Introduction Terrorism is a special type of violence. It is a tactic used in peace, conflict, and war.

The threat of terrorism is ever present, and an attack is likely to oc cur when least expected. A terrorist attack may be the event that marks the tran sition from peace to conflict or war. Combatting terrorism is a factor to consid er in all military plans and operations. Combatting terrorism requires a continu ous state of awareness; it is a necessary practice rather than a type of militar y operation. Detailed guidance for establishing an organizational program to com bat terrorism, including preventive and protective measures and incident respons e planning, can be found in Joint Publication 3-07.2 (1993). Terrorism is a crim inal offense under nearly every national or international legal code. With few e xceptions, acts of terrorism are forbidden in war as they are in times of peace. See, for example, the Hague Regulation of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 19 49. TERRORISM DEFINED The DOD definition of terrorism is "the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological." This definition was carefully crafted to distinguish between terrorism and other kinds of violence. The act of terrorism is defined independent of the cause tha t motivates it. People employ terrorist violence in the name of many causes. The tendency to label as terrorism any violent act of which we do not approve is er roneous. Terrorism is a specific kind of violence. The official definition says that terrorism is calculated. Terrorists generally know what they are doing. Their selection of a target is planned and rational. T hey know the effect they seek. Terrorist violence is neither spontaneous nor ran dom. Terrorism is intended to produce fear; by implication, that fear is engende red in someone other than the victim. In other words, terrorism is a psychologic al act conducted for its impact on an audience. Finally, the definition addresses goals. Terrorism may be motivated by political , religious, or ideological objectives. In a sense, terrorist goals are always p olitical, as extremists driven by religious or ideological beliefs usually seek political power to compel society to conform to their views. The objectives of t errorism distinguish it from other violent acts aimed at personal gain, such as criminal violence. However, the definition permits including violence by organiz ed crime when it seeks to influence government policy. Some drug cartels and oth er international criminal organizations engage in political action when their ac tivities influence governmental functioning. The essence of terrorism is the int ent to induce fear in someone other than its victims to make a government or oth er audience change its political behavior. Terrorism is common practice in insurgencies, but insurgents are not necessarily terrorists if they comply with the rules of war and do not engage in those form s of violence identified as terrorist acts. While the legal distinction is clear , it rarely inhibits terrorists who convince themselves that their actions are j ustified by a higher law. Their single-minded dedication to a goal, however poor ly it may be articulated, renders legal sanctions relatively ineffective. In con trast, war is subject to rules of international law. Terrorists recognize no rul es. No person, place, or object of value is immune from terrorist attack. There are no innocents. This situation did not always prevail. Throughout history, extremists have pract iced terrorism to generate fear and compel a change in behavior. Frequently, ter

rorism was incidental to other forms of violence, such as war or insurgency. Bef ore the nineteenth century, terrorists usually granted certain categories of peo ple immunity from attack. Like other warriors, terrorists recognized innocents-people not involved in conflict. Terrorists usually excluded women, children, a nd the elderly from target lists. For example, in late nineteenth-century Russia , radicals planning the assassination of Tsar Alexander II aborted several plann ed attacks because they risked harming innocent people. Old-school terrorism was direct; it intended to produce a political effect through the injury or death o f the victim. The development of bureaucratic states led to a profound change in terrorism. Mo dern governments have a continuity that older, personalistic governments did not . Terrorists found that the death of a single individual, even a monarch, did no t necessarily produce the policy changes they sought. Terrorists reacted by turn ing to an indirect method of attack. By the early twentieth century, terrorists began to attack people previously considered innocents to generate political pre ssure. These indirect attacks create a public atmosphere of anxiety and undermin e confidence in government. Their unpredictability and apparent randomness make it virtually impossible for governments to protect all potential victims. The pu blic demands protection that the state cannot give. Frustrated and fearful, the people then demand that the government make concessions to stop the attacks. Modern terrorism offers its practitioners many advantages. First, by not recogni zing innocents, terrorists have an infinite number of targets. They select their target and determine when, where, and how to attack. The range of choices gives terrorists a high probability of success with minimum risk. If the attack goes wrong or fails to produce the intended results, the terrorists can deny responsi bility. Ironically, as democratic governments become more common it may be easier for te rrorists to operate. The terrorist bombings of the New York City World Trade Cen ter and the Oklahoma City Federal Building