CAPXAJ

1. VCKA FE3FEHOCT: HPOCTOP 3A VH PEuOPMV......................................................2,3,4,5

2. TPAHHHOHAHHA FE3FEHOCT........................................................................................5,6
3. AHTEPHATHBA 3A VCKV FE3FEHOCT.....................................................................6,7,8,9
4. HHHHHJATHBE VCKE FE3FEHOCTH: HPOCTOP 3A 3HAuAJHV VH PEuOPMV ..............10,11
5. 3ABTHTA HHBHHA V OPVXAHHM CVKOFHMA..........................................................11,12,13
5.1 Kpaaa acnr aca................................................................13,14,15
6. HPOHEC VCKE FE3FEHOCTH: HPOCTOP 3A HPOHEVPAHHV VH PEuOPMV.....................15
6.1 Ornapae Canera Feecr ........................................................................15,16,17
6.2 Hpec y Oran...........................................................................................................17
6.3 Mpea yce eecr..................................................................................18,19
7. ,OIOBOPHOCT 3ABTHTE': HOMHPEBE.......................................................................19,20
8. BTA AE?.................................................................................................................21,22
9. HOHOBHO HPOJEKTOBABE VH................................................................................22,24,25
10. HHTEPATVPA..................................................................................................................26

Human Security: An Opening for UN Reform

Lloyd Axworthy

As the authors oI this volume were gathering to look at the role oI the United Nations
(UN) in global security, the organization itselI was in the midst oI a major test oI that role in the
debate and decisions on Iraq. In some ways the debate over Iraq reinvigorated the UN, and Ior a
short time the UN occupied center stage in world diplomacy. Following Hans Blix and
Mohammed Elbaradei's second reports to the Security Council was a spectacle quite uncommon
to Security Council sessions; addresses were made with passion and resolve, heated discussions,
and intense debatediplomatic sparring at its best. In the aItermath newspaper headlines
eIIectively captured this seeming importance: "UN Can Still Put on a Grand Show," "The Rattle
oI Sabers Grows a Bit Fainter in a Fiery UN Debate."1 The eyes oI the world became Iocused on
the drama unIolding at the Security Council as proponents oI war battled it out with those who
argued Ior time and patience.
Given the vociIerous stance oI the Bush administration in support oI war, having the issue
redirected to the Security Council was in itselI a small victory Ior multilateralism. However, the
counter to this is the view that U.S. war plans since August had planned Ior a mid-March attack,
and thus going to the UN was simply an indulgence the Bush administration could aIIord.
Moreover, even though U.S. oIIicials had gone to great lengths to obtain UN authorization, it
became quite clear early on that a decision to proceed with military action in Iraq would not be
contingent on the approval oI the world body. For the Bush administration a UN resolution was
considered "useIul but not necessary."2 Sure enough, attempts to work within the UN were
abandoned as dissent Irom a number oI key states proved an insurmountable barrier to prospects
Ior a second resolution. The war began and the UN Iaded into the sunset, given short shriIt and a
minor role in the post-conIlict reconstruction.
This seriously hurt the credibility oI the organization. In a global survey oI 20 countries
conducted two months aIter war's end, majorities or pluralities in most countries believed that the
UN was now less important than beIore the Iraq imbroglio. It had lost relevance, conIirming
President Bush's selI-IulIilling claim.
The role oI the UN throughout the Iraq crisis was something oI an anomaly. On the one
hand there was an attempt to strengthen the UN by working within UN decision-making channels
and Iorcing Iraq to comply with Security Council resolutions. Global citizens who made their
voices heard in public opinion polls and street demonstrations, cautioning their government not to
go to war without the sanctioning oI the UN, reaIIirmed the central-ity oI the organization in
global peace and security. On the other hand, key states were sidelining the organization through
manipulation and bullying, trying to relegate it to a decorative role on the periphery oI
international action. We could easily say that it was both the best oI times and the worst oI times
Ior the UNrenewed optimism coupled with the threat oI irrelevance looming in the
background.
What the Iraq crisis did reveal is a United Nations held captive to the most potent tensions
in contemporary global politics. Aside Irom the inconsistencies that arise Irom engaging the UN
while simultaneously reserving the right to circumvent its authority were the conIlicting
objectives oI key states. Although rhetorical support Ior disarmament was present, the latent
objective oI some was and had always been regime change. The contradictory posture towards
disarmament in North Korea despite the Iact that it posed a much more serious threat than Iraq, as
discussed in Nina Tannenwald's chapter, provides evidence oI what the underlying objectives

YCKA BE3BEHOCT: HPOCTOP 3A YH PEmOPMY (H Acnpr)

cy ce ayrp nr yera ya a parp yry Veex
aa (VH) y ra eecr, caa praaa e a ycpe ner recra re
yre y ear yaa nea a Hpa. Ha e a eara Hpaa e aaa
Veee ae a par npee VH cy ayee erpay yry y cnerc
ar. Ha pyrr neraa Xaca Fxa Mxae Eapaea Canery
eecr, yce e cera e p eyae a cee Canera
eecr; rnp cy pana crpacrne xpap, cyce cy e yanpee a
eara rena arc capr y cn ae cnery. Kac nc
acn cy e]ern ee ny pn ry crnap: ,VH ae ry yecrnnar
y ne yy', ,3neae ca a ca a crpacrnee VH eare'. O cnera
cy ce ]ycpae a pay a ce panaa y Canery eecr r cy ce p
para ecr cyprcran a cy arnapa eae crpncr.
Ca r, r e ya cran Fyne acrpae a y pr pe pary,
na pe e peycepe a Caner eecr r pecrana ay ey a
yrarepaa. Mehyr, prnrea ne e r a cy anrycrnc par
an Ceex pana apa aa cpe apra, a e re paae
Vee aaa pcr yrae e e Fyna acrpaa ra ce
a pyr. H pe rra, a cy ce na CA-a p rpy a y
pee crpae VH, pae e ne cra p ac a ya yyray y
ny ay y Hpay e axrena cy pea crpae cnercr rea (VH). 3a Fyny
acrpay, peya VH a e carpaa a ,pca, a e exa'.
Hp e ac a e ya a ce r ecrnye p VH r ayre
r ce ne p yx pana aa a epecrna pepea a ee
pyre peye. Par e aer a Veee ae cy eee y cypay ara e
e aa yra y cr]r pecrpy. On e apy
perer praae. V ra crpanay 20 eaa, cpnee na ecea
a paa para, nea y y anee py nx eaa nepna e a cy VH caa
ae nae er pe pe Hpaa. Veee ae cy rye cny peenarcr,
e ce rnpa ana pecea Fya. Vra Veex aa r pe y
Hpay e pecranaa ey npcry aae. Ca ee crpae cra e ya a ce VH
aay aranae p aae VH-a a ee ya ppanae Hpaa a
rye peye Canera eecr. Ipaha p cnera cy pe cne cranne
p crnaa anr ea ye ecrpae, ypanay cne nae a ce e
yyray y par e pea crpae VH, re cy n rnp erpay yry
praae a raa rar pa eecr.
Ca pyre crpae, ye pane cy praay rypae y crpay p ayay
acrn, yanay a ee eparny yry a ep]ep ehyape
ae. Ha e pe a cy na npeea a aa arpa npeea a VH
ne ra yape ca per ryea a nacr a ce apaa y
a.O r e paa pa acra eaa e r a cy Veee ae e
are arerx rea y canpee ra r. Hpe ececr
e cy pcree aranaa VH-a, ce crnpee apana pan a ce
ahe e ayrprer, n e rahe yana a ]re ene yx pana.
Ha e craa perpa pa papyay, cpne ex e , a r e
r yne cya, cea pea. Krparpa cran

were in Iraq. For others the central objective was, Iirst and Ioremost, ensuring the saIety and well
being oI innocent Iraqi civilians.
The clash over objectives seen in the case oI Iraqregime change versus protection oI
civilianshas become a common Ieature oI international relations. It arises Irom a gulI in the
realm oI security perception and practice and has a striking impact on multilateral bodies such as
the UN. Proponents oI traditional security tend to Iocus on the state and exhibit a general disdain
Ior tying their hands in multilateral arrangementsprecisely what occurred in the case oI Iraq.
Innocent lives and the authority oI the UN became expendable objects in the pursuit oI regime
change in Iraq, bolstering a doctrine oI preemptive selI-deIense and a counterterrorist campaign
that goes well beyond any proper interpretation oI the UN Charter.
Human security oIIers a remarkably diIIerent interpretation oI multilateral arrangements. Instead
oI perceiving such arrangements as a hindrance, proponents oI human security consider
multilateral institutions essential components oI international order. In an era oI heightened
insecurity Irom a multitude oI threats, international rules, cooperative arrangements, and a respect
Ior international law are indispensable elements in the protection oI individual rights and
security. As both an architect and conveyor oI international rules and norms, the UN is seen not
simply as a recommended path towards security but a Iundamental prerequisite oI international
peace, justice, and stability.
The attack by coalition Iorces on Iraq has leIt the UN in a rather precarious position. The
UN is now Iaced with a dual challenge Irom the vicious networks oI dictators, terrorists, and
criminals on one hand and enthusiasts oI preemptive selI-deIense on the other hand. Both display
a marked disdain Ior international law, multilateral arrangements, and international rulesin
essence, everything the UN stands Ior. Yet, in a world conIronted with genocide, poverty, the
spread oI HIV/ AIDS, and environmental catastrophes, a strong UN is desperately needed to
counter these and other threats. The reality is, however, that the UN was not designed to deal
with contemporary security threats and must thereIore adjust to these new global conditions
accordingly.
Various reIorm proposals have been proIIered as a means to strengthen the organization,
yet none have captured the volume oI momentum necessary to incite meaningIul change. This
chapter will explore how human security initiatives can strengthen the United Nations by creating
an opening Ior UN reIorm.

