Murder in Dacca: Ziaur Rahman's Second Round Author(s): N. M. J. Reviewed work(s): Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.

13, No. 12 (Mar. 25, 1978), pp. 551-558 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4366470 . Accessed: 28/11/2011 02:47
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SPECIALARTICLE

Murder

in

Dacca

Ziaur Rahman's Second Round

N M J

The past decade in South Asia has been a deterioratingone in terms of the conditions of political imprisonment,both in respect of the numbers of those-incarceratedand the quality of prison facilities. This is the reality in nearly all the countries in the subcontinent. But Bangladesh has grimly distinguished,itself from all others in the past year. Ziaur Rahman has opened an ugly breach. Mass executions of the imprisonedordered by the central authority of the state is something repugnantlynew. The executions in Bangladesh must not only be condemned, but must also be comprehended within the rapidly shifting political alignments that are developing inside Bangladesh and in the external relations of that country.
report in its story was of more interest than what it did. On February 10 1978, The Washington Post ran a rather interesting story entitled "Bangladesh Executions: A Discrepancy". The Post's reporter singled out Banigladesh as a primne example of the deep gap in credibility between America's 'official observations' and actual reality. Wrote The Post: In its long-awaited human rights report released yesterday, the State Department quoted the regime in Dacca as having executed 37 rebels following an abortive coup attempt last October 2.... However, in a confidential cable to the State Department on January 19, the charge d'affairs of the US Embassy in Dacca wrote 'as has been reported in several channels, our best estimate, drawn from sources available to the embassy as a whole, is that 217 military personnel were executed in the aftermath' of the coup attempt. Charge d'affairs Alf E Bergesen also reported that 'we think it is possible that 30-34 of these may have been executed prior to formalisation of military courts".This supported reports by journalists in Dacca that forces loyal to President Ziaur Rahman had slain large numbers of suspected rebels without bringing themn before courts-martial! According to The Post report the confidential American Embassy cable was leaked to the newspaper by a State Department source "who said he believed the Department would 'try to cover up human rights violations' in Bangladesh". The Post commented, "Why the State Department should attempt such an alleged cover-up isn't clear".
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S REPORT

The Mass Executions

THE headline in the Bangladesh Times of February 11, 1978 was a placid one. It was datelined Washington DC and read: "The Human Rights Situation In Bangladesh Has Improved". Just four months after the first official mass executions that have been known in this century in South Asia, one might have been excused if one thought someone in Washington were making a macabre joke about firing squads and hangmen's ropes. But indeed, the US State Department's observations were front page material in Bangladesh, and a much-needed pat on the back for Major-General Ziaur Rahman's martial law regime. The American report is the result of a 1976 amendment to the Foreign Security Assistance Act known as '502B'. Each year the US State Department must now report to Congress ori human rights practices in countries to which the United States provides military aid or security 'assistance. Bangladesh joined the American military aid list after Mujibur Rahman's overthrow in August 1975. The object of the American liberals who originally framed the '502B' amendment had been to ensure that American aid was not used to foster repression and torture within the countries it is provided to. Ile established quarters of American diplomacy and military strategy have not been highly enthusiastic about the new amendment. According to one press comment from Washington, "State Department professionals privately admit they hate the idea. But law is law." What the Bangladesh Times failed to

International released a detailed study of conditions in the country. The Ame, rican 'professionals' should no doubt study it. To read the two human rights Ireports in tandem one might wonder if they were actually referring to the same country. Other than Cambodia, Bangladesh is the only country in Asia, where in the past year mass executions were alleged to have taken place. The comparative attention in press and government circles, particularly the glossy coverage of the Western media, has been, to put it mildly, sensationally unbalanced. Amnesty International's report on Bangladesh opens its review by expressing deep concerned over the recent wave of executions: After 2. October 1977, at least 130, and perhaps several hundred, military inen have been executed following trial by martial law tribunals for alleged involvement in abortive military uprisings which occurred in September/October 1977. Amnesty International is gravely concerned about these executions, particularly in view of the absence of legal safeguards in the military trial procedures, as described in this report [trials are held in camera without the right of appeal to any court of law]... The government has confirmed that, of those sentenced to death, 37 have been executed for being involved in the attempted coup which took place in Dacca on 2 October 1977. As of 26 October 1977, 55 were reported awaiting execution for being involved in a similar coup attempt which took place in Bogra on 30 September. Although their execution has not yet been officially confirmed, observers in Bangladesh believe that they have now also been executed inside Dacca Central Jail by hanging and in Dacca cantonment by firing squad. According to recent reports, executions have also been carried out in Comilla Jail. 551

In the Bangladesh case the discrepancy between the American description and the actual reality was highlighted on February 27 when Amnesty

