "my life," instead of being returned to me, becomes concretely another life. That is how we become parents, by becoming ano he bjec . But this is how we are children: we start, genetically, our own history, the history of our own subjectivity. To procreate and to be born are two operations which are mine, mine as a subject, yet which elude me. The first eludes me in the separation that follows the sexual act from which procreation indeed originates. The second operation, to be born, eludes me because only others can tell me it is mine. It is not in the first person. I can not remember my intrauterine life and my birth. The two operations, which elude me, are projected unto God, who becomes the only creator. There is an implication: the scientific study of procreation and birth, and finally gene ic . As a phenomenological science this falls, in some way, within the purview of anthropology, as well as of psychology and somatology, because its problem is posited as the study of the modalities and the meaning of genesis, experienced subjectively, and thus phenomenologically. One of the consequences of the scientific implication is the following: the scientific study of genesis, the objective scientific study may appear as a substitute for the sexual act. A scientist may realize, perhaps [too ?] late, that scientific knowledge has replaced, for him, "knowledge" in the biblical sense, namely the sexual act. This can happen to the philosopher as a researcher of the genesis of the world. Or to the historian: genesis is history. Fetishism is fascinating because it replaces the creative sexual act. From this point of view, technology can exert a magical attraction. Technology can replace the sexual act and, in cybernetics, failed procreation. The technician will want to build his child as a hom nc l in the unconscious desire to replace men with machines. Goethe's hom nc l is the symbol of what
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Husserl denounces as the "crisis of the sciences." Paris, March 30, 1960 I met Ricoeur at the Gare de Lyon. We had not seen each other for fifteen years. He had left Wietzendorf suddenly. I had been asleep. He had not wanted to wake me up and had left a loaf of bread on my bed. He was a professor in Strasbourg, and I in Pavia. Later in Paris, and I in Milan. Fifteen years ago he was translating Husserl's Ideen I, and if today I meet him again it is because I have resumed studying Husserl. April 2, 1960 Conversation with Merleau-Ponty after my lecture at the Sorbonne. He is not prepared to give a decisive importance to the problem of time. He mentions a book of his where, among other things, he will try to do for biology what he did for psychology in Structure du comportement and in Phnomenologie de la perception. I insist on the fact that only a phenomenological approach to time can clarify the conception, for me too labile, of "ambiguity." We end up talking about Husserl's unpublished works on time and the problem concerning them. Ricoeur is particularly preoccupied with the problem of evil. He is looking for a philosophy of yes, not only for a philosophy of no. Phenomenology he thinks discovers the negative concealed in us, but can not dissolve evil in a theoretical explanation of evil. April 3, 1960 Strolling in the Bois de Boulogne with Ricoeur. He is not convinced by my way of reconstituting phenomenology. A different reading of Ideen II in Merleau-Ponty and in Ricoeur. Ricoeur seems to be too closely tied to Ideen I. He has great admiration and great respect for Sartre, but he certainly does not love Sartre's ontology (if it is a question of the first part of tre et le nant, we agree). Speculations on what will be in Critique de la raison dialectique. The problem of evidence. Sensible evidence. Ricoeur reminds me of this sentence of Nietzsche: "It is impossible to confute a sound." [check!] Brussels, April 5, 1960 The copy of Pensiero, esistenza e valore which Ricoeur has kept and which I had given him as a present at Wietzendorf, has restarted my thoughts concerning what I thought of Husserl in 1936. At that time I saw in Husserl three problems: subjectivity, eidetic intuition, intersubjectivity. It seemed to me then that Husserl had not solved the last problem. Now I think the opposite. Ricoeur does not believe, instead, that Husserl manages to clarify
