Facing The 'Counterrevolution'. Romanian Responses To The Hungarian Crisis of 1956

Facing the `counterrevolution`.
Romanian responses to the Hungarian crisis of 1956
Emanuel Copila, Teaching Assistant Politics department, Faculty of Political Science, Philosophy and Communication Studies, West University of Timioara, Abstract For the Soviet Union, the Hungarian revolution from the fall of 1956 represented probably the most important challenge it had to face since the Nazi invasion during the Second World War. The popular democracies were also threatened by it to a great extent; even independent Yugoslavia, a true model for the Magyar insurgents, agreed with Khrushchevs plan of sending Soviet troops to Budapest and forcefully reinstating communism in Hungary. This study focuses on the Romanian reaction towards the event, outlining the actions and the motives which determined the latter rebel of the socialist camp to prove itself, in that turbulent autumn, Moscows most worthy ally. Key words: de-Stalinization, Hungarian revolution, foreign policy, revolutionary vigilance, socialist camp1 Introduction Every communist regime, far from abolishing the conflict between social classes, which it actually gives conflicting dimensions, ends up bringing to the fore a new class. Eclectic, encompassing various social categories (also as classical classes, such as the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, the peasantry, invested by Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries with an inexistent consistency and uniformity in the real world, non-ideological), the new class does not
The documentation for this article was partially facilitated by an AMPOSDRU scholarship, obtained trough the following grant: Investeste n oameni! FONDUL SOCIAL EUROPEAN, Programul Opera; ional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013, proiectul STUDIILE DOCTORALE FACTOR MAJOR DE DEZVOLTARE AL CERCET RILOR SOCIO-UMANE SI UMANISTE. Parts of this study will be used for further research.
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precede the revolution, but is formed as its consequence. In other words, unlike previous revolutions, decisively influenced by a social group or another, in rising, the communist revolution made post-facto the class that legitimizes it and that, at least theoretically, should have put into practice. Here is a substantial invalidation of the Leninist ideological postulate according to which a revolution emerges as a result of the working class efforts, which allies or not, depending on local conditions, with other classes, usually with the revolutionary peasantry. The new class, warns Milovan Djilas, is not to be mistaken for the Communist Party that facilitates its existence. The two sides are in a symbiotic relationship whose polarity gradually changes, moving in a more or less rapid rhythm from the political to the social level. Thus, after the revolution, when the new class begins its existence, it is inferior to the party; as communist promises reveal their unlikelihood, the party falls into obscurity, while the new class prospers. The party makes up the class, but the class grows and uses the party as a basis. The class grows stronger, while the party becomes weaker; this is the inevitable fate of every communist party in power (Djilas: 1957, 40). The roots of the new oligarchy are found mainly in the workers environment. Therefore, the new class will monopolize the proletariat and, through it, the whole society, imposing a monopoly whose main component is the intellectual one. Advantaged by the economic policies specific to communist leaderships, focused on the development of heavy industry, the new class manages from an administrative point of view this process being in a constant expansion (Idem, 37-47). But we can extend the new class beyond thick bureaucracies of Leninist regimes, where Djilas places it; outside of public administration officials, the unquestionable foundation of the new class, it may also include members of the police, elite workers, teachers, or students. In other words, anyone who has something to gain or owes its ascending social position to the communist system. In the autumn of 1956, Hungarians rose against this new class and the party that subtended it. Against the communism imposed by force by the Soviets, a decade earlier. Against ideological, economic, political and cultural oppression to which it was systematically subjected by a despotic and without legitimacy
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autocracy. Against the chains that instead of disappearing, as argued Marx and, later on Lenin, had become increasingly worse. What happened in Hungary as a result of the de-Stalinization process? Andor Horvath suggests that the phrase national democratic insurgence is most appropriate to describe the tumultuous protests of Hungarians in that memorable year. In the strict sense of the word, they were not (...) a revolution, says Horvath, since the objective was the reformation, and not the overthrowing of the regime (Horvath in Jela, Tism neanu: 2006, 120). It is true that the original aspirations of the protesters were rather reformist, but, as the situation escalated, they became downright revolutionary. I think, and will try to argue in this section of the essay, that Hungarians have done in 1956 a genuine revolution, even if it never broke through of under a relentless failure. Ephemeral in length and in political weight, the Hungarian revolution had instead an invaluable symbolic significance. According to the dictionary of sociology edited by Oxford University Press, revolutions are events during which the entire political and social order is reversed, usually by violent means, and rebuilt on new principles, with new leaders (Marshall: 2003, 475 ). Although Imre Nagy was not a new leader, the fact that he declared Hungarys neutrality announcing the UN of its withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organization and, moreover, restored, even if for a short time, a genuine multi-party political system all its actions transcend the logic of changes within the system, outlining the moment of an anti-system movement. In consequence, it can be said that Imre Nagy started as reformer and ended as a revolutionary (Tism neanu: 1999, 86), admittedly because of the pressure of events rather than on his own initiative; however, his personal merits and the revolutionary character of the Hungarian protests cannot be denied (Tism neanu in Jela, Tism neanu : 2006, 146). Of course, Nagy was a convinced communist, and his background includes plenty of black spots, as we are to learn. But the fact that in the twelfth hour he joined the revolution rather than fight it gives him an undeniable prestige. The restoration of the multiparty system in Hungary, although only for a few days, was more radical than in Poland. Here, although they continued to exist until the end of the regime, the non-communist political parties were integrated into a national front designed to give the appearance of political 69
diversity, actually a surrogate of it and a mechanism for the emasculation of those parties. In Hungary, on the other hand, Nagy pursued the democratic cooperation of parties, as they existed in 1945 (my italics) (Meray: 2000, 263; Pop: 2002, 85, Zinner: 1956, 454). Therefore, not in a national front, but in an independent manner, based on relations of mutual equality. What happened in Hungary is thus a revolution, even if a short-lived one and unfortunately born under the sign of failure. The itinerary of a failed revolution Stalins death has resulted in substantial changes in the Hungarian political elite, directly proportional to the crystallization process of the new leadership in Moscow. The Secretary General of the Hungarian Workers Party (MDP), who, as customary during the Stalinist leadership, was also the prime minister, was nicknamed, a defining aspect for his political and ideological orientation, Stalins favorite pupil. Mtys Rkosi had subjected Hungary to an irrational massive program of rapid industrialization, whose economic effects were felt in full at the social level. Consequently, MSZPs popularity and of communism in general were at minimum levels. In June 1953, Rkosi is forced, pressured by the Soviets, to stop leading the government in favor of Imre Nagy. Known as a moderate and reformist communist, who made his apprenticeship in the Comintern, he had been removed in 1948 from his position as Minister of Agriculture, as a consequence of Rkosis direct machinations. This undoubtedly rebound for the MSZPs Secretary Generals political career has not continued, as was likely, by minimizing his role also at the party level. Conversely, highly able and adaptable (incidentally, he knew eight languages), the tireless Rkosi waited for the right time, to which he facilitated its emergence by numerous backstage maneuvering, only to regain in 1955 the presidency of the government. However, one year after this success, as we will see, his political career will end abruptly, just months before the outbreak of protests in Budapest. Rkosi will become one of the victims of the de-Stalinization policy, being undesirable both for the Hungarian society and for the new leadership in Moscow (Brogan: 1990, 122-123; Rainer: 2006, 292-293). Imre Nagy strongly launched towards the implementation of the new economic course. The amounts invested in agriculture, domestic and food 70
industry were increased, while reducing hyper-centralized management of the economy and increasing the importance and decisional weight of local institutions. However, the party apparatus was dissatisfied with the new economic orientation. The former prime minister, after a formal approval of the new course principles and of the collective leadership, began to issue veiled criticism about the increasing number and activities of kulaks (wealthy or very wealthy peasants, responsible in Marxist view for promoting capitalism in villages); another criticism aimed at reducing revolutionary vigilance among the proletariat (Brzezinski: 1971, 215-216). But Nagy was determined to carry out the economic and social reforms. Denouncing the Stalinist monopoly on Marxist-Leninist science, he attributed it with serious theoretical errors, which had repercussions on the global social development and on the fight between the two systems, and finally on the fate of socialism itself. The new process did not represent a deviation from Marxism-Leninism, as it had been accused, but its continuation and development. Highly important, the new course, Nagy claimed, did not propose new strategic tasks for the MDP; these, the shaping of the economic foundations of socialism and building socialism in Hungary, and, in general, the communist world were unchangeable. A step towards building socialism, the new course was still very important and had to be met unconditionally. What did it consist of? In the establishment of ever closer relations in the exchange of goods between towns and the countryside, between socialist industry and the system of small farms producing for the market, easing the transition towards a socialist system of farms producing at a large scale. In Hungary, the implementation prerequisites of the new course were from afar inconsistent; however, its need for the ideological finality of the regime and for earning the peoples confidence in this process was, at least for Nagy, obvious. The basic requirements and specific features of the transition period economic policy (new rate, m. n.) was either non-existent in Hungary, or partially accomplished in part because of our economic policy lacked a scientific basis in Marxist-Leninist analysis, and also because, as a consequence, we simply copied Soviet methods applied to a much larger scale in building socialism, thus eliminating entire development phases. This is why Hungary needed a New Course (in 71
original, m. n.) in building socialism to enable the basic principles and requirements of the transitional period to fully demonstrate their importance, leaving room for specific characteristics and traits originated from actual conditions and, at the same time, ensuring the most effective ways, forms and methods of socialism development. But for the same reason, the New Course cannot simply be abolished or suspended, because such action would deprive the country of the possibility of an effective and rapid way of building socialism, one that would require the smallest possible efforts from the population. (...) The main error was not that we set the New Course for building socialism in Hungary, but, rather, that we have not followed this course fully and consistently (Nagy in Stokes: 1991, 82-87). The route of the new Hungarian course will be stopped in 1955, with replacing Nagy by Andrs Hegeds, a close friend of Rkosis. This would not have been possible without some changes in the leading structure of the Soviet Union itself. Therefore, the Soviet Prime Minister Gheorghi Malenkov, the new course initiator and, consequently, Nagys supporter, was replaced by Nikolai Bulganin, a close friend of CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Unlike Malenkov, Nagy does not self-criticize himself, not recognizing the major economic errors attributed to him by the MDP first secretary, and thus gaining an impressive image capital. However, he will not become a Hungarian Gomu; ka; he will have the chance but, for various reasons, as we will see, he will miss it (Crampton: 2002, 322). Meanwhile, Rkosis exhilaration will be short-lived. Besides being a very unpopular public figure, the political opposition against him grew in a threatening rhythm. The 20th Congress of the CPSU will have a destabilizing effect on the MDP leadership. Popular dissatisfaction, combined with that of intellectuals, grew, undermining more and more Rkosis and the Stalinists position, still in leading positions. The Polish workers revolt consumed in June 1956 in Poznan had been triggered because of conditions existing in full also in the Hungarian society, which was a warning to the Soviet leadership, fueled by the obstinacy with which the MDP First Secretary exhaustively eluded the application of economic and political reliefs, even in a as moderate version as possible. For these reasons, Rkosi will be replaced by Ern Ger (Rainer:
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2006, 293-294). The choice was at least unfortunate, because Ger was also formed at the Comintern school, thus being a convinced Stalinist. Szabad Np, MDPs newspaper, announced on July 19 that, for health reasons, Matyas Rkosi had been suspended, at his request, from the membership of the Political Bureau and the position of First Secretary of the Central Committee. The letter through which he made public his resignation, Stalins favorite pupil said that, reaching the age of 65 years and after two years of suffering from hypertension, his performance as first secretary of the party were deeply affected. Furthermore, he continues, the mistakes I have committed in the personality cult and that of socialist legality burdens the task of leading the Party to focus our Party in the broadest possible manner on tasks that are before us. Self-criticism, however, was not sufficient, because, the new management of the MDP believed, the gaps drawn by the former first secretary on the party and the process of building socialism were very numerous and serious. Thus, Rkosi was forced to make a further statement about his resignation, in which to broadly detail how the endangered the regime and the responsibility incumbent in this regard. Despite its size, Rkosis complex self-criticism is worth to be reproduced in full. In connection with the mistakes I committed in the personality cult line and the violation of socialist legality, I have admitted them at the Central Committee meetings in June 1953, repeating them from then on. I also exercised self-criticism publicly. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU and Comrade Khrushchevs speech, I became clear to me that the weight and effect of these errors were bigger than I thought and the evil done to our party by these mistakes was more serious than I previously thought. These mistakes have aggravated our partys work, have diminished the power and attractiveness of the Party and of the Peoples Democracy, have obstructed the development of Leninist rules of party life, collective leadership, constructive criticism and selfcriticism (sic!), of democracy (sic!) in the party and state life, and of the initiative and creative power of the working class masses.