Traditional Security

Historically, international order has depended on the widespread adoption oI a Iew
essential norms, namely territorial recognition and nonintervention. Implicit in these norms is an
overarching respect Ior state sovereignty, the mutual assurance oI noninterIerence in states'
domestic aIIairs. Since the creation oI our modern state-system, sovereigns have been Iree to
exercise power within their respective jurisdictions as they saw Iit.

pea papyay y Cenep Kpe ypc e a e a pecranaa r ney

pery Hpaa, a r e cyrna y rany He Taena, ae a re
cy cpne en y Hpay. 3a ee pyre, erpa e , a pn
ecry, eehnae eecr crypcr a eye pae ne.
Cy ena nhex y cyay Hpaa pea pea acpa arre na
cra e yaea ana y ehyap ca. O re paca ehy
epee pee eecr a aaa yra a yrarepaa rea a r
cy Veee ae. Hp rpaae eecr ree a ce ]ycpay a
pany ayy r pep a nenae xnx pyy y yrarepa
praaaa, r ce ypan ec y cyay Hpaa. Hen nr ayrprer
Veex aa cy cra rpa pa y rep a pe pea y Hpay, r
ype rpy penerne capae arreppcre aae a
penaa cnay ryy repperay Hnee Veex aa.
yca eecr y y ne ep pyray repperay yrarepax
praaa. Vecr nanaa ranx praaa a pepea, p yce
eecr carpay yrarepae crrye cyrc eraa
ehyapr pera. V ep araee eeecr ner pa per,
ehyapa pana, eparne praae rnae ehyapr pana
pecranay eaene eeere y arr eax pana eecr. Hr
e ye apxrera re e cpn ehyape pce pe, Veee
ae ce e carpay pcr a pepyea yraa pea eecr, ne a
cn peoyce a ehyap p, pany cracr.
Haa ax cara a Hpa cran e Veee ae y pae
ean ay. Veee ae cy caa e cyee ca ncrpy an y
ny x pea rarpa, reppcra aa ca ee crpae eryacra
penerne capae ca pyre crpae. Oa na ana pecranay ney accr
a ehyap pan, yrarepae praae ehyapa pana, y cyr,
accr a cne a ra ce aay VH. Ha, y cnery ce cyana ca re,
cparn, pee XHB/AHC-a pp aracrp]aa, ca Vee
aaa a e rpe a ce cye ca n cra peraa. Peacr e,
ehyr, a VH cy e pernae a anee canpee eec peraa,
a ce crra pay parhanar n n ra ycna.
Par pe pe]p cy pee a a a canae
praae, aa ea nx pera e yce a yxnar ny y
perae care exy a perae aae pee. On rane e crpar
a arne neae a ycy eecr ry aar Veee ae pepae
pcrpa a pe]py Veex aa.

2 TPAHHHOHAAHA BE3BEHOCT

Kp crpy, ehyap pea e anc pr pxnaraa e
cyrcx p, c reprpar paa eeaa (erepnee). V
n paa ce payena ey rnae panr cyneperera, c
yaa ynepanae eeay y yyrpae cne eaa. O pepaa ax
epx panx ccrea, cynepe (naap) cy c y pe yyrap
cnx pecernx aecr ra re cy c a e r

Thus, a precedent was established early on whereby the treatment oI individuals within
states' juridical boundaries was considered to be an immaterial concern.
So engrained are these basic tenets oI international conduct that they have persisted unabated Ior
over three centuries and have had an immense impact on the practice oI international law and the
creation oI international institutions. OI utmost concern to creators oI international institutions
and practices oI international law was the place oI the nation-state in international society. The
state and the state alone was seen as the only relevant entity in international aIIairs, as the
principal subject oI international law and the only acceptable member oI international
organizations. Other actors were simply irrelevant on the international stage. Where individuals
did matter, it was particularly a question oI their respective citizenshipthat is, to which state
they belonged.
The UN is no exception to the rule. The members oI the UN are not NGOs, donor
agencies, human rights groups, transnational corporations, or individuals but nation-states.
According to the creators oI the organization, its central purpose was to ensure the "territorial
integrity and political independence" oI member states,4 a tribute to the sovereignty norm.
However, considering the atmosphere in which the UN Charter was draIted, one can hardly
dispute the perceived need to reiterate the principles oI sovereignty and nonintervention. Fresh in
the minds oI the Charter's authors was the onslaught oI Nazi Germany on the European state
system.
As many oI the authors in this volume have noted, the UN Iaced a diIIicult inaugural
period. Cold war politics and the veto resulted in a rather dormant role Ior the UN throughout the
Iirst Iive decades oI its existence. Alternatively, international peace and security were held in
check by the alliance systems maintained by the superpowers. The end oI the Cold War hinted at
the enormous potential Ior the UN in a new era, particularly with the universal condemnation oI
Iraq's aggression in Kuwaita classic example oI interstate aggression. The P5's unanimous
agreement on responding to Iraq's aggression was certainly cause Ior optimism. UnIortunately,
the GulI War became the exception to UN activity in the post-Cold War era.

The Human Security Alternative

The predominance oI intrastate wars has altered traditional conceptions oI security and
international order. Most, iI not all, oI the most rudimentary assumptions underlying international
relations have been called into question, not least oI which is the nature oI war. Throughout the
1990s, 65 oI the estimated 79 episodes oI conIlict occurred within developing countries, and over
halI oI the bottom 47 countries on the Human Development Index are still suIIering Irom the
aItermath oI violent conIlict.5 The links between low-level economic growth and violent conIlict
have become all too obvious.
The nature oI contemporary war has been particularly problematic Ior civilians. The
traditional distinction between soldier and civilian has been permanently erased. According to
some statistics, the casualty rate Ior civilians in war have reached an alarming 90 percent, a sharp
increase Irom an estimated 65 percent during WWII and even more remote Irom the Iive percent
rate at the beginning oI the twentieth century.6 The targeting oI innocent civilians is not some
unintended outcome oI conIlict but a deliberate strategy oI belligerents. The inIlux oI small arms
and light weapons into situations oI instability has Iacilitated the ease with which civilians have
become embroiled in hostilities, sometimes as direct participants.

pana. Ta, pae e apane pecea e ce rpera eaa yyrap
rpaa panx aecr carpa a enay crnap. Ona cna aea
ehyapr aaa a cy r ypeea a cy craa ecaea r ne
rp nea aa cy rpa yra a pey ehyapr pana pepae
ehyapx crrya. Hanea pra pearpa ehyapx crrya pace
ehyapr pana e ecr ae-pane y ehyap pyrny. pana ca
pana e a carpaa a e peenar errer y ehyap cna, a
cn cyear ehyapr pana e pxnarn a ehyapx
praaa. Ocra arep cy ecran er a ehyap ce. Mecr
re cy e a pan raca pecrana e cyn xn pyrn, c
pany cy paa. Veee ae cy yera a ran pan. uae
Veex aa cy HBO (enae praae), arpce aree, rpye a
arry ycx pana, rpacaae ppae r e, ne ae-pane.
Hpea pearpa praae, ea erpaa cnpxa e a crypanae
,reprpar rerprera re eanccr' pana aa, r pecrana
rnae pe cyneperery. Mehyr, y ye y p arc]epy y e
Hnea Veex aa pepaa, re ce e cpr nea rpea a
anae nx pa cynepecr erepnecaa. J yne cnea y ca
ayrpa Hnee e a anaa acre Heae a enpce pane. Ka r cy r
ayrpa y n yery per, Veee ae cy ce cye ca re
yn ep. Hre Xar para yrpea nera cy peyrpae y ny pae
epere yre Veex aa r pnx er eea er craa.
Areparn, ehyap p eecr cy y pyaa ccrea aac e cy
panae cyepce. Kpa Xar para e arnecr rp rea VH-a y n
ep, ce ca ynepa cy arpece Hpaa a Kynar, r pecrana aca
pep ehypane arpece. Jeraca cpay H 5 (5 crax aa Canera
Feecr) rnpy a arpecy Hpaa e cye e pecrana par a ra.
Haacr, 3anc par e cra ca yera VH arncr y ep a Xar para.

