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8.

Natural Resources

This chapter considers significant natural resource issues for Te Rarawa. The chapter is divided into three main parts with case studies directed at specific natural resource issues. The case studies in section 8.1 concern land and waterways, in section 8.2 they discuss flora and fauna issues and in section 8.3 they relate to generic natural resource issues such as Crown policies and legislation relating to the natural environment. There is considerable overlap in the issues discussed in the case studies.

8.1

Land and Waterways: Case Studies

8.1.1 Te Oneroa a Tohe


Te Oneroa a Tohe is a sandy northwest coastline running from Ahipara to Scott Point. The foreshore is a natural habitat for a diverse range of fish, shellfish, and other sea creatures. There are extensive dune fields at various places along the beach, which are now largely planted in exotic sand binders, pasture and pine forest. The dune lakes and swamps behind Te Oneroa a Tohe are habitats for a variety of bird species.

Historically the northern tribes regarded Te Oneroa a Tohe as an important source of political, social, economic, and spiritual authority. Many battles between Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa took place along the beach, which was a place of continuous occupation and a critical source for food, trade, and migration. Since the 1820s at least, Te Rarawa has exercised exclusive and dominant use of the southern end of Te Oneroa a Tohe, which includes the foreshore.1 Within this area, Te Rarawa enhanced, maintained and gave practical effect to their customary practices. Tribal members learned important rules and practices to maintain the diverse

ecosystems the area supported, as well as learning tikanga that supported the social relationships connected to Te Oneroa a Tohe and its resources.

In 1955, Walter Hone Te Pania lodged an application with the Maori Land Court seeking an investigation of title to Te Oneroa a Tohe with a view to vesting its ownership in nominated trustees.2 The Court heard the application in 1957. Throughout the hearing, leading kaikorero of Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri gave evidence of their customary associations with the beach.

At one time Te Aupouri was dominant in the Ahipara district, controlling fishing grounds and the collection of shellfish. However, tribal authority along the beach has been historically contested between Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa and numerous battle sites dot the foreshore. One
Richard Boast, In Re Ninety Mile Beach Revisited: The Native Land Court and the Foreshore in New Zealand Legal History, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, Vol 23, 1993, p 148. 2 Boast, 1993, pp 163-164.
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of the key battles occurred at Honuhonu, as a result of which, Te Rarawa secured its authority over the southern end of Ninety Mile Beach, including marae and other reserves, fishing grounds, cultivations, and cemeteries.3 In evidence given before the Maori Land Court, Rarawa Kerehoma recounted the following associated rahui: When [the chief] Poroa died [at Honuhonu] all things pertaining to the ocean were set apartdeemed sacred for a period of 1 year. No one was allowed to get any seafood from the sea. When the year was up the restriction was lifted. This is a custom of the Maori people.4 In cross-examination, Kerehoma reiterated that Poroa lived at Ahipara, and had made his mark before the Treaty of Waitangi. Kerehoma also spoke of the importance of the beach to others living inland who relied on the food from the sea, including tuna and various birds, as well as the cultivations along the coast.

James Bowman was called to testify about his observations at Ninety Mile Beach. A Pakeha, he was 83 years old at the time of the Maori Land Court hearing in 1957. He lived at Herekino but had been born in Ahipara. He remarked that when he was a young boy, a chief named Mumu was in charge, controlling nearly the whole of the beach and the land too. There were raupo huts right around the coast along Reef Point, and gardens of potatoes, kumara, watermelon, and taro. Bowman saw thousands of skeletons along the coastline. He explained that when Mumu died a rahui was placed on the beach:

when the old chief Mumu died they buried him and put up a rahui. They put up a pole a good thick post, and they carved some sort of tattoo on itThe people knew the post was up to close the coast for shell fish and mussels. One post was 2-3 miles North of Ahipara and the other was the other side of Reef Point at Otia.5 Bowman was unequivocal that Te Rarawa controlled the beach south of Hukatere and had done since long before he was born.6

In his evidence, Matiu Witana spoke of an event in which his grandfather, Hamihana Paka threw a European into the sea for lighting a fire on rocks that contained a bed of mussels. According to Witana, the lighting of fires was governed by Maori custom and this European had lit his fire below the high water mark.7

3 4

Northern Minute Book 85, typescript copy, pp 10-11. ibid. 5 ibid, p 16. 6 ibid, p 17. 7 ibid, p 17.

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Waata Hone Te Pania commented that Te Aupouri at one time had exclusive control of the beach and that Te Rarawa distributed that exclusive occupation. The last battle was in 1822, when Te Rarawa went to fight Te Aupouri by way of the beach. As a result, Te Pania thought the boundary between Te Aupouri was fixed at Ngapae by the battle in 1820 and not altered by the later battle at Hukatere. After 1820, Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa controlled the beach, with each chief on their side controlling their own area.8

More recently, tangata whenua presented oral evidence about Te Oneroa a Tohe during the Waitangi Tribunals hearing of the Muriwhenua claims. Various Maori submitted that for much of the twentieth century Te Oneroa a Tohe was an important source of fish and shellfish, and other foods and resources. These submissions enhance the evidence given in the Maori Land Court hearing of 1957, demonstrating the contested nature of tribal authority and relationships between neighbouring iwi, with Te Rarawa tribal authority prevailing at the southern end of the beach. The abundance of shellfish and fish caught in various places along the foreshore including estuaries that flowed into the sea is clear in the oral evidence. In more recent times, commercial fishing, over-harvesting and vehicles on the beach have come to be seen as the main causes for the depletion of shellfish and fish in the area.

Haimona Snowden who was born in 1914, stated in his evidence before the Tribunal that he gathered shellfish and fish including ngakoikoi around the rocks and dived for crayfish at Otia. There were rules to be followed, including never scaling fish or gutting fish on the beach and only lighting fires above the high water mark. Snowden had personally placed a rahui on the beach when a local man had collapsed and died there. The rahui was advertised in the local newspaper, the Northland Age. He explained that a rahui would normally be three months or longer, but he had cut it down given the ways of today. The evidence of Hohepa Kanara supports views of rahui commonly held by Te Rarawa people that when a person drowned at sea or when the seabed was exhausted a rahui would be placed on the area to replenish the supply. No one was allowed to trespass.9 According to Snowden, no one person had specific rights, but that the amount of seafood they took was limited in practical ways. Snowden participated in the tribal committee, which was concerned about the depletion of seafood. The committee had discussed making a reserve from Waimimiha to Herekino, although nothing resulted. He stated that members of the tribal committee acted as honorary fishery officers, putting notices up at their own expense, but they had no legal backing to support their actions.10

8 9

ibid, p 2. Boast, 1993, p 147. 10 Haimona Snowden, Submission on Te Oneroa a Tohe, 4 March 1991, Wai 45, Doc # C9, pp 4-9.

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Other anecdotal evidence demonstrates how Maori used their knowledge of particular seasons as a means of maintaining shellfish populations in the area. McCully Matiu stated that toheroa would never be taken when they were small and that: When the kutai go off, the paua are fat, when paua goes off, kina are fat. When kowhai blooms, kina is fat. When tawhara and patangatanga, fruits of kiekie are ready, the kutai is ready. Another important aspect was that shells and remnants of fish were never to go back into the sea.11 Matiu commented that Walter Masters had tried to prevent Maori from accessing their traditional spots by blocking the land, which he had leased from the Crown, with iron gates. Matiu thought that commercial fishing ventures had hindered the area contributing to the depletion of local resources. One example was cray-fishing at Reef Point with people gathering about twenty sacks a day. In his opinion, they should have gone out to sea instead of exhausting the crayfish at the rocks, and because of this commercial venture koura are scarce in the area.12

In his submission, Eddie Walker was concerned that commercial fishing had depleted the schools of fish that were previously in abundance. The trawlers would take huge amounts of fish without regard for other species that relied on fish for survival, including other sea creatures and birds, and that if the foreshore was overpopulated with crabs, other shellfish could not survive. Walker went on to say that the trawlers would dump their rubbish littering the beach with dead fish and that toheroa were affected because of the vehicles travelling along the beach.13

Some oral submissions mentioned kaitiaki of the area, including the white shark and the stingray, Paraweta.14 The submissions further mentioned the diversity of fish and shellfish along the foreshore and coastline, including ngakoikoi, crayfish, toheroa, kingfish, mullet, kutai, kina, paua, tuatua, ngohi, snapper, kahawai, flounder, parore, shark. In addition, there are living memories of gathering seafood in knee-deep water, and netting being restricted to that depth to ensure fish populations would not be over fished.

Despite European settlement and agricultural development Te Rarawa continued to utilise and manage Te Oneroa a Tohe, an important mahinga kai, along customary lines. Evidence given in 1957 at the Maori Land Court hearing supported Te Rarawa having exclusive tribal authority and that they exercised this authority according to their customary practices. The oral

submissions given in the 1990s further enhanced Te Rarawa authority and rights of access and
11 12

McCully Matiu, Submission on Te Oneroa a Tohe, 5 March 1991, Wai 45, Doc # C11, p 7. Matiu, p 11. 13 Eddie Walker, Submission on Te Oneroa a Tohe, 5 March 1991, Wai 45, Doc # C12, pp 2-4. 14 Snowden, p 6 and Matiu, p 9.

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use of natural resources over Te Oneroa a Tohe through continual harvesting techniques and management practices. In the Muriwhenua Fishing Report, the Tribunal stated that for at least twenty years after the Treaty of Waitangi was signed Maori fished coastal areas in their customary manner without regulation, restraint, or impediment except for rahui that they placed on themselves.15

8.1.1.1

Ownership of Te Oneroa a Tohe

Until the 1870s, the Crown operated on the assumption that Maori titles to the foreshore had to be expressly extinguished along with titles to the adjoining land.16 Thus, the Crown assumed ownership and control of such areas under its prerogative right. The Director-General of the Lands and Survey Department, in a memorandum concerning the Awapuni Lagoon at Gisborne stated that, [t]he property in the soil of the shore of the sea, of estuaries and arms of the sea and of navigable rivers between high and low water mark is prima facie vested of common right in the Crown.17 The Crown view was that the foreshore was separate from other land. To reinforce its position the Crown used legislation to secure, maintain, and administer coastal areas. From 1878, the courts were precluded from vesting the foreshore in any person without the special sanction of the General Assembly.18 However, lego-historian Richard Boast maintains that legislation could stop the Court from hearing such claims because the Native Acts were an exception to the Harbours Act of 1878.19

The Harbours Act 1910 enabled foreshore reclamation to be undertaken, based on Crown policy that the foreshore belonged to the Crown. Pastoral development intruded on coastal areas through sand reclamation, without regard for Maori rights and the natural resources the habitat supported. McCully Matiu in his oral submission spoke about relief workers planting marram grass near Lake Waimimiha, and it is possible that this related to reclamation works.20

The ownership and management of the foreshore remained a contentious issue despite the enactment of legislation to secure Crown ownership There are numerous legal cases where Maori have claimed ownership of the foreshore, but where the Court has ruled that customary title did not exist. An example within Te Rarawa rohe was the Ngakororo case in the Maori Appellate Court, where the judge accepted the Crown had title on the basis that the claimants

Waitangi Tribunal, Muriwhenua Fishing Report, Wellington, 1988, p 220. Richard P Boast, The Foreshore, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series (National Theme Q), Wellington 1996, p 31. 17 Geoff Park, Effective Exclusion; An Exploratory Overview of Crown Actions and Maori Responses Concerning the Indigenous Flora and fauna, 1912-1983, unpublished report, Wellington, 2001, p 97. 18 Boast, 1993, pp 152-1523. 19 ibid. 20 Matiu, p 2.
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had failed to reach the standard of proof to show a proprietary rights over the foreshore.21 In this case, the Crown Law Office advised that the Crowns case was weak and recommended the removal of such cases from the jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court.22 It is not surprising that by the time of the investigation of title into Te Oneroa a Tohe, the Crown was taking positive steps to secure its title to the foreshore.

During the 1957 court investigation counsel for Waata Te Pania, contended that Maori held the land according to their customs and usages, that the land was customary land prior to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi and remained so subsequently. Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri effectively occupied the foreshore to the exclusion of other tribes and Pakeha.23 The claimants submitted evidence proving ownership, including the closing of parts of the beach for long periods in recognition of the death of a chief and to fatten shellfish and the exclusion of Pakeha and other tribes from the control and management of the beach. The foreshore had a vast supply of food including fish and birds, and was a place of recreation for wrestling, boxing matches, athletics, and horseracing. Both tribes carried out religious ceremonies associated with rahui. The claimants argued that despite Pakeha influence, Maori continued to occupy the foreshore and many dug for kauri gum both on the foreshore and on the coastline. On the evidence, Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri had actual possession and control of the entire beach and occupied the beach by virtue of necessity in respect of food, fish on the beach and birds in the bush. The Crown could also not show that they purchased or acquired the land.24

In response, counsel for the Crown, persisted with the argument that Maori could not retain ownership of the foreshore. In the Crowns opinion, all Maori practised rahui whether they owned the land or not: [t]he rahui of fish and shellfish is something that all people do and is common to all of New Zealand. The Crowns view was that the battleground issue was not about the reservation of the beach for settling armed combat but that [a]n enemy fought his enemy wherever he met him and could chase him. The Crown also contended that cemeteries near the foreshore were incidental to people living there and having to bury their dead.25 The Crown maintained that prior to the Treaty of Waitangi, Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri did not own the land under custom and that on the cession of New Zealand everything passed to the Crown. Subsequently, under the common law the foreshore was the property of the Crown, held for the benefit of Maori and Pakeha alike. Furthermore, under the Native Land Act 1867 a

proclamation was issued on 29 May 1872 that suspended the Native Land Act 1865 in respect of all foreshores in the Auckland Province. This proclamation had not been revoked prior to the
21 22

Boast, 1996, p 57. Boast, 1993, pp 161-162. 23 Northern Minute Book 85, typescript copy, p 1. 24 ibid, p 8.

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1957 investigation. The Crown argued that there must be proof of exclusive and continuous occupation of land from before the Treaty up until the date of investigation, before the Court could conclude the land be Maori customary land. Crown counsel submitted this was not the case and that for well over half a century the land had been in general use by the public.26

Judge Morrison stated that the legal questions raised by the Crown were for the Supreme Court to determine and his jurisdiction only required him to determine whether the foreshore was Maori customary land. He held that Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa had traditional ownership of Te Oneroa a Tohe with each tribe occupying a particular portion of the beach; Te Aupouri at the northern end and Te Rarawa at the southern. He concluded that each tribe had kainga and burial grounds scattered inland from the beach and they occupied this territory to the exclusion of other tribes. The area was regarded as a major source of food and shellfish and there was ample evidence relating to customary conservation practices of rahui and use of the beach by members of the two tribes.27

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor-General argued that the Crown acquired ownership under the common law or alternatively had ownership under legislation, such as the Harbours Act 1950 and the Crown Grants Act 1866.28 Judge Turner stated that once British rule was established the whole country became property of the Crown from whom all titles were derived. He also maintained that the Treaty of Waitangi, while it reserved certain property to Maori, did not give Maori a legal cause of action. Judge Turner accepted the Crowns argument and read section 150 of the Harbours Act 1950 as preventing the Maori Land Court from exercising its jurisdiction. Boast has commented that this view led to the widespread belief that legislation extinguished Maori title to foreshore areas.29

Again on appeal, the Court of Appeal did not think that the common law was sufficient to destroy pre-Treaty rights. Instead they placed emphasis on the coastal blocks, Muriwhenua South and Ahipara, which the Crown had acquired in the nineteenth century and proceeded on the basis that because coastal blocks had been sold then the Native Land Court must have investigated all land adjoining the beach and issued titles. However, the Crown acquired both the Muriwhenua South and Ahipara blocks before the Court was established. Boast has examined the deeds of the Muriwhenua Southern and Ahipara purchases to see if the Crown had purchased the foreshore the land adjoined. In the Muriwhenua South purchase there was general description of 25 miles of beach frontage but no explicit mention of the foreshore. The Ahipara
25 26

ibid, p 24. ibid, p 1. 27 Boast, 1993, p 164. 28 ibid, p 166.

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purchase did not include the coast and merely set out the western boundary down the coast. It seems that there was no attempt to include the foreshore in the deeds, based on the assumption that it belonged to the Crown by prerogative right.30 Instead, the Crown came into possession of most of the frontage of the southern and central sections of Ninety Mile Beach before the advent of the Native Land Court based on the common law assumption that the foreshore was vested in the Crown upon the cession of sovereignty.31

Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded, incorrectly, that the Native Land Court had dealt with the foreshore and that after investigation Maori customary rights were wholly extinguished. As a result, the Court held that the Crown had legitimate ownership of the foreshore of Te Oneroa a Tohe. The decision of the Maori Land Court, which had sole jurisdiction to determine customary title, was overturned based on legislation and the Native Land Court was assumed to have already extinguished Maori title.

Even if Maori are to accept this conclusion there are several issues left unresolved. Firstly, for much of the nineteenth century the Crown operated on the common law assumption that it owned the foreshore, yet both Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri comprehensively demonstrated at the Maori Land Court hearing, that they owned the area exclusively. Secondly, legislation such as the Harbours Act 1950, was applied to reinforce the notion that the foreshore was vested in the Crown. However, it could be implied that Maori did have ownership of Te Oneroa a Tohe up until that legislation was enacted. Boast maintains that this legislation could not be the basis of Crown ownership as it does not explicitly mention the foreshore and it was not until 1991 that there was legislation specifically referring to foreshore areas as being vested in the Crown. The most disheartening aspect is the position taken by the Court of Appeal that the Native Land Court had investigated and extinguished Maori rights based on coastal block purchases adjoining Te Oneroa a Tohe. The deeds of these purchases never explicitly mentioned the foreshore and the Maori Land Court did not investigate title to Te Oneroa a Tohe until 1957.

8.1.1.2

Resource Management Issues

The variety of iwi concerns over management of Te Oneroa a Tohe and its resources were exhibited during the investigation of title in 1957. Claimants raised concerns about the management of the beach and the disappearance of toheroa. Toheroa is a species restricted to mainland New Zealand, living in exposed open coast beaches. Although toheroa produce

29 30

ibid, p 167. ibid, p 149. 31 ibid, p 150.

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millions of eggs, a large portion is lost, consumed by other sea animals.32 Evidence from local Maori who grew up in the area mentioned the abundance of shellfish and fish.

In May 1920 a proposed lease of Te Oneroa a Tohe was advertised in the New Zealand Gazette for the extraction of toheroa for a cannery. Local Maori objected in a petition signed by 273 people and sent to the Member for Te Tai Tokerau, Tau Henare. The main concern was that the local people would be excluded from gathering toheroa for personal use although they were assured that personal taking for family consumption would be maintained.33 The Crown granted a lease for commercial extraction and a cannery opened in Waipapakauri in 1930. In 1934 nine people were employed with a daily in-season output of one ton and twenty local Maori were engaged in digging and shelling toheroa on the beach.34

In 1940, Tapihana Paikea requested a concession for Maori residing along the foreshore to take toheroa for food. He was aware of the need for control but thought that government restrictions should be waived to those who lived on the coast. In 1942 Tapihana repeated his request to Parliament but extended the provision to all Maori on the North West Coast. No government action resulted.35

During the 1940s and 1950s there were more concerns over the depletion of toheroa. The Waipapakauri cannery stopped canning in about 1943 and by 1947 had instead become reliant on canning seasonal fish and vegetables.36 In October 1947, the Member for Te Tai Tokerau, T P Paikea, asked Parliament to consider compensation for the destruction of toheroa beds. The Minster of Marine, however, suggested that the cannery was not the cause. But that the cause could be the result of pollution of [the] beach by oil during the war, poaching by troops stationed in the vicinity of the beach, heavy and fast transport using the beach during the war and the heavy mortality of toheroa prior to the war. The Crown did not comment on the prospect of compensation.37 In 1950 the cannery ceased production because of the commercial exploitation of the beds and wartime activities.38 However, it is also possible that the depletion was caused by human activity such as poaching and recreational activities on the beach placing increasing pressure on the environment.

Peter Redfearn, in a report on toheroa, compiled a table of toheroa population changes from 1919 to 1986. He concluded that scientific evidence could explain the current depletion of the
32 33

Stokes, p 377. ibid, pp 380-1. 34 ibid, p 381. 35 Park, pp 105-6. 36 Stokes, p 381. 37 ibid.

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species, that a fluctuating population is not unusual for the species; and that there may have been poor spat, or excessive predation of juveniles. Alternatively, changes in beach profiles, caused by swells and storms, could produce heaving surf which can destroy beds.39 Redfearn stated that another reason for mortality arises from the tide not covering toheroa on the beach for several days, one of the general characteristics of North Island west coast beaches. The heating of the sand causes stress to the toheroa and they die from heat exhaustion. Another reason for depletion of the toheroa resource put forward by Maori was that the planting of pine at Aupouri State Forest may have affected toheroa populations, however Redfearn did not think this would have caused depletion. However, he did voice concern that modern forestry

practices might harm toheroa by the run off of toxic materials such as insecticides or herbicides, causing unfavourable conditions in the seawater. Redfearn also thought that the cannery harvests did not have a long-term effect on the resource.40

In the late 1920s there were complaints about motor vehicles that used the beach as a roadway. There was no all-weather road up the Aupouri peninsula and until 1950 the beach was used as a road and stock route. Tour buses travelled up the East Cape Road to Cape Reinga and then would drive down the beach to Ahipara. 41 In the summer there may be up to 36 buses per day, travelling along the dunes at Ahipara through Shipwreck Bay and up towards Cape Reinga.42 Redfearn in his report, commented that in general traffic over adult toheroa beds does not appear to stress animals unless the traffic is heavy, for example, during an open season or beach fishing competition. It seems heavy traffic may cause the toheroa to float towards the surface, causing undue stress. Terrain vehicles can pose further potential hazards, exposing juvenile toheroa to gull predation, heat stress or being crushed in the sand.43 A coastal survey conducted in 1990 concluded that stock and recreational vehicles have caused damage to dune field vegetation and these vehicles were possibly adversely affecting the toheroa population. 44

Te Oneroa a Tohe is presently used for traditional and shore-based recreational fishing and shellfish gathering. Forty two percent of its seafood is gathered by Maori. The area is still an important source for tuatua, pipi, fish, paua, mussels and kina. To a lesser degree, the coastline has crayfish, crabs, toheroa, scallops, oysters, huwai, pupu, karahu, and cockles.45 There is formal protection of ten sites along Te Oneroa a Tohe, administered by the Department of
ibid. ibid. 40 ibid, p 382. 41 Boast, 1993, pp 163-164. 42 James Henare Maori Research Centre, Sustainable Development in Taitokerau: Case Study 2: Te Hiku o te Ika, Auckland, 1996, pp 26-7. 43 Stokes, p 383. 44 Department of Conservation, Coastal Resource Inventory First Order Survey: Northland Conservancy, Wellington, 1990, p 43. 45 James Henare Maori Research Centre, p 27.
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Conservation. Te Oneroa a Tohe has national importance, due to the remnants of coastal vegetation, threatened plants and rare or threatened birds utilising the coastal wetlands and lakes, and several archaeological sites of importance.46

The coastal resources of Te Oneroa a Tohe were an integral part of Te Rarawas heritage economically, socio-culturally, politically and spirituality. The legal process, Crown policy, and legislation operated to effectively deny the mana of Te Rarawa over the foreshore. However, Te Rarawa have always been concerned for the long-term maintenance of Ninety Mile Beach, its natural resources and social, cultural and historical significance. The increasing human

population, agricultural development, over-harvesting (commercial and non-commercial), and vehicles have contributed to the depletion of natural resources and the loss of knowledge and tikanga for Te Rarawa. Te Rarawa had a system of beliefs and practices, which served to conserve and manage those natural resources, but they have been denied the opportunity to maintain and exercise their customary practices.

8.1.2 Tangonge: The Lake Bed


Tangonge encompassed a lake, wetlands and various elevated sections. In 1835, local Maori transferred Tangonge to the Reverend Joseph Matthews as part of a larger pre-treaty transaction. Before the Old Land Claims Commission examined Tangonge in 1843, local Maori maintained that Matthews return the land to them. However, when Matthews requested that Tangonge be excised from his claim, the Commission instead treated it as waste land or surplus and claimed the land for the Crown. The pre-treaty transaction relating to Tangonge and attempts to have ownership of Tangonge returned are considered in detail in Chapter Three of this report. However, a brief summary of the transaction is also set out below and the ownership of the lake bed is also considered.

Tangonge formed part of the Otararau block, which Matthews, under whom the Kaitaia Mission was first established, purchased in a pre-treaty transaction from Nopera Panakareao and four others in 1835. Matthews made a series of payments for the land between 1835 and 1840.47 Even though it appears that Europeans preferred the raised parts of the surrounding area for farming, local Maori tended to gather at the edges of the Tangonge wetland, from which they obtained pipiwai, eels, fresh water mullet, ducks, swans, raupo, flax and other fish and birds.48 Local Maori did not dispute that Tangonge had originally formed part of the land transferred to Matthews. However, in what appears to be recognition of the importance of the site, they

ibid, p 26. Muriwhenua Land Report, p 161. 48 ibid, p 258.


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maintained that Matthews promised to return the land to them before Commissioner Godfrey inquired into the transaction 1843.49

When Otararau came before the Old Land Claims Commission, Godfrey examined it with the nearby Waiokai block. Matthews deed claimed an area of 2000 acres for both blocks. Godfrey recommended 1400 acres and 306.5 acres respectively for the Waiokai and Otararau blocks and a grant to that effect was issued in 1844. Fourteen years later, in 1858, the Bell Commission subsequently called in the grant. The land was surveyed and the two blocks as outlined in the deed were found to have contained 3134.5 acres in total. Waiokai amounted to 1279 acres and Otararau 1855.5 acres. At Matthews request and in what appears to be the fulfilment of his promise to return the land to local Maori, Bell excised 685 acres from the southern end of the Otararau block.50 Though Matthews wrote to Bell noting Tangonge had been cut off as he had asked, he did not say why. Bell merely assumed that this section was the balance of the land or the surplus.51

In the Muriwhenua Land Report, the Tribunal found that Bell should not have assumed the land was surplus.52 Matthews had been close to Panakareao and had known of the condition that Maori would not affirm any land transactions if the Crown did not return the surplus.53 If Matthews cut off a piece of land there was no reason to believe that it should revert to the Crown, rather than local Maori. Moreover, while the Crown had alienated Tangonge on paper, the most visible aspect of a land sale, the delivery of vacant possession, did not occur. Maori did not notify the Crown of their claim to the land in either of the Old Land Claim Commissions simply because they believed it was still theirs. It was not for some 40 years, until the 1890s, that the Crown gave local Maori cause to believe otherwise.

8.1.2.1

Ownership of the Lake Bed

Part of Tangonge was brought before the Native Land Court in 1933 in response to an application by Herepete Rapihana and others requesting a full enquiry and investigation of all the circumstances in connection with our land Tangonge by the Native Land Court.54 By the time of the petition, Lake Tangonge no longer existed as the claimants had known it. A major Government controlled drainage scheme had exposed the bed. The Pukepoto outlet had been constructed to drain the lake into the Awanui River and the lake had become only an emergency
Nepia, p 11. ibid. 51 Muriwhenua Land Report, p 260. 52 ibid. 53 ibid, pp 260-1.
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ponding area.55 Local Maori claimed the work of the Kaitaia Drainage Board had deprived them of their ancestral foods such as Pipiwai, Eels, Fresh water mulletKanae Raukura, Ducks, Swans and other fishes and birds.56 Though the claimants maintained that no part of Tangonge had ever been alienated, the claim before the court was limited at that time to the bed of the lake, which was approximately 693 acres.57

The Crown did not contest the ownership of the lakebed at the hearing in 1933. Indeed, in a letter to the Native Minister later that year, Herepete Rapihana recounted that at the sitting of the Court none of the officers of the Crown were present.58 Evidence was put forward that the lake had never been sold and the lakes importance as a major source of sustenance and other resources was voiced. Judge F.O.V. Acheson subsequently gave his judgement in favour of the Maori owners. The minute book records that orders were made that the bed be declared native customary land and that written judgement would be given as soon as possible. It appears to have never been given.

Further hearings had to take place to determine relative shares in the Tangonge Lake. Acheson divided the 693 acres into 693 shares. 75 shares were vested in the Aupouri tribe; 75 shares were vested in the Rarawa tribe, with 15 temporary trustees being named in the order; 25 shares were vested in Herepete Rapihana; 222 shares in the Puhipi list (individualised, ranging from 17 to 5 shares per person); 221 shares in a list provided by Rapihana; and 75 shares in a list provided by Hohepa Kanara. Acheson evidenced a good grasp of the complex relationship between Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa at Ahipara and his allocations showed he was trying to be fair to everyone. However, because of this judgement, the ownership of the bed of the lake became almost impossibly complicated. In practice, the Pukepoto Tribal committee seems to have taken responsibility for management of the area, and they leased parts of it for grazing.59

The drainage scheme seems to have left the bed in the worst possible state since it was neither a lake nor dry land at least not consistently through the year. A once vital and productive food and plant gathering resource was transformed into a boggy plain, which was usually under floodwater during winter and not useful for much else other than rough grazing during the rest of the year. The drainage scheme was altered in the late 1950s to minimise the risk of flooding

54

Petition, Herepete Rapihana and Others, 8 September 1932, Petition No. 183/32, Tangone Block 1913-1946, MA 1, 38/18/5, Vol 1 Part 1, National Archives Wellington. 55 R.P Boast, The Muriwhenua South and Ahipara Purchases, Waitangi Tribunal Report, p 36. 56 Petition, Herepete Rapihana and Others, 8 September 1932, Petition No. 183/32, Tangone Block 1913-1946, MA 1, 38/18/5, Vol 1 Part 1, National Archives Wellington. 57 Boast, The Muriwhenua South and Ahipara Purchases, p 36. 58 Letter, Herepete Rapihana, to the Hon. Sir Apirana Ngata, 20 October 1933, Tangone Block 1913-1946, MA 1, 38/18/5, Vol 1 Part 1, National Archives Wellington. 59 Boast, The Muriwhenua South and Ahipara Purchases, p 37.

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in Kaitaia over winter. This had the effect of overflowing the bed earlier than before. The owners were not consulted about this, continuing what seemed to have been normal practice.60

8.1.3 Kahakaharoa
Kahakaharoa is a large block consisting almost entirely of sand abutting Te Tai Tamahine on the northern side of the mouth of the Hokianga Harbour. It comprised approximately 4000 acres and as well as being home to a number of wahi tapu, including Te Puna ki Hokianga, it served as a gateway to the moana and its resources. The Crowns interest in the block stemmed from its emphasis on opening up land for agricultural and pastoral development. Sand

reclamation thus became the rationale for the Crown purchase of Kahakaharoa. To some extent, Te Rarawa thought a sand reclamation project would have some benefits, although it was unlikely they would ever compromise the importance of Kahakaharoa as a site of significance. The attitudes of local hapu were reflected in their consistent push to reserve significant sites within the block, and maintain their customary rights to the incumbent natural resources, whether on land or at sea.

By the early twentieth century, the Crown was of the view that coastal sands had no (economic) worth in their natural state. Underlying this perception was the perceived need to further land development objectives, which had dominated Crown land policy for much of the nineteenth century.61 After the turn of the century, therefore, sand dunes, dune lakes and sand flats became subject to the Sand Drift Act 1908 and various Harbours Acts, largely due to the Crowns perception that coastal sands had no (economic) worth in their natural state. The Crown wanted areas of highly evolvable character, like Kahakaharoa, to be either reclaimed for production or stabilised to prevent it threatening adjacent pasture country.62

In 1911, the government published a report by Leonard Cockayne, an ecologist, about the nations sand dunes. This report, and a further report from Cockayne in 1914, became the cornerstone for official attitudes and policies regarding sand dune reclamation. During the years following the production of his reports, Cockyane became one of the commissioners on the Royal Commission on Forestry. His reports considered sand dune areas to be inherently unstable, potentially productive and in need of reclamation.63 The 1914 report stated there were 290,000 acres of sand dune country in the North Island and Cockayne recommended that

ibid, pp 37-8. Geoff Park, Effective Exclusion; An Exploratory Overview of Crown Actions and Maori Responses Concerning the Indigenous Flora and fauna, 1912-1983, unpublished report, Wellington, 2001, p 100. 62 ibid, p 132. 63 ibid, p 133.
61

60

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the State become involved in the reclamation of Crown-owned land.64 He noted that Mori owned many areas in need of reclamation thus: Of the total area of sand dunes in New Zealand a large proportion is owned by Natives, and at present I do not recommend that the State in any way touch this. The chief localities where there are large native areas of sand dunes are the northern portion of Mangonui County, Hokianga Heads, near Helensville, Kawhia, and Levin.65 Cockayne warned the government not to consider the Hokianga Heads for a sand reclamation project, given the number of owners of the block and the process required to obtain consent from them to commit to a reclamation scheme. However, the Crown began to assess a proposal of acquisition to enable reclamation, as settlers in the area were concerned that sand was drifting onto their farms.66 After an inspection of the area, W.J. Wheeler, Chief Surveyor, proposed that Kahakaharoa be made into a scenic reserve due to the wahi tapu in the area and its historical significance as a landing place for Kupe. Moreover, Wheeler thought there would be problems in getting the owners to sell their interests and the only other way in which the Crown could obtain title would be as a compulsory acquisition under the Public Works Act.67 As a result, the Crown did not pursue the acquisition of Kahakaharoa.68

In 1945, Kahakaharoa came to the attention of Judge Prichard of the Native Land Court. In a report to the Native Department, Prichard described Kahakaharoa as useless and dangerous, with drifting sand encroaching on useful lands. He was interested in convening a meeting of owners to discuss the problem. Under the Native Purposes Act 1943 section 8, and with the consent of the owners, such lands could be vested in the Taitokerau District Maori Land Board as trustee for the owners and agent for any negotiations. But Prichard thought the Crown could obtain the freehold title, and that it should endeavour to do so on the basis that: interests of the native owners are almost valueless and unless they are extinguished, hundreds of pounds will over the years be spent by the Department in putting through successions and the owners would never become entitled to any money from the block.69

ibid, p 133. (Cockaynes first report was published in 1911: Report on the dunes areas in NZ, their geology, botany and reclamation, AJHR 1911 C-13, pp 1-76. The 1914 report, Sand Dunes in New Zealand Area and Description, is available at F1, 27/0 vol 3, National Archives, Wellington). 65 ibid, p 133. 66 ibid, p134, (Under-Secretary Lands and Survey to Commissioner of Crown Lands, Auckland, 29 July 1914 re: Sand Areas on Native Land: Proposal for scenic reserve, Hokianga Heads, BAAZ 1108/234e, National Archives, Auckland). 67 ibid, pp134-135, (W J Wheeler to the Chief Surveyor, Auckland, 16 September 1914, Sand Areas on Native Land: Proposal for scenic reserve, Hokianga Heads, BAAZ 1108/234e, National Archives, Auckland) 68 ibid, pp134 -135, (Commissioner of Crown Lands to Under-Secretary for lands and Survey Department, 14 Nov 1914 Proposal for scenic reserve, Hokianga Heads, BAAZ 1108/234e, National Archives, Auckland). 69 Memorandum, Registrar to Under-Secretary, 7 December 1945, MA W2459 5/14/1 pt1, National Archives, Wellington.