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Finally, these errors gave the enemy an opportunity to attack overly broad. In their totality, the mistakes I have committed in the most important position of the Party work have caused serious shortcomings in our overall socialist development. It fell into my tasks to hold the lead role in rectifying these mistakes. If rehabilitation has sometimes been slow and with intermittent breaks, if a certain recrudescence was observed last year in the liquidation of the cult of personality, if criticism and self-criticism together with the collective leadership have developed slowly, if sectarian and dogmatic orientations were not controlled strongly enough then, for all these, undoubtedly, the primary responsibility belongs to me, as First Secretary of the Party (Zinner: 1956, 338-342). Further, the MDP wanted to be connected to the de-Stalinization process through three major reforms. The first one was raising the living standards of workers, followed by increasing the productive security of the working peasantry, and, finally, improving the social and cultural circumstances of working people (Idem, 348). Regarding the last point, things will progressively turn to a disturbing twist. Thus, the Petfi circle which, similar to the Fourfold Circle Club in Poland, had extended throughout the country, favored with aplomb Imre Nagy and the reformist measures that he had initiated. Students, dissatisfied intellectuals and workers began to make common cause against the Stalinist elite in the Hungarian leadership (Brzezinski: 1971, 222). Just before the protests in Poznan, the circle members initiated a large-scale protest against Rakosi and Nagys resettlement to power. The MDP First Secretary renounced to arrest Nagy and some hundreds of his important supporters only following direct Soviet pressures (Durschmied: 2003, 380; Fontaine: 1993, 304). Laszlo Rajks rehabilitation in March and a series of amnesties and limited administrative decentralizations failed to develop into an outlet for the societys grievances. Instead, Rajks reburial a Stalinist no better than Rakosi, executed in 1949 after a Stalinist trial that centrally aimed Titos compromise turned into a major public event, bringing together tens of thousands of people (Franois Fejt advances the figure of 300,000 participants) in a silent, but very expressive, protest against the leaders in Budapest (Brzezinski: 1971, 223; Fejt: 1979, 120). 74
Rakosis replacement by Ern Ger had no effect; on the contrary, by substituting a Stalinist with another, the population requirements for authentic political reforms had not been satisfied, but rather mocked at. Moreover, it seemed that the Soviet Union itself was offering its endorsement for the reform of Hungarian communism. Eventually accepting Gomu; ka as leader of the PUWP and Poland, which the Hungarian press considered having a historic importance, Moscow seemed not to be opposed to the deStalinization of popular democracies. Amnesties decreed in the spring of 1956 by Rkosi had an unexpected effect: they had contributed, by the return of many party members abusively imprisoned in previous years, to demoralize the MDP. Last but not least, confusion increasingly pushed through the army, a comprehensive aspect for the easiness with which it took the insurgents side during the revolution. Gradually, officers and military cadets identified themselves with anxious intellectuals, going down to take part in clubs discussions, writes Zbigniew Brzezinski (1971, 225-227). Even intellectuals convinced of the correctness of Marxism, as Gyrgy Lukcs, acknowledged that, for Hungarian citizens, it was more unpopular than ever. Welcoming the 20th Congress of the CPSU, before whom no debate was possible, the Hungarian philosopher advocated for the democratization of the political and intellectual life with the help of constructive polemics. The return to Leninism, he warned still, must be made by Leninist methodology, as Lenin can be transformed as much as Stalin into a citing and dogmatism figure. Unfortunately, Lukcs noted, there are forces ready to impress this direction to the Twentieth Congress (sic!), and it is the duty of every communist his debt to the socialist revolution, his debt in honor of Marxism, which unites us as Marxist philosophers and intellectuals to take a stand against it at the first outset (Lukcs: 1991, 88-93). The Hungarian revolution will, however, exceed the ideology proposed by Lukcs. He will be deported together with Imre Nagy in Romania, because he actively supported him in the tempestuous days during late October and early November. He will return a year later in Hungary, where he will make his self-criticism, remaining loyal to the regime until the end of his life. * 75
Students, intellectuals, workers, party members, military personnel: the social picture was thus complete. In mid-October, in Szeged, an independent student association had been established, which fought for a democratization of social, political, economic and intellectual life, increasingly less compatible with the existence of the Hungarian communist regime. The news of Wadysaw Gomukas confirmation, who symbolized for Poles what Nagy meant for the hopes of reform in Hungary, in the position of PUWPs Prime Secretary arrives in Hungary a day after the date it became official: October 21. Encouraged, the students propose a list of demands and a demonstration march through the streets of Budapest, which will start on October 23 and will be, by the strong support given by workers, the moment of the Hungarian Revolution outbreak (Rainer: 2006, 298-299; Pop: 2002, 77; Korda: 2006, 92). Among the students requirements, fourteen in total, which had now been assumed by the remaining protesters, were: the MDPs leadership renewal, Government reshuffle and inclusion of comrade Imre Nagy among its members, respecting national sovereignty and the principle of not interfering in internal affairs, the Red Armys withdrawal from Hungarian territory, substantial economic restructuring, public trials for Rkosi and his main collaborator, former Defense Minister Mihly Farkas, modifications to the military uniforms and the return to the national emblem from the Kossuth era, Total freedom of opinion and press freedom, removing Stalins statue, the symbol of tyranny and oppression, from Budapest, and, finally, Complete solidarity of Hungarians (Meray: 2000, 43-44). The government will learn about the students plan to take to the streets. Confused, the members of the MDPs Political bureau who has just returned from Yugoslavia, where they tried to convince Tito of the good faith of the new Hungarian leadership, Rkosi being considered by the latter as one of the greatest personal enemies and also one of the East European leaders most hostile to the Yugoslav version of socialism will prohibit the manifestation (Fejt: 1979, 122). In vain. Gathering around the statue of Jozef Bem, the Polish general who played a critical role during the Hungarian revolution of 1848, the demonstrators then headed towards the Parliament square, chanting anti-communist slogans and demanding that Nagy speak to them. Their numbers increase as more and more workers and even soldiers guarding public 76
buildings joined them, reaching approximately 200-250,000. On the way, part of the demonstrators will go to Stalin square to destroy the statue erected in his honor five years earlier, while another part headed to the radio broadcasting building, wanting to disseminate the 14 points on the air to the whole country (Pop: 2002, 78). The conflictogenous potential was fully fueled by Ger himself, in whose name, in that same evening, the Radio Broadcasting will transmit a defiant and offensive release concerning the demonstrators and the objectives that they sought. Here is a relevant passage from the declaration of the MDPs first secretary: The main task of the enemies of our people today is trying to undermine the working class power, weakening the alliance between workers and peasants, undermining the leading role of the working class in our country, and shaking our peoples confidence in its party the Hungarian Workers Party; trying to weaken our countrys close links of friendship, the Hungarian Peoples Republic, with other countries that build socialism, in particular between Hungary and the socialist Soviet Union. They try to weaken our partys relations linking our party with the glorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Lenins Party, the 20th Congress Party. They revile a bunch of slander against the Soviet Union. They assume we trade with the Soviet Union on unequal positions, that our relations with the Soviet Union would not be initiated on an equal footing, and that our independence should be defended not against the imperialists, but against the Soviet Union. All these are brazen lies, hostile propaganda which does not contain on ounce of truth (Zinner: 1956, 403). For the crowds morale, these words were imprudent, if not even unconscious. Next, Ger recognized that some problems had made their place in the relationship between the party and the society, and announced, as soon as possible, a MDP Central Committee plenary session meant to debate them and to find a solution. Until then, however, a particularly vigilance is necessary to prevent hostile elements to obstruct the efforts of our Party, of the working class and working people, and to clarify the situation (sic!). Calling for the unity and cohesiveness of the party (not only for ideological reasons, but probably because of the awareness of its organizational weakness and the 77
danger of disintegration that threaten it), Ger declared himself strongly in favor of socialist democracy, rhetorically warning against the catastrophic eventuality of the restoration of capitalism in Hungary. The party unity was always greatly needed. Without unity, our Party would not have been able to defy the criminal terror of the Horthyst fascism over a quarter-century. Without the unity of our Party and the working class, popular democracy could have prevailed in our country, and the working class allied with the peasantry would not have gained power. This unit, the Party, the working class and working people unity must be guarded as the light of our eyes. Let us encourage our Partys organizations, in a disciplined manner and in full unity, to oppose any attempt to create havoc, nationalistic poisoning, and challenge. Fellow workers! Workers! We must honestly admit that the question now is whether we want a socialist democracy and bourgeois democracy. Do we want to build socialism in our country or to rupture socialism building, and then to open doors for capitalism? Will you allow the working class power, of the worker-peasant alliance, to be undermined, or will you rise with determination, disciplined and in complete unity, with all working people, to defend the workers power and the success of socialism? (Idem, 406 - 407) In those moments of confusion, members of the Hungarian security guarding the building opened fire on the crowd, instigated after the MDP leaders uninspired speech that ended with the disappointing message The Party Unity for Socialist Democracy. Progressively armed by the soldiers who had changed sides, the insurgents responded in the same manner. The Radio building was captured after an uninterrupted siege. The new troops that were supposed to defend it either changes sides or refused to fight for the detested security service members. On the other hand, an issue that facilitated the occupation of the building by the revolutionary was that the power representatives messages began to be sent from elsewhere (Lakihegy locality); therefore, the strategic importance of this objective was greatly diminished, especially because, after the intervention of Soviet tanks, it could be regained at any time and with minimal loss (Meray: 2000, 159-166). The
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Hungarian Revolution had become irreversible (Granville: 2002, 536-537; Korda: 2006, 94-95; Meray: 2000, 111, 145 pop: 2002, 78-79). On the issue of arming revolutionaries, observations made by historian Adrian Pop are interesting. He considers the ease with which protesters gained, in different circumstances, access to firearms suspicious, reaching the conclusion that the KGB, in collaboration with its Hungarian pendant, V, acted on the express orders of Khrushchevs Stalinist opponents, interested in producing a situation of chaos in Hungary to demonstrate the limits and drawbacks of de-Stalinization and compromise, namely of the political neutralization of CPSU First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev (Pop: 2002, 79-80). Such a hypothesis, however attractive and plausible it might seem at first glance, has not so far been validated by credible documentary sources. Consequently, its adoption as one of the premises of escalation of the Hungarian revolution seems to be at least improper. Meanwhile, Nagy, who had just returned from a vacation, fully placed himself under the party power, to which he had been readmitted a few days back (Meray: 2000, 114; Zinner: 1956, 388-389). He will eventually be called at the party headquarters, where Ger, with an evident dissatisfaction, asked him to address the crowd in the Parliament square to temper it and to prevent a violent outcome. Something the former prime minister will not hesitate to do. Emerging from the main balcony of the building that was headquarters of the legislature, Nagy, after finally being recognized and allowed to speak, will start his speech a terminological inertia that thwarted and annoyed the huge rally. Comrades!, he called them, with the unpleasant surprise of being booed intensely. The stirred crowd, sensitized by events, rather tired, still oscillating between fear and hope, expected, no doubt, that he addressed it with Friends or Hungarians, words that would have met the true state of mind (Meray: 2000, 117). After settling clamor, Nagy urged for calm and the peaceful return of demonstrators to their homes. But in vain. His modest display, contrasting greatly with the dynamic speeches, presence of mind and selfmastery that Gomuka had demonstrated in similar circumstances did not convince the crowd. Clashes with security forces continued until morning. The next day, Nagy was reinstated as prime minister. Simultaneously, following the hail that Ger made the previous day, Soviet troops stationed in Hungary 79
initiated the first action against the insurgents. Demonstrating the MDP leaderships inability to correctly assess the seriousness of the situation and the increasing drift of the party itself, Ger will make public, in terms with which we are already accustomed, the Hungarian government request for military assistance from the Soviet troops. Attention! Attention! The condemnable attacks of counterrevolutionary gangs during the night (October 23 to 24, m.n.) have created an extremely serious situation. Bandits penetrated factories and public buildings and killed many civilians, members of national defense forces and fighters of the state security organs. Government bodies have not reconciled with the bloody and condemnable attacks and, accordingly, have requested the aid, under the terms of the Warsaw Pact, of the Soviet formations stationed in Hungary. The Soviet formations, coming to meet the governments requests, are taking part in restoring order. The government appeals the capitals residents to remain calm, to condemn the bloody disorder triggered by counterrevolutionary gangs and to support everywhere the Hungarian and Soviet troops seeking to maintain order. The liquidation of counterrevolutionary gangs is the most sacred cause of all Hungarian honest workers, of the people and of the Motherland. At this point, we are concentrating all our powers in the direction of this task (Zinner: 1956, 409). Trying to limit the magnitude of armed violence and devastation that began to spread throughout the country, Nagy will address during the same day a proclamation to the Hungarian nation, which, besides the call to end armed violence, advocated for the deep democratization of Hungarian public life, for the achievement of a Hungarian way corresponding to our national characteristics in building socialism and, above all, for a radical improvement of living conditions of workers (Idem, 410). One can observe the attention with which the Prime Minister chooses the words by which he addressed the revolutionaries: people of Budapest, or Friends, Hungarians!. The detested comrades almost disappears, being strategically framed by terms with a familiar sounding, non-ideological: Hungarians, comrades, friends! (Idem, 409-411). Also Nagy insists on the national dimension of the message he
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sends, in the less feasible attempt to overcome the destructive chaos that had installed itself on the Hungarian capital streets. Proving, in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, his inability to properly manage the situation, Ger is replaced by Janos Kadar. By then one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the MDP, he is known for his moderate politicalideological orientation. Demonstrating empathy, to a certain extent, towards the demonstrators, Kadar said that The demonstration of a section of the youth that began peacefully and in which most participants had honest goals degenerated in several hours into an armed attack against state power and the Peoples Democracy in accordance with the intentions of the anti-popular and counterrevolutionary elements which have interfered in the mean time (Idem, 415). Consequently, the armed forces response was thus more than justified. The intervention of Soviet troops on October 24 was, strictly in military terms, less effective. Without a fitting support from the infantry, Soviet tanks were relatively easy targets for mainly young demonstrators, armed with grenades and Molotov cocktails. Then, Soviet soldiers were not familiarized with the operations theater, and most maps they had received were at least ten years old, a period within which many street names were changed. It can be argued that the presence of the Red Army on the streets of Budapest had the opposite effect of the one predicted by MDPs leadership: it potentiated the demonstrators strong anti-Russian and anti-Soviet feelings, also provoking new large scale protests (Pop: 2000, 1982-1983). Concerning the Soviet intervention, Nagy showed an ambivalent behavior, even Stalinist at times. He advised, which is understandable, the Hungarian troops not to oppose in any form the Soviet peacekeepers, and did not protest when Ger appealed to leadership in Moscow in this respect. Moreover, on October 25, he even spoke in favor of increasing the number of Soviet effectives that acted in Budapest (Granville: 1995a, 23; Crampton: 2002, 328). The central figure actions of the Hungarian revolution misled many protagonists and, later, researchers of the event, thus giving him qualities he did not possess. We must not forget that, between 1930 and 1944, Nagy was politically active in Moscow. As a member of Cominform, acting under the conspiratorial name of Volodya, he provided information about almost two hundred people, among which Hungarians, Bulgarians, Russians, Poles, 81
