Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
MICHAELSTOKESPAULSEN*
MynearlyridiculousgoalforthisEssayistopresentacom prehensivetheoryoftheConstitutionsallocationofwarpow ersand,then,toapplyittoeverysignificantissueofthewaron terror,intwentyfivepages. My thesis is straightforward: The allocation of war powers under the Constitution is a classic illustration of the Framers conceptionofseparationofpowers.TheFramersregardedthe war power as too important to vest it in a single set of hands and so, by conscious design, chopped it updivided itand allocated portions of that power to various branches, giving somepowersexclusivelytoeachbranchandalsoprovidingfor someareasofoverlap,andthussharedauthority,amongthem. Iwillmakethreebroadpointsaboutthewarpowerasitex ists within the Constitutions structural separation of powers. First,theConstitutionvests,inthemain,inCongress,andnotin thePresident,thedecisiontoinitiatewartheauthoritytotake thenationintoastateofwar.1Second,theConstitutionvestsin the President, and not in Congress, the power to conduct war.2
*DistinguishedUniversityChair&ProfessorofLaw,TheUniversityofSt.Tho mas.ThisEssayisarevisionofapresentationgivenattheTwentyEighthAnnual FederalistSocietyNationalStudentSymposium,heldatYaleLawSchool. 1.For a short textual and structural defense of this proposition, see Michael StokesPaulsen,YoungstownGoestoWar,19CONST. COMMENT.215,23839(2002). Foroutstanding,fulllengthpresentationsofthetextualandhistoricalbasisforthis position,seeSaikrishnaPrakash,UnleashingtheDogsofWar: WhattheConstitution Means by Declare War, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (2007) and Michael D. Ramsey, TextualismandWarPowers,69U.CHI.L.REV.1543(2002).Forfineexpositionsofthe opposingview,favoringunilateralexecutivewarmakingpower,seeRobertJ.De lahunty & John Yoo, Making War, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 123 (2007), Robert J. Dela hunty&JohnYoo,ThePresidentsConstitutionalAuthoritytoConductMilitaryOpera tionsAgainstTerroristOrganizationsandtheNationsThatHarbororSupportThem,25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY487(2002),andJohnC.Yoo,TheContinuationofPoliticsby OtherMeans:TheOriginalUnderstandingofWarPowers,84CAL.L.REV.167(1996). .For a brief expositionof this proposition andan important historical illustra 2 tion,seeMichaelStokesPaulsen,TheEmancipationProclamationandtheCommander in Chief Power, 40 GA. L. REV. 807 (2006) (arguing that the CommanderinChief
114
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
Eachofthesepowersis,inthemain,autonomousofthepow ers of the other branch and thus to a substantial degree im munefromcontrolbytheotherspowers. Third, the Constitution vests no substantive war powers in the judiciary. But questions of the Constitutions allocation of warpowersnonethelesscanbejudicialquestions.Thissuscepti bility to judicial decision making does not mean that every thing that the courts will decide on such matters is right. Nor doesitmeaneventhateverythingthatthecourtssayshouldbe followedbytheotherbranchesofgovernment.Anotheraspect of the separation of powers is that the Framers regarded the powertointerpretlawthepowerofconstitutionalinterpreta tionas another power too important to vest exclusively in anyonebranchofgovernment.3Ittoolikethewarpoweris adivided,sharedpower.Thepoliticalbranchesthusrightfully mayusetheconstitutionalpowersattheirdisposaltoresistju dicialencroachmentsontheConstitutionsassignmentsofwar powers to them. Nonetheless, the judiciarys power to decide cases, including cases concerning the Constitutions allocation ofwarpowers,andtoseektopressitsinterpretationsuponthe
ClausevestsinthePresidentalldecisionswithrespecttotheactionsofU.S.forces in time of authorized warincluding all matters of military strategy and tactics; generalandspecificmilitaryobjectives;rulesofengagement;meansandmethods to be employed; when and under what circumstances hostilities are to be termi nated;andallmattersofdetention,interrogation,andmilitarypunishmentofcap tured enemy combatantsand noting that this broad conception of the Com manderinChief Clause is an essential ingredient in the lawfulness of President Abraham Lincolns Emancipation Proclamation). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, TheConstitutionalPowerToInterpretInternationalLaw,118YALE L.J. 1762,181216, 183554 (2009) (developing these propositions and applying them to many con temporary issues). For the most plausible textual and historical argument that CongressrightfullymayshackletheexecutivesCommanderinChiefClausepow ersthroughitsperipheraltextualpowersconcerningregulationofthemilitary,see SaikrishnaB.Prakash,TheSeparationandOverlapofWarandMilitaryPowers,87TEX. L. REV. 299 (2008). Although I find Professor Prakashs evidence and argument interestingandinstructive,Iultimatelyfinditunpersuasive.SeePaulsen,TheCon stitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supra,at1852n.209. 3.This proposition has been a theme of my other scholarship. E.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706 (2003); MichaelStokesPaulsen,TheMostDangerousBranch:ExecutivePowertoSayWhatthe LawIs,83GEO. L.J.217(1994);seealsoMichaelStokesPaulsen,LincolnandJudicial Authority,83NOTRE DAME L. REV.1227(2008).Ontheseveralbranchesindepend entpowerswithrespecttotheinterpretationandapplicationofinternationallaw, seePaulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2.
No.1]
TheWarPower
115
other branches with the limited powers at its disposal, is also partoftheseparationofpowersdynamic. I. THECONSTITUTIONALPOWERTOINITIATEWAR (JUSADBELLUM)
Consider first the constitutional power to start warto take the nation from a condition of peace into a state of war. That powerisCongresss,notthePresidents.IntheAmericancon stitutional order, the power to initiate war is a legislative powerandnotanexecutivepower. A. PreconstitutionalBackgroundUnderstandings oftheWarPower
Thingswerenotalwaysthatway.Indeed,thewarpowertra ditionally was understood to be an aspect of the executive power with respect to foreign affairs. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution wrote against a background understanding that the war power was part of the foreign relations executive power of the kinga description attested to by the best legal authorities known in the eighteenth century, including Mon tesquieu, Blackstone, and Locke. The Framers wrote against thatbackdrop,butconsciouslydepartedfromthatfamiliarde sign by taking some of the powers traditionally vested in the Englishkingandassigningtheminsteadtothelegislature.The most important of those reallocations in the area of war and foreignaffairsisArticleI,Section8sassignmenttoCongressof thepower[t]odeclareWar.4 B. TheConstitutionsAllocationoftheWarInitiatingPower: Text,Structure,andHistory
Congress,andnotthePresident,thuspossessestheconstitu tionalpowertodeclarewarornottodeclarewar.Thismeans that Congress, and not the President, has the constitutional powertoinitiatewar.TheCommanderinChiefClausepower of the President is (as I discuss below) a formidable, plenary
4.U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 11. On the traditional background English under standing,seeRamsey,supranote1,at156163(citingsources).SeealsoSaikrishna B.Prakash&MichaelD.Ramsey,TheExecutivePoweroverForeignAffairs,111YALE L.J.231,26572(2001).
