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(IN)SECURITY K INDEX ................................................................................................................................. 1 (IN)SECURITY SHELL ..................................................................................................................................... 3 DILLON 96 ..................................................................................................................................................... 6 BIOPOWER ADD-ON ...................................................................................................................................... 8 V2L ADD-ON ................................................................................................................................................ 9 A2: PERM DO BOTH .................................................................................................................................... 11 A2: PERM COMBINE WITH REALISM .......................................................................................................... 12 A2: THE THREATS ARE REAL ..................................................................................................................... 13 A2: SECURITY GOODCONFRONT THREATS............................................................................................. 15 A2: REALISM INEVITABLEHUMAN NATURE ........................................................................................... 16 A2: REALISM INEVITABLEIR STRUCTURES ............................................................................................ 17 A2: REALISM GOOD/REJECTION BAD ......................................................................................................... 18 A2: MEARSHEIMER ..................................................................................................................................... 19 A2: GUZZINI ................................................................................................................................................ 20 A2: ANARCHY ............................................................................................................................................. 21 A2: WE HAVE EXPERTS .............................................................................................................................. 22 A2: TRANSITION .......................................................................................................................................... 23 A2: DISCOURSE NOT KEY ........................................................................................................................... 24 LINKHEGEMONY ..................................................................................................................................... 25 LINKTERRORISM ..................................................................................................................................... 26 LINKCHINA ............................................................................................................................................. 27 LINKENVIRONMENT ................................................................................................................................ 28 LINKWAR ................................................................................................................................................ 29 LINKFEAR ............................................................................................................................................... 30 LINKTHREAT CONSTRUCTION ................................................................................................................ 31 LINKMILITARY ........................................................................................................................................ 32 INTERNAL LINKS ......................................................................................................................................... 33 ALTERNATIVE SOLVENCY ........................................................................................................................... 35 SECURITY FRAMEWORK SHELL .................................................................................................................. 36

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A2: EDUCATION .......................................................................................................................................... 38 A2: LIMITS .................................................................................................................................................. 39

Page 3 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 (In)security Shell Global governance constructs crisis scenarios in order to justify its existence, yet only perpetuates the problem through attempts to solve. Michael Dillon, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, 00 Alternatives, p.
25

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the
expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem.

problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological
Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial

policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will
extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome.

Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process
of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

Page 4 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 And the discourse of difference and security is the root cause of war. James Der Derian, Professor of Political Science at Brown University, 02 Theory & Event The War of
Networks Without falling into the trap of 'moral equivalency', one can discern striking similarities. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others have made much of the 'asymmetrical' war being waged by the terrorists. And it is indeed a canny and even diabolical use of asymmetrical tactics as well as strategies when terrorists commandeer commercial aircraft and transform them into kinetic weapons of indiscriminate violence, and then deploy commercial media to counter the military strikes that follow. Yet, a fearful symmetry is also at work, at an unconscious, possibly pathological level, a war of escalating and competing and imitative oppositions, a mimetic war of images . A

mimetic war is a battle of imitation and representation, in which the relationship of who we are and who
they are is played out along a wide spectrum of familiarity and friendliness, indifference and tolerance, estrangement and hostility. It

can result in appreciation or denigration, accommodation or separation, assimilation or extermination. It draws physical boundaries between peoples, as well as metaphysical
boundaries between life and the most radical other of life, death. It separates human from god. It builds the fence

it sanctions just about every kind of violence. More than a rational calculation of interests takes us to war. People go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine, and speak of others: that is, how they construct the difference of others as well as the sameness of themselves through representations. From Greek tragedy and Roman gladiatorial spectacles to futurist art and fascist rallies, the mimetic mix of image and violence has proven to be more powerful than the most rational discourse. Indeed, the medical definition of mimesis is 'the appearance, often caused by hysteria, of symptoms of a disease not actually present.' Before one can diagnose a cure, one must study the symptoms -- or, as it was
that makes good neighbors; it builds the wall that confines a whole people. And once known in medical science, practice semiology.

Page 5 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 And the shift to the realm of global policy blinds us to our own responsibility for war, making violence inevitable. Susanne Kappeler , Associate Professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 95 Al-Akhawayn
University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behaviour, pg. 10-12
Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent powerlessness and its

citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such
accompanying phenomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single

events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croation president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own political decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls organized irresponsibiilty, upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also

proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers. For we tend to think that we cannot do anything, say, about a war, because we deem
ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of What

would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defense? Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as virtually no possibilities: what
I could o seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like I want to stop this war, I want military intervention, I want to stop this

are this war, however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our non-comprehension: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the
backlash, or I want a moral revolution. We

ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we are the war in our unconscious cruelty towards you, our tolerance of the fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I dont our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the others. We share in

the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape our feelings, our relationships, our values according to the structures and the values of war and violence. So if we move beyond the usual frame of violence, towards the structures of thought employed in decisions to act, this also means
making an analysis of action. This seems all the more urgent as action seems barely to be perceived any longer.

Page 6 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 And the mechanisms of the state can never put an end to violencethe desire to eradicate difference and violence will only lead to extinction. Dillon 96 Michael Dillon, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, 96 Politics of
Security, pp 150-151
One has one's being to be. The struggle in life is, therefore, not simply a struggle for life. Much less is it a struggle between antecedently determined and conflictual features of human being. Rather, it is instead the struggle of life with its being, the striving of the striving to take-up that which it undergoes; the struggle of its occupation of, and its pre-occupation with and within, the freedom of its very being there. This is not human being's struggle to be, therefore, but, always already being, the struggle which the being of human being's freedom to be entails. Here, Heidegger's understanding of being in the free, active and verbal sense comes across most strongly. For where there is a life comprised by, and in virtue of, difference, there is always struggle less between its free constitutent parts as of this manifold openness with and within the freedom, marked by the ontological difference, into which it is thrown.74 A being that bears this difference as its free composition is a being which is,

violence incites reprisal and there is no necessary end to the cycle of violence which results, short of the extinction of human being. There is no principle of 'guaranteed effectiveness', as Girard puts it, for quelling violence.75 Only violence, it seems, can secure an end to violence, yet not even violence can do that securely because violence, of course, begets violence. Offered as the final guarantor, it is also the chief threat to order: 'the practice of violence changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world'.76 It, like the being-in-common from which it arises is,
therefore, continuously in danger of being overwhelmed by the violence into which that difference may degenerate. For

therefore, also self-propagating. The conundrum of violence is consequently not one problem amongst many, it is intimately related to the conundrum of being-in-common itself. For, in its freedom, human being is always potentially a violent mortal puzzle to itself, because the violence which it can always threaten itself with, in consequence of the very differential composition of the life that it is, cannot be mastered and overcome by greater violence. (Another way of saying that danger is

inherent to the free (in)security of human being, and not an externality to be exterminated.) More to the point. Neither can it be mastered and overcome by regimes, either of normalising surveillance or of policing love, premised alike upon the violent, and violence-inducing, denial of violence and difference.77 The political alone offers
some way of addressing it short of the dissolution of all limits, particularly that threatened by those who dogmatically insist upon the violent, sovereign decided- ness of their own limits. The political arises precisely because we are condemned by our mortal life to be free. Because we are free we have to enact ourselves. In enacting ourselves, we violently articulate standards and judgements. Herein lies the possibility of a politics of freedom in which the function of politics is to preserve that dangerous and violent freedom, to sustain that capacity to invent standards and exercise judgement - and to enlarge it where possible - against existing standards and judgements, while keeping the question of the very violence entailed in judgement open. That is why the political is always concerned with the remainder or the surplus that politics as rule produces, or relies upon, but is always committed against. The tragic challenge of being-in-common to being-in-common is, therefore, how to deal with a violence that is immanent; a possibility that inheres within its own being by virtue of the free differential composition of that being. One response to that challenge is to deny the tragic character of human being by indicting difference itself, and seeking to eradicate it. Integral to the tragic condition, therefore, is the desire to escape from it, resolving the polemos of life by turning upon the very freeing difference which constitutes it. Effacing difference in order to secure an end to the violence of a being that bears violence- threatening difference within itself, nonetheless, means embracing a project that seeks the dissolution of the very life it seeks to secure. Instead of securing an escape from violence, therefore,

the eradication of difference paradoxically serves to institute that very cycle of limitless violence the logical outcome of which is the effacement of freedom and, ultimately, of human being itself.
Tragedy's unique and indispensable contribution to the life of being-in-common is to resist, through exposing and exploring, that mortal threat to mortal life. It resists not by offering a facile solution to violence, however, but by differentiating violence from struggle, and by continuously holding open the question of violence entailed in the metaphysical means of trying to secure ourselves from it. Insisting that there is no such escape, it fixes our attention back on the issue of what Nietzsche calls the 'spiritualisation of enmity', or on what William Connolly Nietzscheanly calls agonistic respect; and, thereby, on the possibility of transformation in life.