March 25, 1978 In view of its*serious concern about the situation in Bangladesh, the Secretary Generai of Amnesty, Martin Ennals, made a special journey to Dacca to in late Decemiiber discuiss the execuof tions, and the imnplementation measuires recommended to the Dacca authorities in an Amnesty Mission report submitted six months previously. Ennals met Major-General Ziaur Rahman. According to the report, "The Secretary General received an assurance from the President that executions of those accused of having been involved in the September and October attempted coups had ceased, but was not given any figure of the total number of executions which had been carrie(d out since these events." The AnmnestyReport goes on to state: In spite of these assurances, Amnestv Internationalhas strong reasons to believe that exectutions of military men for alleged involvement in the attempted military coups we're still continuing, at least until the Secretary General's visit in December, and Al received, for example, reliable reports that 15 executions were carried out in Comilla during December 1977. The government did not deny the executions ' when the Secretary General of Al raisell these reports with the government 'during his visit. Amnesty International also believes that the number of executions is consideralbly higher than the figure of 37 given by the government. Following the Secretary General's visit, Amnesty International received a list, dated December 1977, of names of 129 military personnel executed for alleged involvement 'in the abortive coups following summary military trials. In some cases, the executions allegedly took place without any form of trial. According to these reports, the 129 were among several hundreds of prisoners executed after the recent coups. The same sources stated that 27 pemsons had been sentenced to death and were awaiting execution. In a cable of 19 January 1978, the Secretary General expressed profound concern at reports alleging that hbudreds of military men hiad been executed since 2 October and that executions were continuing. He said: 'If reports are true, they would be in contradiction to your personal assurance given me on December 30.' The Secretary General appealed for a statement from the President confirming that death sentences were no logger being passed, but no such assurance has vet been received 'from the government, nor were the reports by Amnesty International denied. Although Amniesty is only prepared to say "at least 130, and perhaps several hundred" have been executed, some informed sources in Dacca have
552

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY put the figure as high as seven hundred. There is no way to confirm an accurate figure. One description circulating in Dacca in typewritten from alleges that executions were carried out on telephonic orders from Army Headquarters. No documents are being kept for fear of future accountability. In one instance at Dacca Central Jail detained soldiers were said to have been awakened late in the night and told to pack up. They were told orders had come through for their release. A general atmosphere of jubilation spread through the cell block, as jawans gathered up their belongings and were led to the front jail gate. There it is ieported they confronted an Army officer and a special paramilitary force. Death sentences were suddenly read out, and amidst near hysterical cries that their lives be spared, jawans were taken off and hanged seventeen or eighteen at a time. Throughout, according to the report which also lists the names of those hanged that night, "the authority remained cool and composed amidst the cries and wailings of the soldiers being hanged". There are other stories circulating in Dacca of soldiers in firing squads being arrested for refusing to shoot when ordered. No newspapers dare print any of this, and therefore, an authoritativ4econfirmation within the country's press is impossible to find. nestly stated that it "welcomed the release of political phisoners under the amnesties, and hoped that more political prisoners, against whom there is no evidence of involvement in criminal charges, would be released hy similar measures". The report noted, however, that "although there have been substantial releases, many other political prisoners were arrested in the period following, the mission [April 1977], their arrest rarely being reported in the press". The Amnesty document states: After the mission Amnesty International received reliable reports that, members of the National Awami Partv (B), the former Awami League, the East Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), and the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal have been arrested. And, on 14 October 1977, shortlv after the attempted coups, the government ordered the banning of three major political parties, the latiyo Samajtantrik Dal, the Democratic League, and the Bangladesh Communist Party, accusing them of attempting to infiltrate the armed forces and to incite violence.... So far, the government has not produced anv evidence to substantiate the reasons given for the banning of these parties, but three of their leaders, Moni Singh and Mohammed Farhad of the Communist Party, and Shah Moazzam Hossain of the Democratic League, have been subsequently arrested under the provisions of the Emergenev Power Rules, without charge. Observers have reported that manv arrests have been made amwag members of the banned,parties since the Dacca and Bogra events, but these reports, have -as yet not been confirmed. In view of these reports, Amnesty InAernationalbelieves there is no ground to revise its estimate of the number of nolitical prisoners. Amnesty estimates that as of April

On March 5, 1978 The Sunday Times of London reported: _ About 600 servicemen have been executed in Bangladesh since October in a bloodbath only partially exposed by last week's Amnesty International report on the violation of human rights. Amnesty said 'at least 130, and perhaps several hundred 1977 there were between 10,000 and military men have been executed' 15,000 political prisoners in Banglaafter two abortive uprisings against desh. It bases its figures on a number General Ziaur Rahman, the military of sources including an article in the ruler of Bangladesh last autumn. This was in addition to 230 report- Bengali daily Ittefaq of February 19, ed killed in the uprisings. But a for- 1977. Ittefaq stated that the vast mamer senior air force officer told The jority of the Bangladesh prison populaSunday Times that more than 800 tion is held without having been tried. servicemen were convicted by military tribunals - in some cases little At the time of the article there were more than kangaroo courts - after estimated to be more than four times the uprisings in Bogra on September as manv prisoners "awa'iting trial" in 30 and Dacca on October' 2, About as "convicts". The paper 600, mostly from the air force were Bangladesh executed bv firing squad or hanging reported that of 36,685 inmates of the 56 jails in Bangladesh (prison capacity in Dacca. The Amnesty Report noted on other is designed to hold a maximum of nmattersthat the government since as- 14,000 prisoners) anly 6,842 are consuming power had declared a series of victs, the rest - 29,843 - are being partial amnesties umder which 6,500 held 'awaiting trial'. The Amnesty Redetainees had been released. These port states that "although the source is are mainly prisoners who had been im- of informationp not revealed in this prisoned during the Mujib regime. Am- article, when contacted the Inspector

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY General of Prisons did not contradict the Jttefaq figures. Amnesty International was told by usually reliable sources that perhaps between one-third and one-quarter of all prisoners 'awaiting trial' are held in connection with political activities." Many observers of the Bangladesh situation conisider Amnesty's figures highly conservative. A November 1977 story in The Guardian of London reported that Ittefaq in a recent article had stated that the number of prisonners held in the country had risen to 53,000. Amnesty is believed to have been cautious in its Bangladesh estimates, since last year it found itself on the high side in West Bengal regarding the numbers of Naxalite prisoners. The organisation, however, proved highly accurate in its all-India estimates of detentions during the Emergency. The Bangladesh government, when it bothers to say anything on the matter, has attempted to dismiss the issue with patently ridiculous answers. The Amnestv Report recounted the following incident: Home Secretary Mr Salauddin Ahbmedinformed the Amnesty International delegation during the mission that there were 2,000 political prisoners held without trial in Bangladesh. Amnesty International understands that these are prisoners held in preventive detention under the provisions of the Special Powers Act or the Emergency Powers Regulations. But, apart from this, many political prisoners are held on charges punishable under emergency legislation or martial law without, however, being tried. When asked, the government did not supply Amnesty International with figures of the total number of political prisoners so held.
'LEGALITY' UNDER MARTAL LAW

