Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics

Matthew Arnold and the Pragmatics of Hebraism and Hellenism Author(s): Donald D. Stone Source: Poetics Today, Vol. 19, No. 2, Hellenism and Hebraism Reconsidered: The Poetics of Cultural Influence and Exchange II (Summer, 1998), pp. 179-198 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1773438 . Accessed: 05/05/2011 12:37
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MatthewArnoldand the Pragmatics of Hebraismand Hellenism

Donald D. Stone
English, CUNY

The power of intellect and science, the power of beauty, the power of social life and manners,-these are what Greece so felt, and fixed, and may stand for.They are great elements in our humanisation. The power of conduct is another great element; and this was so felt and fixed by Israel that we can never with justice refuse to permit Israel, in spite of all his shortcomings, to stand for it. Arnold, "Equality,"1878

Abstract Matthew Arnold in Culture Anarchy and describes Hebraism and Hellenism as the "two points of influence [between which] moves our world."Arnold was not speaking as an expert in Judeo-Christian or Greek studies; he used the terms pragmatically, flexibly,to denote both a dual historical heritage and two complementary states of being (strictness conscience spontaneity consciousness, and of of respectively) that had practical bearing in a newly industrial and democratic world. An educator by profession, and one deeply influenced by what he perceived as France'ssuperiority in educational and social matters, Arnold initially argued on behalf of the Hellenic, or critical, spirit: the ability to see things freely and objectively, without religious or political bias. But he never divorced the Hellenic stress on knowing from the Hebraic emphasis on conduct. As a disciple of Socrates, he invoked that master's belief in the "interdependence of virtue and knowledge." Lecturing to an American audience in 1883, Matthew Arnold was pleased by the impact of his words, and he was reminded of Benjamin Disraeli's
PoeticsToday 19:2 (Summer 1998) Copyright ? 1998 by the Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics.

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flattering comment, made two years earlier, that he "was the only living Englishman who had become a classic in his own lifetime,"in part through his facility in "launching phrases" (1895, 2:219, 269). From less friendly quarters, Arnold's predilection for such quotable phrases and terms as "sweetness and light," "Philistinism," and "saving remnant" (the latter phrase proved especially popular in America) has been derided as a Victorian equivalent of the modern taste for sound bites-"scrupulously empty phrases," in J. Hillis Miller's view, that serve only to keep "the void open after the disappearance of God" (1965 [1963]: 265). To admirers such as John Holloway or Steven Marcus, however, these phrases are admirable stylistic devices, inculcating "value frames" in the reader (Holloway 1965 [1953]: 217).These "handy and detachable bits of phraseology are memorable," Marcus claims, "not merely by virtue of their ingenuity but also because they refer to and are part of spirited and significant argumentative discussions that have a resonance beyond their original historical context and still retain some connections with matters of issue today" (1994: 165). For Arnold these rhetorical terms were pragmatic tools assembled to goad the English public into facing up to major social problems. Of all these terms, few have proved more influential-or more diffito and cult to define--than the ones Arnold employed in Culture Anarchy describe the "two points of influence [between which] moves our world": "Hebraism and Hellenism" (1960-77, 5: 163-64). Arnold was not speaking as an expert in Judeo-Christian or Greek studies; he used the terms pragmatically, flexibly, loosely, to denote both a dual historical heritage and two complementary states of being that had practical bearing in a newly industrial and democratic world. Differing with those who promoted one of these values at the expense of the other, Arnold argued that "the final aim of both Hebraism and Hellenism is . . . no doubt the same: man's perfection or salvation" (ibid., 5:164). But, he noted, whereas Hebraism, with its concern for inward rectitude, requires an obedience on the part of the individual that might lead to an unquestioning acceptance of the status quo, Hellenism prompts a counterimpulse: the desire to have an objective grasp of reality that might very well lead to a questioning of the status quo. As a supporter of educational and other social reforms, Arnold felt the practical need to achieve an adjustment between the two, an adjustment that would strengthen England's ability to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing world. To his mother, Arnold claimed that the distinction he had made between Hebraism and Hellenism-between "strictness of conscience" and "spontaneity of consciousness" (ibid., 5:165)- was one "on which more and more will turn, and on dealing wisely with it everything depends" (1895, 2:37). And to his good friend Louisa, Lady

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de Rothschild, Arnold expressed delight when the eminent Jewish scholar Emanuel Deutsch commended what Arnold modestly called his "crude speculations" on Hebraism and Hellenism. "I have had no such tribute to my powers of relaxing and dissolving yet paid. If we can but dissolve what is bad without dissolving what is good!" (1895, 1:458-59). "Dissolvents of the old European system of dominant ideas and facts we must all be, all of us who have any power of working,"Arnold had asserted in 1863; "what we have to study is that we may not be acrid dissolvents of it" (1960-77, 3:109-10). The comment appears in the most progressiveminded of the Essaysin Criticism, essay devoted to an author whose style the and message Arnold was particularly drawn to and from whom he had taken the Hebraism-Hellenism construction: Heinrich Heine. "All people are either Jews or Hellenes," Heine had asserted three decades earlier (in LudwigBorne),"people with drives that are ascetic, image-hating, and ravenous for spiritualization, or people of a nature that rejoices in life, is proud of display, and is realistic" (cited in Carroll 1982: 242). For Heine, Western history could be viewed as a perpetual oscillation between Hellenic and "Nazarene"impulses, between the desire for artistic, intellectual, and sensual freedom and the repression of such desires. Although he paid tribute to the claims of both sense and spirit, Heine also cautioned against the political consequences of religions that condemn the flesh: their inevitable "support of despotism" (Heine 1973b [1833]: 132). Heine's assault was not on religion per se. (He protested that instead of "having no religion, . . . I have them all" [Sammons 1979: 306].) Rather, he attacked the unholy alliance between "religious repressiveness" and the existing state of "political repression" (ibid.: 148). It is largely on this account that Arnold--a school inspector by vocation, frustratedby the opposition of the Puritan-biased middle-class establishment to the spread of education-joined forces with the brilliant opponent of "Philistinism"(another of Heine's terms) and borrowed his Hebraism-Hellenism distinction. He decried Heine's "injustice"in praising Hellenism at the expense of Hebraism (1960-77, 5:164), but he praised Heine for containing both qualities within himself (1960-77, 3:127). For all his moral defects, Heine was, for Arnold, "a brilliant soldier in the Liberation War of humanity" (ibid., 3: 132), a cause that Arnold accepted as his own. And both the German and the English poet-essayists looked to France as the country where, in the nineteenth century, Hellenism seemed to be thriving in the forms of a superior educational and social system and a superior intellectual climate. Arnold's lifelong aim as educator and social critic was to support a core of ethical values and, at the same time, to promote a "freeplay of the mind upon all subjects."For this purpose one needed Hebraism, with its regard