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What makes me happy but at the same time cautious, doubtful, perplexed, is to find in Husserl analyses which I believed to be only mine. Sometimes they are identical. Sometimes the difference seems minimal, yet essential, and I realize that I would have pursued an unfruitful path to say the least. But Husserl himself tries different ways. He abandons some. Many converge. Others still seem contradictory even when it later appears they are not. All intersect and in each way there is at least a note which belongs with the others of the same type, or perhaps with groups of ways remote from the "thematized" one. The theme, announced as central, often does not end up as such: the secondary theme imposes itself and pushes aside, in the nonthematized background, the initial theme. A complex symphonic structure. The abandoned themes are not always silent. They continue, muted, or are briefly evoked within the orchestration of the current theme by two or three notes which, even as they are part of such theme, also belong to the theme that seemed to have been abandoned. The constitution of things. The things felt, perceived, lived by all our sensory organs and by our body. which is the organ of the sensory organs. Our body is a living body, Leib. But it can appear as a thing among things, as Ursache. A thing surrounded by the others ("circumstantiality:" the precategorical type of relation between cause and effect). All things are involved in these reciprocal causal relations, and that is why they are things. But is the thing which is there, which I see, and which from here is only a vision, a vision which reveals it to me as much smaller than it really is, real? No, it is a vision, a phantasm. The rich analysis, which Husserl develops in Manuscripts D with regard to the relations between real things and phantasms, is incredible. Things live in circumstantiality, in the perceived, lived causal relations: causality, originally, before being a category, is a modality of perception. The reality of the thing is characterized by its concrete, structural causality. The phantasm, as such, is not involved in causal relations, or it is so only in relation to the thing of which it is a phantasm. This is one of the ways tried by Husserl. Analysis of phantasms, of things, of the constitution of touch in relation to the constitution of sight, of the thing as instrument, as object of use, as Gebrauchsobjekt (in 1910). And, from 1917 to 1921, all the problems of time, of the stratifications of time, of finite periods (the problem, old for Husserl, of birth and death), of individuation. But there is more, much more! And then? Does the distinction between phantasm and real thing not indicate Husserl's preoccupation with "reality"? To be sure what is described is the essence, unreal in itself. But what is such essence if not the revelation (the phenomenon) of reality as such? Of reality which I know as reality precisely and only because it reveals itself to me? How remote are the Platonic interpretations of the Gttingen disciples! I am writing these lines, before going to bed, after a full day's work. It would take months, perhaps years to write about all the problems which reveal themselves to me and which I intuit. Milan, April 28, 1960 Lecture by Ricoeur in Milan. Ricoeur summarizes for me the contents of the second volume of Philosophie de la volont which is about to be published. The second volume will have the general title Finitude et culpabilit and will
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he o ali . I lie in belie ing o Ricoe ' e m .
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The idea of man i a ed be een fini e and infini e i clea no onl in Pla o, b in he Renai ance (Pico della Mi andola). I hink i had a ong effec on H e l, a a ma hema ical-philo ophical idea, ince he ime a Halle, p obabl h o gh hi di ec con ac i h Can o . I a B en ano ho in od ced Can o o H e l, ho in an ca e had been in e e ed in he p oblem of infini al o hen he a d ing Bol ano. Tha Can o , in hi o n a , ma ha e infl enced H e l i diffic l o den . To a he lea , Can o helped him o fo m la e clea l he concep of "infini e e ." Thi i al o, af e all, he opinion of A. F aenkel, Can o ' edi o (cf. Briefwechsel CantorDedekind, Pa i 1922, p.5).
Pa i , Sep embe 23, 1960 Ro a mon ' a g men on dialec ic ha e con inced me of o hing : he nece i of d ing again Ma and he fac ha in F ance he a e no a all a a e of he impo ance of Sa e' o k. The Critique de la raison dialectique ha no been nde ood. I i clea ha in hi o k Sa e he e i en iali i fading a a mo e and mo e, and ha Sa e he Ma i and he phenomenologi mo e o he fo eg o nd. The concep of "p ac ical e " ha , in m opinion, a deci i e impo ance. To ha e en did Sa e hink of Can o ? The set i he d namical ol ion of he p oblem of he ela ion be een indi id al and ocie , and be een pa and hole ( he "de- o ali ed o ali "). Science and dialec ic of na e. A e-e al a ion of he dialec ic of na e i ce ainl po ible, b onl if e do no p e end o ded ce he dialec ic of na e f om cience and f om a philo ophical con c ion (phenomenolog i no a "con c ion"). Le en, Sep embe 25, 1960