March 25, 1978 conclude that the trial fell far short of international standards and consequently finds it impossible to accept the findings of the court". In other words, by any cannon of law or precedure Taher's execution was illegal. The Amnesty Report states: 'Special Martial Law Tribunal No 1' opened on June 21, 1976 to try Colonel Abu Taher and 32 other military and civilian men on charges of attempting to overthrow the government of Bangladesh and of incitement of the armed forces towards mutinv. Most of the accused were connected with the, Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal (Nationalist Socialist Party) (JSD) oi its military wing, the Biplobi Gono -Bahini (Revolutionary People's Army), organisations which, according to press reports, played a major role in the November 1975 events in the armed forces which installed the present government in power. On July 18, 1976, Colonel Taher was sentenced to death, two accused were sentenced to life imprisonment and 14 others to variouis jail terms, whilst 16 others were acquited. The execution of Colonel Taher took place four days later in Dacca Central Jail, on July 21, after an appeal for clemency had been refused by the President (there being no provision in law for appeal to any legal authority). The execution took place after a trial which Amnesty International considers to have been held under the most unsatisfactory circumstances. It has been confirmed to Amnesty International during its visit that, as of June 21, 1976, when the trial started, none of the accused had been able to meet his lawyer. The trial was held in camera inside Dacca Central Jail, under rules which do not comply with the ordinary provisions laid down in the Piocedural Code. Moreover, the lawyers had to operate under an oath of secrecv (and still are) not to disclose anything9 learned in the course of or in connection with the trial proceedings. It has already been pointed out that there was no possibility for legal redress against sentence, including the sentence of death. In the absence of any possibility of assessing the legality of the convictions by way of ptblic sources, Amnesty International asked for a transcript of trial procedures in the Special Martial Law Tribunal No 1. However, Aninesty International was told these could not be made available. Amnesty International is disturbed that it cannot verify most serious reports received by the delegates during their visit that convictions of the accused were reached solely on the basis of evidence given by seven codefendants who had turned state witnesses. According to these reports, this evidence was used in a way not in compliance with the ordinary rules laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, if these reports ar, correct, the accused couldl never

The Amnesty Report focuses a large proportion of its discussion on the operations of Bangladesh's Martial Law Tribunals. Any person living in Dacca today is familiar with the long lists of accused persons ordered by public notice in newspapers to surrender to the authority of the tribunals. In the press declarations no charges are ever specified and in most instances all tribunals hold their sessions in secret. The justification for the tribunals given to the Amnesty delegates by Tobarak Hossain, the Bangladesh Foreign Secretary, was that they provided "a speedy' means of trial". Hossain "explained that the ordiriary procedures applying under criminal law were detailed and time consumimingz did not meet the and specific requirements existing under

martial law". Amnesty, in distinction to Tobarak Hossain's theory of justice, expressed its concern over "the curtailment of procedural rules, since they contain changes in the rules of evidence and procedure which are conceived under ordinary criminal law as safeguards to ensure a fair trial for the accused". There are two types of martial law courts functioning in Bangladesh. The first type are 'Special Martial Law Courts' which consist of three 'judges', two of wvhembelong to the armed forces and are officers not below the rank of colonel. The other member must be a magistrate. The Special Martial Law Courts which frequently try civilian political cases have the authority to award the sentence of death. The second type of tribunals are the 'Summary Martial Law Courts' which have one sitting member, either a magistrate or an army officer not below the rank of major. Sentences of up to five years are handed down by these boards. Once a prisoner has been charged under mnartial law regulations the right to habeas corpus no longer exists. Moreover, there exists no appeal against any verdict passed by a martial law couirt. Amnesty expresses its anxiety at the "acquiescen9e of the legal profession which appears to cooperate fully with the martial law courts. It is surprising that so many nmagistrates should be prepared to participate in this form of trials, which are so widespread". The Amnesty Report expresses further its "grave concern" at the operation of what are known as the 'Special Martial Law Tribunals'. Only two have ever been convened and the first concerned the secret trial and execution of the leading military figure of the JSD (Socialist Nationalist Party) Colonel Abu Taher, in July 1976. Taher had played a leading role in the general uprising and soldiers' mutiny which shook the country on November 7, 1975. Taher was executed on July 21, 1976. His became the first political execution in Bengal in over forty years. It thus became the first round of death under Ziaur Rahman's regime and a prelude to the mass executions that have now occurred. In its extensive review of the case Amnesty concludes that Taher and those accused with him "could never have been convicted if their trial hiad taken place before an ordinarv criminal couirt. Under these circunstances, Amnesty International has to