prove how easy it is for terrorists t o operate in a free and democratic society. Authoritarian governments whose popu lace may have a better reason to revolt may also be less constrained by requirem ents for due process and impartial justice when combatting terrorists. As commanders and staffs address terrorism, they must consider several relevant characteristics. First is that anyone can be a victim. (Some terrorists may stil l operate under cultural restraints, such as a desire to avoid harming women, bu t the planner cannot count on that. Essentially, there are no innocents.) Second , attacks that may appear to be senseless and random are not. To the perpetrator s, their attacks make perfect sense. Acts such as bombing public places of assem bly and shooting into crowded restaurants heighten public anxiety. This is the t errorists' immediate objective. Third, the terrorist needs to publicize his atta ck. If no one knows about it, it will not produce fear. The need for publicity o ften drives target selection; the greater the symbolic value of the target, the more publicity the attack brings to the terrorists and the more fear it generate s. Finally, a leader planning for combatting terrorism must understand that he c annot protect every possible target all the time. He must also understand that t errorists will likely shift from more protected targets to less protected ones. This is the key to defensive measures. THE TERRORISTS Terrorists are inspired by many different motives. Students of terrorism classif y them into three categories: rational, psychological, and cultural. A terrorist may be shaped by combinations of these. Rational Motivation

The rational terrorist thinks through his goals and options, making a cost-benef it analysis. He seeks to determine whether there are less costly and more effect ive ways to achieve his objective than terrorism. To assess the risk, he weighs the target's defensive capabilities against his own capabilities to attack. He m easures his group's capabilities to sustain the effort. The essential question i s whether terrorism will work for the desired purpose, given societal conditions at the time. The terrorist's rational analysis is similar to that of a military commander or a business entrepreneur considering available courses of action. Groups considering terrorism as an option ask a crucial question: Can terrorism induce enough anxiety to attain its goals without causing a backlash that will d estroy the cause and perhaps the terrorists themselves? To misjudge the answer i s to risk disaster. Recent history offers examples of several groups that had ap parently good prospects for success which paid the price of misjudging reaction to terrorism. In the early 1970s, the Tupamaros in Uruguay and the ERP (People's Revolutionary Army) and Montoneros in Argentina misjudged a hostile popular rea ction to terrorism. They pushed the societies beyond their threshold of toleranc e and were destroyed as a result. The same is true of several groups operating i n Turkey in the late 1970s and, possibly, several Mafiosi families in Italy in t he 1990s. Psychological Motivation Psychological motivation for terrorism derives from the terrorist's personal dis satisfaction with his life and accomplishments. He finds his raison d'etre in de dicated terrorist action. Although no clear psychopathy is found among terrorist s, there is a nearly universal element in them that can be described as the "tru e believer."2 Terrorists do not even consider that they may be wrong and that ot hers' views may have some merit. Terrorists tend to project their own antisocial motivations onto others, creating a polarized "we versus they" outlook. They at tribute only evil motives to anyone outside their own group. This enables the te rrorists to dehumanize their victims and removes any sense of ambiguity from the ir minds. The resulting clarity of purpose appeals to those who crave violence t o relieve their constant anger. The other common characteristic of the psycholog ically motivated terrorist is the pronounced need to belong to a group. With som e terrorists, group acceptance is a stronger motivator than the stated political objectives of the organization. Such individuals define their social status by group acceptance. Terrorist groups with strong internal motivations find it necessary to justify t he group's existence continuously. A terrorist group must terrorize. As a minimu m, it must commit violent acts to maintain group self-esteem and legitimacy. Thu s, terrorists sometimes carry out attacks that are objectively nonproductive or even counterproductive to their announced goal. Another result of psychological motivation is the intensity of group dynamics am ong terrorists. They tend to demand unanimity and be intolerant of dissent. With the enemy clearly identified and unequivocally evil, pressure to escalate the f requency and intensity of operations is ever present. The need to belong to the group discourages resignations, and the fear of compromise disallows their accep tance. Compromise is rejected, and terrorist groups lean toward maximalist posit ions. Having placed themselves beyond the pale, forever unacceptable to ordinary society, they cannot accept compromise. They consider negotiation dishonorable, if not treasonous. This may explain why terrorist groups are prone to fracturin g and why the splinters are frequently more violent than their parent group. The Jewish experience in Palestine is a classic example of splintering. In 1931, Haganah B broke from Haganah; in 1936, Irgun Svai Leumi split from Haganah B; a nd in 1940, Lochamei Herut Israel, or the Stern Gang, broke from Irgun. Each suc cessive group was more rigid and violence-prone than its parent.