116
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
constitutional power of military command. But it does not in clude a power to declare war on another nation, entity, or group. The President may notat least not constitutionally launchawarallonhisown.ThatpowerbelongstoCongress. This proposition should not be controversial. I submit that thisissimplytheproperunderstandingofthetexttheorigi nalpublic meaningofthewordsoftheConstitution.Itis that understandingthatshouldcontrolconstitutionalpracticenot policy,precedent,pragmatismoranythingelse.5Andtheorigi nalmeaningoftheworddeclareasusedinthiscontextthat is,asappliedtothepowertodeclareWarwastoinitiateby wordoractionalegalconditionofwar.6 Somemaybeunconvincedbybareargumentsfromoriginal linguistic meaning of the Constitutions words, but there is more to the argument than that. This understanding of the meaningoftheDeclareWarClauseissupportedaswellbythe structureandinternallogicoftheConstitution.Specifically,the understanding of the power to declare war as a substantive lawmakingpower(andnotamerediplomaticordomesticno ticegivingprovision)7isstronglysupportedbythelocationof thepowerinArticleI,Section8asoneofthespecificenumer atedlawmakingpowersofCongress.TheConstitutiontakesa traditional executive power, relocates it away from the Presi dent,andplopsitdownintoalistofsubstantivepowerscom mittedtoCongress.Theimplicationfromlocationisnotalways reliable,butitishardtoavoidhere:TheFramerstookthedeci siontogotowarawayfromtheexecutiveandvesteditinthe Congress.Thisinferencefromstructureandrelationshipisfur
5.ThemeaningoftheConstitutionistheoriginalpublicmeaningthatthetexts words and phrases would have had, in context, to an objective, informed reader andspeakeroftheEnglishlanguagewithintherelevantpoliticalcommunity,atthe time the Constitution was written and adopted. Those exercising governmental authority under the Constitution are dutybound to apply the Constitution in ac cordancewithsuchanunderstanding.Forastraightforwardinternal,textualjusti ficationforthisinterpretivemethodologyanditsbindingcharacter,seeVasanKe savan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitutions Secret DraftingHistory,91GEO.L.J.1113(2003). 6.SeePrakash,supranote1;Ramsey,supranote1.ProfessorPrakashand,sepa rately,ProfessorRamsey,marshaltheevidenceconvincinglythatthisistheorigi nallinguisticmeaning,inhistoricalcontext,ofthephrasetodeclareWar,asused intheArticleI,Section8oftheConstitution. 7.ThatistheincorrectpositionofProfessorsDelahuntyandYoo.SeeDelahunty &Yoo,MakingWar,supranote1;Yoo,supranote1.
No.1]
TheWarPower
117
therreinforcedbytheevidentnecessitythattheFramersfeltto assign a specific CommanderinChief Clause power to the Presidentinordertomakeclearwhataspectsofthewarpower werenottherebyassignedtoCongress(i.e.,thepowerofarmed forcescommandthepowertoconductwarwhichIdiscussin the next section). In addition, Article I, Section 10 prohibits states from engaging in war on their own (unless they are in vaded or in immediate peril) unless Congress consents.8 Dont callthePresident;callCongressthebranchassignedthepre dominantpowertocontrolthedecisionofthenation(orevena partofit)toengageinwar. Finally,thisconclusionisverifiedbynearlyallofthelegisla tive history and early practice. The Constitutional Convention records, the ratification debates, and the statements and prac ticesofearlypresidentsallsupportthisconclusion.9 The Constitutional Convention debates provide an interest ing perspective.10 An earlier version of what became the De clare War Clause provided that Congress would have the power to make war.11 James Madison and Elbridge Gerry moved to substitute declare for make on August 17. This producedafamousshortdebate,takingjustafewpagesinFar rands Records and Madisons Notes, discussing the proposed alteration of the documents language from to make war to to declare war.12 Naturally, as with any type of legislative body,therecorddisplaysacertainamountofconfusionamong the delegates as to exactly what the import of the change in wording would be. But two overlapping explanations are prominent. The first is that changing make to declare would leave in the President, as executive, the traditional executive power to repel attacks on the nationa defensive presidential warpower.13
8.U.S.CONST.art.I,10. 9.MuchofthisevidenceiswellsetforthinRamsey,supranote1,at160309. 10.On the propriety of resort to the secret drafting history, see Kesavan & Paulsen,TheInterpretiveForceoftheConstitutionsSecretDraftingHistory,supranote5. 11.2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 31819 (Max Far randed.,YaleUniv.Press1966). 12.Seeid.at31820. 13.This is the recorded explanation for the making of the motion in the first place, and part of Madisons description of its intended consequence. Id. at 318 (Mr. Madison and Mr. Gerry moved to insert declare, striking out make war; leavingtotheExecutivethepowertorepelsuddenattacks.).
118
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
The second explanation is that declare was a superior word choice to make because the latter might be taken to imply, wrongly, that Congress, the legislative branch, would havethepowertoconductwar,whichwasproperlyanexecu tivefunction.14Thislittlesnippetofconstitutionaldraftinghis tory is obviously of interest for its bearing on the meaning of the CommanderinChief Clause powers of the President, which I discuss presently in Section II. I like to imagine this discussion occurring under the approving, but studiously si lent, gazebut perhaps arched eyebrowsof the President of the Convention, General George Washington, who had had somefamiliaritywiththeproblemsofwarsbeingrunbylegis lative committees. At all events, the Framers deliberately sub stituted declare for make, explained their reasons for do ingso,andadoptedthetextinthatform. There is a natural, intuitive synthesis that comes out of the text,structure,andconstitutionaldraftinghistory:Congresshas the power to take the nation to a state of war where there had beennonebefore,butthePresidentretainsthetraditionalexecu tive power to defend the nation against attacks. There will al ways be linedrawing issues as to where one power leaves off andtheotherbegins,butthisisthenutsandboltsoftheConsti tutionsdivisionofthewarpower,intermsofthepowertostart awar.15 It is significant that the text, structure, and historical evi denceoforiginalintentionallcohere,pointinginasingledirec tion:ThePresidentdoesnothaveconstitutionalpowertoiniti atewaronhisown.Rather,byconsciousstructuraldesign,the FramersmeanttovestthatpowerintheCongress. C. IsHistoricalPracticeaGlossonthe MeaningoftheConstitution?
Onemighttrulyobserve,however,thatalotofournations actual practice does not conform particularly well to this ab stract constitutional division of powers. Presidents seem to
14.Id. at 319 n.* (On the remark by Mr. King that make war might be under stoodtoconductitwhichwasanExecutivefunction,Mr.Elseworthgaveuphis objection,andthevoteof[Connecticut]waschangedtoay.). 15.Therearealsoimportantlinedrawingquestionsastowhatconstituteswar withinthemeaningoftheclauseandwhethertheremightexistaresidualexecu tivepowerovernonwarmilitaryactions.Ileavetheseforanotherday.