64

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Prichard then considered the question of whether the land should be gifted or sold.

He

concluded that while the owners could be persuaded to gift the land, they would over the years regret their decision. The Registrar of the Maori Land Court noted that the nativeswill always be expecting and hoping for a dividend and concluded that the Crown could pay 2/6d per acre, a nominal figure, for Kahakaharoa.70

At Prichards request, the Native Department considered acquiring the freehold title to Kahakaharoa for the Crown, in the interests of Maori land affected by the sand menace. In 1946, the Native Minister investigated the North Head area. It seems there was real interest to provide for some measure of reclamation of Kahakaharoa, with tree planting viewed as one of the most beneficial forms of reclamation.71 The Crowns acquisition of the freehold would prevent the owners from expecting the return of the land with a greatly increased value resulting from the States reclamation work.72 In October 1946, R Packwood, District Engineer, conducted a survey of Kahakaharoa. He concluded that the sand dune country covered

approximately 6,000 acres, which was generally unsuitable for cultivation or settlement. His opinion was that the sand drifts had no economic importance and the land covered had no commercial value unless reclaimed.73 It seems other government departments concurred on the basis that the drifting sand was engulfing stabilized land, but the Commissioner of Crown Lands did not think that the Crown should shoulder responsibility for the area until it was proven that it could be successfully reclaimed. Given the success at Poutu Peninsula, he recommended that the Crown should purchase the lands, as it would be a valuable asset from a farming point of view.74

The government had been fully informed that commencing a sand reclamation project while Mori retained ownership could have disastrous effects. Various government departments recommended that it would be more beneficial if the Government obtain the freehold title. However, the Native Land Act 1931 precluded the government from purchasing Mori land at less than the government valuation. On 13 September 1946, a special government valuation valued Kahakaharoa, containing 4480 acres, at 225. This was an amount the Crown was willing to pay, offering to purchase Kahakaharoa in April 1947 for the stipulated 255.75 While
70 71

ibid Memorandum, Under Secretary to Native Minster, 18 September 1946, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 72 Memorandum, Under Secretary to Under-Secretary, Department of Lands and Survey, 24 July 1946, MA W2459 5/14/1 pt1, National Archives, Wellington. 73 Letter, District Engineer to Engineer in Chief, Public Works Department, 22 October 1946, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 74 Memorandum, Commissioner of Crown lands to Under-Secretary for Lands, 23 December 1946, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 75 Proposed Purchase of Native Land for Sand Dune reclamation, 6 March 1947; and Offer by the Crown to purchase Native Land submitted to the Tokerau District Maori Land Board, 8 April 1947, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington.

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the Crown was eager to complete the sale of Kahakaharoa, the Native Land Act 1931 prescribed the manner in which the alienation should proceed. The owners needed to convene a meeting in accordance with Part XVIII of the Act, and then pass a favourable resolution with the support of a majority of the shareholders present at the meeting.76 Under the Act, an offer from the Crown to purchase had to precede any resolution to sell.77 The Crown was also precluded from purchasing land at less than the assessed value and had to ensure no owner was rendered landless as a result of the transaction.78

The specific details of the trasnaction are sketchy, but it seems that Kahakaharoa was vested in the Te Tai Tokerau Board under Part XIV of 1931 Act, perhaps as early as December 1945.79 In 1947 a meeting of the assembled owners was convened at Waihou. Judge Prichard and the Deputy Registrar of the Maori Land Court attended, and the meeting was facilitated by William Cooper. The minutes record 49 owners as present (three by proxy), 15 of whom had their shares noted. It is unclear what percentage of the owners was represented by these 49, although it is known that the Court listed 419 owners in 1959. Further research into the records of the Maori Land Court should reveal the nature of ownership over time, including the percentage of owners and shares. The resolution of the 1947 meeting was to sell Kahakaharoa to the Crown, however Himiona Kamira proposed that the land in question be gifted to the Crown. The owners resolved to gift Kahakaharoa to the Crown without consideration, although Ngakuru Pene Hare dissented.

Although the owners resolved to gift their interests in Kahakaharoa there was an unequivocal desire to protect particular sites, including waahi tapu, and maintain existing rights to access and use the natural resources within and around the area. At the first meeting in 1947 the owners wanted several waahi tapu excluded as well as an area around Te Puna ki Hokianga of about 50 to 100 acres. They also wanted access rights, at the Crowns discretion, to the sea and the right to use the foreshore for fishing and picknicking to a depth of three chains as well as a right of way for the people living at Rangi Point or Orongatea. In addition, local Te Rarawa asserted that any lime deposits found, and deemed economically workable, should be operated for the benefit of the local Maori farming community.80 In addition, it was understood that the Crown would help to reclaim areas reserved for the owners, and not just reclaim the land it was about to purchase.

76 77

Native Land Act 1931 s 418. Native Land Act 1931 s 434. 78 Native Land Act 1931 ss 452-3. 79 See Memorandum, Registrar to Under-Secretary, 7 December 1945, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington.

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The Court convened to confirm the resolution in April 1948. Representing the Crown, Mr Bell informed the owners that while the Crown was happy with the gesture of gifting the land, it was precluded by law. Section 452 of the Native Land Act 1931 prevented the Crown from acquiring Maori land except at a price at least equivalent to its government valuation. Whina Te Wake, representative for the owners in general and in particular for the people present at the meeting, stated that owners wanted to gift the land even if this required the passing of special legislation. The Court adjourned and referred the proposal of special legislation to the Department of Maori Affairs.81 However, the Crown would not oblige. It was deemed more expedient to purchase the land to obviate any grievance that might be laid against the Crown in the future and that consideration given could be applied for the benefit of the community. The Crown insisted that the alienation of Kahakaharoa be a conventional sale.82

In September 1948, a further meeting was convened to consider the sale of Kahakaharoa. Only 18 owners were present with their shares respectively listed. After considerable discussion, the owners now resolved that if they were to sell the price should be set at 2/6d an acre (with the Crown to bear all survey costs). 83 This was based on an adjoining block a quarter of the size of Kahakaharoa, yet of the same quality, which had been valued at 5/- an acre. The owners felt there was too much disparity between the government valuations for Kahakaharoa and other blocks in the area, and the 2/6d amount seemed a fair compromise. At this rate, the sale would yield around 700, which would be applied to marae and community improvements.

At the 1948 meeting, when the owners heard gifting of the land was legally untenable they resolved to sell to the Crown. However, they insisted on adhering to the conditions they had set at the 1947 meeting: to protect specific sites, access to and use of the beach and its resources, and future economic benefit that might derive from workable lime deposits.84 As long as the Crown met these conditions then the owners could accept the alienation of Kahakaharoa. These conditions highlight not only the importance of Kahakaharoa to Te Rarawa, but also the peoples desire to protect their ongoing interests.

On 29 July 1949, the Court confirmed the resolution of assembled owners under the terms of 2/6d per acre and the reservation of two blocks of land. The Court further confirmed that
80

Minutes of a meeting of assembled owners Kahakaharoa resolution, Waihou, Panguru, 27 September 1947, MA W2459 5/14/1 vol 2, National Archives, Wellington. 81 Extract from Tokerau District Maori Land Board Minute Book, Vol 18 Folio 92-93, 26 April 1948, MA W2459 5/14/1 vol 2, National Archives, Wellington. 82 Memorandum, Under-Secretary to Registrar Auckland, 11 June 1948, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 83 Minutes pf a meeting of assembled owners - resolution, Waihou, Panguru, 16 September 1948, MA W2459 5/14/1 vol.2, National Archives, Wellington. 84 Memorandum, Registrar, Auckland to Under-Secretary, 20 April 1949, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington.

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maintaining access rights and maintaining interests in the lime deposits be given effect as far as practicable.
85

The actual confirmed resolution passed by the assembled owners did not,

however, mention the issue of access rights and lime deposits; it merely noted the reservation of two particular blocks from the sale.86 Crown officials at the Department of Lands and Survey felt that the purchase of the land was still cheaper than administering the land while in Maori title. However, the Crown was hesitant over the conditions of sale. One major concern was Te Puna ki Hokianga, which it thought could be cut down to an area of 30 to 40 acres, despite the owners resolving that it be an area of 50 to 100 acres. Officials were also concerned with access rights for residents of Orongatea Block and Rangi Point in that it would heighten wind erosion and create a fire hazard. They were further troubled by the three-chain foreshore right and wanted it to exist only from the low water mark and not above the high water mark.87

The Deputy Registrar responded to these concerns by explaining each condition of the resolution. He informed the Under-Secretary of Maori Affairs that the figures of 50 to 100 acres for Te Puna ki Hokianga were approximate to avoid the expense of survey work, and that the boundary lines were of small importance. He noted that very few residents at Rangi Point had no road access, and that the reservation of access rights would retain their access to outer settlements. The Registrar was clear in stating that such issues would not cause major problems for the Crown. He seemed more concerned with completing the transaction as the issue of reclamation would take considerable time and these incidental issues could be dealt with once the transaction was completed.88

In 1950, the Director General of Lands informed the Commissioner of Works that hundreds of Maori owned valueless interests in the area, and that the Maori Land Court recommended the Crown acquire the land for reclamation. He continued that there would be no expense in buying the land but there must be a definite reclamation proposal or else the block would become a liability for the Crown.89 The Director General was simply reiterating comments and concerns shared with other government departments, yet it seemed that the Crown had not properly dealt with the issue of Kahakaharoa. Relevant government departments pushed memos around for a while answering internal questions concerning the boundaries and access rights to the beach. In 1951, the owners, represented by Whina Cooper, contacted the Minister of Native Affairs
Extract from Tokerau District Maori Land Board Minute Book, vol 18 Folio 176/178, 29 July 1949, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 86 Confirmation of Resolution passed by Assembled Owners, 29 July 1949, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 87 Memorandum, Director-General, Department of Lands and Survey to Under Secretary, 30 August 1949, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 88 Memorandum, Registrar, Auckland to Under-Secretary, 16 September 1949, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 89 Park, p136, (Director General Department of Lands and Survey to the Commissioner of Works, 5 May 1950, re Sand dune reclamation: Northside Hokianga Harbour, F1/27/1, National Archives, Wellington).
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regarding the sale of land.

He stated that he had no knowledge of the matter as sand

reclamation had been taken over by the Forestry Department.90 The Minster of Native Affairs replied to Whina Cooper in June of 1951 stating that sand reclamation was very much a nationwide issue but that purchasing the block had been deferred until the government had decided on the best way to deal with the problem.91 Further internal memos indicated that the government was still mulling over what policy it should adopt regarding sand dune reclamation.92

Despite Judge Prichard, in 1951, further requesting information as to whether the Crown would proceed with the sale of Kahakaharoa, there was still no authorisation from the government to purchase the block. By May 1953 the government recommended that Kahakaharoa be purchased but only at the nominal figure of 1/- per acre.93 By this time, the Lands and Survey Department had taken over sand reclamation. Crown agents were awaiting approval from this department, and there was some concern that the Crown could not go back on its earlier offer.94 In 1953, the Director General of Lands was again alerted that its figure of 1/- was below government valuation and that it could not legally purchase at the price, just as it was prevented from accepting the land as a gift.95 In July 1953, based on a government valuation conducted in 1952, the government indicated it was prepared to pay 255 because it did not materially differ from the figure of 1/- per acre.96

Nine people are recorded as attending a meeting convened at Panguru on 14 December 1953. The minutes also mention that numerous other owners on succession were present. The meeting recorded that the owners were disappointed at the delay over this matter and the failure to pay the original figure of 2/6 per acre. However, the owners resolved to sell Kahakaharoa at the price of 1/- per acre subject to the same conditions in the resolution of 1948, which included the exclusion of two portions of land.97

In September 1954 at a Court hearing the Crown submitted that while it was willing to purchase the land, the exact area needed to be surveyed. Court was adjourned, though the resolution was provisionally confirmed. The Maori Land Court confirmed the owners resolution to sell and, on

90 91

Notes of Interview, 12 April 1951, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. Letter, Minster of Mori Affairs to Mrs W Cooper, 18 Jun 1951, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 92 Memorandum, Duty Registrar to Under-Secretary, 16 May 1951, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 93 ibid 94 Kahakaharoa and Wairoa A: Sand Dunes, 26 May 1953, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 95 Memorandum, Secretary to Director General of Lands, 4 June 1953, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 96 Memorandum, Director General to Secretary for Maori Affairs, 15 July 1953, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 97 Minutes of meeting of assembled owners, at Panguru, 14 December 1953, MA W2459 5/14/1, vol 1, National Archives, Wellington.

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9 April 1959, ordered a partition of the Kahakaharoa block into Kahakaharoa A, B, and C. Further, Kahakaharoa B and C were vested in nominated trustees. Kahakaharoa at this stage had 419 owners in unequal shares. The Court reported that all other owners who had attended earlier meetings were deceased and that these orders were provisional only until a further meeting of owners was convened.98 In 1960 the Mori Land Court confirmed the trustees for Kahakaharoa B and C blocks with the power to arrange leases, to negotiate for sale of sand and minerals and to administer funds arsing from those activities.99 Kahakaharoa C contained the historical spring Te Puna ki Hokianga. Each block was to have sea access and block B would have road access to a public road.100 The Crown acquired Kahakaharoa, described in the purchase deed as containing 3620 acres. The deed states that the owners met, the Court confirmed their resolution and on 7 July 1959, the Board of Maori Affairs adopted the resolution and the Maori Trustee executed the transfer as agent of the owners and received the sum of 181.101

While further research is required to discover the history of Kahakaharoa since 1960, it is clear from maps compiled as a part of the Te Rarawa treaty settlement negotiations process that the stretch of beach adjoining Kahakaharoa, in the Crowns view, is in the ownership of the Department of Conservation, a clear contradiction of what the owners had intended.102

8.1.4 Whangape Harbour


The Whangape harbour is one of the smallest harbours and estuaries opening up to the Tasman Sea on the west coast of the northern North Island. It is a 4 kilometre long narrow gorge, which opens into a broad Y shaped with two rivers Awaroa and Rotokakahi.103 The floor of the harbour is irregular due to sandy bedforms and rock outcrops up to two metres in height. There is an active transport of sediment from catchments to the lower estuary in Rotokakahi River.104 The river banks act as a store of sediment but changes in natural control initiate new sediment patterns. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that rapid bank erosion on Rotokakahi was initiated by the removal of willows in mid 1980s but records relating to this issue were lost in a

98 Hokianga Minute Book, Vol 29 Folio 187-198 & 199/202, Partition Order, 9 April 1959, MA W2459 5/14/1 pt1, National Archives, Wellington. 99 Memorandum, Secretary to Minster of Maori Affairs, 27 July 1962, MA W2459 5/14/1 vol 2, National Archives, Wellington. 100 Partition Order, Kahakaharoa & Wairoa A, 1954-73, MA W2459, 5/14/1 volume 2, Box 50, National Archives, Wellington. 101 Kahakaharoa A Block (AK 5453) paper and attachments summarizing the transfer of Kahakaharoa A Block to the Crown, tabled by the Office of Treaty Settlements at a negotiations meeting with Te Rarawa, Auckland, 5 June 2003. 102 See, for example, Map of Crown Owned Land, (Sinclair Knight MERZ, sourced from Land Information New Zealand data) tabled by the Office of Treaty Settlements at a negotiations meeting with Te Rarawa, Auckland, 21 August 2003. 103 S1 WHAT IS THIS REFERENCE? 104 S31

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fire at Far North District Council offices.105 The gravel in the Rotokakahi and Awaroa rivers is highly moveable, with the gravel bar accreting rapidly despite regular gravel extraction.106 One of the main concerns for Maori in this area has been the depletion of shellfish resources and the decline of stocks of fish in the North Hokianga region. Pipi and cockles range in size but on average are very small. The harbour supports a very high mud content, this top layer of mud kills pipi, though cockles adapt and can increase in size.107 In the late 19th and early 20th century there was a Kauri timber milling industry operating in the area. The catchment of the harbour covers 300 square kilometres and by the 1920s the area had largely been stripped of its kauri timber. A mill operated on the west side of the harbour inside the entrance and at mouth of Awaroa River, but this activity ceased in the 1920s. The last of the logging operations were in 1960s at the catchment in Warawara Ranges where timber was taken from the Hokianga Harbour.108 Pollution has been one of the major concerns of Te Rarawa Maori in this area, especially as it relates to the failure of the Crown to protect fisheries and other resources in the Whangape harbour and environs. The history of pollution from milling is discussed in this section.

In 1907 G.W. Budd, a coastwaiter at Herekino, noted that sawdust from Mitchelson & Co Mill at Whangape was streaming through gaps in a retaining wall into Whangape Harbour.109 Local Mori sent a letter of concern to the Minster of Marine on 12 October 1908 stating that the Whangape River was being silted up by the dumping of sand used as ballast from the ships of Mitchelson & Co and from kauri sawdust flowing into the harbour from the mill. Debris was being deposited on the upper side of the wharf and part of a paddock had been left open for sawdust to run through to the river where it floated on water before sinking.110 The Secretary of Marine, George Allpot acted on the complaints requiring local officers to report on the situation. However, even after this action the company still let sawdust seep through into the harbour. This was evidenced in correspondence from the acting Collector of Customs to the Secretary of the Marine Department.111

In 1909 Budd reported that sawdust was still being allowed to run into the harbour unchecked. Mitchelson denied these claims and stated his intention to repair breastwork on the retaining wall as soon as a pile-driver was available (the pile driver was at that time employed at Herekino). Mirchelson stated the problem was teredo, a shipworm which bored though wood.112
105 106

S 15 S15 107 S91 108 S2 109 Daamen, p 80 110 ibid, p 81 111 ibid, p 84 112 ibid, p 85.

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The work was still not done by 10 August 1909. Mr A. Ngawaka wrote to say he feared channel would become blocked owing to ballast being washed into it near the low water mark. The manager of the company, J.H.M. Carroll, explained on 16 September 1909 that floods and bad weather had damaged repairs, that the mill was not working at that point and that ballast was not being deposited into the harbour but only under the wharf in order to secure it.

By December 1910 the company went into liquidation. Despite the liquidators instructions that no material be deposited into the harbour, the manager was unresponsive.113 In January 1911 Budd reported to the Minster of Marine that the retaining wall was in a worse condition than first reported, with no repairs being done, and ballast was still being emptied behind the wall which washed out into the harbour. Budd also wrote that Constable Hampton of Herekino had visited with Budd and seen the damaged wall.114

In September 1913 W.E. Hunt succeeded Budd as the coastwaiter at Herekino. He contacted the Secretary of the mill about debris being dumped in the harbour and sent a letter to the Superintendent of Mercantile Marine stating that no serious attempt was being made to stop sawdust dumping in the harbour and along the foreshore. He commented that the dumping was not interfering with navigation but that local Mori were concerned that the sawdust was affecting the fisheries resource. As a result, proceedings were begun against the Whangape Timber Company on 19 January 1914. The company was convicted and fined but did not stop further sawdust dumping.

Ngawaka made a further complaint relating to gravel abstraction in June 1919. Budd, who was now the coastwaiter at Whangape, noted this and a further complaint about the dangerous slips that could be caused by continued removal of gravel and that it be discontinued pending an official examination of the foreshore. John Brindle, harbourmaster at Hokianga investigated the complaint and agreed that the taking of gravel from that part of the river should cease immediately.115 John Wood, resident engineer of the public works department at the district office in Whangarei agreed that their contractor J Harrison should cease working on extracting gravel from the river. However, the district engineer suggested that there would be no harm done in removing shingle from Rotokakahi River, Pakinga Point or the area on the southern side of harbour extending from site of ferry to the bar.116

113 114

ibid, p 86. ibid, p 87. 115 ibid. 116 ibid, p 88.

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It is unclear what happened after this. However, the records show the continuous concern of Maori about the ill-effects of sawdust, sand dumping and gravel extraction. The Crown may have been responsive in terms of initiating investigations into potential damage but it did not act with enough force and speed to control continued damage.

8.1.5 Reclamation of Mudflats in the Hokianga Area


Mudflats on the Hokianga area were an important source of sustenance for local Mori. They yielded large amounts of shellfish with extensive sources of pipi and karehu. The issue of mudflat reclamation brought into question river access for Maori to exercise their fishing rights.117 Shellfish was considerably reduced by mudflat reclamation and large tracts of traditional food-gathering sites were destroyed. Such sites did not only exist as sources of food but as integral parts of the local Mori cultural landscape. The reclamation of such sites reflected a Pakeha understanding sanctioned by the government: that the land was more valuable and productive as pasture. The Maori view of such sites and their significance in the Mori world-view was disregarded.

As with many other Government actions, there was never any specific contract that the Crown could take or reclaim such areas. Mori wanted unrestricted access maintained. However, the government considered the shell fish argument to be very weak and that Maori still had sufficient sites to gather what they needed. Section 39 Harbours Amendment Act 1910 gave the Governor-General in council, the power to grant rights to lease lands between the high and low water marks where the depth of water was not sufficient for the purposes of navigation, for reclamation for up to 21 years. The 1908 Harbours Act stated that such work could not be authorised without the sanction of a special Act of Parliament.118 Pakeha farmers in Hokianga applied for licenses to expand farming and cultivations onto mudflat areas. In 1930 the

Secretary of the Marine Department, G.C. Godfrey, released mudflat regulations under section 146 Harbours Act 1923. Licensees were notified that they could surrender their leases and apply to Commissioner of Crown Lands for a lease under the new regulations. To obtain the benefit of the regulations a new proclamation had to be issued setting land aside for reclamation.119 There were two areas under reclamation in Hokianga in the early 20th century, the Vujcich reclamation at Tapuwae and Robert Hollands reclamation at Whakarapa. In general, Maori were opposed to the reclamations on the basis that the mudflats were a source of food and traditional use. On 31 January 1922 a petition by Te Tai Papahia and others was sent to Native Minister relating to banks of Hokianga River that were under water at high tide and left dry at
117 118

Reclamation Mudflats, North Auckland, 1935-40, MA 1, 19/1/217, National Archives Wellington. Daamen, p 96

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low tide. They objected to mud banks being vested in the Marine Board as the lands in questions were not sold by Mori to the government and the areas still belonged to Mori. They received no reply except to say they were informed that where the salt water of the ordinary tide flows over land, that land belongs to the King and that the Marine Department managed these areas and the government could lease but not sell these areas.120

8.1.5.1

The Vujcich Reclamation

In 1917 Mijo Vujcich and Vukovich sought a licence from the Marine Department to lease a portion of mudflat on the southern bank of the Tapuwae River. The land comprised 100 acres, a strip extending from near the mouth of the river to a distance of 1/3 of mile upstream. This area fronted their property and a Mori owned block known as Puketoro No 1 or Rerenga.121 Vujcich reapplied for a licence in July 1919, intending to buy his partners interest in adjoining land. A licence to occupy and reclaim for 50 years was issued by order-in-council on 17 Nov 1919. However, Vujcich considered the expense of 50 acres too expensive. As a result this licence was revoked and a new one was issued on 26 Jan 1920 for 165 acres.122 In 1923 Vujcich assigned occupation to his wife, Kathleen Vujcich. She had intended to improve the land but this did not occur. A half interest in the licence was then transferred to his brother, Ivan Vujcich. Vujcich did not always made full payments of rent to the Marine Department. In 1934 Ivan wrote to change payments on the basis they occupied only 146 acres not the full 165 acres and accordingly the rental was reduced. On 2 March 1937 they requested that the tenure of the land be placed under s146 Harbours Act 1923.123

In November 1923 Hohepa Himi Hare wrote to Tau Henare asking that the mudflats from the mouth of the Tapuwae River to its source and along its tributaries not be included in Marine Department leases as his people obtained food from these areas. His concern was directed solely at the mudflats fronting their interests in land.124 Rosemary Daamen commented in her report into Te Rarawa ki Hokianga that Maori throughout Hokiangawere concerned about the reclamations in their areas and the very apparent loss of their rights to use these areas for their own purposes.125

8.1.5.2

The Holland Reclamation

119 120 121

ibid. ibid, pp 98-99. ibid, p 99. 122 ibid. 123 ibid, p 100. 124 ibid. 125 ibid.

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The Whakarapa River is an arm of the northern Hokianga, located in an area of mudflats in the intertidal zone known as Ngakororo.126 In October 1919 a request to lease the Ngakororo mudflats at Whakarapa was made by Robert Holland.127 In November 1920 plans were prepared and forwarded to the Marine Department. In January 1921 John Mitchell, the pilot and signalman at Hokianga, sent the plans back to the Marine Department.128 The plan showed 63 acres to be included in the lease. The District engineer reported that Holland did not own any land around the foreshore but land that was some distance inland. Also that local Maori objected to the proposal, but that this there was no reason, in his view, to object. Holland received permission and an order-in-council was signed in January 1922.129

In 1922, much to the dismay of local Maori, Holland was given permission by the Marine Department to extend his farm by draining and banking an area of foreshore. Permission was granted pursuant to section 39 of the Harbours Amendment Act 1910. The license allowed Holland to occupy the area of foreshore for 21 years and to execute works for reclamation purposes.130 In effect, Holland was given permission to artificially create an area above the high-water mark directly abutting on areas of Maori freehold land. The owners of these blocks were incensed. Hollands project, if successful, would destroy their areas of foreshore and cut them off from access to the sea.131 In September 1924 Holland wrote to Marine Dept requesting that he be able to lease a small extra piece of land at Whakarapa between his section and the main road. Around this time William Topia wrote to the Native Minister asking what rights local Maori owners had. He wrote again not objecting to Pakeha gathering shellfish for their own use or sale but objecting to Pakeha farming on the mud flats.132

In 1924 a deputation of northern Maori called on the Minister of Marine, G.J. Anderson to explain their concerns about the Hokianga foreshore. The two major concerns were that Pakeha were legally taking and selling toheroa and the issue of the leased areas of mudflats around Hokianga.133 Terima Teiki stated that the mangroves flats adjoining lands and homes at Waihou and Whakarapa inlets and at Motuti and Wairae, were leased by the Marine Department to Pakeha who owned farms inland. themselves.
134

He wanted to work the mudflats adjoining their lands

Despite being told by the government that Maori would be given an opportunity

to object to the leases the problem at Whakarapa did not go away. For example, the Auckland
126 127

Boast, 1996, p 57. Daamen notes that this is at odds with King' assertion that Holland took a lease from the Marine Department in s 1914. 128 Daamen, p 101. 129 ibid, p 102. 130 Boast, 1996, p 57. 131 ibid. 132 Daamen, p 103. 133 Boast, 1996, p 57. 134 Daamen, p 103.

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Star on 2 March 1925 reported that two Mori being charged with trespass and damage to property on land leased by Holland. Two Maori had dug out and demolished part of retaining wall erected as part of the reclamation. The newspaper reported that on 15 September a large number of Maori had assembled on the property armed with shovels to demolish the wall. However, the Judge reserved his decision.135

On 11 June 1925 Ira Anihana applied to the Native Land Court for an investigation of title to Ngakororo. The Native Land Court investigation of title began at Rawene on 18 August 1925. However, the Crown representative was not present so the case could not proceed. A record of objections to the licence included those made on the basis of ancestral rights, occupation, access, fishing purposes and frontage to sections. The Court recognised there may be special rights but adjourned the hearing until November of that year. By December 1925 there had still been no decision.136 On 13 May 1926 in the Native Land Court at Opononi, Judge Acheson held that at since the Crown representative did not claim the mudflats as Crown land it was customary land.137 Judge Acheson wanted a survey of the area completed but the Lands and Survey Department could not complete the report for some time as they were gauging the tide over 15 months. Meanwhile, Holland asked the Marine Department to protect his tenancy. He wanted a lower rental from September to December 1927 given he could not do anything with the area. In 1930 Holland refused to pay rent for the 63 acres unless he could get a lease for a further four acres. The survey was finally completed on 1 September 1931.138 There was a further court hearing on the investigation of title on 21 October 1931 at Rawene but the court adjourned until 28 January 1932.139 In February 1932 the Native Land Court heard further evidence at Pangaru. In April 1935 Secretary of Marine informed the Secretary-General that final consideration of the case was deferred for various reasons which included the possibility of the Public Works Dept taking over and reclaiming the area for Native Settlement.140 In 1941 judgement was given that Ngakororo was papatupu land. Ngakororo became a tribal reserve as a Native Reservation under section 5 of the Native Purposes Act 1937 and rentals from it were paid to Maori. However, on appeal the Native Appellant Court accepted that the Crown had title and stated that the Claimants had failed to meet standard of proof to show any proprietary rights over the foreshore.141

135 136 137

ibid, p 104. ibid, p 106. ibid. 138 ibid, p 107. 139 Daamen, p 108. 140 ibid, p 109. 141 Boast, 1996, p 57.

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8.1.6 Owhata
The following account relating to Owhata block is taken directly from Professor Evelyn Stokes report on the Muriwhenua Claims Post 1865.142 On the Owhata block there was a papakainga on a sandy spit jutting out into Herekino Harbour. It was not part of the sale to the Crown of Rarotonga A1 in 1897. When the title to Owhata was investigated in April 1889 the area on the plan before the Court was 43 acres. In 1897 the block was partitioned into Owhata A and B. The papakainga, with a marae and urupa, was known as the place where kaimoana was abundant. The people also cultivated kumara and had vegetable gardens there. There was probably little to disturb the pace of life in this remote community until 1937 when a road was surveyed and constructed around the shores of Puhata Creek to Owhata, and now called Owhata Road. The large family of Maraea Heke were living at Owhata, and she believed that some of their land was being taken for the road. Jim Heke, in his oral evidence before the Tribunal, said his grandmother, Maraea Heke, ' strongly disagreed'with any taking of Owhata block. When the workmen arrived to start constructing the road, she put a fence across it to obstruct them.

During 1937 Maraea Heke had written letters to the Native Minister complaining about the road, before she fenced the area where she thought it crossed Owhata land. Officers of the Department of Maori Affairs were asked to investigate but the plan they found showed a road laid out in 1895 entirely on Rarotonga block, not Owhata. Maraea did not accept this. The unsympathetic Department of Maori Affairs officer advised the County Council it was a matter for police action. The neighbouring farmer Vickers who was also Mangonui County Chairman, was also putting pressure on to resolve the matter. Maraea was arrested and sent to Mount Eden gaol. By this time Judge Acheson, who had not been directly involved, sent an urgent message to the Under Secretary. On the grounds that Maraea had not been present in court when her case was heard in Kaitaia, there was a rehearing in Whangarei, and she was put on probation and sent home. In response to Judge Acheson' conclusion that there was some merit in Maraea' claim. s s Chief Judge Jones decided to do his own investigation. He wrote to the Under Secretary, Native Department, on 18 May 1938: I have gone through the records and plans so far as they were available and have come to the conclusion that the Native owners of this [Owhata] Block have reasonable grounds of complaint both with regard to the taking and laying off of a road over their land and a claiming of a portion of the block as Crown land (National Archives ABWN 6095 ACC W5021 7/871, box 256).
142

Stokes, pp 147-155.

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Chief Judge Jones recommended the matter be sorted out on the ground with local people with a surveyor present. Meanwhile, Vickers could not wait for a full investigation and unwisely led a picnic party of about 36 family and friends to the beach on the disputed land. The party was met by a hail of stones from Maraea and her family and there were some injuries. Maraea was arrested again and sentenced to five months in Mount Eden. Her husband was working away on an unemployment relief scheme. Her numerous children (at least 8 of her 23 children were still living at Owhata) were left in the care of a 13-year-old daughter. In spite of pleas by local staff and Judge Acheson to arrange for relocation of the family, nothing was done by Native Department officials. Acheson considered that the eroding Owhata block was too small to support a family farm. Further investigation revealed survey problems acknowledged by the Chief Surveyor, and in January 1941 the boundary issue was put before the Native Land Court. Mr P B. Wright gave evidence, based on an investigation by the Department of Lands and Survey of all the earlier survey plans, in an attempt to establish whether the road did encroach on Owhata block. He explained that the original Plan 3402 Red", surveyed by a Mr Simpson in 1875, had been before the Court in 1879, when Rarotonga block title was investigated, in 1889, when it was partitioned, and when Owhata block title was investigated on 9 April 1889: Plan 3402 shows a road coloured burnt sienna running over the Rarotonga Block only and not through or adjoining the Owhata Block. I wish to point out that this road was not part of the survey but was merely superimposed upon Plan 3402 and not (in all probability) immediately defined. This practice is not permitted nowadays but was allowed in the old days. He then referred to a plan dated 1893, ' 7085/3 Blue' No. : This was the first survey of the road which may intersect the Owhata block on the Rarotonga block. There is a dotted line which may appear to indicate the boundary of the Owhata block. It would appear from this plan that for the most part the boundary of Owhata is just to the north of the road, but that at the S. E. corner of the Owhata block the road intersects the Owhata block. None of the pegs of the Owhata block are shown on plan 7085. However, in the Native Land Court orders, dated 19 March 1897, for the partition of Owhata A and B. the plans ' show the road wholly on the Rarotonga Block' . Wright then referred to Plan 4477 Red", prepared by the Survey Department in 1898 on which the road, instead of being shown inside the boundary of Rarotonga block, as on the earlier plans, "is now shown as running along the southern boundary of the Owhata Block. This

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apparent adjustment of the Owhata boundary had involved taking off about 1 acre from the south-western corner of Owhata block as well as a small part of Rarotonga. ' the other On hand a small portion of the Owhata block at the S. E. corner seems still to be included in the area taken for road.' Wright also drew the ' Court' attention to the fact that none of the old s pegs showing southern boundary of Owhata were picked up' Plan 4477. Wright commented on that it was ' quite clear that the road boundary of Owhata as shown on Plan 4477 Red cannot possibly be the same line'that was shown on the earlier plans. He also stated that he had searched the files for an explanation of the I acre taken from the south western corner, which was a ' clear deviation from the original boundary of Owhata". It was the surveyor' s duty to find the old pegs from former surveys, but perhaps he had been unable to find them: It has been suggested that he cut off the lac. lr. 08p in order to bring the area of Owhata to the original 43 acres. In my opinion a Surveyor of Mr Warner' type would not have s cut off this area without some very good reason. A second suggestion is that Mr Warner, finding no old pegs to define the boundary between Rarotonga and Owhata, decided to bring Owhata up to the road by adding to it part of the Rarotonga Block between the road and the Owhata Block. To allow for this extra area for the Owhata Block he must have added lac. lr. 08p (from S. W. corner of Owhata) to the Rarotonga Block, which at that time was Crown Land. The area 43 acres as fixed on investigation [of title] remained the same but the boundaries were different. Wright also added that the proclamation taking the road did not refer at all to any land taken from Owhata Block. Figure 20 shows the boundary of Owhata Block and road line based on the 1898 Plan 4477 Red. In summing up the situation. Wright noted that Plan 3402, surveyed in 1875 by Mr Simpson, was ' found to a very unreliable survey' the surveyor did not ' as close' survey lines. It was his this survey that had caused the problems for the Crown in Samuel Yates' claims for reimbursement of survey costs noted earlier in respect of Rawhitiroa block. None of Simpson' s original survey pegs had been found by surveyors who followed him. Complicating this situation, Wright suggested, ' seaward boundaries of the three blocks may have altered The between 1875 (Plan 3402) and 1893 (Plan 7085/3' He concluded it was impossible now to . establish the original 1875 boundary of Owhata: The Lands Dept. makes the following suggestion that the Natives accept the southern boundary of the Owhata block the road as first surveyed by A. B. Wright in 1893 Plan 7085/3 blue, commencing at the western side where the road meets the seashore ... and thence by the road to the point where the shore is reached on the S. E. boundary of Owhata. By accepting the road as the Southern boundary the Natives will gain more than they will lose. A road is a natural boundary. The suggestion I have made seems to be the common sense one. I leave the matter in the hands of the Court (Northern MB 72/94).