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for conduct and duty, but one also needed a Hellenic or "critical"outlook. The function of criticism, he notes (in perhaps the most widely quoted of his phrases), is to obey "an instinct prompting it to try to know the best that is known and thought in the world, irrespectively of practice, politics, and everything of the kind" (ibid., 3:268)-an instinct that Arnold defines as being conspicuously Hellenic. But opposition to such thinkinga thinking that would call for inevitable changes in English institutions and tempers--came from the newly powerful middle class, "drugged with business, ... its sense blunted for any stimulus besides, except religion; ... a religion, narrow, unintelligent, repulsive" (ibid., 5:19). Thus, Arnold felt obliged to "dissolve"the authority of a popular but repressive form of religion (latter-day Puritanism), while also arguing the pragmatic value of religion in upholding standards of conduct. To understand Arnold's seemingly ambivalent handling of the Hebraism-Hellenism distinction, one must know something about his personal background, and one should have a sense of England's historical situation, as he saw it, in the middle third of the nineteenth century. It is also instructive to briefly examine the views of some of Arnold's contemporaries who made use of the HebraismHellenism distinction for their own purposes. While Heine is credited with turning the opposition between Hellene and Hebrew into a historical paradigm, he was anticipated, to some degree, by two German authors who dallied with the charms of the pagan world, Johann Joachim Winckelmann and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. As an English disciple (who also draws on Arnold), Walter Pater, writes in devoted to Winckelmann, "The aim of our the chapter of TheRenaissance culture" is the attainment of "not only as intense but as complete a life as possible." Thus, Pater, following Arnold, celebrates the idea of Bildung, the German concept of self-development devised by Goethe and Johann Gottfried von Herder by way of Platonic sources. In the contrasting figure of Girolamo Savonarola (self-denying, Hebraic), Pater points to another, if less attractive, Renaissance "type of success" (1986 [1873]: 121). Like Heine and Arnold, Pater describes the Renaissance in terms of a contest between revitalized Hebraic and Hellenic forces. Unlike his predecessors, however, Pater saw the efforts of a Pico della Mirandola "to reconcile Christianity with the religion of ancient Greece" (ibid.: 20) as a doomed undertaking. Heine, by contrast, had endorsed the pagan (or "sensual")effort "at rehabilitating matter and vindicating the rights of the senses without denying the rights of the spirit or even its supremacy" (1973a[18351:324). Implicit in Heine's or Arnold's defense of Hellenism is the view that a position that supports self-development would also allow for the satisfying of spiritual "is and needs. "Essential in Hellenism," Arnold declares in Culture Anarchy,

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the impulse to the development of the whole man, to connecting and harmonizing all parts of him, leaving none to take their chance" (1960-77, 5: 184). Such a development was, for Arnold, in society's best interest; and here we see a divergence between Arnold and Pater. For whereas Hellenism for Arnold is an educational means of advancing England, Hellenism for Pater is purely an individual matter.' John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty (1859), also distinguishes between religious (i.e., "Calvinistic") and pagan counterdemands. "'Pagan selfassertion,"' he contends (quoting John Sterling), "is one of the elements of human worth, as well as 'Christian self-denial.' There is a Greek ideal of self-development, which the Platonic and Christian ideal of selfgovernment blends with, but does not supersede. It may be better to be a John Knox than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a Pericles than either; nor would a Pericles, if we had one in these days, be without anything good which belonged to John Knox" (1969 [1859]: 409-10). But there was no guarantee that a Hellenic-minded individual would have respect for, or be tolerated by, someone of a Hebraic cast of mind. George Eliot, in Romola(1863), drew a cautionary portrait of a young hedonist, living in the Florence of Savonarola, who disavows all claims upon him. "I am no Hebrew," Tito Melema announces upon his entry into the novel (1980 [1863]: 56), and before long he has betrayed everyone close to him.2 Eliot wrote four admiring essays on Heine in the mid-185os, but she duly noted Heine's own sardonic admission that in his time of suffering the Greek gods were of no avail. When Heine collapsed in the Louvre, he imagined hearing the Venus de Milo say to him, "Dost thou not see, then, that I have no arms, and thus cannot help thee?" (Eliot 1963: 241-42). In her most ambitious novel, Middlemarch (1872), Eliot sought to reconcile the Hebraic and Hellenic impulses; or, rather, in the persons of the overly self-denying Dorothea Brooke and the benignly hedonistic Will Ladislaw, she shows how each gains from contact with the other. Dorothea becomes aware of the value of beauty and of her own sensual needs, while
1. On this point see Donoghue 1995: 158. The differing use of Hellenism Arnold and Pater by is also explored by David DeLaura (1969) and Linda Dowling (1994). 2. Arnold's devotee Henry James also draws on Arnold's distinction between Hebraic- and Hellenic-minded individuals. The ill-fated sculptor-hero of his first major novel, Roderick Hudson(1875),loftily asserts, "I'm a Hellenist; I'm not a Hebraist!" (James 1960 [1875]: 88); but Roderick's lack of self-control proves ruinous to his life and art. (James may also be thinking of the opposition between pagan and Christian impulses depicted in Hawthorne's MarbleFaun.) The protagonist of "The Author of 'Beltraffio"' describes the difference between his wife and himself as that between "Christian and pagan. . . She thinks me, at any rate, no better than an ancient Greek. It's the difference between making the most of life and making the least" (James 1963 [1884]: 334).

