Blagojevich

Illinois Taxpayers
How the fiscal legacy of Blago is alive and well

VS.

Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................................. 3 Ten.Vignettes.that.Define.the.Blagojevich.Administration 1) Pension Underfunding .................................................................................................................5 2) Culture of Deficits.......................................................................................................................8 3) All Kids ...........................................................................................................................................12 4) Illinois Cares Rx .........................................................................................................................14 5) Preschool for All .......................................................................................................................16 6) Seniors Ride Free..........................................................................................................................18 7) Flu Vaccines ...................................................................................................................................20 8) I-Save Rx .........................................................................................................................................21 9) Video Game Lawsuit ....................................................................................................................23 10) Tollway Road Signs ..................................................................................................................24 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................25 Endnotes ......................................................................................................................................................26
Graphics
Graphic 1: Annual pension overfunding/underfunding during Blagojevich years ................................................................................. 6 Graphic 2: Blagojevich doubles Illinois direct bond obligations................................................................................................................. 7 Graphic 3: Cumulative.general revenue fund deficits .................................................................................................................................. 9 Graphic 4: Illinois total net assets for fiscal years 2003-2010 ...................................................................................................................10 Graphic 5: State comparison of total net assets, as of fiscal year 2010 (in billions) ................................................................................11 Graphic 6:Annual All Kids expansion expenditures and eligibility .........................................................................................................12 Graphic 7: All Kids expansion and number of uninsured children in Illinois ........................................................................................13 Graphic 8: Historical funding for Illinois Cares Rx ....................................................................................................................................14 Graphic 9: Historical Preschool for All allocations ....................................................................................................................................17 Graphic 10: Forecasts of RTA revenue loss from the Seniors Ride Free program ..................................................................................18 Graphic 11: I-SaveRx related expenditures ..................................................................................................................................................21

Guarantee of Quality Scholarship The Illinois Policy Institute is committed to delivering the highest quality and most reliable research on matters of public policy. The Institute guarantees that all original factual data (including studies, viewpoints, reports, brochures and videos) are true and correct and that information attributed to other sources is accurately represented. The Institute encourages rigorous critique of its research. If the accuracy of any material fact or reference to an independent source is questioned and brought to the Institutes attention in writing with supporting evidence, the Institute will respond. If an error exists, it will be corrected in subsequent distributions. This constitutes the complete and final remedy under this guarantee.

Blago vs. Illinois taxpayers How the fiscal legacy of former Gov. Rod Blagojevich is alive and well
I (expletive) busted my ass and pissed people off and gave your grandmother a free (expletive) ride on a bus. OK? I gave your (expletive) baby a chance to have health care. And what do I get for that? Only 13 percent of you all out there think Im doing a good job. So (expletive) all of you. Rod Blagojevich, federal wiretap from November 20081

Introduction
Rod Blagojevichs tenure as governor of Illinois will have a lasting effect on the states reputation and fiscal condition. From January 2003 to January 2009, Blagojevich made headlines for his sensational comments, political feuds and backroom deals. After being arrested in December 2008 on charges of political corruption, the Legislature removed him from office the following month. He since has been convicted on federal criminal charges. Blagojevich was a master at pairing populist rhetoric with new programs directed toward his core constituencies. That mastery, however, was confounded by incredible lapses of judgment and public grandstanding that baffled both voters and politicians. Programs such as free bus rides for seniors and free health care for children beg the question: Did he target seniors and children because it was politically expedient, or because he truly believed in these programs? In promoting new programs, did he think he was more powerful than the federal courts and U.S. Food and Drug Administration, or was he really a social entrepreneur with great resolve? Was he was a narcissist obsessed with reaching the White House, or a great man of the people? These are questions Illinoisans still are trying to answer. What is fact, however, is that to pursue his highly visible programs and agendas, Blagojevich needed money. He found it by diverting billions from the states pension system. By taking holidays from required pension system contributions and by nearly doubling Illinoiss debt, he burdened future generations to support favored groups in the present. Offered in this report are 10 programs, policies and issues that capture the essence of the Blagojevich administration. The first two are structural issues, which had a significant effect on the states financial condition. The next four are signature programs, focused on Blagojevichs core constituencies; these programs were not effective and overextended Illinoiss spending capabilities. The final four are smaller initiatives that exemplify Blagojevichs predilection to use taxpayer money to make political statements rather than improve the lives of Illinoisans.

Amanda Griffin-Johnson is a senior budget and tax policy analyst for the Illinois Policy Institute. Ted Dabrowski is the vice president of policy for the Illinois Policy Institute.

Page 4 of 28

10.vignettes.that.define.the.Blagojevich.administration

Blagojevich was Illinoiss leader for six years. His legacy will last for a generation and possibly longer.

Perhaps worst of all, as CEO of Illinois, Blagojevich institutionalized a culture of deficit spending. He accomplished this so effectively that Blagojevichs successor, Gov. Pat Quinn, and todays lawmakers feel comfortable perpetuating the ruinous habits of spending and borrowing more than the state can afford. Fiscal ineptitude is the new norm. Blagojevich was Illinoiss leader for six years. His legacy will last for a generation and possibly longer. He left Illinois on a dysfunctional path toward fiscal ruin. Fixing his mess is not just an issue of cleaning up the states financial position; it also is about restoring faith in an honest and constructive government that works for the people of Illinois.

Page 5 of 28

No..1:.Disregarded.obligations.to. state.pensioners
Policy:

Shorted the pension system by more than $2.3 billion; Foregone investment income: as much as $1 billion
Blagojevich diverted billions of dollars from the pension funds of future government retirees to pay for his own spending priorities.

Problem:
Blagojevich ballooned existing spending programs, ignoring his responsibility to ensure the health of the states pension systems. Retirees and taxpayers are on the hook for his political expediency.

Program.cost:
Excess of $3 billion for future taxpayers During his six-year tenure as governor, Blagojevich shirked his responsibility to supply the pension funds for employees of state government. By not putting aside the billions of dollars necessary to pay for those retirements, Blagojevich contributed to the instability of Illinoiss public pension system. Illinois has five pension systems for the states public school teachers, judges, university employees, state workers and members of the General Assembly. These employees save for their retirements by regularly contributing to the states public pension systems. The state also legally is required to make employer contributions to these pension systems to ensure each retiree receives his or her contractual pension at retirement. Unfortunately, Blagojevichs wayward priorities took precedence over the states pension obligations. Blagojevich had many special interests he wanted to satisfy, and for that, money was necessary. It didnt take long for him to find the golden source the states retirement systems. By not contributing the billions required for the pension system, Blagojevich was able to spend more freely on other government programs and pet projects. Blagojevich and his legislative partners got away with this for two reasons. First, there is an absolute lack of transparency in determining the health of the pension system. Since Blagojevich was not shorting existing pensioners, but instead government workers who planned to retire in the subsequent 15 years to 30 years, everyone looked the other way. Second, rather than demand that politicians pay the pension system to protect their members, some unions supported Blagojevichs spending increases for his other favorite programs2. It must be noted that Blagojevich did not act alone; other politicians, including many still in office, have played a role in todays pension crisis and its $85 billion underfunding. The number of fingerprints on the dollars diverted from the pension system is too many to count here. But under his tenure, the pension raiding became the norm.