Thi ime I am eading onl man c ip in g o p K, hich ela e di ec l o he Krisis, fo he Commento I am p epa ing. I al o pend man ho in H e l' lib a . I i e do n long no e . He e onl a fe ema k . In he man c ip I find inn me able pa age on he concep of "conc e ene " of he Lebenswelt. I i a eal o ld, and he cience of he Lebenswelt i he d of he structure of he o ld of eali ie (Struktur der Realit tenwelt). T e on olog i he d of ch c e (K III 32: one of he la man c ip , ince i i da ed Ap il, 1937). The Realit tenwelt i anal ed in connec ion i h bjec i i , logic and in e bjec i i . Sep embe 26, 1960
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A I al a ho gh , H e l a ign a decisive impo ance o gene ic phenomenolog . In he pa I co ld ha e do b abo he fac ha he migh indeed eek a phenomenolog of conc e e gene i . No an mo e. The con i ion of he o he , empa h ["en opa ia", ee Glo a in The F nc ion of he Science . T an al o ' no e.], he Einf hlung, i linked o he econ i ion of he hi o of he monad, of man, ince bi h. The p imi i e a in hich I e pe ience he o he (the first Einf hlung fo he child) i he ela ion hip i h he mo he (K III 11, J l 1935). I i he efo e linked o bi h, hich i in od ced he e, gene icall , a Ursprung. The o he en e of he o iginal, f om hich he philo ophe m al a begin h o gh eflec ion, i he ac al e idence of he bjec . B ch e idence i al a one and other, and con i e an a ocia ion ch ha he bjec i he him elf and, a he ame ime, he o he . Thi happen bo h a bi h and in li ing p e ence, in he lebendige Gegenwart. To an la e i in o conc e e lang age i o ld be nece a o efe o he e al ac , he e pai ing i ni and d ali , and f om hich he child i bo n, a o he f om he d ali . Phenomenolog of he child. The p oblem of he con i ion of he e e nal o ld (fo H e l i m occ af e he con i ion of he o he , o ha , if he Einf hlung i h he mo he o i h he pe on ho eplace he e e mi ing, he con i ion of he e e nal o ld o ld be mi ing). Th o gh he con i ion of he o he and of he e e nal o ld, he con i ion of hing and, he efo e of he name of hing , i po ible. Phenomenolog of lang age. Anal i of he fo ma ion of lang age in e m of he kine he ic mo ion of he mo he . The child fo m hi o n pace and hi o n ime and h , a H e l, "he en e hi o ."
Sep embe 27, 1960 An impo an poin , fo me, in man c ip K III 4 (1934-1935), in hich he heme of gene i i connec ed o ha of ni e al eleolog (g o p-E man c ip ). No mali and abno mali . No mal Lebenswelt i eleological and i ime i eleological ime. Li ing o gani m : p e ence of totality in hei in en ional life and in hei teleologische Zeitlichkeit (p. 45-49). The o ali men ioned he e i , a Sa e o ld a , a "de- o ali ed o ali ." Teleolog i a la , b no a cien ific la in he al en e: i applie onl o he plane of he cience of he Lebenswelt, no o he e ac cience ( hi i o al o fo he "la " in Ideen II). Ske ch of a phenomenolog of animal pecie : p oblem of cla ifica ion, of de elopmen , of inhe i ance. The fi pa of he np bli hed o k ( o p. 60) a i en be een he 8 h and he 9 h of Sep embe 1934. H e l con in e i in Ap il 1935. I i connec ed o all he heme of he Krisis. Page 66-73 ha e been p bli hed a Beilage XIV of he Krisis: he a e ic l linked o he pa ag aph he e, in Husserliana, he e of he Krisis end . In i ence on objec ifica ion no onl in p cholog b al o in ociolog and in co molog (p. 120). Sep embe 28, 1960 H e l in man c ip K III 3 (1934-1935): "Phenomenolog , a ni e al cience, i eo ipso al o cience of a ional men and of he fo m and no m of
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their individual, social, political, scientific rationality" (p. 9). [check!] The study of the relations between classical and contemporary physics in K III 2 (1934-1935). The problem of "consciousness," of the Selbstbesinnung. The problem of God (in pages which were to be used for the Prague conference, but were not utilized). God is a telos which lives in the evidence of the decision by which, in the finite, I choose the path of the infinite and find myself, by virtue of such decision, non only ith, but in the others. God appears as the limit pole of the reciprocal encounter of the monads one in the other (hence Ricoeur's "respect," and much more). It is the pole toward which all paths tend, in such a way, however, that they are not converging in a point, but internally into each other in a mutual compenetration. This pole, as sense of truth, lives in the action of each monad which is aware of having humanity within itself, that is of each monad which acquires consciousness of itself in the Selbstbesinnung. Infinite truth lives in the finite, but the finite can never pretend to exhaust it in itself, to objectify it and to have realized it. Each monad is intentional insofar as it lives the truth while knowing that it [the monad] is not the