March 25, 1978 have been convicted if their trial had taken place before an ordinary criminal court. Under these circumstances, Amnesty International has to conclude that the trial fell far short of international standards and consequently finds it impossible to accept the findings of the court. It trust that no further trials under this procedure will be instigated and urges the government to consider granting a re-trial of those tried under the special martial law tribunal procedure, before an ordinary' criminal court, where normal legal safeguards apply. The Amnest:y Report expressed furcher concern about the fact that when the Dacca High Court acts independently and orders the government to release prisoners, who according to the court are being held "illegally", the authorities have refused to carry out releases. Amnesty cites three reported examples of prisoners ordered by the court to be set free who were rearrested at the jail gate. They were Nur Alam Ziku, Organising Secretary of the JSD, Khalequzzaman, President of the Chanpur District JSD, and Mesbaduddin Ahmed, Joint Secretary of the JSD. Since the Amnesty Report was written the Dacca High Court on February 14, 1978, ordered for the second time in six months the release of Shahiahan Siraj, former General Secretary of the JSD, and President of the Bangladesh Workers League, who had been arrested on November 23, 1974 under the Mujib regime. Siraj had been the man who read out Bangladesh's Declaration of Independence on March .X, 1971 at a mammoth meeting in central Dacca at the height of the autonomy movement. The court declared once again that his detention was illegal and ordered his release. Most legal observers in Dacca doubted, however, if the government would obey the law. IThe Amnesty Report summed up the paradox of "legality" under martial law when it stated: The existence of martial law in Bangladesh implies in itself that normal system of government has The fact that broken down... there are thousands of political prisoners (the majority of them held without trial), the functioning of martial law courts without appeal, the possibility that such trials can be held in camera, the severe restrictions in force on the applicability of habeas corpus and the right to bail are all examples indicating that present government is still far from upholding the rule of law. If., any notion of democratic legality had become ridiculouls in Bangladesh,
N.MA

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY life was quickly approaching the realm of the absurd when, last August, the authorities announced they were intending to bring the detained JSD leadership to trial on charges of overthrowing the govemment by force. The absurdity was 'that the trial would not be for attempts to overthrow the present government, but for an alleged attempt to overthrow the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1974. What is so extraordinary about the whole affair is that the men who are presently in power, a great many of whom - such as Mabubul Alam Chashi, A M S Safdar, and others - played critical behind-the-scenes roles in the coup which overthrew Mujib, are now in an act of near comediy intending to put the JSD leadership on trial for the act, when in fact most of the JSD leaders were in prison at the time of Mujib's downfall. The new charges derive- from an incident which took place on March 17, 1974 in which the JSD organised a hunger march on Mujib's Home Minister's house. They were protesting against rising prices and demanding action on the emerging famine conditions that soon starved over 50,000 peasants. The demonstration was broken up when Mujib's Indiantrained paramilitary force, the Rakkhi Bahini, opened fire killing nearly thirtv demonstrators. The JSD leaders present at the demonstration were arrested and many of their detentions date from that day. Having failed to establish any grounds to deny writs of habeas corpus before the civilian High Courts which are ordering the release of JSD, prisoners, Ziaur Rahman's Home Ministry'has descended to the level of complete legal nonsense in attempting to rehabilitate charges first instituted by the Mujib government, but never acted on by it. The Amnestv Report states: Particularly doubtful is the reliability of new charges made against leaders of the JSD, already serving long prison terms after having been convicted by a special martial law court. According to The Bangladesh Times of August 21, 1977, 24 persons, including leaders of the JSD, have beeni charged with offences punishable under the Special Powers Act and the Penal Code for making 'inflammatorv, seditious and prejudicial speeches inciting the audience to take up arms to overthrow the government by force' on March 17, 1974. This charge relates to an event which took place more than three years ago, under the Sheikh Mujibiir Rahman adminis0tration.Since the then government did not itself take anY legal steps for prosecution at the time, Amnesty International seriously questions the validity of prosecution of a political nature by a later administration, more than three years after the event took place. In conclusion the Amnesty Report expresses its concern for the security and safety of political prisoners. It mentions, in particuilar,the incident at Dacca Central Jail on June 22, 1977. According to a report in the Far Eastern Econiomic Review of August 26, 1977, 3,000 inmates out of a total of 5,000 were injured in the "massive and bloody free-for-all". A commission was set-up headed by the government's
favourite commission head, Justice,

A F M Ahsanuddin Chowdhury, Although the official press declared at the time the commission's report would appear by July 31, 1977, more than six months after the prison incident, no report has appeared. Nevertheless, justice Ahsanuddin has been appointed head of yet another commission to inquire ino the facts and causes of the military rebellions in Bogra and Dacca in October. No one seriously expects a document from the last of Zia's "lost commissions". The latest juridical non. exercise follows the failure of a similat
commission of inquiry to report on the

killing of four of Mujibur Rabman's cabinet ministers who were bayoneted to death in their cells at Dacca Central Jail on the night of November 4, 1975. According to the Amnesty Report this commission has "not been allowed to convene". Amnesty concludes its report summarising allegations of post-arrest treatment of prisoners. It reviews accusations of beatings and the use of burning cigarettes during periods of interrogation, particularly those which occur at National Security Intelligence (NSI) interrogation centres and in Dacca Cantonment. It mentions specifically the JSD leader, Sirajul Alam Khan, who "according to reliable reports, during his prolonged interrogation had been deprived of food, drink, and sleep". In February 1977 the organisation cabled Major-GeneralZiaur Rahman expressing concern about the deteriorating health of the JSD leader. The Amnesty Docu-, ment reminds the Bangladesh authorities of the United Nations' "Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners". The past decade in South Asia has been a deteriorating one in terms-of the conditions of political imprisonmenst