Page 7 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 The alternative is to reject the affirmative and immediate policy action is response to security threats. Voting negative repudiates the affirmatives prioritization of a secure worldsaying no to the affirmative returns the Gift of Security. The effect is to open a space so that politics may be otherwise. Mark Neocleous, prof. of critique of political economy @ Brunei University, 08 p. 185-186, Critique of Security The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the
security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive

constant prioritising of a mythical security as a the political end - constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in
conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The

political end - as

which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this world, it

it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we
removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,141 dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism

We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks : if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.142 The mistake has been to think that there is a hole: and that this hole needs to be filled with a new mission or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered}g humanised or
and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination .
expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up affirming the state as the terrain of modem

The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another dimension of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security an'q which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political: language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while< much of what I have said here has been of a
politics, the ground of security.
negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as; the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept

to keep demanding' more security' is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate
of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on! about insecurity and

(while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty)

ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political .. issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean,

But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part
precisely, must be open to debate. of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities'

it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.143
that come with being human;

Page 8 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 Biopower Add-On The discourse of apocalypse allows for biopolitical control of the population. Peter Coviello, PhD in English from Cornell University, 00 Queer Frontiers, p. 40-41
Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida's suitably menacing phrase) `remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,"6 then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an "other" people whose very pres-ence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threaten-ing the safety and prosperity of a cherished "general population:' This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that, "Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: not `Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now On."" The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss)

apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of destruction-through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse-agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of
is that his first volume of The History o f Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than pro-ductive, less lifethreatening than, in his words, "life-administering:' Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life . . . [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to pre-cise controls and comprehensive regulations:' In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;' however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or

agencies of modern power presume to act "on the behalf of the existence of everyone:' Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or,
even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," indeed, potentially annihilating. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power;' Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population:'8 For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

And biopower leads to war and extinction. Michel Foucault, Professor of Philosophy at the College de France, 78, The History Of Sexuality: An
Introduction, Volume 1, 136-137
There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of deathand this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limitsnow presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and

Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so
multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.

many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the

decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individuals continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battlethat one has to be capable of killing in order to go on
livinghas become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

Page 9 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 V2L Add-On Securitization makes life calculable Michael Dillon, professor of security @ Lancaster, 08, Underwriting Security Security Dialogue 32.3) This essay enframes risk as a biopolitical security technology. It explains how biopolitics of security take life as their referent object of security, how the grid of intelligibility for biopolitics is economic and how, in the second half of the 20th century, life also came to be understood as emergent being. Contingency is constitutive especially of the life of emergent being and so the essay argues that a biopolitics of security which seeks to make life live cannot secure life against contingency but must secure life through governmental technologies of contingency. Risk is one of these technologies. The essay also explains
how it has come to pervade the biopolitics of security of the 21st century and how through the way in which risk is traded on the capital markets it has begun to acquire the properties of money. The essay closes by describing how the biopolitics of security differ from traditional prophylactic accounts of

security and how these biopolitics of security exceed the liberal political thinking which rationalises and legitimates them. Calculability results in the devaluation of human life Michael Dillon, professor of politics and international relations at the University of Lancaster, April 99,
Political Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2, Another Justice, p. 164-5 Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The

very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and
the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.

Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget
that, we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure. But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

Page 10 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 Dehumanization leads to extinction David Berube, Professor. English. University of South Carolina, 97 Nanotechnological Prolongevity: The Down
Side. 1997. http://www.cas.sc.edu/engl/faculty/berube/prolong.htm.

Assuming we are able to predict who or what are optimized humans, this entire resultant worldview smacks of eugenics and Nazi racial science. This would involve valuing people as means. Moreover,

there would always be a superhuman more super than the current ones, humans would never be able to escape their treatment as means to an always further and distant end. This
means-ends dispute is at the core of Montagu and Matson's treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn: "its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or

natural calamity on record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse.... Behind the genocide of the holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and dissidents... in the cuckoo's nest of America, lies a dehumanized image of man... (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impact dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate the actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is evil's most powerful weapon.>

Page 11 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Perm Do Both No solvencycombining the global with the local blinds us to our own responsibility.
[Jayan Nayar, Professor of Law at the University of Warwick, 99, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Orders of Inhumanity, Fall 1999, 9 Transnatl L. & Contemp Probs. 599]
That there is suffering all over the world has indeed been made more visible by the technologies of image-ing. Yet for all its consequent fostering of "networks," images of "global" suffering have also served to disempower. By this, we mean not merely that we are filled with the sense that the forces against which the struggle for emancipations from injustice and exploitation are waged are

it diverts our gaze away from the only true power that is in our disposal--the power of self-change in relationships of solidarities. The "world," as
pervasive and, therefore, often impenetrable, but, more importantly, that we perceive it today, did not exist in times past. It does not exist today. There is no such thing as the global "one world." The world can only exist in the locations and experiences revealed through and in human relationships. It is often that we think that to change the world it is necessary to change the way power is exercised in the world; so we go about the business of exposing and denouncing the many power configurations that

we blind ourselves if we regard this power as the power out there. Power, when all the complex networks of its reach are untangled, is personal; power does not exist out
dominate. Power indeed does lie at the core of human misery, yet there, [*630] it only exists in relationship. To say the word, power, is to describe relationship, to acknowledge power, is to acknowledge our subservience in that relationship. There can exist no power power can only achieve its ambitions through its naked form, as violence.

if the subservient relationship is refused--then

Page 12 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Perm Combine With Realism The realist mode of thought excludes alternative understandings and co-opts alternative solvency. Jon Barnett, Fellow in the School of Social and Environmental Enquiry at University of Melbourne, 01 The
Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era, pg. 29

A cognent definition of security from the realist perspective is difficult. Clements is perhaps closest to the mark in saying that security is whatever national security elites say it is', suggesting that security is a vehicle for the exercise of power over domestic society (1990: 3). Nevertheless, in general the 'who' of the realist understanding of security is the nation-state, the 'what' is most frequently war, and the source of the threat is other groups of people. For realists, peace is seen as a contractual matter rather than as a moral, obligation. In this view, peace means the absence direct violence (notably war), and this is at best a temporary abeyance of the inevitable recurrence of conflict. Thus in realist theory peace is, by definition, an armed peace' (Paggi and Pinzauti 1985: 6). The prevailing approach to national security understands the state as a given rather than as a socially constructed and therefore mutable entity. Indeed, for all the emphasis placed on the integrity of nation-state, there is a general absence of theorisation about the state itself (Walker 1993). This view of the nation-state as a

coherent, natural and preordained entity excludes the historicist understanding of the state as a particular product of recent history. So, with the realist approach to security, world politics is
portrayed as a permanent game, which can appear to have followed the same rules more; or less since time immemorial' (Walker 1995: 321). In this respect realism is conservative, its commitment to the world as it is forecloses on the possibility of change, and instead it reasserts (continually) the impossibility of lasting peace (Linklater 1995).