truth. It is not therefore a question of being, of a metaphysical-theological being, but of its sense (and thus of truth), of a transcendental teleological horizon intended as telos of a intersubjective rational life namely of a life in which each subject is subject for the other, not object. But this means that men must try not only to be each one near the other, but each one in the other. The relation between me and mankind is not Nebeneinander but Ineinander. Paris, September 30, 1960 I think I am interpreting correctly Husserl's pages prepared for the Prague Conference. In my opinion, for Husserl the consideration of God as being in the metaphysical and objectivist sense would be idolatry. Intentionality is directed toward intersubjectivity, and to the extent in which the action of a monad is right, because it transcends itself beyond its own finity, the monad has within itself the other monads. Hence the possibility of evil, namely the fall of intersubjective intentionality. Not only: I do not live in the other except by going beyond my being, as it is given in intentional truth. If I want to make the other and myself coincide with truth, that is intersubjective being with truth, I negate myself and the other in a complex dialectic which is not only dialectic between myself and the other, but dialectic between myself-other and between the two of us and everybody else (mankind). Notice that if God is not a reality or a being, but an intentional limit, the origin of evil, for the individual who is a part, consists in his positing himself as realized totality. This is true for the individual as "phenomenological" or "practical" set. "De-totalized totality" is the intentional intersubjective totality. Milan, October 14, 1960 This year's lecture will be devoted to Sartre's Critique de la raison dialectique, in addition to the Krisis. What contemporary thought is seeking is
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labor. In me, as individual, there is the world. There is also, and above all, something "external" which I experience, "live" as "external," as "contraposed." My actions, my kinesthesis, here are praxis and technology. Fetishized technology fails to recognize labor as my labor, as labor of the subject in the first person. The I is "I do", "I can" as Husserl puts it. We must add: "I work." The problem of matter, of the modalities through which I experience matter and I act in it, acquire thus a fundamental importance. Technology is an extension of myself in the world: it causes matter to become mine, my product, extension of my work. Hence value. To strip technology of subjectivity means to objectify, to alienate the meaning of life. January 18, 1961 Phenomenology of matter. It is not an accident that it is the most difficult, and that it must struggle against the most serious concealment. Tight connection between phenomenology of matter and phenomenology of labor. It is clear that it is not sufficient to speak of mutual insertion of the subject into the object and of idealism into realism (Merleau-Ponty: ambiguity). The materialistic dimension is missing. Point out how this absence ends up provoking "spiritualism." Materialism is not obvious, as it has been believed until now. Phenomenologically, it is linked to the Erlebnis of the external, to the modalities by which I live the external. I never own things without labor, for free, I never own them entirely: this means that I must constitute them by penetrating them with that particular participation, or Einf hlung, which is established between me and matter in work and in technical operations. Hence the possibility of a phenomenology of technology, beyond objectification and fetishization. Technology as mediation, as Kantian transcendental schema which becomes extension of man in work, and in which man is man and nature, and truly appropriates nature. If he does not fetishize it, and if he is not used as object by another man, who makes him a slave by means of technology, he rediscovers nature within himself. Labor, technology, "interiorization" of nature. Each instance of interiorization, in the sense of Sartre's dialectic between interiorization and exteriorization, is an operation which has a meaning, which has not lost intentionality. Capitalism, in its various forms, can also be interpreted as the loss of the intentionality of labor, of the sense of labor, of its teleological meaning. February 6, 1961 Hegel's "servile self-consciousness [?]." The servant claims for himself, against the master, the "faculty," the possibility of giving meaning to work. Self-consciousness frees the servant from feeling as an "object," an instrument. The sense of labor, with which, for the servant, death is defeated, is the sense of life, the irreversibility transformed into sense of life and meaning of history (that is, into intentional truth). Lectures on the relations between psychology and phenomenology. I already know where they will lead: to the attempt of positing the problem of