both in respect of the numbers of those tary staff college at Dehra Dun. How<incarcerated and the quality of prison ever, as economic conditions deteriorat facilities. This is the reality in nearly ed in Bangladesh in the period 1972-74. all the* countries in the subcontinent. Bengali nationalism grew and came to But Bangladesh has grimly distinguish- blame India increasingly. When Mujib ed itself from all others in the past was killed, all military links were broyear. Ziaur Rahman has opened an ken with India and the Rakkhi Bahini ugly breach. Mass executions of the im- was disolved. Into top positions in the prisoned ordered by the central autho- Bangladesh police, intelligence agencies, rity of the state is something repugn- and Hlome Ministry moved men with antly new. One can only hope these historically strong links to the United stop, or that those responsible will States (through the US office of PubXwill thenmselvesbe stopped by the more lic Safety), Britain, and Pakistan. In lucid and courageous among their own 19371niany had been accused of active collaboration with the Pakistan Army. countrvynen. Dormant anti-communist internal security programmes'which had existed II during the days of East Pakistan were The Political Dimension quickly 'revived. First on the agenda The executions in Banigladesh which was a ?720,000 British grant to develop the Amnesty Report has brought to Bangladesh's police telecommunications. light must not only be condemned, but Prior to 1971, the Americans had been must also be comprehended within the heavily involved in the constrpction of rting po4,*tical alignments a complete provincial police telecomrapid:ly s;hi that are developing inside Bangladesh munications grid in East Pakistan as and in the external relations of the part of their Office of Public Safetv country. The Washington Post made a (OPS) AID Programme in the country. somewhat naive statement in its expose The OPS programmewas dismantled by of the discrepancy between the official the US Congress in 1973/74 after the State Department's 'human rights' re- CIA Director William Colby acknowledged in a letter to the US Senate port and the American government's actual knowledge of firing squads, when Foreign Relations Committee that the with OPS conit asied: "Why the State Department Agency had worked tacts "for the purpose, of obtaining should attempt such an alleged coverThe up is not clear." For anyone who stu- foreign intelligence infprmation". dies the question the answer is not Senate study of OPS concluded that the programme had developed such such a mystery. that The fall of Mujib brought a qualita- close ties with local security forces inevitably the United States bad betive shift in Bangladesh's international alignment away from the Soviet and come -"politically identified with police Indian axis which had vigorously sup- terrorismi"in the recipient countries. Abourezk introducing the ported the national independence strug- Senator Jamnes amendment which abolished the progle following the Pakistani crack-down to in March 1971. The new regime under gramme declared the object was cease the United States making "reKhondakar Mustaque Abmed and subpressive regimes even more repressive". sequently Ziaur Rahman swivelled the country's international orientation toBRITISH MILITARYMISSION words; the American and the British governments in the West. and secondWhere the Americans left off in East arily towards the Islamic bloc, princi- Bengal, the British have more than pally Saudi Arabia, in West Asia. It still picked up the slack. New Congressional remains an uncertain and open ques- restrictions made it impossible for US tion of what involvement apy of these security and military services to operate governments had in Mujib's overthrow. in ways they had done prior to 1971, What is clear is that immediately although Bangladesh Army officers have after Mujib's dlemise important internal resumried training programmes at US security, telecommunications, and mili- bases as of 1976. Parliament in Britain tary training programmes which had has passed no similar legislation equibeen linked to the American and British valent to the Abourezk Amendment in governments prior to independence were America. In July 1977 an eight-man Brisuddenly resumed. These had remained tish military advisory team commandsuspended during Mujib's regime. Mujib ed by Colonel T A Gibson arrived in had accepted Indian military assistance Dacca. Th1e ostensible object of ffie in setting up his special paramilitary Gibson Mlissionis to set up a Military reserve known as the Rakki Bahini. Staff College at Savar outside Dacca. Bengali officers in the Rakkhi Bahini tThis is where Indian military advisors Bahini in 1972. wzeresecretly trained at the Indian mili- trained Mujib's Rakkhwi

eJtent

What is generally not known is the of opposition which existed insi(le- the Bangladesh Armed Forces to allowxingthe Gibson Team into the couintry. The rebellions in September and October are believed to have been in part connected to objections to the British Military Mission. Of the 'Twvelve Demands' which constituted the principles of the Soldiers' Mutiny of November 7, 1975 the "complete abolition of British colonial practices within the armed forces" had been one of the fundamentals of the uprising. Now xwithina year and a half of the revolt a, British' military training mission was seting uip permanent shop in Bangladesh. The more serious objections to the Gibson Mission was that its main alleged purpose was not training but military intelligence. Gibson and other members of his unit are described in Bangladesh army circles as senior mnenbersof the British Anmly's'Special Air Services' Brigade.; The SAS is the crack couinter-insurgency unit of the British Army. It is the lagacy of Robert Thompson's Malaya Emergency strategy and continues on active operations in Oman, Malaysia, and Northern Ireland among other places. Ex-SAS members have .tuirned up in Afirica as mercenaries in the Angolan civil war and in the Rhodesian Army. "The November 1975 uprising took the Western countries by complete surprise here" says a vell-informed Bengali. "They realised how poor their intelligence was, having historically based it on [West] Pakistan conitacts. Within the government and the armed forces it is generally believed, and privately discussed, that the real purpose for the British Military Mission is to prepare dossiers for Western intelligence on the entire officer corps forces and the Bangladesh Army in particular. They want to know when Zia falls, who can be the next proWestern Ayub Khan. But they also want to be able to spot any Marxists like Abu Taher. They want to know wvho is politically reliable. You can't do that sittinigin London or in an office in the Pentagon. Computers will not tell you. Persopal contact might." On December 20, 1977 The Guardian's South Asia Correspondent, Simon Dacca Winchester, reported from ("Where Britain May Be Aiding an Armed Dictatorship"): Considerable opposition is I;eing voiced in Bangladesh to a number of British government aidl programmes which critics say are helping to reinforce suppression of political opposition to General Ziaur Rahman's military dictatorship. In particular, Brutish assistance 555