Page 13 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: The Threats Are Real The threats arent realtheyre only constructed scenarios. Ronnie Lipschutz, Director of the Politics Program at University of California at Santa Cruz, On Security, 98, p.
8] In contrast to Buzan's political geography of core and periphery, an alternative view might see not a binary

Security is, to put Wver's argument in other words, a socially constructed concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context.18 It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states
and among them.19 To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a notinsignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there."20 But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions.21 That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective. To the extent that they act on these projections, threats to each other acquire a material character. In other words, nuclear-tipped ICBMs are not mere figments of our imagination, but their targeting is a function of what we imagine the possessors of other missiles might do to us with theirs .22

Security threats are a subjective matter of interpretation. David Campbell, Professor of International Politics at the University of Newcastle, 98 Writing Security, p. 1 Danger is not an objective condition. It [sic] is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. To illiterate this, consider the manner in which the insurance
industry assesses risk. In Francois Ewalds formulation, insurance is a technology of ask the principal function of which is not
compensation or reparation, but rather the operation of a schema of rationality distinguished by the calculus of probabilities . In insurance, according to this logic, danger (or, more accurately, risk) is neither an event nor a general kind of event occurring in realitybut a specific mode of treatment of certain events capable of happening to a group of individuals. In other words, for the technology of risk in

insurance, Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality: But on the

other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyzes the danger, considers the event. As Kant might have put it, the category of risk is a category of the understanding; it cannot be given in sensibility or intuition. In these terms, danger is an effect of interpretation. Danger bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is said to derive. Nothing is intrinsically more dangerous for insurance technology then anything else except when interpreted as such.

Page 14 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 The implication that a secured subject is safe is merely a faade used by the implementers of the policy to ignore the truth that nobody is safe in a securitized world Maria Stern, Research Fellow and Lecturer in the Dept. of Peace and Development Research, Goteborg University and the Swedish Institute of International Affair, 06, We the Subject: The Power and Failure of (In)Security,
Security Dialogue. http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/37/2/187

One way of exploring the paradox of (in)security and its implications for the reproduction of violence is to inquire into how the promise of a secure subject is inscribed in discourses of (in)security. Why is the successful secur- ing of we impossible? How might the supplementary
relationship between security and insecurity inform the inscription of we as the sovereign subject of security? Arguably, integral to the promise of an assured security is the concealment of the

impossibility of fulfilling this very promise. Security narratives, however, work towards concealing this impossibility. They represent a story of security and the subject that is to be secured that is cohesive, and therewith the promise of security seems possible. What do such stories look like, in broad strokes? Security narratives both those written by the security elites of modern sovereign states and those written in resistance to the violence and exclusion of sovereign national projects can be seen as key discourses through which modern politics and political subjects are inscribed (see Weldes, 1999). They are distinctly modern insofar as they
are written through the idiom of modern state sovereignty and the correlated belief in the possibility of a sovereign subject. This subject is cast as ontologically prior to the discourses established to secure it (Burke, 2002; Campbell, 1999; Dillon, 1996; Edkins, Pin-Fat & Shapiro, 2004). Importantly,

like other narratives, security narra- tives offer seemingly cohesive representations of reality with a given past, present and future, with a beginning, middle and end, and a clear, coherent, stable subject (Disch, 2003: 264; Wibben, 2002). Security narratives are osten- sibly
written to provide safety, to counter danger. They can also be seen as attempts to impose order and certainty, to ensure existence.

Page 15 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Security GoodConfront Threats Knee-jerk policy solutions will failwe must rethink our individual relationships. Jim George, Australian National University; and David Campbell The Johns Hopkins University International Studies Quarterly, 90, Vol. 34, No. 3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International
Studies. (Sep., 1990), pp. 269-293.

The second issue, concerning the need for more "concrete' research, is dealt with below. But perhaps

for those urging quick-fire concrete application of theoretical approaches, the following is worth pondering. Speaking of the "god's-eye view" of those who want "hard nosed, concrete solutions to particular problems," Walker (1988b:71 argues that it is an "arrogance that is inconsistent with the empirical evidence" of contemporary global life. Such evidence, he suggests, "requires a
willingness to face up to the uncertainties of the age, not with the demand for instant solutions . . [or] concrete policy options . . . but more crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is

possible for human beings to live together." Security rhetoric is self-defeating. Barry Buzan, Professor of IR at the London School of Economics, 83 People, States, and Fear: The National
Security Problem in International Relations, pg. 19 p2

It is useful to discuss security in relation to specific threats. Against me threats, such as preventable diseases or poverty, some individuals can achieve very high levels of security. Against others, daily where cause-effect relationships are obscure (cancer, crime, unemployment), security measures may be chancy at best. Given limits on resources, decisions will also have to be made as to where to allocate them in relation to an impossibly large number of threats. Efforts to achieve security can become selfdefeating, even if objectively successful, if their effect is to raise awareness of threats to such a pitch that felt insecurity is greater than before the measures were undertaken. The urban householder's efforts to burglar-proof his house can have this effect. As locks, alarms and bars proliferate, their daily presence amplifies the magnitude of the threat by, among other things,

advertising to burglars that he thinks his possessions are valuable, thereby leading to a net loss of tranquility for the fortified householder. Paranoia is the logical, self-defeating extreme of
obsession with security, and there is thus a cruel irony in one meaning of secure which is 'unable to escape.

Page 16 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Realism InevitableHuman Nature Human nature doesnt demand realism, and the alternative can solve. Brian E. Fogarty, Chair and Professor of Sociology at College of St. Catherine, 00 War, Peace, and the Social
Order

This book is based on a third assumption, that humans are not "inherently" anything.

Everything we are, we have made ourselves and whatever we want to be will likewise have to be a human construction. Both war and peace are cultural inventions, and each can lay claim
to equal importance in human affairs. It is a bitter truth that human nature seems to often be characterized by both extremes: peace and violence, cooperation and competition, love and hate. Most striking, much of human behavior consists of both at the same time. To the sociologist these ironies have a familiar ring, for they manifest old dualities: that freedom comes partly through constraint that conflict involved cooperation, that the self is created through others, that "we" are partly defined in terms of "them." This dualistic assumption about human nature leads to two general principles. First, war is to be regarded as a natural social process that can be understood in the same way as other familiar social ills. This means that war itself must be given attention as one of humanity's creations. I believe strongly that the study and advancement of peace, without an understanding of war, is doomed to failure. Those who dismiss war as an incomprehensible aberration, or as the evil work of wicked people, cannot hope to disassemble the machinery that produces it. Second, war and

violence are not inevitable simply because they are natural social processes. The human world is human made, and real peace- with freedom, dignity and justice- can be had if people set themselves the task of learning how to bring it about. It is a sad irony that much of what makes war possible is ignorance of the
possibility of peace.

Page 17 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Realism InevitableIR Structures The warrants to realism inevitable are flawedstates are no longer the primary actors. Roland Bleiker, Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard Popular Dissent, 00 Human Agency
and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press

Questions of agency in international theory should not and cannot be reduced to analyses of state behaviour. This book demonstrates how an instance of transversal dissent may influence global politics at least as much as, say, a diplomatic treatise or a foreign policy decision. At a time when processes of globalisation are unfolding and national boundaries are becoming increasingly porous, states can no longer be viewed as the only consequential actors in world affairs. Various scholars have thus begun to question the prevalent spatial modes of representation and the artificial separation of
levels of analysis that issues from them. They suggest, as mentioned above, that global life is better understood as a series of transversal struggles that increasingly challenge what Richard Ashley called 'the paradigm of sovereign man.' Transversal struggles, Ashley emphasises, are not limited to established spheres of sovereignty. They are neither domestic nor international. They know no final boundaries between inside and out side.18 And they have come to be increasingly recognised as central aspects of global politics. James Rosenau is among several scholars who now acknowledge that it is along the shifting frontiers of transversal struggles, 'and not through the nation state system that people sort and play out the many contradictions at work in the global scene'.19

Realism is a self-fulfilling prophesy that must take into account critical theory or war risks being exacerbated. Freyberg-Inan 04 Annette Freyberg-Inan, Ph.D. of political science, 04 What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International
Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature, State University Press of New York Press, pg. 152-3

The problem of the self-fulfilling prophesy is of course not unique to the realist paradigm of international relations. We have seen that similar criticisms have been raised against other scientific approaches, and that, in principle, any interpretive frame work, if it is influential enough, can become self confirming. However, an exposure of these tendencies as they are exhibited by political realism may be considered particularly important. It is important because of the effects realist policies can have on the lives of human beings. It is clear that realism is enormously influential as a political ideology. It is far from clear that, through lack of proper judgment, it does not serve to inhibit peaceful coexistence and cooperation and increase the risk of violent-conflict among and within nationstates. As long as there is only a slight risk that it might, it is necessary that at least part of the

discipline of international relations theory adopt a critical as opposed to a defensive attitude with respect to its major assumptions. It is equally necessary that the other part listen.