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Will learns to apply his scattered energies and talents to a useful vocation. In Arnold's life and writings, one finds a similar movement at work. A playful, aesthetically minded schoolboy (Merry Matt) changed into a brilliant elegiac poet, then into an earnest inspector of schools, and finally (without giving up the inspectorship) into the most discerning social and literary critic of his generation. In Arnold's development one finds the legacies of Greece and Israel continually enriching his endeavors and encouraging him, in turn, to pass on to his readers the values of that double heritage. In the more than three decades he spent inspecting Dissenter-run schools, Arnold came face to face with the meager curricula and fates afforded the majority of English schoolchildren.3Preparing A Bible-Reading (1872),Arnold explained to a friend, "Into the education of the for Schools people there comes, with us at any rate, absolutely nothing grand"(1895, 2:99). For Arnold, to be sure, the Bible was to be appreciated as literature, not dogma. ("More and more," he wrote in "The Study of Poetry,"in 1880, "mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us" [1960-77, 9:161].) Of the power of a literary text such as the Book of Isaiah, Arnold marveled, "What an extending of [its readers'] horizons, what a lifting them out of the present, what a suggestion of hope and courage!" (1960-77, 7:71-72). But the English lacked

more than an appreciation of good literature. They also lacked, Arnold felt, the ability to see where they as a nation were heading, and they were unwilling to profit from the wisdom of other nations. They lacked, in short, an objective awareness of their Hebraic background (its negative and positive qualities), and they desperately needed a Hellenic perspective. A typical, mistaken criticism made by Arnold's more religious-minded contemporaries was that (as a reviewer of Arnold's St. PaulandProtestantism complained) in his "culture,perhaps in his nature, the Hellenic element is too exclusive; the Hebraic has scarcely any place" (cited in Dawson and
Pfordresher 1979: 262). Arnold admitted to his mother that he gave more

"prominence" to Hellenism than his father, Dr. Thomas Arnold, would

have conceded (1895, 1:455). But, he added, modern times and modern

needs demand this new balance. It is useful to look back to Greece, he argued in his inaugural lecture as professor of poetry at Oxford (1857,published in 1868 as "On the Modern Element in Literature"),if England is
3. As Park Honan writes, during his school inspections Arnold "found that religious schism and the pride of middle-class Dissenters and their animosity to the state all meant the poor would suffer" (Honan 1981: 253). Fred G. Walcott studies Arnold's educational backand (1970); Peter Smith and Geoffrey Summerfield ground in The Originsof Culture Anarchy have assembled a selection of Arnold's writings on education, including his inspection reports (1969).

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to achieve "intellectual deliverance" and move forward as a nation. "Such a deliverance is emphatically, whether we will or no," he says, "the demand of the age in which we ourselves live." Without denying the need for "moral deliverance," delivery from pride and selfishness ("in the enjoyment of both [moral and intellectual] united consists man's true freedom" [1960-77, 1:19]), Arnold urges the Oxford students to examine the most enduringly "modern" of literatures, that of ancient Greece. Writers like his father's beloved Thucydides are modern, Arnold claims, because they possess the critical spirit, the ability to "view all the facts" (25) without exaggeration or distortion. The critical or Hellenic spirit, Arnold maintains throughout his work, is the ability to see objects as they really are (140); where the English are at fault, he argues, is in their inability to rise above a narrow point of view. Invoking Pericles' famous eulogy of Athens (as cited byThucydides), Arnold links the flourishing of Greek culture with its "freedom," in Pericles' words, "for individual diversities of opinion and character,"for its toleration of "the tastes and habits of our neighbour" (25). Mid-Victorian England, by contrast, seemed a nation singularly indifferent to alternative viewpoints, whether expressed by ancient authors or by foreign thinkers. The "collective life of humanity,"Arnold says, is precious, and relevant to us all: "everywherethere is connexion, everywhere there is illustration: no single event, no single literature, is adequately comprehended except in its relation to other events, to other literatures" To learn, he contends, is to make comparisons, to achieve what a (20-21). modern philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, calls a "fusion of horizons" between oneself and the world outside the self. The effect of such learning is change: self-transformation, as our individual knowledge expands, and social transformation, as we learn as a collective body to act on our new ideas. The goal of education, in Arnold's view, is, accordingly, "to know how others stand, that we may know how we ourselves stand; and to know how we ourselves stand, that we may correct our mistakes and achieve our deliverance" (21). Like John Dewey, Arnold saw in education the means of nurturing and safeguarding a democratic culture. "So hard, nay, so impossible for most men is it," he interjects near the end of the "Modern Element" lecture, "to develop themselves in their entireness; to rejoice in the variety, the movement of human life with the children of the world; to be serious over the depth, the significance of human life with the wise!" (36). The impetus for Arnold's critical efforts not only came from his work as inspector of English schools; it was also fueled by his examination of Continental schools. Arnold's job reinforced his sense that in a time of change, "openness and flexibility of mind [the Athenian qualities praised by Pericles] are

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.. the first of virtues" (1960-77, 2:29), and it also reinforced his sense that there could be no intellectual deliverance in an England where the mass of the population was ignored. In France, Arnold duly noted, nearly six times as many students as in England attended secondary schools (196077, 8:359). As a result, the French had a better sense of "social solidity" (361) and of the possibilities of life: "Life is so good and agreeable a thing there, and for so many" (362). The apostles of culture, Arnold repeatedly says, are believers in solidarity and political equality. That a nation needs high standards Arnold takes for granted. What it doesn't need are fanatics or dogmatists or theorists blocking our ability to see things in their rich variety. In his inspection tours of European schools, Arnold discerned a more intellectually liberating climate- one in which the spirit of Bildung was at work. In "A French Eton" (his account of a school run by Jean Battiste Henri Lacordaire), Arnold cites Wilhelm von Humboldt's view "that it was a joy to him to feel himself modified by the operation of a foreign
influence" (1960-77, 2:312). The essence of Bildung ("perhaps the greatest

