1lLas asslgnmenL lnfo

hLLp//enwlklpedlaorg/wlkl/Samuel__PunLlngLon
Samue| h||||ps nunt|ngton (Aprll 18 1927 uecember 24 2008) was an lnfluenLlal Amerlcan
pollLlcal sclenLlsL who wroLe hlghlyregarded books ln a halfdozen subflelds of pollLlcal sclence
sLarLlng ln 1937 Pe galned wlder promlnence Lhrough hls closb of clvlllzotloos (1993 1996) Lhesls of
a posLCold War new world order
Life and career
Huntington was born on April 18, 1927, in New York City, the son oI Dorothy Sanborn (nee
Phillips), a short-story writer, and Richard Thomas Huntington, a publisher oI hotel trade
journals.
|1||2|
His grandIather was publisher John Sanborn Phillips. He graduated with
distinction Irom Yale University at age 18, served in the U.S. Army, earned his Master's
degree Irom the University oI Chicago, and completed his Ph.D. at Harvard University where
he began teaching at age 23.
|3|
He was a member oI Harvard's department oI government
Irom 1950 until he was denied tenure in 1959.
|4|
From 1959 to 1962 he was an associate
proIessor oI government at Columbia University where he was also Deputy Director oI The
Institute Ior War and Peace Studies. Huntington was invited to return to Harvard with tenure
in 1963 and remained there until his death. He was elected a Fellow oI the American
Academy oI Arts and Sciences in 1965.
|5|
Huntington and Warren Demian Manshel co-
Iounded and co-edited Foreign Policy. Huntington stayed as co-editor until 1977.
|6|

His Iirst major book was The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations, (1957) which was highly controversial when it was published, but today is
regarded as the most inIluential book on American civil-military relations.
|7||8||9|
He became
prominent with his Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), a work that challenged the
conventional view oI modernization theorists, that economic and social progress would
produce stable democracies in recently decolonized countries. As a consultant to the U.S.
Department oI State, and in an inIluential 1968 article in Foreign Affairs, he advocated the
concentration oI the rural population oI South Vietnam as a means oI isolating the Viet Cong.
He also was co-author oI The Crisis of Democracy. On the Governability of Democracies, a
report issued by the Trilateral Commission in 1976. During 1977 and 1978, in the
administration oI Jimmy Carter, he was the White House Coordinator oI Security Planning
Ior the National Security Council.
Huntington died on December 24, 2008, at age 81 in Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts.
|1|

edit] Notable arguments
edit] Political Order in Changing Societies
,aln arLlcle ollLlcal Crder ln Changlng SocleLles
In 1968, just as the United States' war in Vietnam was reaching its apex, Huntington
published Political Order in Changing Societies, which was a critique oI the modernization
theory which had driven much US policy in the developing world in the prior decade.
Huntington argues that, as societies modernize, they become more complex and disordered. II
the process oI social modernization that produces this disorder is not matched by a process oI
political and institutional modernizationa process which produces political institutions
capable oI managing the stress oI modernizationthe result may be violence.
In the 1970s, Huntington applied his theoretical insights as an advisor to governments, both
democratic and dictatorial. In 1972, he met with Medici government representatives in Brazil;
a year later he published the report "Approaches to Political Decompression", warning
against the risks oI a too-rapid political liberalization, proposing graduated liberalization, and
a strong party state modeled upon the image oI the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI). AIter a prolonged transition, Brazil became democratic in 1985.
In the 1980s he became a valued adviser to the South AIrican regime, which used his ideas on
political order to craIt its "total strategy" to reIorm apartheid and suppress growing resistance.
He assured South AIrica's rulers that increasing the repressive power oI the state (which at
that time included police violence, detention without trial, and torture) can be necessary to
eIIect reIorm.
|citation needed|
The reIorm process, he told his South AIrican audience, oIten
requires "duplicity, deceit, Iaulty assumptions and purposeIul blindness." He thus gave the
imprimatur oI American social science to his hosts' project oI "reIorming" apartheid rather
than eliminating it.
|10|

Huntington Irequently cited Brazil as a success, alluding to his role in his 1988 presidential
address to the American Political Science Association, commenting that political science
played a modest role in this process. Critics, such as British political scientist Alan Hooper,
note that contemporary Brazil has an especially unstable party system, wherein the best
institutionalized party, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's Workers' Party emerged in opposition to
controlled-transition. Moreover, Hooper claims that the lack oI civil participation in
contemporary Brazil stems Irom that top-down process oI political participation transitions.
edit] %he %hird Wave
In his 1991 book, The Third Wave. Democrati:ation in the Late Twentieth Century,
Huntington made the argument that beginning with Portugal's revolution in 1974, there has
been a third wave oI democratization which describes a global trend which includes more
than 60 countries throughout Europe, Latin America, Asia, and AIrica which have undergone
some Iorm oI democratic transition.
edit] %he Clash of Civilizations
In 1993, Huntington provoked great debate among international relations theorists with the
interrogatively-titled "The Clash oI Civilizations?", an extremely inIluential, oIt-cited article
published in Foreign Affairs magazine. Its description oI post-Cold War geopolitics
contrasted with the inIluential End oI History thesis advocated by Francis Fukuyama.
Huntington expanded "The Clash oI Civilizations?" to book length and published it as The
Clash of Civili:ations and the Remaking of World Order in 1996. The article and the book
posit that post-Cold War conIlict would most Irequently and violently occur because oI
cultural rather than ideological diIIerences. That, whilst in the Cold War, conIlict likely
occurred between the Capitalist West and the Communist Bloc East, it now was most likely
to occur between the world's major civilizations identiIying seven, and a possible eighth:
(i) Western, (ii) Latin American, (iii) Islamic, (iv) Sinic (Chinese), (v) Hindu, (vi) Orthodox,
(vii) Japanese, and (viii) the AIrican. This cultural organization contrasts the contemporary
world with the classical notion oI sovereign states. To understand current and Iuture conIlict,
cultural riIts must be understood, and culture rather than the State must be accepted as
the locus oI war. Thus, Western nations will lose predominance iI they Iail to recognize the
irreconcilable nature oI cultural tensions.
Critics (Ior example articles in Le Monde Diplomatique) call The Clash of Civili:ations and
the Remaking of World Order the theoretical legitimization oI American-led Western
aggression against China and the world's Islamic and Orthodox cultures. Other critics argue
that ProI. Huntington's taxonomy is simplistic and arbitrary, and does not take account oI the
internal dynamics and partisan tensions within civilizations. Furthermore, critics argue that
Huntington neglects ideological mobilization by elites and unIulIilled socioeconomic needs
oI the population as the real causal Iactors driving conIlict, that he ignores conIlicts that do
not Iit well with the civilizational Iault lines identiIied by him, and they charge that his new
paradigm is nothing but realist thinking in which "states" became replaced by
"civilizations".
|11|
Huntington's inIluence upon U.S. policy has been likened to that oI British
historian A.J. Toynbee's controversial religious theories about Asian leaders in the early
twentieth century.
The New York Times obituary on Samuel Huntington notes, however, that his "emphasis on
ancient religious empires, as opposed to states or ethnicities, |as sources oI global conIlict|
gained...more cachet aIter the Sept. 11 attacks."
|12|