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an h opolog i
Ma ch 6, 1961 e- eadi g Ul e i he I a ia a a i . The beach. A igh , J ce e Ai e (I d ' i h d e he be f hi a i ). Ra he , ha c e a bi a e , he a e age, i i deed a e he e gica a a i f i e he i . I fac , i i ie he e i e f a ce de a e he ic . J ce c d ha e he D- a ci .B , did he Ideen I? "S ephen clo ed hi e e o hea hi boo c h c ackling ack and hell . Yo a e alking h o gh i ho ome e . [S de ' Edi i . The C ec ed Te ...Pe g i 1986, . 31]" T a h gh: a a i f ha he I ca e cei e, i e e ,a e hi g hich ca ca be a e ed. I i he I i deed. The E lebni f he I, he I' da i ie f " i i g." I i he c c e e I, he c c e e ad, he ad hich i a "co p p op e," ea b d , Leib. The I, i h i ea b d , c i e he db ea f he e e ga , a d he b ea f i e he i : "I am ,a ide a a ime. A e ho pace of ime h o gh e ho ime of pace. [ibide ]." H e ' a i - e a c e f he Leben el , i h ega d i e he i . S e he c : "Fi e, i : he Nacheinende . [ibide ]." Whe e did J ce ge ch a H e ia e ? (a bi a e : Nebeneinande ). S e he , hi e e c ed, i e he d f hi e . He hi ab he da i ie b hich he c ea I e e he d; ab he c c da ce f he e e ga i ha ga f ga , a H e i , hich i he b d . B I ca e c e e e .Id ee he d, e i i e e , i i he e, I a i e c ab i ed i Boden. I he b i hed a ci D 17 a d D 18 a i i ed a e Ea h, i e hi e f, i e hi b d . J ce' i .B i i ib e i a ca e ead he e i e Ul e i a he e gica e . Ma ch 28, 1961 be E i ' The Wa e Land (1922) a d J ee '14 a d '21). ce' Ul e (1922, i e Ia
"T an hing S a bo jo nali [ ee a man. Hi oge he 38]
a i " hich ca be f da i The Wa e Land: "Did o ee of o a i b o he S ephen la el ? No? S e he' no do n in g e ace i h hi a n Sall ?" [ibide . 32] "M. D mon , famo , D mon ..." [ibide . 36] Hi . B a bi a e "dea h b a e " E i , "i . Dea h b Wa e ", . 41. T a a ' e] "A d o ning h man e e c eam o me o of ho o of hi dea h. I...Wi h him do n...I co ld no a e he . Wa e : bi e dea h: lo ." [ibide .
The d g: "Thei dog ambled abo a bank of d indling and, o ing, niffing on all ide . Looking fo ome hing lo in a pa life." [ibide . 38]
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"Hi hi d a he ca e ed he a d: he hi f e a dabb ed a d de ed. S e hi g he b ied he e, hi g a d he ." [ibidem p. 39] The dog is " i g he dead." [ibidem p. 39]
Joice's texture is complex, and in the phenomenological E eb i that distinguishes him, he reveals themes which are very close to those of The Wa e La d. Metamorphosis, metempsychosis, ineluctable return of life (in the spring, in April, in " he c e e h" [Eliot p. 29]). In Eliot: is the dog a friend or an enemy of man? He has the habit of grubbing, of unearthing corpses. In The Wa e La d what is buried is also the seed of violence, of life as violence, which sprouts again inexorably according to the cycle of a a. If the dog unearths the seed, in April the plant will not grow and the cycle will be broken. In this case the dog is a friend of man, provided man understands the value of renunciation (of the voice of thunder: da. Namely: da a, da adh a , da a a [Eliot p. 45]: give, be compassionate, refrain). Is the dog, when he does not allow the corpse-seed to bloom, a friend because he breaks the cycle of a a, of violence and pain, or a friend because he can not bear that the body be buried, that the man be dead, and would like, by unearthing him, to make him alive again? The h c i e ec e , since he does not want to understand the voice of thunder, will opt for the latter solution. The ambiguity may seem even more complex: it is possible to negate life only with an act of violence. That is why Buddha condemned the will to live, but also the will against life, for himself and for the others (namely, both masochism and sadism). The problem is this: to live in the world, but not in the mundane. Hence: not in fetishism and in the fall of meaning, but in intentional meaning. April 11, 1961 It was a true joy to be with Sartre here, in Milan. We had breakfast with many friends. His insistence on the importance of the problem of subjectivity. He is perfectly aware of the relation of his concept of "set" to that of mathematicians, although he obviously uses it in a different I would say "phenomenological" sense. He sees with pleasure a phenomenological reading of the C i i e. With regard to the problems of the dialectic between interiorization and exteriorization, we begin a conversation which attempts to illuminate the relation between the non-interiorized external [exterior?] and the unconscious. It seems to me possible to discover in this way a very significant connection between what we call "unconscious" and the exteriority of things, of the world, of history. At a certain point our conversation ceases to refer to the C i i e and develops along different directions. Sartre's fascination lies in his continuous capacity to be present and to go beyond himself. He burns himself in an uninterrupted intentional movement. He insists on the fact that interiorization is labor, is a i . I feel a confirmation of my hypothesis of searching to what extent the unconscious may also be a mode of being of the