idea of the eighteenth century,"Gadamer calls it [1991:9], noting also its genesis in the Greek educational ideal), of the cultivation of the self, is that we enrich ourselves by going out of the self, discovering other cultures, learning to "become at home" in the other, as Gadamer (and, before him, Hegel) puts it (Gadamer 1991:14).Widening our perspectives, we become so familiar with the enormous range of human achievement that we learn (in Nietzsche's phrase, taken in turn from Pindar) to become what we are. But while France and Germany were providing an education for their citizens that prepared them for the future, instructing them in scientific as well as literary subjects, England was lagging behind-in large measure, Arnold felt, because of its resistance to state-supported enterprises. (Arnold's fellow liberal, Mill, opposed the idea of state-run schools in On Liberty.)And England's individualistic habits-its refrain of "Leaveus to
ourselves!"(1960-77, 2:21)-was abetted by a Protestant cast of mind that

served to thwart (as Arnold lamented in a note to William Gladstone aca and companying a copy of Culture Anarchy) sense of "larger existence and more sense of public responsibility" (1960-77, 6:417). The English middle are Garland, enemies of Bildung,eneclass, Arnold complains in Friendship's versions of the biblical Phimies of enlightenment; they are modern-day listines. This does not mean, however, that Arnold undervalued the Hebraic impulse. Ideally, "culture" (the work of Hellenism) and "character" (the work of Hebraism) are interdependent. "Culture without character is, no doubt, something frivolous, vain, and weak," he concedes in "Democracy" (the great essay that originally served to introduce his survey The Popular

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Education France[1861]);"but character without culture is, on the other of hand, something raw, blind, and dangerous.The most interesting, the most truly glorious peoples, are those in which the alliance of the two has been effected most successfully, and its result spread most widely. This is why the spectacle of ancient Athens has such profound interest for a rational man; that it is the spectacle of the culture of a people" (1960-77, 2:24-25). With help from the state (not an authoritarian state but one that represents our collective "best selves"), Arnold felt the English, "more than any modern people, have the power of renewing, in our national life, the example of Greece" (ibid.: 314).4 The road to Greece, however, required a detour through modern France. Like Heine, Arnold felt that Paris was the successor to Athens. It was to Paris that Heine had emigrated because he deemed the French more accessible "to ideas than any other people" (1960-77, 3:112). Thomas had Revolution, warned of the danger to any people Carlyle, in The French itself the "Athensof Europe"(Carlyle 1989 [1837], 1:lo); but Arnold calling welcomed the legacy of the revolution and praised one of its prophets, Voltaire, for his ability to look "at things straight,"with "marvelous logic and lucidity" (1960-77, 8:363). Midcentury France boasted a culture of criticism: in her journals appeared the work of Heine, Charles-Augustin Sainte-Beuve, Hippolyte-Adolphe Taine, Charles Baudelaire. It was here that Arnold encountered Heine's Hebraism-Hellenism distinction, and it was from Ernest Renan's Essaiesde morale de critique et (1859)that he found the literary form in which to promulgate these values: the critical essay. Renan was a critic concerned with the pressing social problems of the day. (A former seminarian, Renan was also the author of perhaps the most influential of revisionary histories of Christianity.) But whereas Renan tended (as Arnold explained to his sister) "to inculcate morality, a high in sense of the word, upon the French nation as what they most want, . . . I tend to inculcate intelligence, in a high sense of the word, upon the also English nation as what they most want" (1895, 1:129).5 Just as the modern Athens needed a dose of Hebraism, so too did modern England require a dose of Hellenism added to its customary diet of Hebraism. In truth, Arnold's Essaysin Criticism collection inspired by Renan's (a Essaies)inculcates Hebraic as well as Hellenic values (see apRoberts 1983: 133). Arnold's Essays of 1865 (followed by a second series in 1888) con4. I have compared Arnold's views on Greece, education, culture, and religion with those of Nietzsche (Stone 1988), noting how both men felt that Hellenic values were in need of revival. 5. I discuss the influence of Renan (and other French critics) on Arnold in my Communicationswith theFuture (1997), chapter 2.

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stitutes a dazzling display of literary prowess put to the service of sage admonitions. "Only by a literary form of this kind being given to them," he confided to his mother, "can ideas such as mine ever gain any access in a country such as ours" (1895, 1:282). His method in the Essayswas to provide a gallery of non-English points of view (the largest group coming from France), each offering a valuable idea. "I hate all over-preponderance of single elements," he explained, "and all my efforts are directed to enlarge and complete us by bringing in as much as possible of Greek, Latin, Celtic [as well as German, Dutch, Persian, and Russian] authors" (ibid.: 287). The true aim of criticism, thus, as Arnold avows in the most celebrated of the Essays,"The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," is "spiritual": "to keep man from a self-satisfaction which is retarding and vulgarising, to lead him towards perfection [an unending goal, for Arnold], by making his mind dwell upon what is excellent in itself, and the absolute beauty and fitness of things" (1960-77, 3:271). Among the voices heard in the 1865 Essaysare conservatives like Joseph Joubert and Edmund Burke and Eugenie de Guerin; revolutionaries like Spinoza and Goethe and Heine; the stoic Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius; and the humble St. Francis. Long before the term "dialogism"became fashionable, Arnold was contending that we must take part in that neverending dialogue with ideas and their authors that makes up culture. In Heine Arnold found an intellectual and literary model, one bridging "the French spirit"with "German ideas and culture" (ibid.: 120) and thus connecting past and present with the future. Heine "had in him both the spirit of Greece and the spirit of Judaea," Arnold writes admiringly (ibid.: 12728). In the end, however, Arnold faults Heine for his "want of moral balance" (ibid.: 132).Still, Heine's campaign in behalf of ideas, his war against philistinism, was also Arnold's fight. Overall, Arnold seeks, in the Essays, to balance the claims of Greece and Israel. In specific cases, his strategy is frequently to moderate the extreme position of a particularvoice by following it with an opposing point of view.6Hence, Heine is charged with insufficient Hebraism, while Eugenie de Guerin, who clings to an outworn faith, is implicitly charged with insufficient Hellenism. In the essay on Marcus Aurelius, Arnold makes his most trenchant case against paganism, even at its best, and for Christian-inspiredconduct. The Imitation Christ of provides
6. Joseph Carroll (1982: 245-46) has compared Heine's tendency to play the Hellenic pole off against the Hebrew pole in a spirit of mockery ("The defects of each pole tend to be played off against the other and produce the ironic tonal reverberation that Arnold rebukes as 'incessant mocking' ") with Arnold's tendency to present each side in a creditable light: "he restricts the use of irony to ridiculing the opponents of both his Gods, the Hebraic and the Hellenic."