Unfortunately, Blagojevichs wayward priorities took precedence over the states pension obligations.

Page 6 of 28

Pension.borrowing
Blagojevich was fully aware when he took office that the pension systems already faced serious problems. Early in his administration, he took two actions that often are misconstrued as attempts to fix the system. First, Blagojevich raised $10 billion in 2003 by issuing pension obligation bonds. The money from those bonds allowed him to inject billions directly into the pension system (this report will address more on the bonds later). Second, he called for a Governors Pension Commission in February 2005 to review the pension crisis and make recommendations for his administration. The commissions first two guiding principles instructed that 1) the state must fully honor its pension obligations, and 2) under no circumstances should pension payments be deferred. By the end of 2005, Blagojevich would begin to ignore the principles that came from the very pension commission he mandated. Using the strictest method to measure how underfunded the pension system became during his tenure, it becomes clear that Blagojevich did nothing to improve the health of the retirement system. Each year the General Assemblys fiscal and economic research organization, the Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability, calculates the annual dollar contributions necessary simply to keep the pension system underfunding problem from getting worse much like paying the minimum amount necessary to keep a credit card balance from growing. Graphic 1 shows this information. Blagojevich and the Legislature failed to contribute to that minimum, and as a result, the system was underfunded by $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion each year, save one, of his governorship. While Illinois law doesnt require the Legislature to make the payment equal to the minimum amount, the level of underfunding is one of the key measures to determine the health of a pension funding system.

The state pension system was underfunded by $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion each year, save one, of his governorship.

Graphic.1..Annual.pension.overfunding/underfunding. during.Blagojevich.years Figures.represent.funding.necessary.to.halt. growth.of.pension.underfunding.(in.billions)

Source: Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability

The only time Blagojevich did fully fund the pension system was in 2004, when he borrowed $10 billion using the 2003 Illinois Pension Obligation Bonds. A majority of those dollars directly went into the pension system, giving the impression that Blagojevich greatly improved the pension situation. But this did nothing to change the total liabilities of Illinois. The reality is he did nothing more than borrow from the state credit card to pay off the state mortgage. In issuing these pension bonds, Blagojevich more than doubled the amount of debt owed by Illinois taxpayers. Adding insult to injury, a majority of the debt repayment is pushed 20 years to 30 years into the future, burdening future generations.

Page 7 of 28
Unfortunately this would not be the last time Illinois borrowed to cover the pension payment. Quinn and the Legislature used this gimmick twice issuing $3.466 billion of pension obligation bonds for the fiscal year 2010 pension contribution and an additional $4.096 billion in bonds for the fiscal year 2011 contribution.3

Graphic.2..Blagojevich.doubles. Illinois.direct.bond.obligations

Source: Illinois Office of the Comptroller

Pension.holidays
Feeling satisfied with the bond issue and the 2004 funding of the pension system, Blagojevich and the 94th General Assembly quickly signed a law that allowed Illinois to take what is called a pension holiday. Under the holiday, the state was not obligated to contribute the full amount to the retirement system that is required under existing laws. Blagojevich had found his cash cow. The new law allowed Illinois to underpay the pension system a cumulative $2.314 billion from 200607. And with that, the idea that pension contributions should not be deferred was betrayed.

Lost.investment.income
Not only did Blagojevich shortchange the retirement system by billions of dollars, but every missing dollar has meant lost investment income for the system. Had the money been available for investment, and assuming they had been invested in U.S. Treasuries at a 4.5 percent annual rate of return, the retirement system would have had an additional $250 million to $1 billion in earnings by the end of Blagojevichs tenure. That missing money is an affront to retirees and taxpayers alike. Any way you measure it, Blagojevichs action severely undercut pensioners and taxpayers.

Blagojevich and the 94th General Assembly quickly signed a law that allowed Illinois to take what is called a pension holiday. Under the holiday, the state was not obligated to contribute the full amount to the retirement system that is required under existing laws.

Page 8 of 28

No..2:.A.culture.of.deficits
A six-year string of deficits is crippling Illinois Policy:
Grow spending to appease Blagojevichs core constituencies.

Problem:

Blagojevich started cementing a culture of borrowing, spending and deficits that eventually would disgrace Illinois reputation and national standing.

While Blagojevich was creating and expanding unaffordable programs, the states financial position deteriorated year after year.

Program.cost:
Worst rating of net assets in the nation. After the fiscal year 2004 budget passed, the first of his tenure, Blagojevich announced: We have changed business as usual in Springfield. We have stopped years of mismanagement and unchecked spending that had left Illinois with the worst financial condition of all 50 states.4 Nothing could be more false. Immediately after this budget, Blagojevich started cementing a culture of borrowing, spending and deficits that eventually would disgrace Illinois reputation and national standing. In fact, this culture has become so institutionalized and so ingrained, that even with the rejection of Blagojevich and all that he stood for, his successor Gov. Pat Quinn and subsequent general assemblies have done nothing but embrace it. Even worse, theyve supercharged that culture but more on that later. Under Blagojevich, massive budget deficits continued every year, eventually escalating to new record highs and leaving Illinois in shambles. A budget deficit in a given year means that the state has spent more than it received in revenues. These deficits or shortfalls have to be paid down at some point, but in the short term, they have to be financed. Just as a household that mismanages its budget might load up its credit card, draw on a home equity line, or eat into its retirement money, so must the state in order to meet its bloated spending obligations. Regrettably, the state has overspent year after year, leaving Illinois and future generations on the hook to pick up the tab. The graphic below exhibits the continuous mismanagement of Illinois general fund budget. The general fund is the main budget managed by the governor and Legislature to pay for the states daily operations, including education, health care, public safety, human services and other areas.