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ma e ial o ld in . A mode of being hich i no a a e n il e make i o . E en if e a e no con cio of i , e a e oo ed in he ma e hich i in . Wi h labo , i h he a io pe of praxis, "in e io i a ion" become hen one of he f ndamen al modali ie of bjec i i . Ma 4, 1961 Me lea -Pon died e e da . "La tradition est oubli des origines, disait le dernier Husserl. Justement si nous lui devon beaucoup, nous sommes hors d'tat de voir au juste ce qui est lui." Wi h he e o d he open hi bea if l e a Le philosophe et son ombre. I did no kno I o ld ead hem hinking, in ch a conc e e and di ec i a ion, of he comm nica ion be een he li ing and he dead, of he "dialog i h he dead" H e l peak of. I had o gani ed a e ie of lec e in I al fo Me lea -Pon , and I a abo o info m him of he fine de ail of hi ip. De pi e he diffe ence among he a io in e p e a ion of phenomenolog , he e i in e e philo ophe ho efe back o H e l a f ndamen al ag eemen , and ome ime he e face he ame p eocc pa ion . " l'gard d'un philosophe dont l'entreprise a veill tant d'chos, et apparemment si loin du point o il se tenait lui-mme, toute commmoration est aussi trahison, soit que nous lui fassions l'hommage trs superflu de nos penses, comme pour leur trouver un garant auquel elles n'ont pas droit,--soit qu'au contraire, avec un respect qui n'est pas sans distance, nous le rduisons trop strictement ce qu'il a lui-mme voulu et dit...Mais ces difficults, qui sont celles de la communication entre les 'ego,' Husserl justement les connaisait bien, et il ne nous laisse pas sans ressource en face d'elles." In e e philo ophe he e i a ho i on of ho gh hich implie a backg o nd hich ha no been made e plici , a hado . We oo m e o o he implici backg o nd in Me lea -Pon ' philo ophical ho i on. I i he leep backg o nd hich al a emain in he o ld of akef lne , of e plici ea on. The con in i of he egos allo fo pa e , fo in e p ion . The pa e of leep, he pa e of dea h. To nde and H e l, a Me lea -Pon , i o make him ali e again in oda : "Husserl dlivr de sa vie, rendu l'entretien avec ses pairs et son audace omnitemporelle." In H e l, in Me lea -Pon , in , a con in o co ec ion. J ne 10, 1961 Fa he Van B eda a i ed on Ma 29 and ha emained in I al ince. He ema ked ha in I al , ince Feb a 1958, he la ime he a he e, phenomenolog ha made m ch p og e . In hi lec e in Milan, and in a e pecial a in he one he ga e in T in, Van B eda a e happ o nde line he impo ance of genetic phenomenology. Al ho gh man of m o nge f iend e e a a f om Milan, and ome f om I al , a ema kable n mbe of people a ended he lec e and he ecep ion . Van B eda' in i ence i al a on he f ndamen al p oblem of he ens qua verum, of meaning. Thi i indeed a ke concep fo H e l, ea o a e, diffic l o nde and. Pe hap , acco ding o m in e p e a ion, i i e en mo e diffic l o g a p he fac ha in H e l he esse of he philo ophical adi ion e ol e i elf in
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verum: the opposite of traditional metaphysics. It is striking to think about the enormous labor that awaits all those who have approached the problems of phenomenology. Encounters with the various scholars are more and more necessary. What is important is that such encounters happen spontaneously, free from prejudices and pre-constituted positions. June 16, 1961 For a phenomenolog of technolog . To try once again the analysis of the real body, of the Leib. The body as presentation, coordinated in me, of all the sense organs, and as certainty of being able to act through its coherence, its form, its whole "schema." Use of my hand. Use of the instrument. Automatism. Its negative and positive functions. My relationship with the instrument becomes "unconscious." In the sense that my Leib uses the instrument as its own. All this leads me to think about a tight relationship of technology with the life of our body which lives organically-automatically. In technology and automatism are incarnated operations which from abstract become concrete. The body, in order to learn, must forget abstraction, the abstractive effort of attention formalism. Categories must become corporeal and automatic. In fact, categories derive from corporeity, from the body