Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila


EN BANC


EUGENIA MENDOZA, A.C. No. 5338
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, ,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, Jr,
NACHURA,
DE CASTRO,
BRION, and
PERALTA,

ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, Promulgated:
Respondent February 23, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- x


R E S O L U T I O N


PER CURIAM:


Any departure Irom the path which a lawyer must Iollow as demanded
by the virtues oI his proIession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the
disciplining authority Ior there is perhaps no proIession aIter that oI the sacred
ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that oI law
(


BeIore the Court is the Petition Iiled by Eugenia Mendoza (complainant)
dated September 9, 2000, seeking the disbarment oI Atty Victor V Deciembre
(respondent) Ior his acts oI Iraudulently Iilling up blank postdated checks without her
authority and using the same Ior Iiling unIounded criminal suits against her

Complainant, a mail sorter at the Central Post OIIice Manila, averred that:
On October 3, 998, she borrowed Irom Rodela Loans, Inc, through respondent, the
amount oI P20,00000 payable in six months at 20 interest, secured by 2 blank checks,
with numbers 47253, 47256 to 47266, drawn against the Postal Bank Although she was
unable to IaithIully pay her obligations on their due dates, she made remittances, however,
to respondent's Metrobank account Irom November , 998 to March 5, 999 in the
total sum oI P2,9000
2(
Claiming that the amounts remitted were not enough to cover
the penalties, interests and other charges, respondent warned complainant that he would
deposit Postal Check No 47253 Iilled up by him on March 30, 999 in the amount
oIP6,00000 AIraid that respondent might sue her in court, complainant made good said
check and respondent was able to encash the same on March 30, 999 ThereaIter,
complainant made subsequent payments to the Metrobank account oI respondent
IromApril 3, 999 to October 5, 999,
3(
thereby paying respondent the total sum
oI P35,69000
4(


Complainant Iurther claimed that, later, respondent Iilled up two oI the postal
checks she issued in blank, Check Nos 4726 and 47262 with the amount oI P50,00000
each and with the dates January 5, 2000 and January 20, 2000 respectively, which
respondent claims was in exchange Ior the P00,00000 cash that complainant received on
November 5, 999 Complainant insisted however that she never borrowed P00,00000
Irom respondent and that it was unlikely that respondent would lend her, a mail sorter with
a basic monthly salary oI less than P6,00000, such amount Complainant also claimed that
respondent victimized other employees oI the Postal OIIice by Iilling up, without
authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition Ior loans
5(


In his Comment dated January 8, 2000, respondent averred that his dealings with
complainant were done in his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he Iiled a
complaint Ior violation oI Batas Pambansa Blg (BP Blg) 22 against complainant, he was
only vindicating his rights as a private citizen He alleged Iurther that: it was complainant
who deliberately deceived him by not honoring her commitment to their November 5,
999 transaction involving P00,00000 and covered by two checks which bounced Ior the
reason 'account closed; the October 3, 999 transaction was a separate and distinct
transaction; complainant Iiled the disbarment case against him to get even with him Ior
Iiling the estaIa and BP Blg 22 case against the Iormer; complainant's claim that
respondent Iilled up the blank checks issued by complainant is a complete lie; the truth was
that the checks reIerred to were already Iilled up when complainant aIIixed her signature
thereto; it was unbelievable that complainant would issue blank checks, and that she was a
mere low-salaried employee, since she was able to maintain several checking accounts;
and iI he really intended to deIraud complainant, he would have written a higher amount
on the checks instead oI only P50,00000
6(


The case was reIerred to the Integrated Bar oI the Philippines
7(
(IBP), and the
parties were required to Iile their position papers
8(


In her Position Paper, complainant, apart Irom reiterating her earlier claims, alleged
that respondent, aIter the hearing on the disbarment case beIore the IBP on September 5,
200, again Iilled up three oI her blank checks, Check Nos 47263, 47264 and 47265,
totaling P00,00000, to serve as basis Ior another criminal complaint, since the earlier
estaIa and BP Blg 22 case Iiled by respondent against her beIore the OIIice oI the
Prosecutor oI Pasig City was dismissed on August 4, 2000
9(


Respondent insisted in his Position Paper, however, that complainant
borrowed P00,00000 in exchange Ior two postdated checks, and that since he had known
complainant Ior quite some time, he accepted said checks on complainant's assurance that
they were good as cash
0(


Investigating Commissioner WilIredo EJE Reyes submitted his Report
dated September 6, 2002, Iinding respondent guilty oI dishonesty and recommended
respondent's suspension Irom the practice oI law Ior one year
(
The Report was adopted
and approved by the IBP Board oI Governors in its Resolution dated October 9,
2002
2(
Respondent Iiled a Motion Ior Reconsideration which was denied, however, by
the IBP Board oI Governors on January 25, 2003 on the ground that it no longer had
jurisdiction on the matter, as the same was already endorsed to the Supreme Court
3(


On June 9, 2003 this Court's Second Division issued a Resolution remanding the
case to the IBP Ior the conduct oI Iormal investigation, as the Report oI Commissioner
Reyes was based merely on the pleadings submitted
4(


AIter hearings were conducted,
5(
Investigating Commissioner Dennis A B Funa
submitted his Report dated December 5, 2006 Iinding respondent guilty oI gross
misconduct and violation oI the Code oI ProIessional Responsibility, and recommended
respondent's suspension Ior three years
6(


Commissioner Funa held that while it was diIIicult at Iirst to determine who
between complainant and respondent was telling the truth, in the end, respondent himselI,
with his own contradicting allegations, showed that complainant's version should be given
more credence
7(


Commissioner Funa noted that although complainant's total obligation to
respondent was only P24,00000, since the loan obtained by complainant on October 3,
998 was P20,00000 at 20 interest payable in six months, by April 3, 999, however,
complainant had actually paid respondent the total amount oI P30,24000 Thus, even
though the payment was irregularly given, respondent actually earned more than the agreed
upon 20 interest Moreover, the amounts oI P50,00000 as well as the name oI the payee
in the subject checks were all typewritten
8(


Commissioner Funa also gave credence to complainant's claim that it was
respondent's modus operandi to demand a certain amount as 'settlement Ior the dropping
oI estaIa complaints against his borrowers As Commissioner Funa explains:

A( complaint Ior estaIa/violation oI BP 22 was Iiled against
complainant( beIore the Prosecutor's OIIice in Pasig City on June 2,
2000 On August 4, 2000, the Prosecutor's OIIice dismissed the
complaint On October 2, 2000, Complainant Iiled this disbarment case About
one year later, or on September 5, 200, Complainant was surprised to receive a
demand letter demanding payment once again Ior anotherP00,00000
corresponding to another three checks, Check Nos 0047263, 0047264 and
0047265

Furthermore, Respondent Iiled another criminal complaint Ior
estaIa/violation oI BP 22 dated October 7, 200, this time beIore the QC
Prosecutor's OIIice The prosecutor's oIIice recommended the Iiling oI the
criminal case Ior one oI the checks

x x x x

Respondent's version, on the other hand, is that Check Nos 004726 and
0047262 were given to him Ior loans (rediscounting) contacted on November
5, 999 and not Ior a loan contracted on October 3, 998 x x x He claims that
the October 3, 998 transaction is an earlier and diIIerent transaction x x x On
the very next day, or on November 6, 999, Complainant again allegedly
contracted another loan Ior anotherP00,00000 Ior which Complainant
allegedly issued the Iollowing Postal Bank checks Check No 0047263 dated
May 6, 200 Ior P20,00000; Check No 0047264 dated May 30, 200
Ior P30,00000 and Check No 0047265 dated June 5, 200 Ior P50,00000(

x x x x

Oddly though, Respondent never narrated that Complainant obtained a
second loan on November 6, 999 in his Answer dated January 8, 2000( and
in his Position Paper dated October 8, 200( He did not even discuss it in his
Motion Ior Reconsideration dated December 20, 2002, although he attached the
Resolution oI the QC Prosecutor's OIIice Clearly, the November 6,
999 transaction ,8 , mere concoction th,t did not ,ctu, occur It was a
mere aIterthought Respondent once again Iilled-up three oI the other checks in
his possession (checks dated May 6, 200, May 30, 200 and June 5, 200)
so that he can again file another estaIa/BP 22 case against Complainant
(October 7, 200) AFTER the earlier complaint he had Iiled beIore the Pasig
City Prosecutor's OIIice had been dismissed (August 4, 2000) and AFTER
herein Complainant had Iiled this disbarment case (October 2, 2000)

More telling, and this is where Respondent gets caught, are the
circumstances attending this second loan oI November 6, 999 In addition to
not mentioning it at all in his Answer, his Position Paper, and his Motion Ior
Reconsideration, which makes it very strange, is that Iact that he alleges that the
loan was contracted on November 6, 999 Ior which Complainant supposedly
issued checks dated May 6, 200, May 30, 200 and June 5, 200 Note
that May 6, 200 is eighteen (8 months), or year and 6 months,
Irom November 6, 999 This is strangely a long period Ior loans oI this
nature This loan was supposedly not made in writing, only verbally With no
collaterals and no guarantors Clearly, thi8 i8 , non-exi8tent tr,n8,ction It
was merely concocted by Respondent

More importantly, and this is where Re85ondent commit8 hi8 f,t,
bunder thus exposing his illegal machinations, Complainant allegedly
received P00,00000 in cash on November 6, 999 Ior which Complainant
gave Respondent, in return, checks also amounting to P00,00000 The checks
were supposedly dated May 6, 200, May 30, 200 and June 5, 200 x x x

Now then, would not Respondent suIIer a Iinancial loss iI he gave
away P00,00000 on November 6, 999 and then also receiveP00,00000
on May 6, 200 or year and 6 months later? A person engaged in lending
business would want to earn interest The same also with a person re-
discounting checks In this instance, in his haste to concoct a story,
Respondent forgot to f,ctor in the intere8t At 20 interest, assuming that it is
per annum, Ior years, Respondent should have collected Irom Complainant
at least P30,00000 And yet the checks he Iilled up totaled
only P00,00000 The same is true in re-discounting a check II Complainant
gave Respondent P00,00000 in checks, Respondent should be giving
Complainant an amount less than P00,00000 Thi8 ex5o8e8 hi8 8tor ,8 ,
f,bric,tion

The same observations can be made oI the Iirst loan oI P00,00000
secured by Check Nos 004726 and 0047262

More strangely, during the course oI the entire investigation, Respondent
never touched on what transpired on the dates oI November 5 and 6,
999 Consider that Complainant's position is that no such transaction took
place on November 5 and 6 And yet, Respondent never made any eIIort to
establish that Complainant borrowed P00,00000 on November 5 and then
another P00,00000 again on November 6 Respondent merely Iocused on
establishing that Complainant's checks bounced --- a Iact already admitted
several times by the Complainant --- and the reasons Ior which were already
explained by Complainant This only shows the lack oI candor oI
Respondent
9(


x x x x

We take note Iurther that Complainant is a mere mail sorter e,rning e88
th,n P6,000.00 5er month Who would lend P200,00000 to an employee
earning such a salary, nowadays, and not even secure such a loan with a written
document or a collateral? It deIies realities oI Iinance, economy and business It
even deIies common sense
20(


Commissioner Funa also took note that the instant case had practically the same set
oI Iacts as in lbes v Deciembre
2(
andAcosta v Deciembre
22(
In lbes, complainants
therein, who were also postal employees, averred that respondent without authority Iilled
up a total oI Iour checks to represent a total oI P200,00000 In Acosta, the complainant
therein, another postal employee, averred that respondent Iilled up two blank checks Ior a
total oI P00,00000 Acosta, however, was dismissed by Commissioner Lydia Navarro
on the ground that it did not involve any lawyer-client relationship, which ground,
Commissioner Funa believes, is erroneous
23(


On May 3, 2007, the IBP Board oI Governors issued a resolution adopting and
approving Commissoner Funa's Report, but modiIying the penalty, as Iollows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-219
Adm. C,8e No. 5338
Eugeni, Mendoz, v8.
Att. Victor V. Deciembre

RES'ED to ADPT and APPR'E, as it is hereby ADPTED and
APPR'ED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating ommissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex 'A`, and, finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondents gross misconduct and for practically found guilty of committing
the same set of facts alleged in A 5365, Atty 'ictor ' Deciembre is
herebySUSPEADED IADEFIAI1ELY from the practice of law to be served
successively after the lifting of Respondents Indefinite Suspension
[24j


Although no motion Ior reconsideration was Iiled beIore the IBP Board oI
Governors, nor a petition Ior review beIore this Court as reported by IBP and OIIice oI the
Bar ConIidant, the Court considers the IBP Resolution merely recommendatory and
thereIore would not attain Iinality, pursuant to par (b), Section 2, Rule 39-B oI the Rules
oI Court The IBP elevated to this Court the entire records oI the case Ior appropriate
action

The Court agrees with the Iindings oI the IBP, but Iinds that disbarment and not just
indeIinite suspension is in order

The practice oI law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualiIications required by
law Ior the conIerment oI such privilege
25(
A high sense oI morality, honesty and Iair
dealing is expected and required oI members oI the bar
26(
They must conduct themselves
with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all
times
27(


The Iact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions
entered into by respondent were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a
lawyer, Irom liability

A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for
acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable
opinion of the public.
[28j
Indeed, there is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not
divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
[29j


In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has Iailed to live up to the standards
required oI members oI the legal proIession SpeciIically, respondent has transgressed
provisions oI the Code oI ProIessional Responsibility, to wit:

CANON A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws oI the
land and promote respect Ior law and legal processes

Rule 0 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawIul, dishonest, immoral
or deceitIul conduct

x x x x

CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
oI the legal proIession and support the activities oI the integrated bar

x x x x

Rule 703 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reIlects
on his Iitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private liIe,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit oI the legal proIession

As correctly observed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Funa, respondent Iailed
to mention in his Comment dated January 8, 2000, in his Position Paper dated October 8,
200 and in his Motion Ior Reconsideration dated December 20, 2002, theP00,00000
loan which complainant supposedly contracted on November 6, 999 It is also
questionable why the checks dated May 6, 200, May 30, 200 and June 5, 200 which
were supposedly issued to secure a loan contracted about 8 months earlier,ie November
6, 999, were made without any interest The same is true with the checks dated January
5 and 20, 2000 in the total sum oI P00,00000, which were supposed to secure a loan
contracted on November 5, 999, Ior the same amount Considering these circumstances
and the sequence oI dates when respondent Iiled his criminal cases against complainant,
and complainant her disbarment case against respondent, what truly appears more
believable is complainant's claim that respondent was merely utilizing the blank checks,
Iilling them up, and using them as bases Ior criminal cases in order to harass complainant

The Court also notes that the checks being reIuted by complainant, dated January 5
and 20, 2000, May 6, 200, May 30, 200 and June 5, 200
30(
had its dates, amounts
and payee's name all typewritten, while the blanks on the check Ior P6,00000 dated
March 30, 999 which complainant used to pay part oI her original loan, were all Iilled up
in her handwriting
3(


It is also observed that the present case was not the only instance when respondent
committed his wrongIul acts Inlbes,
32(
complainants therein contracted a loan Irom
respondent in the amount oI P0,00000 on July , 999, Ior which they issued Iive blank
checks as collateral Notwithstanding their Iull payment oI the loan, respondent Iilled up
Iour oI the blank checks with the amount oI P50,00000 each with diIIerent dates oI
maturity and used the same in Iiling estaIa and BP Blg 22 cases against
complainants The Court, in imposing the penalty oI indeIinite suspension on respondent,
Iound his propensity Ior employing deceit and misrepresentation as reprehensible and his
misuse oI the Iilled up checks, loathsome
33(


In Acosta,
34(
complainant therein also averred that on August , 998, she
borrowed P20,00000 Irom respondent with an interest oI 20 payable in six months and
guaranteed by twelve blank checks Although she had already paid the total amount
oIP33,30000, respondent still demanded payments Irom her, and Ior her Iailure to comply
therewith, respondent Iiled a case against her beIore the City Prosecutor oI Marikina City,
using two oI her blank checks which respondent Iilled up with the total amount
oIP00,00000 UnIortunately, the complaint was dismissed by IBP Investigating
Commissioner Navarro on October 2, 200 on the ground that the said transaction did not
involve any lawyer-client relationship
35(
As correctly observed by Commissioner Funa,
such conclusion is erroneous, Ior a lawyer may be disciplined even Ior acts not involving
any attorney-client relationship

As manifested by these cases, respondent's offenses are manifold. First, he
demands excessive payments from his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank
checks with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents for his material gain;
and then he uses said checks as bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his
borrowers in order to harass them. Such acts manifest respondent's perversity of
character, meriting his severance from the legal profession.