The psychodynamics also make the announced group goal nearly impossible to achie ve. A group that achieves its stated purpose is no longer needed; thus, success threatens the psychological well-being of its members. When a terrorist group ap proaches its stated goal, it is inclined to redefine it. The group may reject th e achievement as false or inadequate or the result of the duplicity of "them." N icaragua's Recontras, The Basque ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, "Basque Fatherland and Liberty"), and many Palestinian radical groups apparently suffer from fear o f success. One effective psychological defense against success is to define goal s so broadly that they are impossible to achieve. Even if the world proclaims th e success of a political movement, the terrorists can deny it and fight on. Cultural Motivation Cultures shape values and motivate people to actions that seem unreasonable to f oreign observers. Americans are reluctant to appreciate the intense effect of cu lture on behavior. We accept the myth that rational behavior guides all human ac tions. Even though irrational behavior occurs in our own tradition, we seek to e xplain it by other means. We reject as unbelievable such things as vendettas, ma rtyrdom, and self-destructive group behavior when we observe them in others. We view with disbelief such things as the dissolution of a viable state for the sak e of ethnic purity when the resulting ministates are economically anemic. The treatment of life in general and individual life in particular is a cultural characteristic that has a tremendous impact on terrorism. In societies in which people identify themselves in terms of group membership (family, clan, tribe), there may be a willingness to self-sacrifice seldom seen elsewhere. (Note, howev er, that American soldiers are less surprised at heroic sacrifice for one's mili tary unit; the difference among cultures is in the group with which one identifi es.) At times, terrorists seem to be eager to give their lives for their organiz ation and cause. The lives of "others," being wholly evil in the terrorists' val ue system, can be destroyed with little or no remorse. Other factors include the manner in which aggression is channeled and the concep ts of social organization. For example, the ambient level of violence is shaped by the political structure and its provisions for power transfer. Some political systems have no effective nonviolent means for the succession to power. A cultu re may have a high tolerance for nonpolitical violence, such as banditry or ethn ic "turf" battles, and remain relatively free of political violence. The United States, for example, is one of the most violent societies in the world. Yet, pol itical violence remains an aberration. By contrast, France and Germany, with low tolerance for violent crime, have a history of political violence. A major cultural determinate of terrorism is the perception of "outsiders" and a nticipation of a threat to ethnic group survival. Fear of cultural extermination leads to violence which, to someone who does not experience it, seems irrationa l. All human beings are sensitive to threats to the values by which they identif y themselves. These include language, religion, group membership, and homeland o r native territory. The possibility of losing any of these can trigger defensive , even xenophobic, reactions. Religion may be the most volatile of cultural identifiers because it encompasses values deeply held. A threat to one's religion puts not only the present at ris k but also one's cultural past and the future. Many religions, including Christi anity and Islam, are so confident they are right that they have used force to ob tain converts. Terrorism in the name of religion can be especially violent. Like all terrorists, those who are religiously motivated view their acts with moral certainty and even divine sanctions. What would otherwise be extraordinary acts of desperation become a religious duty in the mind of the religiously motivated terrorist. This helps explain the high level of commitment and willingness to ri

sk death among religious extremist groups. TERRORIST ORGANIZATION Terrorists organize to function in the environments where they carry out their a cts. Organizational details are situation-specific. There are, however, a few ge neral organizational principles. Because terrorists must operate in a hostile en vironment, security is their primary concern. Security is best served by a cellu lar structure in which members do not know and cannot identify more than a few o f their colleagues in the event of capture or defection. Defection is rare in mo st groups; defectors or even dissenters are frequently killed or maimed. Yet, te rrorists are not immune to human weaknesses. Unless they are united by a charism atic leader, terrorists are affected by group dynamics that produce both problem s and opportunities for security forces. Opportunities arise because internal