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of more comfort, he avows, than the Meditations Marcus Aurelius. Morethe early Christians can be seen as the needful "dissolvents"of moriover, bund pagan values. "It was inevitable," he audaciously contends, "that Christianity in the Roman world, like democracy in the modern world, like every new spirit with a similar mission assigned to it [in the Heine essay, Arnold had just praised the "dissolvent" power of Goethe's and Heine's radicalism], should at its first appearance occasion an instinctive shrinking and repugnance in the world which it was to dissolve" (ibid.: 144). In one of the key essays, "Pagan and Mediaeval Religious Sentiment," Arnold balances the claims of Hellenism and Hebraism, the pagan "religion of pleasure" (Heine's phrase), and the Christian "religion of sorrow." For the multitude, Arnold acknowledges, the latter offers more "joy.""But the main element of the modern spirit'slife is neither the senses and understanding [the Hellenic sphere]," he adds, "nor the heart and imagination [the Hebraic]; it is the imaginative reason," a faculty that combines regard for the things of this world with that sense of our responsibilities, and regard for conduct, which religion nourishes. And no other writers were so "well balanced" in this respect as the supreme Greek poets: Simonides, Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles. "No other poets, who have so well satisfied the thinking power, have so well satisfied the religious sense" (ibid.: 23031).

Arnold's praise for the Hellenic point of view reaches a climax in "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," which might well be retitled "The Function of Hellenism at the Present Time." If only England would allow itself the same "free play of the mind on all subjects" that Pericles saw as the great Athenian achievement, many seemingly intractable social and religious problems might be solved. Even the widespread misery of human life occasioned by the Industrial Revolution might be lessened, Arnold hints, if we exerted some mental energy on the subject. There is no reason to be proud of a system that has produced so many victims like the workhouse girl named Wragg. (Arnoldjuxtaposes the praises for England's industrial progress made by her political leaders, as reported in the London Times,with a 7imes account of a young woman who strangled her illegitimate baby.) "By the Ilissus there was no Wragg, poor thing!" (ibid.: 273). In "The Function of Criticism," Arnold chastises the British habit of acting without thinking (bringing factories into existence, for example, without foreseeing the consequences), of being satisfied by "inadequate ideas" (274), of being in thrall to a political and religious system that discourages widespread education and disparages alternative points of view. In this vein, Arnold applauds Renan's recent application of "criticism"to the Scriptures for its attempt to see the Bible as in itself it really is--taken

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from "the old, traditional, conventional point of view and [placed] under a new one" (279). In all of this, Arnold is announcing his own program in and Culture Anarchy in his books on religion written in the 187os. and Culture Anarchy Arnold's best-known work, its creation and is Although was both inevitable and incidental. The decade of the 186os was a busy time for him. In 1865 he made an official inspection tour of state-supported schools on the Continent. ("Sooner or later we shall all learn, even we in English people," he wrote to the Pall Mall Gazette that year, "that there is an appointed sphere for public function as well as for private" [1960-77, 4:11]). In 1866 he completed a series of Oxford lectures, published as On theStudyof CelticLiterature, daring in their insistence that the English have much to learn from their non-Anglo-Saxon neighbors. In early 1866 he published a rejoinder to Fitzjames Stephen's attack on "The Function of Criticism" in the form of a Heine-inspired comic diatribe, "My CountryGarland men." Collected with the follow-up Friendship's papers, Arnold's is a fictionalized conversation between himself and a German visiessay tor to England, Arminius, who assaults the British lack of intelligence ("Geist"),its low standard of culture, its narrow-minded religion. (Heine himself, visiting England in 1827, had felt "convinced that a swearing Frenchman is a pleasanter sight for the Godhead than a praying Englishman" [Sammons 1979: 131].)In 1867, once again at Oxford, Arnold gave a final lecture there on the topic "Culture and Its Enemies." In it all the various Arnoldian concerns-England's resistance to change even as the world was changing, its traditional dislike of state-supported enterprises, its social inequalities, its clinging to an outmoded religion-came together and in what was to prove the opening chapter of Culture Anarchy. in some academic quarters that the Contrary to the misguided notion book is a defense of elitist values (a promotion of "culture" as a way of numbing the energies of a rising democracy), Arnold's book is one of the great Victorian tributes to democracy and its inevitable triumph. In the early essay "Democracy," he had written about the current efforts to its of the working class to "affirm own essence; live, to enjoy, to possess the world, as aristocracy" had done earlier and as the middle class was now doing. But, he cautioned, with an eye on America, "the difficulty for democracy is, how to find and keep high ideals" (1960-77, 2:7, 17, emphasis in original). Arnold was scarcely being elitist when he proclaimed that democracy has a rightto all that makes life worth preserving-from access to knowledge and things of beauty to access to better health care. ("Agood thing meant for the many cannot well be so exquisite as the good things of the few; but it can easily, if it comes from a donor of great resources and wide power, be incomparably better than what the many could, unaided,