Page 18 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Realism Good/Rejection Bad Realism is the root cause of all war scenarios. Annette Freyberg-Inan, Ph.D. of political science, 04 What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International
Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature, State University Press of New York Press, pg. 152-3
In addition to studying the possible psychological effects of realist motivational assumptions on foreign policy decision making, it is useful to observe the political effects of the operation of the realist paradigm. If the above suspicions are supportable, we should be able to identify particular patterns in international interaction that associated with realist policies. According to Margaret Hermann and Joe Hagan, i44'""

"[T]he view that the world is anarchic ... leads to a focus on threats and security, a sense of distrust, and a perceived need for carefully managing the balance of power. Leaders with this
view must always remain alert to challenges to their states' power and position in the international system."131 John Vasquez has even argued that "the rise to power of militant hardliners who view the world in such realpolitik terms is a crucial prerequisite for war.

Claims about realisms centrality lock the link to the critiqueself-fulfilling prophecy Mark Neocleous , prof. of critique of political economy @ Brunei University, 08 Critique of Security, p. 3-4 This saturation of the political and social landscape with the logic of security has been accompanied by the emergence of an academic industry churning out ideas about how to defend and improve it. Security has been defined8 and redefined.9 It has been re-msioned,1 re-mapped, gendered,12 refused.13
Some have asked whether there is perhaps too much security,14 some have sought its cimlisation,15 and thousands of others have asked about

Much of this redefining, revisioning and remapping and so on, has come about through a more widespread attempt at widening the security agenda so as to include societal, economic and a broad range of other issues such as development or the environment. These moves have sought to forge alternative notion saturations of' democratic' and 'human' security as part of a debate
how to 'balance' it with liberty. about whose security is being studied, the ontological status of insecurities and questions of identity, and through these moves security has come to be treated less as an objective condition and much more as the product of social processes. At the same time, a

developing body of work known as 'critical security studies' has emerged. This range of research - now quite formidable, often impressive and sometimes drawn on in this book - has a double lack. First, for all its talk about discourse, processes and the need for a critical edge, it still offers a relatively impoverished account of the different ways in which security and insecurity are imagined.16
To speak of different' security fields' such as the environment, migration, energy, and so on, often fails to open up the analysis to the ways in which spaces and places, processes and categories, are imagined through the lens of insecurity and in turn appropriated and colonised by the

Given the centrality of the state to the political imagination, to imagine the whole social order through the lens of insecurity is to hand it over to the key entity which is said to be the ground of security, namely the state.17 This is related to the second lack, which is that for all the critical edge employed by the authors in question, the running assumption underpinning the work is that security is still a good thing, still necessary despite how much we interrogate it. The assumption seems to be that while we might engage in a critical interrogation of security, we could never quite be against it. 'Why we might want" security" after all' is how one of the most influential essays in this area ends. IS As Didier Bigo points out, how to maximise security always seems to remain the core issue.19 And so there is a danger that these approaches do not quite manage to shake off the managerialism prevalent in more traditional security studies: the desire to 'do' security better. The common assumption remains that security is the foundation of freedom, democracy and the good society, and that the real question is how to improve the power of the state to 'secure' us.
project of security.

Page 19 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Mearsheimer Mearsheimers theories are simplistic and unfounded. Zachary Shore, Research Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 03 Orbis, Spring
2003, pg. 351

Unfortunately, Mearsheimer's theory is so dogmatic in its prescriptions and so far removed from the real world of international relations that from a practical standpoint, offensive realism seems

heavy on the "ism" and light on the "real." One of the problems with offensive realism, as Mearsheimer concedes, is its inability to consider domestic factors in state behavior. Nor does his theory account for the individuals within states (who act from particular cultural values,
personality traits, psychoses, or biochemical imbalances) or for regime types. To accept Mearsheimer's view, one must believe that democracies, dictatorships, oligarchies, and juntas all act similarly in accordance with certain immutable laws of power politics. In Mearsheimer's world, only the drive to maximize power matters; internal factors are largely irrelevant.

Page 20 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Guzzini Guzzini concedes realism is ineffective and his theorizations regarding its inevitability are flawed Makinda 00 Samuel Makinda, Prof. of IR @ Murdoch, 00 Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 54 Reading and
Writing International Affairs, p. Proquest

Guzzini concludes that realism cannot offer a proper understanding of world politics and that the `unity between diplomatic discourse and the discipline of International Relations, so self-evident in times of Morgenthau, can no longer be upheld' (p. 234). He believes that attempts
`to save realism as the discipline's identity defining theory' have failed because currently there is no work that provides a meta-theoretically coherent realism (p. 235). Guzzini therefore posits that realist scholars face a fundamental dilemma. They can update the practical knowledge of a diplomatic culture, rather than
science, and thereby risk losing scientific credibility. Alternatively, they can cast realist rules and culture into a scientific mould, but this will continue to distort the realist tradition. Guzzini argues that despite its crises, realism cannot be ignored because it is `part of the collective memory and selfdefinition of international actors, academics [and] politicians alike, which order thought, suggest analogies, and empower attitudes to political action' (p. 227). He concludes that `despite realism's several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action' (p. 235). Guzzini

presents a powerful argument, but his analysis raises several questions. First, in the light of the debates unearthed by Schmidt, part of Guzzini's argument looks like a distortion of IR history. Guzzini claims that IR in the US dates back to the 1940s. However, there is evidence that the discipline emerged long before the US became a superpower. Second, Guzzini has placed too much emphasis on a symbiotic relationship between the American foreign policy establishment and the evolution of the discipline. Even Morgenthau, the so-called founding father
of IR, was opposed to the US involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. While the external world cannot be ignored in a serious analysis of the evolution of IR, its effects on the core concepts have been more limited than Guzzini would like to suggest. Third, I believe Guzzini has over-emphasised the identification of the entire discipline with realism. Guzzini's attempt to identify realism with IR has made it difficult for him to consider, for example, the works of theorists like Michael Doyle (1986) and James Lee Ray (1995), on the `democratic peace' thesis. By reducing all IR developments in the US to the evolution of realism, Guzzini has denied himself a chance to understand the rich tradition of liberal thought in American IR. Fourth, I find Guzzini's discussion of the `inter-paradigm' debate a little problematic (cf. Waver 1996; Banks 1985). Guzzini makes very interesting points in relation to the 'banalisation' of Thomas Kuhn's concept of paradigm. However, his definition of realism is so wide that it captures virtually everyone, including those who believed they were
offering alternatives to realism. For example, major contributors to the `inter-paradigm' debates included Keohane and Nye (1977), whose book, Power and Interdependence made a major breakthrough in IR theory by articulating the concept of `complex interdependence'. Guzzini argues that `their theory did not imply a departure from all realist thought, but a broadening of the International Relations agenda' (p. 112). While Guzzini's reading of Nye and Keohane is accurate, it is not the only proper reading of this book. The assumption that everyone who defends the role of the state in global politics is a realist can be misleading. Such an assumption would turn several critical and liberal theorists into realists! Another weakness in Guzzini's taxonomy comes out when he analyses the implications of The Logic of Anarchy (Buzan et al. 1993). Like several other scholars, Guzzini regards this book as a major effort `to rescue the rich realist tradition out of neorealism ... a realist response to the crisis of both realism and neorealism' (p. 217). However, after delving into Jones's contribution, he remarks: `This is a neat description of main research programmes inspired by post-structuralism or constructivism ... It is less obvious, however, how this can fit realism' (p. 223). This underlines the indeterminacy of many labels in IR, including realism. One way of dealing effectively with this situation is to go for principled or self-conscious eclecticism.