3 AATEPHATHBA 3A YCKY BE3BEHOCT

arcr yyrappanx parna e pea rpaae ee
eecr ehyapr pera. Bea, a e cne, acnx percran
e ypy ehyape ce a e neea y rae, ehy a e ppa
para. T 1990-x, 65 rpe 79 ]ara ec ce yyrap eaa y pany, a
pe ne 47 cex eaa Hecy ycr pana ae ce
ceay cee a acx ]ara. Bee ehy cr ecr pacra
acx ]ara cy crae cyne ree. Hppa canpeer para a e
ce peara a ne. Tpaaa paa ehy na na a
e ayne pcaa. Hpea e crarcr aa, cra crpaaa na y pary e
crra aaparx 90 peara, r pecrana rpa pacr y cy a
peex 65 peara a npee pyrr cnercr para rp pacr y cy a
cry 5 peara ca era naecerr nea. Hae eyx na e pecrana
e eaep cx, ]ra ne pey crparery apaex crpaa. Hpn
ar pya y cryaaa ecracr ra e epey pea n
cray cr r epare, a ea per yec.

A disturbing trend has been the sharp increase in child combatants serving in government
Iorces as well as armed rebel groups.7
It was diIIicult Ior policy makers, accustomed to the intricacies oI competing ideologies, alliance
systems, and proxy wars, to Iashion an eIIective response to the intrastate wars oI the 1990s. To
make matters worse, it was not simply decision makers who were stymied by this unIoreseen
shiIt in global politicsthe treasured institutions that we theoretically should have been able to
turn to were ill equipped Ior the tasks ahead.
The UN Charter was Iashioned in response to interstate wars and thereIore was silent on
the issue oI civil conIlicts. The central problem since the end oI the Cold War has been how to
deIine security in an era where civil conIlicts are on the rise, particularly when domestic issues
have historically evaded international consideration. However, adhering to the characterization oI
intrastate war as a purely domestic matter has become increasingly problematic given the
signiIicant potential Ior destabilization that can result Irom the spillover oI conIlict and reIugee
inIluxes into neighboring countries, as exempliIied in Gil Loescher's chapter on the crucial
linkage between reIugees and global security. The other chapters in this volume testiIy to the
plethora oI challenges Iacing the UN in addressing and adapting to these threats. As the authors
in this volume demonstrate, the UN was eIIectively paralyzed in terms oI its mandate, structure,
and operational capacity. Ottawa, like many other capitals, realized that a new approach was
imminent. By the time I assumed the post oI Ioreign minister, it was becoming clearer that the
security oI individuals would have to be redressed. It was with this sentiment in mind that Canada
embraced the human security approachthe idea oI "putting people Iirst."8
The human security approach represents an important shiIt in the way to view global
politics. It endeavors to modiIy the lens through which security is viewedIrom the level oI the
state to the level oI the individual. Yet it is not simply a question oI adjusting our lensesit is
also a matter oI broadening one's deIinition oI security. Human security is much more than the
absence oI military threat; it includes the security against economic privation, an acceptable
quality oI liIe, and a guarantee oI Iundamental human rights. It recognizes the links between
environmental degradation, population growth, ethnic conIlicts, and migration. By
acknowledging the vast array oI issues threatening individual security, the human security
approach is entirely consistent with the complexities oI our current global reality and in this sense
goes beyond the simpliIied and outdated version oI traditional security.
The Iirst time I used the language oI human security was in September oI 1996 during an
address to the UN General Assembly. The United Nations seemed like the logical venue in which
to introduce this important concept. In Iact, human security became the platIorm oI our 1997
campaign launch to win a seat on the Security Council. Once on the Council we actively
promoted the principles oI human security under the banner oI "Protection oI Civilians."

Vepyy rpe e ar neae ee paa cy cy y

na caraa a y apya ye rpyaa.
F e yer re a rape, anyre a ae yperx
era, ccrea aac pex parna, a pee e]erna rnp a
yyrappane parne 1990-x. a crnap yy rpe, cy ca c ya
crane y era a n epenhe epaa y ra
r er nceee crrye a ce reperc r parr, e
cy ca peee a aare cy craa pe a.
Hnea Veex aa e a naa a rnp a ehypane parne
a e crra a ea pe pe rpahacx ]ara. Herpa pe
paa Xar para e rae a e]car eecr y ep aaex
rpahacx ]ara, ce aa cy yyrpa pe crpc erana
ehyap eae. Mehyr, ppanae ca yyrap-panr para a cr
yyrpaer raa y cne ne ep e craa pear r craa ner
reaa a ecraay a e peyrnar penae ]ara
pn era y cycee ee, a r e r aa a pepy y rany Ia
Hecxepa pya ne ehy era rae eecr. Ocraa rana
y n yery cnee rny ana ca a ce cyanay Veee ae y
peanay parhanay a ne pere. Ka r ayrp y n yery
ecrppay, VH cy e e]ern apanae y ycna cnr aara, crpyrype
eparnr aarera. Orana, a r pyr ran rpan, cxnara e a e n
pcry eea. rpeyra aa e ayrp nr rana peye yry crpa
crpax cna, craa e cne ace a e eecr eaa paa r
panea. Ca n ee Kaaa ce aranaa a pcryy yce eecr
ea ,cranay y a pn ecr'.
Hpcry yce eecr pecrana naa apea y ay carpaa
rae re. O acr a ]ye a a ce eecr carpa
epay ra ca na pane a n ea. Ha n e rae ecranr
parhanaa ax carpaa r e rahe rae ppea e]e
eecr. yca eecr pecrana r ne ecraa ne pere; a
yxnara eecr ece cye, pxnarn narer nra raparnae
]yaerax ycx pana. Oa peae nee ehy erpaae nre cpee,
pacra yae, erx ]ara rpaa. Hpeay ney pacr
pea pere eecr eaa, pcry yce eecr e y rycr
crera ca eccra ae rpeyre rae peacr y n ccy
penaa ecraney acrapey nepy rpaae eecr.
Hpn yr e ayrp nr rana pcr repry yce eecr
cerepa 1996. a npee rnpa y Ieepa cyr Veex aa. Veee
ae cy, r, enae a ecr re rpea pecranr na naa er. V
crnap, yca eecr e craa ar]pa a acpae aace aae 1997.
a ae cre y Canery eecr. Oa aa cy r , arn cy
pnca pe yce eecr apa ,arre na'.

Human Security Initiatives: An Opening for Substantive UN Reform

In recent years popular discontent with international organizations has intensiIied. OI
particular concern is the lack oI transparency, absence oI international accountability, and an
overall disregard Ior democratic principles. Moreover, the state-centric nature oI international
organizations, Iollowing the scriptures oI traditional security, has led to a disconnect between
these institutions and the vulnerable populations they are meant to serve. Globalization has
heightened the democratic deIicit in international structures, and the need Ior genuine reIorm is
obvious.
The 2002 UNDP report Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World remarks on this
widespread disillusionment with international institutions: "Protests and cries oI Irustration have
hit the streets in both industrial and developing countries reIlecting concerns that marginalized
and less powerIul people and states are losing out because oI how global security and economic
aIIairs are managed." According to the report, these antiglobal-ization protests are "symptomatic
oI an almost universal belieI that global cooperation must do a better job oI preventing and
managing a host oI issues."
The UN is certainly no exception. Failure to deliver on its post-Cold War promises dealt a
severe blow to UN credibility. The problems that arose were endemic to the organization's
structure, bureaucracy, ambiguous mandate, and operational incapacity. As criticisms oI the
organization augmented, so too did proposals Ior UN reIorm, particularly oI the UN Security
Council, the organization's principal decision-making body. Having spent a great deal oI my
tenure as Ioreign minister working within UN structures, I am no stranger to the need Ior UN
reIorm. What I came to realize during my years in oIIice was how human security initiativesby
tackling some oI the most pressing security issues hitherto excluded Irom international
consideration can create an opening Ior substantive UN reIorm.