edit] Who Are We and immigration
Huntington's last book, Who Are We? The Challenges to Americas National Identity, was
published in May 2004. Its subject is the meaning oI American national identity and the
possible cultural threat posed to it by large-scale Latino immigration, which Huntington
warns could "divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages".
edit] Other
Huntington is credited with coining the phrase Davos Man, reIerring to global elites who
"have little need Ior national loyalty, view national boundaries as obstacles that thankIully are
vanishing, and see national governments as residues Irom the past whose only useIul Iunction
is to Iacilitate the elite's global operations". The phrase reIers to the World Economic Forum
in Davos, Switzerland, where leaders oI the global economy meet.
|13|

edit] The National Academy of Sciences controversy
In 1986, Huntington was nominated Ior membership to the National Academy oI Sciences,
with his nomination voted on by the entire academy, with most votes, by scientists mainly
unIamiliar with the nominee, being token votes. ProIessor Serge Lang, a Yale University
mathematician, disturbed this electoral status quo by challenging Huntington's nomination.
Lang campaigned Ior others to deny Huntington membership, and eventually succeeded;
Huntington was twice nominated and twice rejected. A detailed description oI these events
was published by Lang in "Academia, Journalism, and Politics: A Case Study: The
Huntington Case" which occupies the Iirst 222 pages oI his 1998 book Challenges.
|14|

In the book Political Order in Changing Societies that Huntington published in 1968 he used,
Lang alleged, pseudo-mathematical arguments to argue that in the 1960s South AIrica was a
"satisIied society". Lang didn't believe the conclusion, so he looked at how Huntington
justiIied this claim and concluded that he used methodology which was simply not valid.
Lang suspected that he was using Ialse pseudo-mathematical argument to give arguments that
he wanted to justiIy greater authority. It was, said Lang, ...
... a type oI language which gives the illusion oI science without any oI its substance.
Huntington's prominence as a Harvard proIessor and (as then) Director oI Harvard's Center
Ior International AIIairs contributed to much reportage by The New York Times newspaper
and The New Republic magazine oI his deIeated nomination to the NAS.
Lang was inspired by the writings oI mathematician Neal Koblitz who accused Huntington oI
misusing mathematics and engaging in pseudo-science. Lang claimed that Huntington
distorted the historical record and used pseudo-mathematics to make his conclusions appear
convincing. Lang documents his accusations in his book Challenges.
Huntington`s supporters included Herbert Simon, a 1978 Nobel Laureate in Economics. The
Mathematical Intelligencer oIIered Simon and Koblitz an opportunity to engage in a written
debate, which they accepted.
edit] Quotations
O t ls my bypotbesls tbot tbe fooJomeotol sootce of coofllct lo tbls oew wotlJ wlll oot be
ptlmotlly lJeoloqlcol ot ptlmotlly ecooomlc 1be qteot Jlvlsloos omooq bomookloJ ooJ tbe
Jomlootloq sootce of coofllct wlll be coltotol Notloostotes wlll temolo tbe most powetfol
octots lo wotlJ offolts bot tbe ptloclpol coofllcts of qlobol polltlcs wlll occot betweeo ootloos
ooJ qtoops of Jlffeteot clvlllzotloos 1be closb of clvlllzotloos wlll Jomloote qlobol polltlcs
1be foolt lloes betweeo clvlllzotloos wlll be tbe bottle lloes of tbe fotote
O 1be west woo tbe wotlJ oot by tbe sopetlotlty of lts lJeos ot voloes ot tellqloo bot totbet by
lts sopetlotlty lo opplyloq otqoolzeJ vloleoce westetoets ofteo fotqet tbls foct ooo
westetoets oevet Jo 1be closb of clvlllzotloos ooJ tbe kemokloq of wotlJ OtJet p 31
O ypoctlsy Jooble stooJotJs ooJ bot oots ote tbe ptlce of oolvetsollst pteteosloos
uemoctocy ls ptomoteJ bot oot lf lt btloqs slomlc fooJomeotollsts to powet
oooptollfetotloo ls pteocbeJ fot too ooJ top bot oot fot stoel ftee ttoJe ls tbe ellxlt of
ecooomlc qtowtb bot oot fot oqtlcoltote bomoo tlqbts ote oo lssoe fot cbloo bot oot wltb
5ooJl Atoblo oqqtessloo oqolost ollowoloq kowoltls ls mosslvely tepolseJ bot oot oqolost
oooollowoloq 8osoloos uooble stooJotJs lo ptoctlce ote tbe ooovolJoble ptlce of oolvetsol
stooJotJs of ptloclple 1be closb of clvlllzotloos ooJ tbe kemokloq of wotlJ OtJet
p 184
O o tbe emetqloq wotlJ of etbolc coofllct ooJ clvlllzotloool closb westeto bellef lo tbe
oolvetsollty of westeto coltote soffets tbtee ptoblems lt ls folse lt ls lmmotol ooJ lt ls
Jooqetoos mpetlollsm ls tbe oecessoty loqlcol coosepoeoce of oolvetsollsm 1be
closb of clvlllzotloos ooJ tbe kemokloq of wotlJ OtJet p 310
O o otoslo tbe qteot blstotlc foolt lloes betweeo clvlllzotloos ote ooce mote oflome 1bls ls
pottlcolotly ttoe olooq tbe boooJotles of tbe ctesceotsbopeJ slomlc bloc of ootloos ftom
tbe bolqe of Aftlco to ceottol Aslo vloleoce olso occots betweeo Mosllms oo tbe ooe booJ
ooJ OttboJox 5etbs lo tbe 8olkoos Iews lo stoel loJos lo oJlo 8oJJblsts lo 8otmo ooJ
cotbollcs lo tbe lblllpploes slom bos blooJy botJets
O sloms botJets ote blooJy ooJ so ote lts loootJs 1be fooJomeotol ptoblem fot tbe west ls
oot slomlc fooJomeotollsm t ls slom o Jlffeteot clvlllsotloo wbose people ote coovloceJ of
tbe sopetlotlty of tbelt coltote ooJ ote obsesseJ wltb tbe lofetlotlty of tbelt powet
PunLlngLons 1998 LexL 1be closb of clvlllzotloos ooJ tbe kemokloq of tbe wotlJ OtJet
O coltotol Ametlco ls ooJet sleqe AoJ os tbe 5ovlet expetleoce lllosttotes lJeoloqy ls o weok
qloe to bolJ toqetbet people otbetwlse lockloq toclol etbolc ooJ coltotol sootces of
commoolty wbo Ate we? Ametlcos Cteot uebote p 12
O 1be effectlve opetotloo of o Jemoctotlc polltlcol system osoolly tepoltes some meosote of
opotby ooJ ooolovolvemeot oo tbe pott of some loJlvlJools ooJ qtoops kepott oo tbe
Covetooblllty of uemoctocles to tbe 1tllotetol commlssloo
O A qovetomeot wblcb locks ootbotlty wlll bove llttle oblllty sbott of cotoclysmlc ctlsls to
lmpose oo lts people tbe soctlflces wblcb moy be oecessoty we bove come to tecoqolze
tbot tbete ote poteotlol Jesltoble llmlts to ecooomlc qtowtb 1bete ote olso poteotlolly
Jesltoble llmlts to tbe loJeflolte exteosloo of polltlcol Jemoctocy
O 5ocb o ttoosfotmotloo woolJ oot ooly tevolotloolze tbe uolteJ 5totes bot lt woolJ olso bove
setloos coosepoeoces fot lspoolcs wbo wlll be lo tbe uolteJ 5totes bot oot of lt 5oso eoJs
bls book 1be Ametlcooo uteom wltb eocootoqemeot fot ospltloq lspoolc eottepteoeots
1be Ametlcooo Jteom? be osks t exlsts lt ls teollstlc ooJ lt ls tbete fot oll of os to sbote
5oso ls wtooq 1bete ls oo Ametlcooo Jteom 1bete ls ooly tbe Ametlcoo Jteom cteoteJ by oo
Aoqloltotestoot soclety MexlcooAmetlcoos wlll sbote lo tbot Jteom ooJ lo tbot soclety
ooly lf tbey Jteom lo oqllsb 1he Plspanlc Challenge from lorelgn ollcy p 43
O A wotlJ wltboot u5 ptlmocy wlll be o wotlJ wltb mote vloleoce ooJ JlsotJet ooJ less
Jemoctocy ooJ ecooomlc qtowtb tboo o wotlJ wbete tbe uolteJ 5totes cootlooes to bove
mote lofloeoce tboo ooy otbet coootty lo sboploq qlobol offolts 1be sostoloeJ lotetootloool
ptlmocy of tbe uolteJ 5totes ls ceottol to tbe welfote ooJ secotlty of Ametlcoos ooJ to tbe
fotote of fteeJom Jemoctocy opeo ecooomles ooJ lotetootloool otJet lo tbe wotlJ
wby otetootloool ltlmocy Mottets otetootloool 5ecotlty (5ptloq 199J)8J
O 1be otcbltects of powet lo tbe uolteJ 5totes most cteote o fotce tbot coo be felt bot oot seeo
lowet temolos sttooq wbeo lt temolos lo tbe Jotk exposeJ to tbe soollqbt lt beqlos to
evopotote Ametlcoo lolltlcs 1be ltomlse of ulsbotmooy p 73
edit] Selected publications
O 1be 5olJlet ooJ tbe 5tote 1be 1beoty ooJ lolltlcs of clvllMllltoty kelotloos (1937)
O 1be commoo uefeose 5ttoteqlc ltoqtoms lo Notloool lolltlcs (1961)
O lolltlcol OtJet lo cbooqloq 5ocletles (1968)
O 1be ctlsls of uemoctocy Oo tbe Covetooblllty of uemoctocles (1976)
O Ametlcoo lolltlcs 1be ltomlse of ulsbotmooy (1981)
O 1be 1bltJ wove uemoctotlzotloo lo tbe lote 1weotletb ceototy (1991)
O 1be closb of clvlllzotloos ooJ tbe kemokloq of wotlJ OtJet (1996)
O coltote Mottets ow voloes 5bope omoo ltoqtess (2000)
O wbo Ate we? 1be cbolleoqes to Ametlcos Notloool Jeotlty (2004) an arLlcle based on Lhe
book ls avallable afLer (free) reglsLraLlon aL lorelgn ollcy
hLLp//enwlklpedlaorg/wlkl/1he_Clash_of_ClvlllzaLlons
The Clash of Civilizations is a theory, proposed by political scientist Samuel P. Huntington,
that people's cultural and religious identities will be the primary source oI conIlict in the post-
Cold War world.
This theory was originally Iormulated in a 1992 lecture
|1|
at the American Enterprise
Institute, which was then developed in a 1993 Foreign Affairs article titled "The Clash oI
Civilizations?",
|2|
in response to Francis Fukuyama's 1992 book, The End of History and the
Last Man. Huntington later expanded his thesis in a 1996 book The Clash of Civili:ations and
the Remaking of World Order.
The phrase itselI was Iirst used by Bernard Lewis in an article in the September 1990 issue oI
The Atlantic Monthly titled "The Roots oI Muslim Rage".
|3|