March 25, 1978 now being given to the Bangladesh police force and army, as well as Britain participation in a controversial development programme in a remote hill region near the Burmese border, have been singled out for criticism. In all cases opponents of the schemes protest that instead of helping the poor people of Bangladesh, the British government is helping to support a regime which practises detention without trial, summary execution and suppression of free speech, as often as not directed against the people the Western governments should be trying to help. The aid programmes whichl are at the focus of the storm are not by Bangladesh aid standards especially large. One worth ? 750,000 is an Overseas Development Ministry project to give the national police force of Bangladesh radio communications. Marconi, the contractor, is setting up a series of VHF stations that will enable the police in all parts of the country to be in touch with national HQ here in Dacca. The second plan cost the British government almost nothing, but is seen as symbolic of what critics call 'the British sense of priorities - law and order first,-real aid second". Eight senior British military officers - six soldiers (incluiding one colonel in the SAS), a sailor and an air force officer - are on loan to the Bangladesh government to set up an officers' staff college north of the capital.... 'The problem is that for' too long the Western media have portrayed Bangladesh as a nation ofifamine and floods', said the official of an international or-ganlisation. 'But it should also be remembered that for the past two years this has been a country ruled by a peculiarly tough military dictatorship. There are thousands of people in political prisons. More than 255 people have been executed, since the attempted coup of last October.' The senior officer of an English aid organisation agreed, 'Britain s6ems to have this obsession with law and order. It seems to think that unless you have a police force that can be mobilised at the flick of a switch, or army that is well up on contemporary counter-insurgency techniques, there is no point in pouring out money' for food or shelter or clothing. Well -we disagree. Food for the hungry is truly vital. Radios for the police and roads for the army can come later. At least the taxpayers in England should have a chance to decide.'
FOREIGN INVESTIMENT IN NATURAL GAS

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY ral Motors assembly unit in Chittar gong, a few pharmaceutical multinationals, insurance, banks, and the old colonial tea estates, foreign investment was almost non-existent and totalled less than 30 million dollars. Now American investors are contemplating what will be their largest foreign investment in the entire South Asia sub-continent. In asset value it will be greater than all American investments in India and Pakistan combined, It is no drop in the bucket and its political and military implications within Bangladesh are enormous. First news of the matter was made public last spring when it was announced that International Systems and Conti ols Corporation of Houston, Tegas (USA) was negotiating an 800 million dollar investment deal to exploit Bangladesh's extensive natural gas reserves. The American company was reported to have finalised arrangements to sign an agreement with Dacca's Martial Law authorities for the construction of a massive Liquefied Natural Gass (LNG) complex to export gas from the Bakhrabad fields. Bangladesh has known reserves of 30 trillion cubic feet of high quality gas with over 94 per cent hydrocarbon content. International Systems which through subsidiaries is involved in LNG plants in Colombia, Venezuela, and Algeria intends to export the gas to American West Coast and Japanese markets. The obstacle to a final go-ahead on the nmtain ambitious investment scheme is the American investors' uncertainty of the internal security and political situation. They want to be confident that no ra%lical regime will come to power and nationalise what will be one of the largest and most profitable investments in Asia. Some observers in Bangladesh are talking of the possibility of an Indonesian style "crackdown solution" to the dilemma. The most recent executions are seen as only a prelude to what might develop. The arrival of the British Military Advisory Team headed by the SAS Colonel Gibson are seen by a number of Bangladesh Marxists as not unrelated to securing a confident "stable" envir;onment agreeable to foreign investing interests. The British are deeply involved.along with the Americans in the proposed investment schemes, and Callaghan's New Year's journey to Dacca was financially of much greater importance to British interests than the much better publcised visits to India and Pakistan. The correspondent of Financial Times travelling with Callaghan reported from Dacca ("UK likely to help Exploit Bangladesh Natural Gas", January 6): The prospect of a, major UK involvement in the exploitation of the rich natural gas fields of Bangladesh appears to be much closer following further 'talks between Mr James Callaghan and President Zia. Talks involving the British Gas Corpora, tion and a major private company are well advanced. The Prime Minister has promised his maximum backing on his return from Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. A senior official of British Gas's International Cknsultancy Service is expected to fly to Dacca for fuirther negotiations later this month. Tle ICS subsidiary is involved in a num-ber of gas projects overseas.... Apart, from exploration and exploitation 'schemes it is hoped that an ambitious proposal will be developed which would entail the ordering from British yards of around six tankers to export the natural gas to the West Coast of the US and to
Japan.... The value of the vessels

Against the background of these various deveopments a highly significant event has emerged on Bangladesh's foreign investment from which has been almost totally ignored. At the time of independence in 1971 there w,as almost no foreign capital investmcnt in the country. Outside a Gene556

would depend on size, but could easily be in the 450m area - four times the value of the recent Polish order. The Polish order has been, widely viewed in British financial and press circles to have been the one event last year which saved British shipbuilding from virtual bankruptcy. The proposecd Batigladesh order would mean a shortterm boom. On January 7, Finanqial Times Energy Correspondent reported "British Companies Chase Bangladesh Contracts"): British equipment suppliers could be in the runing for a- large share of $660 m (? 350) worth of gas processing contracts in Bangladesh, according to engineering consultants bidding for a major stake' in the project. They have told Mr James Callaghan that UK, Companies are in a good position to help Bangladesh exploit its important gas reserves. The prospect of major UK involvement in the exploitation of'Bangladesh's rich natural gas fields is said to 'be much closer following the Prime Minister's discussions with President Zia during his visit to the, Indiail sub-continent. Consultants for International Management and Engineering Group, which is .negotiating a multi-million pound contract' with the Bangladesh government has told Mr Callaghan in a letter that as much as $660 m could be spent on a gas ' gethering and transmission Fystem, gas liquids treatment' facilities and a loading terminal. It was suggested that hal, of this money might be spent on materials . and eauipment which could be supplied from the UK providing the terms and delivery dates were satisfactory. British. Steel could