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provide for themselves" [ibid.: 21].) The enemies of culture, thus, are the enemies of democracy. In ancient Greece, he notes, there was also once a triumphant democracy, a culture of the people, for whom things of beauty and the love of knowledge ("sweetness and light") were cultivated. From the Greek pursuit of "perfection"came the belief in culture as a process, a means of endless growth and development requiring "harmonious expansion of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and [which] is not consistent with the over-development of any one power at the expense of the rest" (1960-77, 5:94). The political situation of the mid-186os may have provided some of the and immediate background of Culture Anarchy -the agitation preceding the Second Reform Bill of 1867, for example. But Arnold's disenchantment with English stolidity was of long standing. In writing the book, Arnold aired his grievance at the major obstacle lying in the way of true reform: the alliance between political liberals and middle-class Protestants that thwarted efforts at improved education for the masses in the name of laissez-faire ("Doing as One Likes")7and opposed efforts at solidarity or any breakup of the English class system. In the chapters preceding the one devoted to Hebraism and Hellenism (Arnold did not add the descriptive chapter titles until the second edition, in 1875),Arnold urges that England "rise above the idea of class to the idea of the whole community, theState," an ideal state embodying not our warring individuals but rather our "best self" (1960-77, 5:134, emphasis in original). By Arnold's ideal Ilissus, there were also no barbarians, philistines, or populace engaged in a Hobbesian (and Industrial Revolutionary) war of each against all. Another popular misconception of Culture Anarchy that Arnold, in and is his comparison of the forces of Hebraism and Hellenism, is divorcing the realm of action (Hebraic "conduct") from the realm of thought.8 But for Arnold, the Liberals and Protestants were themselves acting unaided by the powers of thought; hence, their version of "reform"was a mechani7. Arnold singled out Mill and EdwardMiall (editorof the leading Dissentingjournal, the Nonconformist) as partners in here,despitetheirmemberships the Hellenicand Hebraic becauseof theirmutualmistrust state-run for camps,respectively, enterprises. 8. In Human and Nature Conduct, Dewey insiststhat there is no demarcation between John conductis one hundredpercentof our acts"(1922:279). thinkingand doing:"Potentially ArnoldwouldagreewithDeweyon thispoint-especially his use of the word"potentially." In A Common sense of an oppositionbetween Faith,Dewey furtherchargesthat "Arnold's Hellenismand Hebraism in resulted exclusionof beauty,truth,andfriendship fromthe list of the consequences towardwhichpowersworkwithinand without" (1934: Arnold,on 54). the contrary, hoped to mend that breach.Elsewhere, Dewey showshimselfto be Arnold's that a democracy mustofferthe fullestculturalpossibilidisciplein his view, as educator, ties to its citizens.(See chapter5, "Arnold the Pragmatists: and Cultureas Democracy," in Stone 1997.)

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cal solution: to extend the suffrage without providing needful educational opportunities. "To act is easy, to think is hard": Arnold quoted Goethe's words in "The Function of Criticism" and again in Culture Anarchy and a pragmatist, Arnold argues at the (1960-77, 3:276, 5:227). Speaking as very beginning that the aim of culture is both to know and to make reason prevail (1960-77, 5:9). In his own mental development, the practice of "criticism"(the Hellenic aim of seeing things as they really are) had been subsumed into the enterprise of culture (seeing and acting accordingly). In the chapter on Hebraism and Hellenism, Arnold thus seeks to define the forces that have divided human loyalties over the centuries, dooming humanity to be fragmented rather than whole selves. These forces were once united in Periclean Greece and might well be reconciled in England in the future. Like Heine, he differentiates between spiritual impulses (Heine's target, here, was Catholicism, while Arnold's is Puritanism) and secular and material impulses, warring tendencies that have flourished in part because of their oppositional nature. Both forces seek human "perfection," but by different routes: "The uppermost idea with Hellenism is to see things as they really are; the uppermost idea with Hebraism is conduct and obedience" (ibid.: 165). If Hebraism "set doing above knowing" (165), it did so in the belief that all efforts of the unaided "individual will" were sinful; hence, to do was to obey. To seek knowledge, as any Hellenist knows, is to question prevailing dogmas and customs. For Goethe and Heine, the response to the claim of dogma and authority was an unflinching "But is it so? is it so to me?"(1960-77, 3:11o, emphasis in original). In this respect, Socrates had been the supreme questioner. But Socrates was also, Arnold would say in later writings, a devotee of the Dorian religion of conduct. For the moment, Arnold praises the Socrates who spoke in behalf of human development, who said that "the best man is he who most tries to perfect himself, and the happiest man is he who most feels that he is perfecting himself" (1960-77, 5:167-68, emphasis in original). Such Hellenic optimism about human nature was put aside -"it was unsound at that particular moment of man's development," Arnold remarks; "it was premature"-in favor of Hebraic calls for self-denial (ibid.: 169). to For Arnold, both "contributions human development," "a man's intellectual and moral impulses" (ibid.: 171, emphasis in original), must be heeded; and he laments the oscillations of history that have allowed one force to thrive at the expense of the other. He particularlylaments the lost occasion during the Renaissance when England had a chance to renew its Hellenic energies ("that irresistible return of humanity to nature and to seeing things as they are" [173]) but chose instead to enter, as Arnold had written in the Heine essay, "the prison of Puritanism, and had the key

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turned on its spirit there for two hundred years"(1960-77, 3:121). England, to its intellectual cost, repudiated Hellenism at the time when it was most needful, and it continues to do so: "Formore than two hundred years the main stream of man's advance has moved towards knowing himself and the world, seeing things as they are, spontaneity of consciousness; . . . [the English instead] have made the secondary [stream] the principal at the wrong moment" (1960-77, 5:175). Arnold was by no means denying the value of Hebraism. For the rest of his life he would insist that the Hebraic stress on righteous conduct constitutes three-quarters of our needful energies. But given the immense problems faced by England, he insists that "now, and for us, it is a time to Hellenise, and to praise knowing; for we have Hebraised too much, and have over-valued doing." ("The habits and discipline received from Hebraism," he adds, are an "eternal possession" that we cannot assign "to the second rank to-day, without being prepared to restore to them the first rank to-morrow" [ibid.: 255].) Meanwhile, let us "Hellenise a little," he urges (ibid.: 199); and, accordingly, Arnold looks to areas of concern where lucidity of vision is called for: to England's abominable treatment of Ireland, for example; to the prevalence of "grotesque and hideous forms of popular religion" (204); to the slums of East London, whose "everaccumulating masses of pauperism" are ignored by a religion that piously speaks of the poor always being with us (216-17). It is from such excesses of the Hebraic cast of mind that one must turn away, realizing all the while "that the human spirit is wider than the most priceless of the forces which bear it onward, and that to the whole development of man Hebraism itself is, like Hellenism, but a contribution"(171). In the decade following Culture Anarchy and Arnold turned his attention to a series of religious books. This has occasioned some scholars to view the 187os as a time of "regression"for Arnold, a time in which he abandoned Hellenism for Hebraism. It is claimed that this change of attitude was brought on in part by the deaths of three of his children and by the outbreak of the Franco-PrussianWar (see Carroll 1982:109). Yet Arnold began to ponder the weaknesses of Hellenism as early as 1868, in a review of Ernst Curtius'sHistoryof Greece. Greece's freedom of intellectual inquiry, when cut adrift from its ancient religion (he argues), proved fatal in the end. "The power to respect, the power to obey, are at least as needful for man as unlimited freedom and the practical school of public life" (196077, 5:283). And Arnold now praises Socrates, who, though "assuredly ... no mere conservative [he had, after all, "introduced a stream of thought so fresh, bold, and transforming that it frightened 'respectable'people and was the cause of his death"], . . . was never weary of recalling the Hellenic