Germans or Austrians. Fifteen of them died in prison or before a firing squad. Also, in 1951, when Janos Kadar, in turn, was imprisoned and subjected to extreme torture (his testicles were crushed), Nagy approved in writing the arrest and implicitly the punitive measures to which his party colleague had been subjected to. It is not excluded that Nagy, once he fell into disgrace in 1948, has been shielded from the fate of Rajk, Kostov, or, to a lesser extent, Gomu; ka, due to the protection given by persons belonging Stalins entourage himself (Granville: 1995b, 34-35; Granville: 2002, 544). Thus, once more, if necessary, the inconsistency of the dichotomies native communists or patriots, moderate and reforms oriented, and Moscow communists, foreigners and responsible for the use of Stalinist methods is demonstrated. Another important figure of the Hungarian revolution, this time less known, is that of Colonel Pl Malter. In the last days of October, after being instructed by Kadar to suppress counterrevolutionary actions, he changes sides to the insurgents, putting into practice an organized and, as much as possible, coordinated defense against Soviet troops. With five tanks, but having the advantage of knowing the arms deposits both of the army and of the security forces, the colonel has made a major contribution, if not to an impossible win against the Soviets, who temporarily withdrew the troops at the end of the month, then at least to the euphoric mood of those memorable days. In him, writes Erik Durschmied, the movement found its military leader. But soon the situation will take a dramatic turn. After the restoration of the multiparty and declaring Hungarys neutrality, a delegation led by Malter met with Soviet representatives to negotiate a new form of relations between the two sides. Not suspecting the trap that had been set for them, all delegation members were arrested. Until the summer of 1958, nobody heard anything about its leader, when his execution was briefly announced, together with that of Imre Nagy (Durschmied: 2003, 376-440; Fontaine: 1993, 321-322; Korda: 2006, 156; Andrew, Gordievski: 1994, 301). On the streets of Budapest the fighting continued despite permanent appeals from the authorities to restore peace and the resumption of daily activities, without which the city was literally paralyzed. However, not all inhabitants of the Hungarian capital were taking part in the hostilities. There were endless lines in front of bakeries, and being part of such a group required no less courage than when engaging in combat activities. The risks of those who 82
waited to buy bread to turn into collateral casualties were very high. In such cases, which were not rare at all, the victim was simply moved elsewhere. No one risked to losing their place and returning home without bread (Mironov: 2006, 471-509). Here is a type of heroism that is not observed at all in literature centered on the Hungarian Revolution that of Budapest housewives who, unlike combatants, were directly exposed to shooting, but who, without looking for cover, had as a priority the supplying of their families (Fontaine: 1993, 325). Meanwhile, Nagys attitude is increasingly converging with revolutionary demands. Across the country, in cities like Gyr or Debrecen, workers organize their own councils, called ironically anti-Soviet Soviets, making regional committees through which they demanded free elections, the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the neutrality of Hungary and the released from prison of Cardinal Jzsef Mindszenty, a symbol of Hungarian anticommunism, imprisoned in 1949 (Crampton: 2002, 328). More under the pressure of events than on his own initiative, Nagy will gradually put into practice these measures. He began by affirming, in October 25, when street fight amplified, the withdrawal of the Red Army from Hungary, an event that will be consumed, only in appearance, a few days later. As President of the Council of Ministers, I am announcing that the Hungarian Government will initiate negotiations concerning the relations between the Peoples Republic of Hungary and the Soviet Union, among others concerning the withdrawal of Soviet forces stationed in Hungary, under the Hungarian-Soviet friendship, the proletarian internationalism, equality between Communist parties and socialist states, and national independence. I am convinced that the Hungarian-Soviet relations built on these foundations will provide a solid basis for a true and sincere friendship between our peoples, for our national progress and our socialist future. Recalling the Soviet troops whose intervention in fighting was made necessary by the vital interests of our socialist order will be made immediately after the restoration of peace and order. The government will show a deep generosity in the spirit of reconciliation and understanding and will not impose martial law against those who resorted to arms without the intention to overthrow 83
our peoples democratic regime and against those who cease fighting immediately and will hand over the weapons. This applies to all, all young people, workers, and armed forces personnel. (Zinner: 1956, 417-418). After two days, Nagy will form a new government (Peoples Patriotic Front) to continue implementation of reforms and restore control of the situation (Crampton: 2002, 328). But street fighting still went on, as the polarization of what could inappropriately in that context be called the Hungarian political elite. Some wanted to moderately continue the reforms, accepting that the revolution had a legitimate basis, while others cataloged the insurrection as counterrevolutionary calling for its defeat by any means possible. Trying not to further inflame the atmosphere, the Szabad Np newspaper, which was suspended briefly, but had resumed its appearance, recognized the justified grievances of the population, which in October 23 manifested for the implementation of fair, national and democratic reforms. However, it warned against bad elements who took part in the demonstration at the first outset. They have committed armed excesses, especially after the fighting outbreak. The accusations continued. They rose against our Peoples Democracy. They killed innocent people, unarmed, and prisoners, even engaging, if we were to give credence to the article, in looting and theft from shops (Zinner: 1956, 425-427). Meanwhile, Nagy had issued a cease-fire order, which, however, had no effect. Regarding the ideological meaning of events, it was firmly against cataloging them as counterrevolutionary. The demonstrations, even if at times had been infiltrated by counterrevolutionary elements, were the expression of the Hungarian workers will for democracy, dignity and living conditions, if not compatible with the aspirations of the socialist ideal, then at least decent. The government condemns the views which argue that the present formidable movement is a counterrevolution. Without doubt, as always happens in times of large popular movements, this movement, too, was used by criminal elements to undermine it and to commit common crimes. It is also a fact that reactionary and
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counterrevolutionary elements have penetrated the movement to overthrow the peoples democratic regime. But it is also indisputable that, in these agitations, a great national and democratic movement, embracing and unifying all our people, developed with a great force. This movement aspires to ensure our national freedom, independence and sovereignty, to advance our society, our economic and political system towards democracy for that is the only foundation of socialism in our country. This great movement has exploded due to the serious crimes committed during the recent historical period. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that, until the end, the leadership [of the Party] did not decide to separate itself, once and for all, of the old and criminal policy. This, above all, has led to the tragic fratricidal war in which so many patriots have died on both sides (my italics) (Idem, 429). Later, after the imposition of house arrest at the villa in Snagov, Nagys view on the subject will be radicalized. Explicitly condemning the great power Russian chauvinism, the Hungarian politician will blame those who are stubborn enough to see the Hungarian Revolution a counterrevolution of ignoring Marxism itself and of trying to restore the old Stalinist subordination in the relations between countries, peoples and Communist parties. Not the Hungarian people, but those who are incriminating it, Nagy concludes, are the real counterrevolutionaries. And continues rhetorically: Can a popular movement in which the working class, the former main representative of national interests, in addition to armed struggle, uses such a characteristic weapon for it, the weapon of the general strike, of passive resistance, the specific and tested weapon of workers, be seen as a counterrevolution? In addition to workers, even the vast majority of inferior members of the MDP have actively participated to the street fighting, which makes Nagy ask himself again: Is it counterrevolution the peoples movement or struggle or the most desperate armed struggle in which is involved all the working class led by hundreds of thousands of communists? (Nagy: 2004, 79). A few days after creating the new government, the Soviet contingents withdrawal from Hungary is announced. It was, however, a manipulative movement made by Moscow that, sending its representatives in Budapest, 85
sought to mislead Nagy, mainly through official statements on the absence of any interference in internal affairs of socialist states and on respecting the egalitarian bases of the relationship between them (Zinner: 1956, 485-489). When, on October 30, he announced the restoration of the multiparty system, followed two days later by the declaration of Hungarian neutrality by waiving membership of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Idem, 453-454, 463-464) the Soviet plan for a second military intervention was already materialized, being put in place the morning of November 4. The Hungarian revolution would be crushed by a huge military force, 2,000 tanks and 60,000 troops methodically eliminating a significantly lower resistance in all respects (Pop: 2002, 91). The same day that Hungary declared neutrality, the First Secretary Janos Kadar announced the formation of a new communist party on the ruins of the former MDP. It was called the Hungarian United Socialist Party (HUSP), calling amidst its lines workers, peasants, and intellectuals to fight for the socialist future of our people. Making known its solidarity with other political parties (in that context, there could be no alternative), HUSP required the overcoming of the danger of a damaging counterrevolution and called at the aid of the government for external support (Zinner: 1956, 464-467), knowing, of course, that this fraternal aid had already been set in motion. The notification of the establishment HUSP was not done in Budapest, because Kadar mysteriously quit the scene a few days before, and would not return in the Hungarian capital until November 7 to reconfigure, in Soviet parameters, the Hungarian communism (Granville: 1995, 27). Thus, the HUSP first secretary, after initially asserting the Hungarians grievances will now move to the other side, directly and even in a vilifying manner condemning the Hungarians fight for a better life, which could be built up outside the Soviet sphere of influence. The power of truth will conquer Kadar and his comrades, as well as all those behind them and covering their treachery, will prophetically write Nagy, while he was in captivity in Snagov (Nagy: 2004, 120). However, more than three decades will pass until the desideratum of the iconic figure of the Hungarian revolution will be put into practice. The second Soviet intervention was not caused by assertion of Hungarian neutrality. Conversely, Nagy resorted to this move because he knew that the country was invaded (Crampton: 2002, 331), probably seeking to terminate 86
any legal basis of Moscows aggression, which now had no justification for its intervention under the principles of the military Treaty that the communist countries had signed in Warsaw the last year (Pop: 2002, 87). No matter how loyal to the Soviet Union, Nagy was overtaken by events and was no longer trustworthy for Moscow. Also, he made the statement when the consequences of the Soviet decision for a new military involvement had become apparent by that the army sent in Hungary was not withdrawing, but increasing its numbers (Granville: 1995, 27; Bks: 2006, 332). A particularly controversial aspect of the 1956 events in Hungary lies in the role played by the West. One of the main myths that persist in this regard is that of direct military support that the United States could have granted the Hungarians, helping them to get out from under the Soviet hegemony and creating a hole inside the Iron Curtain. Thats not true. Washington morally supported the Hungarians struggle, not getting involved beyond this level. The existing geopolitical situation, the Cold War, made the risk of any conflict between the superpowers to escalate uncontrollably to a nuclear catastrophe possible, perhaps even a third world war, which more highly disadvantageous to both parts (Bks: 2006, 322). President Dwight Eisenhower was explicit in this regard, publicly stating, Nothing did disturb the American people so much that the events in Hungary. Our heart was with the Hungarians and we did everything possible to soften their suffering. But, Eisenhower insists, I must emphasize the following fact: the United States never encouraged and never will encourage defenseless population open riots against superior forces (Meray: 2000, 311; also see Korda: 2006, 103-104). Unfortunately, this was not true. Radio stations like Radio Free Europe and Voice of America incited demonstrators in protests and announced armed support from the West, namely from the United States. The situation went so far as clear advice was given to rebels to give new claims and cause mistrust against Imre Nagy and his government (Idem: 2000, 231; Pop: 2002, 1992-1993). The brochures later distributed on the popular democracies territories to process the revolution have fully insisted on this point (The counter-forces role ...: 1958, 11-21). Henry Kissinger explained: Although Radio Free Europe was a station funded by the U.S. government, it was led by an independent board of directors which did not receive formal instructions from the administration (Kissinger: 2003, 486). But this does not 87
exonerate him of the responsibility he bears in the unnecessary extension of the tragedy and of the need to pertinently obtain information before encouraging gullible and saturated with Western triumphalist propaganda Hungarians to a suicidal resistance. International attention on the Hungarian revolution was overshadowed by a crisis that the western world simultaneously experienced, namely the event that has remained known in history as the Suez crisis. Nasser, Egypts leader at that time, decided, following an unfulfilled promise made by Washington to help modernize the canal, its nationalization. The United States decided to use this gesture to punish Egypts receptivity to Soviet advances, however not materialized in any way until then. Nationalizing the channel to gain from taxation of all vessels which were to cross it, Nasser directly touched the colonial interests of Great Britain and France. These, together with Israel, initiated a military incursion to win control of the channel. The United States will publicly admonish this action, which will therefore fail. It was the first time since World War II when the West had to deal with a resounding domestic conflict. Moscow offered to join efforts with those of Washington to address the crisis, a proposal promptly rejected by the Eisenhower administration, which would have thus seen as damaged its international prestige (Kissinger: 2003, 474). Instead, the Soviets took advantage of the synchronization of the two conflicts to resolve as quickly and discreetly as possible the one in its geopolitical area. Moreover, Kremlin gained even a moral support through the Suez crisis: why should the Red Army activity be condemned on Hungarian territory when Britain and France proceeded exactly the same in Egypt? (Korda: 2006: 104) In addition, Moscow was given the opportunity to draw Nasser towards the communist world and strengthen some relatively modest diplomatic relations until then, taking advantage of the weaknesses and inconsistencies with which the United Nations finally addressed the Suez crisis (Martelli: 2006, 26; McCauley: 1981, 777-800; Hoffman: 1957, 446-469). Faced, in the Security Council, with a resolute condemnation of hostility and a decision of ceasefire, London and Paris will gradually withdraw troops from Egypt, which were, by the end of December, substituted by the U.N. Blue Helmets. The fact that led to the greatest extent towards this outcome was, writes Alfred Grosse, the brutal financial pressure of the American 88
government, which initiated a systematic devaluation of the pound campaign, placing in circulation enormous sums of this currency on the international market (Grosser: 1999, 199-200). Eventually, the Soviets would have intervened anyway in Hungary the risk that the revolutionary spark would reignite Poland and possibly other popular democracy was unacceptable to Khrushchev whatever might have happened or not in Egypt (Bks: 2006, 324). Romania, like other socialist states, condemned the imperialist intervention in Egypt, considering Nassers position completely justified. Besides the fact that, at that time, it did not want to draw Moscows attention by adopting a dissenting position, Bucharest initiated economic relations with Egypt, from where it began to particularly import leather, cotton or exotic fruits and vegetables, providing in exchange industry and agriculture know-how, Diesel engines and other electronic products. Consequently, there was an increasing interest in growing and developing economic relations between the two parts (Stanciu: 2004, 84-89). It is estimated that over 2,500 Hungarians and about 700 Soviet troops died during the Hungarian revolution. The disproportion is even greater when it comes to the number of wounded: around 20,000 in the first case, respectively, 1,500 in the second (Granville: 2004, 97, 99). One must take into account also the disproportion between manpower and equipment of the combatants: several tens of thousands of professional soldiers, properly equipped, certainly faced fewer opponents and much less well equipped. However, military operations have lasted considerably longer than anticipated by Marshal Ivan Konev, the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact (Idem, 98). The revolutionaries fighting against the regime revived by the fraternal aid of the Soviet Union, now led by First Secretary Janos Kadar, will continue sporadically until January 1957. In Budapest, armed conflicts ended earlier, in mid-November. The Hungarian Revolution was over. But its ghost will haunt the international Communism spectrum until annus mirabilis 1989, when the revolutions then produced in Eastern Europe had in it an essential reference and an impressive moral inspiration. *
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While Soviet tanks crushed the upright bold resistance of the Budapest people on the morning of November 4, Imre Nagy, together with his family and few close friends, sought and obtained political asylum at the Yugoslav embassy. After about three weeks of uncertainty and negotiations in which he finally succeeded to obtain the promise he could return safely home, him and all those accompanying him will be arrested immediately after leaving the embassy building and, under Soviet escort, were initially transported to a military school from where, the next day, they were sent to Romania. Bucharest had a central role in conducting the whole operation, which will be considered in another section of the study. I am interested here primarily on Nagys sense of what happened in Hungary at the end of the remarkable year 1956. So let us give him the floor to learn how the evacuation of the Nagy group took place in reality, a group of politicians with heterogeneous opinions, in no way an organized group, as the Soviet and Eastern European press suggested (Hegeds, Somlai in Rusan: 2000, 610) from the building of the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, after the Ministry of Defense, led now by Ferenc Mnnich had made a bus available for the refugees. On November 22, 1956, at 6 P.M., the bus arrived in front of the Yugoslav Embassy. The Yugoslav military attach, full of indignation, told us that the bus driver is Russian and that there were other passengers, too. I said that in those circumstances we will not get on the bus. After that, the two officers of the Hungarian police entered the premises of the Embassy and informed us that, following Mnnichs orders, they will care for our transport home. We then started to get on the bus. They wanted to take me by large car, Zis type, but I refused and got on the bus along with others. While we were taking our seats on the bus, one of the Hungarian police officers gave the show away and said that, before going home, we will go to Mnnich who wishes to speak to us. I immediately got off the bus, I did not allow it to start anymore and started to give arguments to the Soviet commanders who were there in their position, as well as to the Soviet Embassy interpreter that he got on the bus, too. I called from the Yugoslav 90