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Anaru Ngawaka, speaking in Court on behalf of Maraea Te Awa Heke, thanked Wright for his explanation, and noted the apparent discrepancies in area. ' Maraea appears to have made a mistake, just as the surveyor did/ Anaru agreed that the road boundary was the best solution. ' Maraea says that the Natives were not consulted" about the survey of the road: If the position had been properly known some years ago. Maraea te Awa would not have suffered imprisonment. The position re her imprisonment should be looked into. She is poor and in ill health. She has a big family. She has insufficient means for a living. She does not look for trouble. What she wanted to do was to show her right. I ask the Court to look into this question of Maraea' imprisonment. s I ask that an extra ten acres be awarded to Maraea out of the Rarotonga Block' (Northern MB 72/95). Maraea was also present and told the Court: I support what Anaru has said to the Court. I claim an extra ten acres. With regard to the road I am still "pouri" [distressed] about that. The County Council or the Crown did not deal fairly with me about the road. If the Crown were to award me an extra ten acres perhaps the troubles over the road might be forgotten (Northern MB 72/96). The hearing concluded with the Judge' comments: s Court will report fully on the facts to the Chief Judge but it feels it to be its duty to say plainly that if the facts of the case had been properly investigated by the Native Department in the first place and by the Magistrate in the second place. Maraea Te Awa would never have been subjected to the indignity and injustice of imprisonment. The Court feels it necessary also to say that it strongly objects to the Magistrate' Court or even the Supreme s Court assuming jurisdiction to decide matters involving title to Native land. Only the Native Land Court has the jurisdiction and the knowledge and experience required in deciding questions affecting Native land, and in this case of Owhata the Native Land Court' assistance and judicial enquiry were not sought until after all the harm had been s done. The Court will certainly recommend substantial financial and other compensation for Maraea Te Awa, and a rectification of the boundaries and area of the Owhata Block (Northern MB 72/96-97). Judge Acheson did write a report some time later that was received by the Chief Judge in January 1944. After outlining what he called the "salient points" of the survey evidence, and noting that the place where the Vickers party was attacked was the small piece of Owhata that had been added to Rarotonga by the surveyor Warner, Judge Acheson attacked Native Department officials for their ineptitude in dealing with the matter. He explained that Maraea had come to see him to explain her objection after her first arrest, but the issue had not been referred to the Native Land Court until after the second incident:

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I had immediately realised the need for searching at the roots of the titles and for verifying the old surveys. I at once warned Mr Vickers against assuming that Maraea was in the wrong, and 1 told them both that the Court would search the old records on return to Auckland. Before the search could be made, Mr and Mrs Vickers trespassed again, and were attacked by Maraea and her husband. Not knowing the true facts, the Magistrate gaoled Maraea. She was a sick woman when she went to gaol. Her bitterness at what she knew was unjust imprisonment undoubtedly affected her health. She did not live very long after her release, but before she died [in 1941] she expressed her determination to press for redress, for compensation for wrongful imprisonment (National Archives MAI 22/1/135 pt 2 Owhata A, box 486). Judge Acheson recommended substantial compensation should have been paid to Maraea. and should now be paid to her children, in ' form of a house in which Maraea' children might the s live clear of debt or rent' He also suggested that other farm land should be found for the . family with their new house, closer to a school. The Owhata block was eroded, ' small for too farming purposes'and ' , should be converted under Consolidation into a Seaside Reserve for the Maoris of the district' (ibid). In addition he recommended monetary compensation of 500 as well as the 10 acres suggested in the 1941 Native Land Court hearing. The Chief Judge of the Native Land Court was now G. P Shepherd, who was not impressed with Judge Acheson' report, with its criticism of Native Department officers. As far as the s Owhata block boundary was concerned. Shepherd considered that the suggestion by the Lands Department officials to make it at the gazetted road line should be accepted: As for the recommendation made by the Court about compensation, I can only say that I see no justification for the provision of compensation. The office file shows that everything possible was done by the Department to assist Maraea. Her second incarceration was the result of her failure to make good her promises of good conduct for the future (ibid). This is in stark contrast to his predecessor. Chief Judge Jones, who considered the Owhata owners had grounds for complaint, and the evidence produced by the Lands Department supported this conclusion. Neither the 10 acres of land, nor another house and farm, nor any other compensation was granted to Maraea Te Awa Heke, or her family. It is obvious, however, that firstly, if the early survey plans had been accurate, the boundary between Owhata and Rarotonga blocks would have been properly defined. Secondly, even if there was stilt doubt, proper consultation about survey of the road would have allayed local fears. In 1973 Paenga Wikitera, one of the owners, applied to the Maori Land Court to partition out his interest in Owhata. This required a survey and the surveyor. B. von Stunner, encountered two related problems. First, he could not find any of the early survey pegs on the Rarotonga

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block boundary. Secondly, there had been substantial erosion on the western boundary of Owhata and some accretion on the eastern boundary. The Court cancelled the original partition orders of Owhata A and B so that the proposed subdivision could be considered in relation to the whole block. The surveyor was directed to make the road line the inland boundary. In 1976 the Court made orders for new partitions: Owhata A: 4a. lr. OOp Paenga Wikitera solely

Owhata B: Esplanade reserve with area and boundary adjustment to be defined on survey to vest in the Mangonui County Council. Owhata C: Balance area to be in the names of balance owners for 37.500 shares.

The old partition lines had served no useful purpose as the land which was flat had been treated as one block. In adjusting the shares by amalgamating the former partitions, the total shareholding was 43 shares, based on the original acreage. Paenga Wikitera' shareholding s represented the equivalent of 4a. lr. 20p: ' Having regard to the fact that Paenga' area had s road frontage and the use of an esplanade reserve in excess of I acre it is felt that 4a lr OOp should more than satisfy his entitlement" (Kaitaia MB 9/341-343). Unfortunately for the rest of the owners, Paenga Wikitera' subdivision had the effect of requiring the vesting of a one s chain esplanade reserve around the seaward boundary of the block. In 1976 there were some 95 owners in Owhata C block, and by 1990 there were over 150. An esplanade reserve of one chain, the ' Queen' Chain' now a 20-metre strip around the s , seashore and banks of rivers and lakes, is a requirement set out in s.289(l) Local Government Amendment Act 1978, when any land with a boundary to mean high water mark is subdivided. In s.23 Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 a new S.432A was added to the Maori Affairs Act 1953 requiring that partitions of Maori land comply with Part II of the Counties Amendment Act 1961 as to subdivisions. These provisions are now embodied in the Local Government Act. This is an issue which is also of concern in Karikari 2 block and is discussed later in the Wai 117 claim. For the people at Owhata who have already lost land from erosion from the sea, the loss of the title to the esplanade reserve was a further blow. Although the owners of Owhata C still have the use of their coastal strip it is not an exclusive use, as it is public reserve. Erosion has continued on the western side of the block, eating up much of the esplanade reserve. The available land was estimated by Jim Heke in oral evidence before the Tribunal on 5 December 1990 as between 20 and 22 acres because of the erosion. Jim Heke claimed that the rate of erosion had increased dramatically in the past few years, that

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between April 1989 and December 1990 the coastline had retreated another two feet. Accretion on the other side of the spit has been limited and does not compensate for the losses by erosion. When the Tribunal visited Owhata in December 1990 there were about five families living there, although Jim Heke said the numbers fluctuate, and formerly the population was much higher. They were living in caravans, tents and makeshift corrugated iron shacks. There is also a marae and urupa. The other small reserve, Omaku, has no road access. The Owhata owners feel their papakainga is under threat, that the Crown and/or the local authority should do something constructive to curb the losses by erosion. In their view there does not seem to be much logic in having a public esplanade reserve around their papakainga, and the loss of this land from their tiny reserve is deeply felt.

8.2 8.2.1

Flora and Fauna Kereru

Mori have a relationship with the kereru based on its role as a food source and as a cultural treasure. The kukupa was used for food and its feathers for cloaks.143 The Wild Birds Protection Act 1864 was the first legislation concerning the kukupa but this Act and other legislation probably had little practical effect on Maori and their hunting continued for most of the nineteenth century.144 However, the legislation did establish a framework which eroded Mori rights and access to kukupa in the twentieth century.

The Wild Birds Protection Act in 1864 prescribed a hunting season for kukupa to be shot from April to July, within specific areas as proclaimed by the governor. The 1865 Act moved the kukupa season one month later into the year and prohibited snares and traps. This had a devastating effect for Maori given the customary practice of using snares to catch kukupa. In 1866 the kukupa was classified as game and a license to shoot kukupa became necessary. In 1867 kukupa was reclassified as native game as opposed to game, and a distinction was made between the two categories, principally based on property rights. A license was no longer

James W Feldman, Treaty Rights and Pigeon Poaching: Alienation of Mori Access to Kereru, 1864 1960, Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 2001. 144 TP p 2. WHAT IS THIS REFERENCE?

143

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required after all. The 1867 Act set an important precedent by establishing government-granted property rights to wildlife.145

The Animals Protection Act 1867 provided the first clue of how early game laws affected Mori. Harry Atkinson, a member of the House of Representatives, objected strongly to the 1867 Bill and questioned the impact of game laws on Maori. Atkinson also noted that in some areas Maori lived on wild ducks and that bird life was an important part of the Maori economy. At the very least he wanted the Bill translated into Mori to avoid ignorance leading to violation of the law.146 Maori objections or responses to the legislation were not recorded or were nonexistent.

In 1868 there were further ramifications for kukupa with the Protection of Animals Amendment Act 1868 removing kereru from the schedule of native game. Thus, no license was needed to kill kukupa. However kukupa remained on the schedule until 1872 when it returned to its status as native game. The 1872 Act reinforced the ban on snaring game but the clause did not apply to native birds.147 In 1879 Paora Tuhaeres Maori Parliament at Orakei held a discussion on the status of kukupa. Maori supported new restrictions on hunting but thought such laws should not apply to them. It seems this argument would continually surface for the next fifty years. Maori agreed the season idea was a good one, recognising that the pigeons potentially faced extinction and that kukupa needed time to breed.148

In 1889 Animals Protection Act Amendment Act was amended to tighten up previous loopholes of early Acts. There was the clamping down on market hunting as some people were making a living by killing thousands of birds. The Act banned specific types of weapons, game could only be sold at certain times of the year and birds could only be shot for sport and not for profit.149 In the 1880s Maori Members of Parliament spoke about the management of the bird. Many thought that the game laws should not apply to Maori and that Maori could take care of their own birds. They supported this by demonstrating that Maori had a seasonal structure for hunting and were more active than Pakeha in ensuring the sustainability of the bird populations. They commented on rahui, the ramifications for the breaking of rahui and commented that the hunting season depended primarily on the condition of the birds. Mori preferred to hunt when the birds

145 146

TP p 9-10. TP p 12 NZPD, 1867, vol 1, pp 1230 1231. 147 TP p 13-14. 148 TP p 15 AJHR 1879, session II, G8 pp26,28. Mentioned in Claudia Orange, Treaty of Waitangi, Wellington, 1987, p 192. 149 TP p 19.

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had grown fat on miro berries usually in July, August or September but Pakeha had failed to consider this traditional timing.150

Hone Heke commented in 1899 that the trend towards conservation conflicted with the way Maori used native birds but he was also concerned with the taking away of Maori rights. Heke stated that Maori had a system whereby they acted as a management control in the taking of the bird and he proposed that Pakeha align their dates with the Maori season for the taking of birds.151 Hone Heke spoke for the Mori position on this issue again in 1900, 1903, 1907, 1908 and 1910. His argument repeatedly explained the Maori system of rahui and he demanded more flexible hunting seasons.152

In 1900 an amendment (the Animals Protection Act Amendment Act 1900) opened up the hunting season for native and imported game on the first day of May and closed it on the last day of July. There was provision for the governor to alter the season but not at the request of iwi and hapu. In 1901 season signs were posted in English and Maori and there were also posters in the Gazette that any Mori or half-caste Mori could kill pigeons in certain, prescribed areas.153

In July 1905 Taiaha Paurini and 137 others petitioned Parliament: Your petitioners hereby pray that we be left to manage our Maori birds upon our own lands; we to fix the times at which they may properly be killed. For the reason that the law administering birds is wrong; when the birds are fat they are protected, and when they have become thin their killing is now open. From former times down the Maoris have been a people expert in administering their bird-forests, and all other food workings; for that reason an abundant supply prevailed; and now since the European Law has come in to protect them our birds are disappearing. Another prayer of your petitioners is that we may have the power to prevent Europeans from wrongfully coming to kill our birds, We are not permitted to go to their lands [sic} to kill birds.154 The Animals Protection Act 1907 contained a clause prohibiting use of snares. Hone Heke opposed this on the basis that the snaring of birds by Maori was for food not for sport and Maori preferred snares because guns scared the birds away. He stated that the government should not prevent Maori from using their old methods of catching food.155

150

TP p 20-21 Tame Parata representing Southern Maori District, explained this to his colleagues in 1888 at Parliament that Maori could take care of their own birds NZPD, 1888 vol 61 p 373. 151 TP p 32 NZPD 1899 vol 10 p 407 152 TP p 37 NZPD 1903 vol 26, p 72; NZPD, 1907 vol 142 p 788; NZPD 1908 v144 p 288; NZPD 1910 vol 151 p 207. 153 TP p 35. 154 TP p 37 22 July 1905, IA 1 1905/2536, NA, DB p 21. 155 TP p 38 NZPD, 1907 vol 142 p 786.

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Maori used preserved birds as a vital food source. The Act prohibited hunters from preserving their prey and selling them later. Sir Peter Buck (Te Rangihiroa) argued that the latest amendment would cause great hardship as Maori killed game entirely for food purposes. Custom among Maori was that birds were cooked and preserved in their fat and kept as food source for leaner time of the year. The Minister of Internal Affairs, David Buddo, introduced an amendment to the legislation in 1910 (the Animals Protection Act 1910) that protected Mori right to keep preserved food.156

Treaty issues played little role in Crown management of the kereru. The government used legislation to limit access to pigeons. Given the restriction on their access to a traditional food supply, still Maori expressed their belief in a Treaty-guaranteed right to take the kereru and other native game.157 Various correspondents reiterated arguments made by Maori for over 30 years: Maori retained the right to kill kereru on their land, whereas Pakeha had cut down their bush and lost that right, and that the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed access rights to kukupa and other native game.158 For most of 1910s Maori continued to hunt the bird and when confronted by rangers they claimed a Treaty right to do so. The Crown Solicitor, E. Redward, was determined to prove that Maori enjoyed no special access rights to the kereru. He maintained that [t]here is no exception with respect to Mori or half-castes and anything contained in the Treaty of Waitangi cannot affect this position. Whatever force or effect that the Treaty may have nothing therein can override the direct provisions of a statute. He cited court cases with closely related issues over access to fisheries. Redward argued fisheries were in a better position because there was specific reference in Article Two of the Treaty to fisheries but no such reference was made to birds or native game.159

In 1922 a new version of Animals Protection Act stripped Mori of their last claims for access to kukupa. It listed the kukupa as protected and to hunt kukupa special permission was needed from the governor. From 1922 the focus was on preventing poaching of kukupa.160 Maori during the 20th century continued to hunt the bird and claimed it as a right guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi.161 In the Far North in the late 1950s, there were no full-time rangers and large numbers of pigeons were hunted. In 1960s miro fattened pigeons were still being hunted and it appeared that little had changed in 100 years.162

156 157

TP pp 38-39 Te Rangihiroa NZPD 1910 vol 151 pp 257-58. TP p 48. 158 TP p 53. 159 TP pp 56-57; E Redward, Native Pigeons and the Treaty of Waitangi, 27 September 1917, IA 1 25/12/pt. 1, NA, DB. 160 TP p 58. 161 TP p 61. 162 TP p 86.

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From 1922 management of native birds was delegated to acclimatisation societies. The Department of Internal Affairs gave these societies a range of powers including the right to charge for licenses to shoot native game. These societies continued management of native game for the next thirty years. However enforcement of conservation measures continued to be difficult. The kukupa was the most difficult to manage. The societies often concentrated their efforts on game, ignoring their responsibility to protect native birds. With pressure from the newly formed Native Bird Protection Society in 1923, the Department of Internal Affairs restructured their efforts, relying on local agencies such as the Police to capture and prosecute offenders. But the real problem lay with the fact that wildlife as a category was not controlled by one department. It was not until 1946 that a Wildlife Branch was created as part of the Department of Internal Affairs. This branch undertook a review of government policy on bird conservation. In the 1950s the branch took a much more active role in educating people on the importance of native species and much of their work was geared at decreasing pigeon poaching. The branch co-operated with Department of Mori Affairs to stop Maori pigeon poaching; it circulated pamphlets and published an article on the issue in Te Ao Hou: The New World.

The new argument in the twentieth century for government departments and conservationists was that Mori no longer depend on the kukupa as food source. There was also a further concern that the habitat could no longer support the kereru. Predators had increased and the kukupa took a long time to breed giving predators an opportunity to destroy nests. Maori responded by stating the historic importance of bird as food source and a cultural treasure.163 However, in the last two decades Maori people have still been apprehended for taking kereru. Since April 1990 18 people have been charged with taking kereru with total of 33 birds seized. Twelve of these offenders were caught in the Mangamuka scenic reserve area.164

In April 1991 Ian Gregory (brother of Northern Maori MP, Bruce Gregory) was observed leaving home with a rifle and entering the Herekino conservation area. After shots were heard Gregory was approached by wildlife rangers who found four freshly plucked kukupa. Gregory was charged with a firearms offence and under section 63 of the Wildlife Act for hunting and unlawfully possessing a protected species. He was convicted and sentenced to 150 hours of community work. In July 1991 two Maori from the Mangamuka area pleaded guilty to charges in the Kaitaia Distirct Court of killing seven kukupa. The lawyer for these two men argued that they had been asked to do so by the older members of their community. The Judge convicted them but discharged them without penalty. In November 1992 a Kaitaia panel beater, Raymond Subtrizki pleaded guilty to charges of killing and possessing a native pigeon. He argued that he

163 164

TP pp 91-92. F&B 21 WHAT IS THIS REFERENCE?

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had taken the bird on the wishes of his dying father, a kaumatua of the area. The Department of Conservation prosecuted the case themselves and the Judge discharged Subritzki without penalty.165

8.2.2 Toheroa at Mitimiti


On 29 September 1924 a deputation consisting of Tau Henare, W Rikihana, Terima Teiki and Tamaho met with the Minister of Marine, G.J. Anderson, concerning the toheroa beds and mudflats in the Hokianga area. The deputation wanted the toheroa beds between Whangape and entrance of Hokianga harbour to be protected. They claimed Europeans took and sold toheroa and suggested that tangata whenua form a committee to prevent further taking of toheroa and to look after the beds. They did not claim exclusive rights. The Minster of Marine offered to prosecute Pakeha illegally taking toheroa for sale.166

On 5 Deemberc 1924 LF Ayson, Chief Inspector of Fisheries, accompanied by Tau Henare and Inspector Flynn met to discuss Toheroa beds and fisheries at Pangaru. Ayson inspected the beach and concluded that the beds much smaller than the average size. His report added to what the deputation had said and supported the idea that a committee be formed. He also advocated the compulsory taking of toheroa by hand and that there be a closed time during spawning season (from December to February). Ayson told the department that it should do what was necessary to conserve this food for Maori. He was not opposed to the selling of Toheroa but was opposed to establishing a factory to can toheroa.167 The next day Ayson meet with Maori at Mitimiti, recommending in addition that selling licences be allocated by the department on the advice of the local committee. A committee was established consisting of Himiona Kamira, Ngakuru Pene Haare, Henare Matini, Moa Tahana, Mane Hotere, Winata Hone and Eruera Rikihana.168

An Order of Council was drafted under section 5 of the Fisheries Act 1908 with regulations concerning toheroa. There was a closed season from December to February. Taking toheroa was lawful for local consumption but not for sale or barter except with the consent of the Minister. The taking of Toheroa was under the control of the committee appointed by Minster. No spade or blade implement was to be used to extract toheroa. In addition, if any of these regulations were breached there would be a fine of 20.169

165 166

F&B 19. Daamen, p 89. 167 ibid. 168 ibid, p 90. 169 ibid.

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The draft was circulated for comment. The gazetting of the regulations was considered in 1925 but deferred until later. Eventually the draft dropped out of circulation. There was no formal acknowledgement of committee which had been operating since 1924, and in 1930 people found out that the committee had no standing and so no longer paid any attention to the committee. Barney Hotere wrote to the Minster in June 1930 requesting confirmation that the rules were lawful. In 1933 Henare Matini wrote to Minster, Apirana Ngata suggesting the reappointment of members. This correspondence suggested the tangata whenua believed the beds to be a native reserve.170

In 1943 Wiremu Tahana and Himiona Kamira wrote to the Marine Dept to request a licence to sell toheroa. The department obtained reports on the beds at Mitimiti. E G Hendall, reported that presently the stocks were insufficient. The report also noted there had been two drownings in the area and fishing of all description and the taking of shellfish was prohibited.171 Hefford suggested that the selling of toheroa not be allowed and regulations concerning the numbers to be taken (80 per Mori and 30 per European) be strictly enforced. He suggested there be official supervision of the beach by either a Police Constable at Kohukohu or Wiremu Tahana. He noted tribal regulation and the closed season were indicators of the need to conserve.

The Committee wrote again advising of new appointments in March 1944, they insisted on official recognition of committee as well as the enactment of new by-laws including a closed season from January to March, and that blades and implements used to dig up the toheroa not exceed four inches wide. They also sought a restriction on the amount a person could gather to no more than 200 toheroa per home. The Committee also wanted to prevent selling of toheroa. Hefford suggested that the by-laws be incorporated into marine regulations and that a chairman of the committee be appointed an inspector of sea-fishing.

In the next four years there were no serious problem and the toheroa on Mitimiti beach were in splendid condition. In July 1948 a permit was sought for hui to celebrate Father Wanders jubilee as priest. This was granted by Marine Dept. In November 1948 Hipiriona Hotere (Barney) sent word to Crown officials that the taking of toheroa was getting out of hand and he recommended the closing of the beach. There were also concerns as to the efficacy of Hotere as fisheries officer. A.H. Taylor, local inspector of fisheries, suspected he was accepting bribes to let people exploit the beach, but this accusation was not accepted by the Marine Department.172 The Marine Department officials were reluctant to close the beach because of the lengthy legal process involved. However, by March 1950 toheroa on Mitimiti beach were all undersized and
170 171

ibid, p 91. ibid, pp 92-93.

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the taking of toheroa was declared to be illegal. In 1952 the committee in conjunction with fisheries officers requested that the beach be closed for 12 months.173

The efforts of the local community clearly highlight a plight to conserve resources over 28 years. The Crown recognised the need to implement conservation practices and management, but it did not give up control and abdicated responsibility which prevented a management structure operating efficiently.

8.2.3 Warawara State Forest


The Warawara State Forest is a rainforest on the west coast of Northland between the Hokianga and Whangape harbours, with an area of 6931 hectares. The forest features four of the largest kauri in New Zealand, Moetangi 1, 2, 3 and Ward kauri. The mountain Moumoukai is its tallest peak at 730 metres and the mountain range is volcanic. The forest is supported by three watersheds of the sea and streams connecting to the Rotokakahi River. The forest supports a wildlife habitat including kaka, kiwi, pied tit, red parakeet and bats. The kokako was last sighted in Warawara in 1965. Warawara is also known for its plant diversity including manuka, taraire, towai, puriri and rimu, kauri, miro groves, nikau, rewarewa, mahoe, kohekohe, kiekie, supplejack, comprosma and ferns.174 Within Warawara are significant pa sites and urupa in the mountains, sacred to the local people.175

In 1885, the State Forest Act was enacted to allow the Crown to have ownership and forested lands were administered by the Lands and Survey Department. The Crown acted on a policy that the forestry industry was in crisis, giving them a legitimate reason to gain control of an important economic and financial source for New Zealands economy.176 In 1886 Warawara was gazetted as a State Forest comprising of land purchased in 1875 and 1879 including land from Te Kauae o Ruru Wahine 1, 2 and 3, Otangaroa 1 and Te Takanga 1 and 2 blocks. The total area was 12,360 acres.177

In January 1911 Edwin Mitchelson of the mill of Mitchelson & Co, merchants, brokers and exporters, at Whangape sought timber cutting rights in Warawara. His request was rejected following a report of the caretaker who felt the forest should not be logged due to the risk of fire and the low price to be obtained from timber. Another request was made from J W Easson of

172 173

ibid, p 94. ibid, p 95. 174 Watkins, p 119. 175 ibid, p 4. 176 ibid, p 119. 177 ibid, p 119.

182

Easson Ltd, timber merchants, who were similarly declined.178 In 1913 the Royal Commission on Forestry was of the opinion that because of the position of the forest and the rugged nature of the country it was too difficult and expensive to remove the timber. The Commission instead wanted the forest for the purpose of a national kauri park.179

There was a Maori desire to dig gum in the forest at this time because of the lack of land and other resources remaining in Maori ownership on which the Te Rarawa people could make a living. On 2 June 1913 Robert Ngakuru wrote to the government asking for the forest to be opened for gum digging for the Mori people of Mitimiti as it had been a struggle making a living since the closing of the forest. He stated that Mori were happy to pay a licence but the Commissioner of Crown Lands was adamant that State Forests would not be opened up for gum digging.180 Three days later Pakihi Peita wrote on behalf of the women at Whakarapa and Waihou asking that their children be allowed to gum dig for one month so that they could afford to go to school.181 In August 1914 two Mori, Kararoa Pairama and Peri Poko, were found camped in the forest with five and half sacks of bled gum. They were convicted at Rawene on 30 May 1915 and fined 10 (including 1 16 shillings in costs) and the gum was confiscated.182

In the early 1920s kauri gum was collected from Warawara under a licence issued by Forest Service.183 In February 1920 the Commissioner of Crown Lands had noted that gum of about ten tons remained on trees. He thought that unless it was collected it would remain an incentive for Maori and others to trespass. In August 1922 Joseph Leef and 13 other returned Maori servicemen were out of work. They requested permission to dig gum to earn an income. A reported from Conservator of Forests stated that on no account should this be allowed.184 The Forest Service was formed and took control of the area in 1922.185 In the same year the settlers association at Whakarapa, pressured for land within Warawara forest be opened up for settlement. The Forest Service agreed to release approximately 1300 acres at the northern end of the forest but this did not occur until December 1929. Reweti Kingi of Otiria applied in July 1923 to extract gum but was informed that the right had already been given to a Pakeha named A.P Browne.186 In 1929 the Native Department purchased 3,000 acres comprising sections Waihou Lower A37, A39, A40, A41, A42, A43 and Whakarapa 61A from a Mr Duthie. This land was intended for a land scheme to consolidate, extend and improve Maori land in the
178 179

Daamen, p 60. ibid, p 150. 180 Daamen, p 61. 181 ibid. 182 ibid. 183 ibid, p 120. 184 ibid, p 62. 185 Watkins, p 119.

183

district but only two small portions were needed. The Native Department offered the remaining land to the Forest Service as it was forested and although the Forest Service was interested they had insufficient funds to purchase the land. It seems that no further action was taken.187 In 1930 1,400 acres of Warawara was withdrawn and made part of the land scheme initiated by the Native Department. However in 1939 1,190 of the 1,400 acres was declared unsuitable for farming and again proclaimed State Forest.188

In 1937 forest foreman D.M. Blithe noted in his monthly report considerable shooting of native pigeons. In one incident a Maori person was stopped, but when asked to hand over rifle he pointed the rifle at the ranger. This person was later identified as Nuki Te Hira.189 Four years later the caretaker of the forest reported that eight Maori, one with a rifle, had trespassed on the land. Those involved were taken to court at Rawene on 7 August 1941 but the hearing was adjourned pending proof that it was a State forest. Three of the alleged trespassers were convicted and fined, one was admonished and discharged and another was dismissed. At the second hearing the other three accused were convicted and fined.190

In 1947 143 acres, 3 roods and 8 perches of Crown land (formerly part of Ototope A) was proclaimed State Forest to improve the forest boundary.191 Ten years later, 4,223 acres, comprising of Waihou Lower A37, A38, A39, A40, A41, A42, A43 and Waireia became part of the Warawara State Forest.192 In 1961 299 acres of Maori Land, Rotokakahi A3C2E2C, became part of Warawara State Forest and in 1964 Paihia 1A1 was gazetted as part of Warawara State Forest.193

The milling of timber was considered over time but the implementation of a milling station was too expensive. The forest was also saved by logging in the early days due to the remote, wet, windswept and steep terrain and also its isolation from roads and waterways.194 However, dry timber could be taken. In 1922 a sawmill licence was given and 136,000 board feet was extracted, 90 % of which was kauri. No saw milling licenses were issued after 1922 but sales of dry kauri were made between 1933 and 1937. Between 1937 and 1967 no licenses or permits were issued to remove timber from the forest. There were numerous requests for permits to

186 187

Daamen, p 63. Watkins, p 119. 188 ibid. 189 Daamen, p 163. 190 ibid, p 64. 191 Watkins, p 119. 192 ibid. 193 ibid. 194 Watkins, p 150.

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collect kauri gum but these were refused on account of the risk of fire and damage to living trees.195

Local Maori communities requested timber for numerous purposes but these requests were often denied. Local Maori petitioned that the timber contained in Warawara was not a part of the sale of the land but no recommendation was made by the Native Land Court.196 A letter was sent by Taitokerau Mori Land Board to make available 15,000 board feet of dry kauri to repair a meeting house at Mitimiti. In return the Board and native owners of Taikarawa A and B, Moetangi and Ototope B blocks reciprocated by granting access routes through the blocks to kauri areas thereby providing legal access to the forest. Mitimiti elders agreed to this as it meant they had legal access themselves.197 In 1937 the people of Pawarenga wanted to extract timber for housing from northern end of Warawara State Forest adjoining their property for housing purposes. 198 They also requested a saw mill at Pawarenga to cut the timber, with the cost to be borne by themselves. The Forest Service agreed to the taking of timber as long as the activity was supervised by the Native Department. However, the Forest Service thought the quantity did not warrant the expense of a mill and preferred Mori to contract the mill work. In 1937 the local community of Mitimiti requested 50,000 board feet for the purpose of building a school and Whina Cooper requested timber for a Maori housing project.199 The Conservator of Forests decided that milling timber at Warawara Forest would not be considered until a working plan has been approved and this could not be completed until legal access was provided and boundaries were defined.200

In 1963 a report was commissioned regarding millable timber in Warawara. This report was brought on by pressure to open the forest up for logging purposes. The report reflected a positive outlook for Warawara but the figures suggesting that Warawara could sustain logging were not accurate, possibly reflecting only part of the forest. Logging operations continued but were restricted to 1,300,000 board feet, 60% of which could be kauri with a minimum diameter.201 The total quantity of timber extracted during logging was 8,500,000 board feet with kauri comprising just over half of the total amount. The remainder timber quantity was made up of tawa, rimu, miro, taraire, matai, kawaka and kahikatea.202 Whitecliffs Sawmilling Company

195 196

Watkins, p 121. ibid. 197 Daamen, p 66. 198 Watkins, p 121. 199 Watkins, p 121. 200 Daamen, p 66. 201 Watkins, pp 121-122. 202 ibid, p 123.

185

had contractual rights to the timber of Warawara until 1977 though logging ceased on 23 March 1974.203

In 1972 Warawara State Forest became a sanctuary but it was not until 1979 that the Warawara Forest Sanctuary was gazetted. Part of the Warawara State Forest became Te Hura Ecological Area in 1980, which was gazetted in 1982. The Warawara Forest Sanctuary contains about 869 hectares and Te Hura Ecological Area supports about 999 hectares. Both these areas are protected under sections 21 and 22 of the Conservation Act 1989.204 In 1979 Warawara Forest was opened up for recreational purposes, though it was gazetted a year later. Two mineral prospecting warrants were granted, in 1971 to Waihi Exploration and Mining Company, covering portions of Ecological Area and a second licence was issued in 1980.205 On 31 March 1987 Warawara Forest was transferred to the Department of Conservation to be held under section 61 of the Conservation Act 1987. Warawara was deemed part of Northland

Conservation Park with the Sanctuary and Ecological areas intact.

8.3 Generic Issues 8.3.1 Crown Policies in relation to Scenic Reserves


Since 1840 the Crown has been committed to transforming large tracts of land for pastoral and agricultural development, but in the late nineteenth century it became interested in preserving areas showing the original habitation of New Zealand. Three Crown polices evolved in the late 19th century and 20th century. Through these policies preservation legislation was enacted, seeking to reserve areas of land for scenic purposes as well as the preservation of native flora and fauna. Crown policy and legislation failed to acknowledge Maori rights to use and access land reserved for scenic purposes, as well as the natural flora and fauna these areas contained. Maori were not advised, informed or consulted despite such areas providing sustenance culturally, economically, and spiritually to iwi and hapu members.

Initially scenic reserves were set aside on aesthetic grounds and because of proximity to tourist routes under the Land Act 1892. The Act, while providing for scenic reserves, did not set out a selection process nor did it offer a management structure for the maintenance of scenic reserves. Instead, the Act stated that the Governor had a prerogative right to declare lands reserved in the national interest.206 Reserves were selected based solely on the Crowns policy of beautiful

203 204

WK 152. Watkins, p 123. 205 ibid. 206 Geoff Park, Effective Exclusion; An Exploratory Overview of Crown Actions and Maori Responses Concerning the Indigenous Flora and fauna, 1912-1983, Waitangi Tribunal unpublished report, Wellington, 2001, p 252

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scenes and based on proposals to develop tourist and health resorts. These early reserves were under the control of the Department of Tourism. 207

In 1901, the Department of Lands and Survey took control of scenic reserves. The Department held two conflicting roles, however, and was required to recommend to the Crown the setting aside of reserves while also opening land up for pastoral and agricultural development. Coinciding with Department of Lands and Survey taking over the management of scenic reserves, the Scenery Preservation Act 1903 was enacted, modifying the earlier Crown policy of beautiful scenes. The Act, unlike its predecessor, set up an evaluation, selection and regulated management framework for scenic reserves. It set up a five-person commission, who were to recommend to the Crown land to be set aside for scenic, thermal, or historic reserves. The primary object of the Act was to safeguard beauty spots and scenic wonders for tourism.208 The Government set aside 100,000 to be spent over four years for the acquisition and maintenance of these reserves. However, the reservation of land was still limited to a Pakeha perception of what was beautiful and the commission did not allow for Maori input.

For much of the early twentieth century the Crown was concerned with the acquisition of land for reserves as opposed to the maintenance of existing scenic reserves. In 1906, an amendment to the Scenery Preservation Act prevented Maori land from being reserves. However, under the Maori Land Claims Adjustment and Law Amendment Act 1907 Maori reserve land could be taken for scenic purposes.209 Once land became a reserve that land was inalienable, however upon reservation it became Crown land and if the reservation was revoked the Crown could dispose of the land under the Land Act 1892.210 The 1906 Act replaced the Commission with a board of three senior public servants. Again, there was no Maori representative nor did the Act allow public consultation.