This expression derives Irom clash oI cultures, already used during the colonial period and
the Belle Epoque.
|4|

Overview
Huntington began his thinking by surveying the diverse theories about the nature oI global
politics in the post-Cold War period. Some theorists and writers argued that human rights,
liberal democracy and capitalist Iree market economy had become the only remaining
ideological alternative Ior nations in the post-Cold War world. SpeciIically, Francis
Fukuyama argued that the world had reached the 'end oI history' in a Hegelian sense.
Huntington believed that while the age oI ideology had ended, the world had only reverted to
a normal state oI aIIairs characterized by cultural conIlict. In his thesis, he argued that the
primary axis oI conIlict in the Iuture will be along cultural and religious lines.
As an extension, he posits that the concept oI diIIerent civilizations, as the highest rank oI
cultural identity, will become increasingly useIul in analyzing the potential Ior conIlict.
In the 1993 Foreign Affairs article, Huntington writes:
It is my hypothesis that the Iundamental source oI conIlict in this new world will not be
primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the
dominating source oI conIlict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerIul
actors in world aIIairs, but the principal conIlicts oI global politics will occur between nations
and groups oI diIIerent civilizations. The clash oI civilizations will dominate global politics.
The Iault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines oI the Iuture.
|2|

In the end oI the article, he writes:
This is not to advocate the desirability oI conIlicts between civilizations. It is to set Iorth
descriptive hypothesis as to what the Iuture may be like.
|2|