No.1]
TheWarPower
119
startsmallandlargewars,withoutCongresssauthorization,a fairbitofthetime.Hasournationsactualconstitutionalprac tice in the field of war conformed to the Constitutions provi sions?Ifnot,shouldweconcludethathistoricalpracticeconsti tutes a gloss of sorts on the meaning of the Constitution, alteringhowweshouldunderstandtheConstitutiontoday?Or does it mean, quite the reverse, that the Constitution has been materially violated on important occasions, and that we should seektorecovertheConstitutionstruemeaninginsteadofbend ing it to justify the violations of the past and (furthering the wrong)thenusethebentversiontojustifyfurtherdepartures? Thesefundamentalquestionsbedevilmanyareasofconstitu tional law, but they are presented in an especially sharp and critical way with respect to war powers. Indeed, much of our constitutional practice today departs from the Constitutions original vision with respect to the allocation of war powers. Specifically, the last fifty years have seen the rapid develop ment of unilateral presidential warmaking. Some of our con stitutionalpracticewithrespecttowarpowersfitsthemodelI havesketched,butsomeofthepracticesimplydoesnot. Tocitejusttwoquickexamples:Icannotfindawaylegally tojustifythe1999KosovoWarunderthetextualtheoryIhave advanced. That does not mean that Americas involvement in this military action was bad from a policy standpoint; it just means that this significant military action did not conform to the text, structural logic, and original understanding of the Constitutionsallocationofwarpowers.Thesamegoesforthe Korean War. Congressdid not authorize it; President Truman initiateditonhisown.ItseemsimpossibletodenythattheKo rean War was a war in the constitutional sense of the term. Butitplainlydoesnotfitintothemodelofconstitutionallyre quiredcongressionalauthorization.TheKoreanWarmayhave been a good war, but it was an unconstitutional oneif by unconstitutional one means at variance with the Constitu tionsoriginalpublicmeaning.16
16.GaryLawson,TheRiseandRiseoftheAdministrativeState,107HARV. L. REV. 1231,1231(1994).Ihopetodevelopthesehistoricalobservationsandothersin futurework.Fornow,itissufficienttonotethatKosovoandKoreaareprominent examplesofsustained,open,armedconflictagainstanenemyforceorpower,ofan intensity and duration that must be conceded to constitute war, but where the
120
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
Thisisaclassicproblem.Whathappenswhenconstitutional practicedoesnotconformtosoundfirstprinciplesofconstitu tional interpretation? There are two ways of resolving this di lemma.Underoneschoolofthought,oursisalivingConstitu tion, the meaning of which changes with the times. Under another, the Constitution sets forth immutable principles of fundamental law that must never be altered by mere govern mentofficials.TheLivingConstitutionpositionisusuallyas sociatedwithliberalconstitutionaltheorists,andtheOriginal Meaningpositionwithconservatives.Butintheareaofwar powers,thepositionsofthecontendingpartiesseemalmostex actly reversed. Conservatives frequently defend broad presi dential warinitiating power, against the greater weight of evi denceoforiginalmeaninganddesign.Moreshockinglyyet,they do so largely for policy reasons and defend such antioriginalist constitutional revisionism on the basis of consistent modern practicea position that few conservative constitutional schol arswoulddefendinotherareas(likecriminalprocedure,abor tion, or expansive conceptions of federal government power). Butsotoodoliberalschangetheirconstitutionalstripeswhen itcomestowar:Infew,ifany,areasdothosewhootherwiseso ferventlydefendtheideaofanevolving,changingConstitution clingsotenaciouslytotheFramersandtheoriginalmeaningof thewordsoftheConstitution! I am the only principled constitutional interpreter. I do not change mystripes.17 Where practice under the Constitution (or precedent,includinglongstanding,ostensiblysettledjudicial precedent) departs from the actual original meaning of the Constitutions provisions, one must go with the Constitution and not with the practice. Always.18 The principled constitu
war was not authorized by Congresss declaration of war or equivalent statutory authorization. 17.This is not quite true. There are other principled constitutional interpreters outthere.Iamsurethereare. 18.Bythisreasoning,itfollows(asIhavearguedelsewhere)thatstaredecisis,in thesenseofdeliberateadherencetoawrongdecisionmadeinthepast,isunconsti tutional. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Con gressRemovethePrecedentialEffectofRoeandCasey?,109YALE L.J.1535(2000);Mi chael Stokes Paulsen, Can a Constitutional Amendment Overrule a Supreme Court Decision?, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 285, 289 (2007); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain JamesT.KirkandtheEnterpriseofConstitutionalInterpretation:SomeModestProposals from the TwentyThird Century, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 671, 67881 (1995); Michael StokesPaulsen,DoestheConstitutionPrescribeRulesforItsOwnInterpretation?,103
No.1]
TheWarPower
121
tional interpreter must bite the bullet, swallow hard, and be willing to say that much of our nations actual practice with respecttothepowertodeclarewarinfacthasbeenunconstitu tional.Somuchtheworseforournationspractice. Notallofit,ofcourse:asInotedbefore,therearemanyareas ofambiguityanduncertaintyinapplication,includingthedo main of the word war and also the realm of the Presidents power to defend the nation against sudden (or imminent) attacks.Butwhenpushcomestoshove,Iamwillingtosaythat some exercises of military force in our nations history have been wars and that, where they were not authorized, they wereunconstitutional. D. Application:TheLawfulnessoftheWar(s)onTerror
Fortunately,noneofthishasanysaliencewithrespecttothe war on terror. At least, none of this should have any salience. The Authorization for Use of Military Force of September 18, 2001(AUMF)isthebroadest,mostsweeping,embracing,legal declaration of war in our nations history.19 The President is expressly
authorizedtouseallnecessaryandappropriateforceagainst those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist at tacksthatoccurredonSeptember11,2001,orharboredsuch organizationsorpersons,inordertopreventanyfutureacts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations,organizations,orpersons.20
This is an absolutely sweeping authorization for military force.21Congressdeclaredwaragainstnotonlyenemynations (as described), but against organizations or persons. The sole condition is that the President determineshe alone is as signed the power to make the relevant determinationthat a
NW. L. REV. 857, 913 (2009); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005); Paulsen, The Irrepressible MythofMarbury,supranote3,at273134. 19.Authorization for Use of Military Force Against September 11 Terrorists (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 10740, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. 1541 (2006)).SomeofthediscussionthatfollowsisbasedonmyearlierworkinPaulsen, supranote1,at25057. 20.AUMF2,115Stat.at224. 21.Someofthediscussionthatfollowsisbasedonmyearlierwork.SeePaulsen, supranote1,at25057.