While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld whenever
a lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired,
36(
the seriousness oI respondent's
oIIense compels the Court to wield its supreme power oI disbarment Indeed, the Court
will not hestitate to remove an erring attorney Irom the esteemed brotherhood oI lawyers
where the evidence calls Ior it
37(
This is because in the exercise oI its disciplinary powers,
the Court merely calls upon a member oI the Bar to account Ior his actuations as an oIIicer
oI the Court, with the end in view oI preserving the purity oI the legal proIession and the
proper and honest administration oI justice by purging the proIession oI members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the oIIice oI an attorney
38(


As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the legal proIession, the
severance oI his privilege to practice law Ior liIe is in order

EREFORE, Atty Victor V Deciembre is hereby Iound GUILTY of GROSS
MISCONDUCT ,nd VIOLATION oI Canon , Rule 0 and Canon 7, Rule 703 oI
the Code oI ProIessional Responsibility He is DISBARRED Irom the practice oI law and
his name is ordered stricken oII the Roll oI Attorneys eIIective immediately

Let copies oI this Resolution be Iurnished the OIIice oI the Bar ConIidant which
shall Iorthwith record it in the personal Iiles oI respondent; all the courts oI the Philippines;
the Integrated Bar oI the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereoI to all its
Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies oI the Republic oI the
Philippines

SO ORDERED.



kepub||c of the h|||pp|nes
Supreme Court
Man||a


EN BANC


CUNRADU QUE,
ComplalnanL







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8espondenL
A.C. No.

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romulgaLed

uecember 4 2009

D E C I S I U N

Pk cukl4M

ln a complalnL for dlsbarmenL
1
Conrado Cue (complolooot% accused ALLy
AnasLaclo 8evllla !r (tespooJeot% before Lhe lnLegraLed 8ar of Lhe
hlllpplnes CommlLLee on 8ar ulsclpllne (l8l commlttee oo 8ot
ulsclplloe or c8u% of commlLLlng Lhe followlng vlolaLlons of Lhe provlslons of Lhe
Code of rofesslonal 8esponslblllLy and 8ule 138 of Lhe 8ules of CourL

(1% 1he respondenL's abuse of courL remedles and processes by flllng
a peLlLlon for cettlototl before Lhe CourL of Appeals (cA% Lwo
peLlLlons for annulmenL of LlLle before Lhe 8eglonal 1rlal CourL
(k1c% a peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL before Lhe 81C and
lasLly a peLlLlon for declaraLory rellef before Lhe 81C
(collecLlvely sobject coses% Lo assall and overLurn Lhe flnal
[udgmenLs of Lhe MeLropollLan 1rlal CourL
2
(Me1c% and 81C
3
ln
Lhe unlawful deLalner case rendered agalnsL Lhe respondenL's
cllenLs 1he respondenL ln Lhls regard repeaLedly ralsed Lhe lssue
of lack of [urlsdlcLlon by Lhe Me1C and 81C knowlng fullywell LhaL
Lhese courLs have [urlsdlcLlon over Lhe unlawful deLalner case 1he
respondenL also repeaLedly aLLacked Lhe complalnanL's and hls
slbllngs' LlLles over Lhe properLy sub[ecL of Lhe unlawful deLalner
case

(2% 1he respondenL's commlsslon of forumshopplng by flllng Lhe
sub[ecL cases ln order Lo lmpede obsLrucL and frusLraLe Lhe
efflclenL admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce for hls own personal galn and Lo
defeaL Lhe rlghL of Lhe complalnanL and hls slbllngs Lo execuLe Lhe
Me1C and 81C [udgmenLs ln Lhe unlawful deLalner case

(3% 1he respondenL's lack of candor and respecL Lowards hls adversary
and Lhe courLs by resorLlng Lo falsehood and decepLlon Lo
mlsgulde obsLrucL and lmpede Lhe due admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce
1he respondenL asserLed falsehood ln Lhe moLlon for
reconslderaLlon of Lhe dlsmlssal of Lhe peLlLlon for annulmenL of
[udgmenL by fabrlcaLlng an lmaglnary order lssued by Lhe presldlng
[udge ln open courL whlch allegedly denled Lhe moLlon Lo dlsmlss
flled by Lhe respondenLs ln Lhe sald case 1he complalnanL alleged
LhaL Lhe respondenL dld Lhls Lo cover up hls lack of preparaLlon
Lhe respondenL also decelved hls cllenLs (who were all squaLLers%
ln supporLlng Lhe above falsehood
4


(4% 1he respondenL's wlllful and revolLlng falsehood LhaL un[usLly
mallgned and defamed Lhe good name and repuLaLlon of Lhe laLe
ALLy Alfredo CaLollco (Atty cotollco% Lhe prevlous counsel of Lhe
respondenL's cllenLs

(3% 1he respondenL's dellberaLe fraudulenL and unauLhorlzed
appearances ln courL ln Lhe peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL
for 13 llLlganLs Lhree of whom are already deceased

(6% 1he respondenL's wlllful and fraudulenL appearance ln Lhe second
peLlLlon for annulmenL of LlLle as counsel for Lhe 8epubllc of
Lhe hlllpplnes wlLhouL belng auLhorlzed Lo do so


AddlLlonally Lhe complalnL accused Lhe respondenL of represenLlng flfLy
Lwo (32% llLlganLs ln Clvll Case no C0348762 when no such auLhorlLy was ever
glven Lo hlm

1he C8u requlred Lhe respondenL Lo answer Lhe complalnL

ln hls Answer
3
Lhe respondenL declared LhaL he ls a member of Lhe
kalayaan uevelopmenL CooperaLlve (uc% LhaL handlespto booo cases for Lhe
underprlvlleged Lhe less forLunaLe Lhe homeless and Lhose ln Lhe marglnallzed
secLor ln MeLro Manlla Pe agreed Lo Lake over Lhe cases formerly handled by
oLher kuC members Cne of Lhese cases was Lhe unlawful deLalner case handled
by Lhe laLe ALLy CaLollco where Lhe complalnanL and hls slbllngs were Lhe
plalnLlffs and Lhe respondenL's presenL cllenLs were Lhe defendanLs

WlLh respecL Lo paragraph 1 of Lhe dlsbarmenL complalnL Lhe respondenL
professed hls slncerlLy honesLy and good falLh ln flllng Lhe peLlLlons complalned
of he flled Lhese peLlLlons Lo proLecL Lhe lnLeresLs of hls cllenLs ln Lhelr properLy
1he respondenL asserLed LhaL Lhese peLlLlons were all based on valld grounds
Lhe |ack of [ur|sd|ct|on of Lhe Me1C and Lhe 81C over Lhe underlylng unlawful
deLalner case Lhe extr|ns|c fraud comm|tted by the |ate tty Cato||co and
Lhe extr|ns|c fraud comm|tted by the comp|a|nant and hls famlly agalnsL hls
cllenLs he dlscovered LhaL Lhe allegedly deLalned properLy dld noL really belong Lo
Lhe complalnanL and hls famlly buL ls a foresL land 1he respondenL also asserLed
LhaL hls resorL Lo a peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL and a peLlLlon for
declaraLory rellef Lo conLesL Lhe flnal [udgmenLs of Lhe Me1C and 81C were all
parLs of hls legal sLraLegy Lo proLecL Lhe lnLeresLs of hls cllenLs

Cn Lhe allegaLlons of falsehood ln Lhe moLlon for reconslderaLlon of Lhe
order of dlsmlssal of Lhe peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL (covered by
paragraph 3 of Lhe dlsbarmenL complalnL% Lhe respondenL malnLalned LhaL hls
allegaLlons were based on hls observaLlons and Lhe noLes he had Laken durlng Lhe
proceedlngs on whaL Lhe presldlng [udge dlcLaLed ln open courL

1he respondenL denled LhaL he had made any unauLhorlzed appearance ln
courL (wlLh respecL Lo paragraphs 3 and 6 of Lhe dlsbarmenL complalnL% Pe
clalmed LhaL Lhe 32 llLlganLs ln Clvll Case no C0348762 were lmpleaded by
lnadverLence he lmmedlaLely recLlfled hls error by dropplng Lhem from Lhe
case Cn Lhe peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL Lhe respondenL clalmed LhaL a
ma[orlLy (31 ouL of 49% of Lhe llLlganLs who slgned Lhe cerLlflcaLlon consLlLuLed
sufflclenL compllance wlLh Lhe rules on forumshopplng 1he respondenL llkewlse
denled havlng represenLed Lhe 8epubllc of Lhe hlllpplnes ln Lhe second peLlLlon
for annulmenL of LlLle 1he respondenL polnLed ouL LhaL Lhere was no allegaLlon
whaLsoever LhaL he was Lhe sole represenLaLlve of boLh Lhe complalnanLs (hls
cllenLs% and Lhe 8epubllc of Lhe hlllpplnes 1he respondenL polnLed ouL LhaL Lhe
peLlLlon embodled a requesL Lo Lhe Cfflce of Lhe SollclLor Ceneral Lo represenL hls
cllenLs ln Lhe case
6


1he respondenL submlLLed LhaL he dld noL commlL any lllegal unlawful
un[usL wrongful or lmmoral acLs Lowards Lhe complalnanL and hls slbllngs Pe
sLressed LhaL he acLed ln good falLh ln hls deallngs wlLh Lhem and hls conducL was
conslsLenL wlLh hls sworn duLy as a lawyer Lo uphold [usLlce and Lhe law and Lo
defend Lhe lnLeresLs of hls cllenLs 1he respondenL addlLlonally clalmed LhaL Lhe
dlsbarmenL case was flled because Lhe complalnanL's counsel ALLy Cesar uy
(Atty uy% had an axe Lo grlnd agalnsL hlm

LasLly Lhe respondenL poslLed ln hls pleadlngs
7
before Lhe l8 LhaL Lhe
presenL complalnL vlolaLed Lhe rule on forum shopplng conslderlng LhaL Lhe
sub[ecL cases were also Lhe ones on whlch a complalnL was flled agalnsL hlm ln
C8u Case no 031099 flled by ALLy uy before Lhe l8 CommlLLee on 8ar
ulsclpllne 1he respondenL also poslLed LhaL Lhe presenL complalnL was flled Lo
harass rldlcule and defame hls good name and repuLaLlon and lndlrecLly Lo
harass hls cllenLs who are marglnallzed members of Lhe kuC

1he llndlngs of Lhe lnvesLlgaLlng Commlssloner

LxcepL for Lhe lasL charge of unauLhorlzed appearance on behalf of 32
llLlganLs ln Clvll Case no C0348762 lnvesLlgaLlng Commlssloner 8enaLo C
Cunanan
8
(lovestlqotloq commlsslooet coooooo% found all Lhe charges agalnsL
Lhe respondenL merlLorlous ln hls 8eporL and 8ecommendaLlon he sLaLed

Whlle an aLLorney admlLLedly has Lhe solemn duLy Lo defend and proLecL Lhe
cause and rlghLs of hls cllenL wlLh all Lhe fervor and energy wlLhln hls command yeL lL ls
equally Lrue LhaL lL ls Lhe prlmary duLy of Lhe lawyer Lo defend Lhe dlgnlLy auLhorlLy and
ma[esLy of Lhe law and Lhe courLs whlch enforce lL A lawyer ls noL aL llberLy Lo malnLaln
and defend Lhe cause of hls cllenLs Lhru means lnconslsLenL wlLh LruLh and honor Pe
may noL and musL noL encourage mulLlpllclLy of sulLs or brazenly engage ln forum
shopplng
9


Cn Lhe flrsL charge on abuse of courL processes lnvesLlgaLlng Commlssloner
Cunanan noLed Lhe unnecessary use by Lhe respondenL of legal remedles Lo
foresLall Lhe execuLlon of Lhe flnal declslons of Lhe M1C and Lhe 81C ln Lhe
unlawful deLalner case agalnsL hls cllenLs
10


Cn Lhe second charge Lhe lnvesLlgaLlng Commlssloner ruled LhaL Lhe acL of
Lhe respondenL ln flllng Lwo peLlLlons for annulmenL of LlLle a peLlLlon for
annulmenL of [udgmenL and laLer on a peLlLlon for declaraLory rellef were all
done Lo prevenL Lhe execuLlon of Lhe flnal [udgmenL ln Lhe unlawful deLalner case
and consLlLuLed prohlblLed forumshopplng
11


Cn Lhe Lhlrd and fourLh charges lnvesLlgaLlng Commlssloner Cunanan
found ample evldence showlng LhaL Lhe respondenL was dlshonesL ln deallng wlLh
Lhe courL as shown ln hls peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL he resorLed Lo
falslLles and aLLrlbuLed acLs Lo ALLy CaLollco and Lo Lhe presldlng [udge all of
whlch were unLrue
12


Cn Lhe flfLh and slxLh charges Lhe lnvesLlgaLlng Commlssloner dlsregarded
Lhe respondenL's explanaLlon LhaL he had no lnLenLlon Lo represenL wlLhouL
auLhorlLy 13 of Lhe llLlganLs (Lhree of whom were already deceased% ln Lhe
peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL (Clvll Case no C0143336% 1o Lhe
lnvesLlgaLlng Commlssloner Lhe respondenL merely glossed over Lhe
represenLaLlon lssue by clalmlng LhaL Lhe auLhorlLy glven by a ma[orlLy of Lhe
llLlganLs complled wlLh Lhe cerLlflcaLlon of nonforum shopplng requlremenL 1he
lnvesLlgaLlng Commlssloner llkewlse brushed aslde Lhe respondenL's argumenL
regardlng hls mlsrepresenLaLlon ln Lhe second complalnL for annulmenL of LlLle
slnce he knew very well LhaL only Lhe SollclLor Ceneral can lnsLlLuLe an acLlon for
reverslon on behalf of Lhe 8epubllc of Lhe hlllpplnes uesplLe Lhls knowledge Lhe
respondenL solely slgned Lhe amended complalnL for and on behalf of hls cllenLs
and of Lhe 8epubllc
1he 8oard of Covernors of Lhe l8 CommlLLee on 8ar ulsclpllne Lhrough lLs
8esoluLlon no xvll2003164 on C8u Case no 031100 adopLed and approved
Lhe 8eporL and 8ecommendaLlon of lnvesLlgaLlng Commlssloner Cunanan and
recommended LhaL Lhe respondenL be suspended from Lhe pracLlce of law for
Lwo (2% years
13
Cn reconslderaLlon Lhe 8oard of Covernors reduced Lhe
respondenL's suspenslon from Lhe pracLlce of law Lo one (1% year
14