Page 9 of 28

Graphic.3..Cumulative.general.revenue.fund.deficits

Source: Illinois Comprehensive Financial Annual Report 2010

The trend of deficits and fiscal irresponsibility is clear. Blagojevich and the Legislature particularly were adept at finding sources to pay for these serial deficits. They racked up more debt by borrowing, they systematically underpaid the retirement system and they stopped paying bills to vendors. Its that debt Illinois taxpayers now must pay down. Most people will have difficulty measuring how large these billions of deficits are, and they could be forgiven for thinking that Illinois is no different than other states. But the next two graphics, which exhibit the level of a states net assets, or in laymans terms, its net worth, will illuminate how dire Illinois situation really is. A states net assets are calculated much the same way an individual measures his net worth by taking total assets (real estate, receivables, investments, etc.) and subtracting total liabilities (accounts payable, debts, etc.). Of course, every household wants to grow its net worth. According to the Illinois Comptrollers Office, Over time, increases and decreases in net assets measure whether the states financial position is improving or deteriorating.5 That Illinois net assets were negative should have been alarming. The fact that net assets continued to decline year after year is indefensible. The graphic on the next page shows Illinois net asset position each year and its sharp decline during the Blagojevich tenure. Sadly, the drop has accelerated under Quinns leadership.

Blagojevich and the Legislature racked up more debt by borrowing, they systematically underpaid the retirement system and they stopped paying bills to vendors.

Page 10 of 28

Graphic.4..Illinois.total.net.assets.for.fiscal.years.2003-10

Because spending wasnt cut and in fact, actually increased the states unpaid bills to vendors still totaled $3.8 billion at years end.

Source: Illinois Auditor Generals Office

Blagojevich oversaw a $16.7 billion decrease in the states net assets, to a total deficit of $29.5 billion in fiscal year 2009. This simply means that Illinois has more debt and obligations than it has in total assets, and in the private sector, this would imply bankruptcy. This type of fiscal imbalance is rare in the U.S. The Illinois Auditor Generals Office found that only three other states New Jersey, Connecticut and California had negative net assets as of fiscal year 2010 (Note: Hawaii has yet to release their annual report and was not analyzed).6 For those thinking that Illinois is not really that different from the other states, the graphic on the next page will change that perception. In 2010, Illinois was dead last in net assets in the nation. That amount of wealth destruction only can be described as scandalous and it is a key reason that Illinois debt is the worst rated in the nation. With Blagojevich gone, and a public rebuke of his legacy by those in government, one would expect Illinois to experience a major turnaround on both the fiscal and reputational fronts. But that has not been the case. The institutionalization of spending and borrowing of the Blagojevich years is ingrained, too powerfully, in Springfield. And with Quinns lead, good governance, distressingly, is not making a comeback. After running massive deficits in 2010, with unpaid bills to vendors exceeding $6 billion and a continued increase in debt, Quinn further hurt Illinoisans and businesses by signing a record income tax increase in 2011. Because spending wasnt cut and in fact, actually increased7 the states unpaid bills to vendors still totaled $3.8 billion at years end.8 The cycle that Blagojevich sped up continues unabated.

Page 11 of 28

Graphic.5..State.comparison.of.total.net.assets,. as.of.fiscal.year.2010.(in.billions)

In 2010, Illinois was dead last in net assets in the nation. That amount of wealth destruction only can be described as scandalous and it is a key reason that Illinois debt is the worst rated in the nation.

Source: Illinois Auditor Generals Office

Page 12 of 28

No..3:.All.Kids
Policy:

Hundreds of millions of dollars for middle class entitlements

Expand Medicaid to all children in Illinois regardless of citizenship or family income

As it turns out, the All Kids expansion has provided coverage to a fraction of the children projected at a much higher per-enrollee cost.

Problem:
Blagojevich traded the future of state pensioners for middle class entitlements in the present. Even though the program significantly spent more money per child than predicted, still it was ineffective at accomplishing its goals.

Program.cost:
$316.5 million over five years In 2005, Blagojevich signed into law the Covering All Kids Health Insurance Act. The act expanded Illinois KidCare program, which covered populations enrolled in Medicaid and the State Childrens Health Insurance Program to include all uninsured children in Illinois regardless of citizenship or family income, with varying premiums based on eight income levels.9 Previously, state-provided insurance coverage was reserved for minors whose family income was less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level, or FPL, or $38,700 for a family of four.10 After All Kids, millionaires could enroll their children for government-subsidized health care.11 The All Kids program was made effective in July 2006 and was forecasted to enroll 204,000 children by its fifth year, at an annual cost of $96 million.12 Under this prediction, the programs cost per child in 2011 would have been $471.13 As it turns out, the All Kids expansion has provided coverage to a fraction of the children projected at a much higher per-enrollee cost. In 2011, the program only enrolled 37 percent of the children projected, but at more than double the original per-child cost estimate.

Graphic.6..Annual.All.Kids.expansion. expenditures.and.eligibility
State fiscal year
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Cumulative total

Total payments (net of premiums)

$36,990,314 $58,786,364 $69,208,854 $76,874,175 $74,664,879 $316,524,586

Eligibility
54,958 66,043 71,623 73,793 74,887

Average cost per child

$673 $890 $966 $1,042 $997

Source: Department of Healthcare and Family Services and calculations by the Illinois Policy Institute

Although the program is more expensive per child than predicted, the program has failed to stop the growth of uninsured children in Illinois. From 2007-09, the number of uninsured children in Illinois increased by more than 64,000. Over the coming years, All Kids significantly is set to add to the states mounting Medicaid costs, which already make up almost a third of Illinois total expenses.14

Page 13 of 28

Graphic.7..All.Kids.expansion.and.number. of.uninsured.children.in.Illinois

Source: Department of Healthcare and Family Services, U.S. Census Bureau15 (Illinois children younger than 18).

All Kids emerged as a government-centric idea to reduce the number of uninsured children in Illinois. Yet years into its existence, 291,000 children remain uninsured in Illinois, and the programs cost per child significantly is higher than predicted. In January 2011, lawmakers passed a Medicaid reform bill that decreased eligibility to children whose family income is at or below 300 percent of the federal poverty level, or $66,150 for a family of four.16 While this was a step in the right direction, All Kids is far from the best solution for achieving the goal of affordable, sustainable health care coverage for Illinois children. Medicaid is a broken system, and All Kids increasingly strains a program that is supposed to act as a safety net for those who need it most. In Illinois, doctor shortages, low provider reimbursement rates and the unreliable nature of state payments have made it difficult for Medicaid recipients to access care. A study conducted in 2010 of specialist clinics in Illinois found that Medicaid patients were six times more likely than privately insured patients to be denied an appointment. 17 The Covering All Kids Health Insurance Act should be replaced with more effective and economical health care solutions, such as introducing medical savings accounts or reducing insurance mandates.18

Years into the existence of the All Kids program, 291,000 children remain uninsured in Illinois, and the programs cost per child significantly is higher than predicted.