122
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
nation, organization, or person has participated in any of a numberofways,directorindirect,insupportoftheattacksof September11,2001,includingharbor[ing]personsororgani zations who may have aided persons or organizations who planned, authorized, or committed those infamous attacks. Combining the links in the chain of legal authorization, the Presidenthasplenarypowertowagewaragainstanyonecon nectedinanyactiveorevenpassivelysupportivewaywiththe organizations or persons responsible for the September 11 at tacks. He chooses the targets; he determines the enemies, in cludingnotjustnationsbutindividualpersonsandgroups;he choosesthetiming;hechoosesthemeans;hechoosestheends. Moreover,theAUMFswhereasclausesembraceessentially thepropresidentialviewofconstitutionalpowertoinitiatewar, including preemptive war, against terrorism: Whereas, the PresidenthasauthorityundertheConstitutiontotakeactionto deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States....22 Congress, in enacting the AUMF, sweep inglyand in separationofpowers terms somewhat surpris inglydeclared its acceptance of unilateral presidential military actiontodeterandpreventactsofterrorismagainsttheUnited States,andoftheclaimofunilateralpresidentialconstitutional authoritytodoso. All of this is extraordinary. The AUMF marks a stunning, landmark paradigm shift in the constitutional practice of war powers, light years distant in tone and attitude from the War PowersResolutionof1973,23whichwasnotsomuchrepealed assimplyoverwhelmedbytheSeptember18,2001AUMF.The AUMFwaspassedbyavoteof4201intheHouse24and980in theSenate.25Ithasnotimelimitnoexpirationdate. There is more yet. The separate congressional enactment au thorizinguseofmilitaryforcespecificallywithrespecttoIraqis
No.1]
TheWarPower
123
also,legally,afullyfunctionaldeclarationofwarforthatspecific enemyortheater.26 Thus,whateverthescopeoflegitimatedebateoverwhether the President may, in certain circumstances, employ military force on his own unilateral constitutional authority, notwith standingCongresssenumeratedpowertodeclareWar,that debateismootwithrespecttothesewars.Congresshasadded itspowerstothoseofthePresident.InYoungstownishterms,27 the wars of September 11, 2001, including the Iraq war, are Category I wars: They are fully constitutionally authorized, onanyviewoftheConstitutionsallocationofwarpowers. Morethanthat,Congresslegislatedsweepinglyinsupportof presidential power with the enactment of the Military Com missionsActof2006.28ThatactgivesthePresidenttheauthor ity to interpret international law for the United States, and delegatesbroadwarpowerswithrespecttothecapture,deten tion, interrogation, and military punishment of unlawful en emycombatants. Ifeveritwerethecase,itiscertainlytrueherethatpresiden tial power to wage warauthorization to use force and the mannerofitsconductisatitsmaximum.Congresshasadded essentially all of its powers to those that the President pos sesses by virtue of his independent constitutional powers un der Article II. In such a situation, military action commanded bythePresidentis,asJusticeJacksonaptlyputitinhisconcur ringopinioninYoungstown,supportedbythestrongestofpre sumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any whomightattackit.29
26.See Authorization for UseofMilitary ForceAgainst Iraq Resolutionof 2002, Pub.L.No.107243,116Stat.1498(codifiedat50U.S.C.1541(2006)). 27.YoungstownSheet&Tubev.Sawyer,343U.S.579(1952). 28.MilitaryCommissionsActof2006,Pub.L.No.109366,120Stat.2600(codi fied as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.); see also Paulsen, The Constitu tionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at184751. 29.Youngstown,343U.S.at637(Jackson,J.,concurring).
124 II.
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
THECONSTITUTIONALPOWERTOCONDUCTWAR (JUSINBELLO)
Whohastheconstitutionalpowertoconductwar,wherewar hasbeenlegallyauthorizedbyCongressorwheremilitaryac tionfallswithintheresidualexecutivepowertodefendagainst suddenorimminentattacks?TheConstitutionsanswerisclear and categorical: The President has the power to conduct war, andCongressdoesnot. A. TheExecutivePowerandtheCommanderinChiefClause
Once again, it is fairly easy to discern the Framers separa tionofpowers design in dividing, allocating, and checking power.Atthelevelofgranddesign,theFramerssplitthewar powerbetweenthepowertoinitiatealegalconditionofwar now vested in the legislative branchand the power to con ductwar,retainedintheexecutive.Atthelevelofspecifictext, thisdivisionisreflectedintheinitialgrant,ingross,oftheex ecutive Power to a single chief magistrate, the President, in ArticleII.30Thatgrantisthenqualifiedbythereassignment,in wholeorinpart,ofcertaintraditionalexecutivepowerstothe legislative branch by specific enumeration.31 Notably, these powers include the power to declare war32 and to raise and support armies33traditional executive powers of the Black stoniankinginEngland34andthequalifiedlegislativerolein treatymaking.35Suchspecifictextualreassignmentsofpower deviationsfromthetraditionalmodelinturnrequiredclarifi cations of what was not meant to be reassigned. Most signifi cantly, the power to direct and command the nations use of military force, another clearly executive power under tradi tionalunderstandings(asindeedallwarpowerpreviouslyhad beenunderstoodasexecutive),wasintendedtoberetainedby the Presidentnot reassigned to Congress. Thus, the crucial CommanderinChiefClause.TheCommanderinChiefClause ofArticleIIistheConstitutionsdefinitiveclarificationthatthe
30.U.S.CONST.art.II,1,cl.1. 31.U.S.CONST.art.I,8. 32.U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cl.11. 33.U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cl.12. 34.See,e.g.,1WILLIAMBLACKSTONE,COMMENTARIES*24951. 35.U.S.CONST.art.II,2,cl.2.
No.1]
TheWarPower
125
traditionalexecutivepowertoconduct,manage,anddirectin short,toexecutewarisretainedintheexecutivepower,tobe exercisedsolelybyaPresidentoftheUnitedStates.Congress decides whether or not to start a war. The President decides howtocarryitout. In her plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice OConnorquippedthatastateofwarisnotablankcheckfor thePresident.36Well,then,whatkindofcheckisit?Likemost judicialaphorisms,thisoneismorewittythanastute.Adecla rationofwar(toextendJusticeOConnorsmetaphor)writesa checkinthefullamountoftheexclusiveCommanderinChief ClausepowerofthePresidenttoconductwaragainsttheene miesdesignatedbythedeclaration. TheAUMFwritesanenormouscheck.Itis,asnotedabove, in legal effect a declaration of war triggering the full extent of the CommanderinChief power to wage war against those againstwhomitwasdeclaredandtoprotectthenationfromat tacks by those enemies. There is no question that the AUMF gives the President the absolute maximum of his constitutional authoritytowagewarandauthorizeshimtodosoagainstper sons and organizations connected to the September 11 attacks inawayhedeterminessufficientlyproximatetojustifyaction topreventfuturesuchactsofinternationalterrorismagainstthe United States. The Authorization for Use of Military Force in Iraqdoesthesame,specificallywithrespecttotheIraqtheater.37 Congressspowertoauthorizewarisnotapowertomanage theconductofwar.Thatisaportionoftheexecutivepowerthe Framers did not reassign to the legislative branch, but a part retained and reaffirmed as solely vested in the President through the CommanderinChief Clause. To switch meta phors, Congresss power to declare war is an onoff switch, notathermostatthatCongresscanadjusttowhateverlevelit prefers.38 Once the switch is flicked to the on position, and forsolongasitremainsinthatposition,thePresidenthasthe powertoconductwar.AndCongressdoesnot.