joined with nature, from the "secret art of nature." In order to arrive at constructing an instrument I must avail myself, at a high level, of artificial categories. Thus I find myself, temporarily, on the abstract plane. The categories exist only in my head, my body does not know them yet. The instrument will function, for me, when the categories are learned from the body, when the body transforms them from potential to actual. When the body expands its own subjectivity and its own operational capabilities. I must learn to steer, to "govern" (intentional cybernetics) the instrument as I steer and govern my body. Governed technology becomes subjective and intersubjective. To use technology not as objectification, but as enrichment of the human subject and of his autonomy, of its ability to self-govern. That is, to eliminate objectified, fetishized technology, which contributes to the fetishism of man. And to eliminate that which makes fetishism necessary, by making also the negative side of automatism necessary. June 19, 1961 Schnberg's Moses und Aron at La Scala. I had never seen this opera on the stage. The effect was striking even if, naturally, one can always argue about the interpretation. I spoke with Frau Gertrud Schnberg, and also with Nuria Nono Schnberg, about Schnberg's interest in the religious problem and the Kabbala. Nuria was born in 1932, in Barcellona, at the very time her father had completed Moses und Aron. We talked until very late, with Rognoni, Nono, Castiglioni, Pestalozza, and everybody else. Listening again to the opera I convinced myself that it is the musical expression (at the highest level, particularly in the first act) of an unresolved crisis. Hence its pathos. Is Schnberg's God fetishized from the very beginning? I am afraid it is. If so, it is unavoidable that the story may end in the orgy around the golden calf. Moses' law is already expression, and if expression, instead of being meaning, is considered objectification, fetishism and idolatry, the law is idolatry (Aron).
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"One, eternal, omnipotent invisible and unrepresentable God." But the invisible, the non-representable, can not be expressed. This concerns music itself as expression. Schnberg has remained prisoner of the riddle. If his opera is a great opera, it is nevertheless so precisely because it expresses Schnberg's drama when faced with the riddle. The opera allows itself to be defined, paradoxically, as the expression of a negated expression. What is the meaning of expression? Schnberg did not give an answer, perhaps he could not answer this question. He would have been forced to say that God is not the being who dictates the law. What matters is the life of the law, the life of the meaning of truth: an intentional truth, a limit-truth and, in this sense, never objectified, never reducible to being, never conquered and never representable as conquered. The initial error is to attribute being to God, to posit God as static source of truth and expression, while what was sought in God was the meaning of expression and of its life. Something similar can be drawn, if one were so inclined, from the Kabbala itself. The law, as life of truth, is not in the formulation, in the letter, but in the intentional life of man, of the subject, and in the intentional life of intersubjectivity. It is a question not of receiving it as a dictate, but of finding it in each one of us, and in all for each of us, if it is indeed in each of us. Authentic law is infinite norm which is before us, not behind us. It is telos, not letter nor sign which absorbs in itself its own meaning. It is therefore meaning of life and intersubjective life which tends to an ideal, perfect intersubjectivity, and which, on the other hand, condemns itself, if it believes it has reached it. Any idolatry derives necessarily from the pretense of having received or to have conquered a definitive truth, a truth which is, has been and will always be being itself. Intentional life always tends beyond the being we are, and beyond that categorical being itself which we construct abstractly. It tends to an infinite meaning of man. And true expression is this tension. Expression which is not possession of anybody, and which is potentially meaningful to each one and to all. There is a premonition of all this in the Kabbala. The true Torah can not be written. It is oral. It is lived, in the living presence, by man, by all men. But then it is the meaning of man's life and it is in this sense that it is expression. The struggle against idolatry, against the vanity of seeking one's salvation or one's condemnation in the judgment of a tribunal (Kafka), is the struggle against objectification and fetishism. It is thus, as Husserl wanted, a