As early as 1907 Maori were concerned that scenery preservation was causing further land dispossession. The Department of Lands and Survey failed to appreciate the idea of public consultation and input. For Maori the only legitimate process to air their grievances was through submissions to the government or alternatively voicing their concerns to members of parliament. Hone Heke Rankin, a Maori Member of Parliament iterated in 1907 that the areas

207 208

ibid, pp 346-347. Cathy Marr, Robin Hodge and Ben White, Crown Law, Policies and Practices in relation to Flora and Fauna, 1840-1912, Waitangi Tribunal unpublished report, Wellington, 2001, p 417. 209 Anna Hewitt and Diana Morrow, Te Atiawa and the Customary Use of Natural Resources in Te Tau Ihu, 18402000, a report commissioned by Te Atiawa Manawhenua ki Te Tau Ihu Trust, Wellington, August 2000, p 77 210 Park, pp 256-257.

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now in reserves continued to provide some means of subsistence for iwi and hapu.211 Despite this, the Crown continued to acquire lands for more scenic reserves.

By 1912 there were 262 reserves. In 1912, alone 92 new reserves were created containing 94,000 acres of Crown land.212 Scenery preservation legislation required that land taken for

scenic reserves be gazetted but this was not consistently done. In 1913, twenty-two of the new fifty-nine reserves were Mori land and by 1917, there were 63 new reserves from Maori land.213 But where Mori land was involved Crown officials took the position that once the acquisition of an area had been recommended and Maori were informed then the land came under Crown control. When and if gazetted, these reserves were not identified as being Mori land.214 However, the problem was that often Crown officials negotiated the reservation of lands with Maori who had no legitimate authority to agree to such a proposal. The Crown failed to appreciate the nature of decision making within a collective community of whanau, hapu and iwi.

By the 1920s Crown policy changed and protecting nature became the core doctrine for scenic reserves. Crown officials were concerned about the maintenance and management of reserves based on a report given to Parliament in 1920.215 Instead of the beautiful scene ideology Crown officials seemed committed to the preservation of indigenous flora and fauna, possibly as a result of concerns over the large clearing schemes set up to facilitate pastoral development. Inherent in this new protecting nature philosophy was the exclusion of human habitation, including access and use of natural resources within scenic reserves. But the Crown still carried an ongoing policy that scenic reserves would only be selected if they had no potential for agricultural development.
216

Early Crown policy and legislation separated Maori from an integral resource base yet Maori retained an interest and continued to use forest materials. In 1925 there was a report that certain saplings had been culled and a track cut through Mangamuka Scenic Reserve. The Crown was concerned about the damage to the scenic reserve. They proceeded with a prosecution but the case was dismissed after inadequate proof. The Crown maintained that the Maori people involved were guilty of trespass, the only preservation of Maori rights stemmed from legislation and this was limited to a right to take birds and bury their deceased in existing urupa with scenic reservea.
211

ibid, p 292 NZPD 1907 vol 142 pp 1178-1179 ibid, p 258. 213 ibid, p 263. 214 ibid, p 260. 215 Report is in AJHR 1920 C-6 Report on Scenic Reserves. 216 ibid, p 254.
212

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The Crown often delegated management of reserves to trust domain boards who were thought to be better equipped to manage reserves and who would allow local input. Yet Mori remained on the outside. In the Auckland region, a list of honorary inspectors in 1947 showed 280 names, with only one name identifiable as Mori. Despite having customary rights and conservation practices Maori were excluded in the consultation and management processes of scenic reserves. The Reserves and Domain Act 1953 consolidated the early Scenery Preservation legislation and the Crown shifted their focus from acquisition of land to the maintenance of exiting reserves. This Act provided a measure of protection that Maori land could not be taken without consultation of the Minster of Mori Affairs.217 Effectively this implied that the

Minster would inform Maori owners, call a meeting then make a decision based on what the owners had agreed. However, most of the time this did not occur and the Minster merely rubberstamped such takings and the Mori owners were often not informed or consulted.

The Reserves Act 1977 transformed Crown policy from preservation of indigenous flora and fauna to preserving representative samples of natural ecosystems and landscapes, coupled with a effort to classify reserves so that management structures could be more efficient. At first glance, the change in policy does not seem revolutionarily. But with the emphasis on creating representative samples of a diverse range of ecosystems the Crown had a new incentive to acquire more land for reserves. The Act created reserves for recreation, historic, scenic, nature, scientific, national and government purposes with administration carried out by the Department of Lands and Survey. Under section 12 the Minister of Conservation could acquire land for a reserve or improvement, protection or extension of or access to an existing reserve. There is no public notification or gazetting where the Minister of Conservation purchased land in name of the Crown. If Mori land was needed then the Department needed to obtain the consent of the Minister of Mori Affairs. There is no information of what the Minister of Maori Affairs did when confronted with this issue. Where local authorities wanted to reserve land then they had publish a notice one month prior. This assumes that Maori could object and that there was a process for submissions. 218

The use and management of flora and fauna varied according to the reserves classification. If the scenic reserves were previously Maori land, the Minister may grant permission for Maori to take or kill birds provided it does not contravene the Wildlife Act 1953. Crown owned reserves may be vested in the local authority for administration and management purposes. There is a potential for Mori or Maori dominated trust to become the administrating body. The
217

ibid, pp 278-280.

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Minister is generally required to publicly notify this intention and consider public objections and submissions.219

In 1978, the Department of Lands and Survey published a general reserves policy, which remains operative. It focuses on the implementation of management plans for reserves. This enables local authorities to learn how to draft a plan and outlines the necessity of public consultation, public consultation, and public hearings. The policy aims to promote public participation in reserve policy. However, the policy contains no explicit reference to Mori interests or values. Originally, the Act provided that management plans be prepared within five years or within 5 years of the administration body who subsequently took or takes control of reserves after 1977. In 1983, the Minster of Lands and Survey granted an extension for recreation reserves which continues to apply; local authorities are free to choose when they will prepare the management plans.

With the enactment of the Conservation Act 1987, the Reserves Act 1977 remained in place but control, authority and management of these reserves was taken over by the Department of Conservation (DoC). DoC could delegate the administration of reserves to various bodies including local authorities, voluntary organisations, reserve boards, trust boards, trustees, Maori Trust Boards or a Minster. There are 4000 reserves in New Zealand. The Minster of

Conservation has the power to grant the right to take species of flora and fauna and can permit Mori to take or kill birds in a scenic reserve provided the land was Mori land before becoming a reserve.220

Despite a general reserves policy having been developed it was not until 1997 that local government and DoC sought to update the Reserves Act 1977. In 1998 a report was produced by a working party but there was no formal Mori representation on the working party. The update saw the inclusion of Treaty of Waitangi obligations and discussion of the implications of claim settlements and provision for consultation with tangata whenua.221 Only a small number of reserves have been vested in iwi authorities or such authorities have been granted powers to manage reserves under the Reserves Act 1977 as part of a treaty settlement. Examples of where this has happened are in the Ngai Tahu and Ngati Turangitukua settlements.222 Yet the majority of reserves remain within the conservation estate and use of reserves or access to natural materials still requires a permit from DoC.
218

Peter Thrush, Indigenous Flora and Fauna of New Zealand, a report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, August 1995, p 21. 219 Robert McLean and Trecia Smith, The Crown and Flora and Fauna: Legislation, Policies and Practices, 19831998, Waitangi Tribunal unpublished report, Wellington 2001, p 292. 220 Thrush, pp 7-8. 221 Marr, p 443.

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8.3.1.1

Tapuwae Scenic Reserve

The Tapuwae reserve is a part of Tapuwae No 3 block alienated by the Crown on 11 March 1897. On 25 May 1905, the Land Board recommended that the section be made a reserve for the preservation of scenery under section 235 of Land Act 1892 and Tapuwae scenic reserve, of 202 hectares, came into existence in 1905 under the Scenery Preservation Act 1903.223 There were attempts by Maori and Pakeha to have the reservation removed and land made available for purchase or for timber. During 1932, timber was taken illegally and sold to the King Timber Company at Kohukohu. Tihi Harris admitted to the theft and was fined.
224

King Timber

Company knew it to be stolen but no action was taken against them.

Section 16 of the Reserves Act 1977 provided that all reserves were to be classified. The Committee recommended that Tapuwae remain scenic. Section 1A of Tapuwae block was not officially a scenic reserve. As early as November 1905, it was noted that the adjoining section 1A block XIII Mangamuka Survey District of 10 was acres not gazetted as a scenic reserve but referred to as a scenic reserve in correspondence. In 1980, this scenic reserve was gazetted and classified for scenic purposes.

There was only one official record of tangata whenua involvement in monitoring or administering with a report by John Beachman, the District Conservator. The Department of Conservation visited the reserve on 18 August 1989 with L Forester and A Walker. Beachman stated that Ben Te Wake of Motukaraka came with them. Presently this reserve is administered by DoC.225 LM McCaskill in 1981 published a book on the scenic reserves of Northland. McCaskill listed the Tapuwae reserve as containing 202 hectares, and was gazetted by the Crown in 1905 as a scenic reserve. McCaskill states the reserve is on the right bank of the Tapuwae River, but is isolated with no formal road access. The reserve can be viewed from the harbour.226 The reserve is situated in the hill slopes between Te Kotuku Creek and Okapura creek overlooking Hokianga Harbour, North West of Rawene. The area supports kahikatea, puriri, taraire, totara, scattered medium sized kauri and clumps of pole kauri, and secondary kanuka.227

8.3.1.2
222 223

Motukaraka Scenic Reserve

ibid, p 445. Daamen, p 72. 224 ibid. 225 ibid. 226 LW McCaskill, Scenic Reserves of North Auckland. Book One: North of Whangarei and Dargaville, Wellington, Department of Lands and Survey, 1981, p 29.

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Manuoha/Motukaraka scenic reserve is part of Motukaraka West B block. In November 1940 the Commissioner of Crown Lands, L J Poff, stated a decision to declare sections of Motukaraka a scenic reserve and the matter was to be considered by the scenery preservation board. Motukaraka Scenic Reserve came into existence in 1941. There were still issues over sections 67 and 68 block IX Mangamuka Survey District Motukaraka scenic reserve and sections 65 and 66, block IX Mangamuka Survey District Tapuwae state forest and section 13A block V Mangamuka Survey District, which was unoccupied Crown land acquired in 1880. There were attempts to put these three areas together under one administration. In 1969 there was a joint report from the district ranger of the forest service and senior field officers of the Lands and Survey department recommending amalgamation as either all scenic reserves or all state forests. In 1977 there was a further joint report which stated that the area was unworthy of scenic status and should be offered to the adjoining farmer.

The naming of Motukaraka was questioned in 1977, relating to the classification of reserves under Reserves Act 1977. Although gazetted and referred to as Motukaraka, the reserve had never been named as such. There had been no involvement of tangata whenua in the naming process. A senior field officer was asked to comment on the suitability of a name, however, and he responded that the name Motukaraka was in common usage.228

McCaskill reports that the Motukaraka scenic reserve contains 121 hectares and was gazetted in 1941. The reserve is 6km west of Kohukohu and adjoins the Tapuwae State Forest 160.229 The Register of Protected Areas lists the Motukaraka scenic reserve as an area of 96 hectares,. It is above the Manuoha Stream, 5.4 kilometres west of Kohukohu. The area features kauri forest, rimu, miro, kahikatea, puriri, and taraire.230

8.3.1.3

Rotokakahi River Scenic Reserve

The Rotokakahi River scenic reserve comprises of sections 47, 48, and 93 Block III Whangape Survey District, within a block formerly known as Rotokakahi A2 block. The earliest record was dated October 1952 from the Commissioner of Crown Lands to G E Mulligan of the Lands and Survey Department stating that [s]teps were taken in 1947 to have following areas reserved for Scenic purposes but this was overlooked in Head Office. 231

The Hokianga County Council thought the area should be controlled by the Forest Service and submitted this proposal to the Conservator of Forests. E A Corby, district ranger at Kaikohe,
227 228

Department of Lands and Survey, The Register of Protected Areas in New Zealand, Wellington, 1984, p 12. Daamen, p 74. 229 McCaskill, p 30. 230 Department of Lands and Survey, p 12.

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was called upon to report. He recommended that the section be proclaimed a state forest. Following the report, the Conservator of Forests agreed to the setting apart of the area as a permanent state forest for scenic and protection purposes. But in late 1953 the Director-General of Lands thought the land should be set aside as a permanent state forest and the Commissioner of Crown Lands advocated the area for a scenic reserve.232

The Register of Protected Areas listed the Rotokakahi River Scenic Reserve as being gazetted by the Crown in 1955, containing 46 hectares. The reserve is a flat terrace in the bend of the river and includes steep slopes above the river. It is located 8 kilometres south-west of Broadwood, with some logging on the lower slopes (possibly part of the mill at Whangape and used as a source of wood for other mills in the area). The area supports various native flora including kahikatea, puriri, taraire, tawa, karaka, towai, kauri on higher slopes. Rimu, miro, kahikatea, puriri taraire appear on the lower slopes and secondary manuka on ridge tops.233

8.3.1.4

Other reserves

Kaitaia Scenic Reserve was gazetted in 1924 containing 7.2 hectares. The reserve is situated on the slopes above Ngahuirangi stream at Kaitaia on the northern side of Ahipara Hills with Old Takahue Road as the northern boundary234. The reserve features puriri and taraire in the gully at the head of the stream, with secondary kanuka trees. 235 In 1984 this reserve was administered by the Department of Lands and Survey.

The Mangamuka Gorge Scenic Reserve is the largest reserve in the Northland Conservancy featuring 2,832 hectares. Land was gazetted throughout the 20th century between 1927 and 1981. The reserve includes the Maungataniwha range, and the headwaters of the Mangamuka River 25 kilometres south of Kaitaia, as well as Soda spring. State Highway One is situated in between the reserve. The reserve features a variety of flora including rimu, rata, taraire, tawa, hinau, rewarewa, puriri, kahikatea, miro, kohekohe and pukatea, and kauri. The North Island kiwi, NZ pigeon, tui and the Kauri snail are the native fauna present in the reserve.236

The Otaneroa Scenic Reserve was gazetted in 1941 containing 2.6 hectares. The reserve is located on a steep hillside above a tributary of Awaroa River, near Waiotehue, 18 kilometres

231 232

Daamen, p 76. ibid, p 77. 233 Department of Lands and Survey, p 10. 234 McCaskill, p 33. 235 Department of Lands and Survey, p 6. 236 ibid.

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from Kaitaia. Above the tributary of Awaroa River, the reserve is isolated.237 The reserve features taraire, rewarewa, and towai remnant, with secondary bracken fernland.238

The Waitawa Scenic Reserve is administered by the Hokianga County Council. It was gazetted in 1935. The reserve is above the Waitawa stream, at the southern end of Maungataniwha range, 16 kilometres south east of Kaitaia. It was formerly Kohukohu Rd scenic reserve and is the southern margin of the Raetea forest239. The area features a forest containing rimu, rata, kahikatea, totara, miro over taraire, tawa, kohekohe, hinau, rewarewa, pukatea, and puriri.240

The Pukemiro Scenic Reserve came into existence in 1921 with a further section added in 1935. In 1984, the reserve contained 191 hectares, and was administered by the Department of Lands and Survey. The reserve is situated in steep broken hill country rising to twin peaks, 33 kilometres south of Kaitaia coming down to the headwaters of the tributaries of the Waitawa Stream. The reserve is along the south-western margin of Raetea State Forest, 9 kilometres north of Broadwood and can be reached by a walk of 3 kilometres from Pukemiro Road. Farm land surrounds it on three sides.241 The reserve features rimu, rata, towai, kohekohe, taraire forest, occasional miro, hinau, rewarewa, pukatea and puriri.242

The Broadwood Scenic Reserve was gazetted in 1919 and contains 7.2 hectares. The reserve is a flat terrace alongside Manganuiowae Stream in the Broadwood township and is accessible from Takahue Saddle Road to the north and the Mangonuiowae Stream to the south.243 The area contains kahikatea, taraire, towai, and houhere, titoki with kohekohe, hinau, karaka and mapou. Totara, matai. There is pastureland with scattered willow, wattle, and toetoe.
244

Pigeon,

kingfisher and fantail use the area as a feeding habitat.

In 1939, the Paponga Scenic Reserve was gazetted containing 2.7 hectares. The reserve is a heavy rolling land south of Broadwood, made up of mudstone. Secondary tree land manuka, regenerating totara, rewarewa, rimu, kahikatea, miro taraire are the native flora appearing in the area. The area also supports broadleaved shrubs including rangiora, heketara, wineberry, and tree fern. The pigeon, tui and fantail use the area as a source of food.245

237 238

McCaskill, p 33. Department of Lands and Survey, p 7. 239 McCaskill, p 33. 240 Department of Lands and Survey, p 7. 241 McCaskill, p 33. 242 Department of Lands and Survey, p 7. 243 McCaskill p 33. 244 Department of Lands and Survey, p 10. 245 ibid.

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The Runaruna Scenic Reserve was gazetted in 1939 and 1978. It contains 5.8 hectares in total. The reserve is a steep hillside, south of Broadwood. The area supports secondary manuka, regenerating towai, taraire, rewarewa, totara, miro, rimu, kahikatea. The pigeon, tui, fantail and robin are common to the area.246

The Mangataipa Scenic Reserve contains 76 hectares and was first gazetted in 1904. Further sections of land were included in the reserve in 1912, 1919 and 1968. The reserve is situated at the slopes above the tidal estuary of the Mangamuka River. The area supports towai, puriri and kohekohe forest. It is of significant scientific value because pohutakawa are not present within the forest. Other native trees include rimu, rata, totara, kahikatea, taraire, towai forest.247

Generally, these reserves were administered by the Lands and Surveys Department with a few exceptions. Presently these areas would be under the administration and management of the Department of Conservation. Effectively Crown actions in respect of reserves were a denial of kaitiakitanga and rangatiratanga. Most of the reserves now in existence are less than five hectares, tiny fragmented areas, which do not necessarily protect, enhance or maintain the flora and fauna they are supposed to. Most of these areas remain isolated surrounded by areas of cleared country.

8.3.2 Legislation
Almost all native plants and animals are protected under legislation. By virtue of the Wildlife Act, fauna that are part of the Wai 262 claim to the Waitangi Tribunal, are deemed vested in the Crown. The responsible Minister has the power to issue permits, permitting the degrees of harvest for protected plants and animals.248 The Act allows reserves to be created as a refuge and sanctuary for particular animals. The Governor-General by proclamation can declare a wildlife sanctuary. Where Crown land is involved, the reservation of such areas requires a joint recommendation by the Minster of Internal Affairs and the Minister in control of the land. If the proclamation affects water, then a joint recommendation is required by the Minster of Internal Affairs and the Minister of Transport. Under the Act the Governor-General has the power to impose conditions including prohibiting or restricting the entry of a person or classes of people.249 These reserves prohibit or restrict hunting, killing and taking of animals, eggs or spawn as well as vegetation in the sanctuary. Proclaimed wildlife refuges or wildlife

management reserves are also subject to restrictions. Wildlife areas are managed by the

246 247

ibid. ibid, p 11. 248 Thrush, p vii. 249 Section 9(2).

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Department of Conservation in accordance with its general policy and conservation management strategies.250

The Wildlife Act effectively restricted Maori rights to take, hunt and keep native fauna. Maori were concerned about the restrictions concerning the use of feathers and bones and other dead specimens, which under the Act belonged to the Crown. In the late 1970s dead kiwi were plentiful. These birds would be handed to the Wildlife Service and were then given to approved weavers. Most of the dead specimens were killed by possum traps, pig hunting or had been hit by cars. The general policy of the Wildlife Service at that time was that any killed native fauna was to be forwarded to the Wildlife Service. Individuals and organisations that wanted the animal material would make requests to the Council for Maori and South Pacific Arts. The Council would then make a recommendation to the Wildlife Service as to allocation, which the Wildlife Service usually accepted.

However from 1983 the supply of kiwi feathers was reduced resulting in fewer to distribute to weavers. The Council for Maori and South Pacific Arts established allocation guidelines outlining that: a) b) c) priority would be given to the repair of cloaks ahead of the making new ones; the experience of the weaver would be taken into account; and the teaching content involved in a programme would be a consideration.

However Maori reacted negatively to this scheme. In 1984 Oneroa Steward from Kerikeri High School was concerned that in the North dead kiwi were quite common from being run over, taken by dogs or falling into cattle stops. She argued that as tipuna had been making korowai for a long time that Mori should not need to ask permission to make or repair such taonga.

In 1986 the Wildlife Service developed its own policy on the allocation of kiwi feathers, that: a) b) c) feathers may only be received from the Wildlife Service; specimens suitable for mounting or study must be used for that purpose; any articles made from feathers (such as korowai) located on marae are the property of

the Crown; d) e) f) g) a register must be kept by marae listing such Crown property; priority is to be given to the repairing of cloaks rather than new items; craftswomen receiving the feathers are to be sufficiently experienced; in creating or repairing traditional materials and methods are to be used (including

muka or treated flax backing); and


250

Thrush, p 3.

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h)

that there should be some teaching content in the project.

Thus, the Wildlife Service still believed that it had the right to enforce such a policy on the basis that native fauna belonged to the Crown dead or alive.251

However, in fact the provisions of the Wildlife Act are deemed not to be retrospective. In Department of Internal Affairs v Gary Nicholls the Court commented that the common law position was that ownership rights did not exist until the fauna was captured and possessed. The issue was whether the provision of the Act only applied to fauna acquired after the Act. The Court concluded that the Act needed to be clarified and was of the opinion that it was not intended to be retrospective. Because of this the Wildlife Service sought legal advice on its obligations to Maori. They were advised of the possibility that the Treaty of Waitangi Act could allow a Maori person to lodge a claim to having customary or traditional rights to take certain wildlife and keep feathers for the purpose of cloak weaving. The legal opinion recommended clarification of the Act but in the end the Wildlife Service was disbanded and the Department of Conservation was established.252

The Act was incorporated into the Conservation Act and the Conservation Act requires that conservation strategies involve consultation with iwi. Until amended in 1990 there was little statutory basis for consultation or community discussion.253 To take any wildlife, dead or alive, the permission of the Secretary of Internal Affairs is required and conditions may accompany any permit including the means of taking and the area of harvest. All wildlife is now absolutely protected and deemed vested in the Crown other than those specified in the fifth schedule.254

Other legislation affecting Maori rights to natural resources includes the Marine Reserves Act 1971, which relates to marine life species inhabiting the sea or foreshore. Under the Act the public shall have freedom of access and entry to reserves and the opportunity to study, observe and record marine life in its natural habitat.255 The Native Plants Protection Act 1934 offered a degree of protection of plants on Crown land. Permission was required for the extraction of some plants, though some were excluded and listed in a schedule. The Governor-General had the power to declare any plant protected. As a result it was an offence to take plants in a public reserve and an offence to take plants from private land without the permission of the owner. However, one could take a reasonable amount for medicinal, scientific and nature study purposes.256 In 1973 the Act was tested in Davy v Borough of Birkenhead concerning the
251 252

McClean and Smith, pp 303-304. ibid, pp 305-306. 253 Thrush, p 4. 254 McClean and Smith, p 287. 255 Thrush, p 6. 256 ibid, p 14.

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cutting of pohutakawa trees. The Supreme Court stated that this Act applied to plants not trees. In 1987 the Department of Conservation took responsibility for the enforcement of this Act.

The Conservation Act 1987 established the Department of Conservation.

The Minster of

Conservation can declare that the Crown under conservation purposes will hold land or foreshore. Marginal strips (land 20 metres wide) which run alongside seashores, lakes and rivers, are reserved from sale or disposition by the Crown and allow public access.257 The Conservation Act is a mixture of consultation and arbitrary announcement but no consultation is required before Governor-General issues a proclamation under section 9(2) of the Wildlife Act.258 The Conservation Act amalgamated all natural resource legislation giving the Department of Conservation a management role over all protected areas. In administration of existing legislation, DoC had to advocate for the preservation of natural and historic areas for the future generations of New Zealand.

The Crown recognises cultural, spiritual, historic and traditional associations of various iwi with certain species and the natural environment through treaty settlements.259 In the Ngai Tahu Settlements Act 1998 there are provisions relating to the ownership and management of particular species. The Crown acknowledges the cultural, spiritual, historic, and traditional association of Ngai Tahu with certain taonga species. The Minster of Conservation under the Act must consult with Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu regarding relevant policies or reviews of taonga species. Ngai Tahu members can lawfully have in their possession wildlife specimens, including species under the Wildlife Act. Such activity cannot be for commercial purposes or noncommercial transfer. As a result the Act legally presents a proprietary interest in flora and fauna to Ngai Tahu. Ngai Tahu also maintains interests in flora and fauna through protocols. These protocols require DoC to exercise its functions, powers and duties with consideration of Ngai Tahu interests. Such protocols include conservation management strategies and management plans.

As part of the Ngai Tahu Settlement, protocols have been prepared on six issues: cultural materials; freshwater fisheries; culling of species of interest to Ngai Tahu; historic resources; involvement in RMA processes; and visitor and public information. The cultural materials protocol refers to plants, plant material and materials derived from animals, marine mammals, or birds for which DoC is responsible. This protocol requires the Department to consider requests for materials as they become available and consult with Te Runanga where there are competing requests from non-Ngai Tahu persons for cultural materials. The Department also
257 258

ibid, p 10. ibid, pp 22-23.

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has other duties to help define levels of customary use of cultural materials, identify local sources of plants and advise Te Runanga in respect of the establishment of Te Runanga cultivation sites.

Despite the provisions for the recognition of Ngai Tahus relationship with the natural environment in the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act, Maori interests in the conservation estate remain undefined and unclear. While some concessions are made for Mori, the Crown remains very much in control of conservation policy, laws, and practice. There are limited provisions in legislation for Maori to take flora and fauna from conservation areas under permits for traditional purposes. However, conservation and sustainable management objectives now dominate government policy. The Crown still asserts the right to manage the conservation estate and local authorities are often given delegated authority to regulate such areas. Maori remain powerless to manage lands unless the Crown grants them a right to do so. Mori are prevented from undertaking sustainable and customary harvests of particular fauna including kukupa and kuaka and from exercising their historical and customary relationships with the environment. Moreover, Maori are largely prevented from obtaining the economic benefit the conservation estate offers through the development of eco-tourism type initiatives.

8.3.3 The State of the Environment


An interim report from the New Zealand Conservation Authority in1997 exposed the reality of New Zealands natural landscape and the severely depleted state of natural resources. The New Zealand Conservation Authority concluded that: world; Nearly one-third of New Zealands original diversity of land and freshwater bird species New Zealand has 11% of the worlds endangered species; Three-quarters of New Zealands present heritage of land and freshwater birds are

threatened a greater percentage of threatened native birds than almost any other country in the

are now extinct; Virtually all New Zealands native bird species are declining in numbers, with a handful

of exceptions; 90% of New Zealands wetlands have been drained, filled or destroyed; The natural habitat that remains for native birds and animals is severely fragmented

because settlement, agriculture, and production land-uses take up over 90% of lowland areas. Many species can no longer survive in the scattered patches surrounded by farmland, pine plantations and built up areas;
259

70 million possums infest about 92% of New Zealands land area;


McClean and Smith, p 423.

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Nearly 3 million hectares of New Zealands native forests are vulnerable to possums

over 60% of the North Islands native forests are at serious risk; Other introduced species cause serious environmental damage and include: deer, thar

and wapiti, rats, stoats and ferrets; feral goats, cattle and sheep, rabbits and hares; wasps and trout; and 10% of New Zealands land area is classed as severely eroded.260

Explanations are given for the current state of New Zealands environment, ranging from preEuropean experience to European settlement and impact. Migration of Mori would have had a major impact on pre-human ecosystems although some areas of original forest would have been destroyed by fire accidentally. Indeed, the clearing and modification of land for settlement would have added to a cumulative process of exploitation and depletion of natural food resources. Early harvesting techniques would also have contributed to the depletion of

resources. Geoff Park comments that;

the country the first Europeans saw wasnt a pristine wilderness, but neither was it a rundown desert, burnt from one end to the otherThe early Maori were capable of burning forests and certainly did but the natural forest cover of plains country was kept intact because these rainforests were often a better source of food than cultivated land or secondgrowth vegetation.261 In contrast, European arrivals saw the new colony as a place of new beginnings. Opportunities for agriculture development and promising economic prosperity were the focus of the new arrivals. Both Maori and European were eager to participate in the benefits of trading and other commercial activities. However, agriculture has had a devastating effect on the environment as New Zealand has been transformed into a producer of meat, wool, and butter for Britain and other international markets.262 Agricultural development brought with it an invasion of new plants and animal species and the clearing of lands destroyed much of New Zealands indigenous flora and fauna. The ethos of the settler government in New Zealand was on development. Indeed, a Royal Commission in 1913 thought that forestland which was suitable for farmland should not remain forest if it could be occupied and resided upon.263

While Maori hunted birds and other resources for food, they also utilised a range of natural resources as building materials and cultural or medicinal purposes including;
260

large trees for waka and buildings;

New Zealand Conservation Authority (NZCA), Maori Customary Use of Native Birds, Plants and Other Traditional Materials: Interim Report and Discussion Paper, Wellington, 1997, pp 71-72. 261 Geoff Park, Nga Ururoa: The Groves of Life Ecology and History in a New Zealand Landscape, Wellington, 1995, pp 45-47 and 318. 262 NZCA, pp 76-77.

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whales.

rongoa plants; wild plants for food sources including bracken fern, karaka, hinau, nikau, mamaku, ti,

tawa, kahikatea, raupo, puha, kiekie, kelp and seaweeds; flax, ti, pingao and kiekie, feather, sealskins and dog skins for weaving and clothing; dyes from muds and soils, tree bark, berries or the pink feet of kereru; oils from whales, shark liver or plant seeds such as titoki; green leaves and twigs for ceremonial purposes; implements from bird bones, whale bone, shells and woods; and decoration with special coloured feathers or plumes of birds, and teeth of sharks and
264

Te Rarawa has informed the Crown that it can manage and control particular natural resources. For example, at a hui in November 1994 Te Runanga o Te Rarawa passed a resolution [t]hat Te Rarawa be given authority, after working out a process of control with the Department of Conservation, for cultural take of kukupa. All applications would be scrutinised by Te Rarawa and any take would need to be for a specific purpose for kaumatua and kuia.265

Under the Wildlife Act 1953 all crafted artefacts or taonga using indigenous materials, and all the feathers and other materials allocated by the Department of Conservation to Maori craftspeople, remain the property of the Crown. Though while this is the case there are no known cases where the Crown has taken back such artefacts, though there is a possibility for this to happen.266 The lack of real ownership for Maori is a concern and may be regarded as an insult to mana and the denial of the rangatiratanga and kawanatanga guarantees in the Treaty of Waitangi.267

8.4

Conclusion

Professor Stokes has commented that in recent decades, and particularly since the mid 1960s when the Crown began acquiring substantial tracts of coastal lands to create scenic and recreational reserves, there has been increasing tension between the Crown and Maori over management of these lands.268 Most of these lands in the late 1980s were transferred to the conservation estate, to be administered by the Department of Conservation. Although this department has taken active steps in recent years to consult more widely with Maori, there is

263 264

Park, p 241. NZCA, p 92. 265 ibid, p 34 266 ibid, p 143. 267 ibid.
268

Stokes, p 397.

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still frustration for many Maori who feel they have lost control of some very special places of significance to them.

This chapter has examined several diverse natural resource issues for Te Rarawa but is by no means exhaustive in its coverage. Case studies relating to land and waterways, flora and fauna and generic issues such as Crown policy and legislation have discussed Te Rarawa claims to management and control of such resources. A consistent picture has emerged of a gradual loss of control over natural resources over time and the failure of the Crown to recognise, protect and provide for Te Rarawas relationship with the natural environment.

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9.0

Social and Economic Deprivation

Te Rarawa has experienced negative demographic, social, economic and political changes to their world since contact with Pakeha and the Crown began. This chapter discusses the social and economic conditions of Te Rarawa Maori over time and attempts to establish a context within which Crown-Te Rarawa relations may be placed. The first part of the chapter considers the social and economic impact of land loss, disease, and changes in the Maori economy in the nineteenth century. The second part of the chapter concentrates on health and education in the Hokianga area from 1900, based on a research report by Sarah-Jane Tiakiwai.269

9.1

Social and Economic Conditions in the 19th Century

Land alienation began prior to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi and continued in to the twentieth century. The flow on effect of land loss in the Muriwhenua region was a cycle of economic dependence, poverty, gum digging, debt and ill-health which disrupted and demoralised communities and hindered their attempts at positive social and economic development.270

Pre-treaty land transactions were executed between private purchasers and Maori before 1840. Such transactions in the Te Rarawa area were mainly with missionaries and other people associated with the Church Missionary Society in the area around Kaitaia. After the signing of the Treaty a number of inquiries were constituted by the Crown to consider the validity of pretreaty transactions. The impact of these purported purchases remained with Te Rarawa throughout the nineteenth century as the Maori owners maintained the position that such transactions had not amounted to sales of land.

From the 1840s the Crown embarked on a determined and comprehensive land-purchase programme which was sustained through to 1865. The aim of the programme was to extinguish customary land title and secure Crown ownership for the purpose of opening up Maori lands for European settlement. The Tribunal has commented that the Muriwhenua region was most affected by the Crown Purchasing programme in the period from 1856 to 1865; a period in which the Crown sought, in particular, to secure title to the Victoria Valley and all its adjacent lands. Viewed as highly desirable by the Crown, these land-holdings constituted an

269

Sarah-Jane Tiakiwai, Education and Health Issues in Hokianga: Research Report for Te Rarawa, unpublished report prepared for Te Uira Associates, 2003. 270 Geiringer, p 7.

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uninterrupted band of land extending north from Mangonui and Whangaroa to Kaitaia and Ahipara, and westward to the North Hokianga. The land-purchase programme in this region involved complex negotiations between Maori and Crown agents who held divergent understandings about the purposes and benefits of land sales. Between 1865 and 1900, the Crown alienated at least 130,000 acres of prime Te Rarawa lands and forests.271 Although part of the ongoing and nation wide land purchasing regime dating back to 1840, a key characteristic of land alienation throughout this period was the employment of the Native Land Court and the Crown Purchasing Board to administer and facilitate the alienation of Te Rarawa lands.

An understanding of the Crowns alienation of Te Rarawa land requires an historical outline of both Crown policies and the socio-economic and political contexts in which Te Rarawa Maori understood and responded to the Crown. As Claudia Geiringer has noted in the Muriwhenua context, Crown land alienations did not occur within a vacuum.A cycle of poverty, disease and debt provided the backdrop to all Crown/Muriwhenua interactions over Muriwhenua land during the late nineteenth century [and] it is within this context that any explanation of Crown land purchase activities in Muriwhenua must be placed.272

According to Linda Bryder and Derek Dow, Maori health has been a relatively neglected field in New Zealand history.273 The provision of health services to Maori in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries was premised on the fatal impact or dying race theory, illustrated through the sharp decline in the Maori population. This decline was due to postcontact dislocation of the Maori environment, whereby changes to traditional Maori structures and ways of existing were significantly eroded. The impact of these changes had, therefore, serious effects on standards of health. James Belich disputes the general notion of fatal impact, arguing that the population decline for Maori post-contact was nowhere near as devastating as European experiences post-plague and famine. Rather, Belich views the fatal impact theory as a myth that was strong enough not only to overshoot the evidence on Maori depopulation and to have an enduring effect on historians interpretations, but also to help project the British Empire into New Zealand in 1840.274 Regardless of the arguments for and against the fatal impact theory or myth, there is clear evidence that Maori health suffered post-contact.