36.542U.S.507,536(2004). 37.AuthorizationforUseofMilitaryForceAgainstIraqResolutionof2002,Pub. L.No.107243,116Stat.1498(codifiedat50U.S.C.1541(2006)). 38.Paulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at 1840.ContraPrakash,supranote2,at347(statingthatCongressswarpowersare moreanalogoustoadimmerswitchthananonoffswitch).
126
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
What is the scope of the Presidents CommanderinChief Clausepower,fullytriggeredherebyCongressssweepingau thorizationsfortheuseofmilitaryforce?Isubmitthatpower, in a time of authorized war, extends to all matters of military strategy and conduct with regard to the waging of that war, includingrulesofengagement,interceptionofenemycommu nications,choiceofweaponryandtactics,rulesofinterrogation and investigation, and the imposition of military punishment forviolationofthelawsofwar.39 The CommanderinChief power, correctly understood, is a formidable powerand quite properly so. It is a dangerous power, as all power is dangerous. But that is inherent in the natureofthepowertoconductwarandinthedecisiontovest thepowerofultimatemilitarycommandinasingleindividual. The President, and not Congress, decides when and where to attack,whomtoattack,howhardtoattack,andwhatthestra tegic and tactical objectives are. The President, and not Con gress, directs the capture, detention, interrogation, and mili tary punishment for lawofwar violations of enemy combatants.Hedecideswhattodowithregardtointerception ofenemycommunications.Heexercisesthepowertointerpret and apply international law for purposes of executing the powertowagewar.40 Thispositioniscontroversial.Ithasdramaticimplications.It meansthatthePresidenthasthepowerifImaybebluntand maybe a bit overdramaticto decide whether or not to kill, capture, hold, interrogate, torture, or play loud music in the face of enemy armed forces.41 In saying this, I am, of course, onlymakingastatementaboutconstitutionalpower.Iamnot sayingwhetheranyorallofthesethingsaregoodorbadfrom apolicystandpoint.Constitutionalpoweristhepowertodoor nottodoanyorallofthesethings.Onecanflipthehypotheti cal exactly around and see that President Obamas recent and
39.Ihavedeveloped and supported the propositions in this paragraph and the several that follow at greater length elsewhere. See Paulsen, The Constitutional PowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at183942;Paulsen,TheEmancipa tionProclamationandtheCommanderinChiefPower,supranote2,at814,82731. 40.SeePaulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2, at 183941; Paulsen, The Emancipation Proclamation and the Commander in Chief Power,supranote2,at82731. 41.SeePaulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2, at1840.
No.1]
TheWarPower
127
proposedactionsarejustifiedbythissamebroadunderstand ingoftheCommanderinChiefClausepower.Thereasonitis constitutionally permissible for the President unilaterally to close Guantanamo, to release prisoners, to refrain from serious, aggressiveinterrogation,tonotseekthecaptureofcertainter rorists,torevealinterrogationtechniquesandclassifiedinternal legal memoranda, to decline to intercept enemy communica tions or to refrain from serious intelligence gathering, to pull back from military engagements, to play softer, gentler music for war prisoners, or to indulge war criminals preferences for ordinaryciviliancriminaltrialsratherthanmilitarytribunalsis that, constitutionally, these determinations about how to con duct war are for the President of the United States. Theymay beusedinonedirectionoranother. B. CongresssLegislativePowers
Thealternativeisthatthesepowersandthesechoicesinone direction or anotherare subject to Congresss control.42 Con gresscouldprohibitorrequiretorture,harshinterrogation,or loudmusic.CongresscouldprohibittheclosingofGuantanamo, the disclosure of interrogation methods, the interception of en emycommunications,oranyothermilitaryaction. This is an utterly implausible reading of the Constitutions allocation of war powers, considered holistically. To be sure, CongresshascertainpowersundertheLawofNationsClause, the Rules Concerning Captures Clause, and the Government andRegulationoftheArmedForcesClause.43Thoselittlepow ers are significant ones and can be used to leverage checks against the President. But none of them, fairly construed, ex tends to the Presidents core power to direct the conduct of war,nordoallofthemcombineddoso.Wereitotherwise,
the CommanderinChief Clause would be a title only, not anindependent,substantivepresidentialpower.Thepower to prescribe the actions and conduct of the nations armed forcesagainsttheenemywouldbeCongresss,asaresultof theaccumulatedweightofseveralperipheralpowers,none ofwhichaddressesthepowerofmilitarycommanddirectly. ThisishardtosquarewiththetextoftheConstitutionand
42.SeegenerallyPrakash,supranote2. 43.U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cls.10,11,14.
128
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
withwhatweknowofthehistoryoftheFramersdecisionsin allocatingwarpowersbetweenCongressandthePresident.44
C.
ThePowertoTerminateWar
My final point concerning the constitutional separation and allocation of the war power between Congress and the Presi dent concerns the power to terminate war. This power is like wise (in practical effect) a shared power of Congress and the President,butinasomewhatdifferentsensethantheallocation of warmaking powers discussed above. With respect to those powers, each branch has an exclusive province that cannot properlybeinvadedbytheother.45ThePresidentcannotprop erly invade Congresss legislative power to declare war, and Congress cannot properly invade the Presidents executive powertoconductwar.Thewarmakingpowerissharedinthe sensethatitisdividedandportionsofitaremadetheexclusive province of branches that are constitutionally independent of oneanother(evenaseachpossessesstrongchecksontheother by virtue of its possession of certain exclusive war powers). Thepowertoterminatewarthepower,asitwere,todeclare peace46isasharedpowerinthesensethatitresultsfromthe overlappingintersectionofCongressspowertoinitiate(ornot initiate)warandthePresidentspowertoexecute(ornotexe cute)war,sothateitherbranchhasthepracticalpower(within limitsandsubjecttootherchecks)tostopwar. Start with the President. I submit that it follows from the above discussion of the Presidents CommanderinChief
44.Paulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at 184041. Congress also possesses power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST.art.I,8,cl.18,tolegislateinsupportofthePresidentsexerciseofhis warexecuting power under the CommanderinChief Clause, by passing laws it judges necessary and proper for carrying into execution the Presidents power. The power is a sweeping one that enlarges the overall scope of national govern ment power, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 HARV.J.L.&PUB.POLY991,1001(2008),butitisnotproperlyapowerthatmaybe usedtosubtractfromthePresidentsconstitutionalpowersundertheCommander inChiefClause.AlthoughCongressofcoursemayusetheauspicesoftheNeces saryandProperClausetopressitsviewsofthelimitsofpresidentialwarpower, the Clause is not a power to disempower another branch, but a power to grant otherbranchespowersancillarytotheirconstitutionalpowers. 45.SeeLichterv.UnitedStates,334U.S.742,77879(1948). 46.IhopetodevelopthisthemeinasubsequentessayprovisionallyentitledThe PowertoDeclarePeace(unpublishedpartialmanuscriptonfilewithauthor).