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mind to the old-fashioned maxims of righteousness, temperance, and selfknowledge engraved on the temple at Delphi" (ibid.: 287). Arnold was deeply shaken by France's collapse in 1870; he sensed that Greek history was repeating itself in France, and for similar reasons. and Hence, in Literature Dogma(1873)Arnold describes how "nations and men" are "shipwreckedon conduct" (1960-77, 6:386, emphasis in original). "All of us feel, at some time or other in our lives, a hankering after the French ideal" (391), Arnold wrote feelingly of his and Heine's beloved country; but he recalls how "brilliant Greece," France'spredecessor, "perfor ished for lack of attention enough to conduct; want of conduct, steadiness, character" (388, emphasis in original). In God and the Bible (1875) he deplores the attitude of Sainte-Beuve ("the finest critical spirit of our Bibles"(1960times") for saying that it is time to bid farewell "aux vieilles Renan for paying insufficient attention to the 77, 7:392); and he chastises moral (as opposed to the scientific) facts of life. "No one feels more than we do," he declares, "the harm which the exaggeration of Hebraism has done in England; but this is Hellenism with a vengeance! ... Moral conscience, self-control, seriousness, steadfastness, are not the whole of human life certainly, but they are by far the greatest part of it; without them- and this is the very burden of the Hebrew prophets and a fact of experience as old as the world-nations cannot stand" (45). But if religion dominated Arnold's attention in the 187os, this does not mean that he had ever doubted its claims. What he did question was the misuse of religion and its distortion in the hands of unthinking dogmatists. He felt that, rather than the reign of the "old Bibles"being over, a new era was commencing in which Protestantism would be obliged to relinquish its allegiance to untenable doctrines. "Allforms of religion are but approximationsto the truth," he contends (ibid.: o18, emphasis in original); and one of the duties of Hellenism or criticism (the two words are often used interchangeably in the religious books) is to see exactly how much of Christianity is verifiable. A "Hellenic" methodology is applied, accordingly, to the Hebraic texts, and the results are some of Arnold's most radical (if generally ignored) works. In the first of the religious books, St. PaulandProtestantism (1870),Arnold he informed his mother) to "sap [the Protestant Dissenters] sought (as intellectually," to "deliver the middle class out of the hand of their Dissenting ministers" (1895, 2:20; see 1:264). His intent here is to show how St. Paul has been misinterpreted, how Puritanical notions about "election" and "justification"are based on misreadings, how Paul's appeal that we resurrect ourselves to righteousness "now" does not refer to resurrecand tion beyond the grave. In Literature Dogmahe argues that the Bible is

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not to be interpreted as dogma but rather as literature-a work of literature focusing on the value of conduct. And in God and the Bible Arnold contends that however much people may need the Bible, they must not be deluded into thinking that miracles happen. Jesus, the successor to Socrates in his "sweet reasonableness,"was misunderstood by his original followers, but Jesus' message remains relevant. The Hebraic legacy has outlasted the Greek, Arnold says, because while Greece (despite Socrates' warning) neglected its moral component, Israel never did so: "Israelis the great, standing, unsilenceable, unshaken witness to the necessity of minding one's ways, of conduct" (1960-77, 7:215).

But for modern man, Arnold maintains, both elements are needed. Culture demands that we develop "in our totality, on our perceptive and intelligential side as well as on our moral side." It is only in "their lower forms,"Arnold suggestively avows, that Hebraism and Hellenism seem to
be "at variance" (1960-77, 6:124-25). Problems arise when the terms be-

come occasions for ideology rather than pragmatic tools. The Greece of Pericles, after all, was flexible enough to combine both instincts, "the old
morality and the new freedom" of thought (1960-77, 9:31). But Greece fell

when its flexibility turned out to be "not flexible enough, because it could not enough bend itself to the moral ideas which are so large a part of life" (ibid.:34).9The last comment appears in one of Arnold's most charming and least-known works, his "Speech at Eton" (1879),which contains in miniature the thesis of Culture Anarchy the religious books. "Here," and and Arnold tells the Eton students, "is the true moral: that man has to make progress along diverse lines, in obedience to a diversity of aspirations and powers, the sum of which is truly his nature; and that he fails and falls short until he learns to advance upon them all, and to advance harmoniously" (34-35)- "But this does but bring us to the old and true Socratic thesis"-so Arnold had concluded his Last Essayson Church Religion and (1877)--"of the of virtue and knowledge." However we may advance "in interdependence science, art, and literary culture,"religion "will be still there as what these rest against and imply; as the indispensable background, the three-fourths of life."Yet "while the remaining fourth is ill-cared for, the three-fourths
themselves must also suffer with it" (1960-77, 8:162, emphasis in original).

And so we come back to the question of whether Arnold's phrase "He-

9. Just as Arnold saw in Periclean Athens a period when Greece's moral (Dorian) and intellectual (Ionian) impulses were balanced, so Pater, in Marius the Epicurean (1885), finds a moment in early Christian history before the church fathers split off the "ideal of asceticism" from the "ideal of culture" ("harmonious development of all the parts of human nature"). "For a little while, at least, there was no forced opposition between the soul and the body, the world and the spirit, and the grace of graciousness itself was pre-eminently with the people of Christ" (1985 [1885]: 241).