271

This figure accounts for approximately one third of total Te Rarawa lands. It is a conservative figure calculated according to transactions identified as part of the research undertaken for this report. This figure excludes private purchases and any Te Rarawa lands unidentified at the time of writing. 272 Geiringer, p 44. 273 Cited in Tiakiwai, p 59. 274 ibid.

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Geiringer notes that crippling health problems and continued population decline disrupted and demoralised the economy of Muriwhenua Maori in the nineteenth century.275 Contemporary accounts emphasise the existence of diseases including scarlet fever, typhoid, measles, rheumatic fever, influenza, and pheumonia, and mortality rates were high. In addition, malnutrition, skin diseases and chronic invalidism meant that many Maori communities simply staggeredfrom one major health crisis to another.276

There were epidemics of fatal diseases. For example, a severe outbreak of typhoid at Ahipara in 1874 killed 34 people in three weeks and many people, including the prominent rangatira, Timoti Puhipi, were seriously ill.277 This epidemic spread to other settlements and was followed by measles. The acting Resident Magistrate, George Kelly, blamed the epidemic for the huge population reduction of 23% between 1874 and 1878.278 In 1875 another epidemic at Ahipara claimed the life of the school master and 28 others and closed the school for a time. At Kaitaia the same epidemic caused a decrease in school attendance from 31 children to 17.279

The most obvious indicator of the impact of European disease in the Muriwhenua region is population decline. Prior to European contact the Muriwhenua claim area supported a considerable population. However, a dramatic population decline took place over the nineteenth century. Rigby and Koning estimate that by 1845 the population of Muriwhenua had been reduced to 4000 and that between 1845 and 1858 the population had again been halved.280 The Redident Magistrate at Mangonui recalled in 1868 that:

twenty years ago on paying my first visit to Ahipara, I was struck by their numbers, their large villages and pas, occupied by a numerous populationNow I regret to say, the country is almost a waste, the population dwindled to a few hundreds.281 The Maori population of the Mangonui area continued to decline reaching a low of 1,615 people in 1878. Because of the early history of Maori/Pakeha contact in Muriwhenua the Maori population declined early but also began to recover earlier than in other tribal areas. By 1880 the Maori population of Muriwhenua was increasing.282 Geiringer concludes that high levels of disease and mortality caused considerable disruption, dislocation and demoralisation to Maori communities and caused greater dependence upon the Pakeha case economy. She notes that the near constant state of disruption and devastation caused by endemic disease provides the
275 276

ibid, p 16. ibid. 277 ibid. 278 ibid, p 17. 279 ibid. 280 ibid. 281 ibid.

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backdrop against which one must analyse all Crown/Maori interaction in Muriwhenua during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.283

A correlation has also been drawn between land alienation and population decline by academics such as Ian Pool.284 Pool writes that:

the Maori subsistence food-economy had depended on a combination of extensive and relative intensive land utilisation. After land alienation had occurred, they were restricted essentially to smaller tracts of land, and thus found it necessary to develop new strategies to obtain food and other basic needs. They had to turn either to more intensive techniques of land use, or to replace subsistence production with cash purchases of food.285 Sources show that the latter strategy identified by Pool was utilised by many Te Rarawa hapu, which from the 1840s had become increasingly dependent on waged employment or some form of exploitative resource industry.286 Drawing on natural resources in their districts some Te Rarawa Maori, particularly those situated in the Herekino region and along the Hokianga and Whangape harbours, were able to derive a cash income from the kauri gum and timber industries. Other Te Rarawa hapu either migrated for extended periods to areas of industry or relied upon European settlement in their areas to bolster their subsistence economies such as gum digging.287

Maori in the Muriwhenua area had been digging gum for commercial export since the 1840s. By the close of the 1850s a flourishing export trade for gum had been established and both prices and demand rose dramatically. Gum digging provided the only industry for Maori in the late 1860s and the industry dominated the Maori economy in this region for the next sixty years.288 The former trade in horticultural produce had slumped at this time and it was gum not land that brought the major influx of Pakeha into the region. In the absence of any other sustainable economic activity gum digging provided a crucial source of income.

However, gum digging had considerable social costs. In order to procure gum Maori lived a nomadic existence, locating themselves wherever it was most abundant. In times of high prices everyone from the very young to the very old was engaged in gum digging. Geiringer notes that
ibid. ibid, p 20. 284 Ian Pool, Te Iwi Maori: A New Zealand Population Past, Present and Projected, Auckland, 1991. Pool sought in his research to test this point originally made by Keith Sorrenson. Pointing to the drop of child to woman ratios in Te Rarawa from 1874 through to 1891, before recovering in 1901, Pool argues that increased Maori exposure to European diseases reinforced a cycle of malnutrition infection caused principally by the processes and end-results of land alienation. 285 ibid, p 63 286 ibid. 287 Stokes, p 80
283 282

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contemporary sources linked the conditions in the gum camps with high levels of disease and mortality.289 Kauri gum also introduced a Maori dependence on the cash economy and its fluctuations. Thus, while prices were good a living could be made but when prices dipped Maori were thrown back on to other meagre resources. The lifestyle also meant that Maori were not cultivating the little land that did remain in their ownership and the monopolistic practices of many store keepers and gum traders considerably worsened the problem of debt.290 Gum digging locked Maori into a cycle of poverty and dependence from which they were not relieved until the 1960s.291

While the timber and gum industries provided some hapu with economic advantages, both industries were contained within isolated pockets throughout the Te Rarawa region and were subject to a fluctuating and often unscrupulous market place. Indeed, the benefits from the timber trade were negated with the use of extended credit by local storekeepers which forced Maori to work year round, disrupting seasonal planting and harvesting, and creating a cycle of indebtedness and poverty.292 Additionally, working in the gum fields for extended periods further impacted on the poor health of Te Rarawa Maori. The overall benefits of such industries, therefore, were nominal and incapable of enabling hapu to survive comfortably, let alone progress in the face of continuing land alienation.

The cultural framework in which Te Rarawa Maori understood and sought solutions to their socio-economic situation remained distinctly Maori at this time. Forming the basis of their worldview was a relationship to the land based on customary systems of socio-political organisation. While it is likely that Te Rarawa Maori would have been developing an understanding of Western concepts of land ownership throughout this period, the principles underpinning hapu land rights were still firmly based upon the principles of take raupatu (conquest), whakapapa (land rights transmitted and validated according to ancestral genealogy), and ahi kaa (continuous occupation). In simple terms, Te Rarawa rights of land possession were transferred down in a line from a common ancestor who had claimed and retained land rights according to the sustained occupation of that land. Those who could whakapapa directly to that common ancestor resided upon the land as members of the hapu, sharing rights and obligations under the direction of rangatira.

288 289

Muriwhenua Land Report, p 355. Geiringer, p 22. 290 ibid, p 24. 291 Muriwhenua Land Report, p 363. 292 Judith Binney, Judith Bassett, Eric Olssen, The People and the Land Te Tangata me te Whenua An Illustrated History of New Zealand 1820-1920, Wellington, 1990, p 22.

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Hence, in response to poverty, illness, and land loss, Te Rarawa rangatira and their hapu sought out solutions to their problems; they did not sink into a state of hopelessness. As Vincent OMalley and Stephen Robertson noted in their report on Muriwhenua, poor socio-economic conditions failed to demoralise Maori communities: although victims of the colonisation process, Muriwhenua Maori were never passive victims.293 Likewise, Te Rarawa continued to act upon their decisions in order to improve the socio-economic welfare of their hapu.

However, at the turn of the nineteenth century it was clear that Crown land legislation and purcahsing had had a devastating affect on Te Rarawa hapu. The extent to which Te Rarawa leadership could continue to exert their authority within the hapu had been severely undermined, while control beyond the hapu to policy matters relating to land tenure reform and alienation was completely severed. Furthermore, the sale of hapu land to the Crown, based upon the expected economic benefits of European settlement, failed to exact any long-term benefits. Quite in reverse, the huge economic costs associated with land sale transactions imposed even more poverty and debts upon hapu, in turn perpetuating a cycle of further alienation of land to the Crown. From 1865 to 1900 the corrosion of hapu authority and economies occurred simultaneously under the Crowns unilateral imposition of Native Land Court systems in 1865, the practices of the Crown Lands Purchasing Board from 1870, and from 1892 the land policies of the Liberal Government.

9.2

Education and Health in Hokianga294

This section is divided into two parts providing an examination of education and health issues for Maori within the Hokianga region. Section 9.2.1 examines the establishment of Mission and Native Schools to provide a context for how Hokianga Maori became exposed to education. Case studies of Motukaraka Native School and Te Karae Native School are included. Section 9.2.2 focuses on the health of Maori, particularly Hokianga Maori, with a particular focus on the provision of health services to Maori in the Hokianga during the period 1939 to 1954.

The findings indicate serious concerns as to the level and quality of education and health care provided for Maori in the Hokianga region. These concerns in part mirror government policies of assimilation, while at other stages are reflective of the racial prejudices of the time. The findings drawn from this study provide an indicative picture of the experiences of Te Rarawa Maori in the Hokianga. These findings suggest that:

293 294

OMalley and Robertson, p 5. This section is taken from: Sarah-Jane Tiakiwai, Education and Health Issues in Hokianga: Research Report for Te Rarawa, unpublished report prepared for Te Uira Associates, 2003.

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1.

There was a clear lack of any basic provision of education, particularly for Motukaraka

Native School students between 1903 and 1908. 2. There was no action on concerns raised by government officials as to the quality of

teaching at Motukaraka Native School. 3. The government sought to provide compensation for the teacher who was found to be

severely lacking in any teaching ability, and had been in such a state for a number of years. No such compensation was offered to the Maori community. 4. There is no evidence to indicate whether the land transferred by the Tokerau Maori

Land Board to the Crown for the purposes of a Native School at Te Karae was returned. 5. Te Karae Maori were inhibited in accessing a Native School education because of

protracted indecision by government officials. During the same period, and in lesser amount of time, a Board school was established in a neighbouring block of land. 6. Hokianga Maori were restricted in their ability to access health services due to isolation

and lack of appropriate roading and transport conditions. 7. Hokianga County Council and health officials were in disagreement about who was

responsible for resolving these conditions, which meant Hokianga Maori continued to miss out on access to these services. 8. There was both blatant and underlying examples of racism, whereby Maori were unable

to access health services available to the general population.

9.2.1 The Educational Experiences of Te Rarawa Maori


The history of education for Maori in New Zealand has been described as contradictory.295 The system has been contradictory in that educational developments, such as the Native Schools, were established and seen by some as instruments of colonisation set up to aid cultural assimilation and economic exploitation, while being seen by others as sites of opportunity for the educational aspirations of Maori.296 The two Native Schools examined in this section illustrate the obstacles faced by Maori in trying to support the education of their children. One case notes the extreme difficulties in actually getting a school established, while the other illustrates the inability of government officials to adequately address issues of teaching quality and achievement, and the problems that emerged as a result. This second case, in particular, provides rich detail highlighting the battles faced by Maori communities regarding the education of their children.

295 296

Judith Simon, (ed), Ng Kura Mori. The Native Schools System, 18671969. Auckland, 1998. ibid, p 2.

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9.2.2 The Mission Schools and the introduction of education to Maori


The education system for Maori, while not formally established as a state system until 1867 was governed by legislation introduced in 1847. Prior to that, missionaries introduced education to Maori. The first Mission School was established at Rangihoua, in the Bay of Islands by Thomas Kendall. While not successful (it closed after two years), Maori had whetted their appetite for learning. Maori interest increased but the government was content to leave the education of the Maoris to the missionaries.297 Simon highlights the ease with which Maori mastered the art of reading and that this resulted in the creation of village schools where Maori taught each other. Maori embraced literacy as a way of accepting that these were relevant tools, which would enable them to communicate and interact on an equal level with their Pakeha counterparts.

The rapid advancement of literacy caused a number of changes to key structures of traditional Maori society. One change was the influence exerted by the missionaries, reinforced through the teaching of the scriptures and subsequent undermining or marginalisation of Maori knowledge and customs through a process of evangelical imperialism.298 Another change also related to traditional Maori knowledge and customs, which focused on the ease with which Maori were increasingly able to access what was traditionally considered a highly tapu system. While Stokes argues that Maori would not have disclosed their knowledge to Pakeha, she does acknowledge that some early missionaries reflected on the negative impact their teachings had on Maori:

Later in his life, William Colenso, the missionary printer, commented on the role of missionaries in undermining the social structures and belief systems of the Maori world. Colenso had been dismissed by the CMS (Church Missionary Society) for allegedly getting a Maori woman in his household pregnant, so he had that as a bias. However, he was one of the few to reflect more deeply on the implications of culture contact.299 The results of these changes thrust Maori into the wider debate of how they would participate not only in the New Zealand education system but also how they could be better incorporated or assimilated into New Zealand society.

In 1847 the Education Ordinance Act was passed. The Ordinance provided government subsidies for missions, conditional on their provision of focusing on boarding rather than day schools. The Ordinance stated that instruction should be provided in English as well as in the

Tiakiwai, p 9. Evelyn Stokes, A Review of the Evidence in the Muriwhenua Lands Claims, Waitangi Tribunal Review Series, Wellington, 1997, p 135. 299 ibid, p 148.
298

297

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vernacular.300 However, another view is that the aim of the Ordinance was to isolate Maori children from influences of traditional villages, assimilating them into the habits of European culture.301

9.2.3 The demise of the Mission Schools and rise of the Native Schools
The missionary domination of Maori education ended following the land wars of the 1860s. The land wars severely impeded attendance at the mission schools. Simon disputes this focus as being the sole reason for the decline in Maori attendance at the mission schools. Instead, she posits that while the intentions of Maori on the surface appeared to be similar to Europeans, the key point of differentiation lay in the fact that Maori viewed schooling as a way to extend their existing body of knowledge while the state, through its assimilation policy, intended to replace Maori culture with that of the European302

Simon gives another reason for growing Maori dissatisfaction with the mission schools. During the 1850s, the government required mission schools to provide industrial training, which effectively meant manual labour. Maori parents concerns lay in the fact that the children spent more time on manual labour than on learning to read and write. However, Simon notes that the school inspector, Henry Taylor, felt that Maori had misinterpreted the role of education and the need to balance academic work with manual training. The result was that intellectual development was given a low priority by both state and missionaries in the Native Schooling policy of this time, highlighting the fact that while Maori were seeking through schooling to enhance their life chances, the state was setting out to control and limit those life chances.303 The introduction of the Native Schools Act 1867 saw the focus change away from mission education to secular education, allowing the government to establish greater control over the provision of education to Maori in New Zealand.

9.2.4 The Native Schools


The Native Schools Act 1867 provided for the establishment of village schools. Instruction was required to be in the English language only, financial contribution by Maori to school buildings and staff salaries was required and there was supervision of village schools receiving government aid.304 Essentially, the schools were to maintain their role as civilising agencies and centres for spreading European ideas and habits.305 Herein lies the contradiction. How
300 301

Tiakiwai, p 10. ibid. 302 Simon, p 9. 303 ibid, p 11. 304 W Bird, The Education of the Maori, in I Davey, (ed.), Fifty Years of National Education in New Zealand, Auckland, 1928, p 62. 305 Tiakiwai, p 12.

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could the Native Schools be sites of educational opportunity for Maori when their main purpose was to facilitate the cultural assimilation of Maori children?

The establishment phase of the Native Schools was supported largely due to the political climate that had witnessed severe disruption to the schooling system as a result of the land wars. The economics of war and desire for greater social control shaped the parliamentary debates that subsequently led to the establishment of the Native Schools. It was proposed that an investment in Maori education would reduce expenditure on Maori incarceration. As Duffy (2002) notes, education was preferred to warfare as a method for tackling Maori resistance to colonisation and settlement.306

Support for the establishment of native schools differed among tribes, particularly after the wars of the 1860s. A large proportion of the support for the schools came from North Auckland, where the tribes had either fought on the Pakeha side during the Wars or remained neutral. The success of the Native Schools, was largely dependent on Maori communities. Maori acted as advocates within their communities to get the Native School established, mostly through the gifting of land for buildings. Furthermore, Maori had to provide evidence of numbers to warrant the erection of a school within their community. Archival evidence includes the names and ages of Maori (and non-Maori) children attached to support petitions and applications for a Native School. For example: Dear Sir Sending list of children to attend Karae School when open. None of these are at school at present but mine and two of Hohaias, the rest having no school yet and never. Mete Smith.307 While Maori communities were the main initiators of the establishment of Native Schools, Pakeha also realised the value such schools had for their own children and were at times willing to support petitions begun by Maori communities. For example, a settler, Seay, wrote: I beg to draw attention to the fact that there are 17 children of school age residing in the Te Karae Block, who are at present receiving no education at all. They are all residing along a two mile stretch of the Te Karae Broadwood road. The road is now near completion. There are 15 native and half caste children and two white children, my own. There are also a

306

S Duffy, Hokianga Native Schools, 1871-1900. Assimilation Reconsidered, MA thesis, Massey University, 2002, p 1. 307 Mete Smith to Millar, Postmaster, Rawene. 11 August 1911. Contained within this letter was a list detailing the ages and gender of 35 Maori children who ranged in age from 4 to 15 years. The Te Karae Native School file contains numerous lists of names, ages and gender of children as the Maori community sought support from government officials to open a Native School in its district: National Archives, Auckland, BAAA 1001/595c.

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number of young children coming on to school ageIt is a great pity that so many children should be growing up in ignorance. 308 The dream of establishing a Native School was quickly replaced by the reality of maintaining them. Teachers were poorly paid and often uncertificated, and attracting teachers to and reatining them in isolated areas such as the Hokianga proved particularly difficult.

9.2.5 Native Schools in the Hokianga


The role of Hokianga Maori, in the foundation of New Zealand as a colony was pivotal. Indeed, Lee noted that while the eastern side of the northland region was fairly well dominated by Pakeha traders, the scenario was quite the opposite in the Hokianga. Lee notes that Hokianga Maori had very strong and healthy trading businesses, both internally and internationally.309 Similarly, the social and political system amongst Hokianga Maori was much more sophisticated and organised. Thus, when Pakeha traders sought to establish themselves in the Hokianga, the success of their endeavours depended largely on their relationships with Hokianga Maori. Further to this, when the missionaries arrived in the Hokianga, the fervour with which Maori responded to the teachings of the Bible opened a whole new range of opportunities from which to advance and progress their trading activities, as well as their relationships with Pakeha. Hokianga Maori clearly understood the advantages associated with accessing literacy, and learning English. Thus, the ability to access education through the establishment of the Native Schools was welcomed. The extent of this view is demonstrated in the following extract: we have been taught three things reading, writing and arithmetic. What we want is that education should be progressive, and that schools should be established for children of two years up to twenty-oneWe want more than these three things to enable our descendants to cope with the Europeans.310 Daamen highlighted the enthusiasm with which Maori communities in the Hokianga appeared to have embraced education and the opportunity to establish Native Schools in their rohe, despite the many hardships faced in getting their children to these schools. The experiences of the Hokianga Native Schools also highlighted the political nature of the education system and of Maori-Pakeha relations during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Duffy states that the Hokianga Native Schools were placed right at the heart of Maori communities, and often became the focal point for community in themselves.311 Simon concurs, noting that the Native Schools contributed to the building of a different sense of community from that of the

308 309

Seay to Fowlds, 13 December 1910. BAAA 1001/595c, National Archives, Auckland. Tiakiwai, p 15. 310 Simon, p 12. 311 Duffy, p 10.

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close whanau-based kainga which had been such a significant part of Maori social organization.312

The Hokianga experience was no different. The experiences of the schools communities examined in this section highlight the importance Maori leadership had and its impact on the ongoing education of Maori children.

9.2.6 Motukaraka Native School


Motukaraka Native School was operational from 1881 to 1908. This case study focuses on the period from 1903 to its eventual closure in 1908. Events after the closure of the school, up until 1925, are also included as they illustrate a range of issues faced by Maori communities, socially, culturally and politically, upon the demise of the Native schooling system in their community.

During this period, the head teacher of Motukaraka Native School was Thomas Danaher, while his daughter, Winifred, held the assistants position. This was in keeping with the policy that no male assistant be employed on the staff of any Native school and also reinforced the role of the female assistant, whose duties were to teach sewing and demonstrate civilised conduct.313 Danaher had been in the Native School service since 1880 and at Motukaraka since 1887.

The school had a Maori committee, in accordance with the legislation under which Native Schools were established. Members of this committee, during the period examined, were drawn largely from the Hare family, of the Ngati Here hapu, who were a well-established family at Motukaraka. Frank Hare, Ngahuia Hare and Himi Te Uruti gifted the school site in 1880. The Maori community was a strong Roman Catholic population and there was a church not far from the school site. In 1899, attendance at the school had increased, due to job opportunities in the timber industry that had arisen in the district. While pleased with this outcome, government officials expressed concern that once the timber supply was exhausted, the school would see a reduction in attendance figures. However, immediately prior to the period being examined in this case study, the school had experienced problems of low attendance and had fallen into a state of disrepair. Despite this, there was hope that the school might be able to overcome these difficulties and move forward:

It has been eight years since any repairs have been done, owing no doubt to the feeble unsettled state of the school which was brought about mainly by sickness and people leaving the place. Now however it is growing decidedly healthy again. It is about 25 years since the Ngatihere people made their gardens here in Motukaraka before. The site of the
312 313

Simon, p 22. ibid, p 14.

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church is only a few chains from the school-house. No doubt that the number of scholars from here will increase before the end of the year.314 However, the following years were punctuated by illness, lack of resources including suitable teachers, isolation and administrative constraints. Thus, the optimism was short-lived.

Simon notes, the majority of the Native Schools were in rural settlements far removed from shops, electricity and other amenities.315 Access to the schools themselves was often difficult due in part to the isolation and also lack of suitable roading. Duffy identifies isolation as being a key factor for the Hokianga schools. Motukaraka was no exception in terms of its physical and cultural isolation although Kohukohu and Rawene were accessible across the other side of the harbour. A letter to the Secretary for Education, Edward Gibbes, Danaher informs him of the reopening of Motukaraka Native School after suffering a bout of illness. Danaher noted that the length of time in which the school was closed (ten days), was a result of a lack of access to medical facilities and a doctor, due to the remoteness of Motukaraka and transport difficulties. The physical isolation of schools such as Motukaraka, combined with a lack of ready access to relieving staff, meant that Native Schools were often required to close when the teaching staff became sick.

The impact of epidemics in Maori communities in locations like Motukaraka was significant. Within the five-year period being examined in this section, Motukaraka Native School was closed on numerous occasions due to general illness (1902-1903, March 1907) outbreaks of influenza (Nov 1905, July 1907, March 1908) and chicken pox (July 1907). The severity of these outbreaks were recorded in official reports:

Here, too, disease had played havoc with the school. Enteric fever was raging for some months and many deaths occurred. This led to the closing of the school for a considerable period.316 Danaher described the Hokianga experience at that time as a very sickly season, what with fever, chicken pocks and influenza.317

Native Schools and their teachers were expected to educate Maori children about the civilised ways of the Pakeha. This included health education. However, when the epidemics swept through the Native Schools, the health of not only the Maori children who attended the Native
314

Inspectors Report, W. Bird, 15 April 1905. Motukaraka Native School file, National Archives Auckland, BAAA 1001/365b. 315 Simon, p 65. 316 AJHR, 1904, Vol. 2, D-G, E-2, p.6. 317 Danaher to Gibbes, 17 July 1907. National Archives, Auckland, BAAA 1001/365b.

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Schools, but also the wider Maori community were severely affected due to the lack of inherited immunity to these introduced diseases. As Simon states:

the work of the Native Schools was often seriously impeded by sickness and disease amongst the pupils. Influenza epidemics, chickenpox, tuberculosis and measles swept through Maori villages and at times closed many schools.318 During these outbreaks, teachers within the Native Schools were often required to dispense medicine despite being given no specialist training in the field. Simon records that many teachers applied themselves with great earnestness to this task; when epidemics raged they took responsibility for nursing the sick.319

Health issues were not the only reason that affected Maori childrens attendance at school. Officials noted that:

The attendance at these schools, with some few exceptions, is not so satisfactory as it should be; indeed in four cases it is altogether unsatisfactory. Proximity to gumfields, to timber-mills, and to flax-mills has a bad effect.320 Motukaraka children, between 1903 and 1907, had relatively little distance to travel to school, except in times of inclement weather, when the roads became impassable due to the poor roading conditions in the area. Yet William Bird, Chief Inspector of the Native Schools described attendance at the school in 1906 as being very lax: The tone is more or less unsatisfactory as regards the appreciation by the elders of the school. The children do not appear to be keenly interested. The want of rigour here and the half hearted manner of the children are very discouraging. The attendance is bad also and this must militate against the success.321 Frustrating to government officials and Native School teachers was the perceived influence Maori leaders had on the attendance figures at Native Schools. According to Duffy, the real lack of departmental control due to the isolation of many of the Native Schools meant that Maori communities were able to manipulate a schools attendance in order to achieve a particular endThe practice seems to have been quite widespread.322 There is little evidence in the Motukaraka file to suggest that Maori community members and Maori leaders were manipulative in their approach to school attendance. Certainly, they knew the value of their

318 319

Simon, p 120. ibid. 320 AJHR, 1905, Vol. 3, D-G, E-2, p.4. Report on the Native Schools in the Hokianga District. There were 12 schools within this district and the Motukaraka Native School file indicates poor attendance during the examination for 1905. 321 AJHR, 1905, Vol. 3, D-G, E-2, p 15. Annual Report by William Bird. 322 Duffy, p 38.

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childrens attendance in establishing the school, as evidenced in the provision of lists of childrens names to government officials. But attendance at Native Schools was not compulsory, and the impact of the flourishing timber and gum industries and distance perhaps contributed to the issue of poor attendance.

Despite concerns expressed by William Bird, Inspector of Native Schools, the Motukaraka Native School file indicates a period of relative stability in terms of attendance figures between 1905 and 1908, although this does not take into account fluctuations in enrolments during the year.

Figure 1:

Motukaraka Native School Attendance Figures 1905 to 1908 Maori Boys 1905 1906 1907 1908 13 11 9 9 Maori Girls 9 11 13 12 Total 22 22 22 21

Source: Motukaraka Native School file, National Archives, Auckland, BAAA 1001/595c.

However, Birds concluding comments in his 1905 annual report to the government about attendance at Native Schools perhaps have more relevance to the state of attendance at Motukaraka than the figures given in the table above:

There can be no doubt, however, that the greatest factors in producing good attendance at a Native school are the inherent attraction that the school itself has for the children and the confidence the parents have in the master. That is to say the attendance in many cases depends largely upon the teacher himself, and falling off in the attendance should be to him the occasion for a little introspection.323 The correspondence from Danaher to officials at the Education Department on attendance indicates that there was some need for justification of low attendance (and subsequent reports of improved attendance) at Motukaraka that belied the introspective approach suggested by Bird. Furthermore, it suggests that Danaher was seeking ways of disassociating himself from the real issues that were impacting on the education of Motukaraka Native School children.

By 1900, thirteen years after Danaher began at Motukaraka, his relationship with the local Maori community was characterised by his dislike of the Chairman of the Native School Committee, Frank Hare. Danaher wrote to Edward Gibbes, Secretary for Education, regarding

323

AJHR, 1905, Vol. 3, D-G, E-2, p.15.

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the improvement in school attendance (which had risen to 23) and that the improvement was due to a change in chairman and Committee. The new committee I am happy to say take an interest in the school and show it by assisting us while at work from time to time.

There was a much more sinister undertone however to the strained relationship between Danaher and Frank Hare, which did not emerge until the mysterious disappearance of Danaher in late 1908. Porteous, Inspector of Native Schools, reported the following to Gibbes in his 1909 Inspection Report:

The current rumour is that Danaher had been misconducting himself with the Maori girls of the place, some of these school girls. It is said he was in the habit of giving them whiskey and tobacco. A girl belonging to a Maori named Nui Hari gave birth to a child. This girl was about 14 years of age and attended school. A hui was held by the Maoris to consider the question of the paternity of this child...It is said that the girl eventually stated that Danaher was the fatherI made an effort to see Nui Hari but failed. Motukaraka is a Roman Catholic community and it is quite probable that the priest had forbidden the Maoris to say anything of the matter now.324 Nui Hari was Frank Hare, the Chairman. The girl had stated that a local boy was the father, but upon the birth of the child, which was of fair complexion, the girl admitted that Danaher was the father. Further to this, it was widely speculated that Danaher was given money to disappear by Frank Hare. There were a number of reported sightings of Danaher in Sydney, Australia, and Auckland, but he was not to surface in Motukaraka again. It is unclear why Danaher and Hares relationship was so strained. Whether Hare knew what Danaher was doing with the Maori girls is unsubstantiated. What the file does show however, is a lack of regard held by Danaher for members of the Maori community, even after Hare had been replaced by Rawiri Rewi as Chairman in 1907. Furthermore, reports completed by Chief Inspector Porteous in 1907 and 1908 express the frustration at any real lack of academic progress being achieved by the students who attended Motukaraka Native School.

In annual reports provided to government on the progress of Native Schools, blame for the lack of academic achievement was often placed at the feet of Maori communities. Indeed, explanations given included poor attendance by children, difficulties within Maori communities and the occurrence of tangis and Native feasts. The reports from the period 1905 to 1908 highlight a number of serious issues relating to the quality of teaching given to the local Maori children who attended Motukaraka Native School. While the 1905 inspection report by William Bird, Chief Inspector for Native Schools, identified a lack of support from the local Maori

324

Inspectors Report, Porteous, 14 April 1909, BAAA 1001/365b, National Archives, Auckland.

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community, Bird also highlighted confidential notes that raised concern about the role the head teachers daughter played as a teaching assistant:

I cannot say that the new assistant, the youngest daughter of the head teacher, showed the slightest capability as a teacher. No method in her work was evident and her controlling power may be set down as nil. The methods generally are behind the times and the children have but a poor chance of acquiring much education. Mr. Danaher informed me that this was his 25th examination. I think that a change would be certainly beneficial to the Maoris here.325 In 1906, Bird again noted the lack of academic progress being achieved by the children of Motukaraka Native School. While not attributing the childrens half hearted manner to school to the very poor results, Bird nevertheless expressed concern at the viability of the school to remain open under the tutelage of the Danaher family. Following the submission of Birds report to government officials, Danaher received a letter from the Secretary for Education in relation to his daughters continuing role as Assistant: From remarks contained in the last two reports made on your school.it appears to the Department that the present Assistant is hardly qualified to undertake successfully the work required of her, and I find now that her appointment has never been confirmed. I shall be glad, therefore, if you will recommend someone who is more capable of doing the work.326 Danahers response was in defence of his daughter and he noted that he had been giving his daughter lessons. Danahers response in the difficulty of finding anyone to replace his daughter as Assistant, ensured a reluctant acceptance to her continued appointment. Bird acknowledged the real difficulty in finding anyone to replace Miss Danaher, but continued to express his concern at her continued appointment.

Less than a month later the school nearly burned down and there was a lack of community support to replace any of the damaged equipment. The Department of Education subsequently refused to give any additional funding to assist in the rebuilding of the school. The reason for this lack of support is unclear, but it suggests that relations between Danaher and the Maori community had reached a low point. This would also seem to be the first clear indication that government officials were not looking at the school in any long-term capacity. The inspection report the following year was equally grim, with Porteous reporting on the sad state of the school buildings and the continued lack of academic progress:

325 326

Inspectors Report, W. Bird, 15 April 1905, BAAA 1001/365b. Secretary for Education, Gibbes to Danaher, 30 April 1906, BAAA 1001/365b.

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The efficiency of this school is not high The whole place [is]going to rack and ruin, and [it] appears to have outlived its usefulness despite some minor repairs being carried out the year before.327 Bird concurred, noting on the file that: The school has never been successful in the hands of the present teacher who is one of the old regime having been in the service since Jan[uary] 1880. I am not prepared to recommend his transfer to another school as I consider he is not qualified for the work.328 Although the reports and comments from government officials were not encouraging, Danaher continued to teach at Motukaraka Native School. He wrote to the Department of Education on a number of occasions, mainly to inform them of the improved attendance, which he reasoned was due to a change in chairman and Committee. Whilst government officials expressed concern in both the inspection report and the Motukaraka Native School file, no further action was taken until after the 1908 inspection report was completed. The report, completed by Bird, was damning. Bird commented on a number of issues, noting the childrens apathy, irregular attendance, lack of discipline and cleanliness. Bird also noted the continued disrepair into which the school had fallen, commenting on the fact that repairs had not been done for quite some time and noting, much of the trouble arises from the neglect of the teacher to attend to small matters. However, Bird saved his most vociferous criticism for the lack of teaching ability and subsequent lack of academic achievement attained by the children.

Attached to the examination results, Bird added a number of confidential notes, writing: It is necessary in connection with this report to state that there have been many children who have attended this school more or less irregularly for long periods from eight years upwards and who have not yet passed even a very low standard. Some of these 8 or 9 have left recently as being over school age. They have reached the age of fourteen or fifteen having passed only S[tandard]1 or S[tandard] 2...Surely the Dep[artmen]t has no need to wonder why the children attend badly or why they show such apathy in school. I have never found in any school such miserable results as these. There can be little doubt that they are due to incompetence on the part of the teacher.

Figure 2: Year 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907


327 328

Examination Results Motukaraka Native School, 1903 to 1908. Passed 2 2 4 6 5 Failed 7 7 11 11 12 Absent 0 0 1 2 2 New 2 2 2 2 0

Inspectors Report, Porteous, 25 March 1907, BAAA 1001/365b. Note from Bird on Motukaraka Native School file, 15 April 1907, BAAA 1001/365b.

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1908

20

Source: Motukaraka Native School file, 13 May 1908, BAAA 1001/365b, National Archives, Auckland,

In a letter from the Secretary for Education, Gibbes, to Bird in May 1908, it was concluded that the:
school should no longer be allowed to exist in its present condition. The reports have been unsatisfactory for years. Inspectors have indicated that Danaher should have been transferred years ago and that the buildings once again be put in order. Time is now, can no longer delay. The settlement must be given another chance under a new teacher, in buildings put into proper order, or the school must be closed, and the place, for a timeabandoned.329 However, in arriving at this conclusion, Gibbes was also conscious of Danahers age and length of service and felt that the termination of his appointment should be compensated. There was little consideration of compensating the Motukaraka Maori community for their prolonged suffering under the incompetence of both Master and Assistant.