@he Issue

1he case poses Lo us Lhe core lssues of wheLher Lhe respondenL can be held
llable for Lhe lmpuLed uneLhlcal lnfracLlons and professlonal mlsconducL and Lhe
penalLy Lhese Lransgresslons should carry

@he Court's ku||ng

Lxcept for the pena|ty we agree w|th the keport and kecommendat|on of
Invest|gat|ng Comm|ss|oner Cunanan and the 8oard of Governors of the I8
Comm|ttee on 8ar D|sc|p||ne

We Lake [udlclal noLlce LhaL Lhls dlsbarmenL complalnL ls noL Lhe only one
so far flled lnvolvlng Lhe respondenL anoLher complalnL lnvoklng slmllar grounds
has prevlously been flled ln llos 8ollJets loc ooJ JqotJo c Cotclo v Atty
Aoostoclo kevlllo It
13
we suspended Lhe respondenL from Lhe pracLlce of law
for hls wlllful and lnLenLlonal falsehood before Lhe courL for mlsuse of courL
procedures and processes Lo delay Lhe execuLlon of a [udgmenL and for
collaboraLlng wlLh nonlawyers ln Lhe lllegal pracLlce of law We lnlLlally lmposed
a suspenslon of Lwo (2% years buL ln an acL of lenlency subsequenLly reduced Lhe
suspenslon Lo slx (6% monLhs
16

Abose of coott ptoceJotes ooJ ptocesses


1he followlng undlspuLed facLs fully supporL Lhe concluslon LhaL Lhe
respondenL ls gullLy of serlous mlsconducL for abuslng courL procedures and
processes Lo shleld hls cllenLs from Lhe execuLlon of Lhe flnal [udgmenLs of Lhe
Me1C and 81C ln Lhe unlawful deLalner case agalnsL Lhese cllenLs

lltst Lhe respondenL flled a peLlLlon for cettlototl (dockeLed as CAC8 S
no 33892% wlLh prayer for Lhe lssuance of prellmlnary ln[uncLlon and Lemporary
resLralnlng order Lo quesLlon Lhe flnal [udgmenLs of Lhe Me1C and 81C for lack of
[urlsdlcLlon ln dlsmlsslng Lhe respondenL's peLlLlon Lhe CA held

Lven for Lhe sake of argumenL conslderlng LhaL Lhe peLlLlon case be Lhe proper
remedy sLlll lL musL be re[ecLed for fallure of peLlLloners Lo saLlsfacLorlly demonsLraLe
lack of [urlsdlcLlon on Lhe parL of Lhe MeLropollLan 1rlal CourL of Cuezon ClLy over Lhe
e[ecLmenL case
17


5ecooJ noLwlLhsLandlng Lhe CA's dlsmlssal of Lhe peLlLlon for cettlototl Lhe
respondenL agaln quesLloned Lhe Me1C's and Lhe 81C's lack of [urlsdlcLlon over
Lhe unlawful deLalner case ln a peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL (dockeLed as
Clvll Case no C0143336% before Lhe 81C wlLh an anclllary prayer for Lhe granL
of a Lemporary resLralnlng order and prellmlnary ln[uncLlon 1he 81C dlsmlssed
Lhls peLlLlon on Lhe basls of Lhe moLlon Lo dlsmlss flled
18


1bltJ Lhe respondenL successlvely flled Lwo peLlLlons (dockeLed as Clvll
Case no C9938780 and Clvll Case no C0246883% for annulmenL of Lhe
complalnanL's LlLle Lo Lhe properLy lnvolved ln Lhe unlawful deLalner case 1he
records show LhaL Lhese peLlLlons were boLh dlsmlssed fot lock of leqol
petsooollty oo tbe pott of tbe plolotlffs" Lo flle Lhe peLlLlon
19


loottb afLer Lhe dlsmlssals of Lhe peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL and
Lhe peLlLlons for annulmenL of LlLle Lhe respondenL Lhls Llme flled a peLlLlon for
declaraLory rellef wlLh prayer for a wrlL of prellmlnary ln[uncLlon Lo en[oln Lhe
complalnanL and hls slbllngs from exerclslng Lhelr rlghLs over Lhe same properLy
sub[ecL of Lhe unlawful deLalner case 1he respondenL based Lhe peLlLlon on Lhe
alleged nulllLy of Lhe complalnanL's LlLle because Lhe properLy ls a parL of foresL
land

llftb Lhe perslsLenL appllcaLlons by Lhe respondenL for ln[uncLlve rellef ln
Lhe four peLlLlons he had flled ln several courLs Lhe peLlLlon for cettlototl Lhe
peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL Lhe second peLlLlon for annulmenL of
complalnanL's LlLle and Lhe peLlLlon for declaraLory rellef reveal Lhe
respondenL's perslsLence ln prevenLlng and avoldlng Lhe execuLlon of Lhe flnal
declslons of Lhe Me1C and 81C agalnsL hls cllenLs ln Lhe unlawful deLalner case

under Lhe clrcumsLances Lhe respondenL's repeaLed aLLempLs go beyond
Lhe leglLlmaLe means allowed by professlonal eLhlcal rules ln defendlng Lhe
lnLeresLs of hls cllenL 1hese are already uncalled for measures Lo avold Lhe
enforcemenL of flnal [udgmenLs of Lhe Me1C and 81C ln Lhese aLLempLs Lhe
respondenL vlolaLed 8ule 1003 Canon 10 of Lhe Code of rofesslonal
8esponslblllLy whlch makes lL obllgaLory for a lawyer Lo observe Lhe rules of
procedure and oot to mlsose tbem to Jefeot tbe eoJs of jostlce" 8y hls
acLlons Lhe respondenL used procedural rules Lo LhwarL and obsLrucL Lhe speedy
and efflclenL admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce resulLlng ln pre[udlce Lo Lhe wlnnlng parLles
ln LhaL case
20




lllloq of moltlple octloos ooJ fotom sbopploq

1he respondenL llkewlse vlolaLed 8ule 1202 and 8ule 1204 Canon 12 of
Lhe Code of rofesslonal 8esponslblllLy
21
as well as Lhe rule agalnsL forum
shopplng boLh of whlch are dlrecLed agalnsL Lhe flllng of mulLlple acLlons Lo aLLaln
Lhe same ob[ecLlve 8oLh vlolaLlons consLlLuLe abuse of courL processes Lhey
Lend Lo degrade Lhe admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce wreak havoc on orderly [udlclal
procedure
22
and add Lo Lhe congesLlon of Lhe heavlly burdened dockeLs of Lhe
courLs
23


Whlle Lhe flllng of a peLlLlon for cerLlorarl Lo quesLlon Lhe lower courLs'
[urlsdlcLlon may be a procedurally leglLlmaLe (buL subsLanLlvely erroneous% move
Lhe respondenL's subsequenL peLlLlons lnvolvlng Lhe same properLy and Lhe same
parLles noL only demonsLraLe hls aLLempLs Lo secure favorable rullng uslng
dlfferenL fora buL hls obvlous ob[ecLlve as well of prevenLlng Lhe execuLlon of Lhe
Me1C and 81C declslons ln Lhe unlawful deLalner case agalnsL hls cllenLs 1hls
lnLenL ls mosL obvlous wlLh respecL Lo Lhe peLlLlons for annulmenL of [udgmenL
and declaraLory rellef boLh geared Lowards prevenLlng Lhe execuLlon of Lhe
unlawful deLalner declslon long afLer Lhls declslon had become flnal

Jlllfol loteotloool ooJ Jellbetote
folsebooJ befote tbe cootts

1he records also reveal LhaL Lhe respondenL commlLLed wlllful
lnLenLlonal and dellberaLe falsehood ln Lhe pleadlngs he flled wlLh Lhe lower
courLs

lltst ln Lhe peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL flled before Lhe 81C
8ranch 101 Cuezon ClLy Lhe respondenL clLed exLrlnslc fraud as one of Lhe
grounds for Lhe annulmenL soughL 1he exLrlnslc fraud was alleged ln Lhe lasL
paragraph of Lhe peLlLlon as follows

ln here counsel for Lhe peLlLloners (defendanLs Lhereln% dellberaLely neglecLed Lo flle
Lhe proper remedy Lhen avallable afLer recelpL of Lhe denlal of Lhelr MoLlon for
8econslderaLlon Lhus corrupt|y so|d out the |nterest of the pet|t|oners (defendanLs
Lhereln% by keeplng Lhem away Lo Lhe CourL and ln compleLe lgnorance of Lhe sulL by
a false preLense of compromlse and fraudulenL acLs of alleglng represenLlng Lhem when
ln LruLh and ln facL have conn|ved w|th the attorney of the preva|||ng party at h|s
defeat to the pre[ud|ce of the pet|t|oner (defendanLs Lhereln%
24


?eL ln paragraph 33 of Lhe same peLlLlon Lhe respondenL alleged LhaL no second
moLlon for reconslderaLlon or for new Lrlal or no oLher peLlLlon wlLh Lhe CA had
been flled as he belleved #tbot tbe Jeclsloos teoJeteJ botb by tbe Me1c ooJ tbe
k1c ote ooll ooJ volJ
23
1hese confllcLlng clalms no doubL lnvolve a fabrlcaLlon
made for Lhe purpose of supporLlng Lhe peLlLlon for annulmenL Worse lL
lnvolved a dlrecL and unsubsLanLlaLed aLLack on Lhe repuLaLlon of a law offlce
colleague anoLher vlolaLlon we shall separaLely dlscuss below

5ecooJ Lhe respondenL employed anoLher obvlous subLerfuge when he
flled hls second peLlLlon for annulmenL of LlLle whlch was an unsuccessful
aLLempL Lo clrcumvenL Lhe rule LhaL only Lhe SollclLor Ceneral may commence
reverslon proceedlngs of publlc lands
26
on behalf of Lhe 8epubllc of
Lhe hlllpplnes 1hls second peLlLlon flled by a prlvaLe parLy and noL by Lhe
8epubllc showed LhaL (a% Lhe respondenL and hls cllenLs requesLed LhaL Lhey be
represenLed by Lhe SollclLor Ceneral ln Lhe proceedlngs (b% Lhe 8epubllc of Lhe
hlllpplnes was slmply lmpleaded ln Lhe amended peLlLlon wlLhouL lLs consenL as
a plalnLlff and (c% Lhe respondenL slgned Lhe amended peLlLlon where he alone
sLood as counsel for Lhe plalnLlffs" ln Lhls underhanded manner Lhe
respondenL soughL Lo compel Lhe 8epubllc Lo llLlgaLe and wasLe lLs resources on
an unauLhorlzed and unwanLed sulL

1bltJ Lhe respondenL also commlLLed falsehood ln hls moLlon for
reconslderaLlon of Lhe order dlsmlsslng hls peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL
where he mlsrepresenLed Lo Lhe courL and hls cllenLs whaL acLually Lransplred ln
Lhe hearlng of !une 28 2002 ln Lhls wlse

Llkewlse Lhe proceedlngs on sald daLe of hearlng (!une 28 2002% show LhaL afLer
boLh counsel have argued on Lhe aforesald pendlng lncldenL Lhe Ponorable resldlng
!udge ln open courL and ln Lhe presence and wlLhln Lhe hearlng dlsLance of all Lhe
plalnLlffs and Lhelr counsel as well as Lhe counsel of Lhe defendanLs resolved @ uNY
@ M@lN @ ul5Ml55 llLu 4Nu ulkc@u ulNu4N@5 cuN5L @ llL 4N
4N5wk @ @ cMPL4lN@ wl@lN @ kM4lNlN6 Pklu
27
underscorlng and
emphasls Lhelrs


1he records however dlsclose LhaL Lhe scheduled hearlng for !une 28
2002 was acLually for Lhe respondenL's appllcaLlon for Lemporary resLralnlng
order and was noL a hearlng on Lhe adverse parLy's moLlon Lo dlsmlss
28
1he
records also show LhaL 81C8ranch 101 held ln abeyance Lhe respondenL's
appllcaLlon for ln[uncLlve rellef pendlng Lhe resoluLlon of Lhe moLlon Lo dlsmlss
flled by Lhe adverse parLy
29
As sLaLed ln Lhe order of Lhe resldlng !udge of 81C
8ranch 101

8rowslng over Lhe records of Lhls case speclflcally Lhe LranscrlpLs of
sLenographlc noLes as Lranscrlbed by Lhe SLenographer Lhe same wlll lndlcaLe LhaL Lhe
allegaLlons ln Lhe MoLlon for 8econslderaLlon are noL Lrue

how can Lhls CourL make a rullng on Lhe maLLer even wlLhouL sLaLlng Lhe facLual and
legal bases as requlred/mandaLed by Lhe 8ules Moreover Lhere are no lndlcaLlons or
loLa of lrregularlLy ln Lhe preparaLlon by SLenographer of Lhe LranscrlpLs and by Lhe
CourL lnLerpreLer of Lhe MlnuLes of Lhe open CourL sesslonunderscorlng Lhelrs
1he records furLher dlsclose LhaL desplLe knowledge of Lhe falslLy of hls
allegaLlons Lhe respondenL Look advanLage of hls poslLlon and Lhe LrusL reposed
ln hlm by hls cllenLs (who are all squaLLers% Lo convlnce Lhem Lo supporL Lhrough
Lhelr affldavlLs hls false clalms on whaL allegedly Lransplred ln Lhe !une 28 2002
hearlng
30


lor Lhese acLs we flnd Lhe respondenL llable under 8ule 1001 of Canon 10
Lhe Code of rofesslonal 8esponslblllLy for vlolaLlng Lhe lawyer's duLy Lo observe
candor and falrness ln hls deallngs wlLh Lhe courL 1hls provlslon sLaLes

CAnCn 10 A LAW?L8 CWLS CAnuC8 lAl8nLSS Anu CCCu lAl1P 1C 1PL CCu81

8ule 1001 A lawyer shall noL do any falsehood nor consenL Lo Lhe dolng of any ln
CourL nor shall he mlslead or allow Lhe CourL Lo be mlslead by an arLlflce

Llkewlse Lhe respondenL vlolaLed hls duLy as an aLLorney and hls oaLh as a
lawyer oevet to mlsleoJ tbe joJqe ot ooy joJlclol offlcet by oo ottlflce ot folse
stotemeot of foct ot low"
31
1he respondenL falled Lo remember LhaL hls duLy as
an offlcer of Lhe courL makes hlm an lndlspensable parLlclpanL ln Lhe
admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce
32
and LhaL he ls expecLed Lo acL candldly falrly and
LruLhfully ln hls work
33
Pls duLy as a lawyer obllgaLes hlm noL Lo conceal Lhe
LruLh from Lhe courL or Lo mlslead Lhe courL ln any manner no maLLer how
demandlng hls duLles Lo hls cllenLs may be
34
ln case of confllcL hls duLles Lo hls
cllenL yleld Lo hls duLy Lo deal candldly wlLh Lhe courL
33


ln defendlng hls cllenLs' lnLeresL Lhe respondenL also falled Lo observe 8ule
1901 Canon 19 of Lhe Code of rofesslonal 8esponslblllLy whlch reads