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braism and Hellenism" is to be dismissed as something merely rhetorical, or as something that retains, in Marcus's words, "some connections with matters of issue today." Although he might speak, on occasion, of Hebraism and Hellenism as if they were scientifically verifiable propositions, Arnold knew that he was speaking of poetic postulates, postulates more likely to be true because they were poetic. But he was also using these terms pragmatically-as a means of pushing for educational and related reforms. By "Hellenism," Arnold generally meant the critical faculty that lets us examine things objectively, unhindered by preconceptions or dogmas. While the French were for Arnold the contemporary practitioners of this method, the Greeks had provided the original impetus for the questioning spirit. But "Hebraism"too had its pragmatic function, as Arnold's Faith. For all twentieth-century follower Dewey would note in A Common their liberal hopes, Dewey and Arnold realized that something was needed to deter what Cardinal Newman had called "fierce wilful human nature on its onward course" (Newman 1968 [1864]: 188). Newman had felt that only "some form of religion" could serve to subdue destructive human instincts. Arnold and Dewey, however, feared that religion, if detached from the faculties of criticism, might make matters worse. And yet the modern substitute, faith in science-Renan's and Dewey's solution-was not acceptable either. A progress lacking in values (as Arnold warned in "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time") was no more tolerable than an outmoded religion that made progress impossible. Of all Arnold's literary musings on this subject, none is more pertinent to modern needs, perhaps, than the essay-lecture that Arnold addressed to American audiences over a century ago. In "Literature and Science" (1882), he maintained that "the needs of our modern life" require that we allow for the teachings of science andliterature, including the presumedly outdated literatures of ancient Greece and Israel. From literature, he argued, we learn how to relate what we know to a world beyond the self: "to the sense which we have in us for conduct, to the sense which we have in us for beauty" (1960-77, 10:63). The two competing literary legacies, he intimates, are now soul mates, both of them endangered species. Yet the "majority of men" and women "will always require humane letters," he concludes, for the sake of self-preservation(ibid.: 73), for the accumulated knowledge that tells us that we can become more "humane"individuals. A hundred years after Arnold's death, as we speed our way down the information superhighway, tossing aside all forms of literary culture (not just Sainte-Beuve's "old Bibles"), we might ponder Arnold's description of the fate awaiting a people that splits off intelligence from conduct, a worship of facts from a belief in values. For Arnold the legacy of Hebraism, the

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legacy of Hellenism, and the legacy of both combined, which ideally constitutes the humanities, dared not be disregarded.
References
apRoberts, Ruth 1983 Arnoldand God(Berkeley: University of California Press). Arnold, Matthew edited by George W. E. Russell, 2 vols. (New York:Macmillan). 1895 Letters, ProseWorks, edited by R. H. Super, 11vols. (Ann Arbor: University of 1960-77 Complete Michigan Press). Carlyle, Thomas Revolution 1989 [1837] TheFrench (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Carroll, Joseph Theory MatthewArnold 1982 The Cultural of (Berkeley: University of California Press). Dawson, Carl, and John Pfordresher 1979 MatthewArnold'sProseWritings:The CriticalHeritage(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). DeLaura, David Newman,Arnold,and Pater(Austin: University 1969 Hebrewand Hellenein Victorian England: of Texas Press). Dewey, John 1922 HumanNatureand Conduct (New York:Holt). Faith(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). 1934 A Common Donoghue, Denis Pater: Loverof Strange Souls(New York:Knopf). 1995 Walter Dowling, Linda and in 1994 Hellenism Homosexuality Victorian (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). Oxford Eliot, George edited by Gordon S. Haight (Boston: Houghton Mifflin). 1956 [1872] Middlemarch, 1963 Essays,edited by Thomas Pinney (New York: Columbia University Press). 1980 [1863] Romola, edited by Andrew Sanders (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books). Gadamer, Hans-Georg 1991 Truthand Method,translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York:Crossroad). Heine, Heinrich the in in 1973a [1835] Concerning Historyof Religionand Philosophy Germany, SelectedWorks, translated and edited by Helen M. Mustard (New York:Vintage Books). 1973b [1833] The RomanticSchool,in SelectedWorks,translated and edited by Helen M. Mustard (New York:Vintage Books). Holloway, John 1965 [1953] The Victorian (New York:Norton). Sage Honan, Park A 1981 MatthewArnold: Life (New York:McGraw-Hill). James, Henry Hudson(New York:Harper Torchbooks). 1960 [1875] Roderick 1963 [1884] "The Author of 'Beltraffio,'" in Complete Tales,edited by Leon Edel, vol. 5 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott). Marcus, Steven 1994 "Cultureand AnarchyToday," in Matthew Arnold, Cultureand Anarchy,edited by Samuel Lipman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press).

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Mill, John Stuart and edited by Jack Stillinger (Bos1969 [1859] On Liberty,in Autobiography OtherWritings, ton: Houghton Mifflin). Miller, J. Hillis 1965 [1963] TheDisappearance God(New York:Schocken Books). of Newman, Cardinal John Henry Pro 1968 [1864] Apologia VitaSua, edited by David J. DeLaura (New York:Norton). Pater,Walter 1985 [1885] Marius the Epicurean,edited by Michael Levey (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books). edited by Adam Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 1986 [1873] TheRenaissance, Renan, Ernest edited by Henriette Psichari. Vol. 2, Essais de moralet de critique 1947-61 Oeuvres Completes, (Paris: Calmann-Levy). Sammons, Jeffrey L. Heine:A Modern (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 1979 Heinrich Biography Smith, Peter, and Geoffrey Summerfield, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer1969 MatthewArnoldand the Educationof the New Order sity Press). Stone, Donald D. Literature 1988 "Arnold, Nietzsche, and the 'Revaluation of Values,'" Nineteenth-Century 43: 289-318. MatthewArnoldin Dialogue(Ann Arbor: University of with 1997 Communications the Future: Michigan Press). Walcott, Fred G. MatthewArnoldand PopularEducationin England 1970 The Originsof Cultureand Anarchy: (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).