Page 21 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Anarchy Claims of anarchy are just a misfounded security tactic used to keep sovereignty intact. David Campbell, Professor of International Politics at Univ. of Newcastle, 98 Writing Security: US Foreign Policy and the Politics of
Identity. Pg 64-66

The paradigm of sovereignty operates on the basis of a simple dichotomy: sovereign versus anarchy. Although these terms have special significance within the discourse of international relations a significance that depends on their effectiveness elsewhere sovereignty and anarchy are replicable concepts that are pivotal for the construction of various mutually reinforcing dichotomies, such as subject/object, inside/outside, self/other, rational/irrational, true/false, order/disorder, and so on. In each instance the former is the higher, regulative ideal to which the latter is derivative and inferior, and a source of danger to the formers existence.
In each instance, sovereignty (or its equivalent) signifies a center of decision making presiding over a self that is to be valued and demarcated from an external domain that cannot or will not be assimilated to the identity of the sovereign domain. This practice is at work in most if not all realms of contemporary life. In the discourses of politics, its operation can be witnessed when, confronting ambiguities and indeterminate circumstances, those discourses are disposed to recur to the ideal of a sovereign presence, whether it be an individual actor, a group, a class, or a political community. They are disposed to invoke one or other sovereign presence as an originary voice, a foundational source of truth or meaning. Most important, it is only those discourses of politics that replicate this heroic practice that are taken seriously as possible sources of truth and meaning. Alternative discourses that are less certain if not totally skeptical of foundations are themselves made objects of this heroic

If alternative discourses cannot be assimilated to some sovereign presence, they often find (as in the case of poststructuralism itself) that they are designed as anarchical and hence are themselves problems to be solved.
practice.

Page 22 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: We Have Experts Appeals to experts are misfoundedtheyre less accurate than monkeys throwing darts. Louis Menand, Professor of English and American Literature and Language at Harvard University, 05
Everybodys an Expert: Putting Predictions to the Test, http://www.newyorker.com/printables/critics/051205crbo_ books1

It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlocks new book, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton; $35), that people who make prediction their business people who appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtablesare no better than the rest of us. When theyre
wrong, theyre rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an experts predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad judgments over good ones. Expert Political Judgment is not a

Tetlock is a psychologisthe teaches at Berkeleyand his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends, and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a
work of media criticism. nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a three possible futures form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomesif they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human

beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who
would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices. Tetlock also found that specialists are not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing

a lot can actually make a person less reliable. We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for
knowledge disconcertingly quickly, he reports. In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journalsdistinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so onare any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York Times in reading emerging situations. And the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts. Experts in demand, Tetlock says, were more overconfident than their colleagues who eked out existences far from the limelight. People who are not experts in the psychology of expertise are likely (I predict) to find Tetlocks results a surprise and a matter for concern. For psychologists, though, nothing could be less surprising. Expert Political Judgment is just one of more than a hundred studies that have pitted experts against statistical or actuarial formulas, and in almost all of those studies the people either do no better than the formulas or do worse.

Page 23 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Transition Presumption lies against the status quodisorders better than the unjust order of International Relations Roland Bleiker, Professor of IR @ Queensland University, 05 International Society and Its Critics Ed. Bellamy,
p. 186-187 In view of the long modern compulsion of ordering it is hardly surprising that order is seen by and large as unproblematic and positive. One can say exactly the same { about order as Chris Brown (1995a: 90) said

about the notion of an international community: it is always used in a positive way, never pejoratively, as if order itself would make the world a better place. It is thus also not surprising
that English School} scholarship treats order not only as an analytical category, but also as a normative goal. Bull (1977: 96, p. xii) is among the few scholars who recognized the problematic' dimensions of this double assumption. While introducing his study as a detached, scholarly analysis of order as an empirical phenomenon in world politics, rather than. a presentation of order as a 'value, goal, or objective: he acknowledged that the two are difficult to separate: I have sought to avoid giving a 'persuasive definition' of the term 'order' that would prejudge the question of the value of order as a human goal. On the other hand, I do in fact hold that order is desirable, or valuable in human affairs. and a fortiori in world politics. Few would question that

order is desirable and essential. Without order there can be no rule of law, no protection of human rights, no civilized life in general. But order does not necessarily equate with the good life. The recently proliferating antiglobalization movement, for instance, has drawn attention to the
undersides of the current neoliberal world order. The merits of this body of knowledge and activism can be debated, but it is far more difficult to dispute that many if not most injustices in life, from domestic

abuse to torture, are not the product of disorder, but of unjust orders. The horror of Nazi Germany, or of any authoritarian state, does not stem from absence of order, but from an obsession with order. Indeed, no society is more ordered than present-day North Korea:
absolutely everything is regulated and controlled by an omnipresent and paranoid state apparatus. Few commentators would present this form of order as desirable. And yet, order remains an overwhelmingly positive and unproblematized category in scholarship about international society.

Page 24 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Discourse Not Key The political discourse of security is used to create the identity of whom we need to secure or secure against Maria Stern, Research Fellow and Lecturer in the Dept. of Peace and Development Research, Goteborg University and the Swedish Institute of International Affair, 06, We the Subject: The Power and Failure of (In)Security,
Security Dialogue. http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/37/2/187

As a critique of the logic of the foundational myths of modern sovereignty, security instead can be understood as a discursive practice, which cannot be separated from the processes of identity formation and even the constitution of subjectivity (see, for example, Campbell, 1992; Dillon, 199091, 1996; Weldes, 1999). Furthermore, modern political thought posits insecurity as an inevitable supplement to security (Dillon, 1996: 127). Following Edkins explanation
of the logic of the supplement, security can only exist in rela- tion to insecurity (Edkins, 1999: 70). Moreover, insecurity haunts any notion of security or act of securing, making it both necessary and impossible (Edkins, 1999: 70; Behnke, 2000, 2004; Sylvester, 1994). The logic of conceal- ment of the impossible promise of security appears in part as follows: in

order for the subject of security to be securable, it must be circumscribed, contained, nameable, with contours dividing the included from the excluded and borders marking that which is to be made secure from the dangerous Others (Campbell, 1992; Jackson, 2005; Schmitt, [1932] 1996). The politics of identity inhere in this logic: in order for the subject of secu- rity to be secured, it must be named, represented, given an identity (McSweeney, 1999; Williams, 2003: 519). Read in this way, identity offers the vector for the forming of the subject so that it can be secured (Weldes, 1999: 103105). Identity, as construction or process, can be seen as an attempt to pin down, capture, name, represent the subject, offering an image (Mendieta, 2003: 408), a name (Hall, 1990: 225) of a self in language, a horizon from which to take a stand (Taylor, 1989: 27). Importantly, identities can be seen as the temporary attachment to the subject positions called forth to represent the subject, which, as we will see below, is ultimately unrepresentable (Hall, 1996: 56; Edkins, 1999: 32;
2004: 12).

Page 25 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 LinkHegemony Their strive for hegemony over all outside threats reinforces boundaries and is a dangerous form of security discourse. J. Ann Tickner, Professor of Policy at Holy Cross University, 95 IR Theory Today When national security is defined negatively, as protection against outside military threats, the sense of threat is reinforced by the doctrine of state sovereignty, which strengthens the boundary between a secure community and a dangerous external environment. For this reason,
many critics of realism claim that, if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed. While E. H. Carr argued for he retention of the nation-state to satisfy people's need for identity, those who are criticalf state-centric analysis point to the dangers of a political identity constructed out of xclusionary practices. In the present international system,

security is tied to a nationalist political identity which depends on the construction of those outsides as 'other' and therefore dangerous. (Walker 1990) David Campbell suggests that security the
boundaries of this statist identity demands the construction of 'danger' on the outside: Thus, threats to security in conventional thinking are all in the external realm. Campbell claims that the

state requires this discourse of danger to

secure its identity and legitimation which depend on the promise of security for its citizens. Citizenship becomes
synonymous with loyalty and the elimination of all that is foreign. Underscoring this distinction between citizens and people reinforced by these boundary distinctions, Walker argues that not until people, rather than any citizens, are the primary subjects of security can a truly comprehensive security be achieved.

Destruction of US hegemony may be critical to solving its securitizing discourse The US is only an imperial power as long as it is propped up by Allies
Luiza Bialasiewicz, et al, of the Department of Geography at Royal Holloway University of London,, May 2007
(David Campbell, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, and Alison J. Williams of the International Boundaries Research Unit in the Geography Department at Durham University, and Alex Jeffrey of the School of Geography and Politics and Sociology at the University of Newcastle-uponTyne, Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy, Political Geography, Volume 26, Issue 4.)