CAnCn 19 A LAW?L8 SPALL 8L8LSLn1 PlS CLlLn1 Wl1P ZLAL Wl1Pln 1PL 8CunuS
Cl LAW

8ule 1901 A lawyer shall employ only falr and honesL means Lo aLLaln Lhe lawful
ob[ecLlves of hls cllenLs x x x


1hls Canon obllgaLes a lawyer ln defendlng hls cllenL Lo employ only such
means as are conslsLenL wlLh LruLh and honor
36
Pe should noL prosecuLe paLenLly
frlvolous and merlLless appeals or lnsLlLuLe clearly groundless acLlons
37
1he
reclLal of whaL Lhe respondenL dld Lo prevenL Lhe execuLlon of Lhe [udgmenL
agalnsL hls cllenLs shows LhaL he acLually commlLLed whaL Lhe above rule
expressly prohlblLs

Mollqoloq tbe oome of bls fellow lowyets


1o supporL Lhe charge of exLrlnslc fraud ln hls peLlLlon for annulmenL of
[udgmenL Lhe respondenL aLLacked (as quoLed above% Lhe name and repuLaLlon
of Lhe laLe ALLy CaLollco and accused hlm of dellberaLe neglecL corrupL moLlves
and connlvance wlLh Lhe counsel for Lhe adverse parLy

We flnd lL slgnlflcanL LhaL Lhe respondenL falled Lo demonsLraLe how he
came upon hls accusaLlon agalnsL ALLy CaLollco 1he respondenL by hls own
admlsslon only parLlclpaLed ln Lhe cases prevlously asslgned Lo ALLy CaLollco
afLer Lhe laLLer dled AL Lhe same Llme Lhe respondenL's peLlLlon for annulmenL of
[udgmenL also represenLed LhaL no second moLlon for reconslderaLlon or appeal
was flled Lo conLesL Lhe Me1C and 81C declslons ln Lhe unlawful deLalner case for
Lhe reason LhaL Lhe respondenL belleved Lhe sald declslons were ooll and volJ ob
loltlo

under Lhese clrcumsLances we belleve LhaL Lhe respondenL has been less
Lhan falr ln hls professlonal relaLlonshlp wlLh ALLy CaLollco and ls Lhus llable for
vlolaLlng Canon 8 of Lhe Code of rofesslonal 8esponslblllLy whlch obllgaLes a
lawyer Lo cooJoct blmself wltb coottesy foltoess ooJ cooJot towotJ bls
ptofessloool colleoqoes" Pe was unfalr because he lmpuLed wrongdolng Lo ALLy
CaLollco wlLhouL showlng any facLual basls Lherefor he effecLlvely mallgned ALLy
CaLollco who ls now dead and unable Lo defend hlmself

uoootbotlzeJ oppeotooces


We supporL lnvesLlgaLlng Commlssloner Cunanan's flndlng LhaL Lhe
respondenL Lwlce represenLed parLles wlLhouL proper auLhorlzaLlon flrsL ln Lhe
peLlLlon for annulmenL of [udgmenL and second ln Lhe second peLlLlon for
annulmenL of LlLle
38


ln Lhe flrsL lnsLance Lhe records show LhaL Lhe respondenL flled Lhe peLlLlon
for annulmenL of [udgmenL on behalf of 49 lndlvlduals 31 of whom gave Lhelr
consenL whlle Lhe oLher 13 lndlvlduals dld noL We cannoL agree wlLh Lhe
respondenL's offhand explanaLlon LhaL he Lruly belleved LhaL a ma[orlLy of Lhe
llLlganLs who slgned Lhe cerLlflcaLlon of nonforum shopplng ln Lhe peLlLlon
already gave hlm Lhe necessary auLhorlLy Lo slgn for Lhe oLhers We flnd lL hlghly
lmprobable LhaL Lhls klnd of lapse could have been commlLLed by a seasoned
lawyer llke Lhe respondenL who has been engaged ln Lhe pracLlce of law for more
Lhan 30 years and who recelved tlqlJ ooJ sttlct ttololoq os be so ptooJly Jeclotes
from Lhe unlverslLy of Lhe hlllpplnes College of Law and ln Lhe Lwo law flrms wlLh
whlch he was prevlously assoclaLed
39
As lnvesLlgaLlng Commlssloner Cunanan
found Lhe respondenL's explanaLlon of compllance wlLh Lhe rule on Lhe
cerLlflcaLlon of nonforum shopplng glossed over Lhe real charge of appearlng ln
courL wlLhouL Lhe proper auLhorlzaLlon of Lhe parLles he allegedly represenLed

ln Lhe second lnsLance whlch occurred ln Lhe second complalnL for
annulmenL of LlLle Lhe respondenL knew LhaL only Lhe SollclLor Ceneral can legally
represenL Lhe 8epubllc of Lhe hlllpplnes ln acLlons for reverslon of land
neverLheless he flled an amended peLlLlon where he lmpleaded Lhe 8epubllc of
Lhe hlllpplnes as plalnLlff wlLhouL lLs auLhorlLy and consenL as a surrepLlLlous
way of forclng Lhe 8epubllc Lo llLlgaLe noLably he slgned Lhe amended complalnL
on behalf of all Lhe plalnLlffs hls cllenLs and Lhe 8epubllc

ln boLh lnsLances Lhe respondenL vlolaLed SecLlons 21 and 27 8ule 138 of
Lhe 8ules of CourL when he underLook Lhe unauLhorlzed appearances 1he seLLled
rule ls LhaL a lawyer may noL represenL a llLlganL wlLhouL auLhorlLy from Lhe laLLer
or from Lhe laLLer's represenLaLlve or ln Lhe absence Lhereof wlLhouL leave of
courL
40
1he wlllful unauLhorlzed appearance by a lawyer for a parLy ln a glven
case consLlLuLes conLumaclous conducL and also warranLs dlsclpllnary measures
agalnsL Lhe errlng lawyer for professlonal mlsconducL
41


1be kespooJeots uefeoses

We flnd no merlL ln Lhe respondenL's defenses

Cood falLh connoLes an honesL lnLenLlon Lo absLaln from Laklng
unconsclenLlous advanLage of anoLher Accordlngly lnuolvetslty of tbe ost v
IoJet we sald LhaL good falLh connoLes an honesL lnLenLlon Lo absLaln from
Laklng undue advanLage of anoLher even Lhough Lhe forms and LechnlcallLles of
law LogeLher wlLh Lhe absence of all lnformaLlon or bellef of facLs would render
Lhe LransacLlon unconsclenLlous
42
8ad falLh on Lhe oLher hand ls a sLaLe of
mlnd afflrmaLlvely operaLlng wlLh furLlve deslgn or wlLh some moLlve of self
lnLeresL lll wlll or for an ulLerlor purpose
43
As boLh concepLs are sLaLes of mlnd
Lhey may be deduced from Lhe aLLendanL clrcumsLances and more parLlcularly
from Lhe acLs and sLaLemenLs of Lhe person whose sLaLe of mlnd ls Lhe sub[ecL of
lnqulry

ln Lhls case we flnd LhaL Lhe respondenL acLed ln bad falLh ln defendlng Lhe
lnLeresLs of hls cllenLs We draw Lhls concluslon from Lhe mlsrepresenLaLlons and
Lhe dublous recourses he made all obvlously geared Lowards foresLalllng Lhe
execuLlon of Lhe flnal [udgmenLs of Lhe Me1C and 81C 1haL he Look advanLage of
hls legal knowledge and experlence and mlsread Lhe 8ules lmmeasurably
sLrengLhen Lhe presence of bad falLh

We flnd nelLher slncerlLy nor honesL bellef on Lhe parL of Lhe respondenL ln
pleadlng Lhe soundness and merlL of Lhe cases LhaL he flled ln courL Lo prevenL
Lhe execuLlon of Lhe Me1C and 81C declslons conslderlng hls own conducL of
presenLlng confllcLlng Lheorles ln hls peLlLlons 1he successlon of cases he flled
shows a desperaLlon LhaL negaLes Lhe slncere and honesL bellef he clalms Lhese
are slmply scaLLershoL means Lo achleve hls ob[ecLlve of avoldlng Lhe execuLlon of
Lhe unlawful deLalner [udgmenL agalnsL hls cllenLs

Cn Lhe respondenL's allegaLlons regardlng hls dlscreLlon Lo deLermlne legal
sLraLegy lL ls noL amlss Lo noLe LhaL Lhls was Lhe same defense he ralsed ln Lhe
flrsL dlsbarmenL case
44
As we explalned ln llos 8ollJets Lhe exerclse of a
lawyer's dlscreLlon ln acLlng for hls cllenL can never be aL Lhe expense of LruLh and
[usLlce ln Lhe words of Lhls clLed case

Whlle a lawyer owes absoluLe fldellLy Lo Lhe cause of hls cllenL full devoLlon Lo
hls genulne lnLeresL and warm zeal ln Lhe malnLenance and defense of hls rlghLs as well
as Lhe exerLlon of hls uLmosL learnlng and ablllLy he musL do so only wlLhln Lhe bounds
of Lhe law Pe musL glve a candld and honesL oplnlon on Lhe merlLs and probable
resulLs of hls cllenL's case wlLh Lhe end ln vlew of promoLlng respecL for Lhe law and
legal processes and counsel or malnLaln such acLlons or proceedlngs only as appear Lo
hlm Lo be [usL and such defenses only as he belleves Lo be honesLly debaLable under
Lhe law Pe musL always remlnd hlmself of Lhe oaLh he Look upon admlsslon Lo Lhe 8ar
LhaL he 'wlll noL wlLLlngly or wllllngly promoLe or sue any groundless false or unlawful
sulL nor glve ald nor consenL Lo Lhe same' and LhaL he 'wlll conducL hlmself as a lawyer
accordlng Lo Lhe besL of hls knowledge and dlscreLlon wlLh all good fldellLy as well Lo
Lhe courLs as Lo hls cllenLs' needless Lo sLaLe Lhe lawyer's fldellLy Lo hls cllenL musL
noL be pursued aL Lhe expense of LruLh and Lhe admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce and lL musL be
done wlLhln Lhe bounds of reason and common sense A lawyer's responslblllLy Lo
proLecL and advance Lhe lnLeresLs of hls cllenL does noL warranL a course of acLlon
propelled by lll moLlves and mallclous lnLenLlons agalnsL Lhe oLher parLy
43


We cannoL glve credence Lo Lhe respondenL's clalm LhaL Lhe dlsbarmenL
case was flled because Lhe counsel of Lhe complalnanL ALLy uy had an axe Lo
grlnd agalnsL hlm We re[ecL Lhls argumenL conslderlng LhaL lL was noL ALLy uy
who flled Lhe presenL dlsbarmenL case agalnsL hlm ALLy uy ls only Lhe counsel ln
Lhls case ln facL ALLy uy has flled hls own separaLe dlsbarmenL case agalnsL Lhe
respondenL

1he sol qeoetls naLure of a dlsbarmenL case renders Lhe underlylng moLlves
of Lhe complalnanLs unlmporLanL and wlLh very llLLle relevance 1he purpose of a
dlsbarmenL proceedlng ls malnly Lo deLermlne Lhe flLness of a lawyer Lo conLlnue
acLlng as an offlcer of Lhe courL and a parLlclpanL ln Lhe dlspensaLlon of [usLlce
an lssue where Lhe complalnanL's personal moLlves have llLLle relevance lor Lhls
reason dlsbarmenL proceedlngs may be lnlLlaLed by Lhe CourL moto ptoptlo upon
lnformaLlon of an alleged wrongdolng As we also explalned ln Lhe case lo te
Almoceo

dlsclpllnary proceedlngs llke Lhe presenL are sul generls nelLher purely clvll nor
purely crlmlnal Lhls proceedlng ls noL and does noL lnvolve a Lrlal of an acLlon or a
sulL buL ls raLher an lnvesLlgaLlon by Lhe CourL lnLo Lhe conducL of one of lLs offlcers
noL belng lnLended Lo lnfllcL punlshmenL lL ls ln no sense a crlmlnal prosecuLlon

x x x

lL may be lnlLlaLed by Lhe CourL moto ptoptlo ubllc lnLeresL ls lLs prlmary
ob[ecLlve and Lhe real quesLlon for deLermlnaLlon ls wheLher or noL Lhe aLLorney ls sLlll
a flL person Lo be allowed Lhe prlvlleges as such Pence ln Lhe exerclse of lLs dlsclpllnary
powers Lhe CourL merely calls upon a member of Lhe 8ar Lo accounL for hls acLuaLlons
as an offlcer ofLhe CourL wlLh Lhe end ln vlew of preservlng Lhe purlLy of Lhe legal
professlon and Lhe proper and honesL admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce by purglng Lhe
professlon of members who by Lhelr mlsconducL have proved Lhemselves no longer
worLhy Lo be enLrusLed wlLh Lhe duLles and responslblllLles perLalnlng Lo Lhe offlce of an
aLLorney ln such posLure Lhere can Lhus be no occaslon Lo speak of a complalnanL or a
prosecuLor
46


Pence we glve llLLle or no welghL Lo Lhe alleged personal moLlvaLlon LhaL drove
Lhe complalnanL Cue and hls counsel Lo flle Lhe presenL dlsbarmenL case

conc/usion

8ased on Lhe foregolng we conclude LhaL Lhe respondenL
commlLLed varlous acLs of professlonal mlsconducL and Lhereby falled Lo llve up
Lo Lhe exacLlng eLhlcal sLandards lmposed on members of Lhe 8ar We cannoL
agree however LhaL only a penalLy of oneyear suspenslon from Lhe pracLlce of
law should be lmposed nelLher should we llmlL ourselves Lo Lhe orlglnally
recommended penalLy of suspenslon for Lwo (2% years

Clven Lhe respondenL's mulLlple vlolaLlons hls pasL record as prevlously
dlscussed and Lhe naLure of Lhese vlolaLlons whlch shows Lhe readlness Lo
dlsregard courL rules and Lo gloss over concerns for Lhe orderly admlnlsLraLlon of
[usLlce we belleve and so hold LhaL Lhe approprlaLe acLlon of Lhls CourL ls Lo
dlsbar Lhe respondenL Lo keep hlm away from Lhe law professlon and from any
slgnlflcanL role ln Lhe admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce whlch he has dlsgraced Pe ls a
conLlnulng rlsk Loo Lo Lhe publlc LhaL Lhe legal professlon serves noL even hls
ardor and overzealousness ln defendlng Lhe lnLeresLs of hls cllenL can save
hlm Such LralLs aL Lhe expense of everyLhlng else parLlcularly Lhe lnLegrlLy of Lhe
professlon and Lhe orderly admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce Lhls CourL cannoL accepL nor
LoleraLe

AddlLlonally dlsbarmenL ls merlLed because Lhls ls noL Lhe respondenL's
flrsL eLhlcal lnfracLlon of Lhe same naLure We penallzed hlm ln llos 8ollJets loc
ooJ JqotJo Cotclo vetsos Atty Aoostoclo kevlllo for hls wlllful and lnLenLlonal
falsehood before Lhe courL for mlsuse of courL procedures and processes Lo delay
Lhe execuLlon of a [udgmenL and for collaboraLlng wlLh nonlawyers ln Lhe lllegal
pracLlce of law We showed lenlency Lhen by reduclng hls penalLy Lo suspenslon
for slx (6% monLhs We cannoL slmllarly LreaL Lhe respondenL Lhls Llme lL ls clear
LhaL he dld noL learn any lesson from hls pasL experlence and slnce Lhen has
exhlblLed LralLs of lncorrlglblllLy lL ls Llme Lo puL a flols Lo Lhe respondenL's
professlonal legal career for Lhe sake of Lhe publlc Lhe professlon and Lhe lnLeresL
of [usLlce