Page 14 of 28

No..4:.Illinois.Cares.Rx
$750 million since 2006 Policy:.
Expand prescription drug coverage beyond Medicare eligibility

Problem:.

Creating and expanding a program that the state cannot afford can create a culture of dependency that is painful to end.

Blagojevich spent money the state did not have to expand a program that could not be sustained, creating dependency among one of the states most vulnerable populations.

Program.cost:.
$750 million since 2006 In 2006, the federal government made Medicare Part D, a voluntary prescription drug benefit, available for Medicare recipients. In response to the new Medicare program, which required enrollees to pay monthly premiums, deductibles and copays, Blagojevich promoted state-based prescription drug coverage to pay most of those costs for seniors. He signed the No Senior Left Behind law in June 2005, which created Illinois Cares Rx by combining and expanding the states previous prescription program SeniorCare and Circuit Breaker to fit the new Medicare Part D plans.19 The program was set to have the income limits at 200 percent of FPL, or $28,480 for a household of two.20 But over the years, the maximum income limits have been expanded. In fiscal year 2011, the income limits were about 250 percent of FPL, or $36,775 for a household of two.21 But creating and expanding a program that the state cannot afford can create a culture of dependency that is painful to end. Because of a maintenance of effort clause in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, also known as ObamaCare, state authorities now are unable to adjust many health care programs that receive federal money. As an optional program that does not receive federal reimbursement, Illinois Cares Rx is one of the few health care programs legislators can adjust, making it a likely target for necessary budget cuts.22

Graphic.8..Historical.funding.for.Illinois.Cares.Rx
Fiscal year
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Cumulative total

General Revenue Fund

$6,164 $84,767,193 $47,631,121 $39,996,231 $42,226,077 $910,987 $215,537,773

Other state funds

$120,301,602 $103,916,079 $69,176,267 $39,694,629 $79,724,313 $127,669,592 $540,482,482

Combined total
$120,307,766 $188,683,272 $116,807,388 $79,690,860 $121,950,390 $128,580,579 $756,020,255

Source: Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services

Page 15 of 28
For fiscal year 2012, the Legislature cut the programs budget to $53.7 million.23 As part of the program reforms, the maximum income requirement has been decreased to 200 percent of FPL, and co-pays for generic drugs were increased to $5 from $2.50.24 While Illinois Cares Rx understandably is a popular program by those who enroll, Illinois simply does not have the ability to pay for such expansive benefits. Creating a program the state cant pay for only to take it away creates uncertainty and instability for the states elderly population. A prescription assistance program also can distort the market and actually keep prescription drug prices artificially high by hiding the true cost of medicines from consumers. The state should work toward reducing subsidizes for prescription drugs rather than encouraging higher prices.

Creating a program the state cant pay for only to take it away creates uncertainty and instability for the states elderly population.

Page 16 of 28

No..5:.Preschool.for.All
$107 million over three years Policy:.
Expand government-paid preschool programs beyond those at risk for academic failure

While some research finds preschool has positive effects for low-income, minority students, the research in universal early education programs does not necessarily support such optimistic claims.

Problem:.
Another example of Blagojevich unnecessarily expanding middle-class entitlements, even though state resources already were stretched too thin

Program.cost:.
$107 million over three years As part of his fiscal year 2007 budget, Blagojevich proposed Preschool for All, a program which would allow every three- and four-year-old in Illinois to attend high-quality preschool.25 The program required participating preschools to be staffed by experienced teachers with bachelors degrees and early education training. 26 The initiative received endorsements from groups such as the Illinois Federation of Teachers, the Chicago Teachers Union, the National Association of Social Workers and the Chicago Fraternal Order of Police.27, 28 The preschool programs could be offered at public and private schools, child care centers, community and faith-based organizations, Head Start and other settings. Unlike the states existing early education programs which only targeted children at risk of academic failure, eligibility would be expanded. According to one of Blagojevichs news releases, The new Preschool for All program will continue to prioritize at-risk children, but expands it to also serve middle-income families.29 Under the legislation, eligibility for the program first was prioritized on children at risk for academic failure and then on children with family incomes of less than 400 percent of FPL, or $82,600 for a family of four.30 While promoting Preschool for All, the governor claimed there would be huge payoffs from the program. In another news release, Blagojevich is quoted: Study after study and basic common sense tell us that giving kids the chance to start reading early and learning early is the single most important step we can take towards helping them become successful students.31 The news release also includes claims such as: Children who begin reading at age three or four do better throughout their academic careers.32 While some research finds preschool has positive effects for low-income, minority students,33 the research in universal early education programs does not necessarily support such optimistic claims. In January 2010, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services released the results of an impact study of Head Start, one of the oldest and most established early education programs in the United States. The study used the gold standard of research, a random assignment design with a very large, representative sample. It found that Head Start fundamentally has no lasting effects on participants.34 Researchers concluded that by the end of 1st grade, there were few significant differences between the Head Start group as a whole and the control group as a whole for either cohort.35 Other studies have found similar results with the academic gains from preschool fading out after a few years.36

Page 17 of 28

Graphic.9..Historical.Preschool.for.All.allocations37
Fiscal year
Preschool for All total Chicago Downstate

2007
$45,000,000 $16,650,000 $28,350,000

2008
$29,606,941 $10,954,568 $18,652,373

2009
$32,400,000 $11,988,000 $20,412,000

Source: Illinois State Board of Education

Over three years, the Illinois State Board of Education allocated more than $100 million to Preschool for All. Since 2009, all of the states pre-kindergarten programs have been integrated under the Preschool for All banner and programs now have to serve at least 80 percent at-risk children.38 In light of the fact that many of the benefits of preschool dissipate by the end of elementary school, programs such as Preschool for All solely should be focused on at-risk children.

In light of the fact that many of the benefits of preschool dissipate by the end of elementary school, programs such as Preschool for All solely should be focused on atrisk children.

Page 18 of 28

No..6:.Seniors.Ride.Free
$100 million over three years Policy:.
Provide free rides for all seniors on the Chicago-area regional transportation system, regardless of the riders ability to pay

A study of the Seniors Ride Free program in 2010 by the University of Illinois at Chicagos Urban
Transportation

Problem:.
Blagojevich created another unsustainable, feel-good program for seniors that ignored the financial condition of both the Regional Transportation Authority and general government finances.