These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal representative democracy and market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an American-centric world. The place of US allies in these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its reflection and reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe's Old and New a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 DPG the dissent of (even some) Europeans is a problem for the US in its world-making endeavours (see Bialasiewicz & Minca, 2005). It is not surprising, then, that following his re-election, George W. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a bridge-building tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but the great alliance of freedom that unites the United States and Europe (Bush, 2005). For although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the new global scenario, its right and the right of its moral-political mission of spreading freedom and justice relies on its amplification and support by allies. The construction of the United States' world role relies also on the selective placement and representation of other international actors who are hailed into specific subject positions (see Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, & Duvall, 1999). Of course, different actors are granted different roles and different degrees of agency in the global script: the place of key European allies is different from that bestowed upon the peripheral and semiperipheral states that make part of the coalition of the willing. Both, however, are vital in sustaining the representation of the US as the leader of a shared world of values and ideals. Indeed, the lone superpower has little influence in the absence of support.

Page 26 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 LinkTerrorism The discourse of terroristic violence leads to a state of exceptionalism that reproduces that violence. Joseba Zulaika, Professor at the Center for Basque Studies, 03 Radical History Review, Issue 85, Winter A war against terrorism, then, mirrors the state of exception characteristic of insurgent violence, and in so doing it reproduces it ad infinitum. The question remains: What politics might be involved in this
state of alert as normal state? Would this possible scenario of competing (and mutually constituting) terror signify the end of politics as we know it?27 It

is either politics or once again the self-fulfilling prophecy of fundamentalist crusaders who will never be able to entirely eradicate evil from the world. Our choice cannot be between Bush and bin
Laden, nor is our struggle one of us versus them. Such a split leads us into the ethical catastrophe of not feeling full solidarity with the victims of either sidesince the value of each life is absolute, the only appropriate stance is the unconditional solidarity with ALL victims.

must question our own involvement with the phantasmatic reality of terrorism discourse, for now even the USA and its citizens can be regulated by terrorist discourse. . . . Now the North American territory has become
28We the most global and central place in the new history that terrorist ideology inaugurates.29 Resisting the temptation of innocence regarding the barbarian other implies an awareness of a point Hegel made and that applies to the contemporary and increasingly globalized world more than ever: evil, he claims, resides also in the innocent gaze itself, perceiving as it does evil all around itself. Derrida equally holds this position. In reference to the events of September 11, he said: My unconditional compassion, addressed to the victims of September 11, does not prevent me from saying it loudly: with regard to this crime, I do not believe that anyone is politically guiltless.30 In brief, we are all included in the picture, and these

tragic events must make us problematize our own innocence while questioning our own political and libidinal investment in the global terrorism discourse. By viewing terrorists as virtual rouge states, the aff is able to use this identity as a scapegoat for securitization policies Federica Ferrari, Holder of a PhD in Science of Language and Culture from the University of Modena, and an expert in cognitive linguistics, discourse analysis, and persuasive communication, 2007, Metaphor at work in the analysis of political discourse: investigating a preventive
war persuasion strategy, Discourse & Society, pgs. 605-606

Scrupulous analysis of the causes is replaced by the frantic search for a scapegoat at which to quickly hurl blame. People whose traits conform well to the classic demonization of adversaries depiction are targeted. The first to play the role of prime enemy, before Saddam
Husseins return on the scene, is Osama bin Laden who, together with the Taliban, is placed in the gallery of the anti-western horrors, making the barbarian epithet show its face again. The strategic nature of this combined rhetorical effort is not hard to unravel. Both in the arguments

is aimed at proving global terrorism as the manifestation of a destabilizing political project which has minds and limbs in the Rogue States. But the more clearly the aims of such a plot-like representation are outlined, the stronger the doubts and discomfort that emerge with relation to international terrorism, which may be real or just a propagandistic product to sustain a certain political design (Tarchi, 2002). If the strategic purposes of a certain kind of rhetoric are evident, the
meant for effect with regards to the Talibans responsibility, and in more complex theories, it persuasive intent with respect to the political action becomes clear, in light of the subsequent political decisions (i.e. the war in Afghanistan, the

What is being enacted is a subtle but effective game of defense against possible dissent with respect to plans preventively inserted in governmental agenda. It is not our intention
war in Iraq). to interpret in detail the events of 9/11, or to comment on the potential government laissez-passer or interference hypothesis (Moore, 2004). Our focus is rather on the problem of the forms of persuasion which rhetorically contributed to political success. In this sense, the

gravity of the consequences of the subsequent American international policy (i.e. preventive war) poses the basis for the urgency of a serious analysis of the discourse on which it has been founded and justified.

Page 27 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 LinkChina Constructing China as a threat is not based upon objective factors but upon Americas selfimagethis construction risks war. Pan 04 Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, 04 Australian
National University, The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics, Alternatives I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily,

from a discursive construction of otherness. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these
frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the postCold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996 missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that " a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."93

Page 28 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 LinkEnvironment Securitizing the environment shifts the environment to the realm of the militaristic state making solvency impossible.
Waever 95
Ole Waever, Senior Researcher at the Center for Peace and Conflict Research, 95 On Security, p. 63-64 . In light of my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of our everyday sense of

the word but, rather, a specific field with traditions, the jump to environmental security becomes much larger than might appear at first to be the case. I do not present this as an argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even explaining the debate over it. Second in his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that the concept of "security" tends to imply that defense from the problem is to be provided by the state: The most serious consequence of thinking of global change and other environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of centralized governmental responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations that are appropriate for security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems. When one is reacting to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, when responding to

environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical. Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of
addressing environmental problems, particularly those that have a global character.44 Moss goes on to warn
that "the

instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding effectively to global environmental problems."45 It might, he points out, even lead to militarization of environmental problems .46 A third warning, not unrelated to the
previous two, is the tendency for the concept of security to produce thinking in terms of us-them, which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan Deudney writes that "the 'nation' is not an empty vessel or blank slate waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to war and 'us vs. them' thinking ( . . . ) Of course, taking the war and 'us vs. them' thinking out of nationalism is a noble goal. But this may be like taking sex out of 'rock and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one remembers that 'rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for sex."47 The tendency toward

"us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental problems." Finally, there is the more political warning that the
concept of security is basically defensive in nature, a status quo concept defending that which is, even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a paradoxical way, this politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by some that the concept of environmental security could become a

dangerous tool of the "totalitarian left," which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental
collectivism." Certainly, there is some risk that the logic of ecology, with its religious potentials and

references to holistic categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily lend itself to totalitarian projects, where also the science of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in the name of the environment.50

Page 29 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 LinkWar Conceiving of war as a major power event papers over the systemic violence of the everyday Chris Cuemo, assistant philoisophy prof. @ Cincy, 96 War is not Just An event, p. 30 Philosophical attention to war has typically appeared in the form of justifi-cations for entering into war, and over appropriate activities within war. The spatial metaphors used to refer to war as a separate, bounded sphere indicate assumptions that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life, or a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. Not surprisingly, most discussions of the political and ethical dimensions of war
discuss war solely as an eventan occurrence, or collection of occurrences, having clear beginnings and endings that are typi-cally marked by formal, institutional declarations. As happenings, wars and military activities can be seen as motivated by identifiable, if complex, inten-tions, and directly enacted by individual and collective decision-makers and agents of states. But

many of the questions about war that are of interest to feminists including how large-scale, state-sponsored violence affects women and members of other oppressed groups; how military violence shapes gen-dered, raced, and nationalistic political realities and moral imaginations; what such violence consists of and why it persists; how it is related to other oppressive and violent institutions and hegemoniescannot be adequately pursued by focusing on events. These issues are not merely a matter of good or bad intentions and identifiable decisions. The matrix of war and violence is used as a means of political discourse Vivienne Jabri, Department of War Studies, Kings College, 06, War, Security and the Liberal State, Security
Dialogue, pgs. 50-51.

Contemporary global politics is dominated by what might be called a matrix of war constituted by a series of transnational practices that variously target states, communities and individuals. These practices involve states as agents, bureaucracies of states and supranational organizations, quasi-official and private organizations recruited in the service of a global machine that is highly militarized and hence led by the United States, but that nevertheless incorporates within its workings various alliances that are always in flux. The crucial element in understanding the matrix of war is the notion of practice, for this captures the idea that any practice is not just situated in a system of enablements and constraints, but is itself constitutive of structural continuities, both discursive and institutional. As Paul Veyne
(1997: 157) writes in relation to Foucaults use of the term, practice is not an agency (like the Freudian id) or a prime mover (like the relation of production), and moreover for Foucault, there is no agency nor any prime mover.