In response to Gibbes letter, Bird reiterated the dismal findings of his inspection report and replied:

Motukaraka Native School is probably the worst from every point of view in the service Mr. Danaher is simply marking time pending his retirement under superannuation. Meanwhile the education of the Maori children at Motukaraka School is being either neglected or carried on in a very lifeless fashion. The Department has certainly given Mr. Danaher every consideration, for his incompetence has been evident for some time past, as can be seen from the reports. I consider that the Department is not justified in allowing the present state of things to continue. At the same time to terminate his engagement after 28 years service when the benefits of the Superannuation Act are almost within his reach, seems harsh treatment. Action should have been taken earlier, e.g., in 1903, and I cannot see my way to recommend his dismissal now.330 In essence, despite the acknowledgement that the Maori children and indeed the wider Maori community involved with Motukaraka Native School had suffered under Danahers instruction, Bird agreed with Gibbes and looked sympathetically upon a man who was marking time until he retired. This was perhaps to mitigate for their own inability to dismiss him some time earlier, when the academic results were already indicating the childrens ability to achieve any reasonable standard of education. After agreement by the Minister of Education a compensation package was negotiated with Danaher. It would appear that the Maori community was not aware of the reason behind Danahers early retirement, nor did they seem unduly concerned at his departure. One might speculate that the community were aware of his activities with some of
329 330

Gibbes, Secretary for Education, to Bird, 11 May 1908, BAAA 1001/365b. Bird to Gibbes, Secretary for Education, 13 May 1908, BAAA 1001/365b.

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their young girls, and were quite glad to see him leave the school. One month later, Danaher had disappeared.

Upon Danahers retirement, the school was closed, as there was no one who was able to replace him. Aside from the initial request from the Maori community about ensuring the replacement teacher would also be Catholic, little was done to advance the reopening of the school. This was largely due to the preoccupation of the community at this time in Danahers disappearance. Many people spent days searching the district for him, and focus was taken away from the school and from the education of their children.

At the end of 1908, Hohaia Hare sent a letter to Gibbes asking when the school might be reopened and perhaps anticipating a not too positive response he also queried whether the schoolhouse might be available to rent. The response was noncommittal to the reopening of the school, and Hohaia Hare was informed that the Department is not prepared to accept any offer for the use of the buildings in the meantime. In January, T. Nui Hare sent a letter to the Secretary for Education requesting a date for the reopening of the school. Bird noted that the Rawene Postmaster, Mr. Millar, had been asked to provide details of the Motukaraka children to assist Inspector Porteous to finally decide upon the action to be taken when he visited Motukaraka.

Millar was unable to complete his task of providing details of the Motukaraka children on account that the nativesleft for Kaikohe to attend to Hone Hekes tangi. However, Millar noted that there was a Board of Education School within a mile of Motukaraka Native School, at which attendance at this school was low. Millar recommended that it might be worthwhile considering the advisability of making two half time schools.

Millars suggestion was not well received by the Motukaraka community. A letter signed by Nui Hare, the committee and the iwi to Millar noted their receipt of his request to supply a list of names for their children to attend the Pakeha school at Wairupe (Wairupe being the European school at Motukaraka). The letter also outlined the reasons why Wairupe was considered an inappropriate alternative by the community:

1. 2. 3.

Already have a school (Motukaraka). Wairupe is too far. Afraid of the bridge at Wairupe lest the children meet with misfortune and die.

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Noting that the community had been without a teacher for a long time, the letter suggested an alternative arrangement. The community requested that the teacher of the European school, Mr. Rudall (or Rutoro, as he was referred to by Maori), be sent to Motukaraka three days a week, and stay at the European school three days a week. The suggestion to operate Motukaraka as a half-time school was deemed worthy of consideration by government officials, but only in regards to transferring Motukaraka Native School to the Board School, which would serve as a half-time school. There was no consideration to the reopening of Motukaraka due to reasons of cost, and the fact that the Board School needed more enrolments to justify its own usefulness.

In March 1909 Porteous found that the buildings were in such a dilapidated state that an extensive overhaul would be required. Despite these anxieties, Porteous recommended that the Motukaraka children could and should commute (be ferried) to the nearest Board School, which was located across the harbour in Rawene:

The children of Motukaraka have in my opinion ample opportunities to attend school, and I therefore recommend that no steps be taken to reopen the Government school there. 331 Gibbes sought Millars opinion in selling the teachers residence at Motukaraka and the feasibility of removing the other school buildings to another school site. Thus the future of Motukaraka Native School was decided. It was three months after Nui Hares petition, and the community had not yet received a reply from government officials as to the state of their school.

Prior to Gibbes decision, Nui Hare put forward another petition, this time to the Minister for Maori schools. The petition again sought a teacher (a Catholic) for the school at Motukaraka, and reiterated the communitys stance not to send their children to the Pakeha school. The reason given was that the bridge crossing was too dangerous for the children. Accompanying the petition were names of children who would attend the school at Motukaraka if it reopened. The list of petitioners was signed by Rawiri Rewi, Chairman of Motukaraka Native School committee.

While the official response to this latest petition was under consideration, government officials continued to pursue the dismantling of the school. Notes on the Motukaraka Native School file indicate that some of the children listed in the petition were considered too old, not interested in attending school, erratic and not resident at Motukaraka. Millar reported to Gibbes in July 1909, refuting many of the claims put forward by the Maori community in their petition. Millar identified 14 of the 22 school age children listed on the petition as being bona fide. He also noted that the bridge referred to is a most substantial one only lately constructed by the Roads Department and is wide enough for coach traffic the fear of the bridge is ridiculous.

331

Porteous to Gibbes, Secretary for Education, 14 April 1909, BAAA 1001/365b.

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In essence, Millar reinforced government perceptions that reopening Motukaraka would be a waste of time and resources. This last comment about the lack of attendance and the seemingly ridiculous nature of the Maori communitys demands do not take into account the Departments own ineptness in reducing the school to this state. Bird himself acknowledged that Danaher should have been removed in 1903. Instead he was able to carry on his abysmal job of educating Motukarakas children. The Department added to this farce by compensating Danaher in his retirement, acknowledging his length of service, as opposed to the quality of the service he provided. Furthermore, the Department did not appear competent enough to inform the community of the decisions being made in Wellington. This was highlighted when Mr J.H. Rudall, the teacher of the Public School at Motukaraka who had been listed in the Maori petition as being the half-time school teacher, himself wrote to Gibbes requesting whether the Education Department has advised the Motukaraka Natives the Departments intention of not reopening the Native School. Gibbes response was to reiterate the intention not to reopen Motukaraka Native School.

Motukaraka was not the only Hokianga Native School that experienced difficulties with government officials. The case of Danaher at Motukaraka was unusual for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is no information on the file to indicate the Motukaraka communitys displeasure with Danahers teaching approaches. This is in contrast to a case at Waima, where the Maori community, under Hone Mohi Tawhai, petitioned government officials for the removal of their teacher, Mr. Hill, because they felt too much time was being devoted to keeping the Waima school facilities clean and that the childrens educational achievement was being hindered (Duffy, 2002, p.86). However, the Motukaraka community had known only one other teacher prior to Danaher, and his service at Motukaraka was over such a long period that it was probable that the community had come to expect nothing more than what Danaher had to offer.

It would appear that the community at Motukaraka were aware of what was happening, despite not being informed directly. In September 1909 Nui Hare wrote to Millar reaffirming the community stance not to send their children to Wairupe, and again requesting the appointment of a half-time teacher for Motukaraka. In his letter, Hare indicated that he had heard of the impending sale and removal of Motukarakas school buildings. His translated reponse was direct:

I say unto you that I will not allow that to be done. If the Maori school here is to be permanently closed by Government, the land will revert to me, and all the buildings thereon, including schoolhouse and Masters residence. I will not allow those to be sold by

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Government, to any other person whatever. I have sent in a demand to the Goverment to that effect.332 Hare saw the opportunity to fight for the return of the land he gifted to the Crown for the purpose of opening a school at Motukaraka. This was to form the next phase of his battle with government officials in relation to Motukaraka Native School.

Hare also sent a letter and a petition to the Minister of Native Affaris James Carroll. The petition, signed by Nui Hare, Rera Hare and 33 others, outlined the lack of progress made in regards to reopening Motukaraka Native School and reiterated their desires and reasons for not sending their children to the Pakeha school. Carroll referred this letter to the Minister for Education. The Minister of Native Affairs received another letter from Nui Hare, dated the same day. This letter was more strongly worded, perhaps an indication of the level of frustration felt by Nui Hare that they had little effect on deciding the future of Motukaraka Native School:

This is to formally notify you that if the Maori school of Motukaraka is permanently closed, that you and the Government are to return the school site to me and all of the buildings standing upon it. Because I gave that land in the first instance as a site for a Maori school absolutely. And if the Government permanently closes the school then it is right that the land and buildings thereon be returned to me. I will not approve of the Government selling the buildings to somebody else. Those houses belong to me if the school is to be permanently closed. If a Master is sent along the thing remains as originally intended, but if the school is to be permanently closed then the land and the buildings must be given up to me.333 This letter, which was also referred to the Minister of Education, clearly states Nui Hares determination in seeking resolution to the issue of the school. The title clearly states that Frank Harris, Ngahuia Hare, and Himi Te Uruti made an unconditional gift of land to the Crown for a Native School reserve. However, according to the Crown, the issue was clear, they held title to the land and simply disregarded Nui Hares claim.

However, the notion of ownership, particularly in relation to gifted land was less clear-cut. In order to establish a Native School within their areas, Maori were required to gift suitable land on which the school could be built. The Maori perspective, as stated in Hares claim, was that if the purpose for use of the gifted land had changed, so too had the circumstances of the original gifting, thereby the land would return to Maori ownership. In Motukarakas case, while the land was transferred to the Crown, the title clearly states the purpose for which the Maori owners gifted the land:
332 333

Nui Hare to Millar, 20 September 1909, department translation, BAAA 1001/365b. Nui Hare to Minister of Native Affairs, Hon. James Carroll, 20 September 1909, department translation, BAAA 1001/365b.

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Particulars of title of Motukaraka Native School known as Matataiki and containing 2 acres 1 rood. 1. Native Title: Memorial of ownership, Northern district (Vol. 2 157), 3 May, 1880, in which Frank Harris, Ngahuia Hare, and Himi Te Uruti are stated to be the owners of the said piece of land. (Note: Memorial bears endorsement by Chief Judge of the Native Land Court 20 June 1881, which refers to the conveyance of the land to the Crown, and is to the effect that the transfer is a bona fide transaction and is complete. This is followed by an Order of the Court bearing the same date (20/6/1881) and declaring that the land shall be held in freehold by the Crown according to the limitations set forth in the deed of conveyance. 2. Title of Crown: Conveyance to Crown 24 December 1880 (Deed 1241 Auckland) and bearing signatures of Frank Harris, Ngahuia Hare, and Himi te Uruti, makes an unconditional gift of the land to the Crown as a Native School reserve. (emphasis added).334 The Waitangi Tribunal in the Muriwhenua Land Report documents Maori understanding in relation to the gifting of land. In particular, the report states:

For everything given or taken a return of some kind was requiredThus those who give gain mana above the recipient. Those who receive must restore the balance, by responding generously over time.335 From within this construct, Nui Hare was justified in expecting the return of the original gift of land. Unfortunately, Hare did not get the support he had hoped for from the Minister of Native Affiar. Carroll was timid in his approaches to the Department of Education, and did little, if anything to advance Nui Hares case to reopen Motukaraka Native School, or for the return of the land gifted for the school:

There is a fairly large Native Village at Motukaraka and unless the number of children has gone off considerably, it should justify the retention of the School. Knowing however the interest the Department has always taken in promoting Maori education, I am sure that any step they have taken is for good reason. I respectfully ask that you supply me with these reasons in order that I may present the facts to Nui Hare and his people. If there is anything that the Maoris may be able to assist in rectifying it.336 Apart from a parliamentary question by Carroll to the Minister of Education in 1912 querying the reopening of Motukaraka Native School, there is nothing in the file on this matter until 1922. This could have been for a number of reasons. Motukaraka Native School was already closed and officials had shown no intention of reopening the school. Instead they had actively worked to find alternative education options. There was no communication with the community on what was happening, despite numerous attempts by Maori and even non-Maori to seek answers from government officials as to the status of the school. Attempts by the Maori
334 335

Motukaraka Native School file, 14 October 1909, BAAA 1001/365b. Muriwhenua Land Report, p 26.

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community to seek support from Ministers also drew little effective response. The sheer effort of maintaining the level of interest within the community and the ability to correspond with bureaucrats was a skill that few Motukaraka Maori possessed at that time. The death of Nui Hare, who had largely spearheaded the efforts to date, had perhaps the most significant impact on progressing the issue.

Ten years after Carrolls parliamentary question, the issue of Motukaraka Native School was reignited. During that time, the school buildings had been sold and removed and in 1916, the land had been leased to Thomas Hancy, a local Maori. In 1922, Tipene Hare, Nui Hares son, petitioned his local Maori Member of Parliament, Tau Henare about the possibility of reopening Motukaraka Native School and freeing up the land that was given for the school site (the land that was being leased by Hancy). Hare sought Henares assistance in the resolution of these matters. Hares petition was forwarded to the Minister of Education, with Henares accompanying comment:

This request is an old and genuine one. I should be glad to hear whether anything can be done to meet this request.337 The belligerence of the government officials experienced by Nui Hare had softened to a more helpful approach in 1922. While there was a firm stand on government policy that required the Motukaraka children to attend school at Wairupe, the view in relation to returning the land to Motukaraka Maori was more supportive. Notes in the file indicate that some work was undertaken to ascertain the status of the land, and it was surmised that the claim was due to the lessee, Hancy, being in arrears on the land. Porteous, who was still working for the Department of Education, recommended to the Minister that the land be returned. The Minister agreed, and after the appropriate legislation was drawn up, a letter from Caughley, the Director of Education, to Tipene Hare was sent advising him of the return of the land to its original owners. The process was completed through the Native Land Court in 1924.

This case study on Motukaraka Native School highlights a number of deficiencies within the administration of the Native School system. Requests by the community in regards to keeping the school open, maintaining the unique character of the school (underpinned by their Catholic beliefs) and maintaining the right to continue sending their children to Motukaraka Native School were met with indifference by officials. The continued provision of substandard teaching at Motukaraka is further evidence of such deficiencies within the government department. The governments decision to compensate Danaher so as not to prejudice his length of service,
336

Carroll to Minister of Education, 19 November 1909, BAAA 1001/365b.

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alongside the suspicious circumstances of his disappearance was problematic. The persistence of Nui Hare in fighting for the return of the land was eventually rewarded, albeit after his death.

The Motukaraka community suffered under the provision of a substandard education over a period of years. The Motukaraka file, unsurprisingly, makes no mention of government officials inability to discharge their duties satisfactorily in the Motukaraka case. Nor is there any mention of how the provision of substandard education might have affected both the attendance figures and the general attitude of nonchalance described by Bird in his 1906 inspection report. The abysmal educational achievement of these children in the period 1903 to 1908 would have severely inhibited their ability to progress when they were forced by government officials to attend the Board (or Public) School. Furthermore, the actions of Danaher outside of the classroom, in what appeared to be widely known dalliances with local Maori girls, might have contributed further to a sense of hopelessness felt by Motukaraka Maori in being able to change their circumstances. Constant rebuffs to the few concerns expressed to government officials would probably have reinforced this view. Given that just over ten years had passed between the last petition by Nui Hare and the renewed one by his son, Tipene, the question also arises as to whether there had been a change in government officials approach to Native Schools and in particular, to addressing the concerns of their Maori communities. This, and the climate that existed as a result of the closure of the school, might explain the initial response by government officials to Nui Hares request. It would appear more likely that the process of time assisted Tipene Hare in his successful petition to have the Motukaraka Native School site returned, facilitated by the support of Tau Henare, the Maori Member of Parliament for Te Tai Tokerau.

9.2.7 Te Karae Native School


This case study examines the experiences of the Maori community in trying to establish a Native School at Te Karae in the Hokianga. The case study indicates an experience fraught with administrative difficulties and delays. Simon notes that Te Karae was open between the years 1910 to 1915. However, Duffys thesis on Hokianga Native Schools lists no reference to Te Karae. There is a file on Te Karae Native School at the National Archives, but there was no evidence in the file to confirm that the school actually opened. It is probable that because a file on Te Karae existed during the period identified by Simon, it might have been assumed that the school actually opened. Thus the examination here is more of a snapshot into the efforts expended by the Te Karae community in trying to establish a Native School in their area.

337

C.J. Parr to Henare, 1 August 1922, BAAA 1001/365b.

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Maori involvement was a mandatory requirement for the establishment of a Native School. This requirement was built into the 1867 Native Schools Act and subsequent legislation. Whilst Maori involvement was built into the legislation, in that Maori were expected to provide land for the school site, contribute to the cost of the school buildings and guarantee pupil attendance; it was the government that dictated the terms as to how this involvement was to occur. Despite these constraints, the Te Karae community, which included Maori and Pakeha families, tried to fulfil the requirements in the hope that they too could have a Native School for their children: I beg to draw your attention to the fact that there are 17 children of school age residing in the Te Karae Block, who are at present receiving no education at allThere are 15 native and half caste children and two white children, my own. There are also a number of young children coming on to the school age. The Block has only been opened to settlement a short while and is now mostly taken up. I think if there was a school here a number of white men with families would settle here, who at present do not care to come on account of there being no educational advantages for their children. I would be very glad of your advice and assistance in this matter. It is a great pity that so many children should be growing up in ignorance.338 This letter, by Pakeha settler Seay, in 1910 is interesting in the fact that he was endorsing the establishment of a Native School, as opposed to a Public School (which had been in operation since the Education Act 1877). Maori communities had to provide land and contribute to the building costs for Native Schools, but Pakeha children were able to attend these schools. The role played by Pakeha within Native Schools, however, were not always supportive of ensuring that their primary function was the education of Maori children. The 1880 Native Schools Code permitted the attendance of Pakeha children, but only if it did not interfere with this primary function. However, Bird revised the Code and the Regulations that were adopted in 1909 allowed European representation on Native School Committees if there were European pupils. The effect of this change on some Native Schools was devastating as an increase in Pakeha children at a school signalled also a potential increase in Pakeha control. Because Native Schools were represented as inferior institutions, this often meant a move by Pakeha parents to have the schools designated as Public Schools.

While it is difficult to assert that Seays intentions would have progressed to the extent of eventually turning the Native School into a Public School, it would be fair to assume that this may have been a possibility, given Seays comments about how a school would attract more Pakeha settlers. Indeed, the Secretary for Education, Edward Gibbes response to Seay, sought clarification as to whether he was requesting the establishment of a Native School or a Public

338

Mr S. Seay to Hon G. Fowlds, 13 December 1910, BAAA 1001/595c.

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School. Subsequent correspondence from Seay confirmed his efforts, alongside the Maori community at Te Karae, to establish a Native School.

In December 1912, frustrated at the delays, Seay sent a letter to the Minister of Education, the Honourable William Massey: Dear Sir I am writing to bring before your attention the hard lot of the children at Te Karae. Two years ago we applied for a schoolAfter waiting about a year the inspector at last came up and selected the site and told us that once it was surveyed we would not have long to wait. It has been surveyed eight months now but we seem to be no nearer getting the schoolWe have written to the Secretary for Education repeatedly and the reply we always get is a promise that the buildings will be started shortly. We settlers in the back blocks have many hardships to ensure but the worst of all is seeing our children grow up in ignorance of even their letters. I understand that in places a teacher has been promised for even 4 children. What is the reason that we, with our large numbers are put off year after year?339 In 1913, Inspector Porteous sent his report to the Secretary for Education, followed a year later by Inspector Birds report. On reading the two reports, it would appear that much of the delay was because of the difference of opinion in relation to where the school should be situated. Porteous noted that the settlers at Te Karae took the opportunity of making a deputation during the Minister of Native Affairs visit to Kohukohu, where they complained that the proposed new school at Karae was not in a central position as far as the Karae block was concerned. Porteous reported that Birds earlier inspection had identified a site at Onepoto, near the entrance of the Karae creek. The rationale for this site was that it was more centrally located and could tap into a much wider district. During this time, a Public School had been established at Orowau (Tutekehua) by many of the original group of settlers who had petitioned for a school at Te Karae. This greatly reduced the case for the Onepoto site. As a result of this development, Porteous disputed Seays claims as to the number of settlers in the district, instead stating that their interests were as yet comparatively small.

Bird makes a number of interesting comments on the report filed by Porteous. In particular, Bird noted that he was informed that the settlers who made the complaint to the Minister of Native Affairs had no children, were not residing on the Te Karae block and that they had other financial interests in the block instead. The fact that the settlers made no offer of a site, as noted by Porteous, indicates that Seay, while wanting his children educated, did not want to have to make any contribution for this to happen. The long delays frustrated Seay so much that Bird reported in 1914 that he had taken to teaching his children at home.

339

Seay to Massey, Minister of Education, 30 December 1912, BAAA 1001/595c.

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Despite these ongoing delays, Maori from the Te Karae community continued to pursue the establishment of a Native School. The Tokerau Maori Land Board had already transferred land to the Crown for the purpose of a Native School, and yet another list was procured (following Birds request) to confirm (again) the numbers that might attend Te Karae:

This is an application from us asking that favourable consideration be given to our request that a school be established for our childrenThere are many children available as has already been stated in the lists supplied last year. There are also a good many new ones to take the place of those who are now grown up and are too old for school. Hence we feel justified in renewing our application to your Department.340 The response to Toki Pangari was not encouraging. Birds notes on Pangaris letter indicated that Gibbes also needed to seek clarification on the status of the Board School, Tutekehua. Bird was of the opinion that given the influx to Tutekehua by Te Karae Maori children, the need for a Native School was perhaps negated. Furthermore, he informed Gibbes that the site originally handed over by the Tokerau Maori Land Board had since been given back to them, as it was considered unsuitable. Gibbes response to Pangari closely mirrored Birds suggestions. Effectively, Gibbes informed Pangari that, following confirmation from the Education Board as to the status of the Board School at Tutekehua, it was the Departments view that one school would serve the area better, and that this school would be Tutekehua. This decision effectively ended any future discussion on Te Karae.

A number of issues emerge in relation to the Te Karae Native School case. Similar to the Motukaraka case study, these issues point to the role of the government officials, and particularly the lengthy delays subjected to the Te Karae community. Correspondence written by Seay was always replied to by government officials, whereas the file indicates only one letter from the Department to the Maori community, and this letter was to inform them that Tutekehua would probably usurp the need for Te Karae. One possible explanation for this might be that both Inspectors Porteous and Bird had contact with Mete Smith (the main initiator for the Native School and contact person within the Maori community at Te Karae). The reports filed by both Bird and Porteous note their communication with Mete Smith. There is little in the file to indicate they had a similar level of contact with Seay. Another explanation might be that Seay felt more would be achieved if he wrote directly to the Minister of Education. This was probably because both Bird and Porteous appeared to view Seay as a man looking after his own interests.

340

Toki Pangari to Inspector of Native Schools, 24 March 1914, department translation, BAAA 1001/595c.

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Of more interest however, is the difference of opinion between Porteous and Bird as to the best location for the proposed school. It appears from the file that this was the main cause of delay, which eventually resulted in the school not being built at all. While there is acknowledgement of the role the settlers played in identifying a suitable site, as Porteous noted, they were unwilling to offer sections of their own, instead relying on Maori to supply the land. After Mete Smiths advice against the original site (which was below a grave yard), it appears that neither Porteous nor Bird could agree on any alternative. Each was firmly of the opnion that their site was best Porteous at Pateoro and Bird at Onepoto. In the end, it would appear that due to this inability to make a decisive statement on this issue, Maori at Te Karae missed the opportunity to send their children to a Native School and were forced (through bureaucratic processes) to send their children to the Board School at Tutekehua.

Another point that emerges from this snapshot is the relative ease with which the Board School at Tutekehua was established in relation to the difficulties experienced by the Te Karae community. This points to the control asserted over the Native Schools system by government officials, and the fact that Maori had no control over the process particularly in relation to the length of time it took to make what appeared to be relatively simple decisions. The question to be asked in the Te Karae case is the extent to which decisions, or lack of decisive action by government officials impacted on the ability of Maori communities to advance their education. The question of deciding a site took over four years, with no satisfactory resolution to the Te Karae community.).

While it could be asserted that the Maori children from the Te Karae district did (finally) access education through the Board School at Tutekehua, Te Karae Maori did not become masters of their institution, but were instead placed even further under the control of the system through their subordination into the Board School system.

9.3

Maori Health in Hokianga

This section examines the issues associated with Maori health in the Hokianga region. Particular focus is placed on the period immediately prior to and post World War Two, where the impacts of post-war stress, the decline of rural communities and corresponding trend towards urbanisation caused by a combination of rural isolation, limited opportunities and government policy were keenly felt by Hokianga Maori.

9.3.1 Maori Health


According to Salesa from the outset of settlement in New Zealand, the health of Maori was a genuine and central concern and health services had already been established for Maori by the
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late 1840s.341 However, the provision of health services for Maori during the 1840s was not in any way systematic.342 This lack of co-ordination could be attributed to the fatal impact theory, which was prevalent throughout the mid to latter parts of the nineteenth century. Many involved in Maori health or interested in the general wellbeing of the Maori people, whilst ascribing to the fatal impact theory, believed that this did not mean that Maori welfare should be neglected.
343

However, these thoughts were more to allay their concerns about acting in a

capacity that would ensure that history will have nothing to reproach us with, than perhaps a genuine interest in the outcomes of Maori health issues at that time. Belich notes that the perception of Maori as a dying race persisted to 1930 and that one reason for the marked decline in the Maori population, particularly in census counts, was due to Maori resistance or disengagement. Disengagement, which meant avoiding interaction with Pakeha state and society, while continuing to interact economically and technologically resulted in no Maori census collections between 1857 and 1874, primarily due to an inability to track Maori populations. As Belich states, a feature of persistent Maori independence was that you did not let the government count you.344

Not all agreed with the theories of fatal impact and the notion of providing humanitarian care for the terminal malady of the Maori. In 1872, the first legislative move for health was made, with the passing of the Public Health Act. Based on the old system of provincial government, the Act failed, because the central boards (established under the Act) were unable to raise funds and the local boards had little power to positively effect change. The lack of basic sanitation and water systems also hindered the core tasks of these boards. The impact of the Act on Maori was small. Government policy prior to 1900 was primarily focused on Maori land, the sales of which were justified as being for the greater good of New Zealand. As a result, the issue of Maori health remained neglected.345

Despite the neglectful state of Maori health, McKegg asserted that Maori were neither apathetic nor inactive in trying to find alternatives to their situation, to the extent that they were active and indeed desperate to improve their appalling health status.346 Belich states that Maori adopted a number of approaches to cope post-contact. One of these, engagement, sought to accept the Pakeha embrace but also to soften it or even subvert it towards Maori
341

T D Salesa, The Power of the Physician: Doctors and the Dying Maori in Early Colonial New Zealand, Health and History, 2001, 3, pp 16 and 17. 342 Tiakiwai, p 60. 343 ibid. 344 Cited by Tiakiwai, pp 60-61. 345 Raeburn Lange, May the People Live: A History of Maori Health Development 19001920, Auckland, 1999, pp 66-67. 346 A McKegg, The Maori health nursing scheme. An experiment in autonomous health care, New Zealand Journal of History, 26, (2), p 145.

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interests, which may have explained Maori eagerness to become involved in the provision of health services for their own people. It may also have been an assertion of their increasing desire to be more independent of the state, fuelled by the knowledge that despite the increasing need of health services for Maori, such views and approaches were still largely rhetoric in nature.

The establishment of the Department of Public Health in 1900 was seen as a direct result of the plague scare. Already under pressure for the government to take greater control over the health system in New Zealand, the formalisation of this department created a number of tensions for Maori. One tension of having greater government control over the health system, and particularly for Maori, was that it drew focus away from efforts by Maori to have some autonomy in the provision of health services. McKegg notes the desire by Maori to develop such systems through the Maori Councils, through the establishment of Native Sanitary Inspectors and a proposed independent hospital system.347 The establishment of the Maori Womens Welfare League in 1951 also sought to develop more effective systems for the provision of health services to Maori. Such developments, however, failed to achieve the anticipated results due to the lack of official Pakeha support.348

The lack of support by Pakeha officials created another tension for Maori health. The anomaly of allowing Maori full participation both in the planning and implementation of health services only occurred under schemes and policies that were Pakeha-controlled and determined according to Pakeha agendas. Tension also existed in that the general public, and government officials themselves viewed Maori as being indisposed to the teachings and practices that would ensure better health; and that Maori were lazy and unwilling to change their unsanitary ways. Indeed, it was a common view that the entire Maori way of life became a cause of their decline.349 This was exacerbated by the reluctance of Maori to fully embrace western medicinal approaches. The continuing presence of tohunga frustrated government health officials, including Maori officials such as Maui Pomare, who in 1902, suggested that there was greater need for properly qualified men to advise indigent Maori patients, in order to negate the threat posed by tohunga.350 Even the impact of Maori nurses was viewed with scepticism and, in cases, scorn by their Pakeha counterparts.

347 348

ibid. ibid. 349 Salesa, p 22. 350 Derek Dow, Safeguarding the public health. A history of the New Zealand Department of Health, Wellington, 1995, p 185.

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Another tension was focused around which department had responsibility for Maori health issues. Up until that time, Maori issues were the concern of the Native Affairs department, which had disregarded a number of suggestions for reforming the provision of health services for Maori.351 However, the practical implementation of daily health messages had, up until that time, been most effectively conveyed through the Native School system. Furthermore, prior to the formal establishment of the Department of Public Health, the issue of Maori sanitation had already been addressed through the appointment of Native Health Commissioners in response to the plague scare. The appointment of Maui Pomare in 1901 as Native Health Officer was seen as a follow on from the work already started by the Native Health Commissioners, and in effect, this appointment was viewed largely as a result of the work Maori themselves had initiated and undertaken.

While Pomares role formalised Maori health within the public health system, there were still pockets of the Maori community who aspired greater Maori control over how decisions pertaining to Maori were made. The passing of the Maori Councils Act in the same year as the Public Health Act was a watered down version of the Kotahitanga movements aspirations for Maori self-government. The revised version was the work of the Te Aute Association, which saw the committees as being an alternative to the declining authority of chiefs, and perhaps more importantly, as being an accepted way of controlling Maori aspirations. In the end, the role and functions of the sanitary committees that were proposed under the public health legislation was shifted under the Maori Councils legislation. The most significant aspect of this shift came through the Maori Lands Administration Act 1900, which required the incorporation of these Councils to have a Pakeha majority, once again effectively negating Maori input and control. 352

The appointment of Maui Pomare as Native Health Officer, whilst seen as positive for Maori, in effect placed him under tremendous pressure. Pomare was expected to, and did, travel the breadth of the country visiting Maori communities in relation to Maori health issues. The appointment of Peter (Te Rangihiroa) Buck, whilst a welcome addition, did little to support Pomare in his job. Seddons admiration and support for the work Pomare and Buck were doing, alongside their pleas for more support, resulted in a proposal to expand the number of medical bursaries offered Maori in order to get more Maori health officers out in the community. According to Lange, Seddons proposal in 1905, which was initiated by the Te Aute Association some fifteen years earlier, was that candidates would be selected from the various tribal areas, trained in Dunedin, and bonded for government service among their own people.353 The

351 352

Lange, p 68. Vincent OMalley, Agents of autonomy. Maori committees in the Nineteenth century, Wellington, 1998. 353 Lange, p 149.

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reasons for why the proposal did not succeed are not clear, but when viewed alongside the establishment of the Maori nursing scheme in 1898, there is a view that racial prejudices sought to limit any advances in Maori health.

The Maori nursing scheme, again an initiative of the Te Aute Association, was seen as a positive opportunity for Maori girls to train and qualify as nurses who would then return to work in their orn communities. These positions were seen as complemeting the work already being done by the Native Sanitary Committees and the scheme was expanded in 1905 to include a full training scholarship, whereby Maori nurses would be bonded to the Health Department, attached to a hospital, in order to copmplete their full state regisration examinations. This is where the scheme fell apart. Despite the support from the Education and Health Departments, many hospital boards were reluctant to take Maori nurses:

Hospitals that did participate did so willingly and professed themselves well satisfied, but other boards raised all sorts of objections when approached by the Education Department. It was argued that all hospitals had a waiting list of Pakeha girls, that training would be a waste of time because the girls would not want to leave the towns and return to kainga life, or that they were bonded to the Health Department and so would be lost to the hospital when trained. There was also the age stipulation, often as high as 23 a regulation Pomare thought silly and obtuse. He passionately denounced what he could only construe as racial prejudice and a disastrous limitation of an essential programmeThe outcome of this situation was that very few Maori nurses were trained.354 Other initiatives during this period included the establishment of a Maori Hygiene division, following the restructuring of the Department of Health under the Public Health Act 1920. The Influenza Epidemic Commission (1918) recommended the creation of this new division in recognition of the limitations suffered by Maori health. However, as with other initiatives for Maori health previously, this one was also shortlived, with the division being mainstreamed and discontinued in 1930 because there was no longer any recognition of the need for Maori leadership in the development and implementation of health policy as it concerned the Maori population.355 The declining mortality rate and increasing prosperity experienced by Maori were cited as reasons for discontinuing any role for Pomare and Bucks contemporaries. However, Durie notes the significance of the role Buck and particularly Pomare made in advancing Maori health during this period. This was largely due to the fact that Pomare recognised the strength of and actively encouraged, leadership in promoting health strategies amongst Maori: Pomare placed great store on community leaders. His work with Maori councils and later with Maori sanitary inspectors recognised community leadership as a key factor in health promotion. He was convinced that local initiative and leadership was much more
354 355

ibid, pp 167-168. ibid, p 258.

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important than the immediate recruitment of health professionals and he was filled with admiration for the effectiveness of these local leaders.356 His efforts were mirrored by other Maori leaders of his time, notably Rua Kenana, Wiremu Tahupotiki Ratana and Te Puea Herangi. However, the lack of any real progress for Maori health during this period has been attributed to health officials lack of tolerance for any system of health care which attempted to incorporate Maori views or Maori delivery systems.
357

Thus, despite gains in Maori health during this period, official statistics noted that Maori

living standards continued to lag far behind those of the Pakeha.358

9.3.2 Hokianga
According to Native School records Maori in the Hokianga were susceptible to the epidemics common across New Zealand early in the twentieth century. Cases of influenza and measles were reported in Native School files numerous times. Lange also reports the Hokianga suffering outbreaks of influenza (1918) and typhoid (1915), noting that Maori nurses were stationed in the Hokianga during these outbreaks. The work done by Pomare and Buck, particularly in relation to the Native Sanitary Inspectors, was extended to the Hokianga in 1908, with the appointment of Taurau Toi. Riapo Timoti Puhipi was also appointed to serve in the Te Rarawa area of Pukepoto. There were shortlived appointments however, because the Native Sanitary Inspectors appointments were terminated by the Health Department in January 1912.

Lange notes, however, the impact that these positions must have made, particularly in the areas in which these men served. Taurau Toi and Riapo Timoti Puhipi were both regarded highly both within their Maori communities, and also amongst Pakeha. Riapo was the son of Te Rarawa chief, Timoti Puhipi; was educated at St Stephens School and was a synodsman in the Anglican church. He was also chairman of Pukepoto Native School, and was held in high regard by the master of the school. Similarly, Taurau Toi, from Opononi, was from a well known family, was high ranking within the Anglican church and had an active association in the business affairs of the southern Hokianga region (Lange, 1998). During Tois short time as a Native Sanitary Inspector, he covered most areas of the Hokianga district, and according to Lange, the Hokianga was singled out by the census enumerator in 1911 for the quality of its Maori Council health work.359

The establishment of the Hokianga Co-operative Medical Service in 1941 and the role of the Public Health nurses give perhaps the best insight into the status of Maori health and the
Mason Durie, Whaiora. Maori Health Development, Auckland, 1998, p 266. ibid, p 45. 358 Lange, p 260. 359 ibid, p 215.
357 356

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provision of health services to Maori in the Hokianga between 1939 and 1953. The role of the Maori Womens Welfare League (particularly through Mira Petricevich) also features prominently in the files on Hokianga health. In reviewing the files on Hokianga health during this period, a number of themes emerge, such as: 1. The relationship between public health bodies (Public Health nurses and HCMS) and

Maori communities; 2. 3. 4. The advocacy role undertaken by Maori organizations such as MWWL; The impact of post-war related health issues on Hokianga region; and The effect on Maori (isolation, roading, funding, resources etc).