Civilian Protection in Armed Conflicts

As we have seen, an indisputable reality oI contemporary global politics is the heightened
level oI insecurity conIronted by individuals. Regrettably, this intensiIication oI individual
insecurity has not yet aIIorded a suIIicient response Irom the international community. This is not
particularly surprising given the state-centric nature oI the international system, which is reIlected
in international organizations such as the UN, whose membership is restricted to nation-states.
Responding to the plight oI individuals has created both theoretical and operational challenges Ior
the UN.
In February oI 1999 we experimented with broadening the UN's mandate beyond the
realm oI traditional security concerns. During our presidency oI the Security Council, we held an
inIormal debate on the issue oI civilian protection in armed conIlict. Subsequent to that debate we
issued a strong presidential statement expressing concern "at the growing civilian toll oI armed
conIlict" and noting "with distress that civilians now account Ior the vast majority oI casualties in
armed conIlict and are increasingly directly targeted by combatants and armed elements."

4 HHHHH1ATHBE YCKE BE3BEHOCTH: HPOCTOP 3A 3HAHA1HY YH PEmOPMY

Hcex ra, renpa e p eancrn pa ehyapx
praaa. O r ana cey apyrcr e ecrara rpacapercr,
ecrae ehyape rnpcr yy ernae eparcx pa.
Hpe rra, pan-erpa ppa ehyapx praaa, a e para
aea rpaae eecr, nea e ecaa ehy nx crrya
panr cranrna a e rpea a cye cye. Iaaa e neaa
eparc e]r y ehyap crpyrypaa, a rpea a crc pe]p e
rea.
VHH (United Nations Development Programme) nera 2002. an
poyoeae oepame y qpaeemca ceemy cre n p paapae
ehyap crryaa: ,Hprecr n ]pycrpae cy pean ye
ycrpcx eaa eaa y pany paanay apyrcr a aprana
ae y pane rye ry r aa a ce ypana ra
eey ec cna'. Hpea n neray, n arraa
precr cy ,crar a cp ynepa ynepee a ce raa capaa pa
a a anr pene ypanae ne pe pea'.
VH cryp e pecranay yera nra. Heycex y crnapey cnx eaa a
Xar para pecrana e rea yapa a perer Veex aa. Hpe
cy ce an cy ee a crpyrypy praae, ppary, eace
aare ecrara eparnr aarera. Ka ce p pra a pay praae
neana, ra ce neana p pera a pe]py VH-a, ce Canera
eecr VH-a, cnr rea a ee ya praae. Hr e ayrp nr
rana pne ne e npeea a ecry crpa crpax cna y pay ca VH
crpyrypaa, rpea a VH pe]p e y a crpaa. O r e cxnar r cnr
cynaa, ane ce e apcyrx eecx pea cy caa
ya ehyapx paarpaa, e a a arne yce
eecr ry pepar pcrp a aay VH pe]py.

5 3AmTHTA HHBHAA Y OPYAHHM CYKOBHMA

Ka r c ne, nc n eeecr ca ce cyanay e
pecrana ecpy peacr canpeee rae re. Haacr, n
renpae eeecr eaa yne e aaa rnp crpae
ehyape aee. On e pecrana ce eahee anay pan-
erpy ppy ehyapr ccrea, a ce paana y ehyap
praaaa a r cy VH, e e acrn rpae a pane. Pearnae a
era a eaa e crnp ye reperce eparne ane a
Veee ae. uepyapa 1999. Kaaa e ecepercaa ca ppee aara
Veex aa na pya rpaae eecr. 3a npee aacr
pecerna Caner eecr, paa e e]paa eara pey ne
arre y pya ]ry. Hce re eare ara e caa ana pecerna y
e paea apyrcr y ne ca ,pacry n yee y pya
]ry' aeyr e ,y aee a n caa pecranay ney ney
prana y pya cya y cne ne ep pecranay pery ery paa
apyax eeeara'. V an ce rahe acrana ca araanae rpee a

The statement also went on to highlight the need Ior a suIIicient international response:
"|B|earing in mind its primary responsibility Ior the maintenance oI international peace and
security, the Council aIIirms the need Ior the international community to assist and protect
civilian populations aIIected by armed conIlict."10
Given the gravity oI the situation and lack oI attention previously devoted to the plight oI
civilians in armed conIlict, the need to explore the issue Iurther was obvious. It was with this in
mind that we called on the Secretary-General to compile a comprehensive report on the situation
oI civilians in armed conIlict. In September oI 1999, when the Iinal report was presented, it was
well received by the international community. The report contained 40 recommendations aimed
at improving the physical and legal protection oI civilians in situations oI armed conIlict.11
In response to the Secretary-General's recommendations, Canada pushed Ior the adoption oI two
important resolutions related to civilian protection in armed conIlicts, Resolution 1265 Iollowed
by Resolution 1296. Taken together these resolutions oIIer the most comprehensive measures
adopted by the Security Council in terms oI civilian protection. Both resolutions recognize the
hardships being borne by civilian populations, condemn attacks upon innocents, and commit the
Security Council to act on their behalI. The resolutions created an opening Ior substantive UN
reIorm by accentuating a number oI issues that had hitherto been overlooked by the international
community, namely, the importance oI conIlict prevention strategies; adequate training Ior peace-
keepers; the impact oI landmines, small arms, and light weapons on civilians; and the need to
weigh the humanitarian impacts oI sanctions on civilian liIe.
The issue oI civilian protection has become an established item on the UN agenda. The
Secretary-General has presented two reports on civilian protection subsequent to the 1999 version
in March oI 2001 and November oI 2002.12 The incorporation oI civilian protection has created
the necessary momentum to incite change on a number oI issues. For instance, it would be
diIIicult to imagine the adoption oI Resolutions 1314 and 1379 pertaining to the protection oI
children in armed conIlict as well as Resolution 1325 concerning the role oI women in peace-
building had the issue oI civilian protection in armed conIlict not been on the UN agenda. The
incorporation oI civilian protection on the UN agenda provides a useIul illustration oI how
human security initiatives can create an opening Ior substantive UN reIorm.

The Criminalization of Mass Violence

The privileged role assigned to nation-states in international aIIairs has translated into
impunity Ior individual transgressors oI international law. The absence oI an international
instrument oI accountability Ior war crimes has made it diIIicult Ior the UN to advance
international peace and security. A positive response to this problem was made in the Iorm oI
UN-established international criminal tribunals Ior Rwanda and the Iormer Yugoslavia. As
Richard Price and Joanne Lee note, these tribunals went beyond the imposition oI "victor's
justice," as was the case with the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. Furthermore, the ICTR and
ICTY were a testament to contemporary global realities in the sense that they dealt with intrastate
wars. Despite the signiIicance oI these tribunals with respect to punishing crimes against
humanity, genocide and war crimes, they were limited as ad hoc instruments oI international
justice.

aenar ehyap rnp: ,Hay a yy cny papy rnpcr a

panae ehyapr pa eecr, Caner rnphye rpey a ehyapa
aea re arr n cranrn rhe pya cy'.
Hay cr cryae ecrara ae cneee reaa na y
pya cyy, rpea a a crpanae nr pea a e rea. Ca
n a yy yye e n Ieepa ceperapy a cacran cneyxnara
nera crya y ne ca na y pya cyy. Cerepa 1999, aa e
pecrane a nera e p pxnae crpae ehyape aee.
Hnera e capa 40 pepya ycepex a ae ]e ace arre
na y cryaaa pyar cya.
Ka rnp a pepye Ieepar ceperapa, Kaaa e prypaa ycnaae ne
nae peye neae a arry na y pya cya: Peyy 1265
paey Pey 1296. One peye ae ye ayxnare epe ycnee
crpae Canera eecr ray arre na. One peye peay ene
ca a ce cyana n cranrn, cyhyy aae a eye aneyy Caner
eecr a pearye y xn e. Peye cy crnpe pcrp a aay pe]py
Veex aa p araanae ner pa pea cy caa
penhe crpae ehyape aee, c, araanae nacr crparera a
cpeanae ]ara, aenare ye pnx cara, yraa arax a, ar
apyaa a ne rpee a pehnae xyarapr yraa caa a nre
na. Hpe arre na e cra crana a en pey Veex aa.
Ieepa ceperap e pecran na neraa arr na a nepe 1999,
r y apry 2001. y nepy 2002. Oyxnarae arre na e crnp exy
peray cary a pae pea y ne ca e cpx raa. Ha pep,
re acr ycnaae Peya 1314 1379, e ce ce a arry ee
y pya cyy, a Peye 1325, a ce an yr ea y epaaa
rpae pa, a pe arre na y pya cyy e a en pey
Veex aa. Oyxnarae arre na en pe Veex aa
pya ce pca ycrpaa re a arne neae a ycy eecr ry
crnpr pcrp a aay pe]py Veex aa.