Program.cost:.
$100 million over three years In 2008, suburban Chicagos commuter train system, the Regional Transportation Authority, faced significant service cuts because of financial problems. In response, the General Assembly approved a 0.25 percent sales tax increase to provide the system, or RTA, with more money. Blagojevich included a provision in an amendatory veto that provided all Illinois senior citizens can ride public transportation for free.39 He encouraged the General Assembly to approve his amendatory veto, which they did, and the Seniors Ride Free program began March 17, 2008. The program rapidly grew. Fewer than 2,000 people were registered for the program in March 2008, and by December 2009 more than 396,000 people were registered. A survey of Senior Ride Free participants found that 28 percent had annual incomes greater than $55,000. 40 During that period, free senior rides represented 5.2 percent of the Chicago Transit Authoritys total ridership.41 But high participation in the program came at a high cost. A study of the Seniors Ride Free program in 2010 by the University of Illinois at Chicagos Urban Transportation Center concluded that the program was unsustainable. The UIC study estimated that the revenue loss from the Seniors Ride Free program to be $38.5 million for 2009. The study forecasted that, without a fare increase, the estimated revenue loss of the Seniors Ride Free program by 2030 would be around $73.5 million.42

Center concluded that the program was unsustainable.

Graphic.10..Forecasts.of.RTA.revenue.loss.from.the.Seniors. Ride.Free.program
Year
Median value of revenue loss

2008*
$19.1-$51.2 million

2009
$38.5 million

2010
$40.2 million

2015
$46.3 million

2020
$54.5 million

2030
$73.5 million

*March 2008 through December 2008 Source: University of Illinois at Chicagos Urban Transportation Center report Note: Assumes no fare increase for all years.

Faced with the fiscal challenges of the program, lawmakers enacted reforms in 2011.43 Beginning in September 2011, Seniors Ride Free changed to an income-based program. Under the reforms, all seniors are eligible for a 50 percent reduced fare on transit, but free rides only will be available to seniors with annual incomes of $27,610 or less for a one-person household, $36,635 or less for a two-person household and $45,657 or less for a household of three or more.44

Page 19 of 28
Blagojevichs Seniors Ride Free program might have been well-intentioned, but fiscally it was not responsible. Government services cost money, and exempting entire segments of users from bearing those costs while sticking taxpayers with the tab is pandering at its worst. Unnecessary and expensive feel good programs, such as these, end up crowding out money for other government services. These programs create the illusion that Illinois has a revenue problem, which can lead to tax and fee increases, when in reality Illinois has a fiscal responsibility problem.

Without a fare increase, the estimated revenue loss of the Seniors Ride Free program by 2030 would be around $73.5 million.

Page 20 of 28

No..7:.Flu.vaccines
$2.6 million Policy:.
Bypass the FDA and federal law to acquire flu vaccines during vaccine shortage

Problem:.

The state spent $2.6 million on vaccine doses that officials knew they were not allowed to bring into the country.

Blagojevich ignored the federal government and spent $2.6 million on unnecessary vaccines that could not be imported to the U.S. The vaccines eventually were destroyed in Pakistan.

Program.cost:.
$2.6 million In October 2004, the nation was facing a flu vaccine shortage after the FDA deemed that half of the flu vaccine supply was unsafe.45 In response to this shortage, officials from the governors office sought other avenues to acquire flu vaccine doses to cover Illinois priority population, which includes residents older than 65, the chronically ill, pregnant women and others. In late October 2004, a memo from the Illinois Department of Public Health, or IDPH, stated that 160,000 to 200,000 doses would cover Illinois priority population.46 The state quickly entered into a tentative agreement with a European pharmaceutical supplier to buy more than 250,000 flu vaccine doses for Illinois use 25 percent more doses than IDPH estimated that the state would need. State officials also worked with the supplier to secure doses for other states and local governments. The agreement was subject to FDA approval, as importation of vaccines without FDA approval is illegal. In the meantime, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention procured enough vaccine for Illinois priority population.47 Documentation shows that although state officials knew that FDA approval to import the vaccines was unlikely and the state was going to receive enough vaccine doses from the federal government, the governors office went ahead with the purchase in January 2005. The state spent $2.6 million on vaccine doses that officials knew they were not allowed to bring into the country. After unsuccessful attempts to sell the supply internationally, the doses were donated to earthquake survivors in Pakistan a year later. By then the doses had expired, and Pakistan destroyed the vaccines.48 This is a story that shouldnt have happened. A report from the Illinois auditor general found a number of discrepancies in the states dealings with the European pharmaceutical company, including problems with the timeliness of the contract and inadequate planning and coordination. 49 But it could have been worse. The auditor generals report found that officials from the governors office did not have written contracts with other state and local governments for which it worked to procure vaccines, which could have made Illinois liable for the entire stock of vaccine at a cost of more than $8.2 million.50 When Blagojevich was asked about the vaccines in March 2005, he replied: When I think about the decisions Ive made as governor, I would say thats probably the best decision Ive ever made.51 But in the end, the state wasted $2.6 million.

Page 21 of 28

No..8:.I-SaveRx
$1 million Policy:.
In another attempt to bypass the FDA, Blagojevich set up a prescription drug importation program from Canada and other countries.

Problem:.
Blagojevich promoted a program that encouraged residents to flaunt federal law, resulting in more wasted taxpayer money.

Program.cost:.
$1 million In 2003, Blagojevich wanted to address prescription drug costs for Illinois residents. His solution was to import drugs from countries such as Canada, which artificially have lower prescription prices because of price controls. Blagojevich petitioned the FDA to allow the state to import drugs from foreign countries and released a study claiming a drug importation system could save the state more than $90 million.52 In June 2004, the FDA responded that they do not believe a waiver could be granted to Illinois to import prescriptions, but nonetheless in October 2004, Blagojevich launched I-SaveRx, a prescription drug importation program.53 Through an online portal, I-SaveRx was meant to facilitate the purchase of prescription drugs for Illinois residents from foreign pharmacies. By mid-2006, Wisconsin, Vermont, Kansas and Missouri also joined the I-SaveRx program. There was a significant push to publicize the program. In all, the Illinois auditor general estimates the state spent at least $944,471 to promote I-SaveRx and complete fact-finding and inspection trips.54 But this figure likely underestimates the actual cost as the Auditor Generals Office only could estimate payroll costs for 29 percent of the employees who participated in marketing the program because of data limitations. Blagojevich also toured the state speaking with community leaders to spread the word about the program.55 Despite all this work to promote I-SaveRx, in its first 19 months of operation, only 4,954 individuals placed orders through the program with 3,689 participants from Illinois.