Durie notes that after the demise of the Division of Maori Hygiene in 1930, the responsibility for Maori health was transferred to medical officers of health and public health nurses. The role of public health nurses in the Hokianga was perhaps more significant than that of the medical health officers. This was because the public health nurses were the main and often only point of contact for health services for the isolated communities of the Hokianga. The medical health officer in charge of the Hokianga region, in contrast, was based in Whangarei and thus had limited access and first hand understanding of the issues facing Maori in this region.

Public health nurses were expected to perform their duties often with limited resources, in (often) substandard living and clinic conditions, and were required to traverse a wide, isolated region with poor roading prone to lack of access due to incremental weather, and at times, expected to cover the duties supposed to be performed by doctors. The public health nurses appeared to generate much sympathy from within the communities they served, some of whom were prepared to petition on their behalf for better working conditions. For example, in 1939, Frank Shepherd, a local schoolmaster, sent a letter to the local Member of Parliament, C. Boswell, requesting a decent residence for the district nurse, and for the division of the Hokianga district into more manageable pieces. Shepherd also noted that the district nurses house, which also served as the dispensary, was inaccessible (it was located on a hill and in times of wet weather, the driveway became unusable). Furthermore, the schoolmaster indicated that the distance between where the nurse was (in Broadwood) in relation to the doctor (who was based in Rawene), made her job more demanding in that she often performed the role of a doctor, to cover the communities lack of easy access to one.360

The medical officer of healths response agreed with the concerns outlined in the petition about the inaccessibility of the nurses house and dispensary. However, he noted that the Hokianga
360

Frank Shepherd, Schoolmaster, to C. Boswell, MP. 10 June 1939, Hokianga Hygiene File, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5.

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County Council, who were responsible for the access road leading to the nurses house and dispensary, were unwilling to spend to provide a more suitable access road.361 He recommended that a new cottage be built on a flat section closer to the township. The Medical Officer of Health also felt that dividing the North Hokianga region was unnecessary and could not readily justify the need for two district nurses, citing that the local District Nurse felt quite able to cover the current area.

Hokianga Maori were also concerned at the lack of adequate provision of health services. Letters written by the Mitimiti Maori branch of the Womens Institute in 1939, and others written by the Motuti and Waihou Maori branches of the Womens Institute in 1940, reiterated Shepherds earlier concerns. These letters sought the appointment of another district nurse to cover the Hokianga district, and to support the current nurse who was based in Broadwood, as well as the replacement of the nurses house.362 Because of the war, the response given to these Maori groups was that there was a shortage of nurses and that there was unlikely to be an easing of this or the appointment of new nurses during the war period.363

The public health nurses themselves also complained to government officials about the difficulties of meeting community expectations within the restrictions of their jobs. In 1941, the district health nurse in Broadwood, S. Bradford, noted that changes in the Social Security Act had increased her responsibilities.364 Bradford sought advice, in light of these changes, as to whether she was to do the pakehas as well as the Maoris, citing also her dissatisfaction with the doctor who was not very responsive to her requests and who was indignant when asked to treat a sick Maori child. The response received advised that she was indeed to continue treating both Maori and Pakeha. However, the attitude of public health nurses to Maori, who constituted a large proportion of the health population in the Hokianga, was not always positive. In a confidential report to the medical officer of health by Nurse Inspector, C. Mackey, in 1953, she noted that some residents were prone to abuse the service offered by the public health nurses:

361 362

Report received from the Medical Officer of Health, Whangarei. 6 July 1939, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5. Emma Howard (President) and Sarah Tate (Secretary), Motuti Maori Branch, Womens Institute to Dr Gilberd, Medical Officer of Health, 27 February 1940, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5. D. Heperi (Sec) and M. Witana (Pres), Waihou Maori branch WI. to Dr Gilberd, Medical Officer of Health, Whangarei, 27 February 1940, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5. Ltr from L. Martin (Sec) Mitimiti Maori Branch WI to Dr Gilberd, Medical Officer of Health, 30 December 1939, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5. 363 Dr Gilberd, Medical Officer of Health, Whangarei, to Emma Howard (President), Motuti Maori Branch, Womens Institute, 17 April 1940, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5. 364 S.A. Bradford, District Health Nurse, Broadwood to Medical Officer of Health, 9 October 1941, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5.

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Many have no sense of their personal responsibility for the welfare of their families and rely on the service to provide care for even the most trifling conditions. They expect to be provided with all the materials necessary to deal with normal home treatments.365 Given the size of the Maori population in the area, it is likely that Mackey was referring to the Maori community.

Figure 3:

Patients visited by district health nurses in the Hokianga Patients Clinics M E 635 308 741 633 679 725 482 594 728 76 171 177 visiting Patients visited at Emergency home Calls T M E T M E T 1115 902 1469 719 850 902 748 939 510 497 940 588 735 906 341 59 299 188 1493 1845 851 556 1239 776 165 78 216 122 201 97 98 56 96 50 92 49 263 134 302 172 293 136 Populations Sch 451 278 213 307 665 401 M 1129 619 498 989 1551 824 E 823 583 528 118 765 693 1945 Census 1962 1022 1026 1107 2316 1517

District Mangamuka Bridge Broadwood Kohukohu Kohukohu West Rawene Opononi

Key: M = Maori, E = European, T = Total, Sch = School Source: Confidential report from Mackey to Medical Officer of Health, Whangarei, 1953. Hokianga Health file, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1, National Archives, Auckland NB: This table includes figures for an average year taken over a three-year period.

While unaware of the confidential report written by Mackey, it appears that by 1953, Maori began expressing their own concerns about the services offered by the public health nurses. Mira Petricevich (later Dame Mira Szaszy), who was Dominion Secretary-Treasurer of the Maori Womens Welfare League wrote to the Director of Nursing in Wellington to concerns at what was happening in the Hokianga.366 The Utakura branch of the Maori Womens Welfare League had reported the most unsatisfactory services of the local district nurse. According to the letter, the district nurses lack of cooperation with members of the local Maori community resulted in some patients being forced to travel some considerable distance to hospital, where one died. Petricevich also conveyed the Dominion Executives concern (on behalf of the Rarawa-ki-Hokianga District Council Maori Womens Welfare League) towards the Northland Hospital Boards proposal to do away with the Hokianga Health Scheme (which is discussed in further detail below). Particular concerns expressed included the huge area covered by the scheme and the exorbitant transport costs the Maori community faced in trying to access health services in their region. Specific examples were given to highlight the points being made,
365

Confidential report from C. Mackey, Nurse Inspector, to Medical Officer of Health, 10 August 1953, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 366 Mira Petricevich (Dominion Sec-Treasurer, MWWL) to Director of Nursing, 24 November 1953, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1.

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including one example where it was noted that the local Cream Lorry was often the only form of transport for the sick from Mitimiti, Lower Waihou and Panguru to get to the hospital. This mode of transport was considered unsuitable for the sick. It was also identified that Pawarenga residents were required to send their sick to Hokianga, but the bus service only went to Kaitaia, which meant that special transport must be found to take patients to Hokianga Hospital.

The reply on behalf of the Director-General Health provided no concrete solutions to the issues raised by Petricevich. While regret was expressed about changes in staffing and a promise to investigate the position was given.367 Acknowledgement was also given to the criticism of health services in the northern part of the health district, and particularly to the Northland Health Boards proposal to do away with the Hokianga Health Services scheme. It was noted that consideration of improvements of services was being undertaken and it was suggested that a meeting be sought between the Maori Womens Welfare League Rarawa-ki-Hokianga District Council and the medical officer of health to further discuss the issues raised in the letter.

The role of the Maori Womens Welfare League (which was established in 1951) in raising the consciousness of Maori health issues in the Hokianga should not be underestimated. Indeed, Durie highlights the impact that this organisation played in advancing the causes for Maori development, noting that in its early years, it was a particularly strong advocate for the establishment of accessible and culturally relevant health clinics.368 The Leagues strength and commitment, particularly in bridging Maori communities and government agencies, meant that they were taken seriously by government, as evidenced by the response, however noncommittal its tone, to their concerns about what was happening in the Hokianga district. Despite this, Durie rues the lost opportunity to Maori in that the League were never seen in any capacity beyond their advocacy role and perhaps their ability to provide health care services based on a combination of both Pakeha and Maori services (as the League themselves envisaged) was never realised.

The relationship between public health nurses and Maori in the Hokianga could perhaps be described as ambivalent. There was support from the Maori community for the services of the public health nurses but there were also clear expectations which were particularly expressed by the Maori Womens Welfare League that such services would also recognise Maori cultural knowledge and understandings in relation to health. Indeed, McKeggs study on the Maori health nursing scheme concluded:
367 368

Reply from D.Cook (for DGH) 16 December 1953, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. Durie, p 49.

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While the district nurse supposedly had the weight of the Public Health Department behind her, this meant little in the remote rural districts of New Zealand. To gain the co-operation of the community the nurse had to achieve a balance between her hospital-based training and the health techniques of the culture within which she worked. Maori had not lost all autonomy.369 Despite this, district health nurses were not always responsive in their attitudes to Maori. The establishment of the Plunket Society in 1907 and the subsequent exclusion of provision of Plunket services to Maori was due more to a territorial dispute with the Department of Public Health than with any overtly racist Plunket agenda. However, when a motion that the work of the Plunket Society be extended to include Maori was put to the Societys conference in 1945, it was dismissed as being wasteful for both public health and Plunket nurses but subsequently revised to include those Maori within city and town boundaries. Queries expressed by district health nurses about whether they were to deal to both Maori and Pakeha were representative of concerns that Bryder states were centred on the belief that the nurse would be snowed under by Maori, since Europeans were in the minority.370 The figures released by the Nursing Inspector highlight such concerns. District nurses were in the position of being refused entry to European homes as a result of unfounded fears that nurses who had contact with Maori families would spread disease and infection. These views persisted into the 1950s forcing in some areas, the segregation of service provision to Maori and Pakeha communities. This resulted in district nurses tending to Maori babies and Plunket nurses tending to European babies.

This type of segregation, and the inadequate numbers of district nurses servicing Maori communities allowed many who could have benefited from their services to fall through the cracks.371 The attitude of government officials was also not always supportive in addressing Maori health concerns. Bryder notes that officials viewed the connections between improved housing and sanitary conditions disparagingly, in that a new house will be of no use without a new mentality to go with it.372 Similarly, the Medical Officer of Health for Whangarei, who was responsible for the Hokianga health district, argued that:

More important than the material defects of food, clothing and houses was the personal defect of non-awareness of the insanitary and unhygienic conditions so well apparent to the average pakeha.373

369 370

McKegg, p 160. Linda Bryder, Lessons of the 1918 influenza epidemic in Auckland, New Zealand Journal of History, 16 (2), p 72. 371 ibid, p 81. 372 ibid, p 83. 373 ibid.

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Bryder concludes that the reasons for the difficulties Maori faced accessing health services were complex and ranged from territorial disputes to local racial prejudices and culturally insensitive services or nurses.374 The experiences of the Hokianga Maori community during this period would appear to mirror those of other Maori throughout New Zealand, which resulted in Maori being left disadvantaged.375

Changes to the Social Security Act prompted requests to the Medical Officer of Health for an exception in the Maternity Benefits Scheme, seeking to make the Hokianga region a designated Special Area. Reasons given for this exception were the considerable distance to travel to areas, and availability of or access to medical facilities in these areas, given that Rawene, under the stewardship of Dr Smith, was the Hokianga base for the provision of medical services. It was noted that isolation proved problematic, and it was felt that there are isolated communities (mainly Maori) which may require to be classed as Special Areas.376 The response from the Acting Director-General Health was that the time was not opportune for consideration of the general question of special areas.377

A visit by the Inspector of Hospitals, Dr Shore, in July 1939, gave rise to another effort to advocate for greater access to and provision of health services for the Hokianga region. Following his visit, a letter was sent back to the Director-General Health highlighting the points raised during his visit. The points included:

1. 2. 3. 4.

That the district be established as a special area under the Social Security Act. That the Board appoint Dr Smith as full time salaried officer. That another medical man be appointed at Kohukohu as his assistant. That extra District Nurses be appointed and the Hospital be made the Administration

Health Centre for the District. 5. That the Board collaborate with the other Northern Boards and establish a Central The costs of the Clinic to be met from the Social Security Fund.378

Clinic under a Surgical specialist at Kaikohe. 6.

The intention was that the North Auckland region, based at Rawene, would provide a full range of medical services, including domiciliary, hospital, nursing and specialist. A letter by the
374 375

ibid, p 85. ibid, p 86. 376 Letter from Medical Officer of Health, Whangarei, to Director-General Health, 5 May, 1939, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 377 Letter from Acting Director-General Health, Wellington, to Medical Officer of Health, 14 June 1939, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 378 Letter from Secretary to Director-General Health, 24 July 1939, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1.

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Secretary of the Kaikohe Chamber of Commerce, along similar lines, was also sent to the Minister of Health, Peter Fraser.379 The issue of having a dedicated service for the Hokianga region was not a new concept. Rather, it was seen as an opportunity by a wide range of people from throughout the Hokianga community to provide what were seen as basic needs. In 1941, the Director-General Health advised the Hokianga Health Board of its decision, setting out the terms under which the Board could operate its new services. The main points arising from this decision were: 1. The provision of medical services, free medicines and continuation of free district

nursing service for all persons usually resident in the Hokianga Hospital District (which was to be reviewed after a twelve month period); 2. Free access for all persons usually resident in the Hokianga Hospital District to a

comprehensive range of health services at the hospital; 3. The provision of domiciliary and medical care to those who would find it impossible or

inexpedient to get to hospital; 4. 5. The appointment of a full time medical practitioner at Rawene; and The appointments of additional staff, including three full-time district health nurses,

which would increase the number of district health nurses in the region to six.380

From this, the Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service was established which provided for an expansion of services offered in a region that serviced a population of some 4900 Maori and 2900 Pakeha:

Figure 4: Health provision services established under Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, 1948 District Area Type of service Northern Broadwood 1 district health nurse Northern Kohukohu 1 doctor 2 district health nurses Northeastern Mangamuka 1 district health nurse Southern Rawene 2 doctors 1 district health nurse Southern Waimamaku 1 district health nurse
Source: Newman report on Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, 1948. Hokianga Health file, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1, National Archives, Auckland.

The Director of the Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service also established district clinics from which services could be dispensed. These clinics were based in Broadwood, Kohukohu, Mitimiti, Motuti, Otaua, Pawarenga, Panguru, Taheke, Waima, Waimamaku and Whirinaki.
379

Secretary, Kaikohe Chamber of Commerce, to Peter Fraser, Minister of Health, 12 July 1939, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 380 Director-General Health to Secretary, Hokianga Hospital Board. 20 August 1941, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1.

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Less than ten years after the Service was established, J. Newman completed a report into its activities. It is unclear from the file as to the reasons for why the report was commissioned or to who J.Newman was. However, Newmans findings suggest one of two things: that there may have been a level of government dissatisfaction with Dr Smiths management of the Service, and that the government was looking at the feasibility of replicating this type of service elsewhere. Newman made a number of observations both positive and critical, pertaining to the six principles formulated by Dr Smith as the essential features of the service:

a) b) c) d) e) f)

Doctors, hospital and nurses are coordinated and cooperative All members of staff have to attend frequent conferences at hospital Doctors are salaried Nurse is to decide if doctor is to call and visit patient Medical service is linked to schools for educational purposes Service operates from district clinics.381 Newman noted the particular success of allowing nurses, through the conference programme, to be kept informed of the progress of their patients; and also the school programme, which allowed the nurses to monitor childrens lunches, although he cautioned that the programme could be prone to misuse. Thus Newman concluded:

Thanks to the service with its higher ratio of staff to population than other districts, the Hokianga gets what is probably a better medical service than other comparable areas in NorthlandSome parts of the system could be reproduced elsewhere, but not the whole schemeThe clinic system is good and may be further extended in the area. So is the link between nurses and hospital, and between medical staff and schools.382 However, Newman expressed concern at the principle concerning doctors salaries, noting that the Service doctors were probably earning less than those doing general medical work. Furthermore, he queried Dr Smiths claims about there being no shortage of doctors applications, wondering as to the impact this might have on quality: the lower rate of remuneration must adversely affect the quality of recruitment. Newman was also not entirely convinced that the costs associated with operating some of the services were correct, suggesting that they were in fact higher than the figures he had been given by Dr Smith. Indeed, Newman noted the difficulties that existed at Hokianga were largely personality based, claiming the Hokianga medical staff have proved entirely uncooperative with outsiders, which had resulted in friction with the Medical Officer of Health being described as severe in previous years. Newman proposed solutions to counter these issues included a joint hospital board for Northland and a resigned view that things might change only upon his retirement.
381

Newman report on Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, 1948. Hokianga Health file, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1.

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The extent to which Dr Smith controlled the Service appears, from Newmans report, problematic in that it may have limited the effectiveness of the Service. This was noted particularly in relationships with external agencies, such as the Department of Health, and the overextended role of the district health nurses:

Dr Smith says that the last person to judge whether a doctor is needed or not is the patient himself. This seems to be a false premiseThe use of the nurses as arbiters of the need for a doctor raises issues ofwhether there are to be two standards of medical care, one a qualified one, the other an unqualified. The use of unqualified assistants is a reproduction of the bad old days of early nineteenth century medicine which led in England to the passing of the Medical Act and the condemnation of covering. For however conscientious a nurse may be, there is no getting away from the fact that her training includes nothing that could make her a diagnostician; and to recognise her as one would involve the provision of two classes of Registered Nurse, one to do the work, the other to take a different training and do the modified work of a doctorThe nurses are doing doctors work...Nurses are not trained to make diagnostic examinations and in going round with them it was obvious that they were not fit to undertake the work that they were expected to do.383 Newman recommended that this role be reviewed, suggesting that district health nurses should be to supervise and administer treatment, not prescribe it. In essence, this was in direct contrast to Dr Smiths views of the role district nurses played within the Service. These contradictory views regarding the role of district health nurses, particularly in relation to the expectation to provide diagnostic services, culminated in a confidential report prepared by the Nursing Inspector, C. Mackey, in 1953.

The nature of this report to the Medical Officer of Health arose from confusion about the status and function of the Public Health Nurses, and more particularly about who had responsibility over them. Mackeys report outlined the intended division of nurses time when the Service was established, noting that it was estimated that two-thirds of nurses time be spent on curative care, and the other third on preventive care.384 Concern was expressed, however, as to Dr Smiths view of the nurses: He considers that the nursing staff belong to him and are provided primarily for curative work. He also considers that all Public Health Nurses are seconded to the Service and that as Director, he should exercise full jurisdiction over their work and their movements. Our control of staff movements has been maintained despite stormy oppositionIt has become increasingly difficult to retain a happy healthy staff.385

382 383

ibid. Newman report on Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, 1948, Hokianga Health file, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 384 Confidential report from C. Mackey, Nurse Inspector, to Medical Officer of Health, 10 August 1953, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1.

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Mackey also noted that some doctors did not attend to the clinics (as they were required to do) or follow up with nurses in regards to patient care. Nurses were often left to administer care, contrary to the recommendations that Newman had put forward in his report, and also contrary to the wishes of the nurses themselves:

Nurses have frequently to administerinjections of penicillinDr Smithadvised me he never refused to admit a case for a Nurse and it was over to her to make the decision. Some Nurses have been reluctant about making this decision. Many of their patients have not progressed in Hospital where it has been felt care has been totally inadequate at times.386 It was also found that, as a result of this practice, some patients went elsewhere for alternative care, and nurses were then advised that they were no longer able to treat these patients if they were in the care of outside doctors.

The assessment of the health services offered by both the Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service and the public health nurses also indicated the compounding problems that contributed to the reality of operating in a region, which had difficulties with transport and roading issues. Mackeys report highlighted the atrocious roading conditions throughout the Hokianga, but also noted that, with increased access to cars, the old approach of doctors and nurses attending to patients in their own homes should be revisited, where the patient travelled to a clinic.

Reports by Newman and Mackey, whilst concerned primarily with the operational components of the Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, nevertheless made interesting observations that shed some light in relation to the perception of Maori and how they should be treated in relation to health services. Recurrent themes of poor roading, remoteness and the lack of a decent public transport system were echoed in the reports written and endorsed by Maori agencies (such as the Maori Womens Welfare League) advocating for improvements to the provision of health services to Maori in the Hokianga region.

Whilst Newman and Mackey appear to lay blame for these issues with Dr. Smith and the Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, the finger is also pointed at the difficulties associated with providing services to Maori. Mackey alluded to the pressure placed on the district nurses because people were too ignorant or lazy to treat themselves. She also implied that Maori expectations of their health services made them disinclined to be self-sufficient. Yet Mira Petricevich, on behalf of the Maori Womens Welfare League, and representations made by the Maori branches of the Womens Institute, indicate that there was a willingness within the Maori

385 386

ibid. ibid.

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community to become, perhaps not so much self-sufficient, but more aware of the types of services Maori, and particularly Maori women, could and had the right to access.

The literature clearly identifies that Maori were subject to a number of barriers that impeded their access to health services. These barriers ranged from racial prejudice, lack of adequate funding, isolation and indifference. For Maori in the Hokianga, despite the provision of a free health service, these indifferent attitudes must have contributed to the success or otherwise of the health system in place there. In essence, the indifference at best demonstrated a lack of clarity in communicating the expectations of the health services available to Maori. This became clear when, in 1954, the Medical Officer of Health and the Nursing Inspector, Mackey, attended a series of meetings organised with branches of the Maori Womens Welfare League across the Hokianga.

The purpose of the meetings arose from the petitions sent by the executive of the Maori Womens Welfare League to the Director-General Health in regards to health issues in the Hokianga. The meetings, held at Tautehihi and Horeke, were attended not only by members of the Maori Womens Welfare League, but also by representatives from the Northern Hokianga District Council and male tribal members.387 In the first meeting, concerns expressed by the participants included clarification as to the status of the Hokianga Hospital (there was concern that it was to be closed), the number of and access to district health nurses, doctors and health services. The meeting also put forward a number of suggestions:

1.

That an additional doctor be appointed in Special Area, might be stationed at area of

greatest need. 2. That a hospital be established on northern side of the harbour to meet the needs of

residents in Pawarenga, Panguru, Broadwood and Kohukohu in particular as Kaitaia was the nearest hospital, but public transport was virtually non-existent in these areas to get to Kaitaia. 3. That a hostel be constructed at Rawene to accommodate expectant mothers in the last weeks of pregnancy, to avoid delivery in taxis, which had happened on numerous occasions.388

In relation to this last point, the Maori Womens Welfare League had already raised 1000 towards the cost of this proposed hostel, further refuting official views that Maori were not selfreliant enough.

387

W. Davidson, Medical Officer of Health (Whangarei) to Director-General Health, 18 January 1954, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 388 ibid.

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Later that same month, C. Mackey, the Nursing Inspector, through the process of meeting with members of the Maori Womens Welfare League and other Maori members of the community, also became more aware of how Maori viewed the issues of health and the provision of health services in the Hokianga. In particular, Mackey noted that they had in fact a misunderstanding (on both sides) in regards to the role and function of the public health nurses: I noted the difficulties we had experienced over the past few years in keeping a nurse stationed at Mangamuka Bridge. I think my statement caused some surpriseI told them that the Public Health Nurse whom they recognised as the person to call in for sickness had many other important duties to performI suggested that the members could help if they attended to minor illnesses and injuries and reduced the number of unnecessary calls on the nurses time. The President of the Branch spoke. She also thought that the people could do more to help themselves. I had said earlier that the treatments of infested heads and skins was the responsibility of the familyShe also expressed willingness of the group to co-operate with the nurse in every way that was possible.389 In light of these comments, it becomes clear that, if anything, Maori were taking full advantage of the health services offered to them, as they believed they were entitled to. Furthermore, the role of the Maori Womens Welfare League in particular, indicates how Maori were able to organise themselves during that period to become more self-sufficient, and to put forward their own ideas as to how to improve the services currently being offered to them and the wider Hokianga community. This final entry in the Hokianga file for this period indicates that a greater understanding had been achieved through the mere process of communicating I consider the meeting was well worthwhilea lot could be gained if one had the opportunity of meeting the European population in the same way.390

Ironically, if it wasnt for the Maori Womens Welfare League capability at advocating on behalf of Maori communities, particularly in remote communities such as the Hokianga, the question is posed whether Maori would have had any better access to the health services offered through the Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service.

9.4

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, Te Rarawa has experienced negative social, demographic and economic impacts since contact with Pakeha and the Crown. It is not possible to quantify the social impacts of many generations of deprivation and the current situation of high unemployment, poor educational attainment and high level of dependence on various forms of

389 390

Mackey (Nursing Inspector) to MOH Whgrei. 22 Feb 1954, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. ibid.

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government assistance. However, a major component of any redress in settlement of Te Rarawas claims should be concerned with social issues.

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Appendix:

Legislation Detrimental to Maori

This appendix summarises some legislation that has been detrimental to Maori. Many of the earlier chapters in this report also deal with other pieces of legislation that directly affected Te Rarawa Maori.

The Constitution Act 1852


New Zealand became a self-governing colony with the enactment of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852. The Act empowered the General Assembly to make laws regulating the sale, letting, disposal and occupation of waste lands of the Crown. Waste lands were defined as lands where native title had been extinguished and were in the possession of the Crown. In addition, the Act preserved the Crowns right of pre-emption under section 73 until it was repealed in 1873, suggesting implicit recognition of the treatys guarantees.391

The Act seemed to give recognition for Mori to be apart of the future government of the colony by making no distinction between the two races regarding the franchise to to vote. The franchise qualification was; to be male, over the age of twenty one, and have in their possession a freehold estate of an annual value of 10, or in occupation of a dwelling house of an annual value of 10 in town, and 5 in the country.392 Although the franchise qualifications did not specifically discriminated Maori, few Maori held property individually to qualify for the vote. In addition, the electoral districts excluded some areas of largely Maori population.393 Essentially the Act was intended to devolve political power to local settlers without provision for Maori representation in those law making bodies.394

In addition, section 71 made provision for the laws of the natives to be maintained in any districts by way of Proclamation. Although requests were made by Maori (the King Country), no such proclamations were ever made.395

The Tohunga Suppression Act 1907


The Tohunga Suppression Act gave the government powers to take action and impose penalties against tohunga (section 2). Tohunga were those person[s] who gathers Maori around him by
David Williams, http://www.library.auckland.ac.nz/dbtwwpd/exec/dbtwpub.dll?AC=GET_RECORD&XC=/dbtwwpd/exec/dbtwpub.dll&BU=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.library.auckland.ac.nz%2Fdbtwwpd%2Fmll%2Fbasic.htm&TN =mll&SN=AUTO32071&SE=841&RN=2&MR=20&TR=0&TX=1000&ES=0&CS=1&XP=&RF=BriefWeb&EF=& DF=FullWeb&RL=1&EL=0&DL=1&NP=0&ID=&MF=WPEngMsg.ini&MQ=&TI=0&DT=&ST=0&IR=3449&NR =0&NB=0&SV=0&BG=0&FG=0&QS=, 29/04/2004, 8:39am. Hereafter referred to as Williams. 392 Orange, p 137. 393 ibid, p 139. 394 Willaims. 395 ibid.
391

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practising on their superstition or credulity of the Maori people by pretending to possess supernatural powers in the treatment and cure of diseases, [and] the foretelling of future events The Act provided summary conviction of a fine of 25 or imprisonment of up to twelve months in the case of second and subsequent offences. However, any prosecution of tohunga first needed the consent of the Native Affairs Minister.396

The Act had two aims; firstly, it was an attempt to promote Maori health, counteracting tohunga who were untrained in Western medical techniques. The second aim was to neutralise Mori leaders, like Rua Kenana that is to counteract the growing influence of charismatic and powerful political and spiritual leaders. However, the primary intent of the Act was symbolic, that was to reassert colonial legal certainty and political dominance.397 The underlying issue was that the government or its members believed that Tohunga hindered Maori advancement into a state of civilisation, that tohunga prevented the Europeanisation of Mori.398

Before this Act, the Criminal Code Act 1893 provided for the prosecution of tohunga; under which at least two convictions occurred: Mapu was convicted under section 240 at Kaikohe in 1900 and Poti was convicted at Wairoa in 1901.399

The Act potentially destabilised Maori social, political and economic structures by disempowering important figures within their whanau, hapu and iwi. There is little evidence of widespread prosecution of tohunga; instead, Maori practitioners were pushed underground. Often the prosecutions which did occur were the result of accusations of Mori and not Pakeha.400

Rating legislation
The predecessor of the rating regime was the Highway Boards Empowering Act 1871. This Act provided that Native lands would be liable for rates if a Native Land Court title had been issued for it or if in the occupation of others, other than an aboriginal native, furthermore the land needed to be traversed by a road. The Act did not contain any power to enforce collection of rates via the sale of the land.401

The Rating Act 1876 introduced a uniformed system for the valuation of land and levying of rates. The Act provided that all land was rateable except lands over which Native title has not
396

Mamari Stephens, Maori Law and Hart: A Brief Analysis, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 32, 3, 2001, p 438. 397 ibid, pp 438-439. 398 Williams. 399 Stephens, p 451. 400 ibid, p 454.

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been extinguished and lands in respect of which a certificate of title or memorial of ownership has been issued, if in the occupation of aboriginal natives only. This meant customary land was totally exempt and that generally most Maori paid no rates. However Mori land which had been leased to Europeans was rateable, but the lessees were liable for the rates.402 The Act provided that rate arrears were a personal debt, if rates remained unpaid after 14 days, a local body could initiate proceedings, if the land still remained unpaid the local body had the right to sell the property on 12 months notice.403

Generally, the Rating Act 1882 did not significantly alter the rating regime, except to suggest wider rating liability of Maori land. The exemptions from rating were in effect the same as the Rating Act 1876, which appears to have only subtle changes in the wording of the relevant section. Effectively this Act allowed the rating of Native land when not in occupation of or owned by, a Native.404

The enactment of the Crown and Native Lands Rating Act 1882 introduced more comprehensive liability for rates to Native Lands. This rating regime was intended to provide local governments with their own funding base. Land belonging to aboriginal Natives that were situated within Boroughs were rateable property. In addition, Native lands within five miles of a highway were liable for rates. Native lands occupied by Europeans were exempt under this Act but were rateable under the Rating Act 1882.

Rates were not charged directly to Maori, under the Crown and Native Lands Rating Act 1882 the Colonial Treasurer was deemed the owner of Native lands for the purposes of this particular Act. The Crown paid the rates and a lien would be placed on the land. Mori members of parliament expressed fear that this was a measure designed to take Maori land, in the event of the rates not being paid.

Maori members of Parliament expressed concern over the liability of rates to native lands within five miles of a highway. They voice concerned that Maori had not asked for roads to be built and were now paying for them. They further stated that the rationale that the imposition of rates increased land value was not true for many Maori as their land continued to be brought cheaply. It was also suggested that this rating regime was just a mean way of confiscating Maori land.

Pita Rikys, Valuation for and rating of Maori Land, Waiheke Island, 2001, p 105. ibid, pp 106-107. 403 Tom Bennion, Maori and Rating Law, Wellington, 1997, p 12. 404 Rikys, p 107.
402

401

253

405

In practice, this particular provision affected 3.5 million acres out of 13 million acres. Over

12,978 had been paid by the treasurer for rates on Maori land.406

The Crown and Native Lands Rating Acts Repeal Act 1888 was introduced as the government cost cutting measure, because it could not afford to keep paying the rates to local bodies. However, Maori land within a borough continued to be rated.407

The Rating Act 1894 consolidated all rating provisions. All the rating provisions of Native land in the 1893 Act were preserved in the 1894 Act.408

An amendment in 1895 to the Rating Act 1894 made land held by the Public Trustee liable for rating. Land occupied by Maori were liable for half rates. However Williams comments that local bodies had not been able to collect rates from Maori occupied land with numerous owners.409

The Native Land Rating Act 1904 extended the categories of Maori land that would be liable for rates. Maori land that had previously been liable for full rates would continue. Section 2 provided that other Maori land that had yet had title ascertained would be liable for half rates.410 Customary land, land which had yet gained a certificate of title was still exempt, however if the Native Minister thought that the delay in obtaining title was to avoid rate liability he had discretionary powers to force the land to be brought before the Court and subject to rates.411

In addition the Native Land Rating Act 1904 introduced the concept of nominated Native occupier. This person would be entered into the Valuation Roll, representing the other owners and rate demands would be sent to that person, and legal proceedings to recover rate arrears would be brought against this person alone. Alternatively the Native Minster could authorise District Maori Land Councils to administer the lands, pay arrears and all other rates falling due. The Native Minster could pay the rates and place a caveat over the land to secure payment, the charge over the land could be satisfied by a portion of land passing to the Crown in the event of subdivision.412

405 406

Bennion, p 19 ibid, p 20. 407 Williams. 408 Rikys, p 113 409 Willaims. 410 ibid. 411 Rikys, p 113. 412 ibid, p 114.

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The Rating Act 1908 again consolidated rating legislation. It was followed by the Native Rating Act 1909 which reformed legislation regarding Maori land by consolidating 72 prior enactments since 1871.413

The Rating Amendment Act 1910 provided that all Maori freehold land was subject to rates in the same manner as if it were European land, unless a specific provision said otherwise. In the case of land held by Maori Land Boards or the Public Trustee, the land was liable to rates to the extent that the land was producing revenue. However the collection of rates remained a problem. Local government found enforcement of rates to be difficult given that blocks were in multiple ownership and did not have a registered title.414

From 1919 a number of Acts were introduced to combat the problems of Mori land being in rate arrears. The Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1919 gave the Land Court sole discretion on partition orders to award additional land to any owner who paid rates or other charges for the benefit of all owners.

An amendment to this Act in 1923 made provision for land consolidation schemes for Native Lands. It included provisions that enable the Court to vest land in the Crown to satisfy outstanding rates and that the Crown and local authorities could enter into agreements of compromise for outstanding rates.415

The Native Land Rating Act 1924 attempted to again solve the problem of outstanding rates owed on Maori land. The Act abolished the existing system of rate collecting and gave the Native Land Court responsibility for the collection of rates. This meant that the Court could make an order that rent from the land be used to pay rates, or a portion of that land be vested in the Native Trustee or the Crown for lease or sale. The Act provided that if rates were not paid charging orders could be issued. If the charge remained unpaid for more than a year the land could be vested in the Native Trustee for the purposes of sale.416 The Act exempted customary land, burial grounds, churches and marae on native land from rate liability.

The Rating Act 1925 was a further consolidation of rating legislation. The Native Land Rating Act 1924 was incorporated into this statute.417

413 414

ibid. ibid, p 115. 415 ibid, pp 116-117. 416 Williams. 417 ibid.