It is in this recursive sense that practices (of violence, exclusion, intimidation, control and so on) become structurated in the routines of institutions as well as lived experience (Jabri, 1996). To label the contemporary global war as a war against terrorism confers upon these practices a certain legitimacy, suggesting that they are geared towards the elimination of a direct threat. While the threat of violence perpetrated by clandestine networks against civilians is all too real and requires state responses, many of these responses
appear to assume a wide remit of operations so wide that anyone interested in the liberties associated with the democratic state, or indeed the rights of individuals and communities, is called upon to unravel the implications of such practices.

Page 30 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 LinkFear US policy decisions are run by fear and security discourse Christopher J. Fettweis, Professor of Security Studies at the Naval War College, April 2010 Threat and
Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2

For the architects of US foreign policy, one belief has remained constant since the Second World War: we are living in dangerous times. In the 1950s, fears of communism caused the United States to raise and maintain an enormous peacetime military for the first time in its history, an action that would have horrified the founding generation. The Cold War ended, but the perception of threat lived on. Today, the Committee on the Present Danger, first established in the 1950s, has re-emerged to
assure America that mortal danger had not gone the way of the Soviet Union. Former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich is typical of many American leaders in his belief that the challenges of the current era are every bit as great as those faced by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, taking it as given that America's present enemies pose a 'mortal threat to our survival as a free country'.11 To

US foreign policymakers, the world is full of enemies and evil, and America must never relax its guard. More than one observer has noted that the United States displays a level of threat perception that is far higher than that of the other great powers.12

Page 31 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 LinkThreat Construction Threat constructions are used to pass normally unpopular decisions. Christopher J. Fettweis, Professor of Security Studies at the Naval War College, April 2010 Threat and
Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2

US leaders have repeatedly decided to raise threat levels to encourage Americans to support otherwise unpopular policy choices. This is not new phenomenon; H.L. Mencken observed that
in order to create support for America's entry into the First World War, Woodrow Wilson and other US liberals realised that 'the only way to make the mob fight was to scare it half to death'.57 More recently, the American public showed little enthusiasm for the first Gulf War until President George H.W. Bush began injecting the threat of Iraqi nuclear weapons into his speeches. Likewise, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Dick Cheney were fond of arguing that a failure to attack Iraq could well result in a nuclear attack on the United States.

When faced with such choices, the American people understandably go along. Manipulation of popular perceptions by individual leaders surely contributes to the national pathology. Stoking such fires not only has effects for the short term, raising support for otherwise unnecessary action, but tends to do long-term damage as well. Once lit, such fires are hard to extinguish. Fear and anxiety persist long after they are useful, and continue to drive decisions. It can prove beyond the power of more rational leaders to control them. President Barack Obama has repeatedly demonstrated an instinct toward restraint and moderation,
but time and again has decided that the political situation requires hyperventilation, or at least that overreaction would not be costly. On

a range of issues, including the Russian incursion into Georgia, the Iranian nuclear programme and the so-called 'Underpants Bomber', Obama's instincts initially produced measured and calm reactions, but each time, criticism from the right, and comparisons with the perceived weaknesses of the Jimmy Carter administration, convinced him to change his reaction and become much more belligerent. Only in a deeply pathological society is reason a synonym for weakness.

Page 32 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 LinkMilitary Military security is about strengthening US economic stangle hold on the world the US only seeks to absorb other nations
Luiza Bialasiewicz, et al, of the Department of Geography at Royal Holloway University of London,, May 2007
(David Campbell, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, and Alison J. Williams of the International Boundaries Research Unit in the Geography Department at Durham University, and Alex Jeffrey of the School of Geography and Politics and Sociology at the University of Newcastle-uponTyne, Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy, Political Geography, Volume 26, Issue 4.)

In the latest incarnations of these understandings both in Barnett's new Blueprint for Action and within the pages of the 2006 National Security Strategy we find a re-playing of the basic chain of claims being made. Countries

integrated into the global economy playing by American rules are less dangerous than those that do not; US security therefore depends on integrating those countries into that rule set; US policy should be directed towards that goal. This, it is claimed, has benefits beyond merely military security and forms the foundation of economic security. Indeed, the first is often mobilized as the rationale
when the second is more clearly the aim. Seemingly unconsciously, the 2006 National Security Strategy proclaims this as a key goal: Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade (The White House, 2006: 1, 25). That the strategies in practice have often produced a process of disintegration, of

a falling apart and a rending of connections previously made is beside the point in the pure idealism of this new realism. While Bush claims that like the policies of Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan, our approach
is idealistic about our national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them (Bush, 2006; see National Security Strategy, 2006: 49), it may well be that it is unrealistic about the first precisely because it is idealistic about the second. Yet, as much as this emergent imaginative geography is new and specific to its time and

place, so too does it recall a much earlier formulation, as we would expect of a performative geopolitics produced by recitation, reiteration and resignification. When the Spanish conquistadores
landed in the New World they were tasked with reading out The Requirement each time they encountered indigenous people. Although based on the ideal belief that the Amerindians were people descended from God like the Spanish, this proclamation nonetheless threatened war, forcible conversion and enslavement against the indigenous should they decide against the Holy Catholic Faith once they had been informed of it. Voluntary integration and violent exclusion were thus two modes of the same disposition towards the other, lodged within the same hierarchy of identity/difference (Campbell, 1992: 112118). Nearly five centuries on, the challenge remains very much the same can the security performances of the major power of the day relate to others in ways less violent and more ethical?

Page 33 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 Internal Links Policymakers fuel imperialist strategies by constructing threats Christopher J. Fettweis, Professor of Security Studies at the Naval War College, April 2010 Threat and
Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 Logic might suggest that power and

security ought to be directly, not inversely, related. As state power grows, so too should security; after all, the stronger the state, the less likely is successful conquest from abroad. Presumably, potential challengers should be emboldened by weakness and deterred by strength. Why, then, do strong states often seem to worry more, often about seemingly trivial matters? The tendency for insecurity to expand with power is not merely paradoxical, it is pathological, an irrational aspect of 7 beliefs that drive destructive, or at least counterproductive, state behaviour. The United States
suffers from several. The credibility imperative is a clear example, one that continues to have a particularly strong influence upon the United

Credibility, when used in policy debates, is a code word for the prestige and reputation of a state; it is, in Henry Kissinger's words, 'the coin with which we conduct our foreign policy', an intangible asset that helps states influence the actions of others.8 In periods of high credibility, policymakers
States.7 believe, a state can deter and compel behaviour and accomplish goals short of war. When credibility is low, sceptical adversaries and allies may

healthy credibility seems to be the equivalent of many armed divisions, and is worth protecting at almost any cost. This belief rests on a shaky foundation, to put it mildly. Decades of scholarship have been unable to produce much evidence that high credibility helps a
be tempted to ignore threats and promises. To national leaders, therefore, state achieve its goals, or that low credibility makes rivals or allies act any differently.9 Although study after study has refuted the basic

the pathology continues to affect policymaking in the new century, inspiring new instances of irrational, unnecessary action. The imperative, like many foreign-policy pathologies, typically inspires belligerence in those under its spell.10 Credibility is always maintained through action, usually military action, no matter how small the issue or large the odds. Insecurity, likewise, whether real or imagined, leads to expansive, internationalist, interventionist grand strategies. The more danger a state perceives, the greater its willingness to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. The 'preventive' war in Iraq is the most obvious consequence of the inflated US perception of threat, but is hardly the only one. America's insecurity pathology is in need of diagnosis and cure, lest Iraq be not a singular debacle but a
assumptions of the credibility imperative,

harbinger of other disasters to come.

Page 34 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 Security constructions create the illusion of us versus them and justifies the killing of the Other. Maria Stern, Research Fellow and Lecturer in the Dept. of Peace and Development Research, Goteborg University and the Swedish Institute of International Affair, 06, We the Subject: The Power and Failure of (In)Security, Security Dialogue.
http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/37/2/187

Attempts to secure a notion of who we are invite violence when these notions are not shared by members of the community in question, when who we are must be forcibly instilled through disciplinary tactics, when who we are also depends on belligerently defining and even killing who we are not. As an integral part of promising safety, the logic of security seems to spin intricate webs of abiding violence and harm webs that are sticky and resilient, ensnaring both peoples bodies and their political imagination (see, for example, Campbell, 1992; Dillon, 1996; Jackson, 2004; Roe, 2004). This paradox, familiar to many, has taken on new urgency as we seek to grapple with the changing terrain of security in a world plagued by globalized terrorism, as well as competing, and conflicting, identity claims. The paradox of (in)security as it is framed here therefore continues to warrant further reflection.