embassy building Ambassador Soldatici, to whom I communicated what had happened and I asked him to clarify the issue with Mnnich Ferenc. The Ambassador, there in the street, protested against the Russian presence and interference and referred to the agreement between the Yugoslav and Hungarian governments (by which Nagy and his companions could not be compelled to go where they wanted after leaving the embassy, m.n.). For safety, he ordered the first secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy, Georgevici, and the military attach to go on the bus and accompany us all home. We started. Soon, we saw that they were not taking us home. Once we started, in front and in the back of the bus appeared Soviet tanks with small guns in firing position. A few minutes later, we arrived in front of the Soviet city commandment on the Ajtai-Drer road. Here they got out the two officials mentioned and security of the bus was taken by Soviet soldiers. (...) After a pretty long ride, under the escort of the two armored vehicles, we arrived at the military school bearing the name of Rkoczy Ferenc II. Here we were now prisoners. We were forbidden to talk among ourselves or to enter one in the other ones room. The corridors were guarded by armed sentries. It was clear that we are in the hands of the Soviet security bodies (Nagy: 2004, 104-105). Shortly after the seizure made under the direct patronage of Moscow, Valter Roman, member of the PMR that Nagy had met several times in Moscow in the early 40s, tried to persuade him to accept a temporary domicile in Romania, until the normalization of political relations with Hungary. The former prime minister peremptorily refused, surely fearing a prolonged Soviet investigation with a foreseeable ending. I said that they can drag me out from Hungary by force, because they have enough power for it, but they will never get my consent (Idem, 105). The next day, the Nagy group members were flown to Bucharest, where they received a fixed residence in a Snagov resort villa. Their situation was not enviable: we were deported, under armed guard and under the supervision of the Security, isolated from the outside world, isolated from each other, with a 91
very incomplete political information (no radio, only a few newspapers) (Idem, 107). Informative notes were written in Hungarian and then translated into Romanian. The personnel and equipment used for monitoring the Hungarian politicians and their families were not distinguished by professionalism. Natural sounds, like coughing, were destroying the recordings. Furthermore, the prisoners eventually managed to establish a relatively easy means of communication, by which they deceived their supervisors for long periods of time. Written slips were hidden for long periods of time, unnoticed by the agents, although they regularly raided apartments and clothing. (Hegeds, Somlai in Rusan: 2000, 610). Now, Nagy will have the time to think long on the events that have changed his life. He will theorize two understandings of them. The first, assumed by Ger and his acolytes with the Soviet leadership, consisted of violent repression, with typical Stalinist means of popular movements, invariably characterized by the name of counterrevolutionary. Then, there was a second possibility for the interpretation of the Hungarian revolution as a revolutionary popular movement which, to be successful, must be guided by the party to the peaceful, balanced and human development towards socialism (Idem, 75). Being, of course, in the favor of the latter, Nagy argued that if he would have won, which was, as noted, downright impossible, the Hungarians insurgency would have given back to the ideas of socialism, democracy, independence and sovereignty what had been kidnapped by Stalinism, namely their true spirit, their Marxist essence (Idem, 117). The rebarbative methods used by the Soviet Union during Stalins reign in the name of broadening and strengthening of the revolutionary ideal have resulted in a painful contradiction between, on one hand, the national independence, respectively, on the other hand, the attractiveness and applicability of socialism. This is the essence of the Hungarian tragedy, says Nagy. The fundamental purpose of the Hungarian revolution was to seek and find the reconcilement of this contradictory situation and to achieve unity of the two ideas (Idem, 118). In terms of Moscows arbitrary involvement in the events taking place in Budapest, Nagy tenably appreciated that the Soviets preferred a weakened Hungary, dependent on Soviet tutelage and used as a warning to any proindependence tendencies that would have risen among popular democracies (Idem, 121-122). Moreover, the former Prime Minister considered, the 92
ideological and political monopoly of the CPSU, which held in full dependence both the party as well as the entire country, has obstructed the MDPs cooperation with the people to clarify internal problems. Consequently, Soviet interference was the main reason of the disaster in Hungary, where the party was not, as the Kadar government propaganda said, assailed by the counterrevolutionaries, but stayed on the oppositions side which has therefore represented the overwhelming majority of the party and thus became legitimate (Idem, 126, 124). For the bloody turn of the October protests, the responsibility belongs absolutely and entirely to the Soviet Union. Moscow should take this into account, thinks the former premier, similar situations that had happened on the territories of some popular democracy in recent years. First, the workers riots that occurred shortly after Stalins death in East Berlin, then the social tensions that had taken place in the summer of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, respectively. All these signaled that the disastrous political mistakes of the CPSU will lead to a series of catastrophes (Idem, 84). Despite the alarm signals represented by these popular movements for Soviet power, it is doubtful that they would have had a premonitory role, anticipating the Hungarian tragedy, especially since the situation in Poland did not degenerate into the real war that took place on the streets of Budapest. Nagy generalizes here beyond scientific acceptability. All the above revolutionary outbreaks have occurred and have developed in different circumstances and under the action of similar factors, but not identical. The particularities of each of these cases reflect its singularity. The sources of the disaster in Hungary lies, besides the Soviet factor, at least to the same extent in the decisions or lack of decisions made by the MDPs leadership in those critical moments, as I will further try to argue. Even Nagy admitted that in the last moment, because of the vigorous and resolute action of Polish leaders, the CPSU and the Soviet government backed out, so armed struggle could be avoided. What did Hungary lack to transform into a second Poland? A party and a party leadership able to cope with the crisis. Only the unity of Polish comrades, the unity of the party leadership, the party and government unity and their fearlessness made the military intervention of Soviet troops not to take place (Idem, 87). And Gomu; kas political flair, I might add, what his Hungarian counterpart never had.
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Next, Nagy acknowledges the Poznan riots role over the soaring tensions in Budapest. The events in Hungary have occurred under the influence of events in Poland, from a feeling of deep sympathy for the Polish partys attitude and towards the Polish independence tendency. They were augmented by the discretionary intervention of Soviet military units, and in no case by the socalled counterrevolution orchestrated by the imperialists; through their attitude, but this time Under the pretext of proletarian internationalism, the Soviets actually restored a historic juncture from the nineteenth century, centered on the Russian czarism ambitions, namely the Holy Alliance, formed after the Napoleonic wars by Austria, Hungary and Imperial Russia. In other words, a holy socialist alliance was reinstated, led, like its predecessor, by the hegemonic tendency of Moscow (Idem, 141-142). Nagy surprises here because he definitely speaks against naming the Hungarian revolution a counterrevolution, while, in the last days of October, he maintained that it had, however, been infiltrated by reactionary and counterrevolutionary forces. (Zinner: 1956, 429). Perhaps he was aware that he had nothing to lose, apart from his integrity. A little known aspect of the political biography of former prime minister, and one which, among others I will deal with later on, makes him no honor, lies in his unconcealed form of anti-Semitism he expressed towards what he called the Rkosi clique. Including, in addition to Stalins favorite pupil, several prominent members of the MDP, Ger, Farkas, Rvai, Kovcs, Ngrdi, the clique was responsible in Nagys view of worsening economic relations with neighboring friendly countries as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. Regarding relations with the last of these countries, the litigious matter of Ardeal prevailed. In 1947, at the Paris Peace Conference, instead of putting the issue in the socialist spirit, Rkosi pushed it to bourgeois nationalism, thus fundamentally preventing the opportunity to resolve it. Not only in international relations but also in domestic affairs the Rkosi clique committed errors and abuses which seriously harmed the Hungarys interests, thought Nagy. Undoubtedly, the decisive role was played by the fact that they were Jews and, furthermore, Jew coming from Moscow. They turned away from the masses, which in turn, despising them, have expressed their hatred of them, have believed them to be some foreign agents who were not able to become representatives of Hungarian national interests and even less representatives of Hungarian national feelings. Trying to overcome that 94
obstacle, Rkosi Jewish clique wanted to be more nationalist than the Hungarians themselves and thus damaged the country immensely (Nagy: 2004, 97-98). Certainly, Nagys arguments give at first sight credit to the theory that operates with the distinction of native communists, patriots, but prevented to do the right thing by Moscow communists, aliens, and often Jews. Although embraced by some of those who are its object of study, the theory is no less valid. Let us remember that Nagy spent the 1930-1944 period in Moscow, returning in Hungary with the Red Army. How could he then accuse Rkosi of being a Muscovite? Internal disputes in the East European communist parties in the postwar era have never been conducted between camps established by this criterion. There were no native and Muscovite communists, non-Stalinist and Stalinist ones. All, without exception, were loyal to Stalin, even Nagy, even if he turned out to be less dogmatic than other colleagues of his. Didnt Lavrenti Beria, the dreaded NKVD leader, become the first, shortly after the death of the Generalissimo, to seek economic and political reforms of such a scale that scared even the reformist Khrushchev? And then, of what consisted Rkosi and Gers Jewishness and how did it reflect in the political behavior of the two? What prevents us to place Nagys failure to resolve the Hungarian crisis peacefully on the fact that he was born a Reformed Christian? At a careful analysis, interior conflicts within communist parties were articulated by more volatile, heterogeneous groups, being in a constant dynamic. Their main criterion of differentiation was neither national nor ideological, but personal. Therefore, the power struggle was chaotic, with the conflicting sides not clearly defined as they continually reshaped according to fluctuant affinities or animosities that animated their protagonists. (Shafir: 1985, 35). On calling the Soviet troops to restore order in October 23, Nagy exculpates. At that time, I was not a P.B. member (Political Bureau m.n.), nor a government member. This measure was requested by Ger by phone to Khrushchev, who proceeded accordingly. Only a few days later was the official request of the Hungarian Government to be assisted by the Moscow military made, and Nagy, who, as we remember, was reinstated as prime minister one day later, on November 24, was asked to sign it. Which I refused, he continues. Later, even Kadar admitted that it was not right for 95
them to ask me to sign that document, because then not I, but Hegeds was President of the Council of Ministers, the de jure responsibility for that request thus belonging to the latter (Nagy: 2004, 145). Finally, Nagy was convinced that if, once in front of Radio Broadcasting building, the crowds demand to air the fourteen points that will soon become the revolutions program would have been satisfied, or if, immediately after the speech in Parliament square, he would have addressed those who surrounded the Radio Broadcasting building, letting them know that the leadership was willing nationally make public their claims, those who were there would have received the idea with huge enthusiasm, would have calmed down and thus the bloody events that followed would have been prevented. If this did not happen, it is the responsibility of the Political Bureau, firstly of Ger Ern and Hegeds Andrs. If Nagy would have begun his appeal in front of the demonstrators again with Comrades!, I am not sure he would have had the anticipated success. On the same tone, he continues saying that the point of view according to which the attack against the Radio was a counterrevolutionary action well prepared, organized in advance, does not correspond to reality and is an ordinary lie (my italics). Accusing the MDPs leaders abstaining to participate in meetings with revolutionaries, besides himself, Nagy will conclude that they have betrayed their mission and have shown cowardice and an unworthy conduct for some communist leaders. The behavior of the Political Bureaus members in the events in October is a shameful stain and marks the moral bankruptcy of the party leadership (my italics), he will stubbornly write. The verdict? In Hungary, the communist leaders have contributed the least to defend socialism. It is an irreparable moral disaster. And these moral cadavers dare now to speak about Nagy Imre governments treason (my italics) ended extremely virulent the former prime minister his last pages of notes from Snagov. All major decisions that this government had taken were in direct continuity with the aspirations of the Hungarian people, tirelessly repeated Nagy, including, or especially, the proclamation of Hungarian neutrality by withdrawing from the Warsaw Treaty Organization (a measure which he initially opposed) (Idem, 169-171; Granville, 2002, 546). However easy was it for Nagy to give credit retroactively by supersizing the connections between the decisions of the cabinet he was leading and the revolutionaries requirements trying to correct himself in a position of the 96
moral hero of the event, his merits for taken some resounding important decisions even pressured by the streets rather than by his own persuasion, cannot be denied. But was Nagy really convinced, in the solitude and meditative ambient in Snagov, by the moral bankruptcy of the communist system itself, not only of certain of their leaders? From his notes it is clear that the answer is no, although the question cannot be provided with a clear answer. Therefore, a complex historical figure like himself must be approached with analytical caution and great care for detail. Otherwise, we are more likely to risk missing the encounter, even unavoidably incomplete and distorted by time and the gradually blurring of the context, with the one that was Imre Nagy. * For better overall comprehension of the events in 1956 in the socialist camp, particularly instructive is the comparison between the two revolutionary outbreaks: Poland and Hungary. There are several good outlined reasons because of which the riots in Poznan and subsequently in Warsaw have not turned in the Budapest revolution and vice versa. They can be grouped into two categories: the nature of requests, namely the character and behavior of leaders during the protests. Thus, if the requirements of the Poznan workers were mainly economic, with a less pronounced political component, in Budapest happened just the opposite. The fourteen requests of the Hungarian revolutionaries were primarily political, and only secondly had an economic sideline, therefore being more difficult to satisfy by a communist regime, in which all other aspects of social life are subordinated to politics. Then, Edward Ochab and PUWP Political Bureau were present in the country ever since the beginning of turmoil, thus having time to become familiar with them and provide a somewhat appropriate response. Ger and his colleagues, on the other hand, were in Yugoslavia to win Titos goodwill and trust, leaving domestic issues in the background. We recall that they returned to the country just the day large-scale protests had started and, instead of making efforts, as their Polish counterparts did, demonstrating a certain understanding, if not sympathy, towards the causes of the peoples dissatisfaction, Gers broadcast speech inflamed spirits even more, by showing contempt, condescension and a total inability to grasp the 97
phenomenons potential that the MDP was facing. Furthermore, Polish leaders did not call for military aid from Moscow. This issue was not even raised, while Ger appealed this method of solving the problem on the first evening, without even trying to surmount the difficulties encountered by own means (Granville: 2002, 528-529). The differences list continues. While the Hungarian army fraternized spontaneously with the revolutionaries, the Polish military forces, dominated by Soviet officers, faced this deficiency only in the beginning, and even then sporadically. Ultimately, cynically claimed Suslov and Mikoyan, Moscows representatives to Budapest, the Hungarian demonstrators were fired at very late, thus allowing them to organize and muster up courage. In Poland, protests were met with fire from an early stage, which more likely contributed to the deterrence of many of those on the streets to persevere in facing the regime (ibid., 536-539). The personal factor is crucial in the political equation of events consumed in 1956 in the communist world. Imre Nagy had, compared to Gomu; ka, a much more subdued political instinct, being instead better prepared theoretically. But argumentative eloquence, even if in the spirit of MarxismLeninism, will be of no use to Nagy in those moments. Conversely, it can be concluded that bookishness (an orientation based on excessive theorizing of revolutionary problems, thus unaware of reality) disadvantaged him. Then, the Polish first secretarys presence and self mastery, who, himself a worker by profession, knew how to manage and moderate the crowd gathered on the streets of Warsaw and whose position was much less stable than generally believed positively impressed the leadership in Moscow, Khrushchev becoming in time one of his best personal friends. Not the same can be said about Nagy, who, despite his charisma, completely and irretrievably lost control of the situation. The most important difference between Poland and Hungary in 1956 is, however, one of international nature. Gomu; ka, fearing Germanys revanchism and being aware that, without Moscows guarantees, it could not maintain Polands postwar western border, which now comprised a large part of former East Prussia, has never committed the fatal imprudence to act according to the requests concerning Polands proclamation of neutrality and 98
its withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Even if the Soviets had decided to intervene for the second time in Hungary before Nagy did so, the Hungarian Prime Ministers gesture could only reinforce their belief that they acted properly (Idem 543-563; Nagee; Donaldson: 1988, 227 - 229). After 1956, the PUWP gradually began to restrict civil liberties that it set up to deal with protests and mitigate them. In relations with Moscow it will begin to show a growing degree of autonomy, which, unofficially, will justify especially based on domestic considerations, namely the Poles traditional anti-Russian feelings (Skilling: 1964, 13). At the conference of communist parties held in Moscow the next year, the Polish delegation displayed an attitude of unprincipled concessions towards imperialist circles, renouncing the classical Leninist thesis that postulated the imperialisms implosion due to its internal contradictions, being motivated by the unwillingness to compromise its trade relations with some Western countries, which had started promisingly. Also, the Poles did not manifest as critically as the other communist parties against revisionists, a concept which referred to the Yugoslavian comrades. They, as we are to see, had an ambivalent attitude towards the Hungarian revolution, which once more affected the relations between Belgrade and Moscow, although not at the same intensity as during the Tito-Stalin conflict. Dogmatism should have been considered as hazardous as revisionism to international communism, Polands representatives argued, who also did not approve the thesis about the Soviet Unions role at the head of socialist countries and as a center of unity of the international communist movement (C t nu: 2004, 28). Hungary, on the other hand, had a different evolution, if not even opposed to the Polish one. Minimizing the memory of the revolution as main objective, HUSP first secretary introduced certain limited economic and cultural concessions, which, however, were not constant, varying according to the short and medium term objectives of the regime. But he did not respect his promise to show leniency and mercy to former anti-communist combatants, and the political trials, deportations, arrests, and secret executions, reminiscent of Rkosis Stalinist regime, once again came to the fore front. Also, the party itself had undergone major metamorphoses: it bureaucratized itself, to be as sure as possible of the support of its members, united, and of the repression exerted on former revolutionary, and gradually distanced itself from the 99
population, getting more and more the characteristics of a religious sect. Internationally, on the other hand, Kadar remained one of the most loyal allies of the Soviet Union (Vli: 1966, 86-107). He owed his political position to Khrushchev personally, therefore looking so as to avoid any possible dissatisfaction of Moscow, unlike Gomu; ka, which had the partys support, and, partially, that of the people. The revolution of 1956 will, however, continue to be for Kadar and for the party he led an unexplainable moment, whose impossible surmounting will be a permanent tare for Hungarian communism, until the moment its inglorious end. The climax of revolutionary vigilance. Romanian Peoples Republic and the Hungarian revolution For the PMRs leadership, Stalins death did not amount to the overcoming of its political heritage. Conversely, Gheorghiu-Dej and his henchmen, deeply tributary, both ideologically and politically, to Stalins Weltanschauung, tried to limit as much as possible the impact of political disputes within the upper echelons of the CPSU on the stability and cohesion of the Romanian leadership. Post-Stalinism and de-Stalinization were for RPR, in Kenneth Jowitts words, a latent period of learning and docility, marked by some internal changes lacking of enthusiasm and by growing concerns about the intentions of the Soviet hegemon; however, it cannot be said But, like Stephen Fischer-Gala i says, that in this period the foundation of the future independence from the early 60s has been established (Jowitt: 1971, 167; Shafir in Schpflin: 1986, 364-365; Fischer-Gala i in London: 1966, 265; Fischer-Gala i: 1998, 157). It is true that the leaders in Bucharest sought to secure a larger room for maneuver, but Soviet rule in the communist world was affirmed convincingly at every public event. And secondly, Romania, through its permanent membership in the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, can only be considered an autonomous or dissident voice within the socialist bloc, in no case an independent one. In absence of frictions with the Comecon, RPR would probably have become another Poland: national-communist inside and, despite some occasional opinions not endorsed by Moscow, indisputably loyal to the proletarian internationalism goals on the outside. Of all the Eastern Europe governments, the Romanian one was least affected by de-Stalinization seizures, wrote Ghi Ionescu, which was a sign of apathy and weakness of the PMR. Disadvantaged by the very weak, almost 100
nonexistent, social influence available, but also by the absence of a genuine Marxist culture to raise its ideological level and to provide a somewhat decent appearance to its scientific displays, the PMR, paradoxically, proved to be, especially because of those causes, more capable than other East European parties to cope with the challenges entailed by de-Stalinization. If it would have had some roots in people, if it would have been at all sensitive to trends in public opinion and the fight would have been fought with original ideas, specific to relevant national issues, then surely it would have been more visibly affected. Relying solely on a politically primitive instinct and on a total dependence on Moscow let us not forget that, before 1945, PCR was the weakest and most disorganized Eastern European communist party (T nase: 2006, 42) the communist party of Romania remained concerned about only one thing to stay in power (Ionescu: 1994, 291-292). In other words, the shock of de-Stalinization was not perceived in RPR at an ideological level; valuably, it was not, as for other communists, a sudden and painful turn, a deviation from the true legacy of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, and, ultimately, it had not who to disappoint; legitimized only by a ideological surrogate, the political elite in Bucharest, made in an overwhelming proportion of people with an education that did not exceed four elementary classes, was simply scared of the new Soviet orientation, being exclusively concerned with the associated precautions that would have allowed it to survive this test, only perceived as shocking politically. Post-Stalinism includes several international events which will leave their mark on the entire evolution of Romanian communism. In 1955, the Soviet Union and Austria signed, ten years after the end of the Second World War, the peace treaty by which the latter became a neutral state. Consequently, Soviet troops are withdrawn from its territory and the need to keep them in Romania and Hungary, countries in which the Red Army contingent kept logistical connections with the troops from Austria, disappears. But to counter the potential threat of NATO, a military organization that emerged in 1949, Moscow decided to create a similar organization with many of the Communist states. Thus, appears the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), a body justifying the Red Armys presence within the territories of brotherly states by the need to counter possible threats from the imperialist camp (Idem, 263-264). Then, after years of repeated failures that had frustrated the regime, emphasizing its external and internal insecurity, the RPR is finally admitted to 101
the UN (Ionescu-Gur : 2006, 1969-1980; Nistor: 2006, 236; Georgescu: 1993, 144). Within this organization, Bucharest would prove to be a very active supporter of the Soviet Union between the late 50s and early 60s (Weiner: 1984, 1940-1941), again contradicting theories that place the germination period of the Romanian dissidence against the socialist camp in the postStalinist period. A clear indication of disorientation produced by the new mutations in the Kremlins political equation in Bucharest lies in the lateness of the organization of the second Congress of PRM. Delayed nearly four years under various pretexts, the event, made in autumn 1955, dedicated Ghoerghiu-Dejs return to the party prime secretary position, since, starting with April 1954, that position went to Gheorghe Apostol, a close friend of the Romanian dictator (Ionescu: 1994, 266, Fischer-Gala i: 1998, 162-163; Deletant: 2001, 192-193; Troncot : 2006, 126). The PRM leader resorted to this stratagem directly influenced by the metamorphoses that happened in Soviet leadership. If, in September 1953, Nikita Khrushchev became first secretary of the CPSU, the prime minister position did not fell onto him no more, like it happened in the Stalinist period, but to Gheorghi Malenkov, a Politburo member, oriented towards reforms whose amplitude scared Khrushchev himself. He managed to overthrow him in 1955 and to appoint in his place Nikolai Bulganin, docile executor of Khrushchevite orders. Gheorghiu-Dej did not overlook the significance of this gesture, which suggested an embellished return to the concentration of political power in the hands of a single governor, as had happened before 1953. Consequently, he became once more, formally, the first secretary of the PMR, assigning the position of prime minister to his close friend Chivu Stoica (Ionescu: 1994, 66; Fischer-Gala i: 1967, 54; Betea: 1997, 127). A detail that escapes many specialty analyses is that, until the PMRs Second Congress, Dejs position was more precarious than generally considered. Some American and British officers in Bucharest have noted this, and the condescending attitude some Soviet officials showed the PMRs first secretary. Only after Khrushchev asserted himself against his political competitors, and pressed by very important international issues such as signing the treaty of neutrality with Austria and the WTO creation, he assured, at least temporarily, Gheorghiu-Dej that he will keep his position, during a visit to Bucharest only after obtaining this assurance the Romanian leader felt confident enough to organize the congress ( r u: 2005, 456-457; Fischer-Gala i: 1967, 51). But the 102
main test to convince Moscow of his loyalty was passed by Gheorghiu-Dej during the Hungarian revolution, a circumstance in which he proved to be very eager and docile in supporting by any means possible the Red Army that was crushing Hungarian insurgents, especially since the Bucharest regime was among the direct beneficiaries of Soviet intervention (Tism neanu: 2005, 191). The new effects were being felt in Romania from an economic rather than political point of view. The Soviets were displeased with the disproportionate emphasis that the PMR placed on heavy industry to the detriment of agriculture or consumer industry. The Danube-Black Sea Canal project was also criticized, and halted shortly following those complaints. The SovRoms (economic enterprises with mixed capital, Romanian and Soviet, and whose benefits were fully assimilated by Moscow) are liquidated starting with 1954. Making the Soviet leaders more or less directly responsible for the economic weaknesses it recorded, RPR will require a significant financial loan, of which only approximately 50% will be given. Politically, Lucre iu P tr canus trial, the longest in the history of Stalinist political trials, will be completed in 1945 by sentencing the defendant to capital punishment. Although no longer a real threat to Dej, he, within the context of uncertainties driven by the new orientation of the CPSU leadership, decided not to take any risks. The Soviets were kept permanently informed, while not intervening directly in the trial development (Buga: 2004, 95-116). The secret report presented by Nikita Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU deeply confused PMR leadership, which did not bring an official position on it for a month. Only in late March, and then in a closed setting, was Stalins personality cult sentenced, which seriously affected the efficiency and attractiveness of the CPSU and the international communist movement in general. A number of excesses made by the Security were also mentioned, but only during the period in which Teohari Geogescu was Minister of Interior. Thus, by skillful political maneuvering, the responsibility for implementing Stalinist principles in the RPR had been transferred to the right deviators, neutralized in 1952: Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu (Deletant: 2006, 137-136; Deletant: 2001 194-195; Haupt: 1968, 674-675; Mary Ellen Fischer: 1989, 50; Fischer-Gala i: 1967, 58; C t nu in C t nu, Buga: 2006, 120-121; Stanciu: 2009, 130). The Romanian deStalinization motto will be contained in the slogan We do not have anyone to rehabilitate, which was meant to be proof of the huge political and human 103
qualities of Gheorghiu-Dej, who protected the party from the ravages of discretionary and unfair purges. In the report presented before the Central Committee plenary session of PMR, held between March 23 and 25, 1956, Gheorghiu Dej said that, simultaneously with increasing the victories of the Soviet people led by the CPSU, in Stalins work began to manifest more strongly those features which, in time, turned into a cult of his person. Evading collective leadership, which Lenin advocated unequivocally, Many important decisions were taken by I.V. Stalin alone, without the Politburo, without the Central Committee. Collective leadership was thus substituted by single-member leader. Copied after the report read by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Dejs communication insisted on Stalins abolishment of the Leninist practices aiming at the reintegration of astray communists, by persuasion and education, within the party in favor of repressive methods that would maim, rather that reinforce the leaders role and the party power as the driving force of world revolution. Furthermore, Stalins break of reality, his halting of work visits were admonished, the only method by which he could hear directly the problems of workers and form an appropriate and realistic view about the needs and aspirations of the working people (Tudor C t nu: 2001, 31-33). The cult of personality enchained creative thinking, led to stagnation in the ideological field, delayed decision making driven by the needs of life, continued Dej. Any errors that Stalin had been guilty of during the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany were also not omitted, when he, despite numerous warnings, ignored the imminent threat of Nazi aggression, which resulted in heavy defeats, big losses of life, of lands and resources in the first period of the war. However, de did not hesitate, after the war and Soviet victory, to correct himself in a position of military genius who made this possible, thus ignoring or minimizing the role of the army, the party and the Soviet people itself, whose determination and superhuman sacrifices led to the feasibility of combined military and ideological success over the Nazi Reich (Idem, 33, 35). Being aware of the delicate situation in which he was, Dej did everything possible to limit the effects of de-Stalinization and to channel the societys 104
discontent and of some party colleagues as far away from himself, firmly directing them in the direction of some of his former victims, whose ritualistic blaming had no implication for the PMR leadership stability, the central objective of the Romanian Prime secretary. Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chiinevschi, who participated together with Dej at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, began to launch a series of criticisms on Stalinist practices and his personality cult, seeking to undermine him and remove him from office. Not obtaining, as we going are going to see in another section of the essay, the strong support from the party, the two did not meet their target, being removed from the Political Bureau. Retroactively, they will be converted to some appendix of Pauker group and accused that they only wanted to discredit and undermine the party leadership. Here is how the PMR leader tried to justify, in 1961, at a Political Bureau meeting in which the main directions of the following Central Committee session were drafted, the absence of a strong and consistent reaction of RPR in relation to the phenomenon of de-Stalinization. ... it touched us all, these things worried us. We have all been educated by our Party in a spirit of respect and love for the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A long time (...), as Stalin replaced the party, etc., etc., communists around the world saw in the person of Stalin the CPSU itself, mistook him for the CPSU. To say today that we saw things differently then, I think nobody can do so, we wouldnt be playing fair. Then, no one could tell; only after the 20th Congress all these things emerged. It is understood why it could cause some unrest in one place or another. Whenever the parties face such issues of great importance they are not understand at once. Sure, not negatively showed, namely that (sic!) it requires adoption, appropriation, to fully realize what is happening (NeagoePlea, Plea: 2006, 120). Moreover, Nicolae Ceauescu even defended the former Soviet dictator, who will represent for him the political model par excellence. We, undoubtedly, he said, have to stand up and draw all the lessons from the abuse, the illegalities with which no one can agree. Now, I find it difficult to say, and I think that it would not be fair for us to say, that we must place everything to one side and that we are not to take into account what was done good. From 105
this point of view, Ceauescu will resume the post-Stalinist theory of blaming Beria and his associates for the most serious errors and abuses that occurred in the Soviet Union, especially after 1945 (Idem, 266-267). Gheorghiu-Dej tried to escape the fears he had concerning Moscows new political orientation. Cautious, noting the conflicts caused by Khrushchevs reform measures within the Hungarian and Polish political elite, he increased contacts with the Muscovite center, reinsuring that he was the right leader to implement the 20th Congress proposed politics. Moreover, he claimed that he supported (actually, he avoided engaging directly in the power struggle inside the post-Stalinist Kremlin, rather he did not speak so strongly in favor of Khrushchevs rule, as Stelian T nase did) the Soviet First Secretary against his political competitors, the two addressing these issues in August 1955, during an official visit of Khrushchevs to Bucharest (T nase: 2006, 141; Jowitt: 1971, 171). Why him and not Molotov, for example, to whom he certainly felt much closer in ideological terms? I would answer this question as follows: because of Dejs innate political instinct, guessing perhaps who will become the new undisputed leader of the Soviet Union, but also because he never got directly involved in the competition for power taking place inside the post-Stalinist Kremlin. And not following a special preference for Khrushchev, as Kenneth Jowitt argues. He says that the two leaders shared a series common features: the same socio-economic background (both were workers), an intransigent attitude towards intellectuals and an orthodox trust in heavy industry benefits (Jowitt: 1971, 171-172). I do not consider these arguments as providing a consistent basis for the assumption of a consistent consonance between Dej and Khrushchev. The PMR First Secretary had no reason to appreciate his Soviet counterpart and, as the main moments of his political evolution will consummate, Dejs contempt for Stalins successor will increase accordingly. Dej had no consideration for Khrushchev. He thought him to be superficial, hasty. I think that even the fact that he raised the cult of personality issue made Dej despise him. He really did not like him, recalls Alexandru Brl deanu, concluding with a total lack of ambiguity: I heard him even swearing him (Betea: 1997, 128). It is likely that Dej was reluctant to support Molotov and because of personal considerations, namely how arrogantly and condescendingly he had been treated by him on several occasions ( r u: 2005, 460).