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The Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1927 continued to address the problems of accumulated rates and survey charges on Maori Land. The enactment of this Act recognised that many blocks owed rates making them uneconomic or that the charges on the land were worth more than the land itself. The Native Land Court Judges could now determine on a case by case basis whether the land was worth rating and the best way to arrange payment (i.e. through leasing or sale). This Act repealed the long standing provision that had allowed Maori Land to be taken for roads or railways without compensation.418

In addition this Act allowed Maori Land Boards to initiate consolidation schemes. These schemes enable the Maori Land Boards to sell land to local authorities for the payment of outstanding rates.419

The Native Land and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1930 consolidated earlier amendments. The Act continued to develop consolidation and land development schemes. Rikys comments that the rationale behind these schemes was to increase the capacity of Native land to pay rates, although not the primary objective that Ngata had envisaged.420

The Rating Act 1967 mainly consolidation all rating legislation. The Act did however give more power to the Maori Land Court, when issuing charging orders, to consider future use of the land and whether to permit leases, sale and alienation.421

The Rating Act 1988 consolidated various Local Government rating provisions. It did not make any major changes to the rating of Mori land as under the Rating Act 1967. Mori Freehold land is liable for rates as if it was general land. The law provides special rules for the levying and collection of rates on Maori Land. The Act provides land exempted from rating, that being customary land, maori freehold land with a marae erected on it, land set apart for the purposes of a marae (includes general land), and land not exceeding 2.03 hectares. Wahi tapu and tauranga waka are not exempt unless they came within the provisions of land not exceeding 2.03 hectares or if such land is vested in the Historic Places Trust.422

Generally the concern with rating legislation is that historically land could be alienated for rate arrears, as a result of legal proceedings brought by local authorities or at the discretion of the Maori Land court to satisfy charging orders and Maori Land Boards.

418 419

Willaims. Riys, pp 120-121. 420 ibid, p 122. 421 Williams. 422 Rikys, pp 126-138.

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When dealing with rating legislation, themes come to the forefront, for example rating legislation is coloured by consolidation schemes and land development schemes of Ngata. While these schemes were primarily aimed at producing workable land and revenue, underlying was this ideal that revenue would also be able to pay rates.

Essentially Maori were concerned because of two things; (a) (b) a. b. c. d. the rating system should never have applied to Mori land, and the rating system alienated or could have alienated Maori land through the operation of Maori Land Boards orders of the Maori Land Court Legal Proceedings initiated by local authorities to recover rate arrears activities of the Colonial Treasurer in paying rates, then taking possession of

Maori land for payment of rates e. actions of Public Trustee/Maori Trustee

The Mori Affairs Acts


The Maori Affairs Act consolidated Maori land legislation, with the objective of providing better administration of Maori land by reforming multiple ownership Corbett, Minister of Maori Affairs, argued that the sight of Maori land unused and covered in weeds was causing unwarranted criticism of Maori as land holders, whereas the cause of idle lands lay in multiple ownership423 The Act sought to reform ownership in two ways: the first, adjusting the number of owners on the legal title or second, placing legal title under a legal entity, where the owners then become beneficiaries. Essentially the government saw fragmentation of land interests as hindering the utilisation of land, by reforming land titles Maori land would potentially become productive, with economic and financial benefits for its owners and/or beneficiaries.

Consolidation schemes regrouped fragmented shares in a particular region. The Maori Affairs Act 1953 remained committed to consolidation through Parts XVII and XVII. Section 149 defined the main purpose of consolidation as consolidating and redistributing the interests of multiple Maori owners in Maori freehold lands so that suitable and convenient holdings that might then be profitably are used to the owners advantage and in the public interest. The act

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also allowed pre-existing consolidations and combined partitions to remain. 424 Individuals loss interests in various blocks to be given a larger interest in one block. These schemes were a drain on the administrative structure of the department of Maori Affairs. Despite the Prichard Waetford Report suggested this practice be abandoned, though it was not until 1974 that it was repealed.425

Land Development Schemes were established by Apirana Ngata, an attempt to develop and settle Maori lands. They were designed for two purposes. The first, to ensure some security of tenure for the occupier so that financing could be arranged. The second was to facilitate the development of land. The Maori Affairs Act 1953 continued to provide for the development of land schemes. Maori Land Boards were in charged with implementing Part XXIV Development Schemes. Legal title to the block remained with the owners but the Boards had right to exclusive occupation. The Boards also had the power to confer that right onto either a

nominated occupier, a lessee, or the owner(s). Developments however never directly dealt with multiple ownership and fragmentation of land interests continued. It was solely a mechanism to procure economic success. Hugh states that development schemes put the proverbial cart before the horse.426

Part XVII of the 1953 Act established a conversion fund within the Maori Trustee account for acquiring uneconomic or other interests in Maori land. Uneconomic interests were those

interests valued at less than 25. Once acquired the Mori Trustee could sell those interest, with the general principle that the interests would be sold to Maori incorporations or Maori people, who were usually trying to build up their interest in order to gain economic and productive holdings. The Maori trustee would acquire such interests through a number of ways including purchase by agreement, exercise power compulsorily on succession, or by recommendation of the court on partition, consolidation, or by recommendation on ordering a consolidation of title.

As far as succession was concerned the court was precluded, under section 137, from vesting any interest that constituted an uneconomic share, thus the operation of the conversion fund and purchase by the Maori Trustee. There were general exceptions to the rule where there was a will, interests were useable in conjunction with other land and interests which the Maori Trustee declined. As a matter of policy the trustee would decline interests in Mori reservations, timber

Williams. Harris, Maori Land title Improvement since 1945, p 139. 425 Paul McHugh, Maori Land Laws of New Zealand, Studies in Aboriginal Rights, No.7, University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, p 61. 426 ibid, pp 62-66.
424

423

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bearing lands, lands upon which houses stood, lands subject to heavy debt, lands in unsuitable locations and lands for which unacceptable prices were asked.427

The Maori Land Court had exclusive jurisdiction under the Maori Affairs Act to ascertain the beneficiaries entitled to a deceaseds interests in Maori land. Succession had been the major cause of fragmentation, and with the Courts new found power it could prevent the creation of uneconomic and fragmented interests. 428 As well as preventing the operation of the conversion process and the acquisition of shares by the Maori Trustee. Under section 136(2) the Court could give effect to any arrangement between beneficiaries, families could by way of an arrangement vest interests with whomever they chose, who need not be entitled to a beneficial interest, this being effected by a Maori Land Court order. 429 Family arrangements involved the family members of the deceased owners to come to an agreement that kept each interest in tact. For example, a family of seven succeeding to their mothers interest in five blocks might agree to only have two successors in each block, thus keeping the value of the interests over 25.430 There was a certain amount of objection in that by vesting ownership into one or several persons to overcome the uneconomic provisions from operating, others would be deprived of their turangawaewae. Yet from the courts point of view family arrangements would retain some amount of tribal stability, based on an assumption that those who had the vested interests would use the land for the benefit of the entire family unit. While these arrangements were to be voluntary the court through practice advocated arrangements to be made.431

The Act gave provision under sections 151 and 152 for the Maori Trustee to actively acquire Maori land interests. By its nature, this was a type of voluntary conversion, coined live buying, enabling sale of ones interests to the Maori Trustee. The process was accomplished by certificates of the Maori trustee without the necessity of a Court order.432Essentially, it was hoped that the Maori trustee would buy land interests then proceed to sell them to other Mori. Tribal groups no longer remained legally entitled and the Maori Trustee had powers under the Act to dispose including g the sale of land with the consent of Maori land Boards.433 Live buying could also take place directly between owners of the land under section 213 which permitted vesting orders to be made when transferring interests in land.

427

Harris, Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974, p 71. McHugh, pp 56-57. 429 ibid, p 56. 430 Harris, Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974 p71. 431 McHugh, pp 56-57. 432 Paul McHugh, The Fragmentation of Maori Land, Legal Research Foundation Inc, publication No.18, p 20. 433 McHugh, Maori Land Laws of New Zealand, pp 57-58.
428

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Live buying became an option for avoiding family arrangements, although the Maori Trustee warned some activities to be dissipated as there was real concern that entire families would have no land at all. The Maori Trustee was not averse to live-buying where the owners agreed to sell their shares, but did proceed cautiously in cases where it was used to avoid other arrangements.434 The acquisition by the Maori Trustee meant these shares under section 213 could be sold to any Maori of any descent, a Maori Incorporation, a Mori trust or the Crown. 435 In reality, land interests could easily be alienated from the original tribal group with no chance of reclaiming it.

To prevent the unwanted accumulation of uneconomic shares in the conversion fund, districts were directed to proceed with live buying with an end in mind, to provide freehold tenure or help small farmers expand their existing holdings. It was a useful tool when used in conjunction with land development schemes.436 Whatever may have been the original intentions of the Maori trustee to sell back to Mori, the trustee ended up owning a stock of uneconomic shares.

In addition, under Part XXVIII the Maori Land Court received further special powers including the amalgamation of titles of adjoining titles into a single title. The Court was given the power to confirm transfers of interests between owners and to declare Maori land held by one owner to be European land.437 The Native Minister, Corbett, thought this would greatly assist Maori economic development as well as push Maori into mainstream.438

Part XXII of the Act introduced Mori incorporations as a legal entity which could act for all the owners and avoid fragmentation. Under the Act, a Maori Incorporation could only be formed with the consent of the owners of Maori freehold land. But fragmentation continued, in the sense that shares were devolved on death, the process of fragmentation of beneficial interests continued. Potentially unclaimed dividends created administrative nightmares. Incorporations resembled trusts more than private companies.439

Section 438 of the Mori Affairs Act provided for the creation of trusts, it was a device to overcome the hurdles of multiple ownership The Court had jurisdiction to define the terms of trust, so long as notice had been given to the owners as far as practicable. Hugh comments that

434

Harris, Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974, pp 77-78. McHugh, Maori Land Laws of New Zealand, p 56. 436 Harris, Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974, p 78. 437 ibid, p 70. 438 Harris, Maori Land title Improvement since 1945, p 139. 439 McHugh, Maori Land Laws of New Zealand, pp 66-71.
435

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the trust concept was and is the most promising attempt to reform Maori land tenure, but were judicially rather than legislatively sparked440

In general, for the year 1956 15,000 uneconomic interests were acquired and 10,000 interests were averted from being uneconomic. About 1,000 family arrangements upon succession were worked out which meant the creation of 6,000 new interests were avoided.441 But conversion relived tens of thousands of owners and potential owners of their uneconomic shares and provided the state with a stock of small and fragmented interests.

The 1957 Amendment to the Maori Affairs Act strengthen provisions for arranged succession by introducing 10 rule, which allowed court to exclude eligible successors in favour of others, without payment provided share of each excluded person did not exceed 10. Hence, the Court would encourage family arrangements where successors instead of taking small interests in a number of blocks, took a larger share in one block.442

The Court would upon arranged succession, consolidate title through orders of gifts and sales between owners to eliminate small interests. The philosophy behind this was to prevent

fragmentation and multiplicity of owners, because of the hindrance to economic progression and prevention of the land from being fully productive.

The Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 merely cemented governmental policy of the need to further improve Mori title to land. The amendment was based, largely, on the

recommendations of the Prichard Waetford Report on Laws Affecting Maori Land and Powers of the Maori Land Court. The Report made several recommendations for the better use of Maori land, most of which were in reaction to the urbanisation of Maori.
443

The Act increased the value of uneconomic shares from 25 to 50, as had been recommended by Hunn in 1960. Prichard and Waetford had recommend this value increase to 100, given the department had been live buying interests above the 25 value anyway. The rationale for the increasing the value of uneconomic shares was that urbanisation was on the rise, and Mori might prefer to have the cash value of their interests. This was not a new concept as the department knew that proceeds of live buying financially assisted Mori who were moving to town.444

440 441

ibid, pp 73-75. AJHR 1957, G-9, p 5. 442 Harris, Maori Land title Improvement since 1945, p 142. 443 Willaims. 444 Harris, Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974, pp 85-86.

261

In response to uneconomic interests, Maori reaction was contained within 3 themes. Firstly was the fear that the 1967 Act would make Maori more vulnerable to the loss of land, for example the compulsory sale of land. Secondly, Mori were committed to the belief that they had ability to make efficient use of land themselves. Lastly that finance and training be made available, which was in the national interest of providing a stabile economy and the utilisation of lands.445

The 1967 Act introduced the four owner rule, this involve a compulsory declaration by the court to declare any Maori land owned by four or fewer owners to be European (general) land. While there had been a similar provision in the 1953 Act, it was rarely used. This provision had the potential for alienating further land from Maori ownership, allowing the owners easier access to alienation. But this provision was eventually repealed in 1974, as the government

acknowledged general Maori dissatisfaction with the procedure. In 1970, the court had made 3,410 declarations of status, only 17 percent of which had been at the owners instigation.446

In order to fulfil the purpose of Part II to promote the effective and profitable use and the efficient administration of Maori Land an Improvement Officer was created to determine the best action for use of the land, including the power to order alienation. This Part of the Act was perhaps the most objected to at the time but it was repealed by the Maori Purposes Act 1970 under section 6.447

Sections 152 and 155 allowed the Maori trustee to sell lessees the freehold of vested and reserve land. The Prichard Report had recommended that this should be allowed. It concluded that Maori owners would never be able to resume such lands because the compensation payable for improvements would always be too expensive (due to rising inflation and reasonably static rents) and that it would better if Maori were able to capitalise their interests instead of continuing to receive rents.448

The Act also made changes to the Incorporation system following the Prichard Report, which had recommended changes to make them more like a business entity. As part of this, the Act provided that the land interests of owners would be converted into shares in the corporate body. This meant that the owners lose their direct link to their interests in the land, their Turangawaewae. Overall, the Act reflected the attitude that Maori land holdings should be

I.H. Kawharu, Maori Land Tenure: studies of a changing institution, Oxford, 1977, p 92. Crown Forestry Rental Trust, The Maori Land Legislation Manual, Crown Forestry Rental Trust, Wellington, (1994), pp 443-445. 447 Williams. 448 ibid.
446

445

262

individual and that the individual should ultimately have the same freedom of alienation as Pakeha. It thus does not recognise the concept of tribal land or that Maori might not want their land to become Europeanised in status.449

The 1967 Act became the object of much criticism among Mori, often labelled as the last land grab. Many protests of this modern era have been directed at this act, for it continued to alienate Mori land from Mori ownership In response to this the act was repealed in 1974 by the Maori Affairs Amendment Act. Effectively the 1974 Act represented the Labour

Governments policy on Mori Affairs with the basic philosophy that the continued alienation of Maori land ought not to be facilitated. The Act was an attempt to repair the invasion of Maori rights by the 1967 amendment. If anything the 1974 Act aimed to insure retention of Mori land, but in reality, the damage had already been done.

The Adoption Act 1955


The Law Commission produced a report looking at the legal framework for adoption and to recommend whether the Adoption Act 1955 and the Adult Adoption Information Act 1985 be modified to address contemporary social needs. This report offers insight into the history of adoption and legal ramifications in New Zealand and the impact on Maori customary adoption or whangai.450

Maori customary adoptions presently are no longer recognised in law apart from the statutory provisions in Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 with regards to succession. Initially customary adoption or whangai were made without state intervention or regulation. The Adoption of Children Act 1895 was the first Act to provide a regulatory scheme which gave all citizens the capacity to adopt children. Maori could avail themselves of the statutory adoption produce, but this was not obligatory.451

The Native Land Claims Adjustment Amendment Act 1901 stated that claims to adoption could not be recognised unless the adoption was registered in the Native Land Court (section 50). Between 1901 to 1904, customary adoption became heavily regulated, largely due to whangai disputing land entitlements. For whangai to pursue a claim, their customary placement had to be registered in the Native Land Court. In addition when registering a customary adoption, the Native Land Court had to carry out an investigation as to the nature and circumstances of the placement and further seek the opinion on the relevant Maori customary law from Maori assessors. The Native Appellant Land Court created guidelines (based on the assessors version
449 450

ibid. New Zealand Law Commission, Adoption, Options for reform: A discussion paper, Wellington, 1999. 451 ibid, pp 82-83.

263

of Maori customary law) to help judges assess the validity of customary placements and determine succession rights.

The Native Land Act 1909, section 161, provided that no adoption in accordance with Native customary, even if made before the Act was passed, had any force or effect in law. An adopted childs rights (adoption meaning legal Western adoption) were only preserved if the adoption had been registered before 31 March 1910.452

The Native Land Court retained jurisdiction over such adoptions. An adoption order made by the Native Land Court carried with it the same legal consequences as other adoption orders under the Infants Act 1908. The Maori child assumed the named of the adoptive parents and the law deemed that the legal ties to the birth parents ceased to exist.453

Section 7 of the Native Land Amendment Act 1927 and the Native Claims Adjustment Act 1927 reinstated customary adoptions made before 31 March 1902. However, the provision only applied in the case of a Maori who dies or who has died subsequently to the commencement of the principal Act.454

Section 202 of the Native Land Amendment Act 1931 re-instated section 161 of the Native Land Act 1909, in that customary adoption had no force or effect in law whether made before or after the commencement of this Act. Clearly, the provision was to have a retrospective effect as had its 1927 predecessor. A similar version was then inserted in the Adoption Act 1955 in section 16(2). 455

In summary New Zealand law has fluctuated in its willingness to recognise Maori customary placements. From 1899-1902 and from 1927-1931 customary placements received legal

recognition. For times in between and since 1932 customary adoption had not been recognised in law.

The Law Commission in its report commented that Mori considered that Adoption legislation was an imposition on their customary law relating to lines of descent. There was risk that the child would lose its sense of identity. In addition, secrecy and the lack of consultation involved in the adoption process continued to undermine Mori customary practices. The report

continued to state that two claims (Wai 160 and Wai 286) before the Waitangi Tribunal argued
452 453

ibid, p 83. ibid. 454 ibid. 455 ibid, p 84.

264

that the Adoption Act constituted a breach of the Crowns obligations to Maori in terms of Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi.456

The Native Land Laws


The Native Land Law summaries below have been taken from David Williams Mori Land Legislation Database. The website has offered great insight into the objectives of Native Land Laws since 1862. The website also offers great commentary of parliamentary debates and what Members of Parliament thought of various pieces of legislation. In many cases David Williams commentary highlights the effect legislation had on Maori and their land, further exemplifying legislation as a mechanism designed to alienate land from Maori. Each new Act has a footnote at the end of relevant paragraph, all information of a particular Act was taken from the same website.

The Native Lands Act 1862 preamble stated that the Act was to definine Native ownership of land according to British law. It was the first piece of legislation to establish the Native Land Court, though rarely used and was soon superseded by the Native Lands Act 1865. The Court was to be established containing local chiefs in each district under the chairmanship of a Pakeha magistrate, to ascertain Native title and issue a Certificate of Title in favour of the relevant tribe, community or individual, prior to the sale of land.

Dillon-Bell said, in the Parliamentary Debates, that we desire, subject to proper safeguards, that the Natives themselves should be empowered to ascertain and define their own titles; and we therefore propose to constitute Courts which, after a proper survey, a careful inquiry, and confirmation of the proceedings by the Governor, shall have the power of certifying who, according to Native custom, are the owners of any land.

Investigation of titles however, did not prevent the Crown from acquiring land, not yet investigated, by purchase or cession. The Governor (rather than the Governor in Council) was given wide powers, he could confirm (or otherwise) orders of the Court, make reservations, and proclaim where the Court could operate.

The Act set up a system which, on the face of it, was to ascertain and assimilate Maori communal ownership into a form recognised by English law. In reality, it was a settler driven piece of legislation initiated to combat Maori reluctance to alienate tribal land. The Treaty of Waitangi was cited in the preamble and while it is said that the waiver of Crown pre-emption

456

ibid, pp 85-87.

265

was in favour of Maori, the aim of the settlers was to facilitate the more speedy acquisition of Maori land.

The waiver of the Crown right of pre-emption was further confirmed by a Proclamation of 6 June 1863 and heralded a system of direct purchase between Maori and private purchasers. The reason advanced by the Government for this was that the previous Crown practice of purchasing land at low prices and then selling it on to settlers at higher prices had meant that Maori were now distrustful of selling land to the Government.

The Act first came into force in April 1864 in the Kaipara districts where there was Native Land Court sittings presided over by Judge Rogan. These hearings led to large blocks of tribal land (e.g. Paparoa Block and Pukeatua Block) being awarded to a single individual.457

The purpose of the Native Land Act 1865 was to ascertain owners and encourage the extinction of Native proprietary customs and to convert ownership into titles derived from the Crown. The Act laid the foundation for the work of the Native Land Court until the 1909 consolidation of the Native land laws. Judge Fentons views were mirrored in the policy and workings of the Court and the Act.

The 1865 Act reflected a stronger push towards the individualisation of title.

The Act

exemplified the 10 owner rule under section 23, in that a Certificate of Title was to be issued to no more than 10 owners, communal Mori title was incompatible with this rule. In reality, many Maori may have thought the 10 owners would be kaitiaki or trustees but legally they were the absolute owners and had the power to deal with the land as they wished. Section 23 did contain a proviso that a certificate of title could be issued to a tribe but that to do so the block of land had to exceed 5000 acres. However, Land Court judges were reluctance to use this provision and it was rarely used. Section 24 was an amelioration of the 10 owner rule. It enabled the Court to divide large areas of tribal land into allotments and award each lot to no more than 10 people. Although this provision admitted more people onto the title to land, it resulted in the fragmentation of tribal land and added to survey costs.

Individualisation of title was assisted by the workings of section 21. Any individual could initiate proceedings for the investigation of title, setting the Land Court machinery in motion and requiring all other interested claimants to appear in court to have their interests recognised. This meant that a member of one tribe could initiate proceedings and that opposing tribes with

457

ibid.

266

an interest in the land had to go to Court to defend their rights, despite arrangements that tribes had made with each other.

Section 75 was a weak attempt to protect Maori from the negative impact of removing the Crowns right of pre-emption. Any contracts entered into prior to the Native Land Court issuing a certificate of title were void.

The Act under section 30 gave the Court jurisdiction to decide upon succession according to [English] law. However, the Court under Fenton introduced a new and arbitrary precedent of succession. All living children of the deceased were to succeed equally to Maori freehold land. The process over many generations divided Maori land into unusable portions. This process of succession worked in conjunction with section 50 which initiated the system of partition orders.

The court system of investigating title placed a further burden on Maori. Court fees, survey costs and payment of judges created huge debts for Mori. The court hearings were in remote areas, miles away from their tribal areas and court delays meant Mori had to rely on settler towns for food and resources which were held on an account and to be paid once a certificate of title had been issued, which in turn led to them selling of more land to pay for the debts.458

Despite the preamble of the Act and section 23 stating that the Court was to ascertain the owners according to Native Custom its real purpose was to eliminate customary tenure as far as possible. Because of the workings of the Native Land Court Mori land was alienated by restricting legal title to only 10 owners and secondly land was sold to pay for the debts of court hearings, survey costs and personal debts in settler towns.

The Native Lands Act 1866 was a reaction to concern over Maori selling land that had been reserved to them, usually to pay off debts. By placing restrictions on alienability the Court was supposed to ensure that Maori would not be able to dispose of all their lands. According to Richmond (1867 Debate) this Act took power concerning restrictions on alienation away from the Court and left it to the discretion of the Governor in Council. Fenton said that this Act should be repealed as it was unpopular with Maori. Rogan reported (A-10a) that the Act had not been translated, and the Native Assessors are called upon to assist in adjudicating under an Act written in a foreign language, which is and must be prejudicial to the satisfactory business of the Court until this is rectified. 459

458 459

Williams. ibid.

267

The Native Lands Act 1867 changed the 10 owner rule, in that it required the Court to record all owners, in addition to the 10 owners on the certificate of title. This was intended to prevent the 10 named owners from selling the land on their own behalf without consultation and without dividing the proceeds of sale among all the owners. However according to the Rees

Commission, ten owners could control leasing and rents without the agreement of the rest of the owners. Ideally investigation of titles preceding this Act would require new court hearings, so that all owners could be recorded but section 10 of the 1867 Act prevented the re-opening of every title of land. Judge Fenton under the 1867 Act refused to implement this policy of naming all the owners on the back of the certificate of title and he continued to issue certificate of titles naming only 10 people. He felt that the Native Land Court should concentrate on eliminating communal ownership460

The Native Lands Act 1869 was introduced into the Legislative Council by Chief Judge Fenton. The Debates on the Bill give the following explanations of sections. Section 10, which gave the Court jurisdiction over transactions before 1840, was intended for cases where the block before the Court joins or runs into land subject to Old Land Claims. Section 12 specifies that grants of Maori land shall be held by owners as tenants in common. This means that when a grantee dies his/her interest in the land passes to his/her own successors. Section 15 meant that the majority in value of owners must agree to alienation before the land can be partitioned for such purposes. Section 22 gives married Maori women property rights not possessed by married Pakeha women at the time. However, it is interesting to note that the right they are given is the right to sell their land.461

The Native Land Act 1873 brought in four main changes because of numerous petitions and complaints on the 1865 Act and land transactions dealt with by the Native Land Court. The first change was to survey charges. The government under this Act would advance the money necessary to pay for surveys, which had previously been an impediment to bringing the land to Court. However Mori owners remained liable for the survey charges and if they could not repay the money, the government could take the land as payment.

The second change was to District Officers. This change meant that District Officers would investigate land ownership before the cases went to Court to avoid claimants having to be aware of and attend Court hearings. However, this did not eventuate and it continued to be the case that claimants initiating action in the Court had an advantage over other interests. Judges were
460 461

ibid. ibid.

268

also giving powers to make preliminary inquires so they did not have to rely on evidence in court, but this did not happen either.

Thirdly changes were made to reserves. Under this Act reserves were to be created to guard against leaving Maori landless, these reserves were inalienable and created to the size of at least 50 acres per man, woman and child.

Lastly the Memorial of Ownership replaced the Certificate of Title system. The Memorial of Ownership system was to list every owner and his or her proportionate share to overcome the abuse of the 10 owner rule. A whole block of land could not be sold without agreement of every named owner, thus making it rather difficult to complete the purchase of land. It was a way of protecting hapu interests though often it was criticised for still individualising title instead of vesting the interests in hapu and iwi.462

The Native Land Act Amendment Act 1877 was enacted with the aim of ensuring that people with genuine claims could ask for a rehearing. The applicant would be required to give security for payment of the costs. Ideally the government wanted rehearing to be deterred, making title to land more secure and purchasers would not need to worry about a rehearing that would later show they had purchased the land from the wrong persons. Section 6 allowed the Crown to appear before the Native Land Court so that it could obtain title to the proportion of the land it had paid for in a block even if it had not purchased the whole block.463 A further Amendment in 1878464 made it more workable for public and private purchases of Maori land. Sections 8, 11, 13, and 15 made it possible for purchasers to obtain title to portions of land even if they had not managed to purchase all the interests under the Memorial of Ownership title and in absence of an accurate survey plan. Furthermore section 4 made it unlawful to advance a loan as a mortgage over any land held by a Maori on a Memorial of ownership or Crown Grant. The Native Minister stated it was better for Maori to obtain money by selling land rather than by mortgaging it. By denying Mori freedom to use their land as security the government refused to allow Maori to control and have responsibility over their land, as well as ensuring the alienation of land into the hands of settlers as the only means to deal with financial difficulty.465

462 463

ibid. ibid.. 464 Native Land Act Amendment Act (No.2) 1878 465 Williams.

269

The Native Land Act 1888 repealed the Native Land Administration Act 1886. The government stated that Mori would not bring their land under the 1886 Act and the government did not have the money to buy sufficient land for settlement. The Act was to work along with the safeguards of the Native Lands Fraud Prevention Acts, to prevent Maori alienating land. However this restriction could be removed on application of the majority of owners. Carroll agreed that Maori should have the right to sell their land as they wished, but that the removal of the restrictions gave trustees the power to sell tribal lands, converting their status as absolute owners because of the power to sell land.466

The Crowns pre-emption right had been previously re-imposed before the enactment of the Native Land Laws Amendment Act 1895. Under the 1895 Act Maori regained the ability to sell their land privately and only in certain cases. This applied to land that was within a town district or borough or if the block as portioned before this Act was less than 500 acres. Section 4 gave the governor power to approve these applications and wavier pre-emption.

The 1895 Act also gave the Native Land Court power to issue a confirmation order for the contracting of a mortgage prior to 1894. However this power was later repealed in 1897, as the power was considered to go too far. Section 7 provided for the first time that Mori could alienate their land without proving that they had sufficient other land for their support. Fenton, who at that time was an ex-chief judge, commented that [t]his Act is of as intricate a character as the previous ones, and it is strongly advised that no operations should be made under it except under legal advice. It contains eighty-four sections, and it is impossible to furnish an intelligible summary of it.467

The Native Land Act 1909 consolidated sixty nine existing Acts which had been passed during the period 1871-1908. In addition, there were several changes to previous Native Land Laws. Firstly, that Ascertainment of Title Native Land Court Commissioners were to be appointed to continue routine Court work, so that Judges could continue to work through the backlog of work. The use of Assessors were no longer compulsory and was left to the discretion of judges, which was really a cost saving measure. Furthermore Native customary title was not

enforceable against the Crowns assertion of clear title. Additionally the Native Land Court when partitioning a block had to have road lines laid out first so that the land would be ready for settlement. Carroll said that the idea was that the Court would be guided by how the land would be used rather than considering Native custom.

466 467

ibid. ibid.

270

The 1909 Act removed all previous restrictions on the alienation of land except those restrictions imposed by this Act. Further Maori land was divided into different categories for the purposes of alienation. The groups were; i) half-castes who have more European than Maori blood were to be classified as European and were able to alienate land as they desired; ii) individual Maori who have sole title to a block and could convert that title into European freehold; iii) if there were 10 or less owners, they could dispose of it as they wish, subject to confirmation of the fairness of the terms of alienation; iv) any land purchased by a Mori from Pakeha or the Crown would not be subject to Native Land Laws; v) for land with more than 10 owners a Runanga system would apply, with assembled owners being able to decide whether or not to alienate. Furthermore the Governor Council could no longer compulsorily vest lands in Maori Land Boards, except under the Noxious Weeds Act and Rating Act.

The third major change was to a miscellaneous issues including that Mori reserves (such as pa, marae and urupa) were to be created, but would no longer be under the administration of the Public Trustee. In addition, the Validation Court was abolished and its function taken over by the Native Land Court. Wills by Maori had to be signed before a reliable witness to prevent litigation. In addition, in the cases of intestacy Native freehold land would descend by custom but other land interests and personal property would devolve according to English Law. Customary adoption was no longer recognised and Pakeha children could not be adopted by Maori.468

The Native Land Act 1931 consolidated Native land laws since 1909. The Native [Maori] Purposes Act 1931 consolidated various enactments regarding Maori land which were in the Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Acts, and which were not to be included in the Native Land Act 1931 consolidation. Apirana Ngata stated that the only new sections were sections 27 and 118(a).469 It was not until the Mori Affairs Act 1953 that there was a major review of Native Land Laws.

468 469

ibid. ibid.

271

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Armstrong, David, and Stirling, Bruce, Surplus Lands. Policy and Practice: 1840-1950, Wai 45 doc #J2. Daamen, Rosemary, Exploratory Report on Wai-128 filed by Dame Whina Cooper on behalf of Te Rarawa ki Hokianga, unpublished report for the Waitangi Tribunal, Wai 128, doc # A1, July 1993. Geiringer, Claudia, Historical Background to the Muriwhenua Land Claim 1865-1950, Wai 45 doc # F10, 1992.

275

Gould, Ashley, Maori Land Development 1929-1954: An Introductory Overview with Representative Case Studies, Crown Forestry Rental Trust (Twentieth Century Maori Land Administration Research Programme), Wellington, 1996. Harris, Aroha, Ngati Here and Ngai Tupoto claims for Te Tapuwae and Other Blocks: A Paper Briefly Scoping the Research Requirements of Wai 452, October 1995. Hewitt, Anna and Morrow, Diana, Te Atiawa and the Customary Use of Natural Resources in Te Tau Ihu, 1840-2000, a report commissioned by Te Atiawa Manawhenua ki Te Tau Ihu Trust, Wellington, August 2000. Hutton, John L, A Quick and Ready Method: the alienation of Maori land by sales to the Crown and private individuals, 1905-30, Crown Forestry Rental Trust (Twentieth Century Maori Land Administration Research Programme), Wellington, 1996. James Henare Maori Research Centre, Sustainable Development in Taitokerau: Case Study 2: Te Hiku o te Ika, Auckland, 1996. Marr, Cathy, Hodge, Robin and White, Ben, Crown Law, Policies and Practices in relation to Flora and Fauna, 1840-1912, Waitangi Tribunal unpublished report, Wellington, 2001. McClean, Robert, and Smith, Trecia The Crown and Flora and Fauna: Legislation, Policies and Practices, 1983-1998, Waitangi Tribunal unpublished report, Wellington 2001. Nepia, Michael, Muriwhenua surplus Lands: Commissions of Inquiry in the Twentieth Century, October 1992. OMalley, Vincent and Robertson, Stephen. Muriwhenua Land and Politics, 1862-1909, A Report commissioned by the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, September 1997. Park, Geoff, Effective Exclusion; An Exploratory Overview of Crown Actions and Maori Responses Concerning the Indigenous Flora and fauna, 1912-1983, unpublished report, Wellington, 2001. Stokes, Evelyn, The Muriwhenua Land Claims post 1865: Wai 45 and others, Waitangi Tribunal, 2002. Te Uira Associates, A Scoping Report on Research for Te Rarawa Treaty Claims, unpublished scoping report commissioned by Te Runanga o Te Rarawa, 2002. Tiakiwai, Sarah-Jane, Education and Health Issues in Hokianga: Research Report for Te Rarawa, unpublished report prepared for Te Uira Associates, 2003. Thrush, Peter, Indigenous Flora and Fauna of New Zealand, Report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, August 1995. Watkins, Daniel, Kahukura, Report commissioned by the Departmnet of Conservation and Te Runanga o Te Rarawa, 1992. Willan, Rachael, Maori Land Sales 1900 1930, Report for the Crown Forestry Rental Trust (Twentieth Century Maori Land Administration Project) 1996.

Other Unpublished Documents


Affidavit of Hekenukumai Puhipi (Hector Busby) on behalf of the WAI 1066 claimants.

276

Appendices, Evidence of Waerete Violet Beatrice Norman Ma in Respect of Claim to Wharo Oneroa a Tohe/Ninety Mile Beach, Wai 45, Doc # C19 Brief of Evidence for Dr Manuka Arnold Henare, 12 January 2002, Wai 1071, 1007, 594, 566, 521, 262, 151, 131, 87 and 45, Waitangi Tribunal. Duffy, S, Hokianga Native Schools, 1871-1900. Assimilation Reconsidered, MA thesis, Massey University, 2002. Harris, Aroha, Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974 with two case studies from the Hokianga, M Phil Thesis, Massey University, 1996. Matiu, McCully, Submission on Te Oneroa a Tohe, 5 March 1991, Wai 45, Doc # C11. Report of the Maori Land Information Office: in respect of an application for research assistance lodged by Paul White, (MLIO Report), Maori Land Court, Whangarei. Snowden, Haimona, Submission on Te Oneroa a Tohe, 4 March 1991, Wai 45, Doc # C9. Walker, Eddie, Submission on Te Oneroa a Tohe, 5 March 1991, Wai 45, Doc # C12.

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