JLkLICkL premlses consldered we hereby IIIkM 8esoluLlon no xvll
2003164 daLed uecember 17 2003 and 8esoluLlon no xvll2008637 daLed
uecember 11 2008 of Lhe 8oard of Covernors of Lhe l8 CommlLLee on 8ar
ulsclpllne lnsofar as respondenL ALLy AnasLaclo 8evllla !r ls foooJ lloble
fot ptofessloool mlscooJoct for vlolaLlons of Lhe Lawyer's CaLh Canon 8 8ules
1001 and 1003 Canon 10 8ules 1202 and 1204 Canon 12 8ule 1901 Canon
19 of Lhe Code of rofesslonal 8esponslblllLy and SecLlons 20(d% 21 and 27 of
8ule 138 of Lhe 8ules of CourL Powever we modlfy Lhe penalLy Lhe l8 lmposed
and hold LhaL Lhe respondenL should be DIS8kkLD from Lhe pracLlce of law

SC CkDLkLD

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.
D E C S O N
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit
1
and a supplemental affidavit
2
for disbarment
against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty.
Valencia) before the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines (BP) Committee on Discipline charging them
with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1. That am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23,
1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes
x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat
Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna
Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;
3. x x x x
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters,
Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked
with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. ignored it and dismissed it as a
mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on
August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinson's Department Store at Ermita,
Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x
5. x x x x
6. That did not stop from unearthing the truth until was able to secure the Certificate of
Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty.
Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong
sometime on 1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed
financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial
constraints.
x x x x
That am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit,
Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts suffered not only mental
anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x
n his Counter-Affidavit,
3
Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea's charges and imputations. By way of
defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia
David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and
Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood
his "bad boy" image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the
years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia
to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial
difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his
children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools;
all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.
4
Atty.
Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the
past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the
bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December
26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.
n her Counter-Affidavit,
5
Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She
explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them
was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty.
Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido,
as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship
with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty.
Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper
party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to
her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
n the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the BP Commission on
Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings
6
in view of the criminal complaint
for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity
7
(of
marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The BP Commission on Bar
Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
8
the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since
Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no
personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not
committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the
acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The BP Commission on Bar
Discipline also denied this motion.
9

Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents,
arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six
(6) children.
10
The BP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.
11

On April 13, 2004, nvestigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (nvestigating Commissioner
San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents' disbarment.
12
The
Commission on Bar Discipline of the BP Board of Governors (BP Board of Governors) approved
and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XV-2004-375 dated July
30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality
required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DSBARRED for gross immorality.
However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DSMSSED for lack of merit of the
complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the BP Commission on Bar Discipline denied
his motion under Resolution No. XV-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that
under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment.
He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the BP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his
profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and
irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
n compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-
Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She
recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that
disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts
and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty.
Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURT'S RULNG
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the BP Board of Governors against Atty.
Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance
by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar.
13
We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling.
14
First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a
matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.
15
The admission qualifications are
also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter
of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. n this sense, the complainant in
a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or
her own;
16
effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the
filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied
for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal
profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed
before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v.
Castillo,
17
the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon
proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent
before he became a lawyer.
18
Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable
presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be
refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar.
19

Parenthetically, Article V Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of
the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to
admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority
is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission
to the practice of law.
n light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea's affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect
of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a
witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of
withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the
Court's examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We
cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the
evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for
her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
mmoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.
20
mmoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency.
21
We make these distinctions as the
supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.
22

n several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful
second marriage or multiple marriages.
n Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,
23
the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and
subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondent's pattern of
misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up
to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-
being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. n this light, no fate
other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.
n 'asanta v. Perata,
24
the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his
first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondent's act of contracting the second marriage was
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the
Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,
25
where the respondent secretly
contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the
respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. n
particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity.
We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.
n this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido
established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not
only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during
the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this
Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not
mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already
married to Constancia.
26
This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a
prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence
of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission
of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages
were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his
actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a
lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not "valid."
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an
apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual
relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life
with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position
advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act
of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past
actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against
him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically,
violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer's oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the
Bar.
27
As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer's oath,
28
Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court,
29
and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
30
all of which commonly require him
to obey the laws of the land. n marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he
entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly
admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a
good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law
and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal
profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be
used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. n this case, he also used the law
to free him from unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
31
Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
32
Lawyers are at all
times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation.
33
Needless to state, those
whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.
34

Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of nvestigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be
administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got
married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a
condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct
was committed in the lawyer's professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his
marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x
Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact
remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as
members of the Bar.
35

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.
36
To have good
moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. t is not enough that
he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the
estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known.
37
The requirement
of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect
the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.
38
Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already
knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he
already had a family. As Atty. Garrido's admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give
him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years
during the subsistence of his two marriages. n 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge
that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the
conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed
of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latter's
family problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person
seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other person's feelings and affection from his wife
and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido's marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the
fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary
decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garrido's advances, as he was a married man, in
fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to
Atty. Garrido from the very start. nstead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him,
upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their
children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia's presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even
left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of
immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.avvph
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia's expressed belief that Atty. Garrido's second marriage to
Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the
strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido's
marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country.
Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido's second
marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino
tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencia's claim that she
agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a
subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong
39
leads us to the opposite
conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of
bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. n this regard, we
cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of
using the surname of her "husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did
not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage.
Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with another woman. This, to us,
is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia's perverse sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia's actions grossly immoral.
Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all
appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also
unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on
his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two
previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia's conduct could not but be scandalous
and revolting to the point of shocking the community's sense of decency; while she professed to be
the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty.
Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She
simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality.
40
n arrentos v. Daaro,
41
we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to
these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal
profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances
concretely show the lawyer's lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to
withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.
n imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar
is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.
42

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The
records show the parties' pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of
mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties
imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido's plea for compassion and his act of supporting his
children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his
demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.
n like manner, Atty. Valencia's behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a
basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the
dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into
question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full
participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DSBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the
Lawyer's Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and
(2) DSBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty.
Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the ntegrated
Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia
from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.





CLG M SMSC- AM no 81!082138
Comp|a|nant
resenL

unC cI
CulSuM8lnC
*

?nA8LSSAn1lACC
CA8lC
CC8CnA
CA8lC MC8ALLS
v e r s u s CPlCCnAZA8lC
vLLASCC !8
nACPu8A
LLCnA8uCuL CAS18C
88lCn
L8AL1A and
8L8SAMln II

IUDGL VIkGILIC G C8LLLkC
kespondent romulgaLed

AugusL 3 2009

x x

k L S C L U @ I C -
Per curiom


1hls ls an admlnlsLraLlve complalnL for dlshonesLy and falslflcaLlon of a
publlc documenL agalnsL respondenL !udge vlrglllo C Caballero 8eglonal 1rlal
CourL (81C% 8ranch 30 CabanaLuan ClLy nueva Lcl[a

ln her complalnL
1
complalnanL Clga M Samson alleged LhaL respondenL
!udge vlrglllo C Caballero should noL have been appolnLed Lo Lhe [udlclary for
lack of Lhe consLlLuLlonal quallflcaLlons of proven compeLence lnLegrlLy problLy
and lndependence
2
and for vlolaLlng Lhe 8ules of Lhe !udlclal and 8ar Councll
(!8C% whlch dlsquallfles from nomlnaLlon any appllcanL for [udgeshlp wlLh a
pendlng admlnlsLraLlve case
3


Accordlng Lo Lhe complalnanL respondenL durlng hls !8C lnLervlews
dellberaLely concealed Lhe facL LhaL he had pendlng admlnlsLraLlve charges
agalnsL hlm

She dlsclosed LhaL on behalf of CommunlLy 8ural 8ank of Culmba (nueva
Lcl[a% lnc she had flled crlmlnal and admlnlsLraLlve charges for grave abuse of
auLhorlLy conducL pre[udlclal Lo Lhe besL lnLeresL of Lhe servlce and vlolaLlon of
ArLlcle 208 of Lhe 8evlsed enal Code agalnsL respondenL ln Lhe Cfflce of Lhe
Cmbudsman on !uly 23 2003
AL LhaL Llme a publlc prosecuLor respondenL allegedly commlLLed cerLaln
lmproprleLles
4
and exceeded hls powers by overrullng Lhe SecreLary of !usLlce ln
a relnvesLlgaLlon he conducLed

Cn March 24 2004 Lhe Cmbudsman dlsmlssed Lhe charges
3
lL also
denled Lhe complalnanL's moLlon for reconslderaLlon
6


1hereafLer Lhe complalnanL flled a peLlLlon for revlew
7
on CcLober 28
2004 ln Lhe CourL of Appeals (CA% ln a declslon
8
daLed november 23 2003 Lhe
appellaLe courL held LhaL lL could noL Lake cognlzance of Lhe crlmlnal charges
agalnsL respondenL on Lhe ground LhaL all appeals from Lhe declslons of Lhe Cfflce
of Lhe Cmbudsman perLalnlng Lo crlmlnal cases should be Laken Lo Lhe Supreme
CourL by way of a peLlLlon for cerLlorarl
9
As Lo Lhe admlnlsLraLlve aspecL Lhe CA
reversed and seL aslde Lhe declslon and [olnL order of Lhe Cmbudsman dlsmlsslng
Lhe charges agalnsL respondenL 1he CA Lhen dlrecLed Cmbudsman Lo flle and
prosecuLe Lhe admlnlsLraLlve charges agalnsL respondenL

Whlle Lhe complalnanL's peLlLlon was pendlng ln Lhe CA respondenL was
lnLervlewed several Llmes ln Lhe !8C from lebruary 2003 Lo AugusL 2003 for Lhe
poslLlon of 81C [udge Cn AugusL 23 2003 he was appolnLed Lo Lhe 81C 8ranch
30 CabanaLuanClLy nueva Lcl[a 1he complalnanL charged LhaL respondenL never
lnformed Lhe !8C of hls pendlng cases 1hls she sald made lL posslble for hlm Lo
be nomlnaLed and subsequenLly appolnLed

ln hls commenL
10
respondenL admlLLed LhaL complalnanL had lodged
crlmlnal and admlnlsLraLlve cases agalnsL hlm ln Lhe Cmbudsman Pe however
lnslsLed LhaL Lhese were already dlsmlssed by vlrLue of Lhe lmmedlaLely effecLlve
and execuLory March 24 2004 declslon of Lhe Cmbudsman 1hus Lhere were
acLually no more pendlng cases agalnsL hlm durlng hls lnLervlews ln Lhe !8C from
lebruary Lo AugusL 2003 Accordlngly Lhere was no lmpedlmenL Lo hls
nomlnaLlon Lo and assumpLlon of Lhe poslLlon of [udge Powever he lnslsLed LhaL
he lnformed Lhe !8C of Lhe sald cases

1he complalnanL flled a reply
11
sLaLlng LhaL Lhe March 24 2004 declslon of
Lhe Cmbudsman was noL yeL flnal and execuLory as lL was Llmely appealed by way
of a peLlLlon for revlew flled on CcLober 28 2004 ln Lhe CA ln facL Lhe peLlLlon
was even granLed
1o furLher supporL her charge of dlshonesLy agalnsL respondenL
complalnanL polnLed Lo Lhe ersonal uaLa SheeL (uS% flled by respondenL
on March 21 2006 ln Lhe Cfflce of AdmlnlsLraLlve ServlcesCfflce of Lhe CourL
AdmlnlsLraLor (CASCCA% 81C ersonnel ulvlslon
12
Accordlng Lo her
respondenL categor|ca||y den|ed ever hav|ng been charged forma||y wlLh any
lnfracLlon

Cn Lhe basls of Lhe pleadlngs and documenLs presenLed by boLh parLles
Lhe CCA found respondenL admlnlsLraLlvely llable for dlshonesLy and falslflcaLlon
of an offlclal documenL for hls false sLaLemenL ln hls uS lL recommended
respondenL's dlsmlssal from Lhe servlce wlLh forfelLure of reLlremenL beneflLs
excepL accrued leave credlLs and wlLh pre[udlce Lo reemploymenL ln Lhe
governmenL servlce

We agree wlLh Lhe flndlngs of Lhe CCA LhaL respondenL ls gullLy of
dlshonesLy and falslflcaLlon of an offlclal documenL

We have no way of knowlng wheLher respondenL wlLhheld lnformaLlon from
Lhe !8C as boLh he and complalnanL never backed Lhelr respecLlve allegaLlons
wlLh concreLe evldence
13
1hus no probaLlve value can be glven elLher Lo Lhe
charges or Lo Lhe defenses
Powever respondenL ls noL Lo be exoneraLed on Lhe basls of Lhe foregolng
alone 8egardless of wheLher he dlsclosed hls pendlng cases durlng hls lnLervlews
Lhe facL remalns LhaL he commlLLed dlshonesLy when he checked Lhe box
lndlcaLlng no" Lo Lhe quesLlon Pave you ever been formally charged?" ln hls
March 21 2006 uS flled ln Lhe CASCCA 81C ersonnel
14


8espondenL's acL of maklng an obvlously false sLaLemenL ln hls uS was
reprehenslble Lo say Lhe leasL lL was noL mere lnadverLence on hls parL when he
answered no" Lo LhaL very slmple quesLlon posed ln Lhe uS Pe knew exacLly
whaL Lhe quesLlon called for and whaL lL meanL and LhaL he was commlLLlng an
acL of dlshonesLy buL proceeded Lo do lL anyway 1o make maLLers worse he even
soughL Lo wrlggle hls way ouL of hls predlcamenL by lnslsLlng LhaL Lhe charges
agalnsL hlm were already dlsmlssed Lhus hls negaLlve answer ln Lhe uS
Powever wheLher or noL Lhe charges were already dlsmlssed was lmmaLerlal
glven Lhe phraseology of Lhe quesLlon Pave you ever been formally charged?"
meanlng charged aL anyLlme ln Lhe pasL or presenL

ln kottl v MeoJozoue costto
13
we held LhaL Lhe maklng of unLruLhful
sLaLemenLs ln Lhe uS amounLs Lo dlshonesLy and falslflcaLlon of an offlclal
documenL ulshonesLy belng ln Lhe naLure of a grave offense carrles Lhe exLreme
penalLy of dlsmlssal from Lhe servlce wlLh forfelLure of reLlremenL beneflLs excepL
accrued leave credlLs and perpeLual dlsquallflcaLlon from reemploymenL ln Lhe
governmenL servlce

8espondenL a [udge knows (or should have known% fully well LhaL Lhe
maklng of a false sLaLemenL ln hls uS could sub[ecL hlm Lo dlsmlssal 1hls CourL
wlll noL allow hlm Lo evade Lhe consequences of hls dlshonesLy 8elng a former
publlc prosecuLor and a [udge now lL ls hls duLy Lo ensure LhaL all Lhe laws and
rules of Lhe land are followed Lo Lhe leLLer Pls belng a [udge makes lL all Lhe more
unaccepLable 1here was an obvlous lack of lnLegrlLy Lhe mosL fundamenLal
quallflcaLlon of a member of Lhe [udlclary