106
In Romanian version, de-Stalinization meant, therefore, a reinforcement of the political elite cohesiveness, united by the desire to preserve their own positions and to veiledly reject some of the principles adopted in the Soviet Union at the 20th Congress of the CPSU (Dumitriu: 1961, 17-18). Although, formally, Dej agreed with criticizing the personality cult and with the counter criticism of its political effects, he, however, did not hesitate to insist on, to protect himself, the different conditions existing in the RPR, on the one hand, and in the Soviet Union, on the other side (Frunz : 1990, 426). Relativizing the problem, the PMR first secretary sought to avoid at all costs his assimilation to a little Stalin. Last but not least, Dej also agreed with the invalidation of the Stalinist thesis according to which the class struggle becomes more intense as building socialism is advancing, drawing, however, the attention that so long as in our country there are remnants of the exploiting classes, so long as the aggressive imperialist circles conspire against peace and independence of peoples, the class enemy will seek also in the future to hit the peoples democratic regime. Consequently, to overcome this danger, the regime was urged to show an untiring vigilance (Tudor, C t nu: 2001, 39-40). The party united around Dej, the fidelity to his person representing more and more the prerequisite for advancement in the PMR hierarchy (Haupt: 1968, 676). Khrushchev had made a calculation error, considering that Dej could easily be removed or rejected, in general, concludes Victor Frunz . To the Soviet first secretary it would become increasingly clear that the PMR have to the fore a leader perfectly in control of the situation and without being a valuable theoretician, just like Khrushchev, Dej was a practitioner of Sovietstyle socialism, hard to prove (Frunz : 1990, 425). But Dej was not in perfect control of the situation. Instead, between 1954 and 1955, his political position, as noted, was obsolete. He was however advantaged by the absence of strong opposition from inside the party, of the direct non-involvement in supporting any player in the power struggle going on inside the Kremlin and by a favorable international conjuncture (Moscow signed the neutrality treaty with Austria and created the WTO), which diverted for the moment the new leader in Moscows attention, Nikita Khrushchev, from the PMR leadership. Surprisingly, the rally around the PMR first secretary (except for Constantinescu and Chiinevschi) was sufficient to protect to a large extent the party from Soviet pressures for changes in the leadership and from the political earthquake in Hungary which, despite being the epicenter of the process 107
development of de-Stalinization, was the biggest challenge the socialist camp had faced so far. The clique located at the head of the Romanian Communist Party has always been characterized by caution, discretion and perfidious use of a weapon of terror; this is probably why it is the only Party leadership that survived Stalins death, wrote several years after the Hungarian revolution and one year after he had managed to escape to the West the writer Petru Dumitriu (1961, 17). Indeed, the Bucharest leadership succeeded, thanks to a combination of circumstances already mentioned, to face the challenges of post-Stalinism. It will eventually overcome the difficulties generated by the process of deStalinization, of which certainly the most threatening to the regime was the contaminant vicinity and effects of the Hungarian revolution. * When the first protests of Romanian students and workers began to take place in major cities (Bucharest, Timioara, Cluj), Gheorghiu-Dej was in an official visit to Yugoslavia. On that occasion, among others, were discussed the start of hydroelectric project the Iron Gates, but work to build the valley will have to wait several years. Until then, both Tito and Dej were increasingly worried about the turn which the demonstrations in neighboring Hungary took. As we shall see, they had a reason to. The PMR first secretary cut short his diplomatic visit and then hastily returned to Bucharest on October 29, worried that the situation could easily slip out of control, as happened in Budapest (Deletant: 2006, 141; Calafeteanu: 2003, 374; Stanciu: 2008, 120). The second day, a decision signed by both the Central Committee of the PMR and the Council of Ministers arose, by which, Given the worsening of the situation in the Peoples Republic of Hungary, and to ensure order on the RPRs territory a General Command is established, composed of Nicolae Ceauescu, Emil Bodn ra, Alexandru Dr ghici and General Leontin S l jan. With great power (he operated the Army and the Ministry of Interior forces), the Command was responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure full order throughout the RPR (Lungu, Retegan: 1996, 149-150). The same day, Moscow issued a release on the relations between socialist states that insisted on equal bases and mutual respect on which they were founded. 108
Importantly, the document referred to two issues that directly interested in the leadership in Bucharest: the question of Soviet troops stationing on the territory of WTO state members at the same time with the question of withdrawing Soviet advisers from the same states (Zinner: 1956, 485-489). It seems that the first aspect, which will be treated in a special section of the essay, was approached in an informal discussion with Khrushchev ever since 1955, but the events in Poland and Hungary placed it, at least temporarily, into obscurity. However, Bucharest was interested in the highest degree of these issues. The delegation that would soon attend a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the WTO was instructed to publicize the fact that the RPR Government did not consider necessary the stationing of Soviet troops in the territory of the RPR and, by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the RPR territory, the means to create anti-Soviet agitation would be taken from the hand of inside and outside hostile elements (Lungu, Retegan: 1996, 148). An ingenious interpretation that displaced the benefits of this gesture from Bucharest towards Moscow, but that will materialize only after another two years. The measures taken by the leadership of party and state to prevent the extension of the revolutionary feelings of neighboring Hungary to Transylvania and Romania in general were particularly harsh. Border guard was increased, civilians not being allowed, for whatever reason, to travel to PRH. Also, Hungarian correspondence and publications were banned so as not to inflame the spirits of the Romanian population, which had already begun to be unhealthy. Broadcasting and communications centers headquarters, but also the locations that housed the PMR were put under police protection (Boca: 2001, 115; Stanciu: 2010, 44-45). The greatest concerns of the authorities were towards the students and intellectuals. Recognizing that in student houses the conditions, as well as the quality of food served in student cafeterias, were poor, the party stressed the need to remedy these shortcomings, but also the need to intensify political activities among students (Retegan: 1995, 122; Boca in Jela, Tism neanu: 2006, 169-195). Other students grievances consisted of the mandatory presence at courses, the mandatory study of the Russian language and Marxism-Leninism. In a speech in Cluj to reduce student dissatisfaction, Miron Constantinescu, future Minister of Education, proved flexible in regard to the first issue, mandatory participation at courses, not doing any concessions in regard to 109
giving up the teaching of Marxism-Leninism in universities: non assimilation of the dialectical and historical materialism concept strips the student of the world overview. Moreover, the promoters of such attitudes have hostile conceptions to socialism, want to replace materialistic education with idealistic, mystical preaching (Lungu, Retegan: 1996, 214). Indeed, student movements were the most organized protests in Romania that year, to which the PMR responded with a series of measures of whose repressiveness remained at high levels even long after the defeat of the revolution and the stabilizing of the situation in Hungary. We will stop on the student protests, especially those of Timioara, the most intense of all the universities, immediately after evaluating the social and economic consequences that Hungarian Revolution has induced in Romania. During the time in which the Hungarian insurgents were fighting against the Red Army and their own leaders, Bucharest gave the impression of a mute and abandoned city, recalls Petru Dumitriu. At night, there was nobody on the streets except police patrols equipped with light automatic weapons and terrifying civilians, always in pairs, which from miles away reeked of secret police (Dumitriu: 1961, 18). An oppressive atmosphere, designed to discourage any signs of rebelliousness against the regime. However, the PMR also tried to win the people to its side, not only to intimidate it. Wage increases and food supplies that the party put immediately into practice are proof (Lungu, Retegan: 1996, 78; Boca: 2001, 132; Duic : 2006, 38-39, 41; Anton: 2007, 99), the party suddenly remembering the shortcomings whose presence had become, as the years passed, more than bearable for the population. One factor that would have tempered to a certain extent the contagiousness of the Hungarian revolution in Romania consisted of, argue historians such as Florin Constantiniu or Alexandru Ghia, the claims issued on this occasion over Transylvania. On the streets of Budapest the maps of Greater Hungary began to be seen, and in higher education centers in the Hungarian capital the idea of the introduction in the revolution program of a separate point the union of Transylvania with Hungary was launched, claims that could not pass unnoticed in Romania (Ghia: 2006, 28). Indeed, the Hungarian population in this province, as well as the Romanian one, throughout the country as a matter of fact, was responsive to events in Hungary, confirming the PMRs fears, which took many security measures to prevent a Romanian 110
revolution (Bottoni in C t nu, Buga: 2006, 381-385). On the other hand, considering revisionism as one of the driving forces of the Hungarian revolution is totally inappropriate. As Andor Horvth or Tibor Meray also remark, in the official documents of the Hungarian revolution there are no irredentist references concerning the Transylvanian issue (Horvth in Jela, Tism neanu: 2006, 136; Meray: 2000, 338-339). Although isolated manifestations of nationalism among the Hungarian revolutionaries existed, they were primarily anti-Soviet, and not anti-Romanian. The regime, however, pedaled on the retrospective legitimacy of the repressive measures implemented with great zeal in 1956 through nationalism and the alleged Hungarian danger that would have threatened the territorial integrity of the Romanian State (Purc ru: 2009, 176-181). Dejs national-communism began to make its presence felt. Dissatisfactions did not occur only among students and workers; some peasants and even some military professionals were also in favor of major economic and social reforms. But, on the political level, the revolutionary ferment was absent (Survey: 2006, 43). Despite the isolated attempt of Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chiinevschi to set the pace of an opposing current within the party, their initiative hit the passivity and fear of PMR members, being thus doomed to fail. What was the ideological interpretation of events in Hungary given by the PMR? It can easily be deduced from the speeches held, on one side, by Miron Constantinescu in front of students in Cluj, and, on the other hand, by Gheorghiu Dej in the Hungarian Autonomous Region, in mid-December and it consisted of adopting the position of Janos Kadar, the new HUSP first secretary, for whom the revolution began with legitimate claims of the working people, but subsequently was penetrated by counterrevolutionary elements, and, therefore, became undesirable, its repression being therefore perfectly justifiable. Thus, Constantinescu said that Hungarian classes differently expressed their interests and, in this process of events, reactionary trends were imprinted more strongly to this movement, a nationalist trend, chauvinistic and revanchist, so what at first was related to certain economic demands, to better certain political mistakes, to improve living conditions, through an active 111
intervention of several counterrevolutionary, nationalist groups, trained in military terms to occupy different strategic points in Budapest, through the intervention of the fascist gangs, the leadership of this movement was taken over by counterrevolutionary elements, which imprinted a certain reactionary direction, a certain retrograde character of the development of events in Hungary, until the final days. It is clear that in Hungary there was a counterrevolutionary military center, which secretly prepared many months before the fascist armed groups, in dark cellars, which acquired arms and created weapons depots. The Nagy government which formed in the early days of the course of these events, rather than focus on a democratic line, went from compromise to compromise, from concession to concession towards the reactionary, clerical, fascist forces, capitulating in from of them (Lungu, Retegan: 1996, 205). Gheorghiu-Dej highlighted in turn the errors made by the former leadership of the MDP, that of Rkosis, namely that of Gers, in all areas of party, state and economic building, which offered the reactionaries within country and the imperialists from the outside the possibility to initiate and later, in a favorable moment, to manage the counterrevolutionary action. Another mistake, with which Dej was familiar since the end of the 40s, when he subjected the party to a lengthy and thorough inspection of members process to accuse Ana Pauker that she allowed the infiltration within the party of former legionnaires and several reactionaries resided in the MDPs inclusion of many opportunistic members or supporters of the former fascist regime. In building the Party, the old leadership seriously and dangerously violated the Leninist principles, has widely opened the doors of the party, irrespective of Hungarys concrete conditions after 24 years of Horthyst dictatorship, a period in which a systematic policy of spreading the poison of fascism and chauvinism was gradually carried out. This meant that, in addition to fair and sound elements from among workers in factories, worker peasants and intellectuals tied to the people, in the party entered many careerist elements, foreign, as well as Horthysts, Szalasists and other reactionary elements. It is known that hostile elements use any opportunity to enter the party so 112
as to weaken it, undermine it, and a particular vigilance to safeguard the purity of party lines is needed. The lack of a strict social composition of the party and party bodies, disregarding the task of forming a strong proletarian party core, from which its leaders to be promoted, gave the opportunity for the small bourgeois mentality and moods to overwhelmingly influence the party bodies and organizations. To this, we also have to add that the old leadership isolated itself, pulled apart from the masses, of the party members, and got self-conceited, using bureaucratic methods. The party bodies pulled apart from the party members mass, and the party organizations pulled apart from the mass of working people. The existence of several groups in the party leadership ground its unit. All these has as result, in the moment the counterrevolutionary action began, carefully prepared by the imperialist intelligence agencies, that the party disbanded, proving to be unable to oppose an organized resistance, to crush the fascist putsch (my italics) (Dej : 1960, 194-195). It can be noted that Dejs position is even more intransigent than Constantinescus, insisting mainly on organizational and tactical shortcomings of the MDP, which led it to the impossibility to properly manage the situation and to disintegration and less on the populations legitimate claims for large-scale economic, social and political reforms. Next, Dej addressed theoretically the nature of the events that took place in Hungary, disagreeing with the term revolution. In his sense, any genuine revolution must have a progressive character, must be animated by the highest ideas of justice and social equity, must seek the abolition of class conflicts through the gradual transfer of power in the hands of the proletariat, which, by its struggles eminently moral size and nature, must represent the guarantor and translator in practice of the societys desire and, ultimately, of a world freed from the straps of economic, social and political conflict. If the proletariat, through its representative, organizer and leader, the communist party at the forefront of revolutionary struggle, is removed from power and replaced with a reactionary regime, oriented towards the potentiation, and not elimination, of social conflicts, then one cannot speak of revolution, but of a counterrevolution. Precisely this phenomenon happened in Hungary, concluded Dej. Taking advantage of the structural weakness of the MDP, he 113