edit] Major civilizations according to Huntington
Huntington divided the world into the "major civilizations" in his thesis as such:
O WesLern clvlllzaLlon comprlslng norLh Amerlca WesLern and CenLral Lurope AusLralla and
Cceanla WheLher LaLln Amerlca and Lhe former member sLaLes of Lhe SovleL unlon are
lncluded or are lnsLead Lhelr own separaLe clvlllzaLlons wlll be an lmporLanL fuLure
conslderaLlon for Lhose reglons accordlng Lo PunLlngLon
O LaLln Amerlca lncludes CenLral Amerlca SouLh Amerlca (excludlng Lhe Culanas) Cuba Lhe
uomlnlcan 8epubllc and ,exlco ,ay be consldered a parL of WesLern clvlllzaLlon Lhough lL
has sllghLly dlsLlncL soclal and pollLlcal sLrucLures from Lurope and norLhern Amerlca ,any
people of Lhe SouLhern Cone however regard Lhemselves as full members of Lhe WesLern
clvlllzaLlon
O 1he CrLhodox world of Lhe former SovleL unlon (excludlng Lhe 8alLlc sLaLes and mosL of
CenLral Asla) Armenla Ceorgla Lhe former ?ugoslavla (excludlng Slovenla and CroaLla)
8ulgarla Cyprus Creece ukralne and 8omanla
O 1he LasLern world ls Lhe mlx of Lhe 8uddhlsL Chlnese Plndu and !aponlc clvlllzaLlons
4 1he 8uddhlsL areas of 8huLan Cambodla Laos ,ongolla ,yanmar Srl Lanka and
1halland are ldenLlfled as separaLe from oLher clvlllzaLlons buL PunLlngLon belleves
LhaL Lhey do noL consLlLuLe a ma[or clvlllzaLlon ln Lhe sense of lnLernaLlonal affalrs
4 1he Slnlc clvlllzaLlon of Chlna Lhe koreas Slngapore 1alwan and vleLnam 1hls
group also lncludes Lhe Chlnese dlaspora especlally ln relaLlon Lo SouLheasL Asla
4 Plndu clvlllzaLlon locaLed chlefly ln lndla 8huLan and nepal and culLurally adhered
Lo by Lhe global lndlan dlaspora
4 !apan consldered a hybrld of Chlnese clvlllzaLlon and older AlLalc paLLerns
O 1he ,usllm world of Lhe CreaLer ,lddle LasL (excludlng Armenla Cyprus LLhlopla Ceorgla
Creece lsrael ,alLa and SouLh Sudan) norLhern WesL Afrlca Albanla 8angladesh 8runel
Comoros lndonesla ,alaysla aklsLan and ,aldlves
O 1he clvlllzaLlon of SubSaharan Afrlca locaLed ln SouLhern Afrlca ,lddle Afrlca (excludlng
Chad) LasL Afrlca (excludlng LLhlopla Comoros kenya ,aurlLlus and 1anzanla) Cape
verde CLe dlvolre Chana Llberla and Slerra Leone Consldered as a posslble 8Lh
clvlllzaLlon by PunLlngLon
O lnsLead of belonglng Lo one of Lhe ma[or clvlllzaLlons LLhlopla and PalLl are labeled as
Lone counLrles lsrael could be consldered a unlque sLaLe wlLh lLs own clvlllzaLlon
PunLlngLon wrlLes buL one whlch ls exLremely slmllar Lo Lhe WesL PunLlngLon also belleves
LhaL Lhe Anglophone Carlbbean former 8rlLlsh colonles ln Lhe Carlbbean consLlLuLes a
dlsLlncL enLlLy
O 1here are also oLhers whlch are consldered clefL counLrles because Lhey conLaln large
groups of people ldenLlfylng wlLh separaLe clvlllzaLlons Lxamples lnclude lndla (clefL
beLween lLs Plndu ma[orlLy and large ,usllm mlnorlLy) ukralne (clefL beLween lLs LasLern
8lLe CaLhollcdomlnaLed wesLern secLlon and lLs CrLhodoxdomlnaLed easL) lrance (clefL
beLween SubSaharan Afrlcan ln Lhe case of lrench Culana and Lhe WesL) 8enln Chad
kenya nlgerla 1anzanla and 1ogo (all clefL beLween lslam and SubSaharan Afrlca) Cuyana
and Surlname (clefL beLween Plndu and SubSaharan Afrlcan) Chlna (clefL beLween Slnlc
8uddhlsL ln Lhe case of 1lbeL and Lhe WesL ln Lhe case of Pong kong and ,acau) and Lhe
hlllpplnes (clefL beLween lslam ln Lhe case of ,lndanao Slnlc and Lhe WesL) Sudan was
also lncluded as clefL beLween lslam and SubSaharan Afrlca Lhls dlvlslon became a formal
spllL ln !uly 2011 followlng an overwhelmlng voLe for lndependence by SouLh Sudan ln a
!anuary 2011 referendum
edit] Huntington's thesis of civilizational clash
Russia, Japan, and India are what Huntington terms 'swing civilizations' and may Iavor either
side. Russia, Ior example, clashes with the many Muslim ethnic groups on its southern border
(such as Chechnya) butaccording to Huntingtoncooperates with Iran to avoid Iurther
Muslim-Orthodox violence in Southern Russia, and to help continue the Ilow oI oil.
Huntington argues that a "Sino-Islamic connection" is emerging in which China will
cooperate more closely with Iran, Pakistan, and other states to augment its international
position.
Huntington also argues that civilizational conIlicts are "particularly prevalent between
Muslims and non-Muslims", identiIying the "bloody borders" between Islamic and non-
Islamic civilizations. This conIlict dates back as Iar as the initial thrust oI Islam into
Europe,
|citation needed|
its eventual expulsion in the Iberian reconquest, the attacks oI the
Ottoman Turks on Eastern Europe and Vienna, and the European imperial division oI the
Islamic nations in the 1800s and 1900s.
Huntington also believes that some oI the Iactors contributing to this conIlict are that both
Christianity (which has inIluenced Western civilization) and Islam are:
O ,lsslonary rellglons seeklng converslon of oLhers
O unlversal allornoLhlng rellglons ln Lhe sense LhaL lL ls belleved by boLh sldes LhaL only
Lhelr falLh ls Lhe correcL one
O 1eleologlcal rellglons LhaL ls LhaL Lhelr values and bellefs represenL Lhe goals of exlsLence
and purpose ln human exlsLence
O lrrellglous people who vlolaLe Lhe base prlnclples of Lhose rellglons are percelved Lo be
furLherlng Lhelr own polnLless alms whlch leads Lo vlolenL lnLeracLlons
More recent Iactors contributing to a Western-Islamic clash, Huntington wrote, are the
Islamic Resurgence and demographic explosion in Islam, coupled with the values oI Western
universalismthat is, the view that all civilizations should adopt Western valuesthat
inIuriate Islamic Iundamentalists. All these historical and modern Iactors combined,
Huntington wrote brieIly in his Foreign Affairs article and in much more detail in his 1996
book, would lead to a bloody clash between the Islamic and Western civilizations. The
political party Hizb ut-Tahrir also reiterate Huntington's views in their published book, The
Inevitability of Clash of Civilisation.
|6|

edit] Core state and fault line conflicts
In Huntington's view, intercivilizational conIlict maniIests itselI in two Iorms: Iault line
conIlicts and core state conIlicts.
Fault line conflicts are on a local level and occur between adjacent states belonging to
diIIerent civilizations or within states that are home to populations Irom diIIerent
civilizations.
Core state conflicts are on a global level between the major states oI diIIerent civilizations.
Core state conIlicts can arise out oI Iault line conIlicts when core states become involved.
|7|