di ssension causes security leaks; problems arise because operational patterns may change as different factions prevail. Terrorist groups that are not supported by a government usually create a support structure of sympathizers and people who have been coerced into helping them. T he support structure may comprise active and passive members. It furnishes the a ctive terrorists with logistic support, intelligence, dissemination of propagand a, recruiting, and money. Terrorist recruitment and training are, predictably, security-sensitive. Among g roups that are not ethnic-based, the usual sources of recruits are high school a nd college students who show commitment to the cause. Ethnically based terrorist groups recruit new members personally known to them, people whose backgrounds a re known and who often have family ties to the organization. Intelligence penetr ation of organizations recruited in this way is extremely difficult. Terrorist training varies considerably. Those with military experience or who ha ve received prolonged training at sophisticated facilities are the equals of mos t state security forces. At the other end of the spectrum are "throw away" opera tives who get little more than inspirational talks before being activated. Typic al training includes instruction in the use of small arms and explosives along w ith intelligence collection and indoctrination in the group's cause. Contemporary terrorist actions include the traditional assassinations, bombings, arson, hostage-taking, hijacking, kidnapping, seizure and occupation of a build ing, attacks on a facility, sabotage, and perpetration of hoaxes. Newer categori es of operations include ecological terrorism and the still largely potential "h igh-tech" terrorism using nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and ma terials. Target selection considerations are equally diverse but include the tar get's value in terms of its contribution to group goals, its accessibility given group capabilities, and the purpose of the attack, such as to gain attention, c ollect resources, eliminate a threat, or demonstrate a capability. All these fac tors are reflected in the group's organization and training. COMBATTING TERRORISM PROGRAM Combatting terrorism involves two sets of actions to oppose terrorism: antiterro rism (defensive measures) and counterterrorism (offensive measures). Antiterrori sm is defined as "defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individ uals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces." Counterterrorism involves those offensive measures t aken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Counterterrorism programs, whi ch will not be addressed here, are classified and addressed in various national security decision directives, national security directives, and contingency plan s. This publication addresses only antiterrorism.

Combatting Terrorism and the Principles of Stability and Support Operations The principles of stability and support operations offer guidance about the rang e of combat and noncombat operations in peace and conflict. In the following par agraphs, these requirements for success are applied to various aspects of combat ting terrorism. Objective The general objective of combatting terrorism programs is neutralizing terrorist groups. As in most stability and support operations, neutralization in this con text means rendering the source of threat benign, not necessarily killing the te rrorists. In antiterrorism, the objective can be further refined as preventing a ttacks and minimizing the effects if one should occur. It includes any action to weaken the terrorist organization and its political power and to make potential targets more difficult to attack. Counterterrorism includes spoiling action, de terrence, and response. Unity of Effort As in all stability and support operations, interagency action is required to co mbat terrorism. Unity of effort requires ways to integrate the actions of variou s responsible agencies of the US and foreign governments. Intelligence is partic ularly important and sensitive. International cooperation in combatting terroris m has advanced to the point at which it is not unusual for a deployed US Army un it to interact with several US government intelligence agencies which, in turn, are interacting with multiple international systems. An Army unit is also likely to have close intelligence relations with host country military and civilian ag encies. Unfortunately, it is easier to prescribe unity of effort than to achieve it. In circumstances where multiple police and intelligence agencies have vague and ove rlapping charters and jurisdictions, friction is bound to occur. As in other asp ects of stability and support operations, the solution lies in negotiation and c onsensus-building. Fortunately, experience has proved that cooperation at the lo cal unit or installation level is relatively easy to obtain. Legitimacy Legitimacy is not usually a