argued, the counterrevolution gradually pushed through not only in the Hungarian society, but also within the party itself. Thus, the revolutionary vigilance has fallen to alarmingly low rates, which enabled a concerted attack on the regime, both inside, from reactionary elements, Horthyst and careerist, and from the outside, from the Anglo-American imperialism, which greatly endangered the gains of socialism in Hungary. And in Romania, the first secretary PMR forgot to mention, that also applied the concept of revolution and emancipation movements of former European colonies in the Third World. A revolution always means a big step forward on the line of historical progress in social development. Therefore, Marx called revolutions the locomotives of history. Progressive, revolutionary is that social process which meets the objective requirements of social development, of the upward march of history, that brings the working people closer to the conquest of political and economic power or which strengthens and develops the socialist achievements of the people, which is directed towards the abolition of exploitation of man by man and the complete victory of socialism. Instead, what precludes those goals always serves the interests of reactionary, counterrevolutionary forces. The fundamental feature of any revolution is the shift of power from the hands of a class in the hands of another. But not any overthrow of one class by another can be called revolution. If against the power held by the advanced, progressive class, a revolt is brewed, as happened in Hungary, and is the power is monopolized by the former ruling class, this is not revolution, but a counterrevolution. (...) A movement that would have pushed back Hungary in its socio-economic development and would have restored the domination and enslavement of the exploiting classes by imperialist powers cannot be called a revolution. In regards to the term national revolution, which he is widely used by reactionary press and radio stations in the West, claiming that events in Hungary had a character of a national liberation movement, it is clear that in reality such character may only have a movement of shaking off the foreign yoke, of release and of acquiring independence and national sovereignty. Such movements occur and are increasingly large in colonial and dependent countries 114
like Algeria, Malaya, Cyprus, South Korea and many others, where a heroic struggle to shake off the imperialist yoke goes on. These are genuine national liberation movements. (...) If the counterrevolutionary attempt would have succeeded, it would have tore Hungary of her true friends the socialist countries isolating it in front of the big imperialist powers and enslaving it economically and politically by them, meaning just the national subjugation of the Hungarian people (italics in original) (Idem, 195197). Just as he acted in Romania, Dej perceived the main threat for the Hungarian communist regime as originated by the Petfi circle, the intelligentsia, which was allowed to take shape in an opposition increasingly organized. For the RPR, two lessons were to be learned from the Hungarian revolution. The first of these was in the fight to defend the ideological unity, the unity of will and party action, the deep strengthening the PMR to successfully manage any crisis like the one that led to the disintegration of the MDP. From this perspective, the Leninist dictum of party discipline before everything was restored. The second lesson was that of strengthening party ties with the society. The masses had to be educated in accordance with the requirements of building socialism, and supervised at all times, for the prevention and thwarting of the machinations of the enemies of the peoples democratic social system. Last but not least, Gheorghiu-Dej mentioned the need to combat bureaucracy trends in party activity, the meetings-mania (sic!), an obstacle in achieving a contact as genuine and sustainable as possible with the society (Idem, 198-199, 201, 203). For the PMR, as for the entire socialist camp, the conclusion was unequivocal: The Hungarian events are for all peoples in the socialist countries an incentive to increase revolutionary vigilance (Re egan: 1995b, 150). In the RPR, revolutionary vigilance was translated in two ways: the security forces patrolling the streets had received reinforcements to prevent or liquidate in the bud any action that the regime would have considered hostile. Another way of persuading people, more subtle and effective, Romanian leaders hoped, was that of improving living conditions. Thus, during the plenary session of the Central Committee of the PMR, in December 1956, Gheorghiu-Dej launched himself in a hypocritical plea for the need for systematic and decisive development of 115
agriculture and consumer goods manufacturing industry (italics in original) by allocating an increased number of materials and financial resources. Thus, the mitigation of social discontent caused by economic policy of regime, focused excessively on heavy industry to the detriment of the populations consumption needs, was intended. New economic direction (temporary) aimed to allocate a larger share of national income to meet material and cultural needs of working people (italics in original) (Dej: 1960, 208-209). Very importantly, on this occasion the annulment, starting with the following year, of the mandatory quotas for socialist cooperative farms, but also for the individual ones was announced, concerning the following products: wheat rye, corn, sunflower and other grains, potatoes, hay, and cow and sheep milk (italics in original). Also, both collective farms and peasants who did not own more than a hectare of agricultural land would be exempted from the same date from the system of mandatory quotas for meat and meat products. Instead of quotas, the state proposed to conclude purchase contracts with willing producers, favored by a number of additional benefits (Idem, 223; Chiri oiu: 2005, 229). The limited liberalizations were not implemented only in the economic sphere. Literature, culture in general has seen a certain thaw, but quickly stopped because of the scale it taken, concerning for the regime (Vasile in Jela, Tism neanu: 2006, 222229). Already in February 1957, the PMR first secretary announced that the party and government took several measures to improve payment for several categories of workers, technicians and officials. What were they? The minimum wage was raised, continued Dej, small pensions were increased and state allowance for children was granted. Also, the workers wages in socialist trade, physicians and teachers, and the army staff were increased. Students, the main revolutionary source in the RPR, though left for the last place in the ideological hierarchy of occupations, also benefited from scholarships and grants for greater canteens (Dej: 1960, 257). These were not given so much as to mitigate the grievances of students, but to gradually integrate them into the new class or at least to determine them to compromise with the regime in the sense of not directly and vehemently contesting it. The working class provides favorable conditions for education, but it does by no means want to support hooligans, said Nicolae Ceauescu days after the defeat of the Hungarian revolution. Both students and the teachers that prepare them should be aware that they owe the working class 116
and all expenses incurred by the state are a good of our people and the students are a good of the people, so we do not have to support any hooligan (my italics) (LunguRe egan: 1996, 255-256) Ghoerghiu-Dej also insisted on the need for appropriate training of teachers in universities, especially from an ideological point of view, leaving the question of professional competence in the background. The peoples democratic state, he said, the workers and peasants state values the patriotic work of the faculty; but it is fully entitled to require all teachers to show a high citizenship awareness in carrying out the task has that been entrusted to it by the people. In other words, to deal primarily with the political education of students, to instill them the revolutionary ideal. This has led to the inclusion in Romanian universities of at least mediocre teachers in training, but with healthy roots and convinced or at least obedient concerning the regimes policies. Gheorghiu-Dej continued: We cannot accept that some teachers to believe that they have fulfilled the duty after delivering the lesson to the students. The work to educate youth, of growing the younger generations patriotism, of love and devotion to the peoples democratic social order, of combating any breached of discipline is a fundamental task for teachers (Dej: 1960, 205). The RPRs role in facilitating the suppression of the Hungarian revolution was considerably, Bucharest proving Moscows most fervent ally throughout the event (Deletant: 2006, 145; Deletant: 2001, 202; Deletant in Rusan: 2000, 602). It had all the reasons to exhibit such a behavior: earning Khrushchevs trust in the sole Eastern European political elite untouched by the de-Stalinization reverberations. As Misha Glenny writes, Stalinism remained the Romanian [political] standard because Moscow was convinced of the ideological orthodoxy in Bucharest and allowed Dej, in exchange for the speed with which it collaborated in crushing the Hungarian revolution, to limit reformism internally (Glenny: 1999, 557, see also Tism neanu : 1998, 111-112). The collaboration between Dej and Khrushchev had reached the point in which the Soviet leader claimed the use Romanian troops to suppress the counterrevolution, declined by Dej because of the increased number of existing Hungarian soldiers in the Romanian army and its general sympathy towards the revolt of the Hungarian people (Verona: 1992, 103; Deletant: 2006, 142; Deletant in Rusan: 2000, 600). Florin Constantiniu gives a completely opposite variant, also confirmed by Khrushchev memoirs (Crankshaw: 1971, 420) namely that both Romania and Bulgaria wanted to 117
send troops to stabilize the situation in Hungary, but Khrushchev would have denied this time, preferring to rely on own strengths (Constantiniu: 2002, 460). Although which version is correct cannot be determined with certainty, the first seems more credible, because Bucharests behavior inspired Moscow in the autumn 1956 anything but confidence, while Bulgaria has been throughout its entire communist period the Soviet Unions most obedient ally. Finally, Khrushchev opted for a unilateral Soviet intervention, giving up the military and logistical contribution of fraternal countries and eliminating the counterrevolution by the WTO. In the Hungarian constitution there was no coverage for such an approach, based on the use of socialist countries troops to ensure internal stability of one of them (Philip 2007, 81-82). Khrushchevs successor, Leonid Brezhnev, did not however allow such insignificant details to jeopardize the gains of socialism in 1968Czechoslovakia. Tism neanu believes that, in autumn 1956, the revisionist Marxism of new leadership in Budapest was the main concern of Dej and his acolytes, and in no case the supposed irredentism expressed by Hungarian revolutionaries (Tism neanu: 2005, 189). As we could note, the so-called claims of Transylvania issued on the streets of Budapest were only a myth by which Romanian communists tried to justify, belatedly, the harshness of the precautionary measures implemented to prevent the spread of revolutionary ferment across Romania. On the other hand, in Romania of those times, an equivalent of the Petfi circle lacked. Also missing was a Marxist intellectual of Gyrgy Lukcs scale. The student risings in Timioara, Bucharest, ClujNapoca and Iai were primarily social and political, and only afterwards intellectual. The regime thus primarily feared the social and political contagiousness of the Hungarian crisis, and not its ideas impact on the Romanian intellectuals. In this regard, it had nothing to worry. Yet, as Michael Shafir points out (1984, 435-459), the dissidence in the communist regime, in order to overcome the stage of a marginal and poorly configured dissatisfaction, had to start just inside the party itself. It had to be translated into genuine Marxist terms. Then, it had to be inserted into the Leninist ideological vocabulary, i.e. pseudo-Marxist. Only in this way could the dissidence be formed in an organized phenomenon, in an embryonic civil society. But communist Romania had no intellectual, no genuine Marxist philosopher; the last thinker of such caliber was Constantin DobrogeanuGherea, but he died in 1920. He was never succeeded by a Gyrgy Lukcs 118
already mentioned, by a Leszek Koakowski, by an Adam Schaff or by a Bronisaw Baczko in a Romanian variant. Because of this, in Romania there never was a Solidarity or Charter 77, because of the betrayal or the absence of scholars who could express their reform demands of the society vis--vis the party leadership. After November 4, the date on which the backbone of the Hungarian revolution was crushed by the Red Army, the protests in Romania decreased in intensity and frequency. The population was aware, disappointed, of the risks and futility of continuing strikes and demonstrations (Boca: 2001, 133). Communism was, at least for now, victorious, as one can also see from the message conveyed by the Central Committee of the PMR and the RPR government to the new Hungarian power, the worker-peasant revolutionary government led by Janos Kadar. The Romanian people expresses its fervent sympathy for this true fight of the brother Hungarian people and the full confidence that the worker-peasant revolutionary government supported by masses will successfully accomplish its program depicted in front of the people and will ensure victory for democracy and socialist forces in the Peoples Republic of Hungary. On behalf of the working class, of the working peasantry, of the progressive intelligentsia, we ensure the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia attached to the Hungarian peoples cause of or fraternal solidarity and support. The unsparing patriotic creative work of the working people of Hungary will ensure the Hungarian peoples prosperity and flourishing, possible only when the power is in the hands of those who work (Scnteia: 1956, November 5, see also Grigorescu in Rusan: 2000, 612616 or Barbulescu et al.: 1983, 222). The events in Hungary had serious repercussions on the economic plans of the leaders in Bucharest. Trade within the socialist camp was short-circuited, economic development had been halted and, not least, production was disorganized. Under these conditions, the Five-Year Plan 1956-1961 objectives could not be reached. The completion of this plan was decided a year earlier and, at the same time, the leaders in Bucharest launched another 119
economic development plan, this time lasting for six years, to distort as effectively as possible the profoundly negative economic effects of the Hungarian crisis (Floyd: 1965, 56). To reward the efforts with the Soviet Union to maintain the camp unity and to expeditiously fight the counterrevolutionary phenomena, and also to compensate for shortfalls caused by a poor harvest, Moscow agreed to lend Romania 450,000 tons of wheat and 60,000 tons of fodder. Moreover, payment of debt to the big brother was rescheduled, being postponed until 1959 (Harrington, Courtney: 2002, 187). Bucharest was very prompt to assist the new leadership of Janos Kadar to help it overcome the critical period and to take control of a devastated country, where hostility to communism and the Soviet Union, exacerbated by the intervention of the Red Army which drowned in blood the Hungarian revolution, gave no signs that would spread too quickly. In addition to medical services and food, the Romanian leaders have also contributed heavily to the reorganization of the Hungarian security service, downright devastated during the revolution (Ionescu: 1994, 306; Deletant: 2006, 144). * Although devoid of a social resonance, the students protests in major Romanian universities have not gone unnoticed. However, they were disorganized and quickly scattered by party activists and members of the security service. The strongest and best organized protests occurred in Timioara, but such actions were also present in Bucharest, Cluj and Iai. Dissatisfied with housing conditions and the poor quality and quantity of meals received in the canteen, but also with the pervasive censorship or mandatory participation in courses and studying Marxism-Leninism, some students from the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering of the Polytechnic Institute of Timioara organized a protest meeting in the canteen hall to lay down their dissatisfaction and to seek their resolution by the authorities. However, the event was not spontaneous. A few days before, the attempt to convince students of the counterrevolutionary character of the Hungarian crisis and the soundness of PMR measures taken in this regard had been tried. The 120
processing was to be held in small groups, during seminars. The assistant who was to break the ice, instead of a single group, found in room where teaching would have taken place the whole 5th year, a fact which made his already difficult mission more complicated. The students refuse to accept the regime alternative according to which the events in Hungary are guided by the imperialist intelligence and put into practice by counterrevolutionary hooligans; well informed, they launched a vehement tirade against the pathetic official argument, asking many hostile questions (Someanu, Iosifescu in Rusan: 2000, 626). The nature of the students claims remains an insufficiently examined subject to this day. For Karl Lupiasca, one of the protagonists of the event, the Timioara students requests regime did not have as an objective the overturn of the regime, only its improvement. He recalls that our generation generally believed that socialism in principle was good. We were in 1956, several years of indoctrination passed... We had no doubt that socialism is the future society, only that socialism, as we did it, wasnt good (Sitariu: 2004, 18). Lupiascas version is, however, explicitly contradicted by Caius Mu iu, Teodor Stanca and Aurel Baghiu, the main organizers of the protests. The former students say unequivocally that the demonstrations had, in addition to the protesting, socio-economic dimension, also an undoubtedly political, anti-communist one. (Mu iu, Stanca, Baghiu in Rusan: 2000, 677-678; Stanca in Rusan: 2000 691-703). The thesis is supported also by Ioan Munteanu, who writes that The movement, initially protesting, situated in the students own objectives, turns into a clear political action, which exceeds as importance the university in Timioara and acquires an unquestionable national significance (italics in original) (Munteanu in Rusan: 2000, 643-644). It is very likely that, if the protests would have spread, consistently expanding to other social levels, it would have acquired a pronounced revolutionary character, as it happened in Hungary, too. Limited to students, their political and implicitly anti-communist character may be overlooked; even though, certainly, there were voices who then called for reform, not the abolition of the system (an unambiguous fact, as evidenced by the Lupiascas testimony), one cannot denied, in whole, the anti-system background of the protests. The student assembly was infested, as expected, with informants. Because of the students demands, were also present deans of several faculties, Coriolan 121