1lme and agaln we have emphaslzed LhaL a [udge should conducL hlmself
ln a manner whlch merlLs Lhe respecL and confldence of Lhe people aL all Llmes
for he ls Lhe vlslble represenLaLlon of Lhe law
16
8egreLLably we are convlnced of
respondenL's capaclLy Lo lle and evade Lhe LruLh Pls dlshonesLy mlsled Lhe !8C
and Larnlshed Lhe lmage of Lhe [udlclary Pe does noL even seem remorseful for
whaL he dld as he sees noLhlng wrong wlLh lL

Pe deserves Lhe harsh penalLy of dlsmlssal from Lhe servlce

1hls admlnlsLraLlve case agalnsL respondenL shall also be consldered as a
dlsclpllnary proceedlng agalnsL hlm as a member of Lhe 8ar ln accordance wlLh
AM no 02902SC
17
1hls resoluLlon enLlLled 8e AuLomaLlc Converslon of
Some AdmlnlsLraLlve Cases AgalnsL !usLlces of Lhe CourL of Appeals and Lhe
Sandlganbayan !udges of 8egular and Speclal CourLs and CourL Cfflclals Who are
Lawyers as ulsclpllnary roceedlngs AgalnsL 1hem 8oLh as Such Cfflclals and as
Members of Lhe hlllpplne 8ar" provldes

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court
of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; udges of reguIar and
speciaI courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based
on grounds which are Iikewise grounds for the discipIinary
action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of
conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative
case shaII aIso be considered a discipIinary action against
the respondent justice, udge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to
comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not
also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned
as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resoIution. (Emphasis
supplied)


8efore Lhe CourL approved Lhls resoluLlon admlnlsLraLlve and dlsbarmenL
cases agalnsL members of Lhe bar who were llkewlse members of Lhe courL were
LreaLed separaLely
18
Powever pursuanL Lo Lhe new rule an admlnlsLraLlve case
agalnsL a [udge of a regular courL based on grounds whlch are also grounds for Lhe
dlsclpllnary acLlon agalnsL members of Lhe 8ar shall be auLomaLlcally consldered
as dlsclpllnary proceedlngs agalnsL such [udge as a member of Lhe 8ar
19


1hls musL be so as vlolaLlon of Lhe fundamenLal LeneLs of [udlclal conducL
embodled ln Lhe new Code of !udlclal ConducL for Lhe hlllpplne !udlclary Lhe
Code of !udlclal ConducL and Lhe Canons of !udlclal LLhlcs consLlLuLes a breach of
Lhe followlng Canons of Lhe Code of rofesslonal 8esponslblllLy (C8%
20


CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTTUTON, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.

CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TMES UPHOLD
THE NTEGRTY AND DGNTY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSON.

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FARNESS
AND GOOD FATH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice.

CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND
MANTAN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDCAL OFFCERS AND SHOULD NSST ON SMLAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.


Slnce membershlp ln Lhe bar ls an lnLegral quallflcaLlon for membershlp ln
Lhe bench Lhe moral flLness of a [udge also reflecLs hls moral flLness as a
lawyer A [udge who dlsobeys Lhe baslc rules of [udlclal conducL also vlolaLes hls
oaLh as a lawyer
21
ln Lhls parLlcular case respondenL's dlshonesL acL was agalnsL
Lhe lawyer's oaLh Lo do no falsehood nor consenL Lo Lhe dolng of any ln courL"

8espondenL's mlsconducL llkewlse consLlLuLed a conLravenLlon of SecLlon
27 8ule 138 of Lhe 8ules of CourL whlch sLrlcLly en[olns a lawyer from commlLLlng
acLs of decelL oLherwlse he may be suspended or dlsbarred 1hus

SEC. 27. Dsbarment and suspenson of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any vioIation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)


1hls CourL dld noL heslLaLe Lo apply Lhe provlslons of AM no 02902SC ln
a pleLhora of cases
22
Cf parLlcular lmporLance Lo Lhls case ls our declslon
ln cooJo v 5oette
23
where we applled Lhe rule Lo lLs fullesL exLenL auLomaLlc
dlsbarmenL

ln cooJo v 5oette complalnanL charged respondenL !udge SuerLe wlLh
grave abuse of auLhorlLy grave mlsconducL grave coerclon dlshonesLy
harassmenL oppresslon and vlolaLlon of ArLlcle 213 of Lhe 8evlsed enal Code
(8C% and Lhe Canons of !udlclal LLhlcs 1he complalnL alleged among oLhers LhaL
respondenL Lrled Lo sell a dllapldaLed cargo plckup Lruck and uaewoo car Lo
complalnanL 1he laLLer refused 1helr frlendshlp laLer on Lurned sour when Lhey
falled Lo reach an agreemenL on Lhe commlsslon respondenL was supposed Lo
recelve as agenLbroker for Lhe conLemplaLed sale of complalnanL's beach loL 1he
complalnanL volced ouL hls fear LhaL respondenL would use hls [udlclal power Lo
persecuLe hlm for whaL respondenL may have percelved as complalnanL's
lnfracLlons agalnsL hlm

ln hls commenL respondenL denled offerlng Lo sell Lhe vehlcles Lo
complalnanL slnce accordlng Lo hlm he never owned a dllapldaLed cargo plckup
Lruck nor could he recall lf he had a uaewoo car ln 1998

Powever a perusal of respondenL's SLaLemenLs of AsseLs and LlablllLles for
Lhe years 19982001 revealed LhaL among hls personal properLles were a uaewoo
car acqulred ln 1996 and an L200 double cab acqulred ln 1998 Accordlngly we
found respondenL gullLy of dlshonesLy for havlng falsely denled LhaL he ever
owned Lhe aforemenLloned vehlcles lor hls lnfracLlon respondenL [udge was
flned ln Lhe amounL of 40000 Pe would have been dlsmlssed from Lhe servlce
were lL noL for Lhe facL LhaL he had already been dlsmlssed Lherefrom because of
an earller case
24


SlgnlflcanLly pursuanL Lo AM no 02902SC we deemed respondenL
!udge SuerLe's admlnlsLraLlve case as dlsclpllnary proceedlngs for dlsbarmenL as
well and proceeded Lo sLrlp hlm of hls membershlp ln Lhe lnLegraLed 8ar of
Lhe hlllpplnes

under Lhe same rule a respondenL may forLhwlLh be requlred Lo commenL
on Lhe complalnL and show cause why he should noL also be suspended
dlsbarred or oLherwlse dlsclpllnary sancLloned as member of Lhe 8ar 1he rule
does noL make lL mandaLory before respondenL may be held llable as a member
of Lhe bar LhaL respondenL be requlred Lo commenL on and show cause why he
should noL be dlsclpllnary sancLloned as a lawyer separate|y from Lhe order for
hlm Lo commenL on why he should noL be held admlnlsLraLlvely llable as a
member of Lhe bench

ln other words on order to comment on the comp/oint

is on order to qive on exp/onotion on why he shou/d not be he/d odministrotive/y
/iob/e not on/y os o member of the bench but o/so os o member of the bor @his is
the foir ond reosonob/e meoninq of "outomotic conversion" of odministrotive
coses oqoinst justices ond judqes

to discip/inory proceedinqs oqoinst them os

/owyers 1hls wlll also serve Lhe purpose of AM no 02902SC Lo avold Lhe
dupllcaLlon or unnecessary repllcaLlon of acLlons by LreaLlng an admlnlsLraLlve
complalnL flled agalnsL a member of Lhe bench
27
a|so as a dlsclpllnary proceedlng
agalnsL hlm as a lawyer by mere operaLlon of Lhe rule 1hus a dlsclpllnary
proceedlng as a member of Lhe bar ls |mp||ed|y |nst|tuted wlLh Lhe flllng of an
admlnlsLraLlve case agalnsL a [usLlce of Lhe Sandlganbayan CourL of Appeals and
CourL of 1ax Appeals or a [udge of a flrsL or secondlevel courL
28


lL cannoL be denled LhaL respondenL's dlshonesLy dld noL only affecL Lhe
lmage of Lhe [udlclary lL also puL hls moral characLer ln serlous doubL and
rendered hlm unflL Lo conLlnue ln Lhe pracLlce of law ossesslon of good moral
characLer ls noL only a prerequlslLe Lo admlsslon Lo Lhe bar buL also a conLlnulng
requlremenL Lo Lhe pracLlce of law
29
lf Lhe pracLlce of law ls Lo remaln an
honorable professlon and aLLaln lLs baslc ldeals Lhose counLed wlLhln lLs ranks
should noL only masLer lLs LeneLs and prlnclples buL should also accord conLlnulng
fldellLy Lo Lhem @he requ|rement of good mora| character |s of much greater
|mport as far as the genera| pub||c |s concerned than the possess|on of |ega|
|earn|ng
30


A parLlng word

1he flrsL sLep Lowards Lhe successful lmplemenLaLlon of Lhe CourL's
relenLless drlve Lo purge Lhe [udlclary of morally unflL members offlclals and
personnel necesslLaLes Lhe lmposlLlon of a rlgld seL of rules of conducL on [udges
1he CourL ls exLraordlnarlly sLrlcL wlLh [udges because belng Lhe vlslble
represenLaLlon of Lhe law Lhey should seL a good example Lo Lhe bench bar and
sLudenLs of Lhe law 1he sLandard of lnLegrlLy lmposed on Lhem ls and should be
hlgher Lhan LhaL of Lhe average person for lL ls Lhelr lnLegrlLy LhaL glves Lhem
Lhe rlghL Lo [udge

JLkLICkL we flnd respondenL !udge vlrglllo C Caballero of Lhe
8eglonal 1rlal CourL 8ranch 30 CabanaLuan ClLyGUIL@ of dlshonesLy and
falslflcaLlon of an offlclal documenL Pe ls ordered DISMISSLD from Lhe servlce
wlLh forfelLure of all beneflLs and prlvlleges excepL accrued leave credlLs lf any
wlLh pre[udlce Lo reemploymenL ln any branch or lnsLrumenLallLy of Lhe
governmenL lncludlng governmenLowned or conLrolled corporaLlons

8espondenL ls llkewlse DIS8kkLD for vlolaLlon of Canons 1 and 11 and
8ules 101 and 1001 of Lhe Code of rofesslonal 8esponslblllLy and hls
name S@kICkL- from Lhe 8oll of ALLorneys

LeL a copy of Lhls resoluLlon be enLered lnLo respondenL's records ln Lhe
Cfflce of Lhe 8ar ConfldanL and noLlce of Lhe same be served on Lhe lnLegraLed
8ar of Lhe hlllpplnes and on Lhe Cfflce of Lhe CourL AdmlnlsLraLor for clrculaLlon
Lo all courLs ln Lhe counLry

SC CkDLkLD




EN BANC


ALAN F. PAGUIA,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 176278

Present:

CORONA, ,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - VELASCO, JR,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR,
PEREZ, and
OFFICE OF TE PRESIDENT, MENDOZA,
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
,nd ON. ILARIO DAVIDE, 1R.,
in hi8 c,5,cit ,8 Perm,nent
Re5re8ent,tive of the Phii55ine8 to the Promulgated:
United N,tion8,
Respondents June 25, 200

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


R E S O L U T I O N


CARPIO, .:

At issue is the power oI Congress to limit the President`s prerogative
to nominate ambassadors by legislating age qualiIications despite the constitutional
rule limiting Congress` role in the appointment oI ambassadors to the Commission
on Appointments` confirmation oI nominees
(
However, Ior lack oI a case or
controversy grounded on petitioner`s lack oI capacity to sue and mootness,
2(
we
dismiss the petition without reaching the merits, deIerring Ior another day the
resolution oI the question raised, novel and Iundamental it may be

Petitioner Alan F Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, Iiled this
original action Ior the writ oI certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo`s nomination oI respondent Iormer ChieI Justice Hilario G Davide, Jr
(respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) Ior
violation oI Section 23 oI Republic Act No 757 (RA 757), the Philippine
Foreign Service Act oI 99 Petitioner argues that respondent Davide`s age at that
time oI his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualiIies him Irom holding his post
Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 oI RA 757 pegging the mandatory
retirement age oI all oIIicers and employees oI the Department oI Foreign AIIairs
(DFA) at 65
3(
Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule Ior all
DFA employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide`s entry into the
DFA ranks discriminates against the rest oI the DFA oIIicials and employees

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the OIIice oI the President,
and the Secretary oI Foreign AIIairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against
the petition First, they question petitioner`s standing to bring this suit because oI
his indeIinite suspension Irom the practice oI law
4(
Second, the OIIice oI the
President and the Secretary oI Foreign AIIairs (public respondents) argue that
neither petitioner`s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to
question respondent Davide`s appointment because petitioner remains without
personal and substantial interest in the outcome oI a suit which does not involve
the taxing power oI the state or the illegal disbursement oI public Iunds Third,
public respondents question the propriety oI this petition, contending that this suit
is in truth a petition Ior 6uo warranto which can only be Iiled by a contender Ior
the oIIice in question

On the eligibility oI respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section
23`s mandated retirement age applies only to career diplomats, excluding Irom its
ambit non-career appointees such as respondent Davide

The petition presents no case or controversy Ior petitioner`s lack oI capacity
to sue and mootness

First Petitioner`s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with
standing to bring this suit We have granted access to citizen`s suits on the
narrowest oI ground: when they raise issues oI 'transcendental importance calling
Ior urgent resolution
5(
Three Iactors are relevant in our determination to allow
third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits oI the crucial issues raised
the character oI Iunds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard oI
constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack oI any other party with a more
direct and speciIic interest to bring the suit
6(
None oI petitioner`s allegations
comes close to any oI these parameters Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a
judicial interpretation oI a statutory provision on the retirement oI government
personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous craIting is the admission that a
'clear disregard oI constitutional or statutory prohibition is absent Further, the
DFA is not devoid oI personnel with 'more direct and speciIic interest to bring the
suit Career ambassadors Iorced to leave the service at the mandated retirement
age unquestionably hold interest Iar more substantial and personal than petitioner`s
generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enIorcement oI the law

The same conclusion holds true Ior petitioner`s invocation oI his taxpayer
status Taxpayers` contributions to the state`s coIIers entitle them to question
appropriations Ior expenditures which are claimed to be unconstitutional or
illegal
7(
However, the salaries and beneIits respondent Davide received
commensurate to his diplomatic rank are Iixed by law and other executive
issuances, the Iunding Ior which was included in the appropriations Ior the DFA`s
total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since
respondent Davide`s nomination Having assumed oIIice under color oI authority
(appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto oIIicer entitled to draw
salary,
8(
negating petitioner`s claim oI 'illegal expenditure oI scarce public
Iunds
9(

Second An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also
obtains Petitioner`s suspension Irom the practice oI law bars him Irom perIorming
'any activity, in or out oI court, which requires the application oI law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience
0(
Certainly, preparing a petition
raising careIully craIted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing
highly legalistic rules oI statutory construction to parse Section 23 oI RA 757
Ialls within the proscribed conduct

Third A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relieI
prayed Ior moot Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on April 200