5 Kpaaa acnr aca

Hpnernaa yra eea aaa-panaa y ehyap cna
a e peera a eancr eax pepaa ehyapr pana.
Hecrae ehyapr crpyera a rnpcr a pare e rea e
Vee aaa rae yapehea ehyapr pa eecr. Hrn
rnp a na pe e apane y y ehyapx pnx rpyaa a
Pyay ny Jyrcany, yccranex crpae VH. Ka cy Pap Hpac Ha
H cra, n rpya cy pena aerae ,pane ea', a r e r
cya ca rpyaa y Hpepry Ty. Hpe rra, ICTR ICTY (ehyap cy
pane a Pyay ny Jyrcany), pecern cy pecrana a canpeex
rax peacr y ccy a cy ce an yyrappan parna. Vpc
aay nx rpyaa a rae aanaa a prn necr, rea
parx a, cy rpae a a x crpyer ehyape pane.
Tpya cy a pena ae ,pane ea', a a e xn aa
yae r ry a ceerncr. On e

The tribunals may have progressed past the days oI "victor's justice," yet their
signiIicance was diluted with respect to the charge oI selectivity. This is particularly problematic
Irom the perspective oI human security as the advancement oI human security hinges upon the
ability to enIorce individual rights and individual security. Nothing short oI a permanent
instrument dedicated to advancing the rule oI law could promote human security.
Although the idea oI an international criminal court had been Iloating through policy circles and
academia Ior decades, the urgency Ior this type oI mechanism grew rapidly in the 1990s. The
immense speed in which the Rome statute was ratiIied is a testament to the acknowledged need
Ior the court. The Statute oI Rome was devised with the security oI the individual in mind and the
responsibility oI the international community to protect individuals wherever they live Irom those
individuals and Iorces that threaten human liIe, human security, and our collective objective to
live in a world that is Iree Irom violence and Iree Irom Iear. The goal is a world that is Iree Irom
the Milosevics, the Idi Amins, the Pol Pots, the Suhartos, the Pinochets, the Hitlers, and all others
who wield political power Ior the beneIit oI themselves and the destruction oI others rather than
Ior the beneIit oI humankind.
The human security approach responds to the heightened level oI insecurity conIronting
individuals in contemporary global politics and the shortcomings oI traditional security. Whereas
only states were considered relevant subjects oI international law under the doctrine oI traditional
security, the ICC is mandated to prosecute individual transgressors oI international law.
Moreover, it is not simply episodes oI interstate war that Iall within the purview oI the ICC but
intrastate conIlicts as well. By this measure, the ICC represents the Iirst bona Iide institutional
expression oI human security. Although the ICC is not a Iormal UN organ, it was created under
UN auspices and will undoubtedly strengthen the UN's role in maintaining international peace
and security, not to mention its Iunctioning as a deterrent to Iuture war crimes.

The Human Security Process: An Opening for Procedural UN Reform

While the concept oI human security is largely understood as a policy outcome, this is
only partially accurate. Human security is much more than an outcome; it is also a processin
Iact it is the process that makes the outcome a reality. As this section will demonstrate, human
security initiatives not only lead to substantive UN reIorm, they also create an opening Ior
procedural UN reIorm.
Opening up the Security Council

As noted above UN Security Council proceedings in particular have been criticized Ior
their lack oI transparency. OI concern to many are the Council's clandestine deliberations and
overall absence oI democracy. Advancing human security initiatives within the UN allowed us to
experiment with a subtle process oI Security Council reIorm. II civilians Iace a higher degree oI
insecurity in today's world than ever beIore, then naturally there is a need to understand the
nature oI these security threats in order to launch an eIIective response. Reliance on an
intergovernmental process alone cannot deliver on this demand; thus, the need to open up
traditional diplomatic channels typically reserved Ior the state to a variety oI other actors is
evident. During our debate in February 1999 on "the protection oI civilians in armed conIlict,"
this is precisely what we did.

ce pear epcerne yce eecr r ce apenae yce

eecr neye a cccr eehnaa pana eecr eaa. Hra
ae crar crpyera cneer yapehey naane pana e r
yaper ycy eecr. Ha ce ea ehyap cyy pane pnaa
p re aaece pyrne r a eea, ycr craa ne npcre
exaa p e paca 1990-x. Orpa pa e Pc craryr par]na
pecrana rnpy rpee a nan cy. Craryr Pa e pahe ay a
yy eecr ea rnpcr ehyape aee a arr ee a
re ne x eaa cara e pere yc nry, yc
eecr ae ern y a n y cnery e che aca
crpaxa. H e cner che Mena, H Aa, H Hrca, Cyxapra,
Hea, Xrepa cnx crax cy pa ry apa cne e pcr
yrea crax, a e apa pr yce npcre. Hpcry yce eecr
pecrana rnp a ne n eeecr ca ce cyanay e y
canpee ra r a ecrare rpaae eecr. cy ce
rp rpaae eecr ca pane carpae a peenare cyere
ehyapr pana, ICC (Mehyap pa cy) a aar a r eae
pepe ehyapr pana. Hpe rra, cy ca ee ehypanx parna e
e caay y epyr ICC-a, ne yyrap-pan cy. H n ep, ICC
pecrana pn pa pe ne a crryanae yce eecr. Ha ICC
e pecrana ]pa VH pra, e pepa pe Veex aa
ecyn e aar yry Veex aa y panay ehyapr pa
eecr, a e ce ern ]ycae a pery a yye pare
e.

6 HPOHEC YCKE BE3BEHOCTH: HPOCTOP 3A HPOHEYPAAHY YH PEmOPMY

Ca e e ra a ce er yce eecr y ne ep carpa
cx re. yca eecr pecrana r ne cxa; r e rahe
pec y crnap r e pec a cx crae peacr. Ka r e na
ea ecrppar, arne yce eecr e ca r ne aae
VH pe]pe, er pepay pcrp a peypay pe]py VH-a.
6 O1napae Cane1a Beec1

Ka r e rpe aeyr, pacpane pe Caner eecr Veex
aa ce cy e prnae r ecrara rpacapercr. Mre py
ppnee aepe Canera yy cycrn epare. Hapenae arna
yc eecr yyrap VH n a e a ecepere ca cern
pec pe]pe Canera eecr. V ce n y aae cnery cyanay ca
ne cree eeecr ne er aa pae, a apan cr rpea a ce
paye ppa nx eecx per ca e a ce acpa e]ern rnp.
Ocaae ca a ehynae pece e e er na axren; crra e rea
rpea a rnapae rpaax arcx aaa peepncax a
pane pea pa cra arepa. 3a npee eare ]epyapa 1999. ,arr
na y pya cyy', ypan r e ypahe. Ha cy epcerne aa Canera
eecr e nae, r pcr e n a careanae ye nr raa
pre nacr; crra cy

While the perspectives oI Council members were important, it was simply not enough to
gauge the depth oI this critical issue; thereIore, the doors oI the Security Council chambers were
opened. For the Iirst time voices heard within the UN's central decision-making body were not
exclusively those oI member states. Rather than limiting the discussions to member states, this
debate incorporated presentations Irom Carol Bellamy, president oI UNICEF; Cornelio
Sommaruga, president oI the International Committee Ior the Red Cross; and Olara Otunnu, UN
special representative on children. A Iollow-up debate was held at the end oI February in order to
allow nonCouncil members the opportunity to make statements and oIIer recommendations on
the Secretary-General's report.
Incorporating the views oI other actors on this issue provided greater depth to the
discussions and enhanced the substance oI the Secretary-General's report. Making the diplomatic
process more accessible to a host oI other actors was a strategy we employed in a variety oI
human security initiatives. One oI the most cited examples oI this is the campaign to ban
antipersonnel landmines.

The Ottawa Process

The prevailing view oI the landmines campaign is that it sidestepped the UN and thus
oIIers little in terms oI an example oI procedural UN reIorm. While it is true that we had to work
around the paralyzed UN ConIerence on Disarmament in order to achieve eIIective action on the
issue, this by no means negates UN participation in the campaign.
A much more appropriate way to view UN participation with respect to the landmine campaign,
as discussed in Keith Krause's chapter, is to look upon the UN system as part oI a complex
network oI transnational governance. According to Krause, a purely state-centric analysis that
distinguishes between the domestic and international spheres can no longer account Ior issues on
the peace and security agenda. In today's global circumstances, assessing the scope oI UN
activity becomes more diIIicult as peace and security issues increasingly require activity on
multiple levels oI governance. So, along with the participation oI individuals and agencies within
the UN system, including the support oI two Secretaries-General, were the 1000 NGOs
comprising the ICBL, the ICRC, nation-states, and a number oI high-proIile individuals.
The landmine campaign provides a practical illustration oI the "process" side oI human security.
The APL ban would not have been possible without the Ottawa Process. The engagement oI civil
society actors in a process oI two-track diplomacy Iacilitated the ease with which a treaty was
draIted. The landmine campaign did not work against the UN but improved upon the ConIerence
on Disarmament by involving a host oI other actors that were necessary in order to make the ban
a reality. In this way we should consider the Ottawa Process as reIorming the UN ConIerence on
Disarmament.