problem in combatting terrorism since the right of s elf-defense is universally recognized and, as indicated above, terrorist acts ar e crimes in peace, conflict, or war. Security forces might bring their legitimac y into question by failing to distinguish between those perpetrating, aiding, or abetting terrorism and others who might sympathize with their cause but do not engage in violent acts. Failure to consider proportionality can also tarnish the American image of legitimacy. An overreaction that results in the avoidable dea ths of hostages while security forces are attempting to neutralize terrorists, f or example, raises questions of judgment as well as the legitimacy of the undert aking. Patience and Perseverance Patience and perseverance are the hallmarks of successful programs to combat ter rorism. In any country or region, there are few terrorists relative to the popul ation. Identifying and capturing them is difficult and entails tedious police an d intelligence work. It is filled with frustration. Antiterrorism efforts are al so low-key and inglorious, requiring patience and running contrary to American c ulture. Perhaps the most irritating aspect of defense against terrorism is that success is hard to identify. For example, if there is no incident, it may be bec ause the defensive measures are effective. On the other hand, it is equally like

ly that the terrorists never intended to attack in the first place. Rarely will success be measurable, but defensive efforts must continue. Restraint Restraint is necessary to both objective and legitimacy in the context of combat ting terrorism. Premature action against individuals, for example, can be counte rproductive if it interferes with developing intelligence in depth that might ne utralize an entire terrorist group. Similarly, overreaction, such as imposing se vere populace and resource control measures, can undermine legitimacy and unnece ssarily irritate the civilian populace. Security Security is the most obvious requirement in combatting terrorism. Terrorists rel y on surprise and the victim's confusion at the time of an incident. Antiterrori sm involves physical security, operational security (OPSEC), and the practice of personal protective measures by all personnel. Commanders and staffs must plan their response to terrorist threats and incidents. Combatting terrorism is an as pect of force protection and is the responsibility of commanders at all echelons at all times. Properly planned and executed, the Army antiterrorism program wil l reduce the probability of surprise while discouraging attack by raising the ri sk to the attackers. In combatting terrorism, intelligence is extraordinarily important. The essentia l elements of information (EEI) differ somewhat from those normally found in tra ditional combat situations. In addition to the terrorists' strength, skills, equ ipment, logistic capabilities, leader profiles, source of supply, and tactics, m ore specific information is needed. This includes the groups' goals, affiliation s, indication of their willingness to kill or die for their cause, and significa nt events in their history, such as the death of martyrs or some symbolic event. The specific EEI are particularly important because most terrorist groups are i nterested in symbolically significant targets rather than in targets that would be operationally more damaging to US forces. For example, a communications cente r is operationally significant, but a terrorist interested in publicity to influ ence US policy might find a few off-duty personnel or a motor pool more appealin g and probably less protected. Unless terrorists' specific interests are known, predicting the likely target is pure chance. US POLICY FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM Until the 1980s, the US government, like most other Western governments, conside red terrorism to be primarily a police matter. The seizure of the US embassy in Teheran and subsequent car and truck bomb attacks on our facilities in Lebanon f orced us to reevaluate that position. Current US policy regarding terrorism enco mpasses acts against Americans at home and abroad. The United States considers all terrorist acts criminal and intolerable and cond emns them without regard for their motivation. The United States will support al l lawful measures to prevent terrorism and bring perpetrators to justice. We wil l not make any concessions to terrorist blackmail because to do so will merely i nvite more terrorist actions. (No concessions does not mean no negotiations.) DOD has identified five threat levels to standardize reporting. They are based o n terrorists' existence, capability, intentions, history, targeting, and the sec urity environment. The five levels are described below: Critical, which means that a terrorist group has entered the country or is able to do so. It has the capability to attack and is engaged in target selection. It s history and intentions may or may not be known.