return to that subjectivity which, if it is truly such, is intentional life for truth, namely life that lives, by always going beyond itself, in the idea of a perfect intersubjectivity, life that lives on this idea and that can, for this reason, e press itself. Not in a sign but in the meaning which always transcends the sign, meaning that finally is logos. Because the logical meaning is an expression: "Logische Bedeutung ist ein Ausdruck" (Ideen I, p. 305). June 22, 1961 A stroll. A rhythm that was waiting and now is present. Music of life. My I constituted itself, as Husserl puts it, in a history. But history is a complex web of stories, of motifs, of themes. While I was living a theme, or several themes, in the foreground, other themes were formed and woven through other
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themes in the background I did not know it, but now I do. Better: now I know that I knew it without knowing it (Husserl: one always knows more than one knows). The themes in the background were readying themselves for a sudden, and forever anticipated, revelation. They were in the dressing room, applying the makeup. Very seriously, yet playfully. They wanted to come to the foreground with a solemn apparition. Solemn and festive (but where had they disappeared? In Asia, in Africa?). Festive and somewhat ironic. As if to demonstrate that there is not only toil, preoccupation, S ge, but the slow maturation of a happiness which is waiting for its moment, its presence. Now happiness is here, on the stage. It carries a bit of waiting. Does it "retain" waiting in presence? Is it afraid of not being so beautiful as in absence? No, it know it is more beautiful precisely because of the waiting it carries within. It moves, it walks. Dance step, rhythmic and almost mechanical step of the mime. It expresses love, joy but it does not take itself too seriously. A ballet in which one encounters h and passion without losing any of the reality of things, which in their contradictions are no longer contradictory. A stroll. There is something similar in Mussorgsky's Pic e a a E hibi i . The G ea Ga e f Kie , the final section. Things are the way they are. The roads are roads. But everything is new. Like when from afar one arrives for the first time in a city which reveals of itself that which it will never reveal again. June 30, 1961 Janheinz Jahn (M : A O i e f he Ne Af ica C e. Translated by Marjorie Grene. New York, Grove Press, 1991) clarifies why the black man is not " e a ed e e i a a e ia f he ech gica ci i i a i f he d" [check!]. "Af ica i e ec a a e e e a d i e i he e e ea i ha he ee a id i he Af ica adi i . Thei idea i ei he he adi i a Af ica he b ac E ea , b he de Af ica . A d hi ea a e he E ea e e e i a adi i a i a e a i ed, e e ed a d c ci fi a e ." [check!] The necessary program therefore is to examine tradition "rationally." If the African intellectual proclaims himself irrationalist, as Fanon writes (Pea i e, a e b a c . Paris 1952), it is because the European imposes upon him a conception of reason in terms of which he is forced to consider himself "primitive," a human being without history. Black man has tried to understand what "primitive" meant and has found African civilization. A civilization which is civilization of reason and of body, not only of disembodied reason. A civilization which is a philosophy in the sense that it has meaning. Jahn: "The i ifica i f e i e ce... hich a e a e de i a i f he ea i g f he d ib e: ha i ha Af ica' c ib i ' i e a ci i i a i c d be." And again: "If e e ci i i a i e a i e i e f, eci e beca e f he fac ha i fi d i e f i he e a f he achi e, i ca i h he de c i f Af ica ci i i a i , he c a : hi g d be e ece a ha a e i hich, i ead f he i e ac ica e d f ab e ee e ... ha i e e a d ea i g i ce agai e ha i ed." [check!] To discover the sense of scientific categories in their precategorical and corporeal origin, for example in rhythm, means to discover that, if there is rhythm, there is a corporeal, empirical, origin of logic, and there becomes possible the ideal of a rational and scientific life, of a "new science" of humanity, in which technology becomes amplification of intersubjective life.
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White man, if he finds in himself the authentic meaning of black civili ation, also recovers the authentic meaning of European civili ation. This is "rationalism," rationalism which does not objectif subjects and bodies, rationalism of meaning. The uneasiness of the white man lies in the fact that his lack of understanding of the black man is a lack of understanding of himself as man.
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En o Paci: Phenomenological Diar

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