The Human Security Network

Apart Irom the immediate beneIits that derive Irom human security initiatives are the
indirect beneIits oI subtle reIorm within the UN system. With each initiative the UN process
beneIited Irom a greater level oI transparency, democracy, and accountability.

npara aa Canera eecr a rnpea. H pn yr cy ce yyrap erpar rea

a ee ya Veex aa y racn x e pecranay pane
ae. Vecr rpaea cyca a pane ae, eara e yxnara
peerae crpae Kap Fea, pecee VHHHEu-a, Kpea Capyre,
pecea Mehyapr rera Hpner pcra; Oape Oryy, ceae
pecrane Veex aa a ey. Hacrana eare pa e pae ]epyapa a
ce panaa e cy ae Canera aa aca a pecrane cne cranne a
ye pepye a nera Ieepar ceperapa.
Oyxnarae cranna crax arepa n pey e a ney yy
cycaa nea e aa neraa Ieepar ceperapa. Vr a
arc pec ye pcrya rpy crax arepa a e crparera a e
cpea a parx arna neax a ycy eecr. Jea
aanhex pepa nra a e aaa apa arax a.

62 Hpec y O1an

Cran penahye aa ara aa ecre a e a era VH
re ya a rra y ycna peypae pe]pe VH-a. Ha e ra a e
pehe paa pa a ce pa na apacae VH K]epee papyay
a ce crra e]erna aa y ne ca pe, n a aan a e
erpa yee VH-a y n aa. Mr ec a carpaa yea VH-a
ray aae ara aa, a r e cyrna y rany Kera Kpayceca,
ecre a ce VH ccre carpa a e ece pee rpacaar ypanaa.
Hpea Kpaycecy, cr pan-erpa aaa a pan pay ehy yyrpae
ehyape c]epe ne ce e e pcrr a cpa raa pne eece
aree. V aa ra cra, penae epyra VH arncr
crae ree r cpa raa pa eecr y cne ne ep axrenay
arncr a ne na ypanaa. Ta, ae ca yecrnnae eaa
area yyrap VH ccrea, yyyy py na Ieepaa ceperapa, aranae cy
xae enax praaa ae ca ICBL (Mehy. Krer a apay HH a
), ICRC (Mehy. Krer Hpner pcra), ae-pane e crayrx
eaa. Kaaa ara aa ae pary ycrpay ,pece' crpae
yce eecr. APL apaa e a rya e peca Orane. Aranae
arepa nr pyrna y pecy are a na cea e ry ay
e na cpay pahe. Kaaa ara aa e paa prn VH, ne e
yapea K]epey papyay p yynae crax arepa, cy
ex a ce apaa crnapa. Ha na a, pec y Oran rpea carpar
a pe]py VH K]epee papyay.

63 Mpea yce eec1

Oc ecpee pcr a e pcrea peca yce eecr,
arne y npy rr peca pecranay pere pcr e cy cyre
npecr a pe]py y npy ccrea VH-a. Ca cna arn VH pec e a
pcr neer na rpacapercr, epare rnpcr. Jea aceara
VH ccrea crae rea a pe]pcae ecre crpyrypa praae; a er, na
acer VH-a e ra rp anee pre.

One aspect oI the UN system that remains diIIicult to reIorm is the structure oI the
organization; yet it is this aspect oI the UN that draws the most criticism.
As discussed in depth by Mark Zacher in his chapter, the privileged position oI the veto-wielding
P5 has been a problematic element oI UN decision making Ior quite some time. But iI we look
closely at the human security initiatives mentioned above, one thing becomes apparent: In no way
were the initiatives undertaken consistent with or supported by the policies oI the P5 in general
and the United States in particular. A consistent Ieature oI many oI the human security initiatives
mentioned above has been the participation oI a number oI like-minded middle powers working
in harmony towards a common goal.
This signals immense potential Ior a coalition oI like-minded governments and NGOs to
play a meaningIul role in international aIIairs. It was precisely with these sentiments in mind that
Canada established the Human Security Networka collection oI 13 middle powers Irom all
regions oI the world committed to advancing the principles oI human security. No longer can we
consider the politics oI the P5 as a barrier to eIIective international action when it comes to
agenda setting and advocacy. The precedent has been established and the necessity Ior new
leadership has mounted as U.S. Ioreign policy continues to retreat Irom multilateral
commitments.

The "Responsibility to Protect" : Areconciliation

This chapter has explored two disparate versions oI security: one that maintains the
centrality oI the state in international aIIairs and the other that is concerned Ior the welIare oI
individuals in international society. In several settings these diverse approaches play out against
one another and have the eIIect oI paralyzing eIIective UN action. In some cases the UN itselI
given its imperIect structure, ambiguous mandate, lack oI resources, and operational incapacity
exacerbates the tensions between the two approaches.
Human security is oIten described as the antithesis oI traditional security. While the two
are indeed philosophically and operationally distinct, there is a subtle connection between them
worthy oI recognition. Human security is not simply an alternative to traditional security; it is
Iirst and Ioremost a response to the shortcomings oI traditional security. As we saw the post-Cold
War era delivered a set oI circumstances to the international community that could not be
adequately addressed by a strict reliance on the practices oI traditional security. The innumerable
setbacks the UN has suIIered in the post-Cold war era are evidence oI this. This explains why
human security initiatives are ideal instruments Ior UN reIorm. It is imperative to bear in mind
the relationship between traditional security and human security as Iailure to do so results in the
tendency to view the two as irreconcilable. Assessing human security as the logical consequence
oI the limits posed by traditional security practices allows Ior the possibility oI reconciliation
between the two.
Despite the shortcomings oI traditional security approaches and the potential Ior human
security to improve upon these approaches, resistance to human security principles remains
strong. Even with the advent oI non-traditional security threats, terrorism being one, nation-states
are adverse to alternative security approaches.

Ka r e era cyrna Map 3axep y cn rany, pnernaa

a er crax aa Canera eecr ca pan nera pecranaa e
peara eeer a ee ya crpae Veex aa r yrr
npeecr epa. A y e rea rpeeyre arne yce
eecr, ea crnap crae rea: peyere arne a aan a cy
e crere pae crpae ra er crax aa a ce
crpae Ceex Aepx pana. Kcrera ana rx
rpeeyrx arna yce eecr e yee e cpee-x
pana crr ea e cy pae y xap a crre ae .
On yaye a rpa rea aa naa cr paaa e-nax
praaa r a a e rpay aay yry y ehyap cna. Vpan
ca nan paae Kaaa e yccrana Mpey yce eecr cy 13
cpee-x pana cnx pera cnera cneex yapehey pa yce
eecr. Be e e ry er crax aa Canera eecr
carpar a pepey a e]erny ehyapy ay aa e y ray pehnae
aree (enr pea) parpae. Hpecea ce r ana ce excr a
n epcrn, crpaa ra CA-a acr a ere ehyapx
anea.
7 ,OIOBOPHOCT 3AmTHTE~: HOMHPEHE

On rane e crpana ne nee nepe eecr: ey a pana
erparer pane y ehyap cna pyry a ce pe pr
eaa y ehyap pyrny. V e cran n par pcry cy
ehyc cyprcrane, a e]ear rra e apanae e]erne ae VH-a. V
e cyaena cae VH y cny ecanpey crpyrypy, ncce aar,
ecrara pecypca ecrara eparnx aarera rpanay ree ehy na
pcrya. yca eecr ce ecr cye a arrea rpaae eecr.
Ha cy na na cranra acra ]]c epa para, cr raaa
nea ehy x y npe pear. yca eecr ecran e pecrana
areparny a rpaay eecr; a e pn ran rnp a ecrare
rpaae eecr. Ka r c ne epa ce Xar para nea e
cya cr y ehyap ae e cy re r aenar ycepee
crpr caae a pacy rpaae eecr. Fep pepea e cy
craae a yry VH-y, y ep a Xar para pecranay a nra. On aana
ar arne yce eecr pecranay ea crpyer a VH pe]py.
Heparn e ar a yy ney ehy rpaae eecr yce eecr,
r y e ea a yy, r e peyrnar ree a ce na na
cranra carpay a epna. Hpenae yce eecr a re
cee rpaea pace rpaae eecr nana a rycr
pea na na cranra. Vpc ecraa pcrya rpaae eecr
reay yce eecr a yape ne pcrye, rp pea pa
yce eecr crae caa. ua ca acryae erpaax eecx
per, x e ea reppa, ae-pane ce prne areparn
eec pcrya. Oer, ypan ne erpaae eece pere
pecranay par r ra cy ra a rpe n pcry eecr. On
p ce pay pxnarr aa e y ray pe xyarape repnee, a r
e