No.1]
TheWarPower
129
Clause war power with respect to decisions concerning the conductofwarthatthedecisiontoendawar(ortorefrainfrom pursuingitaggressively)isanaspectoftheexecutivePower and the CommanderinChief Clause power of the President. The President may terminate war by reaching a treaty that wouldlegallyterminateit,andthePresidentmayfunctionally terminate a war by declining to continue to pursue it, or by reaching an armistice or a truce (a nontreaty executive agreement) that would functionally end, though perhaps not legallyterminate,aconstitutionallyauthorizedwar.47 Finally, and most radically, it follows from the Presidents unilateral CommanderinChief and executive power over the conduct of war that the President has the power to decline to executeadeclarationofwar.IftheCommanderinChiefClause poweristakenseriously,itisthePresidentsdecisionwhento endwhentoquitawar.Toputthemattercolloquially(and in a retro, sixtiesish sort of way), what if Congress threw a warandnobodycameormorespecifically,whatifthePresi dentdidnotshowuptofight?Theconstitutionalansweristhat thePresidenthastheconstitutionalpowernottofightawar,or toendit,bythenonexerciseofhisexclusivewarpowerunder theCommanderinChiefClause. Congress has some powers in this regard, too. Congress couldrepealadeclarationofwarandstripwhateverlegalau thorization comes with such declaration (in those overwhelm ing majority of situations in which such authorization is re quired)leavingawarnolongerlegallyauthorized.Congress didessentiallythiswithrespecttotheVietnamWarbyrepeal
47.On the legal force of executive agreements, see Paulsen, The Constitutional PowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at178799.Mypreliminaryviewis thatawarthatisendedasapracticalmatterbyapresidentialexecutiveagree mentwiththehostileforceorpoweranarmisticeortruceconstitutionallymay be resumed by the President (or a successor President), without renewed legisla tive authorization, when, in the Presidents judgment, the executive agreement is nolongerintheUnitedStatessinterest.ApeacetreatythatcomplieswiththeCon stitutions treatymaking requirements has the status of supreme U.S. law, under ArticleVIoftheConstitution.Itisdifficulttoimaginecircumstancesinwhichsuch atreatywouldnotbeunderstoodaslegallyterminatingCongresssstatutorydec larationorequivalentauthorizationofwar(nomatteronesviewastowhetherthe lastintimerulewithrespecttotherelativelegalforceofstatutesandtreatiesis correct, see id. at 1773 n.28). Again, I expect to develop and refine this point in a subsequentessay.Paulsen,ThePowertoDeclarePeace,supranote46.
130
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
ing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.48 In addition, Congress pos sessestheappropriationspowerandcanemploysuchapower to defund an authorized war.49 The exercise of that power could effectively (though, again, probably not legally) terminate awar.CongressdidthiswithrespecttotheVietnamWar,too, conditioning its postTonkinrepeal military appropriations in such a way as to essentially shut down the war in Indochina, leadingtoAmericaspracticaltacticaldefeatandevacuation.50 SomefolksmistakenlytakethistomeanthatCongresssreal war power is the appropriations power and that the declare Warclauseiseithertoothless,meresurplusage,ormustmean something other than a warauthorization power.51 Not at all. The power to declare waror notremains the relevant sub stantive power of Congress. The power over appropriations is merely Congresss trumpcard, shootout powera different substantivepower,butapowerfulonethatCongressmayem ploy to effectuate its other constitutional powers, including its substantive constitutional power to initiate war. But note that defunding does not deauthorize; a resumption of funding would return to the President the practical ability to continue towagewarwithoutneedforreauthorization.Thereremains alegitimatedebateovertheproprietyofCongressusingitsap
48.The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), was, in my opinion the legal equivalent of a congressional authorization of war, albeit a fairlyimprecise,vague,andgeneraldelegationtothePresident.In1971,Congress repealedtheTonkinGulfResolution,inaonesentenceamendmenttoanunrelated bill.SeeActofJan.12,1971,12,Pub.L.No.91672,84Stat.2053,2055(1971).In the case of the Vietnam War, the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution may not have had the effect of repealing all congressionally granted authority. See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITSAFTERMATH3234(1993). 49.SeeJ.GregorySidak,ToDeclareWar,41DUKE L.J.27,99108(1991)(discuss ingseveralversionsofthispropostition). 50.In 1973, Congress passed, and President Nixon signed, the Joint Resolution Making continuing appropriations for fiscal year 1974, 108,Pub. L. No. 9352, 87Stat.130,134(1973)(Notwithstandinganyotherprovisionoflaw,onorafter August15,1973,nofundshereinorheretoforeappropriatedmaybeobligatedor expendedtofinancedirectlyorindirectlycombatactivitiesbyUnitedStatesmili tary forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, LaosorCambodia.). 51.SeeDelahunty&Yoo,MakingWar,supranote1,at12729;Delahunty&Yoo, ThePresidentsConstitutionalAuthoritytoConductMilitaryOperationsAgainstTerror istOrganizationsandtheNationsthatHarbororSupportThem,supranote1,at49193; Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by OtherMeans: The Original Understanding ofWar Powers,supranote1,at174,17682.