The FDA said they do not believe a waiver could be granted to Illinois to import prescriptions, but nonetheless in October 2004, Blagojevich launched I-SaveRx, a prescription drug importation program.

Graphic.11..I-SaveRx.related.expenditures
Expenditure description
Payroll cost Travel Contractual services Marketing Legal services Total

Amount
$488,000 $111,000 $71,018 $54,453 $220,000 $944,471

Source: Illinois Auditor Generals Office

Aside from low participation, one glaring problem with the program was that it violated federal law. According to a report from the auditor general, Virtually every time an individual or entity imports

Page 22 of 28
or causes the importation of a prescription drug, they are in violation of [federal law].56 Although the FDA did not pursue civil action or criminal prosecution against individuals as it could have under federal law, by March 2005 federal officials were stopping some shipments of prescription drugs from entering the United States.57 The auditor general also found problems with the inspection of foreign pharmacies by Illinois officials. In their review of Pharmacy Inspection Forms for the foreign pharmacies, the Auditor Generals Office found that 40 percent of pharmacies did not have completed inspection forms, only 11 percent of the forms indicated whether the pharmacy was approved and in some cases supervisory review was done by the same person who performed the inspection. The program quietly suspended operation in February 2009.58 If state officials believe that federal laws are not productive, there are more suitable ways to challenge those laws than using taxpayer money to encourage residents to violate federal law. Blagojevich went ahead anyway.

If state officials believe that federal laws are not productive, there are more suitable ways to challenge those laws than using taxpayer money to encourage residents to violate federal law. Blagojevich went ahead anyway.

Page 23 of 28

No..9:..Video.game.lawsuit
$520,000 Policy:.
Protect children by banning the sale of certain video games to minors

Problem:.
Blagojevich ignored existing court decisions that established the bans violated the First Amendment. He challenged the courts at taxpayers expense.

Program.cost:.
$520,000 In 2005, Blagojevich pushed for a law banning sales of certain video games to minors. Multiple states and cities previously had passed similar laws, but all had been thrown out by federal judges on the basis that they violated the First Amendment. In fact, in 2001, a decision by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, which is binding on Illinois courts, came to this same conclusion.59 In the 2001 decision, the city of Indianapolis had to pay $318,000 in legal fees and other costs.60 Even though an Illinois ban would have little chance of surviving a legal challenge and losing would result in state liability for legal fees, Blagojevich still pursued this legislation. As soon as the legislation was signed, a lawsuit ensued and a federal judge declared the law violated the First Amendment, and ordered the state to pay almost $500,000 in plaintiff s legal fees. But the state was so lax in paying the fees that the judge eventually required the state to outline a payment plan. The state ended up paying $520,000, including interest from late payment, in unspent money from various state agencies.61 This fools errand was a way for Blagojevich to make a political statement at taxpayer expense.

This fools errand was a way for Blagojevich to make a political statement at taxpayer expense.

Page 24 of 28

No..10. .Tollway.road.signs :
$480,000 Policy:.
Putting the governors name on tollway signs

Problem:.

The signs came under criticism in 2006 because, at an average cost of $15,000, the signs significantly were more expensive than the usual $200 tollway signs.

Taxpayers shouldnt be on the hook for signs promoting a politician on public areas, especially if the signs egregiously are expensive.

Program.cost:.
$480,000 In 2004, the Illinois Tollway underwent significant renovations including the construction of open road tolling, which allows drivers to pay tolls with their I-PASS devices without slowing down to go through toll booths. As part of the renovation, the Illinois Tollway Authority put up 32 signs announcing Open Road Tolling | Rod R. Blagojevich, Governor at a total cost of $480,000.62 Blagojevich held news media events at the inauguration of multiple open road tolling lanes, which he considered to be one of his major initiatives.63, 64 The signs came under criticism in 2006 because, at an average cost of $15,000, the signs significantly were more expensive than the usual $200 tollway signs.65 The Tollway Authority chairman, a Blagojevich appointee, claimed that no one in an oversight position at the tollway or the governors office knew about the signs, but he was proud to have the governors name on those signs.66 A spokesperson for the governor said that the signs were the tollways project, but we were fine with the decision.67 The tollway signs were removed after Blagojevichs impeachment in December 2008, and in June 2011, Illinois banned state signs with the names of public officials or candidates for public office.68, 69

Page 25 of 28

Conclusion
Repairing the damage from Blagojevichs tenure as governor will take more than ending unaffordable programs and replacing tollway signs. Many of his policies will influence Illinois for years to come. He came into office at a time when Illinois residents didnt trust their government because the state was the corrupt laughingstock of the nation. His administration did not heal those wounds, but made them worse. This report is not only about Blagojevich. It is meant to remind Illinois why leadership matters. Poor leadership can lead to weak governance, corruption and fiscal irresponsibility. Sound leadership also can be the driving force to return Illinois to greatness and economic prosperity. As important as governors are, they arent the only party responsible for good or bad policies. Its necessary to remember that Blagojevich was not alone in many of the policy ideas he promoted. He had a General Assembly behind him, and some of those lawmakers remain in office. The irresponsible policies of Quinn and legislative leaders are evidence that Springfield has not changed. Although Blagojevich is gone, overspending and borrowing continue, and taxpayers must bear the burden of an unsustainable state government. A repudiation of Blagojevich is not enough. Illinoisans must rise together and repudiate all government officials who continue to support Blagojevichs culture of fiscal ruin. In order to turn the state around, the era of corruption and pay-for-play has to end. Transparency and accountability need to be expanded at all levels of government to allow citizens to see where every dollar goes and why. Only then will citizens regain their trust in public officials. Illinois has limitless potential, and Illinoisans know they deserve better than what they have been receiving. With good leadership, Illinois can turn the pages on Blagojevichs legacy and look forward to a brighter future.

Blagojevich came into office at a time when Illinois residents didnt trust their government because the state was the corrupt laughingstock of the nation. His administration did not heal those wounds, but made them worse.