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY be a major contender for much of cannot simply choose between Army the materials, it is understood. The Command and Presidential power. He Prime Minister has also been told must retain supreme power and has that opportunities exist for contractors to become involved in construc- now long passed the point where he tion work and for British banks to can simply return to the barrocks as help with financing. the obedient soldier. This was the professed hope he expressed in November WEST'S SEARCH FOR A SUHARTO 1975 when he said, "I am not a poliBut the crucial developments on tician". But now, too many have been which all these ambitious investment hanged for such a casual withdrawal schemes ultimately rely is the internal from the arena. Zia now has too many political situation and the man concern- enemies with. blood debts against him. ed is Major-General Ziaur Rahman. He can only. go forward in the hope of The issue now for the West is. whether building up a political base on which he can become Bangladesh's General to survive., Suharto, the Indonesian military figure Thus, on February 22, 1978, Zia's whose American backed counter-coup new political organisation the 'New ended in the massacre of an estimated DemnocraticParty' (Jatiyatabadi Ganohalf-million members of the Indonesian tantrik Dal) known as JAGODAL was Communist Party (PKI), and securely registered under the Martial Law opened the country to the Pertamina Political Parties Regulation Decree, of oil export boom' of the next decade. A 1.976. This is Ziaur Rahman's equivanumber of Western observers see an lent of Ayub Khan's Convention Muslim Indonesian style solution as the only League under whose banner Ayub ran answer to Bangladesh's' radical tradi- for President in Pa'kistan's well regutions. Whether Ziaur Rahman is the lated elections of 1965. Bangladesh is nmanfor the job is the question. scheduled to go to the polls in DecemAfter the October 2, 1977 military ber 1978 unless the elections are -once uprising in Dacca, Zia appeared on again postponed or cancelled due to Bangladesh televison visibly shaken. It mutiny. is said in Dacca that fighting reached The present debate between those his-own quarters the night of the reparties still pennitted' legally -to opebetlion and that he barely escaped. rate has taken the form. of aq argument What followed was the mass wave of over the format elections should take. executions of all presumed and actual A number of parties such as the Natioenemies. Politically Zia was tottering. A fresh infusion of support and a nal Awami Party (Bhashani) led by clearer sense of direction was needed, Mashiur Rahman have demanded the if he had to survive. Within a month repeal of the 'Fourth Amendment' of of the revolt it was announced he the CQnstitution as the first step towould form his own political party. He wards the return to deftiocratic rights also inducted six new advisers into his in the country. The Fourth Amendnient cabinet. These are men who will be was the device Mujib used to transform the Parliamentary system into a crucial to his political future. The formation of a party was some- Presidential one in January 1975, when thing Zia had equivocated over for he assumed the office of President and months. His reluctance was due to sub- put the country under a state of emerstantial pressure from, within the Army. gency. At a meeting in Dacca on February His Army colleagues had told him he the must become a civilian, if he intended 21, 1978, com'memorating martyrs of to be a politician. Many officers and the 1952 Language Movement,,Mashitur rank-and-file jawans were clearly of Rahman of NAP (B) called for an early the opinion that he must choose: be- decision on elections wvhich would come a politician and resign from the establish the sovereignty of Parliament. Army Command, or' remain Chief-of- Rahman also called for an open corinStaff, and cease being a politician, nitmnenton the government's part that arranging for a rapid transition to elec- would guarantee the restoration of tions and civilian government. Much fundamental rights and open 'political of the Army had opposed the farcical campaigning well before the elections. '90 per cent plus' referendum Zla held lIe criticised those arguing for the in May to temporarily legitimise his continuation of a Presidential - systenm, position. Many officers and soldiers re- saying, "A presidential system, partiportedly felt it lowered the prestige of cularly the system. of electing the the Army in the country. president directly by the people's vote But this was and still is the contra- is not appropriate as it involves huge dicXtionZia isi unable to resolve.- He campaign expenditures which no can-

March 25, 197S didate other than the one at the highest position of Government or a rich businessman can afford". The NAP (B) is part of a loose coalitioni of parties which ipelude Ataur Rahman Khan's Jatiya League, General M A G Osmany's Jatiya Janata , Party, and Kazi Zafar Ahmed's Untied People's Party. All this have also, condemned the fact that they are' confined to 'legal' indoor meetings while government ministers and members of JAGODAL are stumping the country holding -open rallies. But this is an old stoty. Unless. significant pressure from below develops, it seems likely Zia will keep the 'Fourth Amendment' intact, and run for President in much the same style he carried out his stagemanaged referendum. The General and his backers are in dilemma. If he opens the situation 'upto a fair' democratic election, releases political prisoners, lifts the-ban on major parties, frees the press from current censorship, and: competes on equal terms, not only mnighthe lose, but he could very well lose control of the situation. On the other hand, if he stages a well-managed and rigged election, he may guarantee short-term survival, but ctherwise he will have certainly stigmatised himself as Baiigladesh's new 'Ayub Khan'. And a dictatorship much like Ayub's will be inherently explosive. At the opening press conference of Zia's new party, JActODAL, on February 27, 1978 the Vice-President of Bangladesh, Justice Abdus Sattar. laid out the party's manifesto. Sattar, the elderly juridical grandfather of the current regime, is th- man who has drafted every Martial Law Regulation and Decree since fiat style authority became the order of the day. Sattar is now the Party Convener of JAGODAL. The main point of Sattar's press conference was to declare, not surprisingly, that JAGOiDALstood -for the presidential fQrm (f the state. An interesting report on this question in The Bangladesh Times of Febrtuary 1978 revealed more than 28, the said official press usually does these days. The paper reported: Asked how could the JAGODAL opt for a presidential system when the people of the country had 'rejected' 'the Ayub regime and also the Awami League when it went for such a system, Mr Justice Sattar said, 'Avub Khan was not directly elected as president as we have suggested. The Awami League's presidential form of government was also different because it was based on a one party system.' When a newsman pressed with the question, if the peoplpeof the coun-