Page 35 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 Alternative Solvency The alt crates a rational foundation for the future policy makers and policy commentators in debate. Christopher J. Fettweis, Professor of Security Studies at the Naval War College, April 2010 Threat and
Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2
Strategic performance can be improved if pathologies are recognised and eliminated . Better

policy would result from a dispassionate, rational analysis of material costs and benefits of proposed action. In
other words, although states do not always act rationally, they would usually be better off if they did . Of course, this sometimes
involves the oversimplification of reality, because such calculations are not normally possible in the real world where neither costs nor benefits are knowable a priori. If they were - if rationality were not bounded - foreign-policy decisions would be easy to make. And any discussion of

No equation can tell a policymaker precisely how many lives are worth sacrificing in pursuit of a particular national interest. Nonetheless, states can take steps toward maximising the chance for rationality in their choices. One obvious way is to recognise the irrational motivators for behaviour, and work to eliminate those impulses that tend to have a high probability of producing low-quality results. Good foreign policy cannot be built upon an irrational foundation. Indeed, rationality in decision-making should be thought of as a minimum requirement for sagacious leaders,
rationality necessarily implies assumptions about values, since rarely are costs and benefits neatly comparable.

for their own good and for that of the international system as a whole.

Rejection on an individual level spurs social change through opening up space for resistance. Anthony Burke, Fellow in International Studies at Queensland, 02 Alternatives, p. 27
It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a

sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available--and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired-which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. (60) This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's
challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are. (61 ) Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We

can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual
strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of

We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries.... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible."
rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness."

Page 36 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 Security Framework Shell Interpretation: discourse should be evaluated before hypothetical policy scenarios and the negative should be allowed an individually-based alternative. Evaluating policy in a vacuum is impossibleit is inextricably linked to the discourse that creates it. Roxanne Lynn Doty, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University, 96 Imperial Encounters,
p. 5-6

This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are

inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth." The goal of analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been
obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and, identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. As Said (1979: 21) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such

an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is
certainly "real," though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is in itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada" to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion," a "show of force," a "training exercise," a "rescue," and so on. What is

"really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and
nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objectivethat a critical genealogy calls into question. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms the material and' performative character of discourse. 'In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices I am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a "reality" whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the first world. Focusing

on discursive practices enables one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

Page 37 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A state-centric approach makes education impossible and excludes alternative stories rationalizing violence. Roland Bleiker, Visiting Research Professor with Teaching Affiliations at Harvard, Popular Dissent, 00 Human
Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press To expand the scope of international theory and to bring transversal struggles into focus is not to declare the state obsolete. States remain central actors in international politics and they have to be recognised and theorised as such. In fact, my analysis will examine various ways in which states and the boundaries between them have mediated the formation, functioning and impact of dissent. However, my reading of dissent and agency makes the state neither its main focus nor its starting point. There are compelling reasons for such a strategy, and they go beyond a mere recognition that a

state-centric approach to international theory engenders a form of representation that privileges the authority of the state and thus precludes an adequate understanding of the radical transformations that are currently unfolding in global life. Michael Shapiro is among an
increasing number of theorists who convincingly portray the state not only as an institution, but also, and primarily, as a set of 'stories' of which the state-centric approach to international theory is a perfect example. It is part of a legitimisation process that highlights, promotes and naturalises certain political practices and the territorial context within which they take place. Taken together, these stories provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity. They create boundaries between an inside and an outside, between a people and its others. Shapiro stresses that such state-stories also

exclude, for they seek 'to repress or delegitimise other stories and the practices of identity and space they reflect.' And it is these processes of exclusion that impose a certain political order and provide the state with a legitimate rationale for violent encounters.22 The policy framework prevents us from opening space for challenging the internalization of the states logicthe impact is fascism and immense suffering. Mark Seem, Writing for Deleuze and Guattari, Philosopher and Psychanalyst, 83 Intro to Anti-Oedipus, xvii Oedipus is the figurehead of imperialism, "colonization pursued by other means, it is the interior colony, and we shall see that even here at home ... it is our intimate colonial education." This internalization of man by man, this "oedipalization," creates a new meaning for suffering, internal suffering, and a new tone for life: the depressive tone. Now depression does not
just come about one fine day, Anti-Oedipus goes on, nor does Oedipus appear one day in the Family and feel secure in remaining there. Depression and Oedipus are agencies of the State, agencies of paranoia, agencies of power, long before being delegated to the family. Oedipus is the figure of power as such, just as neurosis is the result of power on individuals. Oedipus is everywhere. For antioedipalists the ego, like Oedipus, is "part of those things we must dismantle through the united assault of analytical and political forces."4 Oedipus is belief injected into the unconscious, it is what gives us faith as it robs us of power, it is what teaches us to desire our own repression. Everybody has been oedipalized and neuroticized at home, at school, at work. Everybody wants to be a fascist.
[explanation note: Oedipus was a character in some Greek plays. He is famous for murdering his father and raping in mother in one of the plays. In another play, however, Oedipus is a king who goes on a crusade in the name of justice and order, imposing a type of self-regulation on his population, while it is actually his own practices that caused the injustice and disorder. Seem uses Oedipus in the context of accepting the logic of the state and guiding ones practices based upon the good of the state]

Page 38 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Education A focus on the state makes education impossible. Shampa Biswas, Professor of Politics at Whitman College, 07 Empire and Global Public Intellectuals,
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 125-126

In making a case for the exilic orientation, it is the powerful hold of the nation-state upon intellectual thinking that Said most bemoans. 31 The nation-state of course has a particular pride of place in the study of global politics. The state-centricity of International Relations has not just circumscribed the ability of scholars to understand a vast ensemble of globally oriented movements, exchanges and practices not reducible to the state, but also inhibited a critical intellectual orientation to the world outside the national borders within which scholarship is produced. Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon ones intellect certain linguistic boundaries, particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual imagination. 32 Comparing the development of IR in two different national contexts the French and the German ones Gerard Holden has argued that different intellectual influences, different historical resonances of different issues, different domestic exigencies shape the discipline in different contexts. 33 While this is to be expected to an extent, there is good reason to be cautious about how scholarly sympathies are expressed and circumscribed when the reach of ones work (issues covered, people affected) so obviously extends beyond the national context. For scholars of the global, the (often unconscious) hold of the nation-state can be especially pernicious in the ways that it limits the scope and range of the intellectual imagination. Said argues that the hold of the nation is such that even intellectuals progressive on domestic issues become collaborators of empire when it comes to state actions abroad. 34 Specifically, he critiques nationalistically based systems of education and the tendency in much of political commentary to frame analysis in terms of we, us and our - particularly evident in coverage of the war on terrorism - which automatically sets up a series of (often hostile) oppositions to others. He points in this context to the rather common intellectual tendency to be alert to the abuses of others while remaining blind to those of ones own. 35

Page 39 of 39 Lab: Core Stanford National Forensics Institute 2010 A2: Limits Limits repeats past mistakes of disallowing new approaches when the fundamentals have been challengedthis renders debate worthless as an activity. Roland Bleiker, Visiting Research Professor with Teaching Affiliations at Harvard Popular Dissent, 00 Human
Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press

But while the waging of fierce intellectual debates emerged as a key feature of modernity, the range of these debates is not as boundless as it appears at first sight. William Connolly leads us right to the core of this paradoxical issue. He emphasises that modern debates all have a distinctive character. They are all well framed, and the contours of this framing process, Connolly emphasises, have to a large extent been drawn by the recurring unwillingness to deal with the death of God. 33 The refusal to accept the contingency of foundations has been a constant modern theme ever since la Botie and his fellow Renaissance humanists disenchanted the world and placed 'man' at its centre. When the old theocentric world crumbled, when the one and only commonly accepted point of reference vanished, the death of God became the key dilemma around which modern debates were waged. Yet, instead of accepting the absence of stable foundations and dealing with the new burden of responsibility, many prominent modern

approaches embarked upon desperate evasive attempts to find replacements for the fallen God. 34