Page 26 of 28

Endnotes
1 The Blagojevich trials, Chicago Tribune, 11 July 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-11/news/ct-editblago-20100709_1_rod-blagojevich-senate-seat-criminal-trial. 2 State of Illinois, Gov. Blagojevichs plan to provide comprehensive health coverage for every child in Illinois earns key endorsements Office of the Governor, 13 October 2005, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=4389 3 State of Illinois, A Report on the Financial Condition of the Illinois State Retirement Systems, Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability, March 2011, http://www.ilga.gov/commission/cgfa2006/Upload/ FinCondILStateRetirementSysMarch2011.pdf. This link did not work for me. 4 State of Illinois, Budget cuts more than $1.3 billion in waste and inefficiency, creates rainy day fund, Office of the Governor, 1 June 2003, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=2147. 5 State of Illinois, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 2010, Office of the Illinois Comptroller, 30 June 2011, http://www.ioc. state.il.us/index.cfm/linkservid/083E57BA-1CC1-DE6E-2F48783E3F984EF7/showMeta/0/. 6 State of Illinois, Statewide Financial Statement Audit For the Year Ended June 30, 2010, Office of the Auditor General, 21 July 2011 http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/linkservid/083E57BA-1CC1-DE6E-2F48783E3F984EF7/showMeta/0/. 7 Collin Hitt, Budget FAIL, Illinois Policy Institute, 21 June 2011, http://www.illinoispolicy.org/budgetFAIL.

8 State of Illinois, State Races to Pay Medicaid Bills, Office of the Comptroller, July 2011, http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/ linkservid/66EE26E3-1CC1-DE6E-2F489DF0E5686654/showMeta/0/. 9 State of Illinois, About All Kids, All Kids, http://www.allkids.com/hfs8269.html.

10 State of Illinois, Covering All Kids Health Insurance Program Audit, Office of the Auditor General, May 2010, http://www. auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/10-All-Kids-Hlth-Ins-Pgm-digest.htm. 11 State of Illinois, Answers to Your Questions about All Kids, Department of Healthcare and Family Services, 2010, http://www. allkids.com/assets/hfs8269.pdf. This link did not work for me. 12 State Watch: Chicago Tribune Examines Concerns over Illinois All Kids Program, Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report, Henry K. Kaiser Family Foundation, October 24, 2005, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/daily-reports/2005/october/24/dr00033287. aspx?referrer=search. 13 Cost per child based on Kaiser State Watch article on former-Governor Blagojevichs prediction of 204,000 in enrollment at $96 million in costs by 2011. 14 Kristina Rasmussen, Testimony Submitted to the Illinois House of Representatives

Special Committee on Medicaid Reform, Illinois Policy Institute, December 13, 2010, http://illinoispolicy.org/uploads/files/10.12.13%20 Kristina%20Rasmussen%20Medicaid%20Testimony.pdf. This link did not work for me. 15 U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage Status by State (Children under 18), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/ data/historical/index.html. 16 State of Illinois Public Act 096-1501, 96th General Assembly, http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=&SessionI d=76&GA=96&DocTypeId=HB&DocNum=5420&GAID=10&LegID=50456&SpecSess=&Session=. 17 Joanna Bisgaier & Karin V. Rhodes, Auditing Access to Specialty Care for Children with Public Insurance, 364 N. Eng. J. Med. 2324 (2011), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1013285. 18 Illinois Policy Institute, 2011 - 2012 Illinois Legislators Guide to the Issues, 27 April 2011, http://illinoispolicy.org/news/article. asp?ArticleSource=4029. 19 State of Illinois, Gov. Blagojevich signs No Senior Left Behind law, Office of the Governor, 29 June 2005, http://www.illinois. gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=4107. 20 State of Illinois, Public Act 094-0086, 94th General Assembly, 29 June 2005, http://ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/94/ PDF/094-0086.pdf. 21 State of Illinois, Illinois Cares Rx Changes, Department of Healthcare and Family Services, June 2011, http://www.hfs.illinois. gov/assets/icrxfactsheet.pdf. 22 Civic Federation, State of Illinois FY2012 Recommended Operating and Capital Budget: Analysis and Recommendations, 9 May 2011, http://www.civicfed.org/sites/default/files/FY2012%20State%20of%20Illinois%20Budget%20Analysis.pdf.

Page 27 of 28
23 Doug Finke, Illinois Cares Rx participants being notified of cutback, State Journal-Register, 14 July 2011, http://www. behealthyspringfield.com/sections/local-news/illinois-cares-rx-participants-being-notified-of-cutbacks. 24 State of Illinois, Copayments and Cost-Sharing, Illinois Cares Rx, http://www.illinoiscaresrx.com/copayments.html.

25 State of Illinois, Gov. Blagojevich unveils landmark plan to give every 3 and 4 year - old in Illinois access to preschool Office of the Governor, 12 February 2006, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=4660. 26 State of Illinois, Governor Blagojevich joins parents and early education experts to celebrate major preschool expansion, Office of the Governor, 7 May 2006, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=4834. 27 Preschool for All Endorsers, Early Learning Illinois, http://www.earlylearningillinois.org/p4aendorsers.html.

28 State of Illinois, Governor Blagojevich joins parents and early education experts to celebrate major preschool expansion, Office of the Governor, 7 May 2006, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=4834. 29 State of Illinois, Governor Blagojevichs Preschool for All plan and college tuition relief plan win legislative approval, Office of the Governor, 4 May 2006, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=4827. 30 State of Illinois, SB1497, 94th General Assembly, 25 July 2006, http://ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=&SessionId= 50&GA=94&DocTypeId=SB&DocNum=1497&GAID=8&LegID=19547&SpecSess=&Session=. 31 State of Illinois, Gov. Blagojevich signs groundbreaking Preschool for All legislation, Office of the Governor, 25 July 2006, http:// www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=5108. 32 State of Illinois, Gov. Blagojevich signs groundbreaking Preschool for All legislation, Office of the Governor, 25 July 2006, http:// www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=5108. 33 Susanna Loeb, et al, How Much is Too Much? The Influence of Preschool Centers on Childrens Development Nationwide, Policy Analyses for California Education, 4 November 2005, http://gse.berkeley.edu/research/pace/reports/Stanford_Berkeley_pr23DA13.pdf. 34 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families Head Start Impact Study, January 2010, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/hs/impact_study/reports/impact_study/executive_summary_final.pdf. 35 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families Head Start Impact Study, January 2010, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/hs/impact_study/reports/impact_study/executive_summary_final.pdf. 36 Robert Holland and Don Soifer, How Sound An Investment? An Analysis of Federal Preschool Proposals, Lexington Institute, 5 March 2008, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Education/how-sound-an-investment.pdf. 37 The Illinois Policy Institute requested Preschool for All expenditures from the Illinois State Board of Education. The Illinois State Board of Education responded that it would be unable to provide expenditure information in a timely manner, but it could provide allocation information. 38 Illinois State Board of Education, Response to follow-up question to Freedom of Information Act Request from the Illinois Policy Institute, 9 September 2011. 39 State of Illinois, Gov. Blagojevich, Rev. Meeks, urge General Assembly to approve Governors plan to provide free public transportation to seniors, Office of the Governor, 13 January 2008, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=6545. 40 Joseph DiJohn, Paul Metaxatos, Ashish Sen, Mike Pagano, Lise Dirks and Valbona Kokoshi, Analysis of the RTA Seniors and People with Disabilities Ride Free Programs, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs, November 2010, http://www.utc.uic.edu/research/reports/RTARideFreePrograms.pdf. 41 Joseph DiJohn, Paul Metaxatos, Ashish Sen, Mike Pagano, Lise Dirks and Valbona Kokoshi, Analysis of the RTA Seniors and People with Disabilities Ride Free Programs, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs, November 2010, http://www.utc.uic.edu/research/reports/RTARideFreePrograms.pdf. 42 Joseph DiJohn, Paul Metaxatos, Ashish Sen, Mike Pagano, Lise Dirks and Valbona Kokoshi, Analysis of the RTA Seniors and People with Disabilities Ride Free Programs, University of Illinois at Chicago College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs, November 2010, http://www.utc.uic.edu/research/reports/RTARideFreePrograms.pdf. 43 Jon Hilkevitch, Free rides for most seniors to end Sept. 1, Chicago Tribune, 1 June 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/201106-01/news/ct-met-transit-senior-rides-0602-20110601_1_free-rides-program-free-rides-seniors. 44 State of Illinois, Governor Quinn Signs Legislation to Reform Statewide Transit, Office of the Governor, 14 February 2011, http:// www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=9218. 45 State of Illinois 95th General Assembly house of Representatives Special Investigative Committee, Final Report of the Special Investigative Committee, 8 January 2009, http://ilga.gov/house/committees/95Documents/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20 Special%20Investigative%20Committee.pdf. This link did not work for me.