No.1]
TheWarPower
131
propriationspowersoastoleverageitintoimpairmentofthe Presidents CommanderinChief Clause powersbut without having repealed a declaration or authorization of war. This maybeunfair,butittoowouldseemtobeapartofthesepara tionofpowers game. The branches may attempt to leverage the powers they have in order to press their respective posi tions with respect to the Constitutions (sometimes debatable) allocations of the war power. And the branches may, and should,resistsuchleveragingbytheotherswiththepowersat their disposal. Put concretely, Congress may push but the Presidentshouldpushback.52 With respect to the power to terminate war, it is interesting thatneitherpartymayforcetheothertoengageinwar(atleast notconstitutionally).Thismeansthat,iftheconstitutionalplanis honored,eachbranchpossessesaunilateralpowertostopwar.53 In that font of legal insight, the movie Ghostbusters, all hell breaks lose if the Gatekeeper and the Keymaster act in
52.JamesMadisonofcoursesawallthisclearly,asamatterofgeneralprinciple. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (The several departments being perfectly coordinate by the terms of their com moncommission,neitherofthem,itisevident,canpretendtoanexclusiveorsu perior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers[.]); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra, at 32022 (To what expedient, then, shallwefinallyresort,formaintaininginpracticethenecessarypartitionofpower amongtheseveraldepartmentsaslaiddownintheconstitution?Theonlyanswer thatcanbegivenisthatasalltheseexteriorprovisionsarefoundtobeinadequate thedefectmustbesupplied,bysocontrivingtheinteriorstructureofthegovern ment as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the meansofkeepingeachotherintheirproperplaces....Inordertolayaduefoun dation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of govern ment,whichtoacertainextentisadmittedonallhandstobeessentialtothepres ervation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own[.]...[T]hegreatsecurityagainstagradualconcentrationoftheseveralpow ers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each de partment the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist en croachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases,bemadecommensuratetothedangerofattack.Ambitionmustbemadeto counteractambition.Theinterestofthemanmustbeconnectedwiththeconstitu tionalrightsoftheplace.). 53.Ofcourse,withrespecttoCongresssexerciseofanyofitslegislativepowers, thePresidentretainsthequalifiedvetosetforthinArticleI,Section7.Congresss exercise of its legislative powers is thus internally checked. Nonetheless, the veto powerisnotaveryeffectivepowerwithwhichtocompelCongresstodoanything. (Ashieldisnotmuchofasword.Butitmightbeusedsomewhatasone.)Tothe extent congressional inaction is sufficient to accomplish certain endsinaction yieldsnonfundingthevetoisaveryweakcheckonCongressspowersilentlyto declarepeace.
132
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
concert,butonlyiftheyactinconcert.Neithercontrolstheac tions of theother.54 So too the war power under the Constitu tionisunleashedonlyifCongressauthorizesandthePresident executeswar.Oneloadsthegunandtheotherpullsthetrigger. Neithercontrolstheother.Andjustaswarcannotconstitution ally occur without the concurrence of both, war constitution ally mayterminateeitherwhenCongressstopsloadingorthe Presidentstopsfiring. III. THERELEVANCEANDIRRELEVANCEOFTHEJUDICIARY
Whataboutthethirdbranch?WhenIfirststartedteachinga specializedcourseintheconstitutionallawofwarpowersin Octoberof2001,immediatelyaftertheeventsof9/11andup until2004,Iwouldhavesaid(anddidsay)that,inmattersof war and peace, the judiciary has been a rare, hesitant, timid player.Thecourtshistoricallyhavebeeninclinedtoduckcon stitutionalissuesofwarpowers,findinglackofstanding,dis missing cases on political question, ripeness, or other nonjusticiability grounds, or deferring substantively (even sometimes cravenly) to the executive branchs constitutional interpretations.(IthinkofcaseslikeDames&Mooreasanillus trationofthelastphenomenon,andevenmoreextraordinarily, KorematsuandHirabayashi.)55 Such abstention, deference, and ducking are wrong. Under our system of separation of powers, the judicial branch is (as Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 78) incomparably the
54.GHOSTBUSTERS(Columbia1984). 55.Thecasesofcravendeferencetotheexecutivebranch,referredtointhetext, areDames&Moorev.Regan,453U.S.654(1981);Korematsuv.UnitedStates,323 U.S.214(1944);Hirabayashiv.UnitedStates,320U.S.81(1943).Forrecentrepre sentative judicial decisions holding warpowers questions nonjusticiable, see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 2024 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding lack of congres sionalstandingtochallengeunilateralpresidentialwarmaking);Kucinichv.Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 311 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding lack of congressional standing to challengepresidentialconductofwar);Dellumsv.Bush,752F.Supp.1141,1144 46, 114952 (D.D.C. 1990) (finding challenge to threatened unilateral presidential warmakingunripe(butnototherwiseanonjusticiablepoliticalquestion));Ange v.Bush,752F.Supp.509,510(D.D.C.1990)(findingchallengetopresidentialtroop deployment a nonjusticiable political question). I have previously criticized the courtsuseofthesocalledpoliticalquestiondoctrinetoavoiddecisionsinmat ters of war powers. See Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law,supranote2,at181622;MichaelStokesPaulsen,TheConstitutionofNecessity, 79NOTREDAMEL.REV.1257,129396(2004).
No.1]
TheWarPower
133
weakest of the three, unable successfully to attack either of the others.Itpossessesneitherforcenorwill,butmerelyjudgment.56 Butitmustrenderjudgment.TheConstitutiondoesnotcon template, and its text does not support, a freefloating restric tiononjudicialpowertodecideissuesotherwiseproperlypre sented to them simply because they involve constitutional questionsofwarandpeace.Neitherthepoliticalsensitivityof an issue nor the importance of an issue disables the judicial powerentirely(assomeapplicationsofthepoliticalquestion doctrine almost seem to hold) or generates a judicial obliga tiontodecideacasewronglyindeferencetowhatotheractors havedonewrongly. Since 2004, the pendulum has swung dramatically, even radically, in the opposite direction with cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,57 Rasul v. Bush,58 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,59 and Boumedi enev.Bush.60Eachofthesedecisionswas,inmyview,wrongly decidedvery badly so, and with potentially harmful conse quencestothenationssecurity.61Butnotewell:Itisnotthefact of judicial decision in this area, but the substance of the actual judicial decisions in this area, that constitutes the problem. Courts have the power to address constitutional issues of this nature. They simply have no rightful power to decide them wrongly.Thatisamisexerciseamisuseoftheconstitutional powerofthecourtstorenderindependentjudgment. What,then,doyoudowhenthejudiciarysuddenlybeginsto intrude on the Constitutions allocation of powers, interfering withtheproperArticleIIpresidentialpowertowagewar,de tain prisoners, and impose military punishments on unlawful enemycombatants?Oneoptionissimplelegislativecorrection.
56.SeeTHEFEDERALISTNO.78(AlexanderHamilton),supranote52,at469. 57.542U.S.507(2004). 58.542U.S.466(2004). 59.548U.S.557(2006). 60.128S.Ct.2229(2008). 61.Afulldefenseofthispropositionwouldconstituteanarticleinitself.Ihave made many ofthose substantive points in other writings, and discussed and em bracedobjectionsmadebyothers.SeePaulsen,TheConstitutionalPowertoInterpret International Law, supra note 2, at 183442. My central point here, however, is the onetowhichIproceedinthenextparagraph:Assumingtheexistenceofawrongly decided, harmfultonationalsecurity judicial decisioncertainly not an unthink ableproposition,giventheCourtsrecentdecisionsinthesecaseswhatdoesthe ideaofseparationofpowershavetosayabouttheexecutivesobligationtofollow suchdecisions?