These conIlicts may result Irom a number oI causes, such as: relative inIluence or power
(military or economic), discrimination against people Irom a diIIerent civilization,
intervention to protect kinsmen in a diIIerent civilization, or diIIerent values and culture,
particularly when one civilization attempts to impose its values on people oI a diIIerent
civilization.
|7|

edit] Modernization, westernization, and "torn
countries"
Critics oI Huntington's ideas oIten extend their criticisms to traditional cultures and internal
reIormers who wish to modernize without adopting the values and attitudes oI Western
culture. These critics
|who?|
sometimes claim that to modernize is necessarily to become
Westernized to a very large extent.
In reply, those
|who?|
who consider the Clash of Civili:ations thesis accurate oIten point to the
example oI Japan, claiming that it is not a Western state at its core. They argue that it adopted
much Western technology (also inventing technology oI its own in recent times),
parliamentary democracy, and Iree enterprise, but has remained culturally very distinct Irom
the West.
|citation needed|

China is also cited by some
|who?|
as a rising non-Western economy. Many
|who?|
also point out
the East Asian Tigers or neighboring states as having adapted western economics, while
maintaining traditional or authoritarian social government.
Perhaps the ultimate example oI non-Western modernization is Russia, the core state oI the
Orthodox civilization. The variant oI this argument that uses Russia as an example relies on
the acceptance oI a unique non-Western civilization headed by an Orthodox state such as
Russia or perhaps an Eastern European country.
|citation needed|

Huntington argues that Russia is primarily a non-Western state although he seems to agree
that it shares a considerable amount oI cultural ancestry with the modern West. Russia was
one oI the great powers during World War I. It also happened to be a non-Western power.
According to Huntington, the West is distinguished Irom Orthodox Christian countries by the
experience oI the Renaissance, ReIormation, the Enlightenment, overseas colonialism rather
than contiguous expansion and colonialism, and a recent re-inIusion oI Classical culture
through Rome rather than through the continuous trajectory oI the Byzantine Empire.
The diIIerences among the modern Slavic states can still be seen today. This issue is also
linked to the "universalizing Iactor" exhibited in some civilizations
|clarification needed|
.
Huntington reIers to countries that are seeking to aIIiliate with another civilization as "torn
countries." Turkey, whose political leadership has systematically tried to Westernize the
country since the 1920s, is his chieI example.
Turkey's history, culture, and traditions are derived Irom Islamic civilization, but Turkey's
elite, beginning with MustaIa Kemal Atatrk, who took power as Iirst President oI the
Republic oI Turkey in 1923, imposed western institutions and dress, embraced the Latin
alphabet, joined NATO, and is seeking to join the European Union. Mexico and Russia are
also considered to be torn by Huntington. He also gives the example oI Australia as a country
torn between its Western civilizational heritage and its growing economic engagement with
Asia.
According to Huntington, a torn country must meet three requirements to redeIine its
civilizational identity. Its political and economic elite must support the move. Second, the
public must be willing to accept the redeIinition. Third, the elites oI the civilization that the
torn country is trying to join must accept the country.
As noted in the book, to date no torn country has successIully redeIined its civilizational
identity, this mostly due to the elites oI the 'host' civilization reIusing to accept the torn
country, though iI Turkey gained membership oI the European Union it has been noted that
many oI its people would support Westernization
|who?|
. II this were to happen it would be the
Iirst to redeIine its civilizational identity.
edit] Criticism
Huntington has Iallen under the stern critique oI various academic writers, who have either
empirically, historically, logically or ideologically reIuted his claims (Fox, 2005; Mungiu
Pippidi & Mindruta, 2002; Henderson & Tucker, 2001; Russett, Oneal, & Cox,
2000).
|8||9||10||11|
In another article explicitly reIerring to Huntington, Amartya Sen (1999)
points to the Iact that "diversity is a Ieature oI most cultures in the world. Western civilization
is no exception. The practice oI democracy that has won out in the modern West is largely a
result oI a consensus that has emerged since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution,
and particularly in the last century or so. To read in this a historical commitment oI the
Westover the millenniato democracy, and then to contrast it with non-Western traditions
(treating each as monolithic) would be a great mistake" (p. 16).
|12|

In his Terror and Liberalism, Paul Berman proposes another criticism oI the civilization clash
hypothesis. According to Berman, distinct cultural boundaries do not exist in the present day.
He argues there is no "Islamic civilization" nor a "Western civilization", and that the evidence
Ior a civilization clash is not convincing, especially when considering relationships such as
that between the United States and Saudi Arabia. In addition, he cites the Iact that many
Islamic extremists spent a signiIicant amount oI time living and/or studying in the Western
world. According to Berman, conIlict arises because oI philosophical belieIs various groups
share (or do not share), regardless oI cultural or religious identity.
|13|

Edward Said issued a response to Huntington's thesis in his "The Clash oI Ignorance".
|14|
Said
argues that Huntington's categorization oI the world's Iixed "civilizations" omits the dynamic
interdependency and interaction oI culture. A long time critic oI the Huntingtonian paradigm,
and an outspoken proponent oI Arab issues, Edward Said (2004) also claimed that not only is
the Clash oI Civilisations thesis a "reductive and vulgar notion" (p. 226), but it is also an
illustration 'oI the purest invidious racism, a sort oI parody oI Hitlerian science directed
today against Arabs and Muslims (p. 293).
|15|

Especially under Said's critique Iell Huntington's view oI 'Islam' as a monolithical entity:
My concern |.| is that the mere use oI the label Islam, either to explain or
indiscriminately condemn Islam, actually ends up becoming a Iorm oI attack |.| Islam
deIines a relatively small proportion oI what actually takes place in the Islamic world, which
numbers a billion people, and includes dozens oI countries, societies, traditions, languages
and, oI course, an inIinite number oI diIIerent experiences. It is simply Ialse to try to trace all
this back to something called Islam, no matter how vociIerously polemical Orientalists
|.| insisted that Islam regulates Islamic societies Irom top to bottom, that dar al Islam is a
single, coherent entity, that church and state are really one in Islam, and so Iorth.
Said , 1997, p. xvi
As early as the 1970s, scholars such as Abu Zahra argued that Islam vastly varies
contextually and historically. Sections Irom the Koran that assert equality Ior men and
women have been pointed out and warnings have been issued regarding the very signiIicant
gaps that may (and do) exist between erudite, theologically nuanced readings oI the Koran on
one hand, and widely held popular views and practices on the other. Embracing an already
problematic "bulk" oI Islam as an explanation Ior social and cultural phenomena might not
only prove unproductive, but is arguably a Ilawed course oI reasoning, since it ignores or
neglects speciIic state policies and interventions (Zahra, 1970, cited in Goddard, Llobera &
Shore, 1994, p. 66)
|16|

Fundamental questions such as what Islam means Ior Muslims themselves in the modern
world are equally "an issue Ior debate and action in the context oI the politics oI nation states,
the struggle Ior energy supplies, superpower rivalry, and dependency. What is the umma,
the Islamic community, and how and where is ijma, or consensus to be Iormed?"
(Gilsenan, 1982, cited in Lukens Bull, 1999, p. 15).
|17|