Dr gulescu, Deputy Minister of Education, but also two members of C.C. of PMR, Vasile Lupu and Ilie Verde , who came without being officially called by students. The questions that the representatives of power had to answer were particularly caustic and hostile. In addition to immediate demands related to housing conditions and food quality, were debated the issue of food shortages, the need to build the Danube-Black Sea Canal and the victims it caused, the execrable living standards of workers and peasants, etc. On this occasion, the Timioara students presented a memorandum, whose idea came the three days earlier, on October 27, when took place the failed attempt to inoculate in the seminars the ideological interpretation variant of events in Hungary which included same type of requests made by their Hungarian counterparts: the withdrawal of the Red Army from Romania, a more transparent trade policy of the regime, the elimination of agricultural quotas and industrial standards, burdensome and degrading, and, not least, the abolition of cultural and media censorship. Overcome by the wave of growing hostility, the authorities assured that they will forward the requests to the party leadership, following, after three days, to give the students also the replies of the Central Committee of PMR (Mu iu, Stanca, Baghiu in Rusan: 2000, 673) . All these were happening while military forces surrounded the building and packed the campus. The next day, on October 31, the protesters and students that began to gather in the center and outside the Prefecture building, demanding the release of their colleagues detained by police forces, over two thousand in total were packed forcedly in several military trucks and taken to Becicherecu-Mic. They would be held there for a few days in some barracks used during the Second World War, where they will be continuously investigated and intimidated. Those who played a part, however small, in the organization of the protests, or stood out during their development, will be separated from the others and sent for interrogation by the security bodies (Boca: 2001, 137-138; Sitariu: 2006 , 49; Somean, Iosifescu in Rusan: 2000, 627). Among them we can enumerate those who have specifically drawn the authorities attention, the students Mu iu Caius, Stanca Teodor, Boghin Aurel, Nagy Ladislau and others, supported by the assistant from the Department of Social Sciences, Pop Gheorghe (DJTAN, PCR Banat Regional Committee fund, File 20, f. 239). Recognizing the negative influence of events in Hungary on the mood existing in the western part of the country, especially among students, local authorities will do 122
everything possible to limit its further dissemination. They will ultimately succeed because of the extremely harsh coercive measures. Let us for now look at the official sense of how the students meeting with representatives of power went in the cafeteria hall of the Polytechnic Institute. It can be appreciated from the outset that the meeting took place in an tensioned atmosphere, with booing at the party and government, maintained by hostile elements, repeaters, expelled students, eventually stimulating the participating in the meeting of most students. The hostile and anti-state nature of the meeting resulted also in that, in addition to those set out in memorandum, some elements claimed that the party is not concerned (sic!) to raise the living standards of the working people, that it must give more freedom to the press and speech, that scholarships are to be given to all students without taking into account their school situation and wealth, that the Soviet army must leave the country, etc. The influence of hostile elements among the students at that time became so great that the intervention of comrades who were present was unsuccessful, being faced with leaving the room. To forestall the possible involvement of students from other institutes in this hostile action, as well as of hostile elements among the population, measurements to isolate students (sic!) were taken with the help of armed forces, measures which have continued during day of October 31, 1956 (DJTAN, PCR Banat Regional Committee fund, File 20, f. 240) This action would not have been possible, the reports author concluded, in the event the party influence in student environments was sufficiently high, but which was not the case. Party organizations of universities do not fulfill their role as leaders both among teachers as well as among students, we are further informed. The main cause of this undesirable outcome was identified in unfitting social composition particular of party members among the teaching staff and administrative personnel (Idem, 242), who were not paying sufficient attention or even at all to the ideological indoctrination of students. The members of the Social Sciences Department of the Polytechnic Institute were especially admonished, of which the assistant Gheorghe Pop was part of, the one who sympathized with the students (Idem, f. 244-245). Instead of 123
being grounded in fidelity to the regime, teachers were selected on the professional competence basis, something appreciated by the author as a big minus in the educational activities of the universities in Timioara. The management of the educational institutes was largely established only after the training criteria (sic!), without taking account of their attachment to the regime. Consequently, the educative side of working with students was in fact inadmissible, neglected (Idem, 245). Analyzing the class structure of teachers that taught in higher education institutes in Timioara, the informant reached the following conclusion: Of the 735 teachers, lecturers and assistants from all institutions, 73 are exploiters in origin (sic!), 401 are officials, 189 worker peasants and small craftsmen and only 72 have workers origin. In addition, many of them, a very seriously fact, were members, before 1948, of the bourgeois parties, some having positions of responsibility. Given this social unsatisfactory composition, the academic teachers failed to live up to that moment and to restrict the influence of counterrevolutionary ideas and activities among students. Moreover, some of them have shown even a tacit approval in relation to the hooligan actions organized by students (Idem, 246). If the socio-professional structure of education is poor, the same could be said about students. Thus, of the 4486 university students, 2214 are sons of officials, priests, merchants, judges, lawyers, sons of exploiters and members (sic!) of the former Fascist and historical parties (Idem, 247). Many party activists were sent to the Polytechnic University houses to try to calm the spirits. In vain, as shown also in the following information note located at the Timi County National Archives (DJTAN) Today, October 31, students received the comrades sent to discuss with them shouting and screaming, openly refusing to participate in discussions, not admitting any opinions, organizing active resistance to the attempts to talk to them. No one wanted to declare who was the organizers (sic!) of this action. Even the students sons of workers and peasants workers sympathized with the hooligan manifestations, being afraid that (sic!) the mass of students is organized and not be denounced by their colleagues to betraying their (sic!) the cause. 124
Again in this home, under the pretext of military presence, the students refused to take lunch, claiming we havent worked, we dont eat, I am too excited to eat. Around 14 oclock, the mood worsened, students refusing to eat in their entirety, going on hunger strike. The foreign students (approx. 50 persons) were served the meals outside the building (sic!) of the house and in the talks with them they kept raising the issue of the situation of their colleagues in the house, wanting to know their situation. The impression of the comrades who talked to the students is that there is a crowd that, based on momentary slogans (demagogic and reactionary) sympathized among each other (sic!) (Idem, f. 105). Courses and seminars were suspended while students at the Faculty of Medicine and the Institute of Agronomic Studies sympathized with the protests of their colleagues from the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering. For a long time to come, security service employees staged nightly raids on houses to intimidate students and learn more about the organizers of the protests (Sitariu: 2004, 82). In order not to be placed in a position to compromise the completion of their studies and even their professional future, students were forced to sign statements of de-sympathizing with the claims supported on October 30 (Boca: 2001, 139). The main organizers of the protests received sentences ranging from maximum eight years and minimum three months of detention. While authorities made systematic efforts to limit the spread of information about the student protests in Timioara, they had an immediate echo in the rest of the country, too, earning the publics sympathy. If the Romanian media did not provide any detail about what happened in the town across Bega, Radio Free Europe or the Voice of America, well known radio stations in the West, have become the Romanians major sources of information in connection with what was happening in their own country (Idem, 139-140). Ioan Munteanu believes that the student demonstrations that took place in Timioara, the capital of the historical Banat, the most intense in the country, did not emerge spontaneously or accidentally. Because of the Banat life style in general, strongly anchored in a deep sense of the property right, but also because of the ethnic composition of the population, the regime manifested 125
itself in this region with more repressiveness. The bourgeois spirit, very well defined by the developed sense of ownership and civic participation, was a territorial enemy of the communist ideology. To ensure at least the perpetuation, not necessarily the victory of the system, it had to be by all means eradicated. The deportations of ethnic Germans, then of Serbian ones, during the anti-Tito paranoia, are testimony to that effect (Munteanu in Rusan: 2000, 636-637). Conclusions: de-Stalinization pitfalls and national communism gestation Using the typology proposed by Kenneth Jowitt in his reference book New World Disorder. The Leninist Extinction, every communist regime experiments in its existence three successive stages: transformation, consolidation and inclusion, respectively (1993, 220-221). In the first case, the party gradually transforms society in relation to which it also isolates itself concomitantly in order to maintain the revolutionary ideal unaltered in accordance with own ideological principles and local particularities. Then, the regime consolidates its power in society through a variety of means. Finally, in the inclusion phase, the system tries to integrate society, and not vice versa, to impart it with the revolutionary desire as highly as possible, thus advancing together, more indiscriminately, into building socialism and communism. It is apparent that the de-Stalinization initiated by Moscow deeply affected the interests and objectives of Romanian communism. While the Soviet Union was trying to advance, through the ideological platform of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, from the consolidation phase into inclusion, RPR and other popular democracies were only just beginning the process of consolidating their power. De-Stalinization was therefore set out of phase in connection with the situation and priorities of East European communist states, the periphery being far from prepared to face the challenges of inclusion in which the center, considering itself sufficiently consolidated, launched itself. From this point of view, the events in Poland and Hungary can be satisfactorily interpreted as reactions of hostile societies to and in connection with which the regime did not become an island, or strengthened enough. Another feature of Leninist regimes, but also of the liberal ones, believes Jowitt, is that social action is guided by impersonal rules. But, what 126
distinguishes the two types of political regimes is that the Leninist impersonality is not articulated, as the liberal one, by procedural values and rules, but by the charismatic impersonality of the party organization. A single fact in history, Lenin managed to reconcile the typical charisma of the individual hero and the organizational impersonality of the party to transform them in the form of an organizational hero the Bolshevik Party (Idem, 1-3). However, I believe that this impersonal charisma does not appear for all Leninist regimes, but only for those independent, not imposed from the outside, or, using Chalmers Johnsons terminology, for the nonderived ones (Johnson in Johnson: 1970, 1-32). Not benefitting from a wellrounded political culture, the derived Leninist regimes are taking shape primarily around the party leaders personality. Of course, within them also the party is credited as the main force of the fight for carrying out classless societies, but not being so ideologically developed as the autonomous regimes, the derived ones are based on more traditional means of legitimating, such as charisma and the image of the party leader. De-Stalinization ended, de facto, in 1958, after Khrushchev managed a year earlier to eliminate the prominent members of the conservative faction of the CPSU, Vyacheslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich and Dmitry Shepilov, who were also joined by the former Prime Minister Georgi Malenkov. His personality had undergone a radical change for the worse: liberal tendencies, however limited and largely simulated, have gradually given way to an increasingly despotic and self-sufficient behavior. Some evidence to this effect of former close collaborators is highly suggestive. Thus, Ghennady Voronov, a former member of the Politburo of the CPSU, says Khrushchev in 1956 and Khrushchev in 1964 were two very different people; in some ways did not at all resemble each other. His inborn democratic approach, which could only win you over when you first met him, gradually left the place for alienation, an attempt to isolate himself in a narrow circle of people, some of whom fueled the worst tendencies. The former Minister of Agriculture, Ivan Benediktov, insists in turn on the negative role that the victory against the anti-party group Molotov, Malenkov, Kahanovich and Shepilov had on Khrushchevs dictatorial metamorphosis. Inebriated with political success and now enjoying a much larger room for maneuver, the first secretary of the CPSU began to appear arrogant, to insist on the infallibility of his own judgments, and to overstate the successes achieved (Taubman: 2005, 365). Even if at the 22nd 127
Congress of the CPSU, the attack on Stalin was resumed with increased intensity, the short Soviet thaw was over. The party leader role was firmly stated in all spheres of social life and the rights granted until then to national minorities in the cultural and especially language plan were gradually withdrawn (Mendel: 1961, 371-486). In RPR, de-Stalinization was completed before it started. By December 1989, Romanian communism was, except for some brief periods of strategic semiliberalization, and neither then, essentially Stalinist. The Red Armys withdrawal was followed by an intense campaign of repression on the population. The legal constraints increased and penalties for political offenses were fully amplified, leading to the introduction of the death penalty for actions perceived as polluting the systems stability. During this period, the main parameters of what would later become the Dej and later Ceauescus national-communism were drafted. The main argument supporting this thesis I consider it to be not the withdrawal of Soviet troops, although it subsequently was abusively and improperly given connotation, but the distortions in a nationalist key of the Hungarian revolution, designed to boost anti-Hungarian bias of the population and to gain its trust and support. Without success, as we observed. This national-communist sporadic episode had no continuation in the late 50s, being resumed only at the beginning of next decade, when Moscows geo-economic claims threatened, as the leaders in Bucharest considered, industrial development and hence the political independence of Romania. But its importance is linked to the practice of manipulation of symbols and especially national prejudices, which began with nonchalance, and by which the regime sought to make the transition from the transformation stage to the consolidation one. As is known, Titoist Yugoslavia offered the first example of a national communist regime. It was succeeded by Enver Hodjas Albania, Poland under the leadership of Gomu; ka, and the list can go on with China or North Korea, etc. In Romania, the resorbing of nationalism in the ideological texture of the regime will increase gradually to a fascist-like Stalinism downright grotesque and, in the last years before the revolution of 1989, essentially xenophobic. Not making any distinctions between its national and the ideological enemies (Shafir: 1989, 3), the Ceausescu regime ended to be hated by both the capitalist and the fraternal socialist states, in a world that 128
practically no longer understood it and with which it had nothing in common. Let us not forget that the foundations of this orientation had been drawn in the last years of the Dej regime, and came as a prophylactic reaction to the inter-system effects of the intriguing ideological avatar of the Muscovite center. De-Stalinization traps were finally overcome by the RPR, as well as the challenges of post-Stalinism. The regimes crisis of legitimacy was however never overcome. The proof lies in that, throughout its entire existence, the regime has failed to pass the consolidation phase. Inclusion, even if it would probably not have had the expected success, as happened in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and China, remained always an unattainable goal for Romanian Communism. References
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Romanian responses to the Hungarian crisis of 1956

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