March 25, 1978

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY ces and a sustained inflow of remittances from abroad from skilled and professionals of Indian origin, have introduced a new dimension.
GROWTH OF ORGANISED INDUSTRY

try had not rejected the presidential tial Law Regulation '512'. But the messystei in favour of a parliamentary sage was clear: There will be no Parform of government, he said, 'that we liament of any meaning, and our milishall know when the presidential tary President-you can take it-has elections are held'. The Bangladesh Vice-President coild, already been elected. This too is an old of couirse, have answered, "Look, you story. And one wvhich mixes as nicely ask ain intelligent question, I'll gIve you with a billion dollars of natural gas exa ridicuLlousanswer.' Of ccurse, be ports as it has done with bananas elsedidn't. That is not allowed under Mar- where.

THE IDUSTRIAL AND CREDIT INVESTMENT CORPORATION LIMITED OFINDIA

Speech of the Chairman Shri H T Parikh
TIRE year 1977 was a turning point to deal with supply problems, should for the country's pattern of growth they arise in some sectors, is better since planning commenced in 1951. In than ever before. the new development strategy, which FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR GROWTH is on the anvil, not only is the growth While good monsoons have contriobjective to be pursued with renewed buted significantly to large agricultuvigour but it is to be mbre effectively ral output, there is sufficient evidence intertwined with employment. In conto suggest that productivity is consonance with a time bound programme tinuously increa?ing. The productivity for eradication of unemployment gains axe being realised on account of adopted by Government, employment infusion 6f improved inputs such as intensive activities such as agriculture fertilizers, pesticides, high yielding and rural development are to receive seeds, irrigation, credit and 'extension e special emphasis in the country's services. planning. Now that technological change is Generation of a large number of job opportunities in the process of growth, permeating through this sector and a is not a new objective of policy. But productivity base is established, its in the past, as the rate of growth in absorptive capacity has consideriably national income only marginally ex- enhanced. This augurs well for the ceeded population growth, the problem new growth strategy which envisages of unemployment continued to worsen. a major injection of funds - 40 per Therefore, for effectively tackling the cent during the Sixth Five Year Plan - in the agriculture and rural secproblem 'hf unemployment, the immediate task before Government is to take tors. Good prospects for growth in measures fDr a sizeable step up in the agricultural incomes and employnient rate of growth. While. formplating po- are of special impQrtance for the inlicies for an overall expansion, along dustrial sector. They open up new with agriculture and small sector, or- possibilities for its growth, both in ganised industry will have to be assign- terms of supply of wage goods and ed its due role. Only an integrated raw materials and as end-user of and balanced dlevelopment of these in- manutactured goods. Likewise, a steady increase in exterdependent sectors can form the basis of a long-term growth strategy for a ports, particularly of non-traditional items and product-wise and regioncountry like India, Although the transition from a weak wise diversification in exports, has supply position to a build-up of opened up a new sector to be devebuffer stocks of foodgrains and foreign loped further for sustaining growth in exchange has led to monetary expan- production and investment. On the resion, there is a reasonable stability in sources side, improved operational the overall level of prices. With a efficiency of many of the basic indusfavourable turn in the balance of eco- tries, including industries in the pubnomic forces, Government's capability lic sector, new finds of energy resour558

i?i?i

However, despite availability of indigenous and imported raw materials and spares, productive capacity in several industries and many manufacturing units remains underutilised. For the industrial sector as a whole, new investment activity has yet not fully responded to the changed situation. During the early phase of planning, public sector investment in socio-economic overheads and the process of import substitution all along the industrial sector, in capital goods, intermediate and consumer goods industries, provided impetus to investment. The situation has changed over the years. Despite increased resource mobilisation by Government through' taxation, its ability to step up investment was constrained because of rising non-development expenditure. With a virtual completion of the phase of import substitution in a wide spectrum of industries, fresh investment opportunities from this source were also on a decline.

In areas where there was scope for new investment to meet the rising demand, such as in the case of cement, fertilisers, paper, etc, economic viability ot new as well as existing investment was impaired,- to a large extent, because of price and distribution regulations. In addition, industrial projects had to bear costs attendant to objective of other policies such as industrial 'licensing, backward area d4velopment, fiscal and other policies designed to attain multiplicity of -objectives. Not that in a developing, economy' social objectives such as diffusion or ownership, disper sal of industries and so on can be overlooked while formulating economic policy. But it has to be recognised that the pursuit of these policies entails economic, costs. Though statutory price controls have been relaxed or lifted in some cases, the market situation has become competitive and there is only a subdued growth in demand. In other industries, such as sugar, cotton textiles and paper, where regulatory measures continue, in the existing market situation it has become increasingly difficult to absorb losses arising from prices stipu: lated for controlled output.