Similar anti-Huntingtonian arguments have been woven around the term 'Iundamentalism', a
"slippery concept |.|, and word that has come to be associated almost automatically with
Islam, although it has a Ilourishing, usually elided, relationship with Christianity, Judaism
and Hinduism" (Said, 1997, p. xvi).
|18|
It has been suggested that "the deliberately created
associations between Islam and Iundamentalism ensure that the average reader comes to see
Islam and Iundamentalism as essentially the same thing" (idem). Indeed, Muslim countries
such as Indonesia and Tunisia hardly Iit into Huntington's Iierce Weltanschauung, while his
prediction that Turkey might decide to Iollow some sort oI imperial past becomes less
plausible by the day, as even newly elected "Islamic" Turkish conservative leaders turn
towards Brussels, and not Tashkent, when contemplating Ioreign aIIairs.
edit] Opposing concepts
In recent years, the theory oI Dialogue Among Civilizations, a response to Huntington's
Clash oI Civilizations, has become the center oI some international attention. The concept,
which was introduced by Iormer Iranian president Mohammad Khatami, was the basis Ior
United Nations' resolution to name the year 2001 as the Year oI Dialogue among
Civilizations.
|19||20|

The Alliance oI Civilizations (AOC) initiative was proposed at the 59th General Assembly oI
the United Nations in 2005 by the President oI the Spanish Government, Jose Luis Rodriguez
Zapatero and co-sponsored by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The
initiative is intended to galvanize collective action across diverse societies to combat
extremism, to overcome cultural and social barriers between mainly the Western and
predominantly Muslim worlds, and to reduce the tensions and polarization between societies
which diIIer in religious and cultural values.
[eJltj 1he IntermeJlute Reglon
Huntington's geopolitical model, especially the structures Ior North AIrica and Eurasia, is
largely derived Irom the "Intermediate Region" geopolitical model Iirst Iormulated by
Dimitri Kitsikis and published in 1978.
|21|
The Intermediate Region, which spans the Adriatic
Sea and the Indus River, is neither western nor eastern (at least, with respect to the Far East)
but is considered distinct.
Concerning this region, Huntington departs Irom Kitsikis contending that a civilizational Iault
line exists between the two dominant yet diIIering religions (Orthodox Christianity and Sunni
Islam), hence a dynamic oI external conIlict. However, Kitsikis establishes an integrated
civilization comprising these two peoples along with those belonging to the less dominant
religions oI Shiite Islam, Alevism and Judaism. They have a set oI mutual cultural, social,
economic and political views and norms which radically diIIer Irom those in the West and the
Far East.
In the Intermediate Region, thereIore, one cannot speak oI a civiliational clash or external
conIlict, but rather an internal conIlict, not Ior cultural domination, but Ior political
succession. This has been successIully demonstrated by documenting the rise oI Christianity
Irom the hellenized Roman Empire, the rise oI the Islamic caliphates Irom the Christianized
Roman Empire and the rise oI Ottoman rule Irom the Islamic caliphates and the Christianized
Roman Empire.
hLLp//wwwhlsLoryorbcom/world/clashofclvlllzaLlonsshLml
Samuel P. Huntingtons Clasb of Civilizations
by !ames Craham
ubllshed ,ay 2004
In the post Cold War world Iew articles have inIluenced how Western and especially
American policymakers view the world more than Samuel P. Huntington's 1993 article, The
Clash oI Civilizations. Published in the inIluential Foreign AIIairs journal the article
suggested the world was returning to a civilization dominated world where Iuture conIlicts
would originate Irom clashes between 'civilizations'. The theory has been broadly criticised
Ior oversimpliIication, ignoring indigenous conIlicts and Ior incorrectly predicting what has
happened in the decade since its publication. The claim made by many that September the
11th has vindicated Huntington is simply not supported by the evidence. Published while a
post Cold War world was searching Ior a new prism to view international relations through
ensured it has however proved inIluential.
Huntington's thesis outlines a Iuture where the "great divisions among humankind and the
dominating source oI conIlict will be cultural" (Huntington 1993:22). He divides the world's
cultures into seven current civilizations, Western, Latin American, ConIucian, Japanese,
Islamic, Hindu and Slavic-Orthodox (Huntington 1993:26). In addition he judged AIrica only
as a possible civilization depending on how Iar one viewed the development oI an AIrican
consciousness had developed. These civilizations seem to be deIined primarily by religion
with a number oI ad hoc exceptions. Israel is lumped together with the West, Buddhist states
and the whole religion is completely ignored.
Huntington argues that the end oI ideological conIrontation between liberal democracy and
communism will see Iuture conIlict occurring along the borders between civilizations at a
micro level. At a macro level he predicts conIlict occurring between states Irom diIIerent
civilizations Ior control oI international institutions and Ior economic and military power
(Huntington 1993:29). He views this mix oI conIlict as normal by asserting that nation-states
are new phenomena in a world dominated Ior most oI its history by conIlicts between
civilizations. This is a dubious statement as inter-civilizational conIlict driven mainly by geo-
political Iactors rather than cultural diIIerences is an equally iI not more persuasive way to
view much oI history.
The theory at least diIIerentiates between non-Western civilizations rather than grouping
them together. He also explains how the West presents pro-Western policies as positive Ior
the entire world and that the very idea oI a universal culture is a Western idea. This he argues
is evidenced by most important Western values like human rights oIten being the least
important values to other civilizations.
His escape Irom a Eurocentric bias is however only temporary. He completely Iails to
account Ior indigenous cultures even though one can argue they collectively comprise a
separate civilization (Fox 2002:430). The article also predicts Iuture conIlicts will be started
by non-Western civilizations reacting to Western power and values ignoring the equally
plausible situation where Western states use their military superiority to maintain their
superior positions. The policy prescriptions he suggests to counter this perceived threat
equate to increasing the power oI the West to Iorestall any loss oI the West's pre-eminence.
Thus he suggests the Latin American and Orthodox-Slavic civilizations be drawn Iurther into
the Western orbit and the maintenance oI Western military superiority (Huntington 1993:47).
By simpliIying the world Huntington's theory ignores culture's inclination to be Iast changing
and multi-dimensional (HerzIeld 1997:116). Most Western states are now multi or bi-cultural
and becoming more so. They are thus potentially part oI multiple civilizations, a situation he
brushes over by designating religion as the deciding Iactor. A secular Arab immigrant living
in an Arab community in England is just one example where this designation is inappropriate.
Indeed situated in a highly religious country with a signiIicant number oI Christian
Iundamentalists he states conIidently that the world is becoming un-secularised. His evidence
to backup this claim is circumstantial a common Iault with most oI his supporting evidence
and thus is as best highly tenuous.
Like many sweeping theories Huntington's suIIers Irom being too vague to address many
speciIic issues. His anecdotal approach is simply not robust enough to account Ior the
explanations and arguments he presents (Fox 2002:423). A systematic quantitative analysis
conducted by Jonathon Fox Ior the period 1989-2002 concluded that the exact opposite oI
what Huntington predicted actually occurred (Fox 2002:425). Not only did Fox Iind that
civilizational conIlicts were less common than noncivilizational conIlicts but the end oI the
Cold War had no signiIicant eIIect on the ratio between the two (Fox 2002:426). Traditional
methods like the level oI discrimination in a society and the characteristics oI a regime
proved more useIul in analysing ethnic conIlict than Huntington's Clash oI civilizations. Most
damning oI all was the Iinding that where civilizational conIlict did occur it was more likely
to be between groups that were culturally similar (Fox 2002:429), that is within the same
civilization and not between them. These Iindings directly contradict Huntington's theory.
The danger oI the Clash oI Civilization thesis is presented by the term "clash oI civilizations"
which is intuitively understandable. This has ensured the theory has been used to increase the
Iear in the West oI an Islamic movement perceived as increasingly powerIul and anti-
Western. It is this Iantasy that has provided much oI the rationale Ior trying to limit and
control the expansion oI the Islam and ConIucian civilizations oI which the war on terror is
but the latest and most extreme example. These policies were advocated by Huntingdon in
the article to reduce the threat speciIic civilizations were perceived to hold (Huntington
1993:47). A reasonable argument can thus be made that this article and the storm oI interest it
created, generated a selI-IulIilling prophecy. The power to make real what one merely
theorises is immensely dangerous. When that theory is based on Ilawed and circumstantial
evidence it is disastrous.
The clash oI civilizations thesis while original and persuasive distorted reality. Its many Ilaws
have been exposed by events since its publication. The theory has however Iorced people to
examine more seriously non-Western cultures. UnIortunately the conclusions many have
drawn Irom these examinations have been the wrong ones as they were conducted Irom the
starting premise oI a 'clash oI civilizations.' Such is the power oI a well written and
persuasive article to distort individual's perception oI culture and conIlict.