134
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
ThissolutionisavailablewhentheCourtrestsitsdecisionona separationofpowersgroundthatthePresidentsactionlegally requires congressional authorization and such authorization hasnotbeengiven.Regardlessofwhethersuchajudicialdeci sionissoundorunsound,itoftencanberemediedbytheex pedient of going to Congress for the authorization the Court thought necessary. This is what happened in the aftermath of theCourts2006decisioninHamdananegregiousandpoten tiallydangerousdecision,butonethatprovedcapableoflegis lativecorrectionbecauseitultimatelyrestedonthegroundthat the Presidents military commission procedures were uncon stitutionalonlybecausenotlegislativelyauthorized.President George W. Bush chose to put the issue to Congressand raised the stakes by transferring several highvalue terrorist unlawful combatants to Guantanamo.62 Congress responded withtheMilitaryCommissionsActof2006(MCA).63TheMCA was, in effect, a sweeping legislative repudiation of Hamdan and a broad reaffirmation of President Bushs position, but tressing presidential power.64 Congress (to use Youngstown speak)addeditslegislativepowerstothosethatthePresident possessesinthisareabyvirtueofhisexclusiveArticleIIpow ers. Presidential actions consistent with the MCA fall within the safest harbor of Youngstowns Category I of most indisputablyauthorized presidential actions. The MCA thus gavePresidentBush,andnowPresidentObama,alltheauthor ityhecouldpossiblyneedwithrespecttomilitarycommissions and war prisoner detentions. When one adds the MCA to the alreadyexisting authorizations for use of military force, it is impossible not to conclude that the waging of the war on ter ror,withrespecttomattersofcapture,detention,interrogation, andmilitarypunishment,standsonanythingbutthefirmestof constitutional footings. The President is at the very height of his constitutional powers. One could think of this as Youngs town Category I on steroidsa sort of a superduper Youngs townCategoryIsituation.
62.President Moves 14 Held in Secret to Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/07/us/07detain.html. 63.Pub.L.No.109366,120Stat.2600(codifiedasamendedinscatteredsections of10U.S.C.). 64.For discussion and elaboration of this point, see Paulsen, The Constitutional PowertoInterpretInternationalLaw,supranote2,at183538.
No.1]
TheWarPower
135
Just about the only aspect of Hamdan that theMCA did not repudiate was the proposition that such legislative authoriza tion was constitutionally necessary in the first place. Is there not a certain implicit weakening of presidential power by the veryactofacquiescingtothesupposedneedtogetCongresss approval? Not necessarily, but one can certainly understand the concern that asking Congress for authority implies, or couldbetakentoimply,alackofindependentauthority.There is also the concern thatCongress might refuse to act or might legislate in support of the Presidents position in a not fully supportive way. This concern no doubt influenced the Bush administrations decisions not to seek specific legislative au thority or support in the first instance. With respect to the MCA, the story had a mostly happy legislative ending. But whatifithadnot? Sometimes, the Court will erroneously hold legislative au thorizationnecessaryforpresidentialactionandCongresswill notgrantthatauthorizationtothefullextentthePresidentfeels necessary.And sometimes the Court keeps invalidating presi dentialaction,notwithstandingcongressionalauthorization,or finds aspects of the authorization unconstitutional. This is an aptdescriptionofwhathappenedinBoumediene.65Whatthen? Isubmitthattheschemeofseparationofpowersthelogic of the Framers design and the clear implication of the words theyusedtoexplainanddefendthatdesignmustpermitthe President,asCommanderinChief,torefusetobeboundbyerro neousdecisionsoftheSupremeCourtthatposeaseriousharmtothe nation.66 I expect that President Bush would have so refused, hadhethoughtitnecessary.Thisposition,ofcourse,iscontro versialintodayslegalculture.Butitshouldnotbe.Theideaof executive review of unlawful Supreme Court decisions fol lows from the same premises that justify judicial review of
65.128S.Ct.2229,226272(2008)(invalidatingaprovisionoftheMCAascon trarytotheWritSuspensionClauseofArticleI,Section9). 66.Ihaveadvancedversionsofthispropositioninotherarticles.SeePaulsen,The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, supra note 3; Paulsen, Lincoln and Judicial Authority, supra note 3; Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of AutonomousExecutiveBranchInterpretation,15CARDOZO L. REV.81(1993);Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, supra note 3; MichaelStokesPaulsen,NixonNow:TheCourtsandthePresidencyAfterTwentyfive Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 134568 (1999); see also Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity,supranote55,at126063.
136
HarvardJournalofLaw&PublicPolicy
[Vol.33
congressionaldecisions:Noonebranchisboundbytheconsti tutionalinterpretationsofanyoftheothers.67Indeed,Isubmit thatitwouldbeaviolationofthePresidentsoathifhewere,in acaseendangeringthenationssecurity,deliberatelyandcon sciouslytoadheretowhatheconcludesisanerroneousjudicial determination that poses a grave threat to national security. PresidentLincolnclearlyunderstoodthisdutyandsawinthe Presidential Oath Clause a duty to defend the nation and to resisterroneousjudicialdecisionsthreateningtheConstitution andtheconstitutionalorder.68ThePresidentswearsanoathto preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, a personal, nondelegable, nondefeasible moral and legal obligation that logically includes the preservation, protection, and defense of the nation whose Constitution it is and upon whose existence everythingelseintheConstitutiondepends. To put it as plainly as I can: It would be a violation of the PresidentsoathtoaccedetoajudicialviolationoftheConsti tutionthatendangersthenationssecurity.If,inconsequence ofHamdi,Hamdan,Boumediene,oranyothererroneousjudicial decision, the President of the United States would be re quired to take action endangering the nations security, he should announce that he will, to that extent, refuse to honor thatjudicialdecision. CONCLUSION Thewarpower,likeanyotherpowertooimportanttovestin asinglesetofhands,isadivided,separated,sharedpower.In crudeoverview:Ingeneral,thepowertoinitiatewarisCon gresss and not the Presidents. Similarly, the power to exe cutewar,butnottoinitiateit,isthePresidents.Eachbranch possesses exclusive powers that the other may not properly infringeorusurp.Buteachbranchmayleverageitswarpow ers, and its other constitutional powers, to check the others exercise of theirsor to attempt precisely such an improper usurpation. That is how the separation of powers game
67.Paulsen,TheIrrepressibleMythofMarbury,supranote3,at272438.Seegener ally Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, supranote3. 68.Paulsen,LincolnandJudicialAuthority,supranote3,at12771301;Paulsen,The ConstitutionofNecessity,supranote55,at126467.
No.1]
TheWarPower
137
works, as a general proposition, and the interaction of war powersisnoexception. Thecourts,asthethirdbranchinthisgame,havetheimpor tant and proper roleand dutyof deciding genuine Article IIIcasesinvolvingwarpowers,inaccordancewiththeConsti tutionstrueallocationofwarpowers.Theyhavenosubstan tive war powers, but an important, coequal interpretive province.Theyshouldnotshirktheexerciseoftheirtruecon stitutionalpowers,butneithershouldtheyabusethatpower. Where they do, a further aspect of the separation of powers gameisthattheotherbranchesmay,andshould,resistthose encroachmentsontheirexclusiveprovincesencroachmentsin violationoftheConstitutionbytheexerciseoftheircoequal interpretivepowers.