Yet it is precisely because oI these nontradi-tional security threats that new approaches to
security are so desperately needed. These concerns have come to a head over the issue oI
humanitarian interventionlike Kosovo in 1999where human security approaches emphasized
the humanitarian imperative and traditional security views stressed the virtues oI nonintervention
and state sovereignty.
An attempt to reconcile these conceptions oI security was made in 1999 when the
Canadian government sponsored what is arguably the most signiIicant oI its human security
initiatives: the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). As
explained by ICISS participant Ramesh Thakur in his chapter, this is a broad-based, international
dialogue oI scholars and policy makers charged with the task oI reconciling sovereignty and
intervention. The debate culminated in a report that proposed an innovative redeIinition oI
sovereignty as the "responsibility to protect." Some oI the key outcomes oI the debate include:
A Iocus on what sovereignty obliges rather than what it endowsby this measure states can no
longer harm their populations with impunity. And iI Ior some reason a state is unwilling or
unable to protect its citizens, the task Ialls upon the shoulders oI the international community.
International attention is Iocused where it is most neededon the victim. To quote Irom the
report: "Such a responsibility implies an evaluation oI the issue Irom the perspective oI the
victim, not the intervener."
The Responsibility to Protect is conceived as a continuum whereby the responsibility to
preventexercising all options prior to embracing the military optionand the responsibility to
rebuildpostconIlict reconstructionare crucial components oI the Responsibility to Protect
principle.
The ICISS corroborates the premiseestablished abovethat human security acts as a
response to the limits oI traditional security. Fresh in the minds oI the ICISS commissioners were
the legal and political ambiguities stemming Irom the Kosovo crisis, not to mention the UN
Iailures in Srebenica and Rwanda, issues that are dealt with in detail in the chapters by Thakur
and JenniIer Welsh.
What Next?

Despite the domination oI the global security agenda in recent years by the war on
terrorism and U.S. rejection oI multilateralism, signiIicant room remains Ior initiatives to be
pursued at the UN. Through its resolution making, the Assembly has the power to establish
prescriptive advice Ior the Security Council. This is nonbinding but can carry weight, as occurred
with the process oI de-colonization. An opportunity to mobilize the Assembly into this kind oI an
advocacy role arises with the recent tabling oI the report oI the Canadian-sponsored Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The emphasis should now be on gaining strong support Ior
an Assembly endorsement Ior the principle "the responsibility to protect" and Ior the committee's
consequent recommendations Ior reIorm oI the UN to meet the needs oI a more robust
interventionist mandate.
The UN is a natural and necessary Iorum Ior a human security agenda. The openness
advocated as part oI that agenda, in Iact, should extend beyond the Council to all the other UN
venues. The UN still has not Iigured out how to incorporate civil society groups into its decision
making. This may be one reason why there is a decline in the UN's credibility among various
publics.

cya Kcna 1999, re pcry yce eecr araanay xyarap

eparn a crann rpaae eecr cry pana erepnecaa
panr cyneperera. Hya a ce ne ne ee eecr ycae e
ye 1999. aa e aaca naa cpcaa r e carpaa a aaay
cnx arna yce eecr a r e Mehyapa ca repne
pan cyneperery (ICISS). Ka r e ae crpae ICISS yeca Paec
Taypa y ern rany, n pecrana p, ehyap ar crpyaa
caa rx ya a e nepe aara pea cyneperera
repnee. eara e ypaa nerae e pe narn
pee]cae cyneperera a ,rnpcr arre'. He yx peyrara
eare yxnaray:
Ouyc a anee cyneperera, a e a ra ae n ep pane ne
e ry acr cn cranrny, a a phy eae. A y er
para pana e na e y cray a arr cne rpahae, ra aara aa a
paea ehyape aee.
OMehyapa aa e ]ycpaa a ey e arpea a prne. a
rpa neraa: ,Tana rnpcr yaye a pey pea epcerne
prne, a e ra np repney'.
OOrnpcr arre ce nana a ryy (epe npeec ep)
rnpcr cpeanaa pcr cne e pe yrpee ne repnee a
rnpcr rpae pecrana cr]ry pecrpyy ae
pecranay ere pa rnpcr arre pyar aaa.
ICISS rpeye pecy, ycraney a, a ce yca eecr aa a
rnp a rpaea rpaae eecr. J yne cnee y ranaa yeca
ICISS ce cy e ace re nccecr pcree Kcnce
pe, a e ce VH eycexe y Cpepe Pya, raa a ce erae
ane rana Taypa He]ep Be.
8 mTA AE?

Vpc a para prn reppa aa yrarepaa crpae CA-a
y ra eec are cex ra, a pecrae aaa pcrp a
pearae arna y VH. Kp cne ee peya, Cyra a a
ae pcae canere Canery eecr. O cy aneyy, a ry cr
pehey rey, a r ce ec ca pec e-ae. Baca a ay
Cyre a nany npcry yre parpaa paa e cp e neraa
Kce repne pan cyneperery, cpcae crpae Kaae.
Haraca caa rpea cranr a pyae cae pe Cyr a pee
pa ,rnpcr arre' a cee pepye rera e rpea
cpcrr a pe]py VH-a, a ce ane rpee a ca
repnecr aar. VH pecranay ppa exa ]py a
arey yce eecr. Ornpecr a ce arnapa a e ne aree, rpea a
ce pp na Canera a cne crae VH rpae. VH ae cy cce a a yxnare
rpye nx pyrana y cne ee ya. On e r ea para ar
cr a perera Veex aa y p ancr. Pa ca ena
praaaa epee nae y pernay yarepax ]pya ra re
e crar pana cnpxa nr yecrnnaa rpea a cy pprer.

Working with NGOs and continued innovations in designing multilateral Iorums where
there can be a true sense oI civil participation should be a priority.
II there is to be an alternative to the anti-UN strategy Iollowed by the present U.S. administration
and the disruptive tactics oI countries like Cuba in deIending the status quo, there will have to be
reIorm. The 15 million people worldwide who walked the streets demanding UN management oI
the disarming oI Iraq was a sign oI a global constituency oI support.

Reinventing the UN

Present UN reIorm eIIorts Iocus on administration eIIiciency and coordination or on how
to gain more equitable representation oI regional powers on the Security Council. Neither
approach really addresses the Iundamentally Ilawed nature oI a multilateral body designed
around Second World War exigencies. The secretive and exclusive exercise oI power by the Iive
permanent members oI the Security Council is the most obvious anachronism. The central role oI
the Council, its legitimacy, and credibility are marred by the present makeup and the veto. II it is
to have a Iuture as a signiIicant place oI decision making it must become both more
representative and democratic and subject to more direct scrutiny and accountability to the
General Assembly.
The present members are unlikely give up their privileged position, although the advent oI
a single Ioreign policy in the European Union presided over by a European Ioreign minister will
put separate French and British status on the Council in some jeopardy. It is also possible to
develop new membership criteria with larger, more signiIicant members serving Ior the longer
term but without the veto. The power oI the veto needs to be circumscribed, narrowing its use to
speciIied peace and security issues under Chapter VII.
Another serious consideration is how to apply more rigorous tests oI membership. Should
a member state be allowed to take a seat endowing some responsibility or authority iI it Ilaunts
basic UN principles resolution, shirks its Iinancial obligations, is governed by a dictatorship, or is
in violation oI rights against its own citizens? Many other multilateral organizations have
established codes oI conduct Ior their members. It is time the UN did the same.
It is also important to move towards greater democratization oI the Assembly. The most obvious
initiative is some Iorm oI a second chamber oI the Assembly. Direct election to a global body,
bypassing governments, is an idea whose time is surely comingperhaps presently slowed down
by the eIIorts by big countries to ignore the UN or use it only when it serves their purpose.
Trying to sell Assembly-direct election in today's atmospherics would need divine intervention.
Nevertheless, opening up the proposal and presenting it as a legitimate long-term plan would
bring some needed zest to the institution. In the meantime there is nothing to stop individual
member states Irom experimenting on their own ways to choose their representatives through
election.
More qualiIied membership and a stronger democratic base would enhance Assembly
credibility and provide the grounds Ior giving it a more active role on issues oI humanitarian
intervention. The General Assembly could extend the notion oI responsibility to protect to
civilians during peacemaking missions by authorizing various Iorms oI soIt intervention; it could
act when the Council Ireezes on peacemaking missions, it could assert a more Iorthcoming role in
dealing with the massive terrorist threats.