#eferences Cited
Fox. Jonathon, Ethnic minorities and the clash oI civilizations: A quantitative analysis oI
Huntington's thesis. British Journal oI Political Science, 32(3):415-435.
HerzIeld, Michael, 1997. Anthropology and the politics oI signiIicance. Social Analysis,
4(3):107-138.
Huntington. Samuel, 1993. The clash oI civilizations. Foreign AIIairs, 72(3):22-49.
hLLp//hnnus/arLlcles/4987hLml
8evlew of Samuel PunLlngLons lWho Are We? 1he Challenges Lo Amerlcas naLlonal ldenLlLy/l
lm Sleeper
,r Sleeper ls Lhe auLhor of Ll8L8AL 8AClS, and 1PL CLCSLS1 Cl S18AnCL8S and ls a lecLurer ln
pollLlcal sclence aL ?ale unlverslLy
With the publication oI this, his thirteen book, the magisterial, sometimes dyspeptic Harvard
political scientist Samuel P. Huntington has once again indulged - nay, has stage managed -
his inclination to administer jolts oI counterintuitive, debate-changing Truth to distracted
American elites. Once again, establishment players oI many stripes are swooning in dismay
at his dark revelations or girding up their loins to join him in another long, twilight battle Ior
Western civilization. Once again, Huntington is arrestingly right about challenges Iacing
liberal democracy that many liberals have been loath to acknowledge.
But never beIore has so big a part oI his argument been so thunderously wrong and so
cheaply sustained. Those who value his chastening realism about liberalism's dicey prospects
will have to work hard to Iollow his most important insight in Who We Are?: that American
cosmopolitans who would like to dispense with nations and multiculturalist zealots who
would like to dismantle them have converged with American multinational proIiteers to Iray
the Iabric oI liberal democracy, which only a renewed civic patriotism here at home can
sustain. This argument, eminently worth arguing about, has already been overshadowed by
another: about Huntington's ill-conceived, crotchety and (pardon the word) undocumented
jeremiad against Latino immigration.
The distraction is the Iault oI Huntington the stage manager as much as oI Huntington the
thinker. In 1993, to prompt a national debate about themes that would Iigure in his 1996
book, "The Clash oI Civilizations and the Remaking oI World Order," he published a Foreign
AIIairs essay oI virtually the same title highlighting his most important warning: The
economic, ideological and nationalist rivalries that most global analysts and activists
presumed were driving world aIIairs would soon be eclipsed by deep cultural and religious
diIIerences among civilizations. He Ioresaw the Ierocity oI our conIlict with Islamicist
terrorists and warned against the American unilateralism and moralism that have been
brought to bear on it, widening the civilizational divide.
Huntington didn't clearly deIine these civilizations; he seemed unsure whether Latin America
is a distinct civilization or is part oI the West. Two months ago he seemed to answer the latter
question by heralding Who We Are? with an essay in Foreign Policy, this one called "The
Hispanic Challenge." It has made the book a lightning rod Ior the least credible oI his
warnings: America's Latino immigration deluge, he claims, is so little like any earlier wave,
so hostile or resistant to sharing the common American language, civic rites and virtues upon
which our republican selI-governance depends, that it constitutes "a major potential threat to
the cultural and possibly political integrity oI the United States." II this clash isn't
civilizational, what is?
The problem is that, most likely, it isn't, and Who We Are? doesn't persuade this reader that
most Latino immigration is a threat to liberal democracy. Two months ago, Huntington also
published (in the conservative journal National Interest) a less-noted essay, "Dead Souls: The
Denationalization oI the American Elite," whose title and contents come Irom another,
smaller section toward the end oI the book. Contradicting his own claims that the Latino tidal
wave is shiIting the balance oI American political culture against patriotism, he announces,
"A major gap is growing in America between its increasingly denationalized |academic,
corporate and cultural| elites and its 'Thank God Ior America' public." The latter, he reports,
has remained consistently patriotic over time, even as the Iormer "reject expressions oI
patriotism and explicitly deIine themselves as multinational.. The CIA . can no longer
count on the cooperation oI American corporations . |which| view themselves as
multinational and may think it not in their interests to help the U.S. government." And we're
supposed to wring our hands instead about Mexican immigrants?
He opens Who Are We? by admitting he's too close to our crisis oI American identity to
address it only as a scholar; he's writing also as a patriot to deIend a distinctive "Anglo-
Protestant" political culture, which he believes is indispensable to republican selI-governance
here. Anyone oI any race or ethnic background can join this "nonracial society composed oI
multiracial individuals," but only aIter having absorbed and adapted - or been absorbed into -
the enduringly Anglo-Protestant idiom and ethos that most Americans oI all colors and
ethnicities do share but which, he says, most Latino immigrants resist.
But Huntington is disappointingly dull in evoking the Anglo-Protestant civic nationalism he
wants to deIend. These sections are as potted and derivative as an undistinguished term paper.
"Eighty-Iive percent oI Americans . cited their 'governmental, political institutions' as that
aspect oI their country oI which they were the most proud, compared with 46 percent oI
Britons, 30 percent oI Mexicans, 7 percent oI Germans, and 3 percent oI Italians. For
Americans, ideology trumps territory." Endless recitations like this trump reader engagement.
Sometimes his Ilinty realism yields observations as arresting as they may be uncongenial:
"America was created as a Protestant society just as and Ior some oI the same reasons
Pakistan and Israel were created as Muslim and Jewish societies in the twentieth century."
This is classic Huntington - an understatement so true it makes us realize how much we have
Iorgotten. (It also makes me wonder iI he understands how much we have changed.) He
chooses interestingly among Iamiliar culinary metaphors Ior American civic identity,
rejecting "melting pot" (too monolithic and suppressive oI legitimate diIIerences) and "tossed
salad" (too diIIuse) Ior a sturdy Anglo-Protestant "tomato soup," to which new arrivals
contribute croutons and distinctive spices without changing its basic constitution.
Most new Americans have been glad to do this, but Huntington turns the holdouts' own
words against them with a trademark sang-Iroid: Writers such as the black nationalist Harold
Cruse declared that "America is a nation that lies to itselI about who and what it is. It is a
nation oI minorities ruled by a minority oI one - it thinks and acts as iI it were a nation oI