EREFORE, we DISMISS the petition

SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A. C. No. 7504 November 23, 2007
VIRGINIA VILLAFLORES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, .
Before Us is a Complaint
1
for Disbarment filed by complainant Virginia Villaflores against respondent
Atty. Sinamar Limos, charging the latter with Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.
Complainant Virginia Villaflores is the defendant in Civil Case No. 1218-BG entitled, "Spouses
Sanchez represented by Judth Medna vs. Spouses 'afores," filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33.
Receiving an unfavorable judgment, complainant sought the help of the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO) to appeal her case to the Court of Appeals. The PAO filed for her a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC.
On 1 September 2004, complainant received a copy of a Notice
2
from the Court of Appeals requiring
her to file her appellant's brief within 45 days from receipt thereof.
mmediately thereafter, complainant approached respondent, who had previously handled her son's
case, to file on her behalf the required appellant's brief. Since respondent agreed to handle the
appeal, complainant handed to respondent on 8 September 2004 the amount of P10,000.00 as
partial payment of the latter's acceptance fee ofP20,000.00, together with the entire records of the
case. The following day, on 9 September 2004, complainant paid the balance of respondent's
acceptance fee in the amount of P10,000.00. These payments were duly receipted and
acknowledged
3
by the respondent.
On 21 September 2004, an Employment Contract
4
was executed between complainant and
respondent whereby the former formally engaged the latter's professional services. Upon the
execution of said contract, complainant again paid the respondent the amount of P2,000.00 for
miscellaneous expenses.
5

On 14 January 2005, complainant received a copy of a Resolution
6
dated 6 January 2005 issued by
the Court of Appeals dismissing her appeal for failure to file her appellant's brief within the
reglementary period. Thus, on 17 January 2005, complainant went to respondent's office but failed
to see respondent.
After several unsuccessful attempts to talk to the respondent, complainant went to Manila on 18
January 2005 to seek help from another lawyer who agreed to handle the case for her. On 19
January 2005, complainant went back to the respondent's office to retrieve the records of her case.
Respondent allegedly refused to talk to her.
Aggrieved by respondent's actuations, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against
respondent.
n her Answer,
7
respondent admitted her issuance of the acknowledgment receipts for the aggregate
amount ofP22,000.00, the execution of the Employment Contract between her and complainant, and
the issuance by the Court of Appeals of the Notice to File Appellant's Brief and Resolution dated 6
January 2005. She, however, denied all other allegations imputed against her. Respondent argued
that the non-filing of the appellant's brief could be attributed to the fault of the complainant who failed
to inform her of the exact date of receipt of the Notice to File Appellant's Brief from which she could
reckon the 45-day period to file the same. Complainant allegedly agreed to return to respondent
once she had ascertained the actual date of receipt of said Notice, but she never did. Complainant
supposedly also agreed that in the event she could not give the exact date of receipt of the Notice,
respondent would just wait for a new Order or Resolution from the Court of Appeals before she
would file the appropriate pleading. Respondent further contended that she had, in fact, already
made preliminary study and initial research of complainant's case.
Pursuant to the complaint, a hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
ntegrated Bar of the Philippines (BP) at the BP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 17 June
2005.
On 11 April 2006, nvestigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco submitted his Report and
Recommendation,
8
finding respondent liable for gross negligence and recommending the imposition
upon her of the penalty of one year suspension, to wit:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that herein respondent be declared guilty of
gross negligence in failing to file the required appellants' brief for which act she should be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Also, it is recommended that
the respondent be ordered to return the amount ofP22,000.00 that she received from the
complainant.
Thereafter, the BP Board of Governors passed Resolution
9
No. XV-2006-584 dated 15 December
2006, approving with modification the recommendation of the nvestigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the nvestigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondent's gross negligence in failing to file the required
appellant's brief, Atty. Sinamar E. Limos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months with Warning that a repetition of similar conduct will be dealt with more
severely and ORDERED TO RETURN the amount of P22,000.00 she received from
complainant.
The core issue in this administrative case is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence
in handling complainant's case as would warrant disciplinary action.
After a careful review of the records and evidence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from the
findings and the recommendation of the BP Board of Governors and, thus, sustain the same.
Respondent's conduct in failing to file the appellant's brief for complainant before the Court of
Appeals falls below the standards exacted upon lawyers on dedication and commitment to their
client's cause.
%he relation of attorney and client begins from the time an attorney is retained.
10
%o establish
the professional relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney are
sought and received in any manner pertinent to his profession.
11

t must be noted that as early as 8 September 2004, respondent already agreed to take on
complainant's case, receiving from the latter partial payment of her acceptance fee and the entire
records of complainant's case. The very next day, 9 September 2004, complainant paid the balance
of respondent's acceptance fee. Respondent admitted her receipt of P20,000.00 as acceptance fee
for the legal services she is to render to complainant andP2,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses
she is to incur in handling the case, and the subsequent execution of the employment contract
between her and complainant. Hence, it can be said that as early as 8 September 2004,
respondent's rendition of legal services to complainant had commenced, and from then on, she
should start protecting the complainant's interests. The employment contract between respondent
and complainant already existed as of 8 September 2004, although it was only reduced into writing
on 21 September 2004. n short, respondent's acceptance of the payment for her professional fees
and miscellaneous expenses, together with the records of the case, effectively bars her from
disclaiming the existence of an attorney-client relationship between her and complainant.
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he
agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
12
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle
that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is,
until the case becomes final and executory.
As ruled in #abana v. Tugade
13
:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client
with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity,
care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save
by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit
of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. f much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative
duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also
serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.
Respondent's defense that complainant failed to inform her of the exact date when to reckon the 45
days within which to file the appellant's brief does not inspire belief or, at the very least, justify such
failure. f anything, it only shows respondent's cavalier attitude towards her client's cause.
A case in point is Canoy v. Ortz,
14
where the Court ruled that the lawyer's failure to file the position
paper was per se a violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code. There, the Court ruled that the lawyer could
not shift the blame to his client for failing to follow up his case because it was the lawyer's duty to
inform his client of the status of cases.
Respondent cannot justify her failure to help complainant by stating that "after receipt of part of the
acceptance fee, she did not hear anymore from complainant." The persistence displayed by the
complainant in prosecuting this complaint belies her lack of enthusiasm in fighting for her rights, as
alleged by respondent.
This Court has emphatically ruled that the trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients
requires in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the
courts and the public. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Certainly, a
member of the Bar who is worth his title cannot afford to practice the profession in a lackadaisical
fashion. A lawyer's lethargy from the perspective of the Canons is both unprofessional and
unethical.
15

A lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner; and he should
provide a quality of service at least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a
competent lawyer in a like situation. By agreeing to be his client's counsel, he represents that he will
exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the
character of the business he undertakes to do, to protect the client's interests and take all steps or
do all acts necessary therefor, and his client may reasonably expect him to discharge his obligations
diligently.
16

Respondent has obviously failed to measure up to the foregoing standards.
t may be true that the complainant shares the responsibility for the lack of communication between
her and respondent, her counsel. Respondent, however, should not have depended entirely on the
information her client gave or at the time the latter wished to give it. Respondent, being the counsel,
more than her client, should appreciate the importance of complying with the reglementary period for
the filing of pleadings and know the best means to acquire the information sought. Had she made
the necessary inquiries, respondent would have known the reckoning date for the period to file
appellant's brief with the Court of Appeals. As a lawyer representing the cause of her client, she
should have taken more control over her client's case.
Respondent's dismal failure to comply with her undertaking is likewise evident from the fact that up
until 19 January 2005, when complainant retrieved the entire records of her case, and more than
four months from the time her services were engaged by complainant, respondent still had not
prepared the appellant's brief.
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
n this case, by reason of respondent's negligence, the complainant suffered actual loss.
Complainant faced the risk of losing entirely her right to appeal and had to engage the services of
another lawyer to protect such a right.
This Court will not countenance respondent's failure to observe the reglementary period to file the
appellant's brief. Counsels are sworn to protect the interests of their clients and in the process,
should be knowlegeable about the rules of procedure to avoid prejudicing the interests of their
clients or worse, compromising the integrity of the courts. gnorance of the procedural rules on their
part is tantamount to inexcusable negligence.
17
However, the matter before us does not even call for
counsel's knowledge of procedural rules, but merely her managerial skills in keeping track of
deadlines for filing necessary pleadings, having difficulty with which, she could have always opted to
timely withdraw from the case in order not to prejudice further her client's interest.
The failure of respondent to file the appellant's brief for complainant within the reglementary period
constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. n Pera
Compana de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquabon,
18
this Court held:
An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence. (Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A faure to fe bref for hs cent
certany consttutes nexcusabe neggence on hs part. (People v. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The
respondent has indeed committed a serous apse n the duty owed by hm to hs cent as
we as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice.
(People v. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People v. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).
All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondent's failure to protect the interest of
complainant, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only
upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been
exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence of the public.
n Peope v. Caw,
19
we held that the failure of counsel to submit the brief within the reglementary
period is an offense that entails disciplinary action. Peope v. 'ar, Jr.
20
characterized a lawyer's
failure to file a brief for his client as inexcusable neglect. n aza v. Court of Appeas,
21
we held that
the filing of a brief within the period set by law is a duty not only to the client, but also to the
court. Pera Compana de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquabon
22
reiterated Ford v. Dato
23
and In re: Santago
F. Marcos
24
in holding that an attorney's failure to file a brief for his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence.
n cases involving a lawyer's failure to file a brief or other pleadings before an appellate court, we did
not hesitate to suspend the erring member of the Bar from the practice of law for three months,
25
six
months,
26
or even disbarment in severely aggravated cases.
27

HEREFORE, the resolution of the BP Board of Governors approving and adopting the report and
recommendation of the nvestigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, respondent
ATTY. SNAMAR E. LMOS is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE
(3) MONTHS, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt
with more severely. Furthermore, respondent is hereby ORDERED to return the amount of Twenty-
Two Thousand Pesos (P22,000.00), which she received from complainant Virginia Villaflores.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the ntegrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 5020. December 18, 2001]
ROSARIO 1UNIO, complainant, vs. ATTY. SALVADOR M.
GRUPO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, .:
This is a complaint Ior disbarment Iiled against Atty Salvador M Grupo Ior malpractice
and gross misconduct
Complainant Rosario N Junio alleged that P
3 Sometime in 995, she( engaged the services oI respondent(, then a private
practitioner, Ior the redemption oI a parcel oI land covered by TransIer CertiIicate oI
Title No 20394 registered in the name oI her parents, spouses Rogelio and RuIina
Nietes, and located at Concepcion, Loay, Bohol
4 On 2 August 995, complainant( entrusted to respondent( the amount oI
P25,00000 in cash to be used in the redemption oI the aIoresaid property Respondent
received the said amount as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt, a copy oI
which is being hereto attached as Annex 'A
5 Notwithstanding the Ioregoing and Ior no valid reason, respondent did not redeem
the property; as a result oI which the right oI redemption was lost and the property
was eventually IorIeited
6 Because oI respondent`s Iailure to redeem the property, complainant had
demanded the( return oI the money which she entrusted to the Iormer Ior the above-
stated purpose
7 Despite repeated demands made by the complainant and without justiIiable cause,
respondent has continuously reIused to reIund the money entrusted to him
(

In his Answer, petitioner admitted receiving the amount in question Ior the purpose Ior
which it was given However, he alleged thatP
6 The subject land Ior which the money oI complainant was initially intended to be
applied could really not be redeemed anymore ;
7 Complainant knew the mortgage agreement between her parents and the mortgage-
owner had already expired, and what respondent was trying to do was a sort oI a(
desperate, last-ditch attempt to persuade the said mortgagee to relent and give back
the land to the mortgagors with the tender oI redemption; but at this point, the
mortgagee simply would not budge anymore For one reason or another, he would no
longer accept the sum oIIered;
8 By the time that complainant was to return to Manila, it was already a Ioregone
matter that respondent`s eIIorts did not succeed And so, when transaction Iailed,
respondent requested the complainant that he be allowed, in the meantime, to avail oI
the money because he had an urgent need Ior some money himselI to help deIray his
children`s educational expenses It was really a personal request, a private matter
between respondent and complainant, thus, respondent executed a promissory note Ior
the amount, a copy oI which is probably still in the possession oI the complainant
9 T(he Iamily oI the complainant and that oI the respondent were very close and
intimate with each other Complainant, as well as two oI her sisters, had served
respondent`s Iamily as household helpers Ior many years when they were still in
Manila, and during all those times they were treated with respect, aIIection, and
equality They were considered practically part oI respondent`s own Iamily
That is why, when complainant requested assistance regarding the problem oI the
mortgaged property which complainant wanted to redeem, respondent had no second-
thoughts in extending a lending hand
Respondent did not ask Ior any Iee His services were purely gratuitous; his acts
were( on his own and by his own It was more than pro bono; it was not even Ior
charity; it was simply an act oI a Iriend Ior a Iriend It was just lamentably
unIortunate that his eIIorts Iailed

OI course, respondent accepts his Iault, because, indeed, there were occasions when
complainant`s sisters came to respondent to ask Ior the payment in behalI oI
complainant, and he could not produce the money because the circumstances
somehow, did not allow it I(t does not mean that respondent will not pay, or that he
is that morally depraved as to wilIully and deliberately renege( in his obligation
towards the complainant
2(

Complainant Iiled a reply denying that respondent inIormed her oI his Iailure to redeem the
property and that respondent requested her to instead lend the money to him
3(

The case was thereaIter reIerred to the Integrated Bar oI the Philippines (IBP) Ior
investigation, report, and recommendation However, while two hearings were set Ior this
purpose, both were postponed at the instance oI respondent For this reason, on August 28,
2000, complainant asked the Investigating Commissioner
4(
to consider the case submitted Ior
decision on the basis oI the pleadings theretoIore Iiled Respondent was required to comment on
complainant`s motion, but he Iailed to do so Consequently, the case was considered submitted
Ior resolution
In his report, dated January 5, 200, the Investigating Commissioner Iound respondent liable
Ior violation oI Rule 604 oI the Code oI ProIessional Responsibility which Iorbids lawyers
Irom borrowing money Irom their clients unless the latter`s interests are 'protected by the nature
oI the case or by independent advice The Investigating Commissioner Iound that respondent
Iailed to pay his client`s money However, in view oI respondent`s admission oI liability and
'plea Ior magnanimity, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be
simply reprimanded and ordered to pay the amount oI P25,00000 loan plus interest at the legal
rate
In its Resolution No XIV-200-83, dated April 29, 200, the IBP Board oI Governors
adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner`s Iindings However, it ordered P
R(espondent suspended indeIinitely Irom the practice oI law Ior the commission
oI an act which Ialls short oI the standard oI the norm oI conduct required oI every
attorney and ordered him( to return to the complainant the amount oI
P25,00000 plus interest at the legal rate Irom the time the said amount was
misappropriated, until Iull payment; provided that the total suspension shall be at least
one () year Irom the date oI said Iull payment
On July 4, 200, respondent Iiled a motion Ior reconsideration alleging that P
(a) there was no actual hearing oI the case wherein respondent could have Iully ventilated and
deIended his position;
(b) the subject Resolution gravely modiIied the Report and Recommendation oI the Trial
Commissioner, Hon Pedro Magpayo, Jr, such that the resultant sanctions that are
ordered imposed are too leonine, unjust and cruel;
(c) that the Iactual circumstances attending the matter which gave rise to the complaint were not
rightly or Iairly appreciated
5(

He argues that the Court should adopt the report and recommendation oI the IBP Investigating
Commissioner
In its resolution oI August 5, 200, the Court resolved to treat respondent`s motion Ior
reconsideration as a petition Ior review oI IBP Resolution No XIV 200-83 and required
complainant to comment on the petition
In her comment, complainant states that her primary interest is to recover the amount oI
P25,00000 with interest and that she is leaving it to the Court to decide whether respondent
deserves the penalty recommended by the IBP
6(