High indicates that a terrorist group exists which has the capability, history, and intention to attack. Medium describes the same conditions as high except that intentions are unknown. Low is a situation in which terrorist groups exist and have a capability to atta ck. Their history may or may not be known. Negligible describes a situation in which the existence or capability of terrori st groups may or may not be present. Threat levels are not the same as threat conditions (THREATCON); the latter are a matter of command decision that implements countermeasures. THREATCONs and actions to implement them are described in AR 525-13 (1992), Join t Pub 3-07.2 (1993), and DOD Directive 2000.12 (1990). TERRORISM IN THE FUTURE Political violence will characterize the last years of this century and the earl y decades of the twenty-first century. One prominent form will be the practice o f terrorism. The universal availability of weapons, explosives, and technologica lly sophisticated timing and triggering devices, along with the global communica tion revolution, adds to the terrorists' capabilities. Increased capabilities in clude coordinated, nearly simultaneous attacks in several countries, fax death t hreats, and comparison of target lists by computer. Concurrently, intrastate con flicts, political uncertainty, and growth of ethnic challenges to the administra tive state are weakening the states' security capabilities. Coupled with the inc reasing porosity of state borders, these trends are making it easier for the ter rorist and his supporters to move anywhere in the world with little chance of be ing apprehended or even identified. Future terrorism is likely to include higher than ever levels of violence. Hijac kings, kidnappings, and drive-by shootings will continue, but their shock effect has decreased with familiarity. Since terrorists need publicity to inspire fear , familiarity causes them to seek more unusual events that capture and hold publ ic attention. The March 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City may be typical of future terrorist attacks. If the bombing had gone as planned by the perpetra tors, there might have been thousands of deaths. There was also a conspiracy to attack symbolic landmarks, including the Holland Tunnel and the United Nations h eadquarters, in and around New York that would have affected thousands of people and caused millions in property damage. It is not difficult to imagine the psyc hological effect of these types of attacks on the U.S. public. Although technology aids in the defense against terrorism, it also provides terr orists with increased opportunities. Terrorists can operate in cyber space to de stroy or manipulate information for their own purposes. Skilled "hackers" with t errorist intent can access all but the most secure data banks, stealing or chang ing information, or destroying it. This gives them the potential, for example, o f manipulating the stock market for their own profit or to precipitate inflation or depression. There is evidence of large-scale counterfeiting of American curr ency to purchase weapons. This could cause serious economic disruption. Access t o police and other security files can keep terrorists one step ahead of their go vernment opponents. Terrorists can follow the example of Iraq's Saddam Hussein and create ecological

disasters by starting fires and causing chemical spills. For example, the fores ts of the American Northwest are vulnerable to arson. Seeking more spectacular a ttacks, terrorists may poison water supplies or blow up dams and levees. Chemica l weapons have become increasingly powerful and easy to produce. Triggering devi ces have become more sophisticated. The potential for using weapons of mass dest ruction, including biological and nuclear material, exists. Parallel to these ominous developments favoring the terrorist is a disturbing tr end to resort to violence for an ever-widening range of causes. Terrorism is pra cticed on a global scale in support of criminal business initiatives, various so cial issues (for example, environmental and antiabortion extremists), ethnic con flicts (ranging from US street gangs to conflicts in Central Africa and South As ia), religious interpretation, traditional political power struggles, and insurg encies. Combined, these factors bode ill for the future and demand the attention of military commanders. US military personnel will continue to be targets for terrorists for the same re ason they have in the past. Collectively and individually, they symbolize US pow er. While no one will challenge the United States on the conventional battlefiel d in the foreseeable future, terrorist acts are likely to be the preferred form for expressing hostility toward the remaining superpower. Relative to the other forms of political violence, terrorism remains cheap and successful regarding li mited objectives and carries low risk to the perpetrator. The activities that ar e likely to engage US military personnel in the near future occur in situations favorable to terrorism. These include peace operations; humanitarian assistance; and foreign internal defense where governments have failed, ethnic conflict pre vails, widespread banditry exists, and weapons are readily available. Terrorism constitutes a threat in all stability and support operations. The depl oyed forces' good intentions will not preclude terrorist actions to thwart US na tional objectives. An effective antiterrorism program will reduce the likelihood of successful terrorist attacks but only if it is so deeply instilled that it i s habitual.

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