white Anglo-Saxon Protestants." To which Huntington responds, Kabuki-like: "These critics
are right." Then he says that Anglo-Protestant conIormity, which absorbed people oI many
colors and Iaiths into a common identity that made possible the New Deal, the war against
Iascism and the rise oI a new middle class, has "beneIited them and the country."
Why doesn't it do so now? Here he sounds diversionary and at times testy. Pondering
widespread adoption oI the name "AIrican American" over "black" in the 1980s, he writes,
"Given the pervasive penchant oI Americans to preIer single-syllable over multi-syllable
names Ior almost everything, this high and growing popularity oI a seven syllable, two-word
name over a one-syllable, one-word name is intriguing and perhaps signiIicant." As is
Huntington's own preIerence Ior the eight-syllable "white Anglo-Saxon Protestant" over
"WASP" to denote his own ethno-religious group.
He doesn't take black Americans seriously in this book, by whatever name. It was the black
civil rights movement that made Huntington's Anglo conIormism even possible Ior millions
oI nonwhites, and yet he takes no cues Irom that breakthrough and its subsequent
breakdowns: The Iabric oI American civic trust has been nowhere more severely tried than in
blacks' cultural, electoral, legal and public psycho-dramatic renderings oI disaIIection with
white America.
Nor does Huntington examine such Latino responses to black disaIIection as a 1992 editorial
in San Diego's Mexican American newspaper La Prensa that declared Latinos the new
"bridge between blacks, whites, Asians, and Latinos." Latinos, the editorial said, "will have to
bring an end to class, color, and ethnic warIare. To succeed, they will have to do what the
blacks Iailed to do: incorporate all into the human race and exclude no one."
II Huntington wants "a non-racial society composed oI multiracial individuals," shouldn't he
reach Ior those Latino immigrants whose notions oI race are more Iluid and ecumenical than
those oI most blacks and whites, locked together Ior so long in a brutal embrace? Mightn't
they lead in renewing the quasi-ethnic bondings oI an American civic culture that, shorn oI
racist exclusions, could ask more oI citizens than does the current ethnic pandering in
commercialism and demagoguery?
There's no denying Huntington's observations about the uniqueness oI the 2,000-mile-long
border that (barely) separates Mexico's northern states Irom its Iormer provinces in the
United States, or that Mexican and other Latino immigrants' sheer numbers and concentration
bring them linguistic and political hegemony, not only in southern Texas and CaliIornia but
also in Miami and parts oI New York.
But he conIlates demographic and political developments through intuition, stray anecdotes,
newspaper stories and poll aIter vapid poll, whose Iindings are oIten contradictory: At times
the gaps between Latinos and the rest oI us in patriotism and perception are growing; at other
times the American public - already 12.5 percent Latino, thanks to immigration that is 50
percent Latino - is maintaining its patriotism, deIying cosmopolitan and capitalist elites. He
can't have this both ways and describe a Latino "reconquista" oI Iormer Spanish territories in
CaliIornia, Texas and Florida that is "well underway."
Although he gives no evidence oI having leIt a metaphorical armchair, Huntington sometimes
writes as iI he's just returned Irom a visit like the ones Henry James made to Eastern
European Jewish immigrants on Manhattan's Lower East Side, where he concluded that the
Yiddish- speaking "hard glitter oI Israel" could never be truly American. And Huntington
glosses the tortuous reception oI peasant, supposedly anti-republican, "papist" waves oI Irish
Catholics, and oI Germans in the Midwest who long resisted eIIorts to impose English.
Not surprisingly, the public and private bureaucrats in our vast, national race industry are
lambasting Huntington's claims. Some have noted quite rightly that American Iorces in Iraq
are commanded by Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, who grew up in one oI the dirt-poor, 98
percent-Latino counties in Texas that prompted Huntington's quasi-civilizational despair. But
they and Huntington's Latino "nationalist" critics ignore his condemnation oI American
interventions abroad, such as the very war Sanchez is Iighting. That skews debate about who
we are as a nation. (It also misses the possibility that Huntington would be relieved iI his
pessimism about Latinos' becoming Iull Americans provoked enough oI them to prove him
wrong.) Keeping him busy answering charges oI racism only spares him the trouble oI having
to own up to his book's anti-corporate arguments and implications.
For example, even as he angers multiculturalist activists by condemning the Ford
Foundation's national "diversity" crusades - on the grounds that a country as diverse as ours
should work overtime to deepen some common bonds - he also condemns Ford Motor Co.,
one oI the corporations he tells us no longer describes itselI as American and has non-
Americans as top executives. The company, even more than the Ioundation, drives what he
bemoans as the "deconstruction" oI civic patriotism. That's a point worth developing, as are
his criticisms oI such enemies oI civic trust as these companies' intrusive culture oI consumer
marketing and what he considers our government's Iaux-patriotic interventions abroad.
Huntington's condemnation oI the latter, in which some honorable conservatives are now
joining, is squarely in the tradition oI his Harvard predecessors William James and Charles
Eliot Norton, and oI Andrew Carnegie and Carl Schurz, who opposed the Spanish-American
War on republican grounds. And since he's writing about clashes between Mexican and
American identities, why not examine Woodrow Wilson's disastrous, humiliating eIIorts to
impose "democracy," Iraq-like, in Mexico in 1917?
Why doesn't he ponder the irony that George W. Bush and Jeb Bush, two oI this country's
most prominent "Anglo-Protestant" political leaders, accept the corporate deIections Irom
America and, in the Iormer Spanish territories, including Texas, Florida and CaliIornia, bear
responsibility Ior immigration policies that Huntington would tighten and enrich with
stronger civic socialization?
When the venerable black Iormer U.S. Rep. Barbara Jordan oI Texas chaired the U.S.
Commission on Immigration ReIorm in 1995, she called Ior just such programs to induct
immigrants more Iully into American civic liIe. She noted that the word "Americanization"
had "earned a bad reputation when it was stolen by racists and xenophobes in the 1920s..
But it is our word and we are taking it back." Shouldn't Huntington join Jordan's successors
against both Iacile multiculturalists and caste-Iorming, low-wage employers, instead oI
sniping at blacks and uttering dire prophecies about Latinos? This book and the way he has
promoted it suggest he isn't up to the challenge.