The Court resolves to partially grant the petition In his report and recommendation,
Investigating Commissioner Magpayo, Jr made the Iollowing Iindings:
In his Answer, the respondent ADMITS all the allegations in paragraph 4 oI the
complaint which avers:
4 On 2 August 995, complainant entrusted to respondent the amount oI P25,00000
in cash to be used in the redemption oI the aIoresaid property (parcel oI land covered
by TCT No 20394 registered in the name oI complainant`s parents located at
Concepcion, Loay, Bohol) Respondent received the said amount as evidenced by an
acknowledgment receipt (Annex A)
By way oI conIession and avoidance, the respondent, however, contended that
when the mortgagee reIused to accept the sum tendered as the period oI redemption
had already expired, he requested the complainant to allow him in the meantime to
use the money Ior his children`s educational expenses,( to which request the
complainant allegedly acceded and respondent even executed a promissory note
(please see 4th par oI Annex 'B oI complaint)
Respondent takes Iurther reIuge in the intimate and close relationship existing
between himselI and the complainant`s Iamily on the basis oI which his legal services
were purely gratuitous or 'simply an act oI a Iriend Ior a Iriend with 'no
consideration involved UnIortunately, his eIIorts to redeem the Ioreclosed property,
as already stated, did not produce the desired result because the mortgagee 'would not
budge anymore and 'would not accept the sum oIIered
Thus, the respondent concluded that there was, strictly speaking, no attorney-client
relationship( existing between them Rather, right Irom the start,( everything was
sort oI personal, he added
Granting to the respondent the beneIit oI the doubt, we shall assume that there was in
reality a loan in the amount oI P25,00000 This is likewise conIirmed by the
execution oI a promissory note on 2 December 996 by the respondent who
'undertook to pay Mrs Junio on or beIore January 997 (Annex B oI
complaint) Moreover, the demand letter oI 2 March 998 (Annex B) mentions oI
'reimbursement oI the sum received and interest oI '24 per annum until Iully paid
giving the impression that the Iunds previously intended to be used Ior the repurchase
oI a certain property (Annex A oI complaint) was converted into a loan with the
consent oI the complainant who gave way to the request oI the respondent 'to help
deIray his children`s educational expenses (par 8 oI Answer)
Be that as it may, the duty and obligation to repay the loan remains unshaken Having
utilized the sum to IulIill his 'urgent need Ior some money, it is but just and proper
that he return the amount borrowed together with interest
Five (5) years had already passed since respondent retained the cash Ior his own
personal use But notwithstanding the same and his Iirm promise 'to pay Mrs Junio
on or beIore January 997 he has not demonstrated any volition to settle his
obligation to his creditor,( although admittedly 'there were( occasions when
complainant`s sister came to respondent to ask Ior the payment in behalI oI
complainant, worse, 'the passage oI time made respondent somehow Iorgot about
the obligation
A lawyer shall not borrow money Irom his client unless the client`s interests are Iully
protected by the nature oI the case or by independent advice (Rule 604, Code oI
ProIessional Responsibility) This rule is intended to prevent the lawyer Irom taking
advantage oI his inIluence over the client
This rule is especially signiIicant in the instant case where the respondent enjoys an
immense ascendancy over the complainant who, 'as well as two oI his sisters, had
served respondent`s Iamily as household helpers Ior many years
Having gained dominance over the complainant by virtue oI such long relation oI
master and servant, the respondent took advantage oI his inIluence by not returning
the money entrusted to him Instead, he imposed his will on the complainant and
borrowed her Iunds without giving adequate security thereIor and mindless oI the
interest oI the complainant
In the light oI the Ioregoing, respondent has committed an act which Ialls short oI
the standard oI the norm oI conduct required oI every attorney II an ordinary
borrower oI money is required by the law to repay the loan Iailing which he may be
subjected to court action, it is more so in the case oI a lawyer whose conduct serves as
an example
7(

It would indeed appear Irom the records oI the case that respondent was allowed to borrow
the money previously entrusted to him by complainant Ior the purpose oI securing the
redemption oI the property belonging to complainant`s parents Respondent, however, did not
give adequate security Ior the loan and subsequently Iailed to settle his obligation Although
complainant denied having loaned the money to respondent, the Iact is that complainant accepted
the promissory note given her by respondent on December 2, 996 In eIIect, complainant
consented to and ratiIied respondent`s use oI the money It is noteworthy that complainant did
not attach this promissory note to her complaint nor explain the circumstances surrounding its
execution She only mentioned it in her demand letter oI March 2, 998 (Annex B), in which
she reIerred to respondent`s undertaking to pay her the P25,00000 on or beIore January
997 Under the circumstances and in view oI complainant`s Iailure to deny the promissory
note, the Court is constrained to give credence to respondent`s claims that the money previously
entrusted to him by complainant was later converted into a loan
Respondent`s liability is thus not Ior misappropriation or embezzlement but Ior violation oI
Rule 604 oI the Code oI ProIessional Responsibility which Iorbids lawyers Irom borrowing
money Irom their clients unless the latter`s interests are protected by the nature oI the case or by
independent advice In this case, respondent`s liability is compounded by the Iact that not only
did he not give any security Ior the payment oI the amount loaned to him but that he has also
reIused to pay the said amount His claim that he could not pay the loan 'because circumstances
did not allow it and that, because oI the passage oI time, 'he somehow Iorgot about his
obligation only underscores his blatant disregard oI his obligation which reIlects on his honesty
and candor A lawyer is bound to observe candor, Iairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client
8(

Respondent claims that complainant is a close personal Iriend and that in helping redeem the
property oI complainant`s parents, he did not act as a lawyer but as a Iriend, hence there is no
client-attorney relationship between them This contention has no merit As explained
in ilado v David,
9(

To constitute proIessional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney proIessionally on any previous occasion It is not necessary
that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged Ior; neither is it material
that the attorney consulted did not aIterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had II a person, in respect to his business aIIairs or troubles oI any
kind, consults with his attorney in his proIessional capacity with the view to obtaining
proIessional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in
such consultation, then the proIessional employment must be regarded as established

Considering the Ioregoing, the Investigating Commissioner`s recommendation to impose on
respondent the penalty oI reprimand and restitution oI the amount loaned by him is clearly
inadequate On the other hand, the penalty oI indeIinite suspension with restitution imposed by
the IBP Board oI Governors is too harsh in view oI respondent`s apparent lack oI intent to
deIraud complainant and oI the Iact that this appears to be his Iirst administrative
transgression It is the penalty imposed in Igual v avier
0(
which applies to this case In that
case, this Court ordered the respondent suspended Ior one month Irom the practice oI law and
directed him to pay the amount given him by his clients within 30 days Irom notice Ior his Iailure
to return the money in question notwithstanding his admission that he did not use the money Ior
the Iiling oI the appellee`s brieI, as agreed by them, because oI an alleged quarrel with his
clients
Anent petitioner`s allegation regarding the lack oI hearing during the IBP investigation,
suIIice it to say that he waived such right when he Iailed to comment on petitioner`s motion to
submit the case Ior resolution on the basis oI the pleadings theretoIore Iiled despite due notice to
him, not to mention the Iact that it was he who had requested the postponement oI the two
hearings scheduled by the Investigating Commissioner
EREFORE, the Court Iinds petitioner guilty oI violation oI Rule 604 oI the Code oI
ProIessional Responsibility and orders him suspended Irom the practice oI law Ior a period oI
one () month and to pay to respondent, within 30 days Irom notice, the amount oI P25,00000
with interest at the legal rate, computed Irom December 2, 996
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (hairman), Quisumbing, and De eon, r, , concur
Buena, , abroad on oIIicial business


















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949
BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB
ASSAD, respondents.
Degado, Dzon and Fores for pettoner.
'cente J. Francsco for respondents.
TUASON, .:
t appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob
Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs.
Hilado's now deceased husband.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the defendant; and
on June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel
for the plaintiff. On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad
as party defendant.
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the
defendant in substitution for Attorney Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the
case.
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to
discontinue representing the defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him about
her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned over the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and
the latter sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorney Delgado,
Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case
was and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.
Attorney Francisco's letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and identified as Exhibit A, is in full as
follows:
VCENTE J. FRANCSCO
Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila
Juy , .
Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado
Manila, Philippines
My dear Mrs. Hilado:
From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil case No. 70075 of the Court of
First nstance of Manila, entitled "Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. S. J. Assad," find that the
basic facts which brought about the controversy between you and the defendant therein are
as follows:
(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property described in the complaint, as the
same was purchased and/or built with funds exclusively belonging to you, that is to say, the
houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal estate;
(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was with your husband, Mr. Serafin P.
Hilado; and
(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your knowledge on the aforesaid date of
May 3, 1943.
Upon the foregoing facts, am of the opinion that your action against Mr. Assad will not
ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had the right to presume that your husband had the legal right
to dispose of the property as the transfer certificate of title was in his name. Moreover, the
price of P110,000 in Japanese military notes, as of May 3, 1943, does not quite strike me as
so grossly inadequate as to warrant the annulment of the sale. believe, lastly, that the
transaction cannot be avoided merely because it was made during the Japanese occupation,
nor on the simple allegation that the real purchaser was not a citizen of the Philippines. On
his last point, furthermore, expect that you will have great difficulty in proving that the real
purchaser was other than Mr. Assad, considering that death has already sealed your
husband's lips and he cannot now testify as to the circumstances of the sale.
For the foregoing reasons, regret to advise you that cannot appear in the proceedings in
your behalf. The records of the case you loaned to me are herewith returned.
Yours very truly,
(Sgd.) VCENTE J. FRANCSCO
VJF/Rag.
n his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney Francisco alleged that about May, 1945, a
real estate broker came to his office in connection with the legal separation of a woman who had
been deserted by her husband, and also told him (Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought
by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate which the deceased Serafin
Hilado had made to the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was
willing to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told the woman that the sales of
real property during the Japanese regime were valid even though it was paid for in Japanese military
notes; that this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would have no objection to defending the
Syrian;
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she had instituted against a
certain Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real estate which her husband had made; that according
to her the case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away
from them; that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased husband he did not hesitate to tell her
frankly that hers was a lost case for the same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado
retorted that the basis of her action was not that the money paid her husband was Japanese military
notes, but that the premises were her private and exclusive property; that she requested him to read
the complaint to be convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he then asked Mrs. Hilado if
there was a Torrens title to the property and she answered yes, in the name of her husband; that he
told Mrs. Hilado that if the property was registered in her husband's favor, her case would not
prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street, he was informed by
Attorney Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him and that
when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit concerned legal matters he attended to her and
requested her to leave the "expediente" which she was carrying, and she did; that he told Attorney
Agrava that the firm should not handle Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the papers, calling
Agrava's attention to what he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed him a letter
which had been dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expedients" to Mrs. Hilado; that
Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney Agrava's request that Agrava thought it more
proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case was rejected; that he forthwith signed the
letter without reading it and without keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs.
Hilado since their last meeting until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed
extrajudicial settlement of the case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case stating that his
American lawyer had gone to the States and left the case in the hands of other attorneys; that he
accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the Court of Appeals,
dismissed the complaint. His Honor believed that no information other than that already alleged in
plaintiff's complaint in the main cause was conveyed to Attorney Francisco, and concluded that the
intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the point of creating the relation of
attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is undoubted: That Attorney
Francisco's law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of her
case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs.
Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's professional
services. Granting the facts to be no more than these, we agree with petitioner's counsel that the
relation of attorney and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued. The following
rules accord with the ethics of the legal profession and meet with our approval:
n order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a professional one and not merely
one of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a
legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in
legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like. (Atkinson vs. Howlett, 11 Ky.
Law Rep. (abstract), 364; cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion. . . . t is not necessary that
any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was
had. f a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his
attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
professional employment must be regarded as established. . . . (5 Jones Commentaries on
Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or
counselor-when he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is
giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or
advocating his client's cause in open court. (Denver Tramway Co. vs. Owens, 20 Colo., 107;
36 P., 848.)
Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract may be
express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought
and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied
on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by
the latter. (7 C. J. S., 848-849; see Hirach Bros. and Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L.
R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot, without the consent
of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an
attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in
express terms from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to
each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted. (In re De la
Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) n fact the prohibition derives validity from sources higher than written laws and
rules. As has been aptly said in In re Merron, 22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information so
received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the interest
of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence
which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client."
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this
being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary the
situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers, personal and private in
character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere
relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's
retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by him from his first client.
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from
thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even though during
the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature was revealed to the
attorney by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C.
J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly
represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the
court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired from his former
during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the adverse party.
(Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)
n order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is
unnecessary that the ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's affairs might
have a bearing on the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on the attorney's
knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
This rule has been so strictly that it has been held an attorney, on terminating his
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in the same general matter,
even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could
operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce vs.
Palmer [1910], 31 R. ., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. n the complexity
of what is said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature
suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only
further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of other un salutary
results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent; i.e., to make the
employment conditioned on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in
determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be
sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The
condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what information the attorney has received
and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be
wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of the proceedings, if an investigation be
held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to him. "Now
the abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is by hypothesis an evil which is fatal to
the administration of justice." (John H. Wigmore's Evidence, 1923, Section 2285, 2290, 2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as
the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent
the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. nt. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n, 183 ll., 97; 47
L.R.A., 792.) t is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another
case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys,
like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
So without impugning respondent's good faith, we nevertheless can not sanction his taking up the
cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not
necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity
of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or
fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly in expedient. t had the tendency to
bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute and suspicion and
undermine the integrity of justice."
There is in legal practice what called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from the realization
that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional
advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to perform the contemplated services on
behalf of the latter. t is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid
observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was
conceived and authorized. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to
insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. t is intended to
remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of
rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the
absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the
services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney
for the services which he has retained him to perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that Attorney Francisco did not take
the trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the interdiction. f this letter was written under
the circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco and he was unaware of its contents, the fact
remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore
demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estop him in the
same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained
from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628;
7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in our
case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the nature of his
connection with the firm is available to his associates or employers. The rule is all the more to be
adhered to where, as in the present instance, the opinion was actually signed by the head of the firm
and carries his initials intended to convey the impression that it was dictated by him personally. No
progress could be hoped for in "the public policy that the client in consulting his legal adviser ought
to be free from apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if the prohibition were not extended to
the attorney's partners, employers or assistants.
%he fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date
Attorney Francisco first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right
to ask for his disqualification. In one case, objection to the appearance of an attorney was
allowed even on appeal as a ground for reversal of the judgment. In that case, in which
throughout the conduct of the cause in the court below the attorney had been suffered so to
act without objection, the court said: "We are all of the one mind, that the right of the appellee
to make his objection has not lapsed by reason of failure to make it sooner; that professional
confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment."
(Nickels vs. Griffin, 1 Wash. %err., 374, 321 A. L. R. 1316.)
The complaint that petitioner's remedy is by appeal and not by certiorari deserves scant attention.
The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any
conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration of the justice. The summary jurisdiction of the
courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but
embraces authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in
their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts from the general principles of equity and policy, will
always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue
consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts acts on the
same principles whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer
declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718 C.J.S., 1005.) This summary remedy against attorneys flows from the
facts that they are officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the
law for the administration of justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the courts and
to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients.
(Charest vs. Bishop, 137 Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.) Attorney stand on
the same footing as sheriffs and other court officers in respect of matters just mentioned.
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed. t is so ordered, without
costs.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Fera, engzon, Pada, Montemayor, #eyes and Torres, JJ., concur.