V cr rpea a ar-VH crparer y par rpeyra

acrpaa CA-a eraye rarre eaa a r e Kya, ycepee a pay
craryca n, a pa pe]pe. 15 a y p cnera cy appa
yaa axrenay a ce VH an rae papyaa Hpaa e a craa
rar rea pe.

9 HOHOBHO HPO1EKTOBAHE YH

Tpeyr ap ycepe a pe]py VH-a ]ycpay ce a e]accr
pay acrpae a r a eer yeaee pecranae
perax ca y Canery eecr. Hea pcry e y rycr e peana
]yaera rpey ppy yrarepar rea pernar y npee ena
pyrr cnercr para. Taa cyna pea crpae er crax aa
Canera eecr pecrana are aaxpa. Herpaa yra Canera,
ern errrer perer ypae cy rpeyr ner. V
e a y yycr cr aa ecr a ee ya ye pa r
pepeerarn eparc a pere crnay
rnpcr pea Ieepa cyr.
Tpeyre ae ce nepnar ee pe cnx pnernax a, aa
e aa ecrnee crpae re Enpce ye, e ypanar Enpc
crap crpax cna, yrpr ne ]payc prac craryc y Canery.
Tahe e rye panr n prepy acrna ca ne, aa aaa e
e ar aar a ye npee, a e nera. Cara nera ce pa a, cyanay
erny yrpey a pehea pna eeca raa y Hrany VII.
J e rae e a per prpe recrne a acrn. a
pan a rpea ryr a aye cry re ar pehey
rnpcr ayrprer y ce a rpa ca pey cn pa
VH-a, erana cne ]acce anee, y e ypana rarp y
p pana cnx ccrnex rpahaa? Mre pyre yrarepae praae cy
pee pane aaa a cne ae. Bpee e a Veee ae ypae
cr. Tahe e na peyr pea ne epara Cyre. Harea
arna e eaan pyre pe Cyre. per p a ra re,
aae nae, pecranay ey e npee cryp re a a rpeyr
ycpea apa nex pana a ce rpy Veee ae a ce cpcre
ca aa cye xn cnpc. 3a ya a ce y aa ra arc]ep prypa
ea per pa a Cyry e rpea ynea repnea. Ha,
perae nanr pera ern pecranae a errr yrpr aa
e pehey exy rpy crry. V ehynpeey e cr ra
r cpe eae pane ae a ecepery a a cne ccrnee
ae aepy cne pecrane p pe. Kna]nae acrn caa
pparca aa yape perer Cyre ee cny a anae
arne yre Cyr raa xyarapx repnea. Ieepaa
cyra ra ppr ey rnpcr arre na a npee pnx
ca p pee parx a ax repnea; a ra pearnar
aa he ae Canera eecr y ne ca pn caa, ra
a]pcar acy yry y aney acn reppcr peraa. One pere
pecranay n

This is a serious new risk to world order, putting in jeopardy the Iundamental rights oI
people and communities to live in Ireedom Irom Iear. Yet Washington aided and abetted with a
spurious coalition oI the willing should not be the sole author on how to answer the terrorist
threat. Building a global consensus based on collaboration will in the long run be a better antidote
than a military strategy that is applied unilaterally.
To make this operational there will eventually have to be a standing UN constabulary that
can (1) move quickly on preventive missions; (2) provide an investigative arm Ior the
International Court; and (3) be available to protect UN humanitarian workers or aid in the
dismantling oI arms systems in compliance with disarmament resolutions. Right now the UN
lacks its own rapid-response capability, all past eIIorts to establish some Iorm oI stand-by Iorce
or to have a UN constabulary have been rejected or ignored. In this respect UN members are
mired in the status quo, unwilling to challenge the will oI the big powers that want to keep the
UN emasculated and reluctant to put up the money and commit the resources. But why should
NATO have a rapid-reaction Iorce but not the UN? The ability oI the UN to act eIIectively,
whether in responding to massacres, policing weapons inspections, or protecting UN Iield
activities is an idea that current circumstances seem to demand. There already exists the Standby
High Readiness Brigade (Shirbrig) made oI ten countries that have standby units available Ior
UN duty. They perIormed well in the UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Shirbrig could be a
platIorm to build on.
Other UN agencies need reIorm. The Geneva-based Disarmament Commission, the
Human Rights Commission, and the High Commission Ior ReIugeeseach in their own way are
ailing, as other chapters in this volume document. In each oI these cases national interests and
power politics get in the way; too oIten there is studied indiIIerence or outright bullying Irom the
rulers oI the strongest member and deIiance Irom many oI the renegade regimes. The
responsibility-to-protect principle could be a catalyst Ior real reIorm by establishing diIIerent
norms Ior state behavior and becoming the base Ior asserting a more robust role Ior the
international community.
What's more, it takes the process oI reIorm beyond war into a basic reassessment oI the
ways in which the responsibility to protect must be applied to economic and environmental
security needspoverty, health, resource exploitation. As we have seen Irom the studies in this
volume, the present Iinancial, commercial, global system promotes an imbalanced distribution in
economic beneIits in which unrestrained growth invariably trumps sustainable development,
where the imperatives oI global rules and regulations are discriminatory and insensitive to local
and regional needs. All this is to say that there is much work to do in helping the UN continue to
transIorm itselI into a more eIIective, credible institution Ior global security in the twenty-Iirst
century, a task that in some ways is more, not less, necessary in an era dominated by the U.S. war
on terrorism.

p a cnerc pea, yrpanay ]yaeraa pana y aea a ne
che crpaxa. Ha, Barr rryr crayr pn a
ne e rpea a crae e ayrp rnpa a reppcre pere. Hcrae
rar ceyca apar a capa y yr py e pecranar
prnrpn ne crparere a ce peye ecrpa.
Ka n rye, a pay e par a cr caa VH a a
ra (1) pearnar p penernx ca; (2) pyr crpana aapar a
Mehyap cy pane; (3) r crya a arry VH xyarapx paa
y eccanay pyax ccrea y cay ca peyaa papyay.
Tpeyr Vee aaa ecrae xna ccrnea cccr pr pearnaa,
ep cy cn pa ap a ce ]ppa eaan cara y ppancr a cr
VH a e rpca. H n ray pane ae VH-a
aranee cy y crarycy n, ene a anay ny nex ca e ee a ape
VH rpae cy ne a ye cn na a cnere cne pecypce. A ar
HATO a ee a py peay a e VH? Cccr VH-a a pearyy
e]ern, y pearnay a acape, crnay pya arr VH arncr
a repey, pecrana ey y axrenay rpeyre cr. Be cr praa
nce cpecr (Shirbrig) ]ppaa crpae ecer pana e ay ee y
ppancr crye a VH ayea. Oe cy aae pe ep]pace y c VH
y Er Eprpe. Shirbrig ra pecranar ar]py a arpay.
Ocra VH areaa e rpea pe]pa. Kca a papyae apaa a
Xeenc ne, Kca a yca pana Bc ecapar a ere
ayy ecrare, r rnphyy pyra rana nr yera. V cna nx
cyaena aa repec re nex ca pecranay pepey; peecr
e aeeea ]epercr rnpe arperpae crpae acae ae
anae crpae rx yrnx pea. Hp rnpcr arre
ra r araarp a crnapy pe]py r p yrnphnae parx p a
aae pana p rnphnae cae yre ehyape aee.
Hpe cnera nra, rpea e pec pe]p ce e c a par, ne a
ay pey aa rnpcr arre paa r peea a rpee
ece eecr eecr nre cpee, cparn, pane,
ecaray pecypca. Ka r c ne crya y n yery, rpeyr
]acc, epa, ra ccre pne epanepy crpyy
ecx npecr erpae pan y ne ep yrpana pn
pan, re cy eparn rax pana pca cparp ecern a
ae perae rpee. Cne n rnp a cr r ca e rpe
anr a ce r Vee aaa a acrane a ce rpac]py y
e]erny, pey crryy a ray eecr y naecer pn ney,
r e aara e a e a ex y ep pa par CA-a
prn reppa.

HHTEPATVPA



1. Price, R. and Zacher, M., The United Nations and Global Security, Palagrave MacMillan, New
York 2004, 245-258