Page 28 of 28
46 http://www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/FY06-Flu-Vaccine-ISaveRXMGMT-digest.pdf. 47 State of Illinois 95th General Assembly house of Representatives Special Investigative Committee, Final Report of the Special Investigative Committee, 8 January 2009, http://ilga.gov/house/committees/95Documents/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20 Special%20Investigative%20Committee.pdf. 48 John Chase, Kim Barker and David Kidwell, How Illinois flu vaccine vanished in Pakistan, Chicago Tribune, 5 August 2007, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-08-05/news/0708040385_1_vaccine-pakistan-flu-shots. 49 State of Illinois, Flu Vaccine Procurement and the I-SaveRx Program, Office of the Auditor General, September 2006, http:// www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/FY06-Flu-Vaccine-ISaveRX-MGMT-digest.pdf. 50 State of Illinois, Flu Vaccine Procurement and the I-SaveRx Program, Office of the Auditor General, September 2006, http:// www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/FY06-Flu-Vaccine-ISaveRX-MGMT-digest.pdf. 51 John Chase, English firm sues Illinois over flu vaccine contract, Chicago Tribune, 1 April 2005, http://articles.chicagotribune. com/2005-04-01/news/0504010217_1_flu-vaccine-comptroller-dan-hynes-illinois. 52 State of Illinois, Blagojevich releases much-anticipated report on feasibility and savings of prescription drug importation, Office of the Governor, 27 October 2003, http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=2346. 53 State of Illinois, Flu Vaccine Procurement and the I-SaveRx Program, Office of the Auditor General, September 2006, http:// www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/FY06-Flu-Vaccine-ISaveRX-MGMT-digest.pdf. 54 State of Illinois, Flu Vaccine Procurement and the I-SaveRx Program, Office of the Auditor General, September 2006, http:// www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/FY06-Flu-Vaccine-ISaveRX-MGMT-digest.pdf. 55 http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=3440

56 State of Illinois, Flu Vaccine Procurement and the I-SaveRx Program, Office of the Auditor General, September 2006, http:// www.auditor.illinois.gov/Audit-Reports/Performance-Special-Multi/Performance-Audits/FY06-Flu-Vaccine-ISaveRX-MGMT-digest.pdf. 57 John Chase and Christi Parsons, U.S. blocks drugs sent from Canada, Chicago Tribune, 10 March 2005, http://articles. chicagotribune.com/2005-03-10/news/0503100295_1_drug-imports-fda-cholesterol-lowering. 58 State of Illinois, I-Save Rx Information Memoranda, Department of Human Services, 17 February 2009, http://www.dhs.state. il.us/page.aspx?item=42489. 59 Declan McCullagh, Illinois video game law challenged in court, CNET News, 25 July 2005, http://news.cnet.com/Illinois-videogame-law-challenged-in-court/2100-1043_3-5803988.html. 60 James Kimberly, Law bars violent game sales to children, Chicago Tribune, 26 July 2005, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/200507-26/news/0507260222_1_video-games-illinois-retail-merchants-association-video-software-dealers-association. 61 State: Video victors in lawsuit will get legal fees by January, Associated Press, 18 December 2006, http://mywebtimes.com/archives/ ottawa/display.php?id=288821. 62 Richard Wronski, Rod Blagojevichs name coming off tollway signs, Chicago Tribune, 2 February 2009, http://www.chicagotribune. com/news/local/chi-tollway-signs-30jan30,0,1316658.story. 63 Jon Hilkevitch, Open-road toll lanes wait for Blagojevich, Chicago Tribune, 21 November 2005, http://articles.chicagotribune. com/2005-11-21/news/0511210061_1_open-road-tolling-toll-plaza-interstate-highway. 64 Jon Hilkevitch, Tollway board says it missed some big signs, Chicago Tribune, 28 July 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune. com/2006-07-28/news/0607280291_1_tollway-open-road-tolling-rod-r-blagojevich. 65 Illinois: Governor Campaigns Through $15k Highway Signs, http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/11/1191.asp.

66 Jon Hilkevitch, Tollway board says it missed some big signs, Chicago Tribune, 28 July 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune. com/2006-07-28/news/0607280291_1_tollway-open-road-tolling-rod-r-blagojevich. 67 Jon Hilkevitch, Tollway board says it missed some big signs, Chicago Tribune, 28 July 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune. com/2006-07-28/news/0607280291_1_tollway-open-road-tolling-rod-r-blagojevich. 68 New sign of the times: No Blagojevich, Chicago Tribune, 20 January 2009, http://archive.chicagobreakingnews.com/2009/01/ new-sign-of-the-times-no-blagojevich.html. 69 Monique Garcia, Illinois politicians can no longer put names on road signs, Chicago Tribune, 16 June 2011, http://www. chicagotribune.com/news/politics/clout/chi-illinois-politicians-can-no-longer-put-names-on-road-